very great advantage that he may fall upon his Enemy where he is worst provided But if he fall upon him where he is best provided he loses and throws away that great advantage And this the Confederates have done by attacquing the strong Garrisons upon the Rhine and particularly Mentz and Bon. Both which Places the French had been fortifying all Winter with extreme diligence and had put seven or eight thousand Men into Bon and into Mentz ten or twelve thousand I know that at the beginning of these Sieges we had an account of far lesser numbers But he that shall consider how many marched out of those Places when they were surrender'd and shall consider likewise what loss of Men the Defendants must sustain in Sieges of that length carried on with so great Forces and with so much Vigour and Violence may reasonably conclude that the Garrisons could not be less numerous at first then I have made them But why don 't I likewise find fault with the besieging of Rhinberg and Keyserwert I answer Because these Places were quickly and easily taken You 'll say This is to judge of things by the Event I own it s but withall I add that it is a good way of judging in matters of this nature The besieging and taking of Towns is a thing wherein Men of Skill go upon Certainties and wherein Fortune hath little or no share So that if the design succeed we may conclude that it was advisable In the former Confederate War against the French we might observe that where ever the French attacqu'd any Town they carried it with Ease and Speed Never speak of Mons for that was only a Blockade But the Confederates were often repulsed and what they got was with extreme difficulty From whence we may safely make a Judgment that the French did manage their Affairs with greater Skill Where a Siege proves long and bloudy either the Difficulties are unexpected or they were foreseen If they are unexpected this shews that the Assailants did unskilfully mistake their measures And surely a Workman that cannot take his measures aright is of no value But if they foresaw the difficulties of the Undertaking and yet did wilfully engage in it the Error is yet more inexcusable and it shews a greater want of Judgment In the Preface to my Observations I made a short but hohourable mention of the Prince of Baden And your Lordship knows that that Preface was both written and printed before we heard of any of that Prince's Actions last Summer But by what he had done before I had great Confidence and Assurance which also I expressed often that he would do better then other Men. This brave Prince if we will consider things aright hath chiefly got his Glory by falling upon easy things and by avoiding the difficult The first time that he acted separately was after the Taking of Buda when he sell into the Turks lower Hungary late in the year with part of the Army which had been so sorely harrased and maul'd at that Siege The chief Fortress the Turks had in those Parts was Zigeth and it lay fairly before him but it was too strong for him Had he attacqu'd it it might have proved another Buda he might perhaps have besieged it one year and have taken it the year following and in the mean time all other things must be left undone Wherefore he wisely pass'd it by and took other work in hand And in a short space of time he subdued all the rest of that Country The next year after the Battel of Harsan he was called away by some Occasions and General Dunwalt did very well supply his place by the same Methods subduing most part of Slavonia with small Force But the year after while the main of the Christian Force was engaged against Belgrade this Prince invaded Bosnia where he made great Conquests and took every place that he attacqued But he did not think fit to attacque Seraio the Capital City of the Province which if he had taken it would have Crown'd all his Victories But there was too great a Force within it He therefore past by it and took Zwornick a place that lay further in beside other Places Last year he commanded the main Army and Seraio being of so great importance he might fairly have thrown away his Men and his Time upon it But he chose rather to leave it behind him and he run in as far as Nissa at which Place and at other Places about it we know he made short work Upon the whole he made a Conquest this year of a great and large Country And if Places were not fit to be kept he presently slighted them if they were fit he made them better For he fell hard to work where ever he came And he hath made it appear That a good General should take up the Motto of the Roman Emperour I think it was Pertinax Laboremus Thus we see that this renowned Prince hath accomplisht with speed what ever he undertook because he undertook nothing but what he knew he could speedily accomplish I am well informed that the Duke of Lorrain undertook this Siege of Mentz full sore against his Will and at the Instance of the other Confederates And it was just so formerly with the Emperour Charles the fifth During the divisions of Germany the French had seized upon Metz and the Germans having made Peace were mad to recover it To which Service they went with an Army of a hundred thousand Men under the Conduct of that Emperour And the French were in no condition to make head against them only Metz was then as well provided for defence as Mentz was now The wise Emperour who was one of the greatest Captains of his Age was cleerly for marching into France where he knew he could easily make such Conquests as would at least oblige the French to an Exchange But nothing would content the Germans but the Siege of Metz. they must needs attacque their Enemy in his strength And we know the ill Success of it There were other Persons now and those no mean ones to whom this Siege was as little pleasing as to the Duke of Lorrain Duke Schomberg was here at the English Court when the first Tidings came that the Siege of Mentz was resolved upon And I am well informed likewise that both Duke Schomberg and a greater Man then He did utterly dislike the Resolution judging the March into France to be infinitely more advisable And I dare say that the Prince of Baden was of the same Mind Had He been at Coblentz where the Confederates pass'd the Rhine and might have had his way he would have chosen much rather to march on to Paris then to march back to Mentz for from Coblentz to Mentz by reason of the bending of the River is plainly backward as any one may see that will look upon the Map of those Countries Did the Prince ever declare his Mind in this Matter I do
Only the Distances upon the Rhine are greater For Coblentz is near thirty miles distant from Bon and more then thirty from Mentz whereas from Oxford to Maidenhead is but twenty five and to Crekelade but twenty I HAVE DONE at last with the Difficulties that might have attended the Invasion of France by the Confederates and am come to the Inconveniences they might have lain under while their Forces were engaged in this Invasion The chief of which Inconveniences are these two First the Incursions which they must suffer from the French Garrisons upon the Rhine Secondly the loss of the Trade and Navigation of that River As to the first I confess the Incursion of those Garrisons is a great and sore Inconvenience And what Remedy do I propose against it Why the same Remedy that the Hungarians used against Newhausell Agria and Caniza while they were Turkish Garrisons and in their full strength and Vigour The same that the Flemmings did use against Mastricht when the French held it and do now use against Lisle and Tournay And the same that the French used against Cambray and Landrecy while they were in the Spaniards hands The same also that the Germans have used these many years against Brisach and for some years against Strasburg and Hunningen In a word the Remedy which all People make use of against Frontier Garrisons And that is that the Countries near them submit to Contribution For there is no other Remedy in the case there is no Medium between Contribution and Destruction 'T is natural for Garrisons to command the Countries about them And he that would hinder them from it would put a force upon Nature he may as well endeavour to keep Fire from burning Or 't is like the checking of a Fever which doth but enrage it and make it more violent A Garrison is a Disease which will have its course and there is no way to prevent or avoid it but by curing the Disease that is by taking the Place This therefore ought to be endeavour'd if the thing may be done with ease and convenience And for this reason the attacquing of Rhinberg and Keiserwert cannot be dislik'd because these Places were easily reduced But if the Work be of great difficulty it seems the wisest course rather to aim at an Equivalent that is to endeavour to get something else as good or better upon the Enemy And in the mean time we must be content to be under Contribution But the Contributions which these Garrisons exact will perhaps be unreasonable and excessive I answer that it is not for their profit to be too hard upon People thereby to drive them from their dwellings and make a desolation But the sure remedy for this Evil is the course mention'd just now that is to get some Places in the Enemies Country For then if They use Our People basely We can use Theirs as bad which thing will bring them to reason if any thing will But what if it shall appear that a powerful Invasion of France would be the readiest way to reduce these Places upon the Rhine If you ask how this should be the answer is By obliging the Enemy to quit them We have seen the time when this Lewis the Great hath upon the like occasion quitted very important Places on the same Riverâ— It was when the last great Confederacy was formed against him At which time he took his last leave of Wesel and Burick together with Rees Emerik Schenksoonce and Nimegen all standing upon this River of Rhine to say nothing of the Towns in Holland In a word he disgorged all his Conquests in these parts Mastricht and Grave excepted And this he was forced to do that he might draw his Forces more close to resist the terrible Storm that threaten'd him If therefore he threw up so many good Places then only for fear of an Invasion how much more must he have done so now had he been actually Invaded He must have laid aside the thoughts of keeping rampant Garrisons upon the Rhine when Paris it self had been in danger with his dear Palace of Versailles the Domus aurea of the French Nero. THUS I HAVE answer'd the Inconvenience first objected namely the Mischiefs which might have been done by the French Garrisons upon the Rhine But before I proceed to the second I have something more to say in particular about Mentz and Bon and something about Mentz only That which I say of Mentz and Bon is this that it had been no hard matter wholly to hinder their Incursions on the German side of the Rhine I do still confess as I have said before that ordinarily there is no hindering of Garrisons save only by a close Blockade from commanding the Countries about them Or if the thing be possible so great Forces are required to do it as will devour the Countries in stead of defending them But the Case of Mentz and Bon is extraordinary They both do stand upon the Western or French side of the Rhine and on the other side the River Mentz hath the Suburb of Cassel and Bon hath the Fort of Bueil But Bueil was a thing of noâ—… being easily taken at the first Bombarding of the Town and before the Siege was form'd or so much as resolved on And Cassel was quitted by the French after they had laboured upon it all Winter a sign of their great weakness and want of Men at that time I say then that if the Confederates had well fortified and enlarged these Places and put strong Garrisons in them they had thereby secured all the Countries on the German side By this means they had pinn'd up Mentz and Bon to their own side of the Rhine For the truth is evident of what hath been said in my Observations That a Town which lies upon a great River and hath no passage over it is half block't up Having done with Mentz and Bon conjunctly let us now consider Mentz by it self This Place by what hath been done to get it may seem to be of so great importance that nothing else might compare with it But yet we shall find that to say nothing now of the general design of Invasion which gave way to this Siege other Places in particular as the City of Treves for instanâ—… had been full as good and might have been had much easier When the Imperial Army was pass'd the Rhine at Coblentz these two Cities lay equally fair for them They might have marched forty miles forward to Treves or forty miles sideward or rather backward to Mentz but to measure more exactly they had something above forty miles to Treves and to Mentz something less The first Question then will be supposing these Places to be equally weak or equally strong and capacious which of them is better in respect of the Situation the one standing upon the utmost Frontier and the other forty miles within the Enemies Country for all those Countries to the West of Rhine were now become French
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE Present War AGAINST FRANCE CONSIDER'D IN A LETTER TO A Noble Lord. By a Person of Quality LONDON Printed for R. Clavel C. Wilkinson and J. Hindmarsh and are to be sold by Randal Taylor near Stationers-Hall 1690. THE MANAGEMENT OF THE Present War against France CONSIDER'D YOU did me the great Favour My Noblest Lord to peruse my Observations upon the War of Hungary some time before they were Printed And You were pleased to give them your Approbation Wherein 't is like your Friendship and Candour might prevail much upon your Judgment Your Lordship doth at present dispense with my Continuation of that Work which indeed I have but faintly or rather have not promised and You demand my Opinion of that which more neerly concerns us namely the present War of the Confederates against the French King Without making Excuses to which I have too just a Title I humbly return this Answer that according to my weak apprehension of things the grand Error of the Hungarian War hath now been acted over again by the Confederates I think I have shewed plainly in those Observations that the Christians did greatly mistake in falling upon Buda thereby attacquing their Enemy in his Strength by which they exposed themselves to great Hazards and Losses brought infinite prejudice to their Affairs and retarded their Conquests which might otherwise have been swift and easy And the same may be said of the Sieges of Mentz and Bon which have caused so great an Expence of pretious Time and Bloud and Treasure At the beginning of the Campagne the Confederates were in a dreadful posture having such a Force in the Field as hath seldom been seen in Europe Their several Armies were reckoned to make up a hundred and seventy thousand Men and surely by the most moderate Computation they must be above a hundred and forty thousand There were above twenty thousand in the Duke of Bavaria's Army the Imperial Troops under the Duke of Lorrain were about the same number and those of Saxony Hesse and Lunenbourg could not be less than thirty thousand These were in the upper Parts of the Rhine and put together made up seventy thousand Men. Then in the lower Parts the Spanish Army with the Troops of Liege and Munster added to it was above twenty thousand and the whole Dutch Force with that of Brandenburg were neer upon fifty thousand So that the Total of these amounted to seventy thousand likewise Here now were two mighty Armies which if they had march'd forward would have made France to shake Yet it is confess'd that 't was very possible they might have made no great progress or impression if they had been opposed by an equal Force or any thing neer equal But the Matter was cleer otherwise For the French notwithstanding they had quitted so many Places beyond the Rhine could get but a small Force in the Field this year Their Generals in these Parts were Humieres and Duras Under Humieres there might by thirty thousand Men but we do not find that Duras though joyn'd by the flying Armies or Parties of Monclar Montal and Boufflers could ever make twenty It may here be demanded what became of their Men for even those that were drawn out of the Towns they quitted would have made a good Army To this I answer that their Men were bestowed in those strong Places they held upon the Rhine to fill them with very strong Garrisons They plainly made this their Barrier against the mighty Force that threaten'd By the great Resistance these Garrisons were like to make in case they were attacqued they might well hope to keep their Enemies at the armes End and stave off the War from France And it may truly be affirm'd that the chief strength of the French Monarchy lay now in these Garrisons The French Garrisons upon the Rhine at the opening of the Campagne were these that follow Hunningen Brisach Strasburg with the dependencies Fort Louis Philipsburg Mentz Bon Keyserwert and Rhinberg And these took up the whole length of that River from Swisserland to Holland only the Germans had the great City of Collen between Keyserwert and Bon and Coblentz between Bon and Mentz But moreover beyond the Rhine or on the French side of it the Germans had all Flanders at their devotion with the Dutchy of Juliers and the Diocess of Liege This being the Condition of Affairs the great Question is Whether it were better for the Confederates to attacque these very strong Places upon the Rhine or to March straight into France And it seems very evident that the marching into France had been more advisable Let any man of reason consider what were the Sentiments of the French King when there was a mighty Force against him which he was no way able to withstand I say let it be consider'd which of these two things he most dreaded whether their Sitting down before some of his remote Garrisons or their falling with the whole weight of the sevenscore thousand Men into the Bowels of his Kingdom I think there is no doubt but that he most dreaded this later For in the former he had his Wish He saw his design succeeded and things fell out just as he would have them He had left those Garrisons there for that very End and Purpose He could not hope but that these Places would be taken at last for he never so much as attempted their Relief But his hopes were that his Enemies would spend their Time and their Strength upon them And I dare say he wishes with all his Soul that they would do the like next year The Miseries of a defensive War I mean where the Enemy is cleerly an Over-Match are beyond Expression David chose rather to submit to a Pestilence then to fly before the Enemy for three Months which is the Condition of those that are upon the defensive against Enemies much stronger then themselves And this must have been the Condition of France for the last whole Summer and the whole Winter too had the Confederates march'd forward The great and swift Conquerours in all Ages such as the Cimbrians of old and after them the Goths Vandals and Lombards never lay pelting at Frontier Garrisons but broke into the Countries overwhelming and seizing whole Countries And the Confederates might have done so now You 'll say the strength of modern Fortifications makes Conquests now more slow and difficult Not at all for Places were stronger in the old times then they are at present that is they were harder to be taken The Engines of Assailing being now so violent that there is no Fence against them No place is now impregnable says a Man of Skill unless it be inaccessible Rohan The Confederates were now cleerly Masters of the Field which is a glorious Condition To be Master of the Field is the Soldiers delight He that is cleerly Master of the Field if he understand his Business will not want any thing And he hath this
an Example where an overwhelming Army was ever distress'd for Victuals They will have it if it be above ground there is no keeping it from them Therefore we do not read that the great and swift Conquerours before named were ever that way distress'd And the like may be said of Tamerlan and Attila the Hunne who drew after them such numerous and devouring Armies Also the Grand Visier who of late years broke into Austria leaving divers strong Places behind him hath given full and clear Evidence of this matter He lay under divers particular disadvantages in point of Victuals For he engaged upon the hard and long Siege of Vienna where he was tyed fast by the Leg he had first with Fire and Sword destroyed all the Country near it and consequently the Provisions and the City standing on the Danube and the Visier having no clear passage over it his Army could range but on the one side the River to get Forrage and Victuals Which things notwithstanding he never wanted and when the Christians forced his Camp they found there Provisions in abundance At the end of the last Confederate War we know Crequi marched against the Duke of Brandenburg to the farther parts of Germany through several Countries over several great Rivers Which Expedition as some think was the most Heroick Enterprize in the kind that hath been known since Hannibal marched into Italy But what care did he take and what Provision did he make for Victuals a thing so needful for his Voyage Truly as far as we can learn it was not much It seems he made account that his Army did carry Victuals and all other Necessaries upon the point of their Swords And the Duke of Brandenburg was no way able to hinder their being supplied with those things Otherwise he would never have submitted to the hard terms they imposed upon him But the Objection concerning this difficulty that is the want of Victuals is enforced yet further 'T is true they say a Commanding Army will get it if it be to be had But it is not to be had where the Defendants have themselves destroyed it by Wasting those parts of their Country in which the Enemy is expected Which they add must so distress him that he cannot possibly subsist .. Here now is a rare Receipt against all Invasions For if these things hold good no Conquest could be made and the weakest People that are might defend themselves against the most puissant Enemy since even the weakest People can destroy their own Country But if this device doth such Wonders why did not the Duke of Brandenburg make use of it against Crequi and the Emperour against the Grand Visier and the Bavarian against the Swede And why were not all the other great Conquerours by this one way defeated and disappointed But many things may be easily said which are not so easily done And surely I think we can hardly find that ever this destroying Device proved effectual against an overwhelming Power such as the Confederates had now The thing was strongly attempted in this France when they made their brave and resolute defence against Caesar but they were not able to go thorough with it The same France was invaded by Attila but the thing which then preserv'd it was the opposing him with an equal Force Had it not been for that how could they have turn'd themselves to this work of destroying when He might have broke in upon them in several places with four or five Armies at once each of them consisting of above a hundred thousand when also every Army might have divided into four or five parts and every part had been a good Army Here we may be told how Charles the fifth was driven out of Provence and this King of Poland out of Moldavia by destroying or cutting off their Forrage and Victuals But their Forces were not to compare with the present Force of the Confederates for which reason that Inconvenience might be easier put upon them And they were closely waited on by Armies near as good as their own the King by the swift and nimble Tartars who infested him with great Skill for such Barbarians as well as Boldness and Activity and the Emperour by the Power of France which was grown strong at last though at first it were much inferiour the Invasion having been sudden and unexpected Also the Emperor was got into a Nook or Corner of the Country having the Sea on one side and on another side the Rhosne And he had likewise unadvisedly engaged be a difficult Siege namely that of Marseilles I think it may in truly affirmed that he did not in this Expedition shew so good Conduct as at other times But to proceed This destroying one part of a Country to preserve the other if we consider things aright is a very sad and dismal Remedy What will they do with the People of those parts that are thus destroyed Will they cut their Throats or will they leave them to be starved or must they be maintain'd by the Countries that are untouch'd which will be a heavy burden So that it is no wonder if this way be seldom practis'd Moreover it is not a small destruction that will serve the turn in this case it must extend far and wide so great a Tract of ground is to be wasted that the Enemy may be distress'd for Victuals in marching through it and before he can reach the Countries untouch'd If therefore it be but three or four days march it will signifie nothing nor distress the Enemy in any measure since he may bring ten or twenty days Provision with him I mean Provision for the Men for as for the Horses Forrage will be had for them in the Summer even in a wasted Country there being no way that we know of to destroy Grass upon the Ground I HAVE answered the grand Difficulty which seems to attend the Invading Design that is the Want of Victuals Another Difficulty is this In case the Confederates here should make a large Conquest which indeed is the thing aim'd at they would be obliged to Garrison a great many Places and this taking up great numbers would very much diminish their Marching Army so that at length they would want Men. But this is a thing which the Confederates needed not to fear since they had Germany at hand that great Magazine of Men to say nothing of all the North of Europe beside which would have supplied them with People to any number if they could find means to maintain them And the Plunder of France had been a high Invitation In all probability there had been such an Inundation of the Northern People as hath not been seen of late Ages Moreover a great number of Garrisons had been no way necessary The Romans kept Countries under by Armies and not by Garrisons And a few Garrisons at forty or fifty miles distance as they would over-spread a large Country so they would throughly command it for it must