exclusively that is to say one and but one only The Apostle otherwise had made use of a very uneffectual argument to prove what he had propounded For he rebuketh those who unadvisedly did pass their judgments either on the persons or the deeds of other men as the invaders of their Rights Who art thou saith he who Dost judge another As if he should have said dost thou know thy self what thou art and what thou dost It doth not belong to thee to thrust thy sawcy Sicle into the harvest of another man much less boldly to fling thy self into the Throne of Almighty God If already thou are ignorant of it then know that it belongeth to him alone to judge of the Consciences of men to whom alone it doth belong to impose Laws upon the Consciences of men which none can do but God alone 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is but one Law-giver It is observable that the Apostle doth ascribe unto God alone the power of saving and destroying from whence we frame the second Argument He only hath power over the Consciences of men either for command or prohibition who hath power with unmerited Rewards to crown the well-doers and with just punishments to torment the transgressors but it is in the power of God alone the onely Law-giver to give Rewards and Punishments according to the quality of every conscience Therefore he alone hath a right and privilege over the Consciences of men X. It is thus proved again in the second place He who alone knoweth the internal motions of the Conscience he only hath the power of prescribing a Law unto them for the Law doth neither determine or judge of things unknown But unto God alone the searcher of the heart the internal motions of hearts and Consciences are discovered Therefore he alone hath the power of imposing a Law upon the Consciences which may oblige them From hence it is that the Laws of men do only bind the external motions of the body to an external Conformity from the knowledge and command whereof all internal motions and several hammers that strike upon the clocks of the mind and Conscience are altogether to be exempted And upon this account it was that not only holy men and endued with the knowledge of the true God such as were the three Captive young men amongst the Babylonians in the third of Daniel and the seven brethren of Maccabeus but many wise men amongst the Heathens did deride the threatnings and torments of Tyrants as exercising their violence not so much upon themselves as upon the outsides only and on the subburbs of them But let us consider what our Saviour Jesus Christ did think himself of these thing◠and what Counsels he prescribed to his Disciples concerning them Fear not them saith he that kill the body and after that have no more that they can do upon you but fear him who after he hath killed hath power to cast into Hell yea I say unto you fear him Luke 12. 3 4. As if he should have said Tyrants by the permission of God have power upon the Bodies but upon the Souls and Consciences of men they have no power no right at all the Laws can neither ordain nor afflict any punishment which doth belong to the inward man God hath only the prerogative of the Soul and Body and for the neglect of their duties can afflict punishments on both and condemn the whole man to everlasting torment XI In the third place it is proved by the condition and natural estate of the Conscience it self which as before I have expressed is so placed as it were in the middle betwixt God the Will of man as that which is usually and truly spoken of Kings and Emperours may as truly be verified of the Consciences of every man Solo Deo minores esse nec aliquem in terris superiorem agnoscere They are lesse than God only and on Earth do acknowledge no Superior That speech of the Emperour Maximilian the first is very memorable Conscientiis dominari velle est arcem coeli invadere To exercise a domination over Consciences is to invade the Tower of Heaven He is a plunderer of the glory of God and a nefarious invader of the power that is due unto him whosoever he is that shall claim a right to the Consciences of men or practice an usurpation over them Let the Bishops of Rome and the Canonists and the Jesuits who do flatter and cringe unto him all others take heed that they be not guilty of this so great a Sacrilege I would also have those admonished who do so submit their Consciences to the power of any creature which ought only to be subjected to God himself to be carefull lest whiles they conferre the Honour of that service to the creature which is due unto God alone they make a God of the Creature which at least is interpreted to be Idolatry From this first Conclusion thus proved there followeth this remarkable position That the proper Rule of Conscience is that which God the supreme Law-giver hath prescribed to it and besides that Rule there ought no other to be admitted XII The second Conclusion followeth which is That the next and most immediate Rule of Conscience although it be neither the Adaequate or the supreme Rule is that light with which the mind at that instant is endued 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Socrat ap Stob. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Joh. 1. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nazian Orat 15. And this is the same light which some do call the light of Reason others the Law of the mind and which the Schoolmen following the Philosophers do call right or rectified Reason This is first proved by some places out of the word of God as Luke 12. 57. Wherefore even of your selves do you not judge that which is right They are the words of our Saviour as if he should have said You have the light within you infused into your minds from that true light which enlightneth every man comming into this world by the help whereof unlesse you will be wanting to your selves you can distinguish what is straight from what is crooked and what is just from that which is unjust The Text Rom. 2. verse 14. and 15. is very remarkable Quum Gentes quae legem scriptam scilicet non habent naturâ ea quae sunt legis faciunt Seeing the Gentiles who have not the Law viz. the written Law do by natue perform those things which are of the Law to wit they practice the Acts of Justice Prudence Fortitude and Temperance and of all other Virtues These men having not the Law are a Law unto themselves for they show the works of the Law written in their hearts their Consciences giveing witnesse thereunto and their thoughts either accusing or defending them By which words it is manifest that in the particular Acts of Testifying accusing and defending and in whatsoever Acts that already are committed by any
written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be
my Judgment In the first place therefore I say That he who de facto is chief Magistrate in a City or Nation although he hath attained to that power by evil Arts is neverthheless to be esteemed by the Citizen as his lawful Prince and by the obligation of his Conscience he is accordingly bound to obey him provided there be no just cause of any doubt to the contrary And in this case this seems to be the only and just cause of doubt when most certainly it is manifest or at least when it seems very probable to the Citizen that there is some other person to whom the chief power is due by greater right If this be not so the Citizen cannot in a good Conscience refuse the commands of the present Possessor For ordinarily it doth not belong unto a Citizen too curiously to enquire by what right the possessor doth possesse it may suffice him for the security of his Conscience that he doth possesse de facto and there is no other man at least so far as he knows who ought by right to possesse that place And besides that which I have already spoken concerning the Roman Emperors the Government of that Common-wealth being subverted to this the whole History almost of all the Kings of Israel doth pertain many of whom relyiug not so much as on the least shaddow of Right but having obtained the Kingdom by unjust Arms and nefarious wickednesse the Royal off-spring of their Predecessors being utterly extinguished that not one of them might remain to succeed in their Fathers Dignities did ascend the Royal Throne and governed the Kingdom by a full and as it were a proper Power and the people rendred obedience to them no otherwise than if they had been invested in it by the greatest right Neither do we find that the people were ever blamed for it But right reason rather perswaded that it so ought to be done For it concerned the publick safety that there should be one who should sit at the Helm of Government and it could not otherwise be better provided for the affairs of his people and himself than that he should be esteemed to have the greatest right who as a true possessor had no right at all And by the Law of Nations those things which belong to none do passe into the right of the present possessors of them XV. In the second place I say That in an Hereditary Kingdom where the right is doubtful betwixt two or more Competitors it is the part of a good Citizen whiles the contention is yet depending and the right to be descerned by a friendly treaty or by war to obey him as his lawful Prince who is in present possession of the Soveraign command Of this Histories can every where afford us very many examples amongst those which are most remarkable are the many differences which happened amongst the competitors of the Kingdom of Portugall after the death of King Sebastian And the six contestations at least for the Kingdom of Scotland after the death of Alexander the King And the most fierce and lasting contention for the Government of the English Nation between the most noble families of York and Lancaster Most certain it is by the consent of all nations throughout the world that the Law did alwayes favour the Person possessing And in these Cases that remarkable saying of the Civilians always prevailed In rebus dubiis melior est conditio possidentis In doubtful things the condition of the Possessor is always the better XVI But again the lawful Prince and Heir of the Kingdom being forced away by the Power of Arms or being so oppressed that he cannot prosecute his own Right If any person whatsoever the said Prince yet living shall violently take into his own hands the Reigns of Government and deport himself as a King when he is more truly an Usurper so that now it is no longer a doubtful right but an open injury If you demand of me what a good Ciâ—â—zen shall do in this condition who peradventure hath taken the Oath of Allegiance in the bâ—halâ— of his lawfull Prince or if he hath not yet he is no lesse indutyed to him than if he had taken it I say in the third place that a good Citizen may not only lawfuly obey the Laws of him who Governs de facto and not de jure that is by present power and not by right and perform all his commands provided there be nothing in them that is uniust or foul but according to the condition of humane affairs there may be such an exigence of necessity as oftentimes it so comes to passe that he may be adjudged to fail even in his duty if he doth not do it It may be objected that but even now it was said that Laws made by one who hath no lawful power do not oblige in Conscience It was so said indeed and it was truly said so and I believe what I have now proposed is not repugnant to it For suppose that a Subject be obliged to perform what by the Law is forbidden yet he is not bound to the Law but to himself and to his Country The obligation is annexed to that Law which is truly so of it self as it is a Law and it necessarily followeth it as the Effect followeth its Cause We have already said that a Law made by one who hath no right unto the Government is not a Law properly but aequivocally therfore hath no power to oblige Therefore whatsoever obligation doth from hence appear to charge the Conscience of the Subject doth arise from another account and not from the Law it self to whom this obligation comes extrinsecally and only by accident as if a professor of Musick should act the part of a Mason XVII You will demand If not from the Law from whence then proceedeth this obligation of the Subject I answer It being the part of a pious and prudent man not only to attend on that which is lawful but also to observe what becometh himself and is expedient for others A good Citizen may be obliged to do that for the advantage of himself and his fellow-Citizens to the performance whereof he is not upon any account or by any right obliged For this obligation doth arise from that double part of duty by which every man is a debtor to himself and a debtor to his Country In the first place it belongs to a prudent man to provide for himself and for his own affairs and it belongs to an honest man to consider in what present condition he is For no man will deny even by the Dictates of Nature but that all must endeavour by all lawful ways and means to defend their lively-hood and themselves and so to deport themselves that they may live safely and in peace to have and to hold to themselves their own Fields Houses and possessions and be careful not to offend those who at their pleasure can take from them both their lives
much tribute is to be paid What merchandise is lawful and what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in such and such a Country What habits are suitable to such and such degrees in an University What Statutes are dispensable and what not c. I say in the third place that such Lawes doe not oblige by themselves and directly I prove first because that God alone is that Law-maker who hath a most peculiar and direct Command over the Consciences of men There is but one Law-giver who is able to save and destroy James 4. 12. In things of a middle nature which are indifferent which for the most part are the subjects of humane Laws we do suppose that God made no Law in particular but left them all to the arbitration of those who are his Vice-gerents on Earth It is proved thus in the second place because that those things only do oblige directly and by themselves which oblige by reason of the matter as of an internal Cause without any respect to the external Causes the Efficient and the Final which would have obliged of themselves if they had not been commanded by Men But things indifferent and of a middle Nature determined by a particular and positive humane Law when they are so qualified in themselves that before the Determination of them they may freely be made or nor be made by any they doe not oblige in respect of the matter therefore not of themselves I say in the third place that the same Lawes notwithstanding doe oblige in particular by the Consequent and by Vertue of the general Divine Commandement And because in this last position the hindge of the whole controversy is turned I will more plainly propound the Conclusion which by and by I will more fully confirm The Conclusion is this Positive humane Laws being rightly and lawfully constituted which contain particular determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themselves indifferent and which before they are determined are free to be made or to be unmade do by the vertue of of the Divine Commandement by which we are bound to obey those who are set over us by God so oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them that they are bound under the penaâ—ty of moâ—tal Sin and the fear of Gods displeasure to give obedience to the said Laws and if they shall fail in the performance thereof they shall endure the checks and sâ—ings of their accusing CoÌ„sciences XXIV This Conclusion is confirmed by divers Reasons the first whereof is taken from this present Text we must therefore be subjected not only for wrath but for Conscience sake The words in themselves are perspicuous enough In the former verses the Apostle had largely insisted upon the necessity of Christian Subjection which he urged chiefly by two Arguments the one from the Institution and the Ordination of God in the two first verses and the other from the fear of the Punishment of man in the two verses following In the way of recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argument and repeateth them in this fifth verse and as it is very usual in the Scripture in an order inverted beginning the repetition from the latter and the next member As if he should have said A great necessity of Obedience doth lye upon you in both respects whether the fear of punishment may deterr you or the Conscience of the Duty may incite you If you despise the Power and Authority of the Lawes and do evil consider with your selves that the Magistrate who is set over you is the Minister of God the Revenger of your neglected Duty and ready to draw the Sword with which God hath intrusted him to inflict a corporal punishment due to the despisers of his Lawes But if these things move you not being deluded by a vain hope to find out one subterfuge or another to escape the force of his Arm yet think on God the just Remembrancer of aâ—l Acts committed whether they be good or evil stand in awe of him as of a just Judge Fear your own Consciences those severe accusers those faithful witnesses and importunate Tormentors you cannot avoid them by any Artifices not elude them by any Inventions From the scope of this place the Argument is thus framed Those things which being violated do leave a Remorse upon the Conscience do oblige the Conscience for so it must necessarily be that all remorse or reproof of Conscience must proceed from the sense of some obligation as all other effects do follow their causes but humane Laws being violated do leave a remorse upon the Conscience for that is the expreâ—â—e sense of those words in the Text Necesse est subjici propter Conscientiam You must of necessity be subject for Conscience sake you cannot keep your Consciences upright and safe unlesse you be subjected Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Conscience XXV But some there are who to un-nerve the force of this Argument do in this place give another Interpretation unto Conscience and chiefly herein they defend themselves by the Authority of Chrysostome as if no other Conscience was to be understood in this place but a Conscience only of benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the Political Government I have made mention of this heretofore and praysed it for the sense I confesse is pious though not so genuine And I have thus much against it For in the first place amongst the Ancients Chysostome is singular in this Interpretation whom hardly one or two amongst so many Interpreters have followed Theophyâ—act only and Oecumenius excepted Who are not to be reputed in the number of witnesses for they so tread in the footsteps of Chrysostome that all three of them do make only but one witnesse Secondly No place can be aleged in the Scripture in which either St. Paul or any other of the Apostles have made use of the word Conscience in that sense as Chrysostome here doth feign unto himself Thirdly the Apostle in this place as it is very manifest would induce something which should be of more moment and more effectual to stir up the minds of men than temporal punishment for which end it was better to affright them with the fear of the Divine anger than to admonish them of any benefits received from men Fourthly and lastly the Apostle here in a short repetition of those reasons before alleged would conclude his discourse of Christian Subjection now in the two first Verses of this Chapter he did bring the reason not from the Conscience of the benefit but of the duty XXVI The second reason followeth from the use and the end of the Laws It being most necessary that they should be made and observed for the preservation of humane societies in peace and publick tranquillity for otherwise there would be no certain rule of Contracts no measure of Faith and Civil Justice which are the firmest bands of Cities and societies for the natural and the
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
shall be examined and discussed at this time The first doubt is De materia impossibili of a matter in it self impossible concerning which I say in the first place That no Law ought to be made concerning a matter altogether impossible If such a Law be made it is tyrannical and by right null and obligeth no man in Conscience The first reason is because that Laws are made in relation to Acts as to be acted by a man who is a free Agent now liberty speaketh a power unto both but in things impossible there is no such liberty of power as by it self is manifest Secondly No man by right can be obliged to the performance of that the omission whereof cannot be imputed as a fault unto him nor ought to be imputed to him for punishment for every obligation is either to a fault or to a punishment or to both but the omission of a thing impossible cannot be imputed to any man for a fault nor ought it to be imputed to any one for a punishment Ergo c. But that there is no obligation of a thing impossible whether it be impossible by the Nature of the thing or by circumstances Praelect 2. Sect. 12. or any other way hath already by me been proved in my treatise of the obligation of an oath and there is no need of repetition VII I say in the second place A Law which is possible to some but seemeth to any other or to but few or peradventure but to one or two to be impossible may lawfully be made if it be useful to the Common-wealth but not unless there be some extraordinary great cause and a manifest necessity doth require it but being made it doth oblige all those who are able to keep it but not those who cannot keep it as if some great Tribute were commanded for the necessary use of the Common-wealth for the payment whereof some of the Subjects are nothing so able as others Those who are so poor that they cannot pay the sum which the Law lays upon them are not bound in Conscience to do that which they are unable to perform as is already apparent by the proposition above mentioned Neverthelesse they are obliged to make their addresses to those who are over them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nazianz. Orat. 9. Debeone omittere quod possum quoniam quod debeo minime possum Bernard and openly and sincerely and without the least falshood to professe the slendernesse of their Estate and unless they can prevail to be quite exempted from the Law or to procure a remission of some part of the sum with which they are taxed they are to bring into the publick as great a part of it as possibly they can for he who cannot do what he ought to do he yet ought to do what he is able to do VIII The second doubt is concerning a thing commanded by the Law not impossible but very grievous and very burthensome and which the Subject cannot perform without great inconvenience losse danger of life and the ruine of hiâ— whole Estate I say in the first place That in this case the Law-giver if he foreseeth this will come to passe ought to use some caution in the clauses of that Law and as conveniently as he can he is to provide a remedy for this Evil And if it cannot so well be done in the form of the Law it self leâ—t subtile and deceitful Knaves and too much intent to their own profit may thereby find a hole to escape 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Isae â—s ap Stob. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so elude the force of the Law yet what possibly in him lyeth he ought to provide that in the execution of that Law some qualification may be had leâ—t a Law otherwise profitable and necessary may become a snâ—re or a detriment to any honest man I say in the second place That the Subject though so heavily taxed is neverthelesse bound in Conscience to obey that Law although with the ruine of his whole Estate if any evident or necessary Cause for the good of the Common-wealth doth so require For example suppose a hostile Army be invading the Kingdom if a Law be made that all the corn in the Fields for some miles not far from the Shore be spoiled and all the Corn in the Barnes or Ricks which cannot be carried away be burned and that all the Houses in the Suburbs be pulled down and that all the Sluces thereabouts shall be opened and the Fields be drowned every Citizen and Subject is directly bound to obey this Law and cheerfully and willingly to obey the Commands thereof and with the loss of his own goods to redeem the publick safety not only upon that account that his Country being betrayed to his Enemies by his unseasonable parsimoniousness it is sure enough that every private person will be suddenly sensible of the ensuing calamity but especially out of the Conscience of his duty because that every good man is to preferâ— the publick above all private interests I say in the third place That a Subject unlesse some remarkable necessity doth appear or fear of publick danger is ordinarily not obliged to obey a Law that is so extremely burthensome as to bring with it the certain ruine of his whole Estate or the imminent danger of his life But he is bound as generally hath been already spoken and which almost in all cases I would have you to observe that we may need not any more to repeat it to you to make not the least resistance but patiently to endure whatsoever injury or contumely shall be brought upon him by the superiour powers IX The third doubt is concerning things necessary as if the Law of men should command any thing which was necessary before and commanded by the Law of God or forbid any thing which was before unlawful and prohibited by the Law of God What is the obligation in this case I answer briefly That the Subject by this Law is absolutely obliged For first the obligation which was in force before the Law of God doth not hinder the effect of the Law of man by excluding a new obligation for a man by many bonds may be obliged to the performance of one and the same duty as I have already declared in the former Lecture to which reason we may also adde another which is that oftentimes the Law of man doth adde something to the Law of God to wit by determining the Act as to the substance of it commanded by the Law of God and therefore necessary as to the manner quantity or some other circumstanceâ— of it which was free before or by adding some determination to the Law of God prohibiting a thing unlawfull as to the degree of the Crime or the manner of the punishment or the measure of it or other things of the like nature for examples sake it is by Divine right that there should be publick congregations to perform
clear indeed from the fault by reason of his invincible Ignorance which was impossible to be helped and consequently he ought to be free from the punishment which justly is due to no man but for the fault neverthelesse he shall not only sustain the Dammage by reason of the nullity of the Contract which he entred into but he is bound also to sustain it according to Conscience both by the force of obedience which is due unto the Law and by his reflection on the publick profit The like is to be determined in many other Laws of the like nature For examples sake In those Laws by which persons are disabled by which privileges are revoked In those Laws by which Usury is moderated and in those by which certain prices of things to be sold are constituted and in the like of which the Canonists and the Divines do treat at large Neither ought this seem to be unjust to any man for although a Dammage be sometimes called a Punishment it is only analogically and very improperly for otherwise there is a great difference betwixt a Dammage and a Penalty or punishment properly so called If an innocent person be punished a great injury is done unto him but often it comes to passe that an innocent person may be dammaged and yet no great injury done unto him And thus much as conduceth to our present purpose may suffize to be spoken of the promulgation of the Law X. In the next place we are to speak of the penal Law in which many things being omitted which unprofitably are accustomed to be disputed by many of the Casuists and which pertain rather to the external and pleading Courts as that of the Canonists and Papists than to the internal Court of Conscience we shall be contented to give a view unto you of some few and the most remarkable of them and which most neerly we conceive do conduce to the Government of Conscience In this kind we meet first of all with this doubt Whether the Constitution of the punishment doth any wayes pertain to the Essence of the Law I answer It seemeth that it doth not as something that is extrinsecally requisite to compleat the Essence of it so that the Law were not a Law if the penalty were not annexed to it but only consequently as something necessary to this that the Law may effectually obtain the end which it intended For the Form and Essence of the Law consisteth in the Precept of it I here understand Precept as it is largely taken to comprehend a prohibition with it as in the Scriptures are the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and amongst the Divines as well Negative Commandments as Affirmative are commonly called Precepts And from this Precept alone both the powers do depend which we have said to be in the Law viz. the power of directing the Action and of obliging the Consciences of the Subjects For the Subject hath a sufficient Rule according to which he ought to direct his Actions and to the observation whereof unlesse he will be wanting in his duty he is bound in Conscience as soon as he understands that his lawful Superior hath commanded this or that by Law whether there be any punishment annexed to that Law or not Therefore this necessity of annexing the punishment doth not arise from the Nature of the Law it self which consisteth in the meer Precept but that the Precept which of it self would not barely suffice Tatitè permittitur quod sâ—ne ultiâ—ne prohibetur Tert. 1. contra Marcion 26. may with the greater vigour obtain its effect from another double Hypothesis the one of the Subject the other of the End For it is expedient that the Laws should be most religiously observed which is the Hypothesis in respect of the End neverthelesse the inbred Depravity of mans heart being supposed w ch is another Hypothesis in respect of the Subject it can very hardly or almost never come to passe but that the most profitable Laws will be despised either by the negligence or the perversenesse of most men unlesse by fear they are contained within their bounds Qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt solo metu continentur Quintil. 12. Instit who make but a mock of the Dictates of Conscience From this double Hypothesis it comes to passe that the wisest Law-makers have alwayes judged it necessary and saving to the Common-wealth to add more force to the observation of the Laws by the fear of punishments and that after the example of God himself who pronounced not the first Law which he gave to man without the threatning of a punishment Gen. 3. Some good Citizens peradventure whose number are but few induced only by the Conscience of their Duty and their Love unto Virtue and their Country would render Obedience unto the Laws although there were no punishment propounded but the Turba or the greatest number are inforced only by the fear of punishment to the performance of their Duties It is manifest hereby that the Constitution of punishments in the making of Laws is necessary XI The second Doubt is concerning the obligation of the penal Law as to the extension of it whether the penal Law doth oblige only unto the penalty or whether it obligeth unto the fault also Which is to demand if a Subject may so satisfie the Law and his Duty if being prepared to undergoe and by undergoing the penalty constituted by the Law he may be no longer guilty of the Delinquency although he observeth not the command of the Law Or whether for all that he is not bound in Conscience to the performance of that which is by the is Law commanded That more clearly and distinctly we may answer to this doubt it being a Question of great Moment and of which in the Common Lives of Men there is a most frequent use It will not be amisse the better to unfold it to premise some things which are very profitable before hand to be known We are to understand therfore in the first place that that positive Humane Law ought only to be called Penal which by the will of the Legislator doth expresly determine some temporal punishment for the Transgressors of it And in all this discourse as often as mention is made of punishment you are to understand no other but only a Temporal punishment This word Temporal punishment is taken in a twofold Consideration either as 't is opposed to the Spiritual or as it is opposed to Eternal punishment And for the most part in common discourse they are taken as Members contradistinct to one another sometimes Spiritual opposed to Temporal and sometimes Eternal unto Temporal there are therefore three kinds of punishments or if you will you may call them Species or manners of punishments or degrees of punishments For whatsoever comes under the name of punishment is first Either a spiritual punishment as the losse or the deprivation of Grace
obliged to the punishment I mean a temporal punishment for the account is far otherwise of the Spiritual and Eternal punishment For examples sake suppose a man hath committed a fault as he hath told a lye or betrayed the secrets of his friend or hath privately detracted from the good name of his Neighbour for which the Laws of men do appoint no punishment he therefore cannot be punished by man with any temporal punishment neither is it necessary that God should temporally afflict him But that no man may too boldly flatter himself assume unto himself hereby a greater liberty of sinning because he thinks himself free from temporal punishment he ought duly to call to mind that he is nevertheless obliged to a far more grievous punishment which is a Spiritual and an Eternal punishment Both which punishments are so necessarily and so reciprocally conjoyned with every fault that the punishment doth alwayes presuppose a fault going before it for God punisheth no man that deserves it not and at the last the deserved punishment must necessarily follow the fault unless it be prevented by the mercy of God remitting the fauâ—t in Christ by Faith and by Repentance XV. These things thus premised to answer to the propounded Doubt I will inferre some Conclusions And in the first place we must judge How the penal Law doth oblige the Subject in Conscience by the mind and Intention of the Law-maker If it be manifest that there is any certainty of it that is if it be certain that the Law-maker did intend to oblige the Subjects not only to the penalty but to the fault also they are undoubtedly obliged to observe that which is commanded by the Law and do not satisfie their Duty if they are prepared to undergo the Penalty ordained by the Law But if it be manifest that he intended not to oblige them but only to the Penalty it is certain that the Subjects are not bound beyond that Penalty The Reason is because the Foundation or Ground of the Obligation of the Law as elswhere is shewed is the manifested will of the Law-maker invested with a Lawful power Therefore where the Will of the Law-maker which is the adaequate Measure of that Obligation which the Law induceth is manifest we need not to make any further doubt concerning the extent of the Obligation XVI Peradventure you will demand what assurance may suffice that a Subject may be secure in his Conscience that sufficiently he understands the mind and intention of the Law-maker I answer that a mathemat calcertitude which is manifest by Demonstration and impossible to be false is in vaâ—n to be expected in morals by reason of the infinite variety of Circumstances and uncertainty of Humane affairs nevertheless a certain logical certitude may oftentimes be had of the Intention of the Law-maker which is to be collected from the words of the Law it self from which his Intention may so perspicuously appear that there needeth not any further Evidence The mind of the Legislator may be manifested partly by the form and manner of the Precept he enjoyneth and partly by the greatness of the Punishment that is to be inflicted but especially from the Preface of the Law it self in which that it may be more acceptable to the people he useth to declare the causes and reasons that do induce him to the making of that Law as also how just it is and necessary for the taking away of abuses and for the advantage of the Common-wealth From all which being rightly weighed together by comparing of the circumstances it will be no great difficulty for a wise and apprehensive man so to learn the meaning and intention of the Lawgiver and to have such a sufficient moral certitude thereof for in morals a moral certitude is sufficient as to conclude that undoubtedly he intended such a thing in the making of it But if the Subject be not of so great an apprehension and Judgment as duly to examine all the importances of the reasons or if he be afraid since every man is not a Competent Judge in his own Cause left he might interpretate the mind of the Law-giver more favourably on his side than he ought to do it would be his best course if it be a business of so great Importance that it will be very uncommodious or troublesome to him to observe that which by Law is commanded to addresse himself to some man of approved Piety and Prudence and plainly and sincerely to declare his mind unto him and to acquiesce in his opinion and his judgment XVII But because it may be and oftentimes it so comes to passe that after all diligence there can be obtained but little certainty of the mind of the Law-maker from the Law it self or not so much as the Conscience of a good man may safely acquiesce therein We must seek further in so doubtfull a case examine what interpretation we are to follow in so doubtfull a case whether that which is the more large favourable as many will have it or as others the stricter interpretation Martin Navar a man of great authority amongst the Canonists is said to be of an opinion that he thought no penal Law did oblige to the fault by it self but only to the penalty Other Authors have been of another judgment and have taught that every penal Law unless by the mind of the Law-maker it was manifest to the contrary did oblige to the fault also I must confess that the extremes of both opinions have been always suspected by me it may so come to pass that as some have spoken too favourably so others too severely That therefore in a thing So dubious we may have something to follow which is certain let this be the second Conclusion A Law purely penal doth by it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty and not unto the fault I say in the first place a Law purely penal whether it be categorically taken or disjunctively I say in the second place by it self for by accident and by the supposition of a former obligation it may oblige to the fault also for a penal Law is made to that end that Subjects by fear of punishment be compelled to their Duties to which they were bound before by a former Law divine natural or humane so those penal Laws he that killeth a man let him suffer the pains of Death He that transporteth Merchandize beyond the Seas let him either pay the Custom or lose his Merchandize do oblige to the fault so that whosoever shall undergo the punishment shall not clear his Conscience thereby unless he shall obey the precept of the Law but they do not bind so by themselves and by their own virtue but by the force of a precedent obligation that taketh its rise from the command of a former Law For the Subject was obliged before that Law according to our supposition was made both by the Law of God not to commit murder and
by a Law which when it is committed we are not able to punish And thirdly seeing the external operation of good works and the external declination of evil ones doth suffice to the outward felicity of a Republick it followeth that a Legislator or a Law-maker neither wisely can nor rightly ought either to command or to forbid the internal actions of Virtues or Vices In which regard as in many others the Law of God and Christ which requireth Truth Purity Sincerity in the inward parts and restraineth and checketh the highest and first inordinate motions of the Will and punisheth as well Sins thought on as Sins committed doth most infinitely excell the most excellent Laws of men And therefore David in the 19 Psalm saith that the Law of God is perfect and undefiled and the Law of Christ is as the maker of it is described to be in the fourth of Hebrews A word lively and mighty in operation and sharper than a two-edged Sword and entreth through even to the dividing asunder of of the heart and Spirit and of the Joynts and Marrow and is a Discerner of the thoughts and intention of the hearts VII I say in the third place that Humane Laws may de Jure or by Right command all the outward Acts of all Vertues and forbid all the outward works of sin but they cannot do it de facto The Reason of the first member is because there is no external Act of Vertue or of Vice in the whole Nature and in every Species of it so disposed but that the commanding or the forbidding of it according to the Condition of Affairs and Times may be ordinated to the publiek good Therefore not only the Acts of Justice properly so called as some will have it but the acts also of all other Vertues whatsoever may become the due object and matter of the Law And this I remember to be the observation also of Aristotle and if I be not much mistaken he giveth Instances of it in the Acts of Fortitude and Temperance As if by a military Law it were ordained that none of the Souldiers should run from his Colours or from his ingaging with the Enemy or throw away his Arms or as if by another a Law of frugality or moderation the excess in banquetting were prohibited or as if there were a Command that none should exceed in the bravery of his habit or in the greatness of his retinue or in the Ornaments of his House The Reason of the latter member is because there is so great a variety even of the Species themselves much more of the Degrees both of the Offices of Vertues and the Acts of Sin that if the Law-makers should provide a Caution for every one of them the very multitude of the Laws would be a burthen to the Common-wealth not to be endured VIII I say in the fourth place that a Law-maker is not obliged to this viz. To forbid all the evil that he can forbid or to command all the good It will suffice that the greatest and most remarkable of both kinds are to be contained in the Laws and which are so conjoyned with some extraordinary publick profit that unless somthing were determined of them there must necessarily follow some great and grievous Evil which would prove extremely incommodious to the Common-wealth for amongst the lusts of the Flesh the Allurements of the world the temptations of the Devil and the diâ—positions of men so fruitful of all manner of Iniquities may we so much as dream of a Platonick or an Eutopian Commonwealth we are to think we have done well enough if we stick not too deep in the mire For it is necessary that in every Common-wealth some evils should not be prohibited but tolerated and many good things not commanded but left to every mans discretion and that many things of both kinds should be passed by by the Laws lest being too unseasonably active to remove one evil we peradventure make way for more and greater to arise IX The third Doubt is concerning the Intention of the Law-giver whether and how far it is required to the effect of obliging Which is to demand If a Prince out of no foresight or intent to Justice or to the publick good at all being either carryed away by hatred or ambition and the meer lust or ruling or by avarice or any other depraved desire of an impotent mind should give a Law to his Subjects whether they are bound in Conscience to obey it The answer is easy they are obliged to obey it if there be no other impediment that is if he who made the Law hath a lawful Power and the Law it self be otherwise just and according to the Law of the Nations duely debated and sufficiently promulgated I say therefore in the first place that as in Artificials the End of the work and of the person wotking is not always the same as in the building of a House the End of the work that is of the House is that it may be a commodious habitation for the master of it but the End of the Carpenter is that he may get some gain thereby Just so in a Common-wealth it may come to passe that the Law-maker may intend his own advantage and yet the Law it self may tend to the publick Good X. Peradventure you will object that an indirect End or Intention doth always corrupt the work and therefore the evil Intention of the Law-maker doth vitiate the Law which was his work To answer this objection I say in the second place that an evil intention doth always blemish the work as the work speaketh the action of the person working but it doth not always blemish the work as it is the effect of the operation These two therefore the Action it self and the Perfection of it differ not a little amongst themselves although they are commonly called by the same Name In the same manner as the Effecting and the Effect it self The building of the House and the House builded are both of them called the work of the Carpenter although the one of them is but an action transient and the other after the house is finished an action permanent A bad Intention therefore doth corrupt the work of the Lawmaker that is his own Act which makes the Law and which for the defect of a good end is not without fault but it corrupts not the work of the Legislator that is the Law made by him if that which is commanded by the Law is reducible to the Common good So for all the evil intention of the Judge a Sentence pronounced by him either for favour or for hatred is firm and valid if the said sentence in it self considered appeareth not to be unjust For as rightly St. Augustine hath it potest ex libidine imperantis sine libidine obtemperari We may without any lust obey the lust of the Commander XI I say in the third place Suppose that a Law be not only made with an evil
from our own meditations or the Institution of other men II. I affirmed that all these and every one of them do oblige the Consciences of men and only these absolutely and primarily by themselves and by their proper virtue for all these and these alone do exhibite to us the will of God who alone of himself hath an absolute and a direct command over the Consciences of men But I gave you to understand that there were many other things which Secondarily and relatively and by Virtue of the Law or the Divine will in which they are founded do in their manner oblige the Consciences And all of them do agree in this that they owe all the force of obliging which they have to the Divine will for otherwise the Divine Law would not be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience nevertheless they do all differ among themselves both in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter and also in the degree according to the power of obliging Moreover there are three degrees of those who do thus oblige The first is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the Authority of another having a right or power in which number are Humane Laws The second is of those things whose obligation doth arise from a free act of the proper will such as are Vowes Oathes Promises and Spontaneous Contracts The third degree is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the intuition of brotherly Charity in which classis is ranked the Law or the Consideration of Scandal or offence III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws I have spoken much more than at the first I propounded to my self yet it may be much less than the weight of the thing deserved of which in our dayly Conversations there is a most frequent Use or the Abundance and Variety of those Doubts required which might cast a scruple into the minds of men In the resolution where of I proceeded so far in the former Terms that having gone over those difficulties which I thought could not improperly be reduced to the material efficient and formal Causes of Laws in my last Lecture I came to treat of those which more properly did pertain to their final Cause where at first having laid this foundation for the whole following Discourse That the good of the Commonalty or which is the same that the publick Peace and Happinesse is the End of Humane Laws with what brevity and perspicuity that I could I answered to the six following Questions First Whether there be any Use or at least any necessary Use of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in order to the Common Good Secondly It belonging to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reverenced and Vices restrained whether a Law-maker could command all the Acts and Offices of all Vertues and prohibit all Vices and Enormities whatsoever Which if he were not able to perform whether he were at least bound to command and prohibit as many as he could of either kind by Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Consciences Whether and how far it be required to the effect of the obliging of the Subjects that the Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick Good Fourthly If the Laws made already shall appear less profitable to the publick whether and how far the change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be urged by the Subject Fifthly The Common good being the end of Laws and even of Government it self whether it be lawful and how far lawful for the said Common good to change the form it self of the whole Government or to attempt the change thereof Lastly how that common saying The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood IV. These things I thought necessary to repeat more fully to you that after so long an interruption of Academical exercitations my whole proceedings in these Lectures and the order I have observed therein might better appear unto you and that I might recall into your memory the heads of those things which having heard before with so much humanity I justly do believe that in so long an interval of time you have almost forgotten You will expect I conceive and not undeservedly that I should now proceed in my intended course and go directly on to those next Doubts which yet remain to be resolved As of those of Privileges of Dispensations and to others which some ways do belong to the final kind of a Cause I do confess it indeed and I ought to do it But my friends do interrupt me they advise me that the stubborn and intolerable boldnesse of some men do rather efflagitate that seeing so precisely and so impudently they abuse the Aphorism to the publick ruine although I expounded it but in my last Lecture in the former Term yet that I would take it under examination again and open the genuine sense thereof more clearly and fully than before I had done This in my Construction was nothing else but in a new pomp of words to do over that which I had done before and to the loathing of your Stomacks to give you that meat you before were cloyd with This desire was not pleasing to me but they did grow upon me with new importunities to take it in hand again It will be your humanity to resent and excuse that modesty which I granted to my persisting friends especially having used such a prevalent Argument to overcome me to it not doubting but it would be grateful to the most of you if I should again undertake it V. It is therefore my present businesse to declare unto you what is the meaning of that common Axiom The safety of the people is the supreme Law and how it is to be understood Some men within these few years not well imployed have invented and brought at last into the Common-wealth a new state of Government as before they had brought into the Church a new Religion and as they have earnestly endeavoured under the pretence of Conscience or of Christian liberty to overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastick Government so under the preâ—ence of Civil liberty or the liberty of the Subject they labour in this confusion of times and with incredible heat of spirit and military terrour to shake and from the very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick of the Government of State These as often as they are accused of the Royal Dignity trod under feet of the despised Authority of all holy Laws of the disturbance of the publick peace of an unbridled and horrible tyranny exercised on their fellow Subjects all barrs of Right and Justice being broken down of an affected parity in the Church and in the Common-wealth all difference of birth and honours and States being taken away and many more such Anabaptistical impieties they presently defend themselves and their manners with this safety of the people as with a Buckler and think this alone to be preferred
person his Conscience doth passe its judgment on every one of them by the light of Reason which is infused and imprinted into his mind And seeing the Rule is the same concerning Acts to come as well as concerning Acts past it followeth that the Conscience as well in those Acts determined to be done as in those which are already done doth make use of the same light of examining judging and dictating as the Rule measure of those Acts. I here shall willingly take no notice of that Text in the fourth Psalm and sixth verse which is commonly produced by the Latin Fathers especially of the latter times and by the Schoolmen for a proof of this Conclusion the words are Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine Thy light O Lord is signed over us because that interpretation of the words are grounded on a bad translation seemeth not to appertain to the mind and scope of the Prophet XIII This is proved again by our common custom and manner of speech for we usually say that the man who acteth according to the light of his mind doth use a good Conscience although peradventure he hath committed or omitted that which was not to be omitted or committed by him and again that he who hath not obeyed those dictates of his mind but hath acted contrary to them hath used a bad Conscience St. Paul the Apostle Acts 2â— 1 doth professe that In all things he served God with a good Conscience even unto that day which words if they are to be extended to the former part of his life before he was made a Christian which interpretation hath been complacent to many and seemeth probable unto me we may conclude by them that although he was an open and a dangerous enemy to Christianity 1 Tim. 1. 13. and as he himself confesseth a persecutor and a blasphemer yet it may be said that even then in all good Conscience he served God because in all that time he acted nothing but what his Conscience according to the measure of that light with which it was then endued did prescribe unto him For indeed he then thought as he himself doth openly and sincerely professe in his Apology before King Agrippa that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he thought in himself Act. 26. 9. that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth But whatsoever may be determined of Paul and of his Conscience at that time most certain it is that God himself gave a testimony to Abimeleck Gen. 20. 6. who ignorantly sent for the wife of Abraham that he did it integritate cordis in the integrity of his heart that is with a good Conscience and for no other reason but for this only by which he did excuse himself for had he known her to have been the wife of another man he would not have sent for her unto his house The Conscience therefore by an ignorance of it self not much to be blamed peradventure erronious may be said to be good and right God himself being Judge not simply and absolutely but as but so far secundum quid as they speak it in the Schooles by reason of the conformity which it hath with the light of the mind thereof as its next and immediate Rule But that the Conscience may be said to be right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is fully and in every respect there must another and a further Conformity be of necessity added unto it which is it must be conformable to its first and supreme Rule which what it is shall most diligently be now discussed XIV This therefore shall be our third Conclusion The holy Scripture or the written word of God is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience Which in the first place is thus proved Beyond the Adaequate Rule of any thing whatsoever it is not necessary that for the same thing there should be any other Rule to be added to it for Adaequation doth exclude the necessity of any Supplement But it is necessary that there should be another Rule of Conscience besides the holy Scripture for otherwise the Gentiles who have not the Scripture should have no Rule for their Conscience which comes quite crosse to reason experience and the expresse testimony of the Apostle in the Text above mentioned Most certain it is that there is a Conscience in all men and that it is under a Law which is a rule to direct it For as the Apostle maketh mention and it is every where extant in History and confirmed by daily experience from whence do proceed those grievous accusations of Conscience those whips those pangs and torments of the Soul those furies expressed by the Tragedians but from the violated Law of Conscience of which if there were no Law at all those people that are most barbarous should be so much the more happy as they are the more far remote from the voice and sound of the Gospel because that then no crime of sin could justly be imputed to them For where there is no Law there is no transgression Rom. 4. 15. Sin being nothing else but the transgression of the Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3. 4. That the power of Conscience is strong in both regards to fear every thing when it is guilty and to be in dread of nothing when it is innocent is not only cryed up by the Schools but by the Theaters of the Heathens who notwithstanding knew nothing of Moses or of Christ nor of the Law or the Prophets and never heard of the Gospel or the Apostles The Scripture therefore is not the sole and Adaequate Rule of Conscience XV. It is confirmed again in the second place from the proper end of the holy Scripture which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 3. 15. To make us wise to everlastâ—â—g Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ For when the light of natural reason could not raise us high enough to those things which do tend to a supernatural end both because of our natural light too much obscured and ecclipsed by the fall of Adam and because we must have supernatural helps to arrive to supernatural ends it pleased Almighty God in pity of our infirmities in his own word to open his own will unto us according to that measure which he himself thought good insomuch that by this gracious and saving Counsel not only those things by divine revelation may be made known unto us which properly do concern our faith and cannot be known by the light of nature but that more perfectly and more savingly we may be instructed in those things also which by nature are known unto us that so those works which nature enjoyneth to be performed taking their rise from a nobler principle which is the love of God and ordained to more noble ends to wit the Glory of God and the salvation of our souls may from moral become spiritual and be grateful and acceptable to God by
assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
and their fortunes And from hence is the first necessity of obedience which our Apostle therefore doth not so much urge as suppose because that every man is endued with the sense thereof by Nature Rom. 13. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only for wrath as if it were not the part of a discreet man rashly to provoke his wrath who hath the power of the Sword in his own hand and by his contumacy to incurre his displeasure upon no occasion It should become him for the advantage of his own safety to endure many affronts to obey Laws and as much as can be without Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to submit to the present powers and thus though he cannot shake off the yoak yet by well enduring it to make it more gentle and more easy XVIII But he whosoever he is who from a Politick Government shall diligently observe with himself what good from thence may be derived to his Country shall find himself bound to the performance of this with another and a stronger obligation and which more properly pertaineth to the Conscience and so indeed St. Chrysostome in this place doth interpret those words of the Apostle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if the Apostle chiefly attended to the benefit received by that protection which a Civil Government conveyeth to the Subject As if he should have said Seeing that every Citizen is conscious to himself how many benefits he doth enjoy under a politick Government he must know that for the requital of so many and so great favours he is bound by a certain Law of gratitude to pay due obedience to him who is invested with the highest Authority 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Chrysostome there speaks in a sense not much incommodous 〈◊〉 unsuitable to the meaning of the Apostle as by 〈◊〉 by we shall represent unto you I acknowlâ—dge the truth of that which by Tacitus is observed Raro fieri ut quis imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis artibus exerceat It seldom comes to passe that any man with good Arts doth exercise the ruling of an Empire which he hath obtained with wicked artifices for with what Arts that Empires have been gained by the same for the most part they are preserved and wickedness is to be defended by wickednesse Neverthelesse that it may be done the examples of Hiero the Sicilian and of Edgar King of England and of many others do sufficiently declare who modestly have mannaged the Government of a Nation which not so rightly they had obtained But howsoever a Prince doth mannage his affairs he can never so abuse his power as 〈◊〉 in the mean time to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Minister of God for good as the Apostle â—â—â—aketh in the fourth verse of that Chapter for there cannot be so great a Tyranny which doth not retain some shew of a just Government and doth not at least a little conduce to maintain the society of men as Calvin rightly on this Text observeth it Seeing therefore that we are Masters of our own Estates and do live safe from slaughter and rapine seeing that even that we live is a Debt we do owe to the chief Powers without which there would be no defence or remedy against the lusts fury and injuries of wicked persons a most reasonable and righteous thing it is that at least we should return somthing for so many benefits The old form of Trafficking an excellent Law of good and right doth exact the same of us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Give something and take something And certainly it argueth a most perverse mind to be willing to live under the protection of his Government whom you are unwilling to obey and to refuse his commands under the umbrage of whose patronage you do find your safety XIX Moreover since no man is born only for himself but for publick profit and for mankind in general there ariseth from hence a third necessity of obeying the present power although it hath been procured by never such indirect means From hence also it may in some manner appear what measure and what bounds are to be given to that obedience which by the duty of Conscience is to be given to him who uniustly sits in the throne of supremacy For whatsoever is to be done in a peculiar reference to its end ought so to be done as shall appear most necessary and profitable for the obtaining of that end Now the end of Civil Government and of the obedience due unto it is the tranquillity and safety of Humane society As far therefore as the peace and safety of that society of which that Citizen is a Member doth require so far he is bound to obey the commands of that person who de facto is the chief Magistrate in that society Now for the preservation of Humane societies there are three things very necessary The first the defence of our Country against all Forein force and endeavours of our Enemies Secondly the administration of right that due rewards may be given to deserving Citizens and punishments to the bad which is the office of distributive Justice Thirdly the care of Commerce and Merchandize concerning buying selling exchangeing and all manner of contracts which belongs unto Justice Commutative In these three the safety of mankind is so contained that unless they be executed it cannot be but all things presently will run to ruine all things and all places will be filled with Plunder Slaughter Deceit and Injuries the lives of the most innocent Citizens their Wives and Fortunes will become a prey and a sport unto the lusts of our armed Superiours to prevent which calamity and that the petulancy of wicked men may timely be restrained the only remedy is for good Citizens to remember that it belongs unto them in all things pertaining to the publick safety to be obedient to their Laws and Commands by whose Sword authority they are defended from the injuries the violence of the Spoylers XX. But that no man may give a false interpretation to what here is spoken they are to pay only such an obedience that at the same time they are to remember that they are no further obliged to it than either the account of gratitude or the safety of the publick do require And the Laws of an Usurper are to be observed not as obligatory by any right of the Commander 1. a 2. ae quaest 96. art 4. but as Aquinas rightly hath it to avoid offence and the trouble of the Common-wealth In which case he saith we ought to depart from our own right and he proves it out of the words of Christ Mat. 5. 40 41. Ei qui vult tecum litigare et tunicam tuam capere dimitte et pallium Et qui te angariabit ad miliare unum abi cum eo duo If any man will sue thee at the Law and take away thy coat let him have thy cloak also And whosoever shall compell thee to go a mile