first thing as it is first and priour should be posterior to it selfe and that the excelling in as much as such should be the excelled So that nothing can be the cause of it selfe no not euen God himselfe who is the cause of all things For if hee were the cause of himselfe then must hee bee also the Effect of himselfe which destroyeth his Omnipotency hee must bee another from himselfe which destroyeth his Vnity and Immutability he must bee after himselfe which destroyeth his Aeternity Yea he must be the Worke and Creature of himselfe which destoyeth his Infinity But none of all these can fall into God For as Hilary truely noteth Neque aliud est neque aliundè quod Deus est God can neither be another from himselfe not of any other but himselfe Therefore God though he be the cause of all other things yet can he not be the cause of himselfe for the fore-named inconueniences It cannot bee denied but that God is of himselfe but not as of a cause He is of himselfe because his Beeing and Himselfe are indeede all one his Essence and his Esse as Aquinas prooueth plainely For his subsisting of himselfe is indeede his very substance as Eusebius prooueth out of Dionysius Non-genitus Deus per se est vt ipsum nongenitum esse substantia sua est The vnbegotten God subsisteth of himselfe and his beeing vnbegotten is indeed his very substance And therefore when Seneca saith that Deus ipse se fecit and Lactantius that Deus est ex seipso procreatus their meaning is no more but this that hee is ab alio nullo factus aut procreatus Hee is therefore sayde to bee the Maker and begetter of himselfe because hee had none other maker nor begetter but himselfe no nor indeede himselfe neither but is altogether vnbegotten And so when God is called by Apollo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by Sibylla 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is one that is made of himselfe and begotten of himselfe the meaning is no more but this that hee is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Vnmade and vnbegotten as it followeth in the same place Neither made nor begotten of any other no nor of himselfe neither For as Iustin Martyr truely writeth hee is neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hee is neither produced out of himselfe nor yet out of any other thing but himselfe He is neither ex se nor ex alio no nor ex nihilo as Anselmus addeth yea and prooueth very wittily in his Monologie Where he summeth vp all these things together vnto the same reckoning that I haue done before that seeing he is not made or begotten of any thing that therefore he must needs be vnmade and vnbegotten Quoniam igitur nec per se nec ex se nec per aliud nec ex alio nec per nihil nec ex nihilo habet principium nâ—llo modo habet principium sedneque finem habebit Because saith he God hath his beginning neither by himselfe nor of himselfe neither by any other thing nor of any other thing neither by nothing nor of nothing it followeth therefore that he hath no beginning as he shall haue no end And the truth of this doctrine is expresly confirmed euen by the very Heathen who hold it for a Maxime that God is vnbegotten Quaecunque gignuntur procedunt ab altero saith Trismegistus Est ergo aliquis factor istorum atque is ingenitus vt genitis sit antiquior Those things that are made are made by some other and therefore they needes must haue a Maker who must needs himselfe be vnmade because hee is more ancient then any thing that is made Thales likewise confirmes the same vnto vs. Deus est antiquissimus est enìm ingenitus God must of necessity be the ancientest of all things because hee is not made or begotten of any thing For Ingenitus praevenit omnia genita saith Philo Iudeus That which is vnmade must needs be more ancient then those things that are made Now if nothing be without a Cause as I haue proued in the former paragraph and yet nothing can bee the cause of it selfe as I haue proued in this then must it needes follow that euery thing that is hath the Cause of his being without it selfe sauing onely God himselfe who hath no cause of his being but is himselfe all one with his owne being as life it selfe is all one with its owne liuing For God is nothing else but Life Tu es ipsa vita qua viuis Sapientia qua sapis saith Anselmus Thou art the Life it selfe whereby thou liuest and the Wisedome it selfe whereby thou knowest And therefore as Life is not the cause of its owne liuing but the very same identity with its liuing so God is not the Cause of his owne being but one and the same thing with his being 3 Now if nothing can be the Cause of it selfe then must euery thing needes haue a cause without it selfe which is another thing from it selfe For we see by experience that there dayly be produced many strange and notable effects in the world which all of them proceed not from one and the same cause and yet none of them is brought forth without his cause And therefore it commeth in this place to be discussed Whether among those Causes there be no first Cause at all but an endlesse proceeding and going on in infinitum or whether among them there be many first Causes or whether there be but one which is Causa causarum that is The true Cause of all the rest and whereof all other Causes are but mere Effects For the first of which three problemes were may dayly see by sense how one Cause produceth and begetteth another and that another and that another and that euery one of these though it bee a cause of some inferior effect yet is it an effect of his owne superior Cause As for example the beating of the Sunne vpon the Earth worketh in it an heate that heate produceth many kindes of fruites out of it those fruites beget nourishment both in men and beasts that nourishment begetteth that Semen genitale whereby yong ones are begotten in all their seuerall kindes and so from generation to generation continued Now in this connexion and series of Causes if we ascend vpward we must needes either ascend in infinitum without all end or else in the end to arise vnto some highest Cause where wee must be forc't to rest and can goe no further because there is no higher To proceede in infinitum that as the Orator speaketh is Auribus Animisque hominum absurdum It is an absurd thing both to the eares and mindes of all men of vnderstanding And as Anselmus pronounceth euen in this very casâ— Hoc nemo non putat obsurdum nâ—si qui nimis est absurdus There
made by those many-things but rather by that one-thing which made all those manythings Now againe If all those many-things haue euery one of them his being of it selfe then must there needs be one certaine power or Nature of Selfe-being by participation whereof they all haue their being of themselues And then they must needs be all of them only by that One-thing by which they do all receiue their selfe-being Therefore all things haue their being more truely from that one-thing then from those supposed many-things which themselues do receiue all their being from that One-thing As for that other opinion that many things should mutually giue each to other his being that is cleane against all reason For it is a senselesse imagination that any thing should from that receiue his owne being vnto which it selfe hath giuen a being A very good and a sound reason though somewhat perhaps perplexed vnto the vulgar vnderstanding through the often iteration and implexed application of the termes of One and Many and Being and Selfe-being so intricately wouen into so many seuerall parts and branches of the sentence But vnto those that be learned it is cleare enough and liquid So that though the Series of Causes be neuer so long yet must we needes at last come by degrees vnto some first which is the true Cause of all the rest and cannot be the effect of any because all other are of it For as Palingenius writeth Ens primum causa est non effectus at imum Effectus tantùm debet non causa vocari Quae media existunt his nomen adhaeret vtrumque In Nature and in order of all things in their respect The first and highest called is a Cause and no Effect The last and lowest an Effect but not a Cause at all But those that stand twixt first and last thou mayst by both names call Both Causes and Effects Causes of their inferiors and Effects of their superiors As in the Series of the Categories the highest is only a Genus and not a Species the lowest is onely a Species and not a Genus the subalternes are both in their diuers relations Genera to their inferiors and Species to their superiors But the highest can bee no Species And no more can the first Cause be the Effect of any other because it is not vnder any forme or higher but is the highest it selfe and is Ingenitum as Aristotle teacheth And therefore Trismegistus expresly affirmeth that Ex vno principio cuncta pendent That all things haue their being and beginning of one thing And that in the same place hee affirmeth to be God And this Nyssen affirmeth to bee the receiued opinion of all men Constat inter omnes ex vna causa pendere res omnes It is confessed of all men that all things depend vpon the supreme Cause And therefore Aristotle biddeth vs that in searching of the causes wee should semper exquirere summam causam That we should neuer cease vntill we are come vnto the supreme and the first cause And so Gregory likewise vnto the same purpose In omni causa solus ipse intuendus est qui principaliter est In euery cause he only is to be eyed that is the principall and principally is For vpon it do all the rest depend as Iamblicus likewise expresly teacheth Ab vna causa integra tota dependet multitudo Adque summam causam plures alia referuntur The multitude of all inferior causes depend vpon one intire supreme cause and to that which is the highest are all the rest referred Thus the multitude of these inferior causes doe leade vs vnto one supreme and first Cause which can be nothing else but God which is the summe and substance of the fourth and last paragraph 4 Now if euery thing that is must needs haue a Cause and if nothing can be the Cause of it selfe and if among all the Causes there can bee but one first and principall Cause which is the true Cause of all the rest and of all those Effects which proceed from all of them then must needes that first Cause be nothing else but God For what can that be which giueth being vnto all things but onely God whom Damascene calleth Infinitum quoddam essentiae pelagus that is A boundlesse Ocean of pure and simple being which out of his fulnesse imparteth their being vnto all other things as the Ocean doth his waters vnto fountaines and riuers For if this first Cause which hath giuen their being vnto all the innumerable things of this world bee something else and not God then what hath God done or what hath God to do to whom hath God giuen any being or how can hee possibly be a God which hath giuen being vnto nothing or how can that bee any other thing then God which hath giuen their being vnto all things in the world Therefore whosoeuer yeeldeth that there is a first cause hee must needes yeeld by consequence that that first cause is God And this we may see verified by a generall consent both of Christians and Heathens Of whom some doe call this first Cause by such titles and appellations as doe necessarily insinuate that it must needes be God Some collect it by such reasons as doe necessarily conclude it And some in direct and expresse termes affirme it For the first of which three heads to wit the titles that are giuen to this first Cause Palingenius as before I shewed calleth it Ens primum Ens primum causa est non Effectus The first Ens is a pure meere cause it cannot an Effect be call'd Both which two titles are the titles of God both to bee Ens and to bee Primum For first for Ens. Demascene expresly affirmeth that of all Gods other names the name of Ens is most proper vnto him Ex omnibus nominibus quae Deo tribuuntur nullum aequè proprium videtur atque Entis nomen Of all the names which are attributed vnto God there is none so proper as is the name of his Essence or Being he being named from his owne Being I am And for Primum euen Aristotle himselfe affirmeth that God is Et primum principale principum both the first and the principall principle of all things Yea and euen God himselfe chalengeth both the same titles directly vnto himselfe For he calleth himselfe I am which is al one with Ens and he calleth himselfe The Ancient of dayes which is all one with Primus Nay Primus in expresse termes Primus novissimus Ego sum Yea and Aristotle further affirmeth this primum Ens to be Ipsum quid est which is all one with I am and to be not an Accidens but a Substance Now Aristotle in another place giueth to this first and supreme Cause another title which is as proper vnto God as either of the former And that is To haue his
noted among the Heathens as concerning the worship of their seuerall gods 2. Yet that this discord doth not infringe the generall opâ—nion as concerning God 3. But that it much confirmes it pag. 49 CHAP. 8. Certaine Obiections touched impugning the generality of the fore-named consent as concerning God 2. The first of those ObiectioÌ„s opened directly denying it 3. The same Obiection answered p. 55. CHAP. 9. The second Obiection against this vniuersality of consent vnfolded that Religion is no better but an humane inuention 2. That Obiection confuted by the Aniquity 3. Vniuersality 4. Consent 5. Perpetuity of Religion p. 58. CHAP. 10. The third Obiection against the Vniuersality of Consent in Religion propounded viz. That it hath beene oppugned by diuers both wise and learned Philosophers though called by the name of Atheists 2. That Obiection answered from the smalnesse of their number 3. The weakenesse of their learning 4. The mistâ—king of their opinion 5. And their inconstancy in their assertion p. 66. CHAP. 11. The two ends of Atheisme Not to serue and Not to feare 2. The Atheist in the first of these two ends is disappointed becomming a base seruant vnto all his owne vices 3. But more especially vnto his ambition 4. And his belly 5. All which seruice he referring to himselfe hee becommeth thereby A god vnto himselfe p. 112. CHAP. 12. The Atheists second end is to free himselfe from feare 2. Yet no man feareth more as hee bewrayeth at three times 3. When he dreameth 4. When it thundreth 5. When hee dieth 6. This his feare is a cleare Argument that he thinkes There is a God p. 121. CHAP. 13. That beside the fore-named direct confessions of Atheists diuers of them haue directly and expresly confessed confessed God 2. Some of them vnwittingly 3. Some of them vnwillingly 4. And some of them both wittingly aend willingly pag. 135. CHAP. 14. That though Atheists should neuer haue confessed neither directly nor indirectly but alwayes most obstinately haue denyed him yet that there is no reckoning to bee made of their opinion 2. Because in the opinion of all wise learned men they are esteemed no better then either Fooles 3. Or madde men 4. Or monsters of men p. 147. CHAP. 15. That God hath at all times powred downe his iust iudgements vpon the heads of Atheists by them sensibly declaring That there is a God 2. Examples out of Scriptures 3. Examples out of Ecclesiasticall Histories 4. Examples out of Heathen writers 5. An Obiection answered concerning the punishment of those Atheists p. 153 CHAP. 16. That the generall consent of al men in agreeing so fully That there is a God is an infallible argument That there is one indeed 2. That to this end it is alledged by those Authors that haue obserued it 3. In making it the Law of Nature 4. In making consent a Symptome of truth in all things 5. In making it the chiefest Argument that can bee brought in this cause p. 163. 164. The Chapters contained in the second Booke CHAPTER 1. THat all Arts leade to God 2. The Metaphysickes by two Arguments 3. The first is the limitting of all finite things as of naturall Bodies 4. And of their naturall faculties 5. And yet not by the Sunne which it selfe is limited 6. Both in his owne working 7. And in his moouing 8. By the limitting also of all artificiall faculties 9. And finally by the limitting of all spirituall Graces pag. 171. CHAP. 2. The immensity of mens appetiâ—â—s doth sheâ— That there is a â—od 2. The immensity of naturall appetites 3. The immensity of sensitiue appetites 4. The immensity of intellectuall or spirituall appetites 5. The immensity of Desire 6. The immensitie of Anger 7. The immensity of will 8. And yet God is able to fill them all p. 197. 198. CHAP. 3. That euery thing in nature hath a Cause of his being 2. That nothing can be the Cause of his owne being 3. That among the Causes there is one first and supreme Cause which is the Cause of all the rest 4. That this first and supreme Cause is nothing else but God p. 212. CHAP. 4. That these sensible and second motions direct vs vnto a first 2. That a first motion doth necessarily imply a first Moouer 3. That this first Moouer is the Cause of all the motions in the world 4. And that therefore this first Mouer is nothing else but God pag. 224. CHAP. 5. That the true cause of Sicknesse is Sinne against God 2. That God for this cause doth threaten to send Sicknesse 3. That he sendeth it according to his threatning 4. That Physitions obserâ—e the stroke of Gods Vengeance to be in many Sicknesses pag. 234. CHAP. 6. That God is the giuer of health vnto men 2. That he is the preseruer of it 3. That he is the restorer of it 4. Both by giuing medicinable herbes vnto men 5. And by teaching them the right vses of them 6. And by ioyning his blessing vnto their working p. 244. CHAP. 7. Little Cities doe rise to be great 2. Great Cities do fall to bee little 3. Yet is not this the worke of either Fate or Fortune 4. But of Gods owne Prouidence and Preordination 5. Who limitteth their powers 6. Boundeth their Domnions 7. And prescribeth their continuance p. 260. CHAP. 8. God is both the Physition and Ethicall last end of all things 2. He giueth vs all vertues which are the way to perfect Blessednesse 3. Hee implaâ—teth in vs all good affections which are the previous dispositions vnto vertues 4. Hee giueth vnto vs the true and perfect Blessednesse 5. Nay hee himselfe is our true and perfect Blessednesse p. 278. CHAP. 9. The Mathematickes shew that there is a God 2. And more particularly Geometry 3. Which by a Geometricall pricke doth leade men vnto some knowledge of God 4. Of whom in diuers powers it hath a kinde of resemblance p. 492. CHAP. 10. Vnity in Arithmeticke doth leade men vnto God 2. Which is affirmed hy Philosophers to be the Originall of all things 3. Yea directly affirmed to bee God himselfe 4. With whom it hath indeed a very great resâ—mblance pag. 298. CHAP. 11. That the motion of the Heauens and Starres is not natural 2. Which yet is so orderly as if it were artificiall 3. That the order of their motion hath a resemblance of a 〈◊〉 4. That the Heauens themselues doe make musicke to this dance 5. That this â—rdâ—rly motion of the Stars hath led diuers men to seek for a God â—boue the Starres 6. Because their orderly motions can neither bee from chance nor from their owne wills But onely from Gods wisedom who is the maker of them pag. 309. CHAP. 12. That God hath made all his creatures in Harmonicall proportion and in a kinde of musicke 2. That all creatures are naturally delighted with it 3. That they prayse God in their kindes with their naturall musickes 4. That artificiall musicke is the gift of God
Historicorum vt suis potissimùm refutaretur Authoribus He ought not vnto him to haue alledged any Diuine authorities but onely humaine because he was as then vncapable of them that so he might conuince his errors by the credit and authoritie of his owne proper authors that is Philosophers and Historians Yea and this his castigation of the blessed Martyr Cyprian is approued by S. Hierome as a iust and deserued one Where he prooueth by the practice of a cloude of Witnesses both of Greeke and Latin Fathers that it is more proper and naturall to confute all kinde of Heathens by the testimonie of their owne writers then by the authoritie of the Scriptures because with those men these haue small authoritie or none And therefore saith Iustin Martyr euen in this very case Non ex diuinis historijs nostris haec probare aggrediar quibus vos nondum propter inveteratum in animis vestris Maiorum vestrorum errorem fidem adhibere vultis sed ex vestrarum nihil ad nostram Religionem pertinâ—ntium literarum monumentis I will not proue these things vnto you out of our owne writers which you doe but smally credite through an errour implanted in you by your Ancestors but I will proue it vnto you out of your owne Authors which are no way partiall vnto the faith of Christians And Lactantius likewise vnto the same purpose Omittamus Testimonia Prophetarum nè minùs idonea probatâ—o videatur ab hijs quibus omninò non creditâ—r Veniâ—mus ad Authores eos ipsos ad veri probationem testes citemus quibus contra nâ—s vti solent Poëtas dico ac Philosophos Let vs leaue the Testimonies of the holy Prophets because they will carrie no fit probation especially vnto such as distrust and discredite them Let vs therefore come vnto their owne Authors and vse those men as witnesses for the Truth whom they commonly doe cite and produce against the truth I meane their Poets and their Philosophers And againe in an other place Neque nunc Prophetas in testimonium vocabo sed eos potiùs quibus istos qui respuunt veritatem credere sit necesse I will not as now cite the testimonie of the Prophets but rather of such Authors as those men which refuse the truth yet haue no power to refuse So that neither the testimonie of God nor of his word though they haue in themselues the greatest strength of probation yea and be most incomparably beyond all exception yet may be vsed by vs in this our disputation vnlesse we would propine both our selues and our cause vnto open and iust derision And therefore whosoeuer will either conuert or confute the Atheists he must vse such Authorities as haue some authoritie with them not such as be derided or reiected by them such as be both the Prophets and Apostles and all other holy Writers all Christian Diuines and generally all Christiâ—ns For all these in this cause are suspected by the Atheists as parciall and inclining witnesses So that by the weakenesse of our Aduersaries wee are forced to forbeare the strongest of our Authorities and after the Apostles practice to feede them with their owne milke rather then with our strong meate because as yet they bee not able to beare it Not with the strong meate of the Scriptures though that were better for them but with the milke of their owne writers because this is fitter for them Ista quidem meliùs Divinis edita libris Cognoscenda forent vbi Legis in aequore aperto Promptum esset ventis dare libera vela secundis Sed quoniam rudibus metus est intrare profundum In tenui primùm discant procurrere rivo Saith Prosper This Subiect better seem's from sacred writ To spring and better thence t' haue learned it Where in the Lawes broad Sea with wind and tyde Ther 's happier saile then any where beside But cause to ruder Novices it is A province full of fearefulnes I wis Into the great vast deepe to venture out Some shallow Riuer let them coast about And by a small Boate learne they first and marck How they may come to manne a greater Bark 3. And yet haue I here vsed them both frequently and largely but not so much vpon hope to doe any great good vpon the Atheist with them by pressing directly their Authoritie vnto him as indirectly to grow somewhat vpon him by an Artificiall circumduction of him and that by these two reasons following First because of my often allegation of the holy Scriptures consenting so fully with other Heathen writers the Atheist may the better be able to discerne that there is an vniuersall agreement and a generall consent of the whole world against him both of Christians Iewes and Pagans and thereby see more plainely his owne nakednes and pouertie how bare and weake yea how desolate he is and vtterly forsaken both of God and men and by that meditation be more easily drawne to apprehend the singular follie of that his singular opinion which hath made him such a spectacle both to Angels God and Men as it were some vncouth monster And so indeed he is For Magnum est ipse prodigium qui mundo credente non credit saith S. Augustine He is surely some great Monster that will abide in Atheisme when he seeth the whole world to beleeue beside him So that in this respect the allegation of the Scriptures will not be meerely idle towards the very Atheists No nor yet in an other which is the second reason of my so frequent alledging them And that is because the holy Scriptures beside that diuine authoritie which is naturally inhaerent in them doe oft-times carry also great strength of reason with them which inforce many points more strongly and effectually against the Atheists then the acutest reasons brought by any of the Philosophers As that of the Psalmist for the proofe of Gods omniscience and that he needs must of congruitie both heare and see all things He that planted the Eare shall he not heare and he that formed the Eye shall he not see What Philosopher in the world could more necessarily conclude from the true and proper causes of the conclusion then the Scripture here hath done And diuers such places of the holy Scriptures the Reader shall meete with throughout this whole Treatise which presse yea and euen oppresse the Atheists with the weight of their Reason howsoeuer the weight of their Authoritie be eleuated by them For though those sacred Authors haue but small authoritie with Atheists speaking as meere Witnesses yet when their Testimonies carry with them also reasons those reasons must be answered if they will defend their cause And if they cannot answer them they must then yeeld vnto them which is the second reason of my so often citing them Now vnto these two reasons in respect of the Atheists I may also adde a third in respect of Christians And that is that by this
credible relations of Histories and Trauellers that haue seene them with their eyes we may answer him againe That by the selfe same Authors wee know also their Religions yea and their generall consent in this generall ground that they all will haue a God as I haue already proued Now for his second proofe that there be such sauage Nations as hee verily is perswaded not to haue so much as the least conceit of God as hee affirmeth it very weakely Equidem Arbitror so he confirmes it much more weakely naming not so much as one which evidently proueth that he had not one to name for else he would as well haue recited the seuerall names of particular Nations as he doth in the next of particular persons And we may note the same defect in Plinie likewise who saith that Alijs est nullus Deorum respectus that with some there is no respect no reuerence at all of God But yet he nameth none though he affirmeth some neither there nor yet throughout his whole Booke though in all other matters he be mostly very curious But indeed he could not name any particular Nation and therefore contents himselfe with this generall assertion of Alijs without adding any instance Now here must needs be very small store of good proofes when as Arbitror and Alijs are the strongest Arguments For I haue shewed before that there is not in the whole world any Nation of Atheists No Author either old or new doth certainely report it And therefore it is Liberum Arbitrium indeed vpon his owne bare Arbitror to affirme it For his third proofe by instance of diuers named Atheists I will quit him with his owne words euen in this very case Placetnè igitur tantas res opinione stultorum iudicari Are Fooles the fittest Iudges to determine so great matters This Obiection he himselfe maketh against both the generall consent of all men and praescript of all time as though all the world excepting onely Atheists were now turned fooles Are all those wise Lawgiuers who haue giuen Lawes and orders to all people and nations on a sudden become fooles because they beleeue a God And are all the great Philosophers whose wisedom and learning the whole world admireth in all other matters become also fooles for this onely cause And is onely the Atheist wise because he denieth God Is this the onely wisedome to deny there is a God We should then haue a wise world For then it would fall out indeed as Aristotle imagined that if all the world were fooles and but two or three wise men in it they should be counted fooles and all the rest to be wise And so it is indeed if the Atheists be the wise men for they are condemned for fooles by the generall consent of all other men as we shall hereafter see Now for those noted Atheists whom he nameth in that place Diagoras Theodorus Protagoras It may be that none of these could be truely counted Atheists though they all were called so by the censure of the vulgar who strictly examine not the proper application of names vnto their things For Diagoras as I finde it reported of him did potiùs Gentilium Deos ridere quam Deum negare He rather derided false Gods then denied the true And Clemens Alexandrinus maketh the same defence for all the rest of them freeing them all expressely from the crime of Atheisme For Theodorus though at the first he was noted of Atheisme yet at the last he fell into Autotheisme professing himselfe a God as Laertius recordeth Now this he could not haue professed if he had maintained that there was no God Yea and it may bee gathered out of Plutarch that euen in his former opinion of Atheisme hee might be mistaken For euen he himself complaineth of the iniquity of his auditors that he did rationes suas dextra porrigere illos verò laeua accipere That he deliuered his speeches with the right hand but his hearers receiued them with the left In which place also Plutarch rendring the reason why he was called Atheos alledgeth no more but this Quòd Deos esse videretur negare Because he seemed to deny that there was any God Was not here a faire proofe thinke you And for Protagoras he neither denied God no nor so much as doubted of him He did but onely professe that he would not as then entertaine the disputation Whether there were a God or no Which Coecilius ascribeth not vnto his prophanenesse but rather to his warinesse He saith that in declining that slippery Question he did Consulte potiùs quà m prophanè disputare as before I haue noted So that none of all his instances doth handsomely fit his purpose And for his fourth Exception of sacrilegious and periured persons they cannot properly be reckoned in the number of Atheists They may iustly bee condemned as prophane and wicked persons who dishonour God yea and perhaps contemne him but yet not properly as Atheists who simply deny him So that no part of his Obiection concludeth for pure Atheists CHAP. 9. The second Obiection against this vniuersalitie of Consent vnfoulded That Religion is no better but an humaine inuention 2. That Obiection confuted by the Antiquity 3. Vniuersality 4. Consent 5. Perpetuity of Religion AS there is nothing in the world wherein all the whole world doth so generally consent as they doe in beleeuing that There is a God so is there nothing againe wherein they doe secondarily so generally consent as they doe in the acknowledgement of that generall Consent All men doe beleeue that There is a God and all men doe beleeue that all men do beleeue that There is a God As the beleefe it selfe is generall so is the beleefe of the beleefe generall the Atheist only exempted who as he is an Aduersary vnto God himselfe so is he likewise an Aduersarie vnto this consent And as he denieth the one so doth he likewise denie the other of them knowing that if this consent be granted it will from thence follow that there needes must be a God as you shall see hereafter proued in the last Chapter of this Booke And therefore hee fighteth against this consent with no 〈◊〉 indeauour then hee doth against God seeking to expugne the veritie of the one by oppugning the Vniuersalitie of the other And so he chardgeth vpon this consent with three seuerall Obiections as it were with three Bands The first of his three Obiections against it is a simple and categoricall denying of it that there is not among men any such generall consent as is generally imagined and commonly praetended vnto which in the former Chapter I haue answered The second vnto which I am now to answere is this That though there were such a generall consent as is conceiued yet that this is not a naturall but an artificiall consent not begotten in mens harts by a naturall instinct but implanted in
Euripides affirmeth to be the first beâ—â—tters of Religion in vs. Yea and Iamblicus an Heathen affirmeth of Religion that it is implanted into the minde of a man Etâ—am ante omnem rationis vsum Euen before hee haue any vse of reason as before I noted of him Which if it be true then could not Religion be a politique inuention to beguile the simpler sort of men For how could it then be imprinted into Children yea and that before they haue the vse of reason When as Aristotle affirmeth of politique doctrine that it is too high for the reach of any young men then much more of young Children For if Iuuenis be not idoneus auditor ciuilis Disciplinae then much lesse is Infants And therefore it hath not any colour of reason that Religion being so timely begotten in them should be first implanted by the meanes of such a fabulous instruction There is I say no colour of reason in this reasonlesse fiction Now for the generall Antiquity of Religion and that ancient possession which it hath had in the world Plutarch sayth that it is so ancient that no man can tell the first originall of it And hee applieth to this purpose those verses of Sophocles Non nunc enim neque heri sunt ista prodita Semper valuêre nec quando inierint liquet These things were not of yesterday or lately brought to passe They euer were and no man knowes when their beginning was But for the true Antiquity of it let vs but follow the stepps of it as they be expressed to vs in the word of God and we shall finde that Religion is more ancient then any fiction and the practise of piety then any deuised lye For when there were but three men in the vniuersall world we reade that two of them offered vp their sacrifices vnto God when as yet there was neither cause of the making of lawes against publique oppressions nor of diuising such fables against secret offences And therefore Religion could not grow from either of those causes Nay it appeareth euen in their examples that oppression though per accidens grew rather from religion then religion from oppression For before those two Brothers had offered vp their sacrifices there was no oppression but when they were once dispatched it presently followed the one brother violently oppressing the other yea and that meerely vpon this one emulation because he was better accepted in his religion Whereby it appeareth that religion is almost as ancient as man nay altogether as ancient For the very first man is sayd to be creâ—ted in the image of God which the Apostle Paul expoundeth to be in righteousness and holinesse which are the two essentiall parts of religion his matter and his forme Nay religion is yet more ancient It is more ancient tâ—en man It is as ancient as the Angels as is plainely insinuated in the booke of Ioâ— Where wast thou when the starres of the morning praised me together and when all the sonnes of God shouted for ioy Here was the vsâ— and practise of religion euen before the making and creation of man And therefore religion could not be an humaine inuention vnlesse either there was a man before there was a man or that man was able to inuent before he was made For as Tertullian hath very well obserued Prior anima quà m litera prior sermo quà m liber prior sensus quà m stilus prior homo quà m Philosophus Poeta There was a soule before there was a letter a speech before ther was a book a sense before ther was a stile a man before there was eâ—her a poet or philosopher And yet there was Religion before there was a Man And therefore it could not be an humaâ—ne inuention So that Time which prescribeth against all humane inuentions and which chalengeth the honour of Antiquity from them yet it selfe is prescribed against by religion and loseth the honour of priority with it because religion is as 〈…〉 latuit semper illuxit etiam ante Romulum sayth Tertullian Yea and ante Homulum too as before I haue shewed you God hath bene knowne from all beginning he neuer lay hid hee euer was manifest euen before the first King euen before tâ—e first thing And therefore if his owne Rule be true Idem esse verum quodâ—unque primum id adulterinum quodcunque postcrius That that which is the ancientest must nâ—eds be the truest then cannot Religion be an humane inuention because it is more ancient then man And consequently that Euripides his Tale whereby he seekâ—th to discredite Religion must needs be a false and an idle fâ—ctioâ— without ground of truth or reason it being but a late and a posteriour inuention Yea and such as hath â—or it not any either knowne or certaine Author to credite it So that it may more iustly be numbred among thosâ— Beâ—â—eselenas those headlesse Old-wiues Tales which Plutarch in the same place so iustly derideth then Religion it selfe can which it seeketh to deride vnder that very name But the true Antiquity of Religion doth free it from any such base imputation and declare it to bee a lesson of Gods owne first teaching bâ—cause it was practised by Adam the first man who could haue no other man to â—each him From which obseâ—ation Iustine Martyr collecteth Quòd ante errorem veritas obtinuerit That Religion is more ancient then superstition Yea and in the same place he bringeth this substantiall reason that Malum posterius est bono quiâ— nihil est aliud nist boni deprauatio That euill is posteriour vnto good because it is nothing but the corruption of good So then the Antiquity of Religion doth proue that it cannot be an humaine inuention 3 Yea and so doth likewise the Vniuersality of it For there was neuer yet any humaine inuention so generally spred as the vse of Religion no not those that seeme most necessary for the vse of men Not cloathing of our bodies which is for meere necessity nor couering of our shames which is for publique honesty For we meete with diuers nations among the west Indians which neither cloathe their bodies nor couer their shames and yet can meete with none but that they haue their gods Which sense of Religion could not possibly be implanted into euery Nation either by imitation from their neighbours because some be so wilde and sauage that they do not admit of any entercouse or commerce Nor yet by institution among themselues vnlesse we should imagine that in euery Nation there should sodainely steppe vp such a politique wise man and as it were by fate tell the same Tale of Religion or that Euripides his man had compassed the whole world about like the Sunne and read his prophane lecture in euery Nation Both which suppositions were idle and ridiculous And therefore it is apparent that Religion cannot be of humane institution but that the same
Quòd et omnium esset et quotidiè cresceret because it was both so generally receiued and beleeued of all men and so prosperously continued from the very beginning concluding no lesse from the Perpetuitie of it then from the Vniuersalitie that it is a plant of natures owne breeding and therefore cannot be any politique inuention And consequently that Euripides in his forged inuention That Religion should be nothing but an humane inuention did as Plutarch truly censures him mendacio veritati tenebras offundere Hee sought onely to obscure the truth with a lie And therefore for this his prophanesse in this his deuice against religion and piety he better deserueth that inured note of Tullie Capitalis Euripides then for his iniustice against right and equitie in that his other sentence Nam si violandum est ius regnaâ—di gratia Violandum est alijs rebus pietatem colas If Iustice may be wrong'd at all then for a Crowne it may Except a Kingdom 's case in all let Pietie thee sway Here yet was in some things a conseruation of equitie but his Tale against Religion imported in all things an extirpation of pietie as the Orator obserueth and that very truly Qut dixerunt totam de Dijs immortalibus opinionem fictam esse Omnem Religionem funditùs sustulerunt They that shall affirme all opinion of the gods to be but a fiction doe vtterly take away the summe of Religion Now these things considered it euidently appeareth that it is not Religion that is a fraudulent inuention to beguile and deceiue men but rather this slander of Religion that it should be but a fraudulent inuention this is a fraudulent inuention indeed yea and that a very wicked one as euen Tullie himselfe insinuateth nay plainely expresseth when hee saith of their Religions that Periculum est ne aut his neglectis impia fraude aut susceptis anili superstitione obligemur That there is no little danger lest either on the one side by neglecting of Religion we be circumuented by the fraud of Atheists or on the other side by accepting of Religion we be intangled with the superstition of old wiues Where I cannot imagine what other fraud of Atheists he should rather meane then this of their affirming that religion is nothing else but an humane inuention which is indeed a very fraudulent suggestion and a fable artificially inuented and composed against religion But so is not religion against the truth It is not fabula arte composita as S. Peter truly teacheth But that this was falsly fayned I hope I haue plainely proued CHAP. 10. The third Obiection against the Vniuersalitie of Consent in Religion propounded viz. That is hath beene oppugned by diuers both wise and learned Philosophers though called by the name of Atheists 2. That Obiection answered from the smalnesse of their number 3. The weakenes of their learning 4. The mistaking of their opinion 5. And their inconstancie in their assertion THere is yet a third Obiection behind which may be made by the Atheist against the Supposition of this so vniuersall a consent in Religion and that is this following That though it could not be denyed that both all Nations and all professions of men in the world doe beleeue There is a God yet that it cannot be affirmed that all seuerall persons haue also therein consented Because there be recorded in the writings both of Heathens and Christians the very names of diuers men that haue directly denied it yea and openly defended That there is no God Amongst whom though they haue beene branded with the name of Atheists as with a note of infamie as crossing the current of that generall opinion with among other men was receiued beleeued most confidently yet were they not denied to haue bin both wise and learned as ranked euen by their aduersaries amongst the number of Philosophers And therefore their opinion cannot in common reason but haue farre greater weight then the whole multitude of the vnlearned because as Lactantius very truly obserueth Plus est momenti in paucioribus doctis quà m in pluribus imperitis There is a great deale more weight in a few that are learned then in a many that are ignorant So that a multitude of the vulgar are not able to counterpoise so much as one Philosopher their iudgement being branded with that note of infamie that Nihil est 〈◊〉 quà m nihil sapere vulgare That there is nothing so common as for the common people to vnderstand nothing And therefore notwithstanding all the crye of the vulgar who obtaine their opinions not by reason but by clamor that may fall out in this case which is noted by the Orator vt altera res verbosior sit altera verior That the one part may bee the truer though the other bee the lowder 2 But now vnto this Obiection I answer three things First that for their number the Atheists doe well not to stand vpon that plea but to disclaime it vtterly and not to vie with their Aduersaries in that point for the victorie For the number of those that haue denied God is so little in comparison of those that confesse him that to vse the Orators comparison it is but stilla muriae ad mare Aegeum but as one drop of brine vnto a whole Ocean Their multitude is so great and so infinite aboue their opposite Neither these onely a multitude of the ignorant and vnlearned but also euen of the wise and learned All the learnedest Philosophers and all the wisest Sages that euer were in the world may be numbred in this multitude that confesse there is a God So that if any cause can gaine any estimation either by the number or honour of those that defend it or by the fewnesse and basenesse of those that oppugne it no cause hath more aduantage in both these points then this For first as concerning the number of those Atheists it is so poore and contemptible that it is an infinite disgrace and reproach vnto their cause to haue beene in all mens eyes so abiect and profligated as to be able to get no moe defenders since the world was first created especially being taught by such learned Philosophers as they would insinuate This is a foule disgrace vnto their cause that so great learned Teachers could get so few Disciples especially being followed by so many Auditors as Laertius obserueth in Bion of Boristhenis one of the chiefest Atheists that Nemo illius Discipulus inscribitur cùm tot habuerit auditores So that in all ages there haue beene but very few either Masters or Schollers in the doctrine of Atheists And this Tullie obiecteth vnto Epicurus another of their principallest Atheists In vestris disputationibus historia muta est Nunquam audiui in Epicuri schola Lycurgum Solonem Miltiadem Themistoclem Epaminondam nominari qui in orâ— sunt caeterorum omnium Philosophorum All historie is mute in the
is no man but thinkes this very absurd if himselfe be not too grossely so And therefore Palingenius very truly affirmeth that there cannot be in Causes an infinite progresse Ergo infinitus In Causis processus erit Minimè sed oportet Nimirùm esse aliquid primum a quo maximus ordo Causarum incipiat qui a summo tendit ad imum What then in Causes can there be an infinite processe And can no End bee found Oh no. There can be nothing lesse But there must needs some first maine Cause of all the rest be set Which th' order great of Causes all beginning doth beget And in which Highest Lowest Midst are all together mett Thus he reiecteth this innumerability of Causes fixeth them at last in some one that is the first So that as Aristotle himselfe affirmeth Est principium aliquod neque sunt infinitae entium causae There is some first cause the causes of of things are not infinite For if there should be in causes an infinite proceeding and no first cause among them then as Aquinas very wittily collecteth there could be no second neither nor no third and so none at all For these numerall termes of First Second Third and so forward are not onely names of number but also of order So that as nothing can be first which hath any thing before it so nothing can be second which hath not a first before it nor third which hath not a second and so on in all the rest From whence it must needes follow that if there be no first cause there can be no second nor third and by consequence none at all But wee see by experience that there be second causes and therefore by necessitie there must needs be a first We see there be inferior causes and therefore there must needs be also some superior and by consequence from which they all descend and vpon which they all depend For as Aristotle himselfe affirmeth Necesse est quod prius est Causam esse eorum quae post illud sunt In the series of Causes that which goes before is alwayâ—s the cause of all them that follow after But now commeth the second Probleme that If there must needs be some supreme and first cause Whether there be Many of them or Whether be but one That there cannot be Many Firsts the very name of First doth necessarily import For if any thing be either before that or with that which wee intend to be First then cannot it truly be called the First If any thing be before it then is it not Primum but Secundum If any thing be with it then it is not Prius but Simul So that if it be first it can be no more but one Besides if there should be many firsts there would follow another very great inconuenience For then as Palingenius obserueth Tunc discordabunt inter se ac magna ciebunt Praelia tot Reges quia Regni summa potestas Non patitur plures Sic mundus non erit vnus Nec pulcher namque est Ordo pulcherâ—ima rerum So many Kings would ne're accord but raise a grieuous broyle For supreme Power suffer's not that many rule the soyle And so the World it selfe nor one nor beautifull should be As lacking Order Order 't is doth all things beautifie But we euidently see those things to be cleane contrary We both see that there is but one world and not many and yet that it is full both of order and beauty And therefore it cannot haue many first Causes in it as Palingenius in another place concludeth Quare non possunt plura esse exordia rerum Ast vnum quia perfectum non amplius vno est A quo sicrerum aeternus ducitur ordo Vt monade a prima innumeri generantur Wherefore more first beginnings cannot be Of things that ord'red are but one prime Cause Because no more but One is perfectly From which all order tak's eternall Lawes As from a single vnion who sees not Innumerable numbers are begot Yea and Trismegistus from the fore-named inconueniences expresly concludeth Impossibile est duos aut plures esse factores neque enìm ordo vnus probaretur in multis Praeterea qui inter illos imbecillior esset potentiori invideret It is impossible that there should be two or more Creators for one and the same order would not be approued of many Besides he that should be the weaker and more impotent would euer enuy the more potent and mighty So Cyprian Non potuerunt multa diuersa rerum esse principia Quia nisi ad vnum oninia respicerent discordia infinita cuncta volverentur in chaos There could not be many and diuers first causes of Creatures Because vnlesse all had respect and reference vnto one prime and supreme cause all would returne into their fist Chaos Anselmus our learned Primate hath of set purpose disputed this point and proued by strength of reason that among all the Causes which are in the world though they be in number infinite yet that there can bee no moe of them but onely one First His reason is this following Quicquid est non nisi per aliquid est Quod cum ita sit aut est vnum aut sunt plura per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt Quòd si sunt plura tunc aut ipsa referuntur ad vnum aliquod per quod sunt aut eadem plura singula sunt per se aut ipsa per se inuicem sunt At si plura ipsa sunt per vnum iam non sunt omnia per plura sed potiùs per illud vnum per quod illa plura sunt Si verò illa plura singula sunt per se vtique est vna aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se quam habent vt per se sint Non est autem dubium quòd per illud vnum sint per quod habent vt sint per se Veriùs ergò per ipsum sunt cuncta quà m per plura quae sine illo vno esse non possunt Vt verò plura per se inuicem sint nulla patitur ratio quoniam irrationalis cogitatio est vt aliquares sit per illud cui dat esse The whole summe of whose reason is in effect thus much Whatsoeuer thing hath being must needs haue it by Something And that thing which giueth it being must needs be either some one speciall thing asunder or else many things together If many things concurre to giue being vnto any thing then must they needs be such as that either all of them haue their being from some one other thing or that all of them haue their being euery one of himselfe or that all of them haue their being euery one from another by a kind of interchangeable and mutuall power Now if all those many-things do themselues receiue their being from any other One-thing then are not all things
being of it selfe Suprema causa est Natura per se The highest cause is such a kind of Nature as hath his being of it selfe Which as Origen teacheth is proper and peculiar vnto God Tu solus es â—ui quod es a nullo datum est Thou only hast a being who hast not thy being giuen thee by any other thing So that this title of Natura per se is the proper and peculiar title of God as Trismegistus expresly affirmeth Solus Deus meritò solus in se a se circum se totus est plenus perfectus isque sua firma est stabilitas It is God sayth he and nothing else but God that hath both in himselfe and of himselfe and about himselfe his fulnesse and perfection and it is only he that is his owne strength and stability Yea and Plato affirmeth of this Natura per se that Ab eo quod verè est non abest nec motus nec vita nec anima nec sapientia That thing which truely is and hath his being of it selfe hath also both his mouing and his liuing and his spirit and his wisedome and all of himselfe Which are the meere properties and attributes of God who as the Scripture testifieth Hath his life in himselfe This is proper and peculiar vnto God to be Natura per se. All other things are Natura per aliud There is none of all them that haue either their liuing or their mouing or their breathing or their being of themselues all which nominatìm Plato ascribeth vnto the first Cause but all these things they doe onely receiue from God as the Scripture nominatìm affirmeth of all of them In him they liue and mooue and haue their being And he it is that giueth vnto all both life and breath and all things Who as Palingenius affirmeth Est per se viuens sapìensque bonúsque Anullo accipiens quod habet verùm omnia ab illo Accipiunt igitur quod habent amittere possunt c. He by himselfe alone doth liue selfe wise selfe good he is From none receiuing what he hath but all receiue of his And therefore they whatâ—er'e they haue haue power it to lees Trismegistus giueth it another title which is likewise the proper title of God For he calleth it Vnum principium ex quo cuncta dependent And in another place as though hee had not yet spoken enough he correcteth himselfe Ex vno cuncta pendentia ex eo potiùs defluentÃa Hee sayth that there is but one principall Cause vpon which all things doe depend or rather indeed from which all things do descend Now this can bee nothing else but God For as Anselmus very well collecteth Id quod per se est per quod alia cuncta sunt summum esse omnium existentium ratio docet That which hath his being of it selfe and which giueth being vnto euery other thing must needs be euen in reason the highest and most principall thing that hath a being Now God hath his being onely of himselfe and hee likewise giueth being vnto euery other thing for there is nothing in the world which hath any being but it hath it by participation from him So that nothing indeede can primarily and properly be called Ens but onely God Euery other thing as it hath his dependence vpon this first Cause so can it bee called Ens but in an vnproper and secondarie acceptance as the Accidens which hath his whole Esse in his Substance And this euen Aristotle himselfe expresly confesseth Caetera Entia dicuntur eò quòd Entis propriè dicti quaedam sunt Quantitates quaedam Qualitates quaedam Passiones quaedam aliud aliquid tale The other Categories are called Entia Beings as being some Quantities some Qualities some Passions and the like of that Ens or Being which is properly so called And that is the prime and onely Praedicament of Substance And so it is betweene the first Cause which hath his being of it selfe and all other things which haue their being from it They be indeed but as Accidents in comparison of it And their being vnto his is no better then nothing as is plainely and directly affirmed by Origen Et quae in Coelo sunt quae in Teâ—ra quantum ad naturam Dei pertinet non sunt Neither the things in Earth nor the things in Heauen in comparison of God haue any true being And immediately aboue Nam vmbra ad comparationem corporis non est fumus ad comparationem ignis non est The shadow being compared with the body hath no being and no more hath the smoake neither being compared with his fire So that all other things in comparison of God are but Fumus Vmbra And therefore this Vnum Principium ex quo cuncta dependent is nothing else but God Whom euen the Scriptures themselues call as Dionysius Areopagita affirmeth Causam omnium Principium Essentiam Vitam The cause Beginning Being and the Life of all Ex quo suspensa sunt omnia saith Seneca Of whom all things depend Yea and in the same place he affirmeth that onely of him Sunt omnes causae causarum That God is such a cause as produceth the causes of all other things For all other causes bring forth nothing but Effects but God is such a cause as bringeth forth causes He is tale Principium quod quidem movetur vt rursus extet principium as Trismegistus affirmeth He is such a cause as by his mouing produceth another â—ause For hee is Causa Causarum and no cause could haue his operation as a cause but onely by the power of his gracious assistance It is onely Gods blessing which giueth vnto all causes their proper operation The Heauens which drop downe fatnesse vpon the Earth doe it onely by the vertue of the blessing of God For it is onely hee that sendeth a gracious raine vpon his inheritance and refresheth the same when it is weary And so likewise the Earth though it drinke in the raine yet can it bring forth no fruite vnlesse it receiue a blessing from God And so likewise the Father which begetteth his Childe receiueth all his generatiue power of God Behold children are the inheritance of the Lord and the fruite of the wombe is his reward saith the Prophet Dauid Yea and Euripides likewise vnto the same purpose A Dijs dantur liberi mortalibus Children are giuen to men It 's God that giueth them So that not onely all things in the world are the works of God but also all the Causalitie which is to be found in any of those things is onely the Effect of God the first cause Nay as Bradwardine very truely teacheth All the Effects which are wrought in things by their second causes yet are more immediatly wrought by God who is the first cause then they be by their
nearest causes themselues Nulla res potest aliquid facere sine Deo Et nulla res potest aliquid sacere nisi Deus per se immediatè faciat illud idem imò immediatiùs quolibet alio faciente And thus the very titles which Authors haue giuen vnto the first cause doe necessarily imply that it must needs be God But yet diuers of them goe further and collect the very same by way of Argument Damascen proueth that the first cause of things must needs be God by this Sorites Quae mutabilia sunt etiam creata sunt Quae autem creata sunt dubium non est quìna quopiam creata sunt Conditorem porrò increatum esse necesse est Nam si ipse quoque creatus est a quopiam quoque creatus est ldque tantisper locum habebit quòad ad aliquid minimè creatum pervenerimuâ— Increatus est ergò summus ille opifex atque immutabilis Hoc autem quid aliud esse quâ—at quà m Deus Whatsoeuer things are mutable as are all that be sensible they must needs haue beene created Whatsoeuer is created is created of some Creator That Creator himselfe must needs be vncreated Or if he also be created hee must be created by something And this holdes on so long vntill wee come at last vnto something vncreated Therefore that great work-man that is the maker of all things must needs himselfe be both vncreated and immutable Now what can that be else but onely God himselfe This is Damascenes reason whereby hee doth conclude that the first cause of all things can be nothing else but God Trismegistus in like sort doth presse the very same Argument in matter fully agreeing though in words somewhat differing Quae sensu percipiuntur facta sunt omnia Genita non a seipsis sed fiunt ab altero Est ergò aliquis factor istorum atque is ingenitus vt genitis sit antiquioâ— Those things that are subiect vnto sense haue all of them beene made Those things that are made haue not beene made of themselues but of something else And therefore they must needes haue had some maker And hee must needs be vnmade because hee is more ancient then any thing that is made He there proceedeth further disputing much both of the Power and Wisdome and Goodnesse of this First cause and Creator and of his Dominion ouer euery creature being much sollicitous by what name he should call him whether by the name of God or of Maker or of Father or of all these three together And hee resolueth his owne doubt that hee may worthily be called Deus propter potentiam Factor propter actum and Pater propter bonum A God for his power a Creator for his worke and a Father for his goodnesse This is that Heathen mans discourse vpon the first cause And Seneca hee bringeth in another Argument vnto the same effect which though in the passage it be somewhat different yet in the conclusion it fully agreeth with it For he reckoneth vp fiue differing causes of the world Id ex quo Id a quo Id in quo Id ad quod Id propter quod that is The Matter the Efficient the Forme the Exemplar and the End But the power of all these he ascribes vnto the Efficient making it in effect the onely true cause and all the rest to be rather as instruments vnto it then Concauses with it Quae nunc retuli non sunt multae singulae Causae sed ex vna pendent ex ea quae facit It is onely the Efficient whereupon they all depend The Efficient is that which praepareth the Matter imposeth the Forme conceiueth the Patterne and propoundeth the End And this Efficient of the world he expresly affirmeth to be nothing else but God Faciens hic Deus est And thus they doe not onely insinuate The first Cause to bee God but also by Argument they indeauour to proue it Yea and diuers of them in expresse termes affirme it which is our third head Seneca whom I last named shall bee the first of them Hee saith expresly of God that Ille est prima omnium Causa ex qua caeterae pendent God is the first and cheifest Cause of all things whereupon they all do hang. And againe in another place Quaerimus quae sit Causa Ratio faciens id est Deus Do we inquire what is the Cause Euen the Reasonable Spirit that maketh it And that Reason or Spirit is God The second is Trismegistus whom I named next before him who saith that that Efficient which is more ancient then any Effect is nothing else but God Efficiens Effectum vnita quidem sunt inuicem sic tamen vt vnum praecedat alterum verò sequatur Praecedens sanè Deus Essiciens sequens verò id quod est effectum The Cause and his effect are alwayes vnited yet so that the one of them goeth before and the other followeth after The Cause which goeth before is nothing else but God the thing which followeth after is the Effect of that Cause Yea and in another place he defineth God to be nothing else but onely a generall Cause of all things Deus profectò mens non est at verò vt sit mens Causa est nec spiritus sed causa qua spiritus extat nec lumen sed causa qua lumen existit God is not vnderstanding but the cause of Vnderstanding It is the inspiration of the Almighty that giueth vnderstanding God is not a spirit but the Cause of all spirits The Father of Spirits God is not a light but the Cause of all light The Father of Lights So that in his verdict this first and chiefest Cause is nothing else but God Whom in another place he calleth Bonum efficiens Bonafaciens omnia That good Efficient Cause which bringeth forth all good Effects The third of them is Aristotle whom I named before them both who expresly affirmeth that Deus est rebus omnibus Causa Principium that God is vnto all things both a Beginner and a Cause Yea and in another place hee affirmeth that he is causa quae continet omnia making him not onely the first and cheifest Cause but also the generall cause of all thing The fourth is Pythagoras who calleth God directly causam efficientem formantem Both the Efficient the Forming cause The fifth is Macrobius who writeth thus of God That Deus qui prima causa est vocatur vnus omnium quae sunt quaeque videntur esse princeps origo est God who is both called the first cause and is so indeed he is both the Ruler and Maker of all things Vnto which fiue fore-named I will onely adde a sixt And that is Pindarus who directly affirmeth that God is the Efficient and Author of all things Omni rei Deum Authorem superponere oportet Wee
must acknowledge God to be the Author of all things The Greeke word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And thus as you see the yeelding of a first Cause which wee must yeeld of necessity doth forcibly draw vs on to the yeelding of a Deitie CHAP. 4. That these sensible and second motions direct vs vnto a first 2. That a first motion doth necessarily imply a first Mouer 3. That this first Mouer is the cause of all the motions in the World 4. And that therefore this first Mouer is nothing else but God I Haue already dispatched the first of those two physical considerations which I purposely selected to declare There is a God taken from the first Cause and Causer of all naturall things I am now come to the second which is taken from the first Motion and Moouer of all moueable things Wherein I may bee the shorter because this Argument runneth almost in the same tract which was traced by the former But it is an Argument so much insisted on both by Philosophers and Diuines that I know not any other that is either vrged oftener or inforced further And therefore for the better vnderstanding of our order in proceeding I will contriue this Argument into this gradation Firâ—â—â—hat second motions direct vs by necessitie vnto a first Secondly that this First Motion doth leade vs yet further vnto a first Mouer Thirdly that this first Mouer is the onely cause of all those seuerall Motions that are found in all things And fourthly that therefore this first Mouer can be nothing else but God For the first of those foure Steppes That these second and inferior Motions do leade vs by degrees vnto one first and supreme Motion Plato proueth by this reason Quandò aliud ab alio movetur illúdque rursum semper ab alio eritnè in talibus aliquid quod primò mouetur At quomodò id cùm ab aliquo moveatur eorum quae moventur primum erit Certè impossibile id est Sed quandò aliquid seipsum mouens aliud quoque mouebit illúdque aliud sic deinceps plurima movebuntur an aliud totius motus principium erit quà m mutatio eius quod seipsum mouet When as one thing is moued by another and that still by another and so in infinitum can there then be any thing that hath a first motion no surely there cannot For how can that be the first moouing of all other which it selfe is moued by another This is a thing vnpossible But if wee grant that there is something which is moued onely by it selfe and not by any other thing if that moue another thìng and that another and so there bee many things moued in their order then the first beginning of all those motions so moued by others can be nothing else but onely the Impulsion of that one first Mouer which mooueth of himselfe Out of which discourse of Plato wee may gather these two Aphorismes First that if there should be in those motions which are moued by another an infinite progresse there could none of them be first Secondly that we must needs come in the end vnto some such thing as is moued onely of it selfe and not of any other thing And thirdly that this onâ— thing which thus mooueth of it selfe is the true cause of motion vnto euery other thing Aristotle in like manner though in many other points dissenting from his Maister yet in this point of Motion he consenteth fully with him yea presseth the same reason almost in the same forme Omne quod mouetur ab aliquo moueri necesse est Et aut ab eo quod mouetur ab alio aut ab eo quod non mouetur ab alio Si ab eo mouetur quod ab alio motu cietur mouens aliquod esse primum quod ab alio non mouetur necesse est Fieri enìm non potest vt in infinitum proficiscatur id quod mouet atque mouetur ab alio Quippe cùm infinitorum nihil sit primum Whatsoeuer thing is mooued must needes be mooued of something and that thing which moueth it must needes it selfe be moued either of another or not of another If it be mooued by such a thing as is mooued of another we must come by necessity vnto a first moouer which is not mooued by any other For it is vnpossible to goe still on for euer in those things that are moued by another Because in those things that are infinite there can none of them be first And therefore where there is granted to be any first thing there cannot be held to be an infinite proceeding Yea and againe a little after Fieri non potest vt id quo motus affertur moveat absque eo quod movet a seipso It cannot be that that which is moued by another should be moued but by that which is moued by it selfe And hee giueth these examples Baculus mouet lapidem mouetur a manu quae ab homine mouetur The Staffe moues the stone the hand moues the staffe the man moues the hand and the man is moued in some sort of himselfe For as the Romane Orator affirmeth Quod animal est motu mouetur interiore suo Euery liuing thing is moued by an internal motion of his owne So that the summe of those two fore-named Reasons which I haue aboue set downe in their Authors owne words is in effect thus much That Whatsoeuer thing is moued must needs be moued by something and that thing must either be moued by it selfe or by some other thing By it selfe can no inferior or second thing be moued but alwayes by some former and superior For as it subsisteth not by it selfe but by another so moueth it also not it selfe but by another Motum enìm suum non sibi debet sed Authori saith Hilarie It oweth all his motion not vnto his owne power but to his Author and first Mouer So that no inferior thing is moued of it selfe but onely by the power of the supreme and first Mouer Now if all these sensible and inferior things be moued of some other as wee plainly see they are then may we by them ascend as by steppes and degrees from the lower to the higher vntill we come at last vnto that first Mouer For in those things that are moued by another wee cannot proceede in infinitum but must at last stay in one which is the Mouer of all the other and yet it selfe is moued by none other but hath both his motion and his being of himselfe And therefore must needs be God This is the whole summe aâ—d effect of that Argument Whereby this first point is euidently cleered That the contemplation of these secondarie motions doe leade vs by necessitie vnto a first Yea and as Aquinas very wittily obserueth as well in Motions as in causes There can be no Second if there be no First no inferior if there be no superior no posterior if
diuers kindes of grieuous sicknesses vnto many And fourthly that euen Physitians themselues doe finde in many sicknesses that they be diuine punishments For the first of which foure Heads What is the true Originall cause of sicknesse S. Chrysostome telleth vs that it is the part of euery good Physition inquirere semper in morborum radicâ—m tque ita pervenire ad ipsum mali fontem to sâ—arch into the roote of diseases and sicknesses and so to proceede vnto the fountaine of those euils And S. Basil hee telleth vs that it is the part of a discreet and wise patient not to leaue this inquisition only to the Physition but he himselfe also to search into a the causes of his owne diseases that so he may the better attaine to know their remedies Nos plagas a Deo suscipientes qui benè prudenter vitam nostram moderatur principio quidem inquiramus cognitionem rationis ob quam nos flagellet Whensoeuer we are scourged and chastised by God who guideth our whole life by his wisedome and goodnesse we ought first to search carefully for what cause hee so correcteth vs. For the cause being once found the Remedie is halfe found and the cure in a manner alreadie halfe performed Medici causa morbi inventâ— curationem esse inventam putanâ— Physiâ—ians hauing once found out the cause of a disease they thinke they haue found the cure Now for the true cause of diseases and Sicknesses though it greatly haue puzelled both the greatest Philosophers and the learnedst Physitions to finde out what it is some assigning them vnto the excesse or defect of the primary Qualities of Heate Cold Moyst Drye some vnto the impuritie and corruption of our meates some vnto the infection of vnwholesome and putrid ayres and to diuers such other Materiall causes wherein they be greatly diuided amongst themselues Yet is there a full agreement both of Heathens and Christians that God is the first Efficient cause of them and that Sinne is the true Impulsiuâ— cause which inforceth him to send them This the Prophet Dauid expresly declareth when he called Sicknesse The Rebuke of God and affirmeth that For sinne hee inflicts it vpon man When thou with rebukes doest chasten man for Sinne thou makest his beautie to consume away This also the Apostle Paul expresly declareth when he telleth vs that By one man Sinne entred into the world and Death by Sinne. And againe in another place where hee telleth the Corinthians that for their Abuses in receiuing the Sacrament they were stroken by God with diuers kinds of punishments some of them with Sicknesse some of them with Weakenesse and some of them with Death Yea and this our Sauiour Christ himselfe expresly declareth when hee biddeth the sick-man whom hee had lately cured to goe and sinne no more lest a worse thing come vnto him Thereby plainely declaring that his Sinne was both the cause of his former Sicknesse and would bee also of his future if he sinned any more And that Sinne is indeed the true cause of diseases wee may see it plainely verified in all these memorable Sicknesses that are recorded vnto vs in the Holy Scriptures The Botches wherewith the Egyptians wery smitten was for their rebellion against God and their oppression of his People The Leprosie wherewith the Prophetesse Miriam was smitten was for being so enuious against the Prophet Moses The Pestilence wherewith the Israelites were smitten was for their adulterie with the Daughters of Moab and for their idolatrie with their prophane god The Emerods wherewith the Philistins were smitten was for their Impietie in detayning the Arke of God And so generally in all the rest There is almost in no place any mention of any greiuous and exemplary Sicknesse but there is in the same place some mention of that Sinne for whose punishment it was sent In which forenamed instances we may obserue these two things First that not onely the pestilence and leprosie and such like grieuous and infectious Sicknesses which are called Morbi Sontici that is mischeiuous diseases are the scourges and strokes of God but also all other inferior diseases as Emerods Botches and such like smaller annoyances as euen hee himselfe professeth in another place Secondly that those diseases are sent by God vnto men to correct and chasten them for their sinne Neither is this the testimony of the Holy Scripture onely but also of the Heathens euen in their owne Histories Wherein wee may obserue that whensoeuer there befell them the publike calamity of any generall sicknesse they still imputed it vnto their sinnes prouoking the anger of some or other of their gods As may be manifestly shewed by manifold instances Herodotus ascribeth that greiuous sicknesse which was sent vpon the Scythians to their sacrilege in sacking the Temple of Venus Pausanias ascribeth that deuouring sicknesse which was sent among the Iones vnto the profane lust of Menalippus and Comaetho And that generall abortion which happened among the Caphyens wiues onely vnto the cruelty of their bloody husbands in stoning for a â—leight cause certaine young and wanton Children The hand of diuine Iustice inflicting their punishment in the very same subiect wherein they had offended Their crueltie exercised vpon other mens Children being iustly punished by the death of their owne in a most equall retaliation The same Author ascribeth the dropsie and lousie-sicknesse of Cassander vnto his crueltie and infidelitie vnto Alexander his Maister And Herodotus againe reporteth of the Persians that they generally held that whosoeuer was smitten with the leprous infection hee was surely a profane person and had doubtles committed some great and grieuous sinne against their god the Sunne though they knew not what it was And therefore they banished them out of all their Cities collecting from the sicknesse the stroke of Gods Iustice euen in an vnknowne Cause And this which we haue seene in the Histories of the Greekes wee may see yet more plainely in the Histories of the Romanes For Plutarch ascribeth that destroying plague which happened among them in the time of Romulus vnto the trechery which was practised in the murther of Tatius And Liuy ascribeth another such like plague which followed the condemnation of Manlius Capitolinus vnto that iniustice which was vsed in his death And thus haue euen the Heathen bene taught in the very Schoole of Nature without going any further that the true cause indeede of all sicknesse and diseases are onely mens sinnes prouoking Gods Iustice to take vengeance of their wickednesse As Dauid plainely confesseth in one of the Psalmes There is nothing sound in my flesh becouse of thine anger neither is there rest in my bones because of my sinne 2 Which Lesson may yet a great deale more perfectly bee learned in the holy Schoole of God For there hee himselfe threatneth and that in many places that
Quae copulatio rerum quasi consentiens ad mundi incolumitatem coagmentatio naturae quem non moâ—et hunc horum nihil reputasse certò scio This consent and agreement of those naturall things so greatly aduancing the good of the whole world if it doe not mooue any man it is onely from this cause That he neuer well considered them Resoluing that no man could euer obserue them but that thâ—y would make a great impression in him But Macrobius leauing all those Allegoricall allusions asserteth this Harmony vnto a true and reall melody indeede occasioned by the various motions and differing magnitudes of the Heauens Which he saith must needes produce sonum dulcem musicum non ineptum asperum A sweete and delightfull not a harsh and distastfull sound as by inuincible reasons he saith may be collected Which point hee indeede hath laboured exactly with much fiâ—enesse and subtility Vnto whom I referre them that desire a more curious discourse vpon this Theame Neither is this an idle fancy begotten onely in the heads of conceited Pâ—ilosophers but it is also entertained for a certaine truth by diuers learned Christians Bedâ— alledgeth this opinion of the Harmony of Heauen for the credit of Musicke Which hee would neuer haue done if he had not allowed of it Boetius doubteth not directly to affirme it yea and to proue it too Non potest ab hac coelesti vertigine ratus ordo modulationis absistere But aboue all Anselmus though otherwise a seuere and a very austere man yet is so sweetened and mollified with the conceite of this Musicke that hee not onely asseuereth it but also indeauoureth with great paines and labour to set out the true musicall proportion of it as Macrobius before did Now it is no lesse vnprobable that so many learned men of so many differing botâ—â—ages and nations should concurre with such an harmony in defending of this Harmony if it were merely fained then it is that there should bee such an Harmony indeede Neg enìm hunc tam certum syderum cursum atque discursum forturti impetus esse dixerim saith Seneca These so certaine both courses and recourses of the Starres cannot possibly bee the workes of blinde Fortune and Chance but must needes bee Gods owne ordinance because they doe not sine aliquo Custode stare but aeternae legis imperio procedere as hee noteth in the same place They neither keepe their stations without a Keeper nor mooue their motions without a Ruler whose aeternall law they faithfully obey And it was a thing no more hard vnto God to make the Heauens to moue with a sweete melodious harmony then to make them moue without it For if Queene Cleopatra when she came vnto Antonius could instruct the Oare-men and Rowers of her Barge to strike all their strokes in such order and number that they made a most sweete harmony and concent vpon the water as exactly agreeing with her musicall instruments as the sound of a Taber agreeth with his Pipes an Art also in practice sometimes among the Greekes as may be collected out of Maximus Tyrius then much more can God doe so who ordereth all his workes both in Number Weight and Measure It is not hard for him in such sort to moderate yea and to modulate the Heauens as to make them to send foâ—th a sweete harmony in their motions Yea and it is not incredible that hee hath also done it For seeing it is vnpossible that this so huge and vast a fabricke of the Heauens being truely materiall and sensible bodies and whirled about with such incredible swiftnes should moue without some noyse as Pythagoras well collecteth and that noyse as Macrobius truely inferreth must be of necessity either sweete and melodious or harsh and absonous aut musicum aut asperum it is far more probable that that sound which God hath chosen to sound continually in his diuine Eares should rather be tuned like the sound of sweete Musicke then harsh and confused like the creaking of a Cart. For as Macrobius in the same place obserueth Fragor turbidus inconditus offendit auditum An harsh and rude crashing of things offendeth the eare And therefore it is not likely to be found in the Heauen In which as there is Nihil fortuitum so is there Nihil tumultuarium As there is nothing done rashly so there is nothing done disorderly And it cannot in any probabilitie be thought that God who hath appointed vs in our singing vpon Earth To make a pleasant melodie and to sing vnto him with a grace in our hearts would admit into the heauens themselues any such vntuneable and incomposed noyse as hath neither any grace nor melodie in it But this I doe not affirme as a certainty but onely propose as a probabilitie leauing euery man vnto his owne liberty to beleeue it or not to beleeue it as he findeth himselfe most inclined in his mind Apologizing for my selfe as Gregory Nyssen doth in a like case That heerein I doe but Ingenium ad mâ—ntem nostram in propositis exercere non doctrinam expositricem posteris relinquere I doe but onely propound it for the exercise of wit as a probability not commend it for a sealed and infallible truth vnto all posteritie Therefore be this opinion of the Harmony of the Heauens as it may be it but Lepidè quidem musicè dictum factu autem impossibile as Aristotle censureth it that is but a pleasant and musicall conceit Yet this so excellent a concent and agreement in the heauens to keepe so constantly their seuerall rankes and orders notwithstanding the diuersitie of their courses is a work which by themselues cannot possibly be done no more then any musicall Instrument can put it selfe into tune It is God the Musitian as Plutarch before calleth him that keepeth all in tune His power keepeth them all in obedience His wisedome guideth them all in their courses and his goodnesse maketh them to produce those good effects which they worke in the earth and in these inferior Bodies And therefore euen Aristotle himselfe who derideth so much the Harmony of the Heauens in any real sounds yet in respect of this harmonicall concent in the creatures he so much admireth it that he compareth God in his working of it vnto a Praecentor in a Quire who both appointeth and moderateth all the Songs that be sung there All which things declare that God as he is delighted in order so is hee likewise delighted in number Yea and in musicall number too In which opinion Anselmus is carried so farre that he not onely affirmeth that God hath giuen to the heauens an harmonicall number in their motions but also from thence collecteth that God hath in his kind an harmonicall motion euen in himselfe Habes haec in te tuo ineffabili modo qui ea dedisti rebus a te
the first Principles of all things in all kindes are two contraries as Finite and Infinite Good and Euill Life and Death Day and Night and such like Whose opinion is by Aristotle expressed more fully who setteth downe distinctly ten seuerall combinations of Contraries which the Pythagoreans defended to be the first Principles and Originals of all things As namely these following Finitum infinitum Par Impar Vnum Plura Dextrum Sinistrum Masculinum Foemininum Quiescens Motum Rectum Curvum Lumen Tenebras Bonum Malum Quadratum Longum that is Finite and Infinite Euen and Odde One and Moe Right hand and Left Male and Female Resting and Mouing Straight and Crooked Light and Darkenesse Good and Euill Square and Long. These Contraries they not onely held to be in the world but also to bee the working Principles of all things in the world And therefore their Effects must needes be contrary as well as their Causes In which opinion Alâ—meon conspired so fully with them that Aristotle doubteth whether hee borrowed his opinion from them or they theirs from him Yea and in another place hee confesseth that it is the common opinion of all the Philosophers That the first Principles of all thing must needes be meere Contraries Omnes Contraria Principia faciunt But hee himselfe handleth this point more exactly then any brings it home more properly vnto our present purpose That in this mixing of Contraries in all sorts of Creatures Nature delighteth her selfe pleasantly as with a most sweete Harmony Natura ad contraria miro fertur desiderio atque concentum ex his facit Nature is strangely carried with a strong desire of ioyning contrary things together and yet maketh of them a delightfull and most melodious tune And this hee illustrates in that place by very pregnant instances both in Ciuill and Artificiall and Naturall things For Ciuill things he giueth these instances That euery City though neuer so well composed and in neuer so great concord yet consisteth of persons of contrary conditions some poore some rich some yong some old some weake some strong some good some bad All which though they be many yet make they but one City and though in nature they bee vnlike yet make they a sweete concord in the Ciuill State In Artificiall things hee obserueth that Ars adimitationem Naturae se componens idem praestat That Art as it imitateth Nature in many other things so doth it also in this that it maketh all her workes of a mixture of contraries Whereof hee giueth these instances The Art of Painting mixeth contrary colours in her Pictures as blacke with white and red with yellow The Art of Musicke mixeth contrary sounds in her Songes as Sharps with flats and briefes with Longs And the Art of Grammar mixeth contrary letters in her words as vowells with mutes and such like In Naturall things hee giueth these instances that Vis quaedam per omnia dimanans transiens siccitatem humori calorem frigori leue gravi commistum rotundo rectum Terram omnem Mare Aethera Solem Lunam Vniversum exornavit Coelum cum Mundum frabricata esset ex diversis nullo modo immistilibus aere terra igne aqua imagine vna quae globos comprehendit There is a certaine power which pierceth and disperseth it selfe through the whole world ioyning dry things with moyst and hot things with cold light things with heauy and crooked with straite and yet by this contrary composition very excellently beautifying both the earth and sea and skie and Sun and Moone and generally all the heauen making the frame of this world of things of far vnlike nature and such as refuse to be mingled together ayre and earth and fire and water and Heauen which comprehendeth all these Spheres in his figure Now all this commixtion of things so contrary do not tend to the defacing but adorning of the world as Concords and Discords doe vnto the better tempering of the Harmony in Singing For by that very Comparison doth Aristotle expresse them Natura Coelt terrae vniversique mundi concretionem principiorum maximè contrariorum vno exornavit instruxit concentu Nature hath compounded both heauen and earth and all the whole World of contrary Principles to adorne it more beautifully with a concent-full Harmony Thus as Seneca obserueth ioyning instances of all the fore-named heads together Nuâ—ilo serena succedunt turbantur maria cùm quieverunt noctem Dies sequitur pars coeli consurgit pars mergitur Contrarijs rerum aeternitas constat After a storme there comes a calme the Seas bee troubled after they haue rested after the night there appeareth day One part of the Heauen riseth vp another goeth downe The whole frame of the Vniuerse is compounded of Contraries And thus as Trismegistus obserueth Rerum singularum ordo concentum quendam melo divino dulcisonum conficit The very naturall order of things produceth a pleasant Harmony composed in a kind of diuine and Heauenly melody Aud therefore hee affirmeth that Musicam nosse nihil aliud est quà m cunctarum rerum ordinem scire To know Musicke is nothing else but to know the naturall order of things For as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth Natura est perfectissima Harmonia There is no Harmony better then the order of Nature Thus God hath made an Harmony in all his Creatures by the ioynt obseruation both of Christians and Heathens 2 But the testimonie of neither of them no nor of them both together doth so euidence the matter as the things themselues doe by that incredible delight which all of them doe naturally take in the sweetnesse of Musick For there is nothing whatsoeuer indued with a liuing and a sensible spirit but it is rauished in a sorte and caried out of itself with the bewitching sounds of Musicke I omitt the fabulous narration of Amphion as a Poëtical fiction that the power of his Musick was so great that he could Saxa movere sono testudinis prece blanda Ducere quò vellet With Lutes alluring sound and his sweet tunes he could Moue the hard Stones and make them stirre where 're he would Which though it be but an Hyperbole and Excesse of speech yet the Poet made choise of it of set purpose thereby to expresse with a greater Emphasis the incredible power of Musick vnto vs. Which indeed is very great yea and not onely with vs men but also with euery other liuing thing both with Birds and with Beasts and with Fishes yea and euen with very Wormes As wee may see in all of them if wee will but looke vpon them First for Birds there is no man but may obserue by his daily experience with what a singular delight they vse to solace and entertaine themselues with their naturall Musick chaunting-out their sweete melodie vpon the pleasant branches of euery greene tree A thing