into their civill government nor have any thing to do with them which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men He ordained likewise that leather money should passe currant thereby to take from every one the defire to come thither and bring any merchandise or art to them so that that citie could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants And because all our actions imitate nature it is neither possible nor naturall that the slender body of a tree should beare a grosse bough therefore a smal Republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and strength then she her selfe is and if perchance it comes to passe that she layes hold on them it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body that sustaining it with much adoe with every small b'ast it is broken as we see it happen'd to Sparta which having seized on the rule of all the cities of Greece Thebes no sooner rebell'd against her but all the other cities likewise fell from her and so remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches which could never befall Rome having her body and stocke so huge that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever This manner then of proceeding together with those others which we shall afterwards speake of made Rome exceeding great and powerfull Which Titus Livius shewes in few words where he sayes All this while Rome wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba CHAP. IIII. Republiques have taken three particular courses to amplifie and inlarge their states HE that hath read the ancient histories with observation findes that Commonwealths have three manner of wayes to amplify their states The one hath bin that which the ancient Tuscans followed to make a league of many Republiques together where no one is preserred before the other neither in authority nor in dignity and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains just as now adayes the Swisses do and formerly in Greece the Achaeans and Etolians were wont And because the Romans had much war with the Tuscans the better to shew the quality of this first way I will inlarge my self in giving notice of them par ieularly Before the Romans had any great power in Italy the Tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land and though there is no particular history that touches their affairs yet is there some small remembrance thereof and some signes left us of their greatness and we know how they sent a colony to the sea coast above called by them Adria which prooved of such renown that it gave the name to that sea and the Latins call it the Adri tick to this day Moreover we know that they had conquered all from Tiber to the very foot of the Alpes which encompass the whole body of Italy Notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any considerable strength the said Tuscans lost the dominion of that countrey which is now called Lombardy Which was seized on by the French who either driven by necessity or allured by the delicacy of the fruits especially the wines came into Italy under the conduct of Bellovesus their Captain and having defeated and chased out the natives seated themselves in that place therein built many cities and called the Countrey Gallia from the name they then bare and this they held til they were conquered by the Romans The Tuscans then liv'd with that equality and proceeded in the amplifying their State in that first manner spoken of before and there were twelve Cities among which were Clusium Vejum Desola Aretium and Volaterra and the like who by way of league rul'd their dominions nor could they inlarge their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy whereof also there was a great part left untoucht by them for the reasons which we shall afterwards tell The other manner is to make allies yet not so thought that thou still reservest not to thy self the principal place in the command rule and title of all the exploits which course was alwaies observ'd by the Romans The third manner is to make them immediatly subjects and not allies as did the Spaâ—tans and Athenians of which three waies this last is altogether unprofitable as it appears it was in the two foresaid Republiques which for no other cause went to ruine but for possessing themselves of those dominions which they were not able to hold For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence especially of those that have bin accustomed to live free And if thou beest not in armes and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers thou canst neither command nor rule them And to be able to do this it is necessary to make friends and companions who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy City And because these two Cities did neither the one nor the other of these their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them And because Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner did the one and the other therefore grew it to that excessive power and for that she alone took this course of living she alone therefore became so mighty For she having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes but on the other side as is abovesaid reserving to her self alwaies the seat of the Empire and the title of commanding these their companions who were never aware of it with their own pains loss of their own bloud came to bring their own necks to the yoke for when they began to transport their Armies out of Italy and to reduce Kingdomes into Provinces to make thosetheir subjects who for that they were used to live under Kings were never much troubled to become Subjects and receiving Roman Governors over them and having bin overcome by Armies whereof the Romans had the name and title they acknowledged no other head but Rome So that those allyes of Rome that were in Italy found themselves on a sudden begirt round by Romes Subjects and oppress'd by an exceeding vast City as then Rome was and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd it was too late to help it Rome had then gotten such authority with forrein Nations and was then of such strength within it self the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike And although those their companions to be reveng'd on them for these injuries conspir'd together against them yet in a short time were they losers by the war making their own conditions worse for of allies they became Subjects Which manner of proceeding as is said hath bin observ'd onely by the Romans nor can a Republique that would enlarge her State take any other for experience hath not shew'd us any course more certain or true This way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues wherein anciently
a man of good worth and esteeme and the Assassine fled into Castruccio's house where the Captaines and Serjeants going to apprehend him were affronted and hindred by Castruccio so that the murtherer by his ayd escaped which thing Vguccion who was then at Pisa hearing and deeming then he had just occasion to punish him calld unto his owne sonne Neri to whom he had now given the command of Lucca and chargd him that under colour of inviting Castruccio he should lay hold on him and put him to death Whereupon Castruccio going familiarly into the commanders pallaces not fearing any injury was first by Neri entertaind at supper and afterwards seised on And Neri doubting lest by putting him to death without any publick justification the people might bee inraged kept him alive till he were better informd by Vguccion what was farther to be done in that case who blaming his sonnes slownesse and cowardise for the dispatching hereof went out of Pisa with four hundred Horse towards Lucca and hardly yet was he arriv'd at the Baths but the Pisans took armes and slew Vguccions Lieutenant and the rest of his family that remaind at Pisa and made Count Gaddo of Gerardesca their Lord Vguccion before he came to Lucca had notice of this accident befalne in Pisa yet thought he it not fit to turne back left the Luccheses like as the Pisans should also shot their gates against him But the Luccheses understanding the chance at Pisa notwithstanding that Vguccion was enterd Lucca taking this occasion to free Castruccio first began at their meetings in the Piazze to speake slightly of him afterwards to make some hub-bub and from thence came to armes demanding Castruccio to be set free insomuch that Vguccion for feare of worse drew him out of prison Whereupon Castruccio suddenly rallying his friends with the peoples favour made an assault upon Vguccion who finding no other remedy fled thence with his friends and so went into Lombardy to the Lords of Scala where afterwards he dy'd poorly But Castruccio being of a prisoner become as Prince of Lucca prevaild so by his friends and with this fresh gale of the peoples favour that he was made Generall of their Forces for a yeare which being compassed to gaine himselfe further credit in armes he purposd to recover for the Luccheses severall towne which rebelld after Vguccions departue and went also by the Pisans favour with whom he had enterd into league at the campe to Serezana and to winne that he had built over it a fort which being afterwards changed by the Florentines is now calld Serezanello and in two monthes space tooke the towne and afterwards in strength of this credit he wonne Massa Carrara and Lavenza and in short time all Lunigiana and to stop the passage that comes from Lombarby into Luginiana he tooke Pontremoli and drew out thence Mr. Anastasia Palivicini who was Lord thereof Returning then to Lucca with this victory he was met by the whole people whereupon Castruccio resolving not to deferre longer to make himselfe Prince by meanes of Pazzino of Poggio Puccinello of Porcico Francisco Boccansecehi and Cecco Guinigi at that time of great repute in Lucca but corrupted by him made himself Lord thereof and so solemnely and by resolution of the people was elected their Prince At this time Frederck of Baviere King of the Romans came into Italy to take the Imperiall crown whom Castruccio made his friend and went to him with five hundred Horse having left for his Lieutenant at Lucca Paulo Guinigi whom in remembrance of his father he made account of as his owne child Castruccio was entertaind very honourably by Frederick who gave him many priviledges and made him his Deputy in Tuseany and because the Pisans had expelld Gaddo of Gerardesca and for feare of him askd succours of Frederick he made Castruccio their Lord whom the Pisans accepted for feare of the Guelfes faction and in particular because of the Florentines Frederick then being returned into Germany and having left at Rome a governour for his affairs in Italy all the Gibellins as well Tuscans as Lomdarbs that followd the Imperial faction had their recourse to Castruccio and each promisd him the Principality of their native country provided that by his meanes they might be restord among whom was Mattheo Guidi Nardo Scolare Lapo Vberti Gerozzi Nardi and Piero Buonacorsi all Gibellins and outlawd Florentines and Castruccio plotting by helpe of these and with his owne forces to become Lord of all Tuscany to gaine himselfe credit the more entred into amity with Mr. Metthem Viscoti Prince of Milan and traind up all the men ofhis owne city and country to armes and because Lucca had five gates he divided the country into five parts armd them and distributed them under Captaines and colours so that on a sudden he was able to bring together above twenty thousand men into the field besides the help he might have from Pisa He then being environd with these forces and freinds it fortun'd that Mr. Mattheo Visconti was assayled by the Guelfes of Piacuza who had driven out the Gibellins in whose behalfe the Florentines and King Robert had sent their troopes Whereupon Mr. Mattheo intreated Castruccio to affaile the Florentines that they being constraind to defend their owne homes should call back their men out of Londarby So Castruccio with a good army entred the Vale Arno took Fucachio and St. Miniato with great dammage of the country and upon this occasion the Florentines were forc'd to call back their troopes who were hardly returnd into Tuscany but Castruccio was compeld upon another necessity to haste back to Lucca And in that City the Family of Poggio being of such power and authority as that it had made Castruccio not only great but Prince also and not taking themselves to have been requited as they had deservd agreed with other Families of Lucca to move the city to rebellion and to chace Castruccio thence whereupon taking occasion one morning they came armd upon the Deputy whom Castruccio had there ordaind over Justice and slew him and further purposing to raise the people to commotion Steven of Poggio an arcient and peaceable man who had no hand at all in this conspiracy came before them constrain'd his friends by his autority amongst them to lay aside their arms offering himselfe to mediate with Castruccio for them that he should satisfie their desires Thus they layd down their armes but not with greater discretion than they had taken them up for Castruccio having had notice of these novelties befalne in Lucca without making any delay with part of his troops leaving Paul Guinigi Commander of the residue came thence to Lucca where having found the tumult appeasd beyond his expectation deeming he might with the more ease secure himselfe disposed those of his party in severall places as best was for his turne Steven of Poggio thinking with himselfe that Castruccio was beholding to him went to him and intreated not for
ought to be undertaken either with ignominy or with glory or whatsoever way it be done it is well defended Chap. 41. Promises extorted by force ought not to be kept Chap. 42. Those men that are bred in the same Country do throughout all ages keep very neere the same nature and dispositim Chap. 43. By sudden supprisal and boldness many times more is obtained then by ordinary means can be gotten Chap. 44. Which course is the better in a battel either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall or else as upon themaine to venture all upon the fury of the first onset Chap. 45. Whence proceeds it that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition Chap. 46. That a good Citizen for the good of his Country ought to forget all private wrongs Chap. 47. When we see the enemy commit a great error we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business Chap. 48. A Republique if one would preserve it free hath every day neeed of provision of new orders and in regard of his good deserts that way Fabius was termed Magnus Chap. 49. FINIS MACHIAVELS DISCOURSES UPON THE First DECADE OF T. LIVIVS Translated out of Italian The Preface WHen I consider the esteem which is made of antiquity and that many times letting pass further examples a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate only to have it at hand to adorn the house withall and that thereby they may be able to cause others who take delight in the art to draw copies thereof and these likewise endeavour as lively as they can to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most vertuous actions that histories relate us to have been archieved by Kingdomes ancient Common-wealths Kings Captains Citizens and Law-givers and such others who have undergone much for their Countries good that these I say have been rather admired then follow'd or rather by every one have been so much avoided that now the very footsteps of that ancient vertue is utterly defac'd I cannot but both marvaile and grieve and the rather because I perceive that in matters of process arising in a Commonwealth among citizens or in criminal causes recourse is alwaies made to those judgements and those remedies which formerly have been ordain'd and practis'd by the ancients for the civil-lawes are nothing else but the opinions given by ancient Lawyers which since having been reduc'd to a method todirect our Doctors of the Law now a daies in giving of their judgements yet for all this in the ordering of Commonwealths in the maintenance of States in the government of Kingdomes in ordeining of military discipline in waging of war in giving judgment upon the subjects in amplifying of the Empire there are neither Princes nor Republiques Commanders nor Citizens who ever seek after any of these ancient patternes which I perswade my self proceeds not so much from that weakness into which the breeding and customes now a daies have brought the world or from that evill which idleness accompanied with ambition hath done to many Christian countries and Cities as from their want of the true knowledge of histories in that by reading them they conceive not that meaning nor relish that tastethey have in them whence it arises that many who read take delight to hear the variety of accidents which are frequent in them without further regard of imitating them deeming that not only hard but unpossible as if the heavens the sun the elements and men were alter'd from what they were of old in theâ—ir motion order and power Wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this errour I thought fit to write upon these bookes of T Livius which have escap'd the malice of the times what I thought conformable to moderne and ancient affaires of purpose for the better understanding of them that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine may there reap that profit for which end the knowledg of historie ought to be sought after And however this be a taske of great difficulty yet by the helpe of those who have incourag'd me to undergoe this burden I beleeve I shall carry it so far onwards that there shall be left for him that comes after me but very little way to bring it to a good end CHAP. I. What were in generall the beginnings of every city and especially that of Rome WHosoever shall reade what beginning the City of Rome had who were the Lawmakers and how it was founded will nothing marvaile that so great vertue was continued so many years in the city and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an Empire to which that Commonwealth attain'd And therefore to discourse first of her birth I say that all Cities were built either by the Natives of the place they were built in or by strangers The first comes to passe when the inhabitants being dispers'd in many and small numbers finde they cannot live safe each one not having strength apart as well by reason of their situation as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them or if they would joyn together for their defence the enemy comming upon them they cannot do it in time and when they should be in one body they must of necessity abandon divers of their retreats so become a sudden prey to their enemies Wherefore to escape these dangers either of themselves or upon the motion of some one of authority among them they confine themselves to dwell together in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence Of this sort among many others were Athens Venice The first under the command of Theseus was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabitants the other much people being retired into certain little Ilands at the point of the Adriatique Sea to avoid those wars which then were beginning in Italy by reason of those huge and continual inundations of Barbarians upon the declining of the Roman Empire began among themselves without the authority of any particular Prince to live under those lawes they thought most proper for their preservation which prov'd luckily to them for the long quiet their situation gave them that Sea having no outlet and those people which then afflicted Italy not having ships to annoy them so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have The second sort is when a City is built by strangers which are either absolute of themselves or depend upon others such are colonies which are sent out either by a Commonwealth or Prince to disburden their Towns of inhabitants or for the defence of some country which of late they have gotten and would safely keep without much expence of which sort the Romans built many througouht all their dominions
others were built by some Prince not to make his seate there but for his glory and so was Alexandria by Alexander and because these cities have not their beginning free they seldome attain to that greatness as to be esteemed the head cities of Kingdomes The like beginning had Florence whither it was built by Syllaes Souldiers or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesola who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under Octavian came down dwelt in the plain upon the Arne for it was built under the Romau government neither could it in the beginning make greater increase then what the Princes favour allow'd it The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free when any people either led by a Prince or of themselves are forc'd by contagion famine or war to abandon their native Soyle and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabite the Cities in the Country they have conquered as Moses did or build new as did Aeneas In this case appeares the ability of the founder and the fortune of the City founded the which is more or less admirable as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities which is seen in two kindes the first in choyce of the situation the second in making the lawes And because men act some things upon necessity others by their own election and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power it is to be consider'd whether it were better to chuse barren places to build Cities in to the end men being forc'd to labor for their sustenance might live the better in agreement the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord as it was in Raugia and in many other Cities built in like places which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable of men were content to live of their own and not seek to rule over others but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle and to plant themselves in fruitful places where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and desend their territories against those that would assault them and over-master all that would oppose their greatness And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these paines the situation doth not and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries and apt to breed men given to Luxury loth to use that industry vertue requires and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Souldiers as by means of their strict discipline they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries were borne fierce such was the Kingdome of the Aegyptians that notwithstanding the countries delicacies the laws strictness prevail'd so far as there were bred by them many great personages and if time had not worne out their names it would appeare they had deserv'd as much praise as did Great Alexauder and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us and whosoever had considered the Soldans Kingdome and the Mamalucks order with their military discipline before they were ruin'd by Selimus the great Turke would have seen in that how the Souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises and therein have known how much they fear'd that case to which the goodness of their Country invited them unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes I avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance When Alexander the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory Dinocrates the Architect came to him and shewed him how it might be built upon Mount Athos which place besides that it would be strong he could so order that the City should be made in forme of a man which would be a wonder worthy his greatness and being askd again by Alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live answerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet whereat having laught he left the mountain alone built Alexandria so that people might resort thither as well for the farness of the soyle as the commodity of of the sea and the River Nilus Whoever then shall examine the beginning of Rome if Aeneas be taken for the first founder it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers If Romulus among those that were built by the Natives And in what manner soever It were it will appear it had a beginning free of it self without dependence of any and moreover that the Laws made by Romulus Numa and others kept it under in an exact obedience as hereafter shall be said so that neither the fruitfulness of the country the commodity of the Sea the osten victories nor the vastness of the Empire could in many ages corrupt it but maintained it so eminent for vertue that never any commonwealth came near it And because those exploits she did and are recited by T. Livius were acted upon publique or private Counsel and either within or without the city I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice which I shall think worthy of remarke adding likewise all the dependences thereupon with which the first book or first part shall end CHAP. II. How many kinds of Commonwealths there are and what was that of Rome I Will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others and speak of such only as were free in their births from forrain serviâ—ude having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands either as a Commonwealth or as a Principality which have had as divers beginnings so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances for some either in their beginning or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone and that at once as the Spartans did theirs from Lycurgus others had their 's casually and at several times and upon occasion as Rome so that it is a great happiness for a Common-wealth to light upon a man of such wisdome so to order the State as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them as we see that Sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years And on the contrary that City may in some degree be termd unhappy which having not met with a judicious founder is forc'd to give it self a new frame and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances hath much mistaken the right way to perfection for
the popular faction advis'd that now the time was come they had power to chastise the people and to take away that Authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the Nobility by keeping them in hunger and want distributing the Corn to them Which opinion of his they hearing of took such distast against Coriolanus that had not the Tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the Senate Upon which accident we note that which before was said how fit and usefull it is that the Commonwealths with their Lawes give meanes to vent the choler which the universality hath conceiv'd against any one Citizen For when they have not these ordinary meanes they have recourse to extraordinary and out of question these are of worse effect then those For if by an orderly course one Citizen be ssuppres'd although it were wrongfully done yet follwes thereupon little or no disorder in the Republick because the execution is done without any private mans power or assistance of forrein forces which are those that take away the common liberty but by the publick and lawful power which have their particular bounds nor any way pass so far as to endammage the Commonwealth And to confirm this opinion with examples this of Coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me upon which let every one consider what mischief thereby had faln on the Common-wealth of Rome if in a tumult he had been flain for thereupon had grown offences between particular men offences cause feare feare seekes defence for defence men make partisans and thus parties grow in Cities and from them the ruine of Cities But the matter being order'd by publick authority they took away all those mischiefes which might have happen'd had it been carried by private power we have seen in our daies what innovations it hath brought on the Florentine Republick in that the multitude had no legal meanes to vent their displeasure against a single Citizen as it befel in the time of Franciscus Valorus who was as it were Prince of the City and being by many thought ambitious and a man that by his insolent and high stomack would not content himself to live within a civil Government and there being no way in the Commonwealth to resist him unless with some faction opposite to his thence it came that he not doubting other then some extraordinary meanes began to seek favourers of his party to defend him On the other side they that oppos'd him having no ready way to suppress him devis'd some extraordinary waies insomuch as they came at length to fight and where if by an ordinary course he could have been restrain'd his power had sunk with his own loss onely a now having to use extraordinary meanes in breaking it there ensued not only his but the ruine of many other Noble Citizens There might also be alledged to confirm our former conclusion the accident chanc'd in Florence upon the occasion of Peter Soderinus which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that Republick to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citizens for it was not enough to accuse a mighty man before eight Judges in a Commonwealth The Judges ought to be in great number for a few do after the manner of two or three so that if such courses were taken either the Citizens would have accus'd him living ill and thereby without calling the Spanish Army to aid would have wreak'd their anger on him or not behaving himself ill they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine for feare themselves of incurring danger And so on all sides had ceas'd that ravenous cruelty which was the cheif occasion of offence Whereupon we may conclude this that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of Citizens we may well beleeve that in that City there is lack of good Ordinances even lack of that ordinary meanes to vent without extraordinary waies the maligne humors which grow in men whereunto it is sufficiently remedied by allowing of accusations before many Judges and withall countenancing them Which courses were so well order'd in Rome that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate neither the one nor the other nor any particular Citizen ever intended to availe themselves by any forreign strength because they having a remedy at home were not necessitated to go seek it abroad And though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this yet I will alledg another related by Titus Livius in his History who reports that in Clusia the Noblest City in those daies in all Tuscany by one Lucumon Aruns was ravished and he not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might went and found out the French-men who then raign'd in that place we now call Lombardy and encourag'd them to bring an Army to Clusia showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the injury done him and if Aruns had seen possibility to have been righted by any means in the City he never would have inquir'd after any barbarous power But as these accusations are profitable in a Commonwealth so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful as it shall appear by our discourse in the next Chapter CHAP. VIII Accusations are not more beneficial to Common-wealths then Calumnies pernitious NOtwithstanding that the virtue of Furius Camillus after he had freed the City of Rome from the siege and oppression of the Frenchmen had brought to pass that none of the Citizens of Rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree to give him place yet Manlius Capitolinus could not endure that so much honor and renown should be ascribed to him Being of opinion that touching the safety of Rome in that he had defended the Capitol from the Enemies he deserv'd as much as Camillus and in regard of other warlike glories he was no way second to him So that overburden'd with envy nor being able to take rest for this mans honor and perceiving he could sow no discord among the Fathers he made his address to the people scattering among them divers sinister opinions And among other things he said this also that the treasure which was collected for the Frenchmen and after not given them was usurp'd by some private Citizens and if it were had again it might be turn'd to the publick good easing the people of their tributes or some private debts These words were of force with the people so that they began to run together and as they listed to raise many tumults in the City Which thing much displeasing the Senat and they taking it for a matter of great moment and dangerous created a Dictatour that he might examin the case and bridle the violence of Manlius Whereupon the Dictator cited him and they met in publick one against the other the Dictator environ'd with the Nobility Manlius with the People Manlius was demanded who had the treasure he spoke
men would be stop'd on the top of the mountains CHAP. XXIIII Commonwealths well order'd appoint rewards and punishments for their people and never recompence the one with the other THE deserts of Horatius had been exceeding great having by his valour vanquish'd the Curiatij His offence was horrible having slain his sister Notwithstanding such a kind of homicide so much displeas'd the Romans that it brought them to dispute whether they should grant him his life though his merits were so great and so fresh Which thing to him that looks but superficially on it would seem an example of popular ingratitude Yet he that shall examin better and with more consideration inquire what the orders of Commonwealths ought to be shall rather blame that people for having absolv'd him then for having had a mind to condemn him And this is the reason For never any Republick in good ordrr eancell'd the faults of their citizens with their deserts But having ordain'd rewards for good service and punishments for desservice and having rewarded one when he had done well if afterwards he commit any offence they chastise him without any regard to his former merits And when these orders are strictly observ'd a city continues long free otherwise it would soone go to ruine For if a man growne into great reputation for some notable peece of service done to the state should take upon him the confidence that he could without danger of punishment commit any offence in a short time would he become so unreasonably insolent that the civill state could no longer consist It is very necessary if we would have punishment for offences fear'd alwayes to reward good deserts as it appeares they did at Rome And though the Republique be but poore and can bestow but little yet may the subject well content himselfe with that little for so even a small gift bestowd on any one for requitall of a good though great shall finde with him that receives it an honourable and thankfull acceptance The story of Horatius Cocles is very well knowne and that also of Mutius Scevola how the one bore up the enemies upon a bridge till it was cut off behinde him the other burnt his owne hand for having mistaken when he meant to have killed Porsena the Tuscan King To these for two such notable acts was given by the publilick two acres of ground to each of them And marke also the story of Manlius Capitolinus To him for having delivered the Capitoll from the French which were encamp'd before it they who together with him were within besieg'd gave him a small measure of flour which reward according to the then present fortune of Rome was large and of such a quality too that afterwards Manlius either moov'd by envy or his owne ill nature occasion'd a sedition in Rome and seeking to get the people of his faction was without any regard had of his good deserts thrown headlong downe from that Capitoll which he to his great renowne had formerly deliver'd CHAP. XXV Whosoever would reforme an ancient state in a free city let him retain at least the shadow of the old customes HE that hath a minde to reforme the state of a City to bring it into liking and the better with every ones satisfaction to maintaine it is forc'd to keep the forme or shadow of the ancient customes to the end the people perceive not the change of them though indeed they are quite new farr different from the fore-past For they generally satisfy themselves as well with that that seemes to be as that that is Nay rather are they many times more mov'd with appearances then truthes And for this cause the Romans knowing this necessity when first they lived free having in change of one King created two Consuls would not suffer them to have more then twelve Lictors because they should not outgo the number of those that attend on the King Moreover when the yearly sacrifice was made in Rome which could not be done without the presence of the King and the Romans willing that the people by the absence of a King should not find a lacke of any of the old ceremonies created a head of the said sacrifice whom they call'd the King Priest who yet was lower in degree then the high Priest So that this way the people was satisfied of that sacrifice and never had any occasion by any default in it to wish their Kings again restored And this they all ought to observe that would cancell the old manner of living in a city and reduce it to a new and free course For being these novelties somewhat moove mens mindes therefore thou shouldst do well to call thy wits about thee and work these alterations in the old mould as much as might be And if the magistrates both in number and authority and durance differ from the ancient at least let them keep the same name And this as I have said rather ought he to observe who meanes to take upon him an absolute authority which is call'd a Tyranny for he is to innovate every thing CHAP. XXVI A new Prince in a city or Province taken by him should make innovations in every thing WHosoever becomes Prince of a city or state and the rather when his forces are but weake to keep it and means not to hold it neither as a Kingdome nor as a regular Republique the best expedient he can find for the maintenance of that Principality is that he himself being a new Prince make every thing new in the state as it is ordinary in the cities to make new governments with new names with new jurisdictions with new men and to enrich the poore as David did when he came to the crowne That filled the hungry with good things and the rich sent empty away To build moreover new cities and to pull down some that are built to remove the inhabitants from one place to another and in some to leave nothing untoucht in that Province that there be neither degree order nor state nor wealth but he that possesses it acknowledges it from these And to take for paterne Philip of Macedon Alexanders father who by these means became of a little King Prince of all Greece And he that writes of him sayes that he chang'd his people from Province to Province as herds-men change their herds from pasture to pasture These courses are very cruel and against all Christian and humane manner of living And every man ought refuse to be a King and desire rather to live a private man then reigne so much to the ruine of mankind Yet he that will not use that first way of good if he will preserve himself must enter into this of evil But men take to certain middle wayes which are very naught for they know not how to be all good nor all evil as shall be shewed for example in the next chapter CHAP. XXVII It is very seldom that men know how to be altogether mischievous or altogether
common people they tooke from the Nobility the meanes to grow rich These quarrells then being taken up against potent persons and they by their resistance thinking to defend the publique whensoever as it is said mention was made of this law the whole city was in an uproare and the Nobility wrought it out with patience and with diligence either by drawing an army forth into the field or by opposing another Tribune against him that propounded it or sometimes by yeelding a part or else by sending a Colony into that place which was to be divided as it befell them of the Country of Antium for which upon a dispute touching this law there was a Colony drawne out of Rome and sent into this place unto whom the said County was consign'd Where Titus Livius uses a notable kind of speech saying that with much adoe they found any one in Rome that would give in their names to go to the said Colony the people being rather desirous of these advantages in Rome then to go and injoy them in Antium And the quarrell touching this law continued a good while till the Romans transported their armes into the uttermost parts of Italy and likewise out of Italy After which as it seemes it ceas'd which so fell out because the fields which the enemies of Rome possessed were farre apart from the peoples sight and in a place where it was not safe to come to cultivate them and therefore grew they lesse desirous of them and the Romans also did lesse use to punish their enemies in that manner And when they did dispossess any towne of the territory they there distributed Colonies so that upon such reasons this law was laid asleepe till the Gracchies time by whom it being afterwards awaked quite ruin'd the Roman liberty For they found their adversaries strength doubled and hereupon kindled such a hatred betweene the people and the Senate that they came to blowes and to bloud without civill meane or order So that the publique magistrates having no power to give remedy hereto nor either of the factions relying on them they sought private helpes each party thinking to make a head should defend them In this quarrell and disorder the people chose Marius and made him foure times Consull and so long he continued his Consulship with small interva's that he had power of his owne selfe to make himselfe thrice more Consul Against which pestilence the Nobility having no other remedy began to favour Sylla and having made him head of their faction they came to civill warres and after much bloodshed and change of chance the Nobility remain'd conquerer These quarrells were anew reviv'd in Caesar and Pompeyes time for Caesar being made head of Marius his party and Pompey of Syllaes coming to fight Caesar remain'd victour who was the first tyrant in Rome so that that city never after injoy'd her liberty such beginning then and end had the Agrarian law And although we shew'd other where how the discords of Rome between the Senat and the People preserv'd Romes liberty because they sprung from those lawes in favor of liberty and therefore the end of this Agrarian law may seeme disagreeing to such a conclusion yet I say that upon this I no way change my opinion for so great is the Nobilities ambition that if by divers wayes and sundry meanes it were not abated in a city it would suddenly bring that city to destruction so that if the strife touching the Agrarian law had much adoe in three hundred yeares to inthrall Rome it is like enough it would have bin brought much sooner into servitude when the people both with this law and also with their other humours had not alwayes bridled the Nobilities ambition We see by this also how much men esteeme wealth rather then honours because the Nobility of Rome if it toucht matter of honour ever gave way to the people without any extraordinary distasts but when it concern'd their wealth so obstinatly did they defend it that the people to vent their humour had their recourse to those extravagant wayes that are above discours'd of The Authors of which disorder were the Gracchi whose intention ought to be commended rather then their discretion For to take away a disorder grown in a Commonwealth and hereupon to make a law that lookes faire backwards is a course ill advis'd of and as formely it hath been said at large it doth nothing else but hasten that evill to which the disorder guides thee but giving way to the time some what either the mischiefe comes slower or of it selfe at length before it comes to the upshot goes out CHAP. XXXVIII Weake Commonwealths are hardly drawne to a certaine resolution and know not how to determine and the course they ordinarily take they are rather forc'd to then choose of them selves THere being in Rome a very grievous pestilence and thereupon the Volsci and the Equi thinking a fit time presented to bring the city of Rome into subjection these two people having got a very great army together set upon the Latini and the Hernici and wasted their country this the Latini and Hernici were constrain'd to give notice of at Rome and intreat that the Romans would undertake their defence to whom the Romans exceedingly afflicted by the plague answer'd that they should take a course to defend themselves with their owne forces because they were not then able to do it Wherein appeares the magnanimity and wisdome of that Senate that even in all fortunes they would reigne and give law to those deliberations their vassalls should make nor were they asham'd to resolve any thing when necessity press'd them to it though contrary to their manner of living and the resolutions usually made by them This I say because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said people to arme and defend themselves and therefore to a Senat whose judgment had bin weaker then was theirs it would have seem'd an abatement of reputation to have granted them such a defence But they alwayes weighed businesses in their due balance and ever chose the lesser ill in lieu of the greater good for it agreed ill with them to see themselves unable to defend their subjects and they were as little content that they should arme without them for the reasons alleadged and others also that are evident Yet knowing that in any case upon necessity they were to take armes having the enemy upon their backes they tooke the more honourable part and would rather that what they were to do they should do it with their leave to the end that having disobeyed upon necessity they should not be accustomed to disobey voluntarily And though this may well appeare a course fit for every Republique to take the weake and ill advised Common wealths cannot do the like nor know not how to stand upon termes of honour in the like niceties The Duke Valentine had taken Faeuza and made Bologna yeeld to his conditions afterwards desiring to
returne from thence to Rome through Tuscany sent a confident of his into Florence to aske passage for himselfe with his army Hereupon they consulted at Florence how to manage this businesse nor did any one advise them to grant it him Wherein they followed not the course the Romans tooke for the Duke being exceedingly well armed and the Florentines in a manner disarmed that they could not hinder his passage it had bin much more for their honour if it had seem'd that he had passd with their licence rather then by force for there it was wholly their disgrace which had bin in part lesse if they had carried it otherwise But the worst condition these weak Republiques have is to take to no resolution so that what party soever they take they take it perforce and if any good be done them it is forc'd upon them for which they owe no thankes to their owne wisdome I will give two other examples that happen'd in our dayes in the state of our city In the yeare 1500 when Lewi the 12 of France had recover'd Milan being desirous to put Pisa into our hands for the summe of 50000 ducats which the Florentines had promis'd him after such restitution he sent his army commanded by the Lord Beaumont towards Pisa in whom although he were a French man yet the Florentines repos'd much trust This army and Captaine came on betweene Cascina and Pisa to assaile the walls where staying some daies to give order for the siege there came some Deputies of Pisa to Beavmont who offer'd to yeeld up the city to the French army with these conditions that upon the Kings word he should promise not to give them into the Florentines hands till after foure monthes which termes were utterly resus'd by the Florentines whereupon ensued that after a while they left the siege with disgrace Nor was that accord refus'd for other reason then because they doubted of the Kings word although such was the weaknes of their counsell that they were forc'd to put themselves into his protection though they trusted him not nor in the meane while did they consider that the King could easier deliver Pisa into their hands having gotten possession of it than promise hee would deliver that which hee had not yet in his power wherein if hee had fayl'd it had bin easy to discover the Kings intention and so have spar'd their cost In such sort that it had bin a great deal more to their advantage had they agreed that Beaumont should have taken it upon any promise as it was seene afterwards by experience in the yeare 1502. when upon the rebellion of Arezzo the Lord Jubalt was sent by the King of France with succours to the Florentines Who being come neare to Arezzo began to treate agreement with the towne which upon certaine termes would have yeelded as before the Pisans but were againe refused by the Florentines Which Jubalt perceiving and thinking that the Florentines did little understand themselves hee began to practise an agreement with them by himself without admitting the commissaries into the party so that hee concluded a peace of his owne head and thereupon entred Arezzo with his owne people shewing the Florentines they were fooles and understood not the affaires of the world and if they desir'd to have Arezzo in their hands they should let the King know of it who could more easily deliver it them having his people already in the towne then if they were without before the walls In Florence they forbare not to rayle upon and blame the said Jubalt till they understood that if Beaumont had bin like Jubalt they should have had Pisa as well as Arezzo And thus to returne to our purpose Republiques which will not come to resolution seldome make any party much to their advantage unlesse they are forc't thereupon because their weaknesse will never suffer them to determine where there is any doubt and unlesse that doubt bee cancell'd by a neessitie that violently thrusts them forward they remaine always in suspence CHAP. XXXIX The same accidents are seene to befall severall peoples THIS is easily knowne by any one that considers things present and things long past that in all Cities and all peoples there are now the same desires and the same humours there were alwayes So that it is very easy for him that examines with diligence the things that are past to foresee the future in any Commonwealth and to serve himself of those remedies which were in use among the auncients or not finding of those which were us'd to devise new for the resemblance these accidents have with the auncient But because these considerations are neglected or not understood by the Reader or if understood not knowne to him that governs it followes that continually in all successions of ages the same offeeces happen The Citie of Florence after 94 yeares having lost a part of their dominions as Pisa and other Townes was forc't to make warre against those that held them And because hee that had them in his hands was of great power it came it passe that they were at great expence in the warrs without good successe From these great expences they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people and from those grievances came the peoples murmurings and complaints And for that this warre was order'd by a Magistracie of tenne Citizens who were call'd the Councell of tenne for the warre they were malic't by the whole body of the Citie as the Authours of the warre and the expences of the same and they began to pâ—rswade themselves that by taking away that Magistracie they should end their wars so that having to make new they would not supply the places but rather suffering that Magistracie to expire they referr'd their imployments all to the Senate Which resolution was so hurtfull that not onely it ended not the warre as the generality was perswaded but those men being put out of the imployment who guided it with understanding there followed such confusion that besides Pisa they lost Arezzo and many other places in so much that the people perceiving their errour and that the feaver occasion'd the mischiefe and not the Physitian they created anew the Magistracie of tenne The selfe same humour grew up in Rome against the name of the Consuls for the people seeing one warre arise from another giving them no rest where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbours ambition who dâ—sir'd to suppresse them they imputed it rather to the ambition of the nobilitie who not being able in Rome to chastise the people protected by the Tribunitiall power indeavour'd to draw them our of Rome under the Consuls and there to oppresse them where they had no assistance And hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the Consuls or so to limit their power that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad The first that assaâ—d to put that law in practise was one
done against a publick State or against a private person WHat indignation may cause men to do is easily known by that which befell the Romans when they sent the three Fabij for Ambassadours to the French who came to invade Tuscany and in particular Clusium for the people of Clusium having sent to require aide at Rome the Romans sent their Ambassadors to the French to let them know they were to forbear from making warr against the Tuscans which ambassadours being upon the place and fitter to play the Soldiers part then the Ambassadors the French and the Tuscans comming to fight they rank'd themselves amongst the foremost to combat the French whence it came that being known by them they converted all the hatred they bore the Tuscans against the Romans which hatred became greater for the French by their Ambassadors having complained to the Senate of this injury and required in satisfaction of the dammage that the aforementioned Fabij should be given into their hands they were not only not given them or in any other manner punished but when the time of their Assemblies came they were made Tribuns with Consular power insomuch that the French perceiving those to be honored that should have been punipunished took all this as done in despight and disgrace to them and thus incensed with rage and disdain they came to assaile Rome which they took the Capitoll excepted Which destruction fell upon the Romans only for their inobservance of justice for their Ambassadors having offended against the law of nations when they should have been punished were honored Therefore it is worthy consideration how much every Republick or Prince should beware of doing the like wrong not only against a nation but also against any particular man for if a man be exceedingly offended either by the publick or by any private man and hath had no reparation made him to his content if he lives in a Commonwealth he will seek even with the utter ruine thereof to avenge himself if he lives under a Prince and be a man of any courage he will never rest till in some kind or other he be revenged on him however that he knows he draws thereby his own destruction on his head And to verify this there is not a fitter nor truer example then that of Philip of Macedon Alexanders Father In his Court there was a very handsome young noble man named Pausanias and of him one Attalus one of the cheifest men that was neer about Philip was inamourd who having several times tryed if he would yeeld to him and finding him far off from consenting to any such thing determined to gain that by a trick and by force which no way else he saw he could attain to And having made a solemn invitation whereat Pausanias and many other noble men met after that every one had liberally eate and drinke caus'd Pausanias to be taken and brought to some by-chamber were not only by force he satisfied his beastly lust upon him but the more to disgrace him he made him be so used by many others in the like manner Of which injury Pausanias several times made his complaint to Philip who having held him a long time in hope of revenging him instead thereof made Attalus governour of a Province in Greece whereupon Pausanias seeing his enemy honored and not punished converted his indignation not against him that had injured him but against Philip that had not aveng'd him And on a morning when Philips daughter was solemnly married to Alexander of Epirus as Philip went to the Temple to celebrate the espousals he slew him between the two Alexanders the son and the son in law Which example is much like that of the Romans and is remarkeable for all those that rule who should never value any man at so low a rate as to think that by heaping injury upon injury he that is thus wrong'd will not devise some way to be reveng'd though it be with his own utter loss and destruction CHAP. XXIX Fortune blinds mens minds when she will not suffer them to prevent her designes IF we consider well the course of humane affaires wee shall many times see things come to pass and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not that order should be taken to prevent And in as much as this which I speak of befell Rome where there was so much valor so much Religion and good order it is no marvail if the same thing often fall out in a City or Country that wants the said things and because this place is very remarkable to shew the power heaven hath over human things T. Livius at large and with words of very great efficacy represses it saying that the heavens would for some end that the Romans should know their power and therefore caus'd those Fabij to erre that were sent Ambassadors to the French and by their means provokt them to make war against Rome And afterwards ordaind that for the suppressing of that war there was nothing done in Rome worthy of the Romans having first ordain'd that Camillus who only was able to remedy so great a mischief should then be banished to Ardea And then the French comming towards Rome they who to resist the fury of the Volsci and many their neighbouring enemies had several times created a Dictatour now upon the approach of the French never created any Moreover for their choyce of Soldiers it was very weake and without any extraordinary diligence they were so slow in taking of arms that they were hardly time enough to incounter the French at the river Allia ten miles from Rome Here the Tribuns pitcht their campe without any ordinary diligence not viewing the ground first neither incompassing it with trench or paliâ—ado making use neither of human nor divine helps And in ranging of their battell they left their ranks so thin and weak that as well the Soldiers as the Captains did nothing worthy of the Roman discipline They fought afterwards without any effusion of blood for they fled before they were assayl'd the greater part went thence to Veium the other retir'd to Rome who never going into their own houses went unto the Capitoll so that the Senate taking no care to defend Rome did not so much as shut the gates and part of them fled from thence and part got into the Capitoll yet in defence thereof they had not such disorder for they did not cloy it with unusual people they furnished it with all the Corne they could possibly get that it might endure out the siege and the greater part of the unprofitable multitude of old men women and children fled unto the neighbouring Towns about the rest staid at Rome for a prey to the French So that whoever should have read of the brave atchievements of that people many years before and afterwards of these times following them would have much a do to beleeve it were the same people And T. Livius having reckon'd up the aforesaid disorders
within his dominions because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds that to keep the enemy off he allows some provision of moneys to those Princes or people that border upon his Country And thereupon those States make some resistance upon the confines only which when the enemy hath past they have no kind of remedy left and they perceive not that this their manner of proceeding is quite contrary to all good order for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd and not the extremities thereof for it can live without those but if these be hurt it dyes but these States keep the heart disarm'd and arme their hands and feet What this disorder hath done at Florence hath been and is daily seen for when any Army posses the frontiers and enters near to the heart of the Country there is no further remedy Wee saw not long since the same proof of the Venetians and had not their City been begirt by the waters we should have seen an end of it Wee have not so often seen this tryal in France because it is so great a Kingdom that it hath few enemies mightier than it nevertheless when the English invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd and the King himself and every one thought that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the State The contraty befell the Romans for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome the more able he found the City to make resistance And it was evident when Hannibal came into Italy that after three defeats and the slaughters of so many Captains and soldiers they were not only able to sustain the enemy but to vanquish him All this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart and made small account of the extremities for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome and the Latins and the other Townes their allyes in Italy and their Colonies from whence they drew so many Soldiers that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world And that this is true it appears by the question Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibals agents after that great overthrow at Canna who having exceedingly magnified Hannibals great acts were asked by Hanno whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace or if any Town of the Latins or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the Roman and they denying the one and the other Hanno reply'd Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first We see therefore by this discourse and what wee have otherwhere said what difference there is between the proceedings of Republicks now adayes and those of the ancients Wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses and wonderfull great conquests for where men are but of small valour and resolution fortune shews much power and because shee is alwaies various therefore do Common-wealths and States change often and will alwaies change till at length some one stand up who is so much a lover of antiquitie as to regulate her that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the Sun how great her power is CHAP. XXXI How dangerons a thing it is to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country MEthinks it is not out of purpose to treat among these other discourses how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are Rulers of States especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of T. Livius in his history though this thing be out of his purpose quite When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army Alexander of Epirus his kinsman uncle came with certain troopes into Italy being cald upon by some outlawd Lucans who put him in hope that by their means he might become master of that whole Country Whereupon it came to pass that he being come into Italy upon their word and assurance was slain by them their Citizens having promisd them their return into their Country if they slew him Therefore should it be consider'd how vain their words and promises are who are banished their Countries for in regard of their word it is to be thought that whensoever by other means than thine they can be restord to their Country they will forsake thee and cleave to others notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes that naturally they beleeve many things that are false and some things out of their own cunning they adde so that between what they think and what they say they think they put thee in such hopes that grounding thereupon thou art brought to a vain expence or to undertake somwhat that proves thy destruction I will satisfie my self with the aforesaid example of Alexander and only this other of Themistocles the Athenian who being outlawd fled to Darius in Asia where he promised him so much when he should invade Greece that Darius undertook the enterprise But Themistocles not being able to make good his promises either for shame or fear of punishment poisoned himself And if Themistocles a rare man committed this error what should we think but that they do much more erre who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the relation of exil'd men for otherwise he suffers either great shame or dammage by them And because it seldom comes to pass that Towns and Countries are taken by stealth or by intelligence that any one hath in them methinks it is not much out of purpose to treate thereof in the Chapter following adding thereunto by how many waies the Romans got them CHAP. XXXII How many waies the Romans used to make themselves masters of townes THe Romans applying themselves all to the war did evermore make it with all advantage possible as well for the expence as for every thing else belonging thereto From hence it proceeded that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges thinking it a matter of great charges and incommodity that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring And for this cause they though it more for their own advantage to take a town any way else then by siege Whereupon in such great and so many wars we have very few examples of sieges made by them The waies then whereby they got their townes were either by conquest or yeilding And this conquest was either by force or open violence or by force mingled with fraud Open violence was either by assault without beating the
encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital city and of the countrey about not to hold much account and whoever shall have well fortified that town and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects as hath been formerly said and hereafter shall be shall never be assaild but with great regard for men willingly undertake not enterprises where they see difficulty to work them through nor can much facility be there found where one assails him who hath his town strong and wel guarded and is not hated of his people The cities of Germany are very free they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them and they obey the Emperor when they please and they stand not in fear neither of him nor any other Potentate about them for they are in such a manner fortified that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious for all of them have ditches and rampires and good store of Artillery and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer besides this whereby to feed the common people and without any loss to the publick they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves they hold up also the military exercises in repute and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them A Prince then that is master of a good strong city and causeth not himself to be hated cannot be assaulted and in case he were he that should assail him would be fain to quit him with shame for the affairs of the world are so various that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer and if any should reply that the people having their possessions abroad in case they should see them a fire would not have patience and the redious siege and their love to themselves would make them for get their Prince I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious will easily master those difficulties now giving his subjects hope that the mischiief will not be of durance sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey upon his arrival and at those times while mens minds are yet warme and resolute in their defence and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt for after some few dayes that their courages grow coole the dammages are all done and mischiefs received and there is no help for it and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince thinking he is now more bound to them their houses having for his defence been fired and their possessions wasted and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do as for those they receive whereupon if all be well weigh'd a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition CHAP. XI Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities THere remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten for they are attained to either by vertue or Fortune and without the one or the other they are held for they are maintaind by orders inverterated in the religion all which are so powerfull and of such nature that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live These only have an Estate and defend it not have subjects and govern them not and yet their States because undefended are not taken from them nor their subjects though not govern'd care not think not neither are able to aliene themselves from them These Principalities then are only happy and secure but they being sustained by superior causes whereunto humane understanding reaches not I will not meddle with them for being set up and maintained by God it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds that the Church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt the Italian Potentates and not only they who are entituled the potentates but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality made but small account of it and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy and ruine the Venetians and however this be well known me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory Before that Charles King of France past into Italy this countrey was under the rule of the Pope Venetians the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and the Florentines These Potentates took two things principally to their care the one that no forreiner should invade Italy the other that no one of them should inlarge their State They against whom this care was most taken were the Pope and the Venetians and to restrain the Venetians there needed the union of all the rest as it was in the defence of Ferrara and to keep the Pope low they served themselves of the Barons of Rome who being divided into two factions the Orsini and Colonnesi there was alwaies occasion of offence between them who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope held the Popedome weak and feeble and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope as was Sextus yet either his fortune or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof for in ten years which time one with another Popes ordinarily liv'd with much ado could they bring low one of the factions And if as we may say one had near put out the Colonnesi there arose another enemy to the Orsini who made them grow again so that there was never time quite to root them out This then was the cause why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in Italy there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt who of all the Popes that ever were shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces and he effected by means of his instrument Duke Valentine and by the ocasion of the French mens passage all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions but to make the Duke great yet what he did turnd to the Churches advantage
means to win them But Master Francis Guinigi now chancing to dye and having left behind him a son named Paul of 13 years of age appointed Castruccio his Tutor and the Governor of his estate having first caused him to be called to him before his death and intreated him that he would take upon him the eare to bring up his son with that faithfulness he had found himself and that what kindnesses he could not return to the father he would requite to the son And now at length Master Francis Guinigi being dead Castruccio left Tutor and Governor to Paul grew in such credit and power that the favor he was wont to find in Lucca in some part was turned into envy and he was calumniated by many as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny Among whom the Principal was M. George Opizi head of the Guelfes faction This man hoping by the death of Mr Francis to remain without competitor in Lucca thought that Castruccio being left with that trust by the grace favor of his discreet carriage gaind him had bereav'd him of all means to attain thereto and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandal against him whereby to choak his well grown credit Which at first Castruccio disdained but afterwards grew jealous of it for he thought that Master George would never rest till he had so far disgrac'd him with King Robert of Naples his Lieuftenant as to cause him to chase him out of Lucca At that time there was one Vguccion of Fagginolo of Arezo then Lord of Pisa who by the Pisans was first chosen for their commander and afterwards made himself their Lord. Divers out-lawed Luccheses of the Gibellin faction abode with Vguccion whom Castruccio practised to restore again with Vguccions aid and this design he communicated also with his friends at home who could no way endure the Opizies authority Having therefore given order as was requisite to this purpose Castruccio fortified the tower of the Honesti and furnished it with munition and store of victuals whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himself therein for some time and the night being come which was agreed of with Vguccion he gave the signe to him who was gone down into the plain with much people between the mountains and Lucca and having seen the signal he came close to Saint Peters gate and fired the antiport Castruccio on the other side raised a great cry calling the people to armes and forced the gate on the other side within so that Vguccion entring with his men forced the town and slew Master George with all those of his family and many others his friends and partisans and chased out the governor and changed the State of the City as Vguccion liked best to the great dammage thereof for it appeard then that there were above a hundred families chased out of Lucca Those that fled part went to Florence and part to Pistoya which Cities were then governed by the Guelfes faction and hereupon they became enemies to Vguccion and the Lucheses And upon this the Florentines and the rest of the Guelfes thinking the Gibellines faction grown too mighty in Tuscany accorded together to restore again these exiled Luccheses and having Levyed a huge army they came to the vale of Nievole and seizing upon Mount Catino from hence they went to incampe at Mount Carlo whereby to have the passage open to Lucca Whereupon Vguccion having gathered a good army of Pisans and Luccheses besides many Dutch horse which he drew out of Lombardy went to find the Florentines camp which perceiving the enemies approach was removed from Mount Carlo and setled between Mount Catino and Pescia and Vguccion sat down under Mount Carlo about some two miles of the enemy where for some daies between the horse of the two armies there passed some slight skirmishes for Vguccion being faln sick the Pisans and Luccheses refused to come to battel with the enemy But Vguccions malady augmenting he retired to mount Carlo for his recovery and committed the charge of the army to Castruccio which was the Guelfes destruction for hereupon they took courage esteeming the enemies armies as left without a head which Castruccio understood and lay still some few dayes the more to confirm this their opinion making shew of feare and not suffering any one to goe out of the trenches and on the other side the Guelfes the more they saw this feare the more insolent they became and every day being orderd for fight they presented themselves before Castruccios army who thinking he had now enough emboldned them and having had full notice of what order they kept resolved to come to the tryall of a day and first with his speeches he confirmd his soldiers courage and shewd them the victory certaine if they would follow his directious Castruccio had seene how the enemy had plac'd all his strength in the body of the army the weakâ—r sort in the wings thereof whereupon he did the cleane contrary for he put his best soldiers in his wings and his slightest people in the body and issuing out of his trenches with this order so soone as ever he came within view of the enemy which solently as before they had wont came to find them out he commanded that those squadrons in the middle should goe on leisurely but that the rest should move with speed insomuch that when they came to ioyne battell with the enemy onely the wings of each army fought and the troops in the middle stood unimployd because the middle part of Castruccio's army had lagguerd so much behind that the enemyes body had not yet reach'd to them and thus the ablest of Castruccio's army came to fight with the weakest of the enemies and the enemies strength lay idle not able to endammage those they were to encounter with nor could they ayd any of their owne party so that without much difficulty the enemies two wings were both put to flight and they in the middle seeing themselves left naked on each flanke without having whereupon to shew their valour fled likewise The rout and the slaughter were great for there were slaine above ten thousand men with many Officers and great Cavaliers of the Guelfes faction throughout all Tuscany and many Princes who came thither in favour of them to wit Peter King Roberts Brother and Charles his nephew and Philip Lord of Taranto but of Castruccio's side they came not to above three hundred among which Francis Vguccions sonne was slaine who being young and over-venturous was killd at the first onset This overthrow much augmented Castruccio's credit so that Vguccion grew so jealous and suspitious of his owne State that he continually busied his brains how to bring him to destruction thinking with himselfe that that victory had rather taken his power from him than setled it and being in this thought while he awaited some fair colour to effect his designes it happned that Pieragnolo Michaeli was slaine in Lucca
by authority taken from the example of the Romans and from the use of the ancient military discipline the foot is more to be esteemed then the horse Chap. 18. That conquests in Republiques not well governed and that proceed not according to the Roman valour procure rather their ruine then advancement Chap. 19. What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers Chap. 20. The first Rector that ever the Romans sent to any place was to Capua four hundred years after they began to make war Chap. 21. How erroneus many times the opinions of men are when they give their judgments touching great affairs Chap. 22. How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects whensoever occasion was offered that constrained them thereunto avoyded the middle way and rather betook themselves to one of the extreams Chap. 23. Fortresses in general do more harme then good Chap. 24. It is a wrong course to assail a City fallen into discord thinking by means thereof to become master of it Chap. 25. Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against them that use it without any return of advantage to them Chap. 26. Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be content with the victory for oftentimes when that suffices not they lose it Chap. 27. How dangerous a thing it is for a Republique or Prince not to revenge an injury done against the publique State or against a private person Chap. 28. Fortune blinds mens eyes when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs Ch. 29. Republiques and Princes that really are mighty seek not by moneys to make alliance with others but with their valor and repute of their forces Chap. 30. How dangerous a thing it is to give credit to men that are banishd out of their Countrey Chap. 31. How may wayes the Romans used to make themselves masters of Towns Chap. 32. That the Romans gave their Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions Chap. 33. The Table of the third book FOr the maintenance of a Religion or Commonwealth long in being it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds Chap. 1. It is a very great part of wisdom sometimes to seem a fool Chap. 2. That it was necessary for preservation of the new gotten liberty to put Brutus his sons to death Chap. 3. No Prince lives secure in his Principality while those are living who were despoyled of it Chap. 4. What it is that makes a Prince lose his Kingdome which he injoys by right of inheritance Chap. 5. Of Conspiracies Chap. 6. From whence proceeds it that of the changes from liberty to slavery and from slavery to liberty some are without blood others exceeding bloody Chap. 7. He that will make alteration in a Republique must consider the subject he is to worke upon Chap. 8. How a man must of necessity change with the times if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings Chap. 9. That a Captain cannot avoid battel when his enemy will fight in any case Ch. 10. He that hath to deal with many however that he be the weaker provided that he can but support their first violence overcomes Chap. 11. That a wise Commander upon his own soldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight and take it as much as he can from his enemies Chap. 12. Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander having a weak army or in a good army having a weak Commander Chap. 13. New sleights and inventions that are used in the midst of a fight and new cryes that are heard what effects they produce Chap. 14. That the command of an army ought to be given in charge onely to one and where there are more they alwaies erre Chap. 15. In time of difficulty and peril true worth and vertue is sought after and in calm and quiet times not their vertues but their wealth friends and parentage prefer them Chap. 16. That he who hath received any not able disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Republique should never be intrusted by them in any employment or service of importance Chap. 17. There is nothing more worthy of a Commander then to be able to discover before-hand and espy out the enemies practices Chap. 18 Whether in the government of a multitude mildness or severity be of greater availe Chap. 19. One example of humanity prevailed with the Falisci more then all the force of Rome could Chap. 20. From whence it came that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipioes wrought the same effect in Italy which the other did in Spain Chap. 21. How Manlius Torquatus his rigor and Valerius Corvinus his mildness gaind each of them the same glory Chap. 22. For what cause Camillus was banished Rome Chap. 23. The continuation of governments brought Rome into thraldom Chap. 24. Of Cincinnatus and many Romans poverties ' Chap. 25. How that upon the occasion of Women states have been ruined Chap. 26. How a City at discord in it self is to be united and how that opinion is not true that to maintain Cities in obedience it is necessary to keep them in discord and divided into factions Chap. 27. That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds are laid the fouudacions of Tyranny Chap. 28. That the peoples faults grow from their Princes Chap. 29. A Citizen that will of his own authority do any good in his own City of necessity must first extinguish all envy and what order is to be taken for the defence of a City upon the enemies approach Chap. 30. Powerful Commonwealths and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity Chap. 31. What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace Chap. 32. It much furthers an army in the winning of a battel to be confident of their own forces and their Generals valor Chap. 33. What fame report or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favors upon a Citizen and whether a Prince or a People do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement Chap. 34. What dangers they incur that put themselves forwards as Principals to advise any designe which are so much the greater by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and peril Chap. 35. The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men and afterwards less then women Chap. 36. Whether slight skirmishes or battels are necessary before a great battel and what is to be done to know a new enemy when one would avoid those skirmishes Chap. 37. What manner of man that General ought to be on whose abilities an army may confidently rely Chap. 38. That a Commander ought exactly to know scituations Chap. 39. How deceit is commendable used against the enemy in time of war Chap. 40. That the defence of ones countrey
are wary not to lose what they have already gotten I say that Marcus Menenius being made Dictatour and Marcus Follius General of the horse both Plebeyans to inquire after certain conspiracies which were made in Capua against Rome authority was also given from the people to find out those that in Rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the Consuâ—ship and the other great honours of the City whereupon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the Dictatour as against them they reported all about Rome that they were not the Nobles that ambituously sought after dignities by unlawful means but the Plebeyans who not confident of their births nor worths sought by extravagant wayes to attain to those degrees and particularly accused the Dictatonr and so powerfull was the accusation that Menenius in a publick assembly where he complain'd of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him quit the Dictatourship and submitted himself to the tryal which was made before the People and after his cause was heard he was absolved where it was argued whether savour'd more of ambition either he that would maintain or he that would gain for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest because men think they hold not surely what they have unless they make a new addition of somewhat else and besides this the larger territories they are Master of the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bringing their designs to effect and this also may we adde that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not a desire to have or to be reveng'd on those that despoyle them or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours which they see others use ill CHAP. VI. Whether in Rome there could have been â—uch a State founded as would quite haâ—â— taken away the hatreds between the People and the Senate WEE have discours'd upon the effects which the differences betwixt the People and the Senate made Now they continuing till the Gracchies where they occasion'd the ruine of the common liberty some man would wish that Rome could have atchieved these glorious acts she did without those jarres in her Yet it seems worthy the consideration to see if it were possible so to frame a State in Rome as could void all differencesâ— and if a man would examin this he should have recourse to those Republiques which without so many fallings out and bickerings have been long free and see what kind of State theirs was and whether Rome were capable of it An example among the ancients is Sparta among the modernes Venice both by me formerly named Sparta made it self a King with a little Senate to govern it Venice divided not the government with the names but in one general tearm all those that had a hand in it were call'd Gentlemen which chance rather cast on them then the deliberation of their founder for many inhabitants being met together upon those rocks where now stands that City upon the occasions foretold when they were grown to such a number that for them to live together it was necessary for them to ordain Lawes they appointed a forme of government and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politick they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there from all power in State affaires And in success of time finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government to give them reputation that govern'd they call'd them Gentlemen and the others Plebeyans So that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any for when it was first made every one that dwelt at Venice did equally partake of the Government so that none could complain they who afterwards came to inhabit there finding the State setled and limited had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult there was no occasion because nothing was taken from them and the meanes they had not because they that govern'd kept them in subjection nor trusted them so far with any imployment that they could take authority upon them Add hereunto that they who afterwards came to inhabit Venice were not many nor of so great a number that there was disproportion between the Governors and those that were governed for the number of the Gentlemen was either equal to them or greater then they were so that for these reasons Venice could well begin such a State and maintain it in unity Sparta as I said was govern'd by a King and a strict Senate and might well maintain it self so a long time because there being in Sparta but few inhabitants and they having seis'd upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there and with reputation living in observance of Lycurgus Lawes took away quite all occasion of discord so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement for Lycurgus by his Laws ordain'd in Sparta more equality of estates and less of dignities for here poverty was to all alike and the Plebeyans less ambitious for the Magistracies of the City were communicable only to some few Citizens and were held apart from the People neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them This eame from the Spartan Kings who being plac'd in that Principality and set in the midst of that Nobility had no surer means to maintain their dignity stedfast then to defend the People from injurious oppressions which made the People that it neither feared nor affected the Government and not having the rule nor fearing it the contention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided and all occasion of tumults and in this sort they might live in peace a long time But two principal things caus'd this agreement because the inhabitants of Sparta were few and therefore might be govern'd by few the other because not accepting of strangers into their Republick they had not occasion either of being corrupted or making great increase so as to become insupportable to those few that govern'd them Wherefore considering these things it appears that the founders of Rome were to have us'd one of these two expedients if they desir'd to maintain it quicker like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of either not to imploy the common people in War as the Venetians or not admit strangers into the City as the Spartans both of which they did which gave the people force and increase and sundry occasions of tumults So that if the Roman State grew more quiet this inconvenient follow'd that it was also weaker because it disabled it self of the means to come
to the greatness it attain'd And therefore if Rome would take away the occasions of disagreements it took away the means of amplifying the State And in all humane affaires it is plain whosoever does throughly examin it that upon the cutting off one inconvenient another will streight arise therefore if thou wouldst make a numerous and a warlike people to inlarge far the bounds of the Empire thou mak'st them of such a temper that they shall never be maneggiable at thy will aâ— if thou keptst them weake and disarmed to have them at command but if they get the rule into their hand thou shalt not be able to bridle them or else become so base that thou shalt be made a prey to what enemy so e're assaults thee And for this cause in all our deliberations wee ought to advise where least inconvenients are and to take that for the best course for there is nonâ— absolutely free from hazard and suspicion Rome then like Sparta could have made 〈◊〉 â—rince for life and a small Senate but could nor then as shee not increase the number of her Citizens having a desire to extend her dominions which was the cause that a King for terme of life and the little number of Senators touching their agreement would have nothing availd Whereupon if a man were anew to lay grounds of a Republick he should first resolve whether hee would have it extend its power and rule as Rome or confine it self to small limits In the first case then hee must order it as Rome and give place to tumults and general differences the best he may for without great number of men and those warlike could never any Commonwealth increase or if it increase continue In the second case thou maist so order it as Sparta or Venice But by reason that ambition to extend the dominions is the poison of such like Commonwealths their founder ought as much as may be in all those waies forbid them to inlarge themselves for all such gaines grounded upon a weake Common-wealth do quite ruine it as it befell Sparta and Venice whereof the first having subdued as it were all Greece upon a very small accident discover'd its own weak foundation for the Rebellion of Thebes following caus'd by Pelopidas with other Cities imitating utterly ruin'd that Republick In like manner Venice having possest her self of a great part of Italy and the greatest not by force but by mony and craft when it came to make trial of its force lost all in a day I should well beleeve that the way to frame a Commonwealth of long continuance were to order it within as Sparta or Venice to place it in a strong situation and make it of such resistance that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden and on the otherside that it be not so great to become a terror to the neighbors and so likely it may long enjoy its State For upon two occasions ordinarily men make War against a Republick the one to become master of it the other for fear it become master of them And this way I have spoken of takes quite away these two causes for if it be hard to overcome as I presuppose it being well furnish'd for defence it will seldome or never chance that any can make a design to conquer it and if it containes it self within its own limits and it be manifest by experience that in it there is no ambition it shall never come to pass that any for feare interrupt its quiet And this would the rather be if in it were made a Law or order to forbid the amplifying of the State And without doubt I beleeve that the bringing of things to consist in these termes and in this equality of temper were the true civil Government and the perfect quiet of a City But being that all humane things are in continual motion and nothing stands firm they must ever be rising or falling And to many things that reason doth not perswade thee necessity bindes thee so that having settled a Commonwealth able to maintain it self not augmenting and necessity should force it to inlarge it self it would manifestly loosen its own foundations and suddenly bring it self to ruine On the otherside if the heavens should prove so favourable as to blow away all clouds and tempests of War thence would arise that sloth and idleness would either divide them or make them effeminate Which two things together or either by it self would occasion their ruine And therefore being impossible as I think to poise all things so justly by the balance or reduce them to this perfection of temper it is properest in founding the Republick to provide for the most honorable part and so to order it that when necessity shall inforce its inlarging it may be able to keep what it hath gotten And to return to our first discourse I think it necessary to follow the Roman Ordinances and not those of other Common wealths for to find a mediocrity between the one and the other I think it not possible And those enmities which should grow betwixt the people and the Senate ought to be tolerated taking them for a necessary inconvenient to attain to Romes greatness For besides other reasons alledged where the authority of the Tribunes is prov'd necessary for the preservation of liberty it manifestly appears what great benefit they make in Commonwealths of the power of accusing which among other things was committed to the Tribunes as in the Chapter following shall be declar'd CHAP. VII How useful accusations are in a Republike for the maintenance of Liberty THere cannot be a more profitable or necessary power given to those that in a city are appointed as guardians of the liberty then is that of accusing the Citizens to the people or before any Magistrate or any councel whensoever they offend in any thing against the free State This order workes two very useful effects in a Republick The first is that the Citizens for feare of being accused attempt nothing against the State and in case they do forthwith without any respect given them are suppres'd The other is that it gives a way to vent the humours that grow in the Cities in any manner against any Citizens And when these humours have not ordinary vents they burst out extraordinary waies and so are the ruine of a Commonwealth And there is not any thing renders a Republick more setled and stedfast then to ordain it in such a manner that the alteration of these humours that stir it have some out-let appointed by the Lawes which may be shew'd by divers examples and especially by that of Coriolanus which Titus Livius reports where he saies that the Nobility of Rome being angry with the people as thinking them to have too much Authority by creation of the Tribunes who protected them and Rome as some time it chances being in great want of provisions and thereupon the Senate sent for Corne into Sicily Coriolanus an Enemy of
the Senate did defend them Moreover he shall see that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save Caligula Nero Vitellius and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them And if their Story were well read over it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace the way of security and of distrust Fot of 26 Emperors that were from Cesar to Maximinus 16 were slain 10. only died natural deaths And if any of those that were slain were good as Galba and Pertinax it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers And if among those those that died natural deaths any were wicked or lewd as Severus it was caus'd by his great fortune and valonr which two accompany very few Hee shall see also by reading this Story how a man may order a good Kingdome for all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire by inheritance except Titus were mischievous those that were adopted were all good as were those five from Nerva to Marcus And as the Empire fell upon the heyres it return'd alwaies to its destruction Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from Nerva to Marcus and compare them with those that went before them and that follow'd them let him choose in which he would have been borne or over whether he would have had command For in those that were govern'd by the good he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens the world replenish'd with peace and justice the Senate enjoying their authority the Magistrates their honours and the wealthy Citizens their estates nobility and vertue exalted and with these all rest and good And on the other side all rancour dissoluteness corruption and ambition extinguished he shall see a returne of the golden age where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases and in the end shall see the world triumph the Prince reverenc'd and honour'd and the people in agreement and security If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Emperours he shall find the warres made them terrible and seditions full of discord as well in peace as in war cruell so many Princes slain with the sword so many civil so many forrain warres Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes the Cities thereof having been sackt and ruin'd he shall see Rome burnt the Capitol by her own Citizens defac'd and spoyl'd the antient temples desolated and their ceremonies neglected the cities repleate with adulteries the sea full of banishments and the rocks besmeard with blood He shall see follow in Rome a numberless number of cruelties and Nobility wealth honours and above all vertue reputed as a most capital crime He shall see accusers rewarded servants corrupted against their masters children against their parents and they who had not enemies oppressed by their friends and then he shall know very well how much Rome Italy and the world was beholding to Caesar And without doubt if he be borne of mankind he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good And truly a Prince ayming at glory would with to be Lord of a disorder'd City not to ruine it wholly as did Caesar but to recompose and restore it as Romulus And beleeve me the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory nor men desire it And if to renew and restore the frame of a City there were necessity for a man to depose his Principality the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity should yet deserve excuse But when he could hold his Principality and yet restore the government he is no way excusable And in sum let them be well advis'd to whom the heavens present such opportunity that either of these two wales be propounded them the one that gives them security in life and makes them glorious after death the other that causes them to live in continual troubles and leave behind them in everlasting infamy CHAP. XI Of the Romans Religion THough Romulus were Romes first founder and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up notwithstanding the heavens judging that Romulus his lawes were not sufficient for such an Empire put it into the Roman Senat 's mindes to elect Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus that what he left unfinished the other might supply Who finding a very fierce people and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies applied himself to Religion as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility and ordain'd it in such a sort that for many ages there was not such a feare of God as in that Commonwealth Which facilitated much any enterprise whatsoever either the Senate or those brave Roman courages did undertake And whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of Rome jointly and of many of the Romans by themselves in severall shal perceive that those Citizens fear'd more to break an oath than the lawes as they that made more account of the power of God than of man as it appears manifestly by the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus for after that Hannibal had given the Romans an overthrow at Canna many Citizens assembled together and being affrighted resolv'd to quit the country and go into Sieily which Scipio understanding went and found them out and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to sweare they would never forsake their native country Lucius Manlius that was afterwards call'd Torquatus was accus'd by Marcus Pomponius Tribune of the people and before the judgment day came Titus went to find Marcus and threatning to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father bound him by his oath and he though by feare compell'd to sweare yet took the accusation off and so those Citizens whom neither the love to their country nor the lawes thereof could retain in Italy were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father the injury he receiv'd of the son and his own reputation to keep the oath he took which proceeded of nothing else but the Religion Numa brought in among them And it is manifest if a man consider well the Roman histories of how much availe their Religion was for the commanding of armies to reconcile the common people to preserve good men and to shame the lewd So that if we were to dispute to whether Prince Rome were more oblig'd Romulus or Numa I beleeve Numa would be prefer'd for where Religion is military discipline is easily brought in and where they are already warlike and have no Religion this hardly followes And it is plain that Romulus to order the Senate and frame certain other civil and military ordinances had no need of the authority of a God
when they did not give colour to a bad designe with a good success CHAP. XIX A very mean Prince may easily subsist succeeding a brave and valourous Prince but a mean one following a mean brings a State into great hazzard WHen we consider the valour and the manner of Romulus Numa and Tullus proceedings the first Roman Kings we shall find that Rome hit upon a very great fortune having the first King fierce and warlick the second peaceable and religious the third of like courage to Romulus and a lover of war rather then peace For in Rome it was necessary that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civill government but in like manner it was afterwards needfull that the other Kings should betake themselves again to Romulus his valour otherwise that City would have become effeminate and been prey'd on by her neighbours Whence we may observe that the successor though not of so great valour as the predecessour is able to maintain a State by the valour of him that hath govern'd it before and enjoy the fruits of his labour but if it come to pass either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine So on the contrary if two of great valour successively follow one the other it is often seen they effect mighty things and eternize their names David was a man for armes for learning and judgement excellent and such was his valour that having overcome and subdued his neighbours he left his son Solomen a peaceable Kingdom which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes without any war and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue But he could not leave it now to Roboam his sonn who not resembling his Grandfather in vertue nor having the like good hap his father had with much adoe remain'd heire to the sixth part of the Kingdom Bajazet the Turkish Sultan although he gave himself rather to peace then war yet could he also enjoy his father Mahomets labors who having as David beaten all his neighbours left him a setled Kingdom easie to be continued by peace but if his sonn Selimus now raigning had resembled the Father and not the Grandfather that Kingdom had gone to wrack But we see this man like to outgoe his Grandfathers glory Whereupon I agree with these examples that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another unless it be such a one as France which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances And those are weak Princes that are not in the exercise of war And therefore I conclude with this discourse that such was Romulus his valour that it could give space to Numa Pompilius for many years by peacefull means to govern Rome But him followed Tullus who by his courage recover'd Romu'us reputation after him came Ancus so endowed by nature that he knew how to use peace and support war And first he addrest himself in a peaceable way but presently when he knew that his neighbours thinking him esseminate undervalu'd him he consider'd that to maintain Rome he was to apply himself to the warres and rather follow Romulus his steps than Numas Hence let all Princes that hold a State take example that he that resembles Numa shall either keep it or lose it as the times prove and fortunes wheele turns but he that takes after Romulus arm'd as he with wisdom and force shall hold it in any case unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him And certainly we may well think if Rome had light upon a man for her third King who knew not how by armes to recover her reputation she could never afterwards or not without much adoe have taken root or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to And thus whiles she liv'd under the Kings she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty King CHAP. XX. Two continued successions of vertuous Princes worke great effects and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous succession And therefore are their gains and increases great AFter Rome had banisht her Kings she was deliver'd of those dangers which as is before said she hazzarded a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her For the sum of the Empire was reduc'd unto Consuls who came not to the government by inheritance or treachery or by extream ambition but by the voices of the Citizens and they were alwaies very worthy men whose vertue and fortune Rome enjoying could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness in but so many more years as she had been under her Kings For we see that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world as was Philip of Macedon and Alexander the great Which so much the rather ought a Republick do having the means to choose not only two successions but an infinite number of valorous Princes who follow one the other which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd Common-wealth CHAP. XXI What blame that Prince or Republick deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects THE Princes of these times and the modern Republicks who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own may be ashamed of themselves and consider by the example of Tullus that this defect is not for want of men fit for war but by their fault who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers For Tullus Rome having been forty years in peace found not when he succeeded in the Kingdom a man that had been ere at war Yet he intending to make war serv'd not himself either of the Samnites or Tascans nor of others train'd up in armes but advis'd as a very prudent man to make use of his own people And such was his vertue that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers Truer it is than any other truth if where men are there want soldiers it is the Princes fault not any other defect either of scituation or nature Whereof we have a very late example For every one knows how of late daies the King of England assayl'd the Kingdom of France and took no other soldiers than his own people And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnisht with Captains and good Armies who had continually born armes in the warrs of Italy All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man and that Kingdom well govern'd which in time of peace neglected not military discipline Pelopidas and Epaminondas Thebans after they had set Thebes at liberty and drawn her out of bondage of the Spartan government perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servitude and in the
thing that in time might occasion the Roman Tyranny alleadging that the first tyrant that was in that city commanded it under the title of a Dictatour saying that if this had not bin Caesar could never with any publque title have given any honest colour to his tyranny Which matter was never well examined by him that holds this opinion but beleev'd without ground For it was not the name not the degree of the Dictatour that brought Rome into bondage but it was the authority the Citizens tooke upon themselves through the long continuance of their rule And if in Rome there had bin wanting the title of a Dictatour they would have taken another for forces will easily gaine titles but not titles forces And we see it that the Dictatour while he was made according to the publique orders and not by his owne authority alwayes did good to the city For those magistrates that are created and those authorities that are given by extraordinary courses wrong the Republiques and not those that come the rodinary way As it appeares it followed in so long a processe of time that never any Dictatour did otherwise then good to the Commonwealth Whereof there are very evident proofes First because to put a citizen in case that he can do hurt and take extaordinary authority upon him we must suppose him to have many conditions which in a Republique not corrupted he can never have for he must be very rich and have many adherents and partisans which he cannot have if the lawes be strictly observ'd and in case they had such kind of men are so doubted that the citizens free votes seldome meete in them Moreover the Dictarous was created onely for a time and not for ever and onely to remedy the present necessity for which he was created And by his authority he had power to resolve by him what courses to take against urgent danger and to execute any thing without calling a counsell and to punish any one without appeale Yet could he do nothing tending to the diminution of the state as it would have binâ— to take away the Senates authority or the peoples to disanull the old ordinances of the city and to make new so that the short time of his Dictatourship meeting with his authority which was limited to him and the people of Rome not corrupted it was unpossible he should exceed his bounds and hurt the city and we finde by experience that he evermore advantag'd it And indeed among other Roman ordinances this is one deserves consideration and worthy to be reckoned among those which contributed to the inlargement of that Empire for without such like course taken cities could hardly escape out of such extravagant michiefes for the wayes ordinarily us'd in Republiques which more slowly being that no counsell nor magistrate hath power of himselfe to go through with any matter but in many things nave neede of of one another because there goes time in getting together their consents their remedies are very dangerous when they are to cure that which cannot stay for time and therefore Commonwealths among their orders should have some such like way and the Republique of Venice which is excellent among these modernes hath reserv'd the authority to a few citizens that in occurrences of importance without more advice all of them joyntly of accord may resolve for when in a Republique there wants such an expedient it must needs by keeping the old customes go to ruine or to escape it break them And in a Commonwealth it were to be desir'd that nothing should chance which might call in the use of extraordinary courses For though that extraordinary way at that time did good yet the example prooves of ill consequence for the custome is brought in to breake the old orders at first for good which afterwards under that colour are broken to ill intent So that a Republique can never be perfect unlesse with her lawes she hath provided for all things and for every mischance ordain'd the remedy and tract out the way of her government and therefore concluding I say that those Republiques which in their dangers have not recourse to a Dictatour or such like authorities will alwayes in those heavy accidents fall to ruine And in this new ordinance the manner of making the choice is to be noted how judiciously it was provided for by the Romans for the creation of the Dictatour being some what a disgrace to the Consulls the heads of the City being as well to come under obedience as others and presupposing that some distaste hereof might arise among the citizens they ordein'd the power of making this choice should be in the Consuls thinking that when the occasion came that Rome should stand in need of this Royall power they would do it with a good will and that they doing it themselves it would lesse grieve them For the hurts or any evil that a man brings voluntarily upon himself and of his owne choyce are farre lesse troublesome then those that are done him by another although that afterwards in the latter times the Romans us'd in liew of a Dictatour to give such authority to the Consull in these words Let the Consull takecare the Commonwealth receive no dammage And to returne to our matter I conclude that the neighibouring inhabitants of Rome by seeking to suppresse them made them not onely provide for their defence but also gave them the way how they might with more force better advice and greater authority offend them CHAP. XXXV The reason why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtfull to the liberty of that Republique notwitstanding that it was made by publique and free voices AND it seemes contrary to that which was said before that the authority which is seis'd on by violence not that which is given by suffrages is hurtfull to Commonweales as the election of the ten Citizens created by the people of Rome to make lawes therin who in time became tyrants in it and without any respect laid hold on the liberty thereof Where we ought well consider the manner of giving the authority and the time for which it is given and when an absolute authority is given for a long time calling a yeare or somewhat more a long time it will alwayes be dangerous and will produce either good or bad effects according as the persons to whom it shall be intrusted shall proove good or bad and if we looke into the authority the ten had and that which the Dictatours had we shall find that of the ten farre to outreach the other For when the Dictatour was created the Tribuns the Consuls and the Senate remain'd still in their authority nor could the Dictatour take it from them And if he could deprive one of the Consulship and remove another from the Senate yet could he not disanull the whole order of Senatours and make new lawes so that the Senate the Consuls and the Tribuns continuing with their authority came to
be as a guard upon him to keepe him from swerving out of he right way But in the creation of the ten there fell out the cleane contrary for they cashierd the Consuls and Tribuns and gave authority of themselves to make lawes and every thing else as absolutly as the people of Rome So that being absolute of themselves without Consuls without Tribuns without appeale to the people and hereby having none to looke into their courses the second yeare they had the meanes especially moov'd by the ambition of Appius to become insolent And hereupon it is to be noted that when it is said that a power given by free suffrages never hurt any Commonwealth we must presuppose that the people suffer not themselves to be induc'd to give it unlesse with due circumstances and at due seasons But when either being deceiv'd or upon some other occasion leading them blindsold they are brought to give it undiscreetly and in that kind as the people of Rome gave it to the ten it will befall them alwayes as it did to these Which is easily proov'd considering the causes that held the Dictatours in goodnesse and those that gave the ten occasion of becomming evill And advising also how those Republiques have done that have bin thought well governed in the giving of authority for a long time as the Sparitans gave their Kings and the Venetians their Duke for a man may preceive that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them that they who were ill dispos'd could not at their pleasures abuse that authority Nor availes it in this case that the matter is not corrupted for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time gathers friends and makes partisans neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let for wealth and every other advantage presently runnes after them as particularly in the ereation of the ten we shall treate CHAP. XXXVI The citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth ought not to disdaine the lesse as unworthy of them THe Romans had made Marcus Fabius and Caius Manlius Consuls and gain'd a very glorious battell of the Veyentes and the Etruscans where in Quintus Fabius was slaine the Consuls brother who had bin consul the yeare before Where we should well consider how proper the lawes of that citie were for her advancement and how much those other Republique that trace not herfoote steps decevie themselves For though the Romans were zealous lovers of glory yet never did they esteeme it dishonourable at one time to obey where other whiles they had commanded and to serve in that army whereof they had bin Commanders which custome is contrary to the opinion lawes and courses of the citizens of our times And in Venice yet is this errour that a citizen having borne a great office esteemes it a disgrace to accept of a lesse and the citie allowes him to refuse it Which thing though it were honourable for the private yet is it wholly unprofitable for the publique For a Commonwealth may expect better performance from and repose more trust in that citizen who descends from a greater charge to undertake a lesse then in him that from a lesse arises to the command of a greater Because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affayres unlesse they see men about him of such reverence and vertue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their vertue and authority And if in Rome there had bin that custome which is in Venice and other Republique and moderne Kingdomes that he who had once bin Consull would never goe to the warr afterwards but as Consul many things very prejudiciall to the free government of the state would have growne therupon and through the errours committed by these new men and by their ambition which they might have us'd with more freedome not having those grave men about them by whose presence they might be so kept in awe that they should not dare to step aside and so they would have become dissolute which would all have turn'd to the publique losse CHAP. XXXVII VVhat distaste the Agrarian law gave in Rome and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth that lookes far backwards and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the Citie IT is an opinion of the ancient writers that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperity and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceede the same affects for at what time soever men are freed from fighting for necessity they are presently together by the ears through ambition which is so powerfull in mens hearts that to what degree foâ—ver they arise it never abandons them The reason is because nature hath created men in such a sort that they can desire every thing but not attaine to it So that the desire of getting being greater then the power to get thence growes the dislike of what a man injoyes and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof Hereupon arises the change of their states for some men desiring to have more and others fearing to lose what have they already they procede to enmities and warre from whence comes the destruction of one country and the advantage of another This discourse I have made because it suffis'd not the Commons of Rome to secure themselves from the Nobility by creating the Tribuns to which desire they were forc'd by nenecessity but that they suddenly upon the obteining thereof began to contend out of ambition and thinke to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes as the things that are in most value with men Whereupon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrell touching the Agrarian law And in conclusion caus'd the destruction of the Roman Republique And because Commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the publique wealthy and the particulars poore it is likely there was in Rome some defect in this law which either was not so exactly fram'd at the beginning but that every day it had need of some revising and amending or that the making of it was so long put off that it became scandalous to look so farre backwards or that being well instituted at first in time it grew by use corrupt So in what manner soever it were that law was never mention'd in Rome but that the whole city was in a tumult This law had two principall heads By one they order'd that no citizen could possesse more then so many acres of ground by the other that the lands which they tooke from their enemies should be divided among the people of Rome It came therefore to thwart the Nobility two manner of wayes because they that had the greatest states in possessio were not permitted by thelaw who were the greater part of the Nobility and there upon ought not to injoy it and when the enemies goods should be divided among the
appeal was profitable he should have caus'd it to be observ'd if otherwise he should never have so urg'd the making of it And so much more remarkable was this accident in that the Frier in those many sermons which he made after the breach of this law never either condemned him that broke it or excus'd the breach as he that would not condemn any thing that serv'd to his purpose and excuse it he could not Which having discover'd his ambitious and sactious mind took much from his credit and charg'd him with blame enough It is a very great fault also in a state every day in the citizens mindes to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments as it befell at Rome after the Decemvirate For all the ten and other citizens at sundry times were accus'd and condemn'd so that all the Nobility were exceedingly affrighted thinking they would never leave condemning them til they had destroyed the whole Nobility And certainly it had produc'd some inconvenient in the city if Marcus Duellius the Tribun had not taken order for it Who made a decree that for a whole year it should not be lawfull for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of Rome which assur'd all the Nobility Where we see how great a hurt it is to a Republique or Prince to hold their subjects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken For men that begin to doubt of mischief in any case provide for themselves in their dangers and grow bolder and less respectfull how they venture on novelties Wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any or the hurt that is to be done to do at once and afterwards let men injoy some assurance that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds CHAP. XLVI Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another and first they aime no further then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others THe people of Rome having recovered their liberty and being return'd into their former state or rather greater insomuch as they had made new laws which were as new foundations laid to establish their power it seem'd probable that Rome for some while would have bin at quiet yet by experience the contrary was seen for every day there sprung up new tumults and new disagreements And because Titus Livius very judiciously gives the reason from whence they grew methinks it is not out of purpose punctually to relate his words where he sayes that alwaies either the people or the Nobility waxed proud when the other grew humble and when the Commons containd themselves modestly within their bounds then began the youth of the Nobility to provoke them with all manner of injuries nor could the Tribuns much remedy this for they also had their shares in the sufferance The Nobility on the other side although well they wot that their youth was too insolent yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side they wished rather their own should be the actors then the commonalty And thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far til they oppressed the other And the order of these accidents is that while men endeavor to be out of fear themselves they begin to put others in fear and that injury which they chase from themselves they thrust upon another as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt Hereby is seen in what manner among other things Common-wealths come to dissolution and men rise from one ambition to another And as that sentence of Salust put in Caesars mouth was very true That all evil examples first spring from good beginnings The first thing that those citizens as is above said endeavor who behave themselves ambitiously in a Republick is not onely to be out of the reach of private mens wrongs but out of the Magistrates power To attain hereto they seek after friendships which they gain by means in appearance honest either by supplying their want of moneys or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them And because this seems worthy and noble every one is easily deceived and thereupon no body seeks to remedy it till he presevering in the same course without let becomes such a one that the private Citizens stand in aw of him and the Magistrates bear him respect And when he is grown to this height and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness he comes to be in such termes that it proves very dangerous to justle with him for the causes I have formerly alleadged of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient which is already come to some growth in a city because then it is brought to such an exigent that there is a necessity to seek either to extinguish it with danger of sudden ruine or letting it alone to submit to the yoke of bondage unless death or some other accident prevent it For being once come to the terms above written that both citizens and Magistrates stand in fear to offend him and his without much adoe after will they understand their own strength and hurt at their own pleasure Whereupon a Republique among her wayes of government ought to use this to watch carefully over her citizens that they have not power under the colour of good to do mischief and that their reputation be such as may advantage the Commonwealth and not wrong it as in its own place we shall argue it CHAP. XLVII Men though they are deceiv'd in generalities yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars THE people of Rome as is abovesaid having taken in distaste the very name of Consuls being desirous that Plebeyans might be made Consuls or their authority limited the Nobility that the Consular authority might as well be chosen out of the Commons as the Nobility The people were herewith contented thinking to abolish the Consulate and to have their share in this highest dignity Hence grew a notable accident that when they came to create these Tribuns which they could have made all Plebeyans the people chose them all out of the Nobility whereupon Titus Livius uses these words The event of these assemblies or Councils shewed that mindes differ much when contention is made for liberty or honour and when all strife being appeas'd the judgments rest clear And examining from whence this proceeds I beleeve it is from thence that men are more deceiv'd in generalities than in particularities The Common people of Rome thought generally they deserv'd the Consulate because they were the greatest part of the City because they underwent the greater dangers in the wars because they were they by force of whose armes Rome maintain'd her liberty and became mighty And thinking as is said this their desire reasonable they would have this authority in any case
after by Numa Tullus Hostilius and Servius and last by the ten Citizens created for the like work nevertheless alwaies in the managing of that city new necessities were discover'd and it was needfull to make new laws as it befell when they created the Censours which was one of those orders that help'd to keep Rome free at that time when she liv'd in liberty for being made Arbiters of the fashions and manners of Rome they were a special occasion that Rome held off so long from being corrupted Indeed in the beginning of that Magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years but not long after wards it was amended by the wisdome of Mamercus the Dictator who by a new law he made reduc'd the said magistracy to the terms of eighteen moneths Which the Censour that were then in office took so much a miss that they put Mamercus out of the Senate ' which thing was much blam'd both by the people and the fathers And because the story shews not any where that Mamercus could defend himself it must needs be that either the historian was defective or the laws of Rome in this part not perfect for it is not well that in a Commonwealth it should so be ordein'd that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they liv'd in should be wrong'd without any remedy But returning to the beginning of this discourse I say that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate that if those cities that have had their beginnings free and were under their own government as Rome with much adoe can find out good laws to maintain them free it is no marvel that those cities which have had their beginnings immediatly servile have not found not onely difficulty but impossibity ever so to order themselves that they can quietly come to a civil government as appears it befell the city of Florence because her beginning was in Subjection to the Roman Empire and having gotten leisure to breathe began to make her own laws which having bin mingled with the ancient that were naught could not work any good effect and thus she proceeded in a government for 200 years as we have by certain relations without ever attaining to such a condition that she could truly be term'd a Republique and these difficulties which she hath had have those Cities alwaies had whose beginnings have bin like hers And though many times by publique and free voices ample authority hath bin given to some few Citizens to reforme this yet never have they order'd it to the advantage of the publique but to serve the turn of their own faction which hath caus'd more disorder then order in the City And to come to some particular example I say among other things which he that ordains a Republique should consider is that he well advise to what men he gives the power of life and death over his Citizens This was well provided for in Rome for by ordinary course they might appeal to the people yet if there were any occasion of importance where to delay execution by means of the appeal was dangerous they had the help of a Dictator who had power immediatly to execute which remedy they never us'd but upon necessity But Florence and other Cities beginning as she did that is servile had this authority committed alwaies to a stranger who was sent by the Prince to this purpose When afterwards they became free they continued this authority in a stranger whom they called their Captain Which thing because he might easily be corrupted by the potent Citizens was very pernicious But afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states they ordained eight Citizens to supply the Captains place Which order of evil became very evil for the reasons we have otherwhere alleadged that a few are alwaies servants of a few and especially of the most wealthy from which the City of Veuice is well guarded which hath ten citizens who have power to punish any Citizen without appeal and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent though they have the authority they have ordained the Quarantie or council of forty and besides they have taken care that the council of the Pregai which is the chiefer council may punish them so that where there is no want of an accuser they are never destitute of a Judge to restrain the great mens insolency There is then no marvail seeing that in Rome order'd by it self and by so many sage persons there grew every day new occasions whereupon new lawes were to be made in favor of the Common liberty if in other Cities which have had their beginnings more disordered there arise such difficulties that put them quite past all recovery CHAP. L. The power of stopping the publique actions of the city should not be given into the hands of one council or one magistracy TItus Quincius Cincinnatus and Cneus Iulius Mentus were Consuls together in Rome who upon a quarrel arisen between them two made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republique which the Senate seeing perswaded them to create a Dictator to the end that might be done which by reason of their discord was hindred But the Consuls disagreeing in every thing else in this alone were of accord both of them not to make a Dictator so that the Senate finding no other help desir'd assistance from the Tribuns who with the Senates authority forc'd the Consuls to obey Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens ambitions exercis'd not onely against the Common people but also among themselves in the next place that it should never be so ordain'd in a city that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Common-wealth For example if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honors and profits or to a Magistrate to dispatch some business to be done it is fit to impose a necessity on him that he do it in any case or so provide that another might and should do it otherwise the order would be defective and perilous as we see it was in Rome unless they could have oppos'd the Consuls obstinacy with the Tribuns authority In the Commonwealth of Venice the great council bestows both the honors and the profits It sometime chanc't that the universality upon some disdaine conceiv'd or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the Magistrates of their Cities nor to their Ministers of State abroad which was a very great disorder for all at once their Townes and Cities wanted their lawfull Iudges nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased or were no longer deceived And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill termes had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them Who
having layd hold of a fit occasion made a law that all the Magistrates within or without the Citie should continue still in their offices till new choice were made and their successours appointed And thus they tooke away from that counsell all opportunity of enabling them with the Commonwealths danger to stop the publique actions CHAP. LI. A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind which indeed meere necessitie compells them to doe WIse men gaine themselves alwayes the thanks of every thing in their actions although in truth meere necessitie constraines them in any case to doe them This discretion was well made use of by the Romane Senate when they resolv'd to ad a dayly stipend out of the Common treasury to those that served in the warres it being then of custome there to serve as their own proper charges But the Senate ceiving that after that manner they could not long make warre and hereupon neither could they besiege townes nor lead their armies farre off and judging it needfull they should doe the one and the other they determined to allow the sayd stipends which they did in such a way that they got themselves thanks for that to which they were bound by necessitie And this present was so acceptable to the people that all Rome seem'd overjoyd with it they thinking it to be a great benefit which they never had hopes of nor of themselves had ever sought after And though the Tribuns did their best to blot out these thanks by shewing it was a matter of grievance and not of case to the people seeing of necessitie they were to impose greater taxes on them wherewith to pay these stipends yet could they not prevayle so much but that the people tooke it very thankfully Which also the Senate augmented by the course they tooke in ordering of the tributes For the greatest and heaviest were those they layd upon the Nobilitie and so were those that were first payd CHAP. LII To stay the insolence of one that growes powerfull in a Commonwealth there is no way more secure and lesse offensive than to seike before hand and so prevent him of those wayes by which he attains to that power WEe see by the above written discourse how great credit the Nobility got with the people upon the demonstrations make for their advantage as well by the stipend appoined as also by the course they tooke in imposing the taxes in which way if the Nobilitie had continued they had wholly avoyded all manner of tumult in that Citie and they had taken from the Tribuns the credit they had with the people and by consequence their authority And truly it is not possible in a Commonwealth especially in those that are corrupted by any better way lesse hurtfull and more easy to oppose the ambition of any Citizen than to prepossesse those wayes by which a man perceives he takes his course to attaine that dignitie hee aymes at Which meanes if they had put in practise against Cosmus of Medici his adversaries had gotten more by the bargaine than by chasing him from Florence For if those Citizens that were at brabble with him had taken the course to favour the people they had without any imbroyle or violence taken out of his hands those weapons which were to him of greatest advantage Peter Soderini gain'd himself credit with this onely in the Citie of Florence that he favou'd the universality Which universality gave him the repute to be a lover of the Cities libertie And surely for those Citizens that envyed his greatnesse it was much easier and had bin a businesse of fairer carriage of lesse danger and dammage to the Commonwealth to lay hold before hand of those wayes by which he became great than by offering to oppose him lest that in ruining him the whole remainder of the Common-wealth also should have fallen to ruine For if they could have taken out of his hands the forces whereby hee became strong which they might easily have done they could in all their publique counsells and resolutions have oppos'd him without suspicion or regard And if any man should reply that if the Citizens that hated Peter committed an orrour in not prepossessing the wayes wherby he gain'd upon the people Peter also came to commit an errour in not laying hold beforehand of those wayes by which his adversaries frighted him I answer that Peter deserves excuse as well because it was hard for him to doe it as because the meanes were not fit for him to use For the wayes by which he was hurt were to favour the house of Medici by which favours they overmaster'd him and at last ruin'd him Yet Peter could not fairely take his part because hee could not with any good repute destroy that libertie over which hee was appointed as guardian and seeing these favors could not passe in private they were suddenly exceeding dangerous to Peter for what way soever it had bin that he had bin discover'd to be a friend of the Medici he had fallen into the jealousie and incurr'd the hatred of the people Whereupon his enemyes had had greater power to suppresse him then formerly they had Therefore men ought in every resolution consider the defects and dangers thereunto belonging and not fasten on any one of them when they carry with them more danger then profit notwithstanding that they seeme well to tend to the end propounded for being otherwise in this case it would befall them as it befell Tullius who by going about to diminish Marc Antonius his power increas'd it For Marc Antonius being judged an enemy of the Senate and he having got together a great army good part whereof had followed Caesars faction Tullius to take these souldiers from him perswaded the Senate to set up the reputation of Octavianus and seng him accompanied with the Consuls and an armie against Marc Antonius alleadging that so soone as ere the souldiers that followed Marc Antonius should heare the name of Octavianus Caesars nephew and that would be call'd Caesar too they would forsake the other and follow this So that Marc Antonius being dispossest of his advantages would easily be suppressed Which fell out cleane contrary For Marc Antonius got Octavianus to his part who leaving 〈…〉 lius and the Senate joyned forces with him Which thing proov'd wholly the ruine of those great mens party Which also it was easy to have conjectur'd nor was that credible which Tullius perswaded himselfe but he should rather have made account that neither that name that with so great glory had exterminated his enemies and gain'd himself the principality in Rome nor yet his heirs or adherents would ever suffer them quietly to injoy their libertie CHAP. LIII The people deceiv'd by a false shew of good oftentimes seek their owne ruine and that great hope and large promises doe easily move them WHen the â—yentes Citie was taken the people of Rome were possess'd of an opinion that it would be
him rather of treason or ignorance and so either put him to death imprison or confine him as it befell very many Carthaginian Captains and Athenians Nor shall any of the former victories gloriously gotten afterwards shelter them for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past as it befell Antoni Giacomini our countrey man here who not having overcome the Pisans as the people presupposed and he had promised fell into such disgrace with the people that for all his many good services past he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people protected him then by any assurance else was given him CHAP. LIV. What authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude THe second thing remarkable upon the text alleadged in the former Chapter is that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multitude inraged as the reverence of some grave man comming among them as Virgil sayes to the same purpose and not without reason Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere silent arrectisque auribus astant And therefore that man of worth and merit that either hath the command of an army or that abides in a city where a tumult arises ought represent himself upon the occasion with the greatest grace and in as honorable termes as may be cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality to gain him the more reverence A few years agoe Florence was divided into two factions of the Frateschi and Arrabiati for so they were called and comming to blowes the Frateschi were overcome among whom was Paul Antonius Sodorini a citizen of great esteem in those dayes and the people in the time of those tumults going in armes to sack his house Franciscus his brother then Bishop of Valterra and now Cardinal was by chance in his house who presently having perceived the stir and seen the multitude comming clad himself with his most honorable vestments and thereupon his episcopal rochet and so met these armed people where by the awfulness of his person and good words he staid them Which thing throughout the City for many dayes was much noted and celebrated I conclude then that there is not a more setled nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude then the presence of such a man who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him And thereupon we see to return to the text formerly alleadged with what obstinacy the Commons of Rome accepted the party to go to Veium thinking it advantagious to them but never considering the mischief therein involved and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion there would have bin harme done had not the Senate accompanied with many grave and reverent personages restrained their fury CHAP. LV. How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principallity and where that is not a Republique cannot be ALthough that heretofore we have sufficiently treated what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are corrupted yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took touching the vow Camillus made to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the Veientes to Apollo Which prey being fallen into the peoples hands seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it the Senate made an edict that every one should publiquely produce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of Veium And though this resolution took not place the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient and by other means given satisfaction to Apollo for the people yet we perceive by these determinations how much the Senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict And on the other side how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict by giving less then was due but rather to free themselves therefrom by shewing their open distaste at such course taken This example with many others above alleadged give very good evidence of the great goodness and religion was in that people and what might be hop'd for of them And truly where this goodness is not little can be hop'd for as we can hope for nothing in those countreys which in these daies we see corrupted as in Italy above others so France and Spain retain a part of the same corruption and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness which is very much fail'd as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union not onely by his vertue but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdomes which is not yet quite perverted This goodness is yet seen in Germany and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people which is the occasion that many Republiques continue free and do so strictly observe their own laws that no forrain enemy abroad nor ambitious man at home dares offer to seize on them And to proove this true that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness I will give another example like to that abovesaid of the Senate and of the people of Rome Those Republiques use when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good that the Magistrates or the Consuls having authority should taxe the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred of that which every man is worth And such a resolution being made according to the order of the town every man comes besore thereceivers of that tax and having first taken an oath to pay a convenient sum he throws into a chest appointed to that purpose what in his conscience he thinks he should pay Of which payment there is no other witness but he that payes Whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men And we may well think that every one payes the due sum for if it were not paid the imposition would not yeeld that quantity as those of old time were wont to do which failing the deceipt would appear whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys then this Which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times because it is very rare or rather remains onely in this countrey Which proceeds from two things the one because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors for neither have these gone into their countreys nor they come to visit these because they have bin contented with those goods to feed on those victuals and to be clad with those wools which the
effect in a Prince for it is the opinion of all writers that vertue is commended even in ones enemies And if Manlius in the midst of that great desire had bin reviv'd the people of Rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison and condemn'd him to death In like manner we see there were some Princes esteem'd wise too that have put some men to death whom afterwards they have much desired again as Alexander did Clitus and others of his friends and Herod Mariamme But that which our Historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude belongs not to that which is regulated by the lawes as was that of the Romans but to that which is loose as was that of the Syracusians which committed those errors that men inraged and dissolute fall into as did Alexander the Great and Herod in the cases aforesaid Therefore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy than that of Princes for all equally do erre when all without respect have power to erre Whereof besides this I have alleadged there are examples enough as well among the Roman Emperors as other Kings and Princes where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life as never was yet seen in any multitude I conclude then beyond the common opinion which sayes that the people when they have the Principallity in their hands are various mutable unthankfull affirming that these faulâ—s are no otherwise in them than they are in particular Princes And if a man blamed both peoples and Princes together he might say true but exempting Princes he is deceiv'd For a people that rules and is well in order will be constant prudent and gratefull as well as a Prince or better though esteem'd wise And on the other side a Prince loosen'd from the law will be unthankfull various and imprudent more than the people and the diversitie of their proceeding arises not from the diversity of their dispositions because in all of them it is much after one manner and if there be any advantage on either side it is on the peoples part but rather that the one hath more regard to the lawes under which they live than the other And he that considers the people of Rome shall find that for four hundred years the name of a King was hatefull to them and yet were they zealous for the glory and common good of their countrey and he shall see many examples among them that witness the one thing and the other of them And if any man alleadge to mee the unthankfulnesse they used towards Scipio I answer that which formerly at large was sayd in this matter where it was made plaine that people are lesse ungratefull than Princes But as touching wisedome and settled stayednesse I say that a people is wiser and more stayd and of more exact judgment than a Prince And therefore not without cause the peoples voyce is likened to Gods voyce for wee see that the universall opinions bring to passe rare effects in their presages so that it seemes by their secret vertues they foresee their owne good or evill And touching their judgement in things it is seldome seene that when they heare two Oratours pleading each of them a contrary part when they are both of equall worth but that they follow the better opinion and are very capable of the truth they heare And if in matters of courage or in things that appeare profitable as it was abovesayd they erre many times also does a Prince erre drawne aside by his owne passions which are greater in them then in the people We see likewise in their choosing of Officers they make a farre better choice then does a Prince Nor will a people ever be perswaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life to which a Prince may easily and diverse wayes be brought We see a people begin to hate some one thing and continue many ages in the same opinion which we see not it a Prince And of the one and the other of these two things the people of Rome shall serve me for witnesse which in so many hundreds of yeares in so many electio 〈…〉 of Consulls and Tribuns never made foure choices whereof they had cause to repent them And they hated so much as I said the name of a King that no citizen of theirs could ever so farre oblige them that if once he affected the Royalty they would pardon his due punishment Moreover we see that in those cities where the Principality is in the people in a short time exceeding great increases are made and farre greater then those that have bin made under the government of a Prince as Rome did after the banishment of her Kings and Athens after she freed her selfe from Pisistratue which proceeds from nothing else but that the peoples governments are better then Princes Nor will we agree to this that all that our Historian sayes in the text before alleadged or any where else opposes this our opinion for if we shall run over all the disorders of peoples the disorders of Princes and all the glorious actions of people as those also of Princes we shall see the people farre surmount the Princes in vertue and in glory And if Princes exceede the people in ordaining of Lawes in framing a civill government in making of statutes and new institutions yet in the maintenance and preservation hereof the people go so farre beyond them that they attaine to the glory of their founders And in summe to conclude this matter I say that as Princes states have lasted long so likewise have those of Republiques and the one and the other have had need to be regulated by the lawes for a Prince that hath the power to doe what he list commits divers follies and a people that can do what they will seldome give great proofes of their wisdome If then the argument be touching a Prince and a people tied and chained to their lawes a man shall see more vertue in the People then in the Prince but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the lawes fewer errours will appeare in the people then in the Prince and those lesse and which are capable of greater remedies for a good man may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tumultuous people and so reduce them to reason But to a mischievous Prince no man can speake nor is there any other remedy but the sword Whereupon a man may guess at the importance of one and the others evill for if words are of Where he cut off the lappet of Sauls garment and therefore was checkt by his owne conscience And that in the Psalm 140. Touch not mine anointed c. Nor doe the heathen writers any thing give way hereunto wherefore Tacitus sayes Ferenda regum ingenia neque usui crebras mutationes Ann. 12. and Quomodo sterilitatem caetera naturae mala
our selves that we may be able to defend it These kindes of educations then and false interpretations cause that there be not so many Republiques now adayes in the world as were of old Nor by consequence do we see among people such an affection to liberty as formerly although I beleeve rather the reason hereof is because the Roman Empire with its force and power extinguish'd all the Republiques and free governments And though afterwards that Empire was dissolv'd yet could not the cities againe be restor'd and anew order'd in a civill government unlesse it were in very few places of that Empire Yet howsoever it was the Romans in every little corner of the world found as it were a conspiracy of Commonwealths very strongly arm'd and very obstinate to defend their liberties which shewes that the people of Rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conquest of them And to give an example of some member thereof that of the Samnires shall sâ—ffice me who and indeed it is admirable and so Titus Livius avowes it were so powerfull and warlike that they were of force till the time of Papirius Cursor the Consul sonne of the first Papirius to resist the Romans which was for the space of forty six yeares after so many routes destruction of their townes and so many slaughters made in their country especially considering the country then where so many cities were and such a vast number of men though now almost not inhabited And then there was such order and so great force that it was insuperable had it not bin assaulted by a Roman power And it is an easy thing to know whence that order and this disorder arise for all that came from the free manner of living then and this from the slavery now For all countries and provinces which live free in every part as formerly I said make exceeding large progresses for here we see the people more numerous because the marriages are more free and desir'd by men being that every one willingly begets those children which he beleeves he can bring up and nourish without doubting their patrimony will be ravish'd from them and when he knowes they are borne free and not slaves so that by meanes of their vertue they may become Princes We see riches likewise increase there in greater measure as well those which arise from cultivation as those which are gotten by the trades of handicraftsmen for every one is more provident in gaining and multiplying of those goods which when he hath gotten he beleeves he shall peaceably injoy From whence it comes to passe that men even contend who shall more advance the private and publique good so that the one and the other increase exceedingly The contrary hereof followes in al those countries that live in servitude and so much the more faile they of their accustomed good by how much their servitude is harder And of all hard servitudes none exceeds that which is subject to a free Republique because ordinarily it is of longest continuance and so least hopes there are of being deliver'd from it a second reason is the end of a Republique is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her whereby to augment her owne Which thing a Prince that brings thee under his rule does not especially if it be not some Barbarian Prince a ruiner of countries and a destroyer of all civill societyes among men as are the easterne Princes But if any of them have bin instructed in humane customes and the arts ordinary among men they most commonly affect equality in the cities they have subdued and let them still possesse all their arts and ancient customes so that if they cannot increase as in liberty they goe not to wracke as in thraldome speaking of that thraldome into which cities fall when they serve a stranger for I have formerly spoken enough of subjection to a native Whosoever then considers well all that which is said will not much marvaile at the power which the Samnites had being free nor at their weakenesse into which afterwards they fell by servitude And Titus Livius gives us good testimony thereof in many places in Hanniballs warres where he declares that the Samintes being oppressed by one Legion of souldiers that were in Nola sent Ambassadours to Hanniball to intreat him for succours whose speeches were to this purpose that they had for a hundred yeares warr'd with the Romans serving themselves onely of their owne souldiers and Captaines and had many times withstood two Consular armies and two Consuls and that now they were brought so low they had much a doe to defend themselves from one small Roman legion that was in Nolâ—â— CHAP. III. Rome became a great citie by ruining those that were near neighbours to her and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignisies ALL this while Rome wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba. Those that intend a city should farre inlarge the bounds of her domnions ought withall indeavour provide that she be well fraught with inhabitants for without a great multitude of men in her she will never be able to grow great And this is done two wayes either by love or by force by love holding the wayes open and secure to strangers that might have a design to come and dwell in it to the end that every one might come willingly to inhabit it by force ruining and defacing the neighbour cities and sending out the inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine all which was punctually observ'd in Rome so that in the timeof the sixth King in Rome there dwelt 80 thousand men able to beare armes for the Romans meant to behave themselves like the good husbandman who to make a plant grow big and fructify and ripen well its fruits cuts off the firstsprouts it thrusts forth that so the vertue thereof remaining yet in the roote of the plant may shortly after bring forth others more lively and fruitfull And that this course held was necessary and good for the founding and inlarging of an Empire the Example of Sparta and Athens shewes us plaine who being both very warlike Republiques and furnished with excellent lawes yet could they never attaine to the Roman Empires greatnesse which seemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not so well ordered as they whereof can be alleadged no other reason then that aforesaid For Rome having inlarged by those two wayes the body of her city was able to put in armes six hundred and 80 thousand souldiers whereas Sparta and Athens never exceeded each of them twenty thousand men Which proceeded not from that the scituation of Rome was more bountifull then theirs but onely from the different course they tooke for Licurgus founder of the Spartan Republique considering that nothing could soone take away the power of his lawes then a commixtion of new inhabitants did what he could to hinder strangers from living with them and that they should neither joyne matrimonies with them nor admit them
or united it was not ami's to let them overcome one another and that afterwards the Church with her allies should assaile the conqueror and it was impossible to find a better occasion then the present both being incamped and so the Pope having his forces in order whereby he might be able to present himself upon the confines of Lombardy near the two armies under colour of guarding his own state should there abide till they had fought their battell which in all probability each army being very valorous could not but prove bloody to them both and leave the Conqueror so feeble that the Pope might easily assaile and break him and thereby he should attain to become Lord of Lombardy and only arbitrator of all Italy And how erroneous this opinion was appear'd by the event of the matter for the Swissers being vanquish'd after a long fight the Popes and the Spanish soldiers were so far from assailing the Conquerors that they prepared themselves with what haste they could for flight which also would have little avail'd them had it not been for the Kings humanity or coldness in their pursuit who sought not after a second victory but was contented to make agreement with the Church This opinion hath some arguments for it which carry a colour of truth but indeed are far from it for it seldome comes to pass that the Conqueror loses many of his soldiers for of them there are some only slai in the battel and not in the flight and during the heat of the combat whiles men stand face to face one with another few of them fall especially because for the most part this continues but a small while And in case it should last long and many of the Conquerors should fall yet such is the reputation and terror also that victory draws with it that it far exceeds the dammage that by the death of those soldiers can be suffer'd So that an Army which upon the opinion that such a one were weakned going to assaile it would be much deceived unless it were such an Army that at all times before and after the victory were able to deale with it In this case the assailing Army may be able according to the fortune and valor it hath to win or lose but that which had formerly fought vanquish'd would have some advantage of the other Which appears plainly by the experience the Latins gave us and the fallacy by which Numicius the Pretour was abus'd as also by the dammage which those people brought upon themselves by beleeving him who when the Romans had vanquish'd the Latins cried out through all Latium that then was it time to assaile the Romans who were weakned with the late fight they had with the Latines that the Romans had carried away only the name of the victory but had suffered all other sorts of dammages even as much as if they had been overcome and that any small force if now a fresh it should assaile them were enough to dispatch them Whereupon those people that gave credit to him levied a new army and were presently defeated and so suffered that loss which others shall that hold the like opinion CHAP. XXIII How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects whensoever occasion was offer'd that constrain'd them thereunto avoided the mid way and rather betook themselves to one of the extreames THe Latins were now reduc'd to such termes that they could neither endure peace nor maintain War Of all unhappy conditions this is the worst unto which a Prince or Republick can be brought that they can neither accept of peace nor support the War unto which those are reduc'd who are overmuch offended at the conditions of peace and on the other side if they have a mind to make war either they must cast themselves as a prey into the hands of those that ayd them or become a prey to their enemy And into these mischances men fall by evil advices and evil courses by not having well weighed their own forces as before it was said for that Republique or Prince that should well weigh them very hardly would ever be brought to those termes the Latines came who when they should not have made accord with the Romans made it and when they should not have broke peace with them brake it Whereby they brought it so to pass that their agreement and disagreement with the Romans did equally endammage them The Latins then were overcome and much broken at first by Manlus Torquatus and afterwards by Camillus who having forc't them to yeeld and render themselves to the Romans and put Garrisons in all the I owns in Latium and taken hostages of them all when he came back to Rome related to the Senate that all Latium was in the people of Romes hands And because this judgement is remarkable and deserves note to the end it may be follow'd when Princes have the like occasions given them I will produce the very words that Livie put in Camillus his mouth which did testifie both of the manner the Romans held in amplifying the State and that in their judgements touching the State they alwaies avoided the middle way and turn'd to the extreams for a government is nothing else but to have such a tye upon the subjects that they either cannot or will not hurt thee This is done either by making thy self fully sure of them in taking away from them all means to hurt thee or by doing them so much good that it is not probable they will wish to change their state all which is there comprehended first by the proposition Camillus made and afterwards by the judgement the Senate gave thereupon His words were these In this consultation the immortal Gods have given you so much power that it is wholly in your hands to chuse whether Latium shall continue still a Nation or no. And therefore now may ye for ever procure your selves repose and security from thence either by rigor and punishment or by clemency and pardon chuse ye whether Are ye minded to proceed by way of cruelty against those that have yeelded and are vanquish'd ye may indeed blot out the very name of Latium But will ye as your ancestors have done before you enlarge the Roman Empire by receiving into your City those whom ye have conquer'd Then have ye here means to grow mighty to your great glory Certes that government is of all other most sure where the subjects take joy in their obedience And therfore it is behoovefull whiles their mindes are in suspence between fear and hope to prevent them either with speedy punishment or benefit To this purpose followed the Senates deliberation which was according to the Consuls words for calling them Town by Town before them those that were of any moment they either much benefited or quite ruined them granting divers exemptions and priviledges to those they would do good to freely making them Citizens and giving them security every way They
with Hannibal was made a Captain over some certain number of slaves whom the Romans for want of men had put into armes ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude so hurtful a matter as it is said was it thought by the Romans to set men at nought and reproach them with any disgrace for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them whether it be spoken in earnest or in jeast Bitter taunts when they have too great a mingle of truth with them leave behind them a very distastfull remembrance CHAP. XXVII Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory for oftentimes when that suffices them not they lose it THE using of disgracefull words against the enemy proceeds most commonly from an insolencie which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to which false hope causes men to erre not only in their sayings but in their doings also for this hope when it enters into mens breasts makes them go beyond the point and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good and because this is a matter worthy consideration men often deceiving themselves to the dammage of their State I am of advice to shew it particularly by ancient examples and modern being it cannot so distinctly be prov'd by reasons Hannibal after he had defeated the Romans at Canna sent his Agents to Carthage to give them notice of the victory and to demand new supplies It was argued in the Senate what was fit to be done Hanno an old man and a discreet Citizen of Carthage advised to use this victory wisely and make peace with the Romans being that now they might have it upon reasonable termes having gained a battell and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battell lost for it should be the Carthaginians design to shew the Romans that they were able to deal with them and having gotten a victory they should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater This course was not taken but afterwards the Senate of Carthage understood that this was very good counsell when the occasion was lost When Alexander the Great had conquer'd all the Levant the Commonwealth of Tyre famous in those daies and puissant by reason that their City was seated in the water as Venice is seeing Alexanders greatness sent Ambassadors to him to tell him that they would become his faithfull servans and yeeld him what obedience he should desire but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their Town Whereat Alexander disdaining that any one City should shut her gates against him seeing he had forc'd all others open throughout the whole world would not accept their conditions but rejected them and forthwith sent his army thither That Town stood in the water and was well provided with victualls and other munition fit for defence so that Alexander after four moneths spent considering that one City took away all that time from his glory which many other great conquests never did and therefore determined to try an agreement and to grant what they of themselves had asked But they of Tyre being grown insolent hereupon not only refused the conditions but slew those that came to treat with them Whereupon Alexander all enraged at this affront so stronly assaulted the Town that he took it destroy'd it and slew or made slaves all the men therein A Spanish Army came upon the Florentines Territories to restore the Medici into Florence and to lay some taxes upon the Town being hired hereunto by some Citizens inhabiting therein who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their Country they would take armes in favour of them they comming into the plain and none of these discovering themselves to be for them because they had want of victualls tryed to make an agreement whereupon the Florentines grown proud would not accept of any upon which occasion followed the loss of Prato and the ruine of that State Therefore Princes cannot commit a greater error when they are assail'd in case the assailants are far more puissant then they then to refuse all termes of agreement especially when they are proffer'd them for never will such poor ones be offerd wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them and some part of his victory Wherefore the Tyrians should have satisfied themselves that Alexander accepted those conditions he had formerly refused and their victory had been great enough when with their armes in hand they had made so mighty a Prince as he to yeeld to their demands It should have sufficed the Florentines also and they had gotten a good victory too if the Spanish army gave way to any of their desires though they had not fulfilled all of them for that armies design was to change the State of Florence to take away her devotion to France and to draw some monies from her When of these three the people had yeelded to two which were the last and had gotten themselves but one which was the preservation of their state they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction nor should the people have troubled themselves for the other two things one remaining to them nor should they have offered sing they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortunes discretion trying even the extremity thereof which never any wise man will endanger himself in unless it be upon necessity Hanniball being departed out of Italy where he had been very glorious for sixteen years recalled by his own country men the Carthaginians to releive his native Country found Asdruball and Siphax defeated the Kingdome of Numidia lost and Carthage restrain'd within the compass of her own walls which had no other refuge but him and his army and knowing that was his Countries last hopes he would not hazard it till he had first made trial of all other remedies nor was he asham'd to ask peace judging that if there was any way to save his Country it was by that and not by war which being refused him though he had been sure to lose he would not faile to fight thinking that it might fall out so that possible it was for him to overcome and if lose it he must lose it gloriously And if Hanniball who was so valorous a captain and had his army intire did require peace before he would hazard the battell when he perceived that in losing it his country would be subdued what should another of less valor and experience then he do But men run into this error by not knowing how to limit their hopes so that grounded on their own vast conceits without weighing their strengths they are utterly ruin'd CHAP. XXVIII How dangerous a thing it is for a Republick or Prince not to revenge an injury
them for their execution maugre the power of those that break them The executions whereof before the sacking of Rome by the French were notable the death of Brutus his sons the death of those of the Decemvirate that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corne after the taking of Rome was the death of Manlius Capitolinus the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus the execution which Papirius Cursor did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie the accusation of the Scipios which things being they were extraordinary remarkable whenosever any of them did chance caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule and when these began to fall out seldom then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught and become more dangerous and tumultuous for from one to another of such like executions there should not pass more than ten years time for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes and unless something chance which anew calls the punishment to memory and puts them in fear thereof there meer together so many delinquents that without danger they cannot be punished To this purpose they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fift year to reforme the State otherwise it was hard to maintain it and they call'd reforming of the State to put that terror and fear in men which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations and speak ill of the present State and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds Also this bringing back of Republiques to their beginnings arises sometimes from the plain vertue of some one man without dependance on any law inciting thee to any execution yet are they of so great reputation and of such remarke that the good men desire to follow them and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects were Horatius Cocles Scevola Fabritius the two Decij Regulus Attilius and some others who by their rare and worthy examples in Rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this City it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome the corruptions multiplied for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more seen And though in Rome there arose the two Catoes yet such was the distance between him and them and between them from th' one to th' other and they remained so alone that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing and especially the last Cato who finding a great part of the City corrupted could not prevaile so by his example as to better his Citizens And this may suffice for Republicks But touching Religions wee see also these reformations are necessary by example of our Religion which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by Saint Francis and Saint Dominique it would have been quite defac'd for these by their poverty and their imitation of Christs life made a new impression thereof in mens minds which was quite blotted our thence and their new rules were so powerfull and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates and the heads of the Religion do not ruine it partly by their living in poverty and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people and preaching to them whereby they give them to understand that it is evill to speak evil against him that is evill and that it is good rather to live in obedience to them and if they are faulty to leave them to the chastisement of God And so they offend the most they can for they feare not the punishment they see not and beleeve not This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion Kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings And wee see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other Kingdom else Of which lawes and customes the Parliaments are the principal maintainers and especially that of Paris which restores them again to life whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm and that they condemn the King in their sentences and till this present it hath maintained it self by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished and they chance to multiply without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder or that Kingdom come to a dissolution Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politick government Sect Kingdom or Commonwealth that it be than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had and take a care that either the customes be good or the men good that they may rather work this effect that it be not left to some forraign force to do it For however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy as it prov'd to Rome yet is it so dangerous that it is in no case to be desir'd And to make it appear to any man how much the actions of particular men served to advance Romes greatness and wrought many good effects in that City I will come to the narration and discourse of them within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third Book and last part of this first decade And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable being the History sets them down at large we shall omit them nor speak of them otherwise unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage and here we will begin with Brutus Father of the Roman liberty CHAP. II. It is a very great part of wisdome sometime to seem a fool NO man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did as Junius Brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool and though Titus Livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto which was to live in security and preserve his patrimony yet if we consider his manner of proceeding we may beleeve that he thus dissembled to the end he might be less observed have the more conveniency to suppress the Kings and free his Country upon any occasion offered And that he thought upon this it appears first in the interpretation he made of Apolloes Oracle when he fained to fall down that he might kiss
Prince There may then his brothers or his sons be left or other of his allyes to whom the Principality may belong may be left alive by thy negligence or upon some occasions formerly spoken of that may execute this revenge as it befell John Andreas of Lampognano who together with his Complotters having slain the Duke of Milan and there being left alive one son of his and two brothers they were ready at hand time enough to revenge his death And truly in this case these conspirators are excusable because they have here no remedy but when any of them survives for lack of good advisement or through their negligence then indeed thereis no excuse to be made for them Some conspirators at Forly slew Count Ierolamus their Lord took prisoners his wife and sons which were but little ones and thinking they could have no security unless they became masters of the fortress which the governour was not willing to give into their hands whereupon the Lady Katherine for so the Countess was called promised the Traitors that if they would let her enter therein she would cause it to be delivered up to them and that they should keep her sons for pledges They upon her word thus given suffered her to enter in who so soon as shee was within the walls reproached them with the murder of her husband and threatned them with all manner of revenge to let them know shee had no regard of her children she shewed them her privy parts saying she had the means left her to bring forth others so that they not knowing what to do and too late perceiving their own error suffered perpetual exile in punishment of their lack of wit But of all dangers that can befall after the execution there is node mone certain nor more terrible then when the people is a friend to that Prince thou hast slain for against this the conspirators can have no remedy for they can never secure themselves We have Caesar for example hereof who because he had the people of Rome to friend was by their means revenged for when they had chased the conspirators from Rome they caused all of them in several places to be slain Treasons that are practised against ones own Countrey are less dangerous for those that work them then those that are practised agaist Princes for in the ordering of them the dangers are less then in the others and in executing of them they are the same and after the execution there is none at all In the plotting and working them the dangers are not many for a Citizen may frame himself so as to be capable of power without manifesting his mind therein or intention to any one and unless those his purposes receive some interruption he may happily proceed in his design but if any law made chance to cross them he must stay his time and seek some other course This is to be understood of a Republique where in corruption is entred in some part for in one not corrupted no evil beginning taking 〈◊〉 place there these thoughts cannot enter into the heart of any citizen The Citizens then may by several means and many waies aspire unto the Principality where they run no hazard of being oppress'd as well because Republiques are more slew then a Prince and stand less in doubt â—â—h refore are less wary as also because they carry more respect towards their principal citizens and therefore are they the more audacious and more insolent to practise against them Few there are but have read Catalines conspiracy written by Salust know how that afterwards when it was discovered Cataline did not only abide in Rome but came into the Senate-house spoke in villanous termes against the Senate and the Consul so great was the respect that that City bore to her Citizens so that when he was departed from Rome and had his Armies already on foot Lentulus nor those others had never been layd hold on had not there been letters of his own hand brought against him which manifestly accused him Hanno the most potent Citizen in Carthage aspiring to a Tyranny had provided at the marriage of one of his own daughters to poison all the Senate and afterwards make himself Prince When this matter was known the Senate took no other order then to make a law which limited the excess of expences anbanquets and weddings such was the respect they bore to men of their qualities It is very true that in the executing of a treason against ones native Country there is more difficulty and greater dangers for very seldome is it that thy own forces suffice being to conspire against so many for every one hath not an Army at his command as Cesar Agathocles or Clâ—omenes and such like who at one pluck have been able to seise on the Country for unto such the way is easie and safe enough But others that have not such advantages of forces must do it either with some slight or artifice or by the aide of forraine forces As for slights and tricks Pisistratus the Athenian having over come the Megarenses and thereby got credit with the people one morning came out among them wounded saying The nobility through envy had thus wrong'd him and ask'd leave of them for his defence to have a guard of armd men about him By this power he easily attain'd to such greatness that he brought Athens under his Tyranny Pandulfus Petrucci return'd himself with others that were out-law'd into Siena there he had the charge given him over the common guard of Justice as a Mecanick office and which others refus'd yet in time those arm'd men gave him such reputation that shortly after he became Lord of the Town Many others have used other endeavors and other waies and in a short space and without danger have attained to the same Those that by their own force or by help of forrain-forces have conspir'd to make themselves Lords over their native Countries have had several successes as fortune hath befriended them or otherwise Cataline we spoke of before was ruined thereby Hanno of whom we formerly made mention when the poison took not effect armed many thousands of his partisans who with himself were all slain Some of the prime Citizens of Thebes to the end they might become Lords of the Town called to their aid a Sparian army and so took upon them the rule of that City So that when we shall have examined all the conspiracies made against a Country we shall not find any at least very few that in the plotting thereof have been suppressed but all of them either have taken effect or bin ruined in the execution rather When they are once acted they carry not with them any further dangers then the nature of a Principality hath in it self for when a man hath once gotten to be a Tyrant he hath his own proper and ordinary dangers belonging to him against which there are no other remedies then those we have
because that in the one and other of these two ways the convenient terms are transgressed being that they cannot hit upon the true way both in the one and the other they fail But he fails least and oftnest lights upon good success that meets as I have said time in its own way and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward Every one knows how Fabius Maximus proceeded with his Army carefully and warily far from all that kind of metle and confidence which other whiles the Romans used and his good fortune would have it that this his way agreed well with the times for Hannibal being come a young man into Italy and with a fresh gale of fortune and having twice broken the Romane Armies and that Republike almost lost all her good soldiers and therefore being affrighted could not light upon better fortune than to have such a Captain who by his slowness and wariness should keep the enemy in play with vain delaies Nor could Fabius have met with times fitter for his ways whereupon came it to pass that he grew glorious And that Fabius did this upon the instigation of his own nature and not upon a meer choice we see that when Scipio desired to pass over into Affrica with those Armies whereby to make an end of the war Fabius much contradicted it as he that could not go out of his own pace nor leave his own custome so that for all him Hannibal might have continued still in Italy for he perceived not that the times were changed and it was needful to alter the manner of making war And had Fabius been King of Rome he might easily have spoiled that war because he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times But being he was born in a Republike where there was divers Citizens and divers humors as she had Fabius who was excellent in those times when the war was onely to be supported so had she Scipio in the times when their enemies were to be overcome Whence arises it that a Republike hath a longer life and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality because she can better fit her self for several accidents by reason of the variety of her Subjects that are in her then can a Prince for a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner never alters as it is said and must of necessity when the times disagree with his way go to wrack Peter Soderini formerly spoken of proceeded in all his affairs with mildness and patience and he and his Country prospered while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings but when the times fell out so that it was needful to break off all patience and mildness he knew not how to do it so that together with his Country he fell to ruine Pope Julius the second carried himself all the time of his Pontificate with great violence and rage and because the times sorted well therewith all his undertakings succeeded well But if other times had come that would have required other advice of force he must have gone to destruction because he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings And that we cannot change our selves there are two reasons the one because we cannot resist that which our nature is inclined to the other is because when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily it is impossible to perswade him that things will prove well where hee proceeds otherwise Whereupon it comes to pass that in one man fortune varies because shee changes the times and he changes not his courses Thence arises also the ruine of a City because the orders of Common wealths change not with the times as we have treated heretofore at large but they are flower for it is a greater trouble to them to change and to effect it they have need of times which should in a manner take a Republick quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration should be made in her for which one man alone suffices not by changing the manner of her proceedings And because wee have made mention of Fabius Maximus who held off Hannibal with delayes I purpose to treate in the following Chapter whether a Captain being desirous to fight a battel with the enemy in any case can be so hindred that he do it not CHAP. X. That a Captain cannot avoid battell when his enemy will fight in any case CNeus Sulpitius the dictator held off from fighting with the French being not willing to stand at fortunes discretion in a tryall against his enemy whom time and a strange Country would continually weaken and consume When such an error enâ—ues where all men or the greater part of them erre I think it not much amiss mary times to reprove it Wherefore though I have formerly several times shewed how the actions about great matters now adays differ from those of ancient times yet I think it not superfluous at this present to repeat it for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders it is especially in military orders where now is not any of those things observed which the ancients made much account of And this inconvenient grew first hereupon because Commonwealths and Princes have committed this care to oâ—hers and to avoid dangers have much laiâ— aside that exercise and if perchance sometime a King in our days venture to go in person we believe not therefore that he seeks out any new orders that are more commendable for when they chance to give themselves to that imployment they do it rather in shew of their pompe then upon any other laudable occasion Yet do these commit lesser errors personally visiting their armies and keeping in their own hands the Majesty of their Government then Republikes do especially those of Italy which trust to others not understanding any thing in the wars or attending to any thing belonging to them and on the other side when they are desirous whereby they may seem to be Princes to take any thing into deliberation they commit therein exceeding many errors And however that other where I have treated of some of them yet at this present I will not forbear to tell one of very great importance When these lazy Princes or effeminate Commonwealths send forth any Commander of theirs the wisest commission that they think they can give him is to charge him that in any case he fight not a battel but avoid it and conceiting with themselves that herein they imitate Fabius Maximus his discretion who by forbearing to fight saved the Romane State they understand not that most commonly this commission is either to no purpose or else hurtful For we must take this for a conclusion that a General that will abide in the field cannot avoid a battel when the enemy will in any case fight So that this commission is but thus as if he should say fight with thine enemy at his pleasure and not at thine
otherwhere being no more in doubt of the issue of her warrs thought she might give the Command of her Armies to whom she pleas'd not so much regarding their vertues as their other qualities ingratiating them with the people for we see Paulus Emilius had several repulses in demanding the Consulate before he was made Consul till the Macedonian war chanc'd which because it was thought dangerous by general consent of the City was committed to him In our City of Florence after the year 1494. many warrs following one upon the neck of the other and all the Citizens of Florence having made unlucky tryal of themselves the City by chance lit upon one man who-shewed them the manner how their Armies were to be commanded which was Antoni Giacomini and whiles the warrs in hand were perillous the other Citizens ambitions ceas'd and in the election of Commissary or Commander of their Armies he had no competitor stood with him But when as any war was to be made where no hazard was but a great deal of honor and dignity he found alwaies so many competitors that they being to make election of there Commissaries to beleager Piza he was left out of the number And however it was not perceiv'd evidently that evill would befall the State because Antony was not sent thither yet may we easily conjecture because the Pisans having no means for further defence or sustenance had Antony been sent thither they would before that have been so straightly beset that they should have surrendred themselves to the Florentines directions But they being besieged by Commanders that understood not how to begirt nor force them were so long held in hand that the City of Florence bought them whereas they might have had them by force It was likely that such a distaste with Antony might have done much and he had need truly of much patience and so good a disposition as not to desire revenge hereupon either with the destruction of the City if he were able or with the wrong of any particular Citizen where of a Republick ought to beware as in the Chapter following we shall treate CHAP. XVII That he who hath receiv'd any notable disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Commonwealth should never after be intrusted by them with any imployment or service of importance A Commonwealth should be well advis'd never to commit any weighty service to any one to whom any notable injury hath been done Claudius Nero who left his Army which he had lying in front against Hannibal and with part thereof went into the Marches to find the other Consul to combate Asdrubal before he should joyn with Hannibal had formerly in Spain been incamp'd against Asdrubal and having shut him up in a place with his Army so that Asdrubal was either to fight at disadvantage or perish by famin was cunningly by Asdrubal so long held in hand with certain treaties of agreement that hee scap'd him and took from him the opportunity he had to suppress him Which thing being known at Rome got him great discredit as well with the Senate as the people and he was spoken of very disgracefully throughout the City to his great disreputation and despight thereat too but being afterwards made Consul and sent against Hannibal took the course we have said which was a very dangerous one so that Rome was amazed and in tumults till news arived of Asdrubals defeat and Claudius being afterwards asked on what ground he undertook so dangerous a course where without an extream necessity he had hazarded the liberty of Rome answer'd that he had done it because if it prov'd lucky he should recover the glory he had formerly lost in Spain and if it fayl'd him and this course fell out cross he knew he should be reveng'd of that City and those Citizens who had unthankfully and undiscreetly wrong'd him And when these passions arising from such offences are of such force in a Citizen of Rome and in those dayes before corruption was crept into Rome we may well ghesse how powerfull they are in a Citizen of such a City that is not so regulated nor order'd as she then was and because to such like disorders which grow up in Common-wealths no certain remedy can be assign'd there followes an impossibility to frame a perpetual Commonwealth for by many unexpected waies desiruction breaks in upon it CHAP. XVIII There is nothing more worthy of a Commander than to be able to discover before haâ—d and espye out the enemies practises EPaminondas the Theban said that nothing was more advantageous or useful to a Commander than to know the enemies designes and purposes and because it is hard to attaine to that knowledge â—he deserves the greater commendations who takes such a course that he ghesses it out And it is not so hard to discover the enemies purposes as some times to understand his actions and not so much his actions which by him are done a far off as those present and near hand for it hath many times chanc'd that a fight having continued til night he hath vanquished that thinks he hath loâ— and he lost that thought he had overcome which error hath caus'd some to take resolutions clean contrary to their own good as it befell Brutus and Cassius who upon this mistake lost their war for Brutus having overcome on his wing Cassius beleev'd he had lost that the whole Army was broken and upon this error despairing of his own safety slew himself In our daies in the battell at Saint Cecily in Lombardy that Francis the King of France sought with the Swissers the night overtaking them that part of the Swissers which remained entire thought they had got the victory knowing nothing of those that had been broken and slain Which error was the occasion that they themselves escap'd not staying to fight again on the morning much at their disadvantage such like error also caused to mistake and well near ruined thereby the Popes the Spanish Army which upon this false advice of victory passed the Po and had it gone never so little on for warder had been prisoner to the French who were the Conquerors The like error to this happened in the Romans Campe and in that also of the Equi where Sempronius the Consul was with the Army to enconnter the enemy and the battell being joyned the combat lasted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other side and night being come each Army being halfe broken neither of them returned to their quarters but both of them chose rather to withdraw themselves unto the adjoyning hills where they thought they might beÌ„ more secure and the Roman Army divided itself into two parts whereof the one went with the Consul the other with one Tempanius a Centurion whose valor that day kept the Roman Army from being wholly routed the morning being come the Roman Consul without hearing further of the enemy retired towards Rome and the like did the Equies
Nobleman whereupon such a tumult was rais'd that they came to blowes where the Nobility was in armes in favour of the Nobleman and the Commons in favour of the Plebeyan so that the Commons having the worse went out of Ardea and sent for ayd to the Volsci and the Nobles sent to Rome The Volsci were there first and as soon as they arrived they sat down before Ardea The Romans came afterwards upon them and inclosed the Volsci between the Town and them so that they forc'd them brought to it by famine to yeeld to their discretion And the Romans entring into Ardea and putting to death the principals of the sedition accorded all the matters of that City In this text are many things to be observed First we see that women have been the occasions of many destructions and have brought great mischiefes upon the Governors of Cities and have caused many dissentions in them And as it hath been already seen in this our Story that excess committed against Lucretia lost the Tarquins their State That other act against Virginia deprived the ten of their power And Aristotle among the principal occasions hee shewes of Tyrants destructions reckons the injuries they did some others for their women in deflowring and ravishing them or defiling their marriage beds as touching this part in the Chapter where we treated of Conspiracies we spoke at large I say then that absolute Princes and Governors of Commonwealths are to take no smaller care hereof but ought well consider the disorders which may grow upon such an accident and remedy it in time so that the remedy be neither with the hurt nor disgrace of their state or Commonwealth as it befell the Ardeates who for having suffered that difference to increase among Citizens came to take part with their several tactions and when they would have reunited themselves were forc'd to send for forrain ayds which is the beginning of a servitude at hand But let us come to the other remarkeable thing of the manner of reuniting Cities whereof in the Chapter following we mean to treate CHAP. XXVII How a City at discord in it self is to be united and how that opinion is not true that to maintain Cities in obedience it is necessary to keep them in discord and divided into factions BY the example of the Roman Consuls who made a reconciliation among the Ardeates the way is shewed how matters are to be composed in a City at variance which is no other nor can otherwaies be held then by putting to death the chief ringleaders of seditions for of necessity one of these three waies is to be goneeither to put them to death as they did or remove them out of the City or cause them to make peace one with another with assurance given not to wrong either the other Of these three waies this last is the most pernicious less certain and most unprofitable for it is unpossible where much blood hath been shed and other like outrages that a peace made by force should continue looking one another in the face every day and it is very hard for them to forbear injuring one another being there may every day be given amongst them by reason of their dayly conversation new occasions of quarrels Whereupon a better example cannot be alledged then the City of Pistoya That City was divided as still it is fifteen years agoe into the Panciatichi and the Cancellieri but then were they in armes now they have laid them aside And after many brabbles among them they came at length to the shedding of blood to demolishing of houses and pillaging of goods and to all other termes of hostilitie And the Florentines that were to reconcile them alwaies took that third course and thereupon alwaies arose greater tumults and greater scandals So that weary hereof they came to take that secoud course to remove the heads of the factions some of which they put in prison others they confined in several places in so much as the agreement was able to continue and so hath done till this present day but without doubt the safest way had been the first But because such like executions have some thing in them of greatness of spirit and magnanimity a feeble Republick knows not how to put them in practise but is so far there from that hardly arrives she to use the second remedy And these are some of those errors of which I spake in the beginning that the Princes of our times commit being to give their judgements in matters of weight for they should have a mind to se how they have carried themselves who of old have deliverd their opinions in like cases But the weakness of men now a daies caused by their weak education and their little knowledge of things makes them esteem those opinions of the ancients partly in human partly impossible Whereas they have certain of their moderne opinions quite contrary to the truth as is that where the wise man of our City a while agoe said it was neeedfull to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa with Cittadells nor perceive they how unprofitable the one and the other of these things is I will pass over the Cittadels because formerly wee spake of them at large now discourse of the incommodity that arises from holding the Towns thou hast under thy government divided into factions And touching the former it is impossible thou canst maintain both those ancient factions Prince or Republick thou art that governst them for by nature men are inclined to take part in any thing that is divided and to be pleased more with this than with that so that the having a faction in that Town discontented with thee is a cause that the first war that comes thou losest it for it is impossible to guard a City that hath enemies without dors within dores If it be a Republick that governes this City there is no readier way to make thy Subjects become nought and to set thy City at variance than by having in thy dominions a Town thus at odds for each faction seeks favour and each part strives to gain friends by all manner of corruption so that two very great inconveniences arise thereupon the one is that thou canst never make them thy friends because thou canst not well govern them the rule ofttimes varying sometimes with the one humor sometimes with the other the other is that that favouring of sides must needs divide thy Republick And Blondus speaking of the Florentines and the Pistoyeses tells us certainly that while the Florentines thought to reconcile those of Pistoya they divided themselves Whereupon wee may easily perceive the evill which grows upon this division In the yeare 1501. when Aretium was lost and the whole vale of Tiber and that of Chiana was taken by the Vitelli and the Duke Valentine there came a Gentleman call'd de Lant sent by the King of France to cause a restitution of all those Towns lost to the Florentines again and this
shal take this order in a City assailed will easily be able to defend themselves whoever does otherwise shal neither imitate Camillus nor defend himself CHAP. XXXI Powerfull Commonwealths and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity AMong other matters of magnificence that our Historian brings in Camillus speaking or doing to shew how an excellent man ought to behave himself he puts these words in his mouth Neithor did my Dictatorship elevate my courage nor hath my banishment abated it By which words we see that great personages are alwaies the same in all fortunes And though she varies now exalting them and then bringing them low they never differ from themselves but alwaies hold a constant resolution so steadily fastened to their ordinary course of living that by every one of them it appears that chance hath no power over them Weake men behave themselves in another manner for they befoole and besot themselves in good fortune attributing all the good they have to those vertues which they never knew whence it proceeds that they grow insupportable and odious to those that are about them whereupon depends the sudden alteration of fortune which so soon as they look once in the face they fall presently into the other defect and become vile and abject From hence it comes that such manner of of Princes thinke rather in adversitie how to make an escape than to stand upon their defence as those that for having made evil use of good fortune are not prepared for any kind of safegard This vertue and this vice which I say is found in one man alone we find also in a Republike of which the Romanes and the Venetians serve us for example Those former never any bad fortune could make abject nor any good fortune insolent as it manifestly appeared after the defeat they had at Canna and after the victory they got against Antiochus for upon that defeat however a very great one because it had been the third together they never grew base upon it but continued to send forth Armies they would not redeem prisoners against the orders they had made nor send to Hannibal or Carthage to ask peace but casting aside all those unworthy courses they thought still upon providing for the war arming for want of souldiers their old men and slaves Which thing being known to Hanno the Carthaginian as was said before he shewed that Senate what small account they were to make of that defeat at Canna And so it appeared as those hard times did not affright nor abase them on the other part neither did their more fortunate times puffe them up for when Antiochus sent Ambassadors to Scipio to require an agreement before they came to joyn battel or that he had lost it Scipio gave him certain conditions of peace which were that he should retire into Syria and leave the rest to the Romans disposing which Antiochus refusing and coming to battel and losing it sent again his Ambassadors to Scipio with order that he would submit to all those conditions which the Conqueror should impose on him to whom he propounded no other conditions than what he had fomerly offered before the victory adding these words That the Romanes if they be overcome lose not their courages nor when they overcome grow they insolent Clean contrary hereunto we have seen the Venetians do who in their prosperity thinking they had gotten it by their own valor which they never were guilty of grew to such an excess of insolence that they termed the King of France Saint Marks son they contemned the Church and their ambition all Italy would not hold but imagined they were to frame a Monarchy like that of the Romanes Afterwards their good fortune abandoning them and that they were a little routed by the King of France at Vayla they not onely lost all their State by rebellion but a good part of it they gave up to the Pope and the King of Spaine even through meer baseness and cowardise And they became so vile and abject that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor to offer themselves to be his tributaries and writ letters to the Pope full of baseness and submission whereby to move him to compassion Into which unhappiness they fell in four days space and after a half defeat for their Army come to battel and to fight in their retreat lost near one half of their men yet so that one of their Proveditors that escaped came to Verona with above five and twenty thousand souldiers between foot and horse in case that if either the Venetians or any of their orders had been of value they might easily have recovered themselves and looked fortune again in the face and have been ready either to overcome or lose more gloriously or get more honorable terms of agreement but the baseness of their spirits caused by the quality of their orders nothing good in matters touching the war made them at once lose both their State and courage And so will it alwaies befall any that shall behave themselves as they did for this growing insolent in good fortune and abject in evill arises from the manner of thy proceeding and from the education wherein thou hast been traind up Which when it is weak vain makes thee like to it self when otherwise it casts thee in another manner of mould and makes thee know the world better rejoycing less at the good besalls thee as also grieving less at the evill comes upon thee and that which is said of one man alone is said also of many that live in the same Commonwealth who attain to that perfection which the order and manner of government thereof wil afford And though otherwhere we have said that the foundation of all States is good military discipline and where this is not there can neither be good lawes nor any other thing good methinks it is not more than needs to repeate it again for to many purposes in the reading of this Story wee see this necessity appeares and wee see that neither can the soldiers be good unless they be traind and practis'd nor can they be train'd unless compos'd of thy own subjects for the wars do not alwaies last unpossible it is they should therefore is it necessary to be able to practise this military exercise in time of peace neither can this exercise be us'd in regard of the expence with others then with thy own subjects Camillus was gone as we said before with the Army against the Tuscans and his souldiers hāving seen the greatness of the enemies Army were much amazd at it thinking themselves too weak to sustain the violence of their enemies the rumor of this fearefulness comming to Camillus his eares he came forth abroad amongst them and going about through the Camp speaking now to one soldier and then to another workt this opinion out of their heads and in conclusion without any otherwise ordering of his
to confine eight or ten thousand men with extraordinary hard conditions had it been to one man alone much more to so many As it befell those souldiers who had fought unfortunately at Canna whom she confined to Sicily and layd this on them that they should never lodge in any Townes andshould always eate standing But of all the other execution the most terrible was that decimation of armies where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death Nor could there to chastise a whole multitude a more horrible punishment be found for when a multitude offends where the author is not certain all cannot suffer because they are too many and to punish one part and let the other go scotfree were to wrong those they should punish and those that escaped free would be encouraged to offend another time But to put to death the tenth part by lot when all deserve it he that suffers blames his evill fortune and he that escapes is afraid least that another time the lot may fall on him and so is wary not to offend Those empoisoners then Baccanalls were punished as their offences deserved And however these diseases in a republick produce evill effects yet are they not deadly for that almost alwayes there is time given to correct them but there is hardly any leasure in those that regard the state which unless they fall under the hand of some wise man ruine the City There was in Rome by reason of the liberality the Romans used in bestowing the Burgeouship freedom of their City upon strangers so many new people borne that they began to have such a part in the suffnages that the government began to vary and parted with those things and from those men by whom it was accustomed to walke Which Q. Fabius who was then Censor perceiving the placed all these new people upon whom this disorder depended under four Tribes to the end that being reduced into so small spaces they might not corrupt the whole City of Rome This thing was well understood by Fabius and by him was there a convenient remedy applied without much change which was so well accepted by the City that they always after gave him the title of Maximus Nicolas Machiavel to Zanobius Buondelmontius and Cosimus Rucelayus health I Send you a present which if it answers not my obligations to you yet certainly is it the greatest that Nicolas Machiavel could commend unto you for herein I have expressed what I know and what I have learned by a long experience and continnal reading of the affairs of the world And being that neither you nor any body else can look for more of me you have no reason to complain I have given you no more Well may you be sorry at the feebleness of my understanding being that these relations of mine here are but weake and at the errour of my judgment being that I my self several times in my discourses am deceived Which being so I know not which of us is the less beholding the one to the other either I to you who have forced me to wriâ—e that which of my own self I should never have undertaken or you to me who have given you but smal satisfaction in my writings Receive this then so as things should be taken by friends where more regard is had to the good will of him that sends then to the worth of what is sent And beleeve that herein I have one alone satisfaction when I think that however perchance I may have erred in many circumstances herein in this alone I know I have not fail'd in making choise of you to whom before all others I may dedicate these my discourses partly because in thus doing I have shewed some thankfulness for the good turnes you have done me and partly for that me thinks I have quit the common custome of those that write who use alwayes to dedieate all their works to Princes and blinded by ambition and covetousness attribute to him the commendations of all vertuous qualities whereas they ought to blame him for what is faulty in him Whereupon that 's I may not run into this error I have made choice not of those that are Princes but of those that for their many good parts might deserve well to be so nor of those that are able to bestow preferments honours nor wealth upon me but of those who though they are not powerfull yet are they willing to do well for me for men if they would carry a right judgment should esteem of those that in themselves are and not of those that have the means to be liberall and so of those that understand how to governe and not of those that without understanding have the government of a kingdom And writers commend rather Hieron of Siracusa when he was a private man then Perse of Macedon when he was a King For Hieron wanted nothing else of being a Prince then a Principality that other had no part of a King but a Kingdome Enjoy therefore that good or that evill which you your selves have desired and if you shall continue still in this error that these my opinions be acceptable to you I shall not faile to proceed in the rest of the story as in the beginning I made my promise FINIS Nicholas Machiavel's PRINCE ALSO The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca AND The meanes Duke Valentine us'd to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliverotto of Fermo Paul and the Duke of Gravina Translated out of Italian into English By E. D. With some Animadversions noting and taxing his errors LONDON Printed for Daniel Pakeman 1661. To the most noble and Illustrious JAMES Duke of Lenox Earle of March Baron of Setrington Darnly Terbanten and Methuen Lord Great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of his Majesties most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdomes POysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality that as destructives of Nature they are utterly to be abhord but we find many nay most of them have their medicinal uses This book carries its poyson and malice in it yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life with advantage The Lamprey they say hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it take that out and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates Epictetus the Philosopher sayes Every thing hath two handles as the fire brand it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt the other being laid hold on will cleave to the very flesh and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart Sin hath the condition of the fiery end the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule nay it is worse one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this Author your judgement shall easily
Afterwards when Paulo was dead he served under Vitellozzo his brother and in very short time being ingenious of a good personage and brave courage he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in but thinking it but servile to depend upon another he plotted by the ayd of some Citizens of Fermo who lik'd rather the thraldome of their City than the liberty of it and by the favour of the Vitelli to make himselfe master of Fermo and writ to John Foliani that having been many yeeres from home he had a mind to come and see him and the City and in some part take notice os his own patrimony and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour to the end his Citizens might perceive that he had not vainely spent his time he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to take order that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of Fermo which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle as his that was the nephew In this John faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew and caus'd him to be well receivd by them of Fermo and lodged him in his own house where having passed some dayes and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany he made a very solemne feast whether he invited John Foliani and all the prime men of Fermo and when all their chear was ended and all their other entertainments as in such feasts it is customary Oliverotto of purpose mov'd some grave discourses speaking of the greatnesse of Pope Alexander and Caesar his son and their undertakings where unto John and the others making answer he of a sudden stood up saying that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place and so retir'd into a chamber whether John and all the others Citizens followd him nor were they sooner set downe there than from some secret place therein came forth diverse souldiers who slew John and all the others after which homicide Oliverotto got a horse-backe and ravaged the whole towne and besieged the supreme Magistrate in the palace so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him and to settle a government whereof hee made himselfe Prince and they being all dead who had they been discontented with him could have hurt him he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders so that in the space of a yeer that he held the Principality he was not only secure in the City of Fermo but became fearefull to all his neighbours and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult as that of Agathocles had he not let himselfe been deceivd by Caesar Borgia when at Sinigallia as before was said he took the Orsini and Vitelli where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide was strangled together with Vitellozzo whome he had had for master both of his vertues and vices Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed that Agathocles and such like after many treacheries and crueltyes could possibly live long secure in his own contrey and defend himselfe from his forrein enemies and that never any of his own Citizens conspir'd against him seeing that by means of cruelty many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their States much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre I beleeve that this proceeds from the well or ill using of those cruelties they may bee termd well us'd if it bee lawfull to say well of evill that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake not insisting therein afterwards but there is use made of them for the subiects profit as much as may be But those that are ill us'd are such as though they bee but few in the beginning yet they multiply rather in time than diminish They that take that first way may with the help of God and mens care find some remedy for their State as Agathocles did for the others it is impossible they should continue Whereupon it is to be noted that in the lay ing hold of a State the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once that he be not forced often to returne to them and that he may be able by not renewing of them to give men some security and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies Hee that carries it otherwise either for fearefullnesse or upon evill advice is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his hand nor ever can heerely upon his subjects there being no possibility for them because of his daily and continuall injuries to live in any safety for his injuries should bee done altogether that being seldomer tâ—sted they might lesse offend his favours should bee bestowd by little and little to the end they might keep their taste the better and above all things a Prince must live with his subjects in such sort that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversries thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties and the favours which then thou bestowest will little help thee being taken as if they came from thee perforce and so yeeld no returne of thanks CHAP. IX Of the Civill Principality BUt comming to the other part when a principall Citizen not by villany or any other insufferable violence but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey which we may terme a Civill Principality nor to attaine hereunto is Verue wholly ' or Fortune wholly necessary but rather a fortunate cunning I say this Principality is climb'd up to either by the peoples help or the great mens For in every City we finde these two humours differ and they spring from this that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people and from these two several appetites arise in the City one of these three effects either a Principality or Liberty or Tumultuary licentionsnesse The Principality is caused either by the people or the great ones according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them and make him Prince whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes The people also not being able to support the great mens insolencies converting the whole reputation to one man create him their Prince to be protected by his authority He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones subsists with more difficulty than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour for he being made Prince hath many about him who account themselves his
of them began upon less occasion than this for neither was their enterprize more just than this nor more easie nor was God more their friend than yours Here is very great justice for that war is just that is necessary and those armes are religious when there is no hope left otherwhere but in them Here is an exceeding good disposition thereto nor can there be where there is a good disposition a great difficulty provided that use be made of those orders which I propounded for aim and direction to you Besides this here we see extraordinary things without example effected by God the sea was opened a cloud guided the way devotion poured forth the waters and it rain'd down Manna all these things have concurred in your greatness the rest is left for you to do God will not do every thing himself that he may not take from us our free will and part of that glory that belongs to us Neither is it a marvel if any of the aforenamed Italians have not been able to compass that which we may hope your illustrious family shall though in so many revolutions of Italy and so many feats of war it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones Nothing can so much honor a man rising a new as new laws and new ordinances devised by him these things when they have a good foundation given them and contain in them their due greatness gain him reverence and admiration and in Italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme Here is great vertue in the members were it not wanting in the heads Consider in the single fights that have been and duels how much the Italians have excel'd in their strength activity and address but when they come to armies they appear not and all proceeds from the weakness of the Chieftaines for they that understand the managing of these matters are not obeyed and every one presumes to understand hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or vertue as that others would submit unto him From hence proceeds it that in so long time and in so many battels fough for these last past 20 years when there hath been an army wholly Italian it alwaies hath had evil success whereof the river Tarus first was witness afterwards Alexandria Capua Genua Vayla Bolonia Mestri Your Illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these worthyes who redeem'd their countreys must above all things as the very foundation of the whole sabrick be furnished with soldiers of your own natives because you cannot have more faithful true nor better soldiers and though every one of them be good all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained commanded and honored by their own Prince Wherefore it is necessary to provide for those armes whereby to be able with the Italian valor to make a defence against forreiners And however the Swisse infantry and Spanish be accounted terrible yet is there defect in both of them by which a third order might not only oppose them but may be confident to vanquish them for the Spaniards are not able to indure the Horse and the Swisse are to feare the foot when they incounter with them as resolute in the fight as they whereupon it hath been seen and upon experience shall be certain that the Spaniards are not able to beare up against the French Cavalery and the Swisses have been routed by the Spanish Foot And though touching this last there hath not been any entire experience had yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of Ravenna when the Spanish Foot affronted the Dutch battalions which keep the same rank the Swisses do where the Spaniards with their nimbleness of body and the help of their targets entred in under their Pikes and there stood safe to offend them the Dutch men having no remedy and had it not been for the Cavalery that rusht in upon them they had quite defeated them There may then the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discoverd another kind of them be a new ordained which may be able to make resistance against the Horse and not fear the Foot which shall not be a new sort of armes but change of orders And these are some of those things which ordained a new gain reputation and greatness to a new Prince Therefore this occasion should not be let pass to the end that Italy after so long a time may see some one redeemed of hers appear Nor can I express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums with what thirst of revenge with what resolution of fidelity with what piety with what tears Would any gates be shut again him Any people deny him obedience Any envy oppose him Would not every Italian fully consent with him This government of the Barbarians stinks in every ones nostrils Let your Illustrious Family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted to the end that under your colours this countrey may be enabled and under the protection of your fortune that saying of Petrarch be verifyed Vertu contr'ul fuore Prendera l'arme fia il combatter corto Che l'antico valore Ne gli Italici cor noné anchor morto The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca composed by Nicholas Machiavelli and presented to Zanobiglioudilmonti and Lingi Alomanni his very good friends ZANOBI and LINGI my very good friends it seems a matter of great mervail to those that take it into consideration how that all they or the greater part of them who have effected great things n◠this world and borne up their heads above others contemporaries have taken their rises and births from obscure and base beginnings or such as have been by fortune extraordinarily afflicted For all of them have been either exposed to the mercy of savage creatures or had such base Sires that as ashamed of them they have feigned themselves sons to Jupiter or some other Diety who these have been every one having knowledge of many of them we shall omit to relate as superfluous yeelding rather distaste than delight to the Reader I am indeed of opinion that it proceeds from hence viz in that fortune willing to demonstrate unto the world that she and not wisdome gives men their greatness therefore begins to shew her strength at such a time when wisdome can challenge no interest but all rather is to be attributed as due to her alone Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was then one of those who in regard of the times he liv'd in and the City where he was borne effected very great matters and had as others in this kind
himselfe because he thought it no way needfull for him but for the others of his Family praying that many things he would pardon in respect of their youth and many things in regard of the ancient amity and obligation he had to the whole kindred Wherunto Castruccio answered courteously and bid him be of good cheere and told him that he received more content the tumult was appeased than he had had trouble that it was raysed and perswaded Steven to cause them all to come to him saying that he thank'd God he had given him opportunity to make a shew of his clemency and bounty They all then presenting themselves upon Stevens word and Castruccios were together with Steven imprisond and put to death In this meane while the Florentines had recoverd S. Miniato whereupon Castruccio thought fit to stay that war considering that as yet he was not secure of Lucca being that he could not safely part from home and haveing causd the Florentines to be felt whether they would admit of a truce he found them easily yeelding thereto for they also were weary of the charge and desirous to stop the expence Whereupon they made a truce of two yeares and that every one should keep what they had gotten In the meane while Castruccio being freed from the war that he might not again incurre those dangers and hazards which formerly he had run under divers colours and pretences cut off all those in Lucca who could have any ambition to to aspire to the Principality and pardoned not one of them depriving them of their Country and Fortunes and those he could get in his clutches of their lives affirming that he had found it by experience that none of them would abide true and for his better safeguard built a Fortresse in Lucca and made use of the materials of their Towers whom he had banish'd and murdred While Castruccio was thus quiet with the Florentines and that he strengthened himselfe in Lucca he fail'd not to do all that he could without entring into open hostility to increase his greatnesse and having a great desire to take Pistoya thinking with himselfe that by the possessiou of that City he had gotten one foot into Florence gain'd himselfe by divers wayes the whole mountaine to friend and by the factions he made in Pistoya so behav'd himselfe that every one rely'd much on him At that time the City was divided as always it was into the Bianchi and Neri head of the Bianchi was Bastiano of Possente and of the Neri James of Gia each of which held streight correspondence with Castrucio one desir'd to expell the other so that the one and the other after many suspicions came to blowes James made himselfe strong at the gate towards Florence Bastiano at that towards Lucca and the one and the other of them relying more upon Castruccio than upon the Florentines judging him more ready and quick of dispatch in any thing touching the warre each of them sent to him secretly for ayd which Castruccio promis'd to them both letting James know that he would come in person and telling Bastiano he would send Paul Guinigi his Foster son and appointing a set time sent Paul by way of Pescia and himselfe went straight on to Pistoya so that about midnight for thus was it agreed between Castruccio and Paul they both arrived at Pistoya and there receiv'd as friends being both entred when Castruccio found his time he gave the watchword to Paul whereupon he slew James of Gia and the other Bastiano of Possente and all their partakers were partly taken partly slaine whereupon they forced Pistoya without resistance and for the government of the towne Castruccio constrained the people to yeeld him obedience remitting to them many old debts and dutyes and thus did he to the whole Country there abouts who all flock't together partly to see the new Prince so that every one fraught with hopes or admiring his valour set his heart at rest It happened about this time that the people of Rome mutinyed upon the extreame dearth of provision there which was caused by the Popes absence who was then at Avignon and they blamed the Germane government insomuch that every day murders and other disorders were committed which Henry the Emperours Deputy could no way remedy whereupon he had a great suspicion that the Romanes would call in King Robert of Naples and chace him from Rome and so restore it to the Pope And having no nearer Allie whom he could make recourse unto than Castruccio he sent to intreat him that he would be pleased not only to send him aid but to come himself also in person Castruccio thought this voyage was no way to be put off as well to render some service of merit to the Emperour as because now the Emperour was absent from Rome there was some necessity of it leaving Paul Guinigi at Lucca he went thence with two hundred horse to Rome where he was entertain'd by Henry with very much honour and his presence in a short time gave so much credit to the Imperials that without blood or other violence all things were wel quieted for Castruccio having caused a good quantity of corne to be brought by sea out of the Countey about Pisa took away all occasion of offence Afterwards partly by admonishing partly by chastsing the cheif Officers of Rome he reduc'd them freely under Henries government Castruccio was created a Roman Senator besides many other honors he received of the people and that Order he took with very great pomp putting on a gown of cloth of tissue with great letters before to this purpose This man is what it pleases God and again behind And shall be what God will In this mean while the Florentines who were displeased that Castruccio during the truce had made himself Lord of Pistoya devis'd which way they might make it rebel which by reason of his absence they thought might easily be effected Amongst the banished Pistoyeses who were then at Florence there was Baldo Cocchi and James Baldini both men of authority and ready for any hazard These men held correspondence with some friends they had within so that with the Florentines helpe they entred by night into Pistoya and chaced thence Castruccios friends and officers and some of them they slew and restored the City her liberty which news much displeased Castruccio so that having taken leave of Henry he came with his men by great dayes journeys to Lucca The Florentines when they had word of Castruccios return thinking he would not take much rest resolv'd to prevent him and with their forces to enter first into the Vale of Nievola before him supposing that if they first made themselves masters of that valley they should cut off from him all means of possibility to recover Pistoya and so having put in order a great army of all the friends of the Guelfes faction they came into the territory of Pistoya On the other side Castruccio came with