a beginninge so we believe it shall have an ende And consequently the producing of more individuall substances shall have an ende And wheras all Species and individualls formerly produced being put together doe make up a number only finite howe can this inferre that God is infinite especially if so be more Species might be produced then have bene produced For eyther it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things or no. If it dothe then the producing of those that are produced is no evidence of Gods greatest power If is dothe not then the number of thinges produced were they double to that they are or shall be cannot evidence that Gods power is infinite Agayne seinge God is yet in producing more and more we can have no evidence herby of Gods greatest power till he come to the ende of his workes therfore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power or that his power is infinite thoughe perhaps the world may have to witt when God is come to the ende of his workinge Yet when that time is come wherein God shall cease from producinge newe all his workes put together being but finite howe can that consideration evince a power infinite Wherfore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea c. maynteyned that the World allready made was infinite because it was fitt as he thought that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent and therfore saythe he the world must be infinite To proceede a litle further when the time shall come that God shall surcease to produce any newe thinge eyther in kinde or individuall the particulars produced put together from the beginninge of the world to that day shall be but finite and howe can this inferre a power infinite Nowe all this discourse of yours proceedes upon supposition that all thinges are produced by God and not only by course of nature but by such a cause as was first created and since maynteyned and governed and ordered by God which truthe was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were And you well knowe that the creation of materia prima was denyed by them all And therfore I should conceave that the infinitenes of God is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things then by the number of thinges produced as namely by his creating of the World that of nothing For if God hathe power to give beinge unto that which hathe no beinge but only is capable of beinge as put the case to a man or Angell and that by his word will he is as well able to give being to any thinge conceavable that is capable of beinge by his word and will and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotens He that can give beinge to any thinge that is possible to be he is Allmighty Agayne if God were finite in perfection of entity then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God then that allso should have an existence For if the essence or existence of a nature lesse perfect shoulde be all one how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect And consequently there shoulde be many Gods one different in perfection above another CHAP. IV. There is no pluralitie of perfections in the Infinite essence albeit the perfection of all thinges be in him Of the Absolute Identitie of the Divine essence and attributes AS for the argument which you propose We must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies or deny them sense because sense is never founde without a body I see no great cause to mislike it especially if it be rightly proposed as it may be thus because sense to witt in proper speeche cannot be founde without a body For is not sense an organicall facultie that is such a facultie as cannot exercise its function without materiall instruments How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument let the Reader judge God the supreame Artificer can make Virtus formatrix you say doe more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason and hence you conclude that therfore God hath both sense and reason Wheras you may as well proove that God hathe bodily substance in him both because he setts virtus formatrix on woorke in producing bodies and can doe more then we can withall our bodies and soules Therfore if you please you may in confidence of such illations proceede to say that God consists of a body and soule too The Psalmists Philosophy is a poore ground for you to builde on For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist that God hathe eyes and eares and handes allso as when he say the The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous his eares are open unto their prayers The right hand of the Lord is exalted the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God why doe you not attribute unto him feeling and smelling and tastinge allso Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses why may not God understand the same without sense as well as Angells That God only is and all thinges numerable are but mere shadowes of his beinge are your owne principles and phrases to drawe conclusions from such groundes is to builde Castles in the Ayre You thinke to helpe it by sayinge that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patternes or perfections you might have taken in three senses more as well and have sayde that smelling â—astinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patternes and perfections and justify Epicurus too in maynteyninge that the Gods have bodies For thoughe our Saviour sayde a Spirite hath not fleshe and bone yet you knowe howe to justifie that bodies and soules and fleshe and bone and braynes and senses yea and the basest thinge that is are in God to witt according to their ideall patternes and perfections For we make no question but that all these thinges are knowne to God and he is able to produce them no more doe you require in the next Section unto this that all thinges are in God yea materia prâ—a and all And this conceyte of yours you prosecute with a great deale more Rhetoricke then Philosophy or Logicke Certeinly not to be and not to have operation are farre more different betweene themselves then nihil agere and otium esse For these are formally the same the other are not For like 〈◊〉 to be and to worke are in themselves manifestly distinct so must be their negations allso so are not nihil agere otium esse 2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge more like a Rhetorician then a Philosopher makes you overlashe and cast your selfe upon resemblances without all proportion As when you say all thinges are in Gods power as strengthe to moove our limmes is in our sinewes or motive faculty Now in this I say is no proportion For seinge all thinges are
neighbours or brethren either in time of plenty or time of scarcitie You doe him the greater wrong to charge him with sucking in cruelty as wine and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you doe him in deeds as for cutting morsels out of other mens throats this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate mans diet is fitter for a superstitious Papist that in case the Priest should vomit the hoast thinkes the people bound to lickâ— it up The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first betweene which what suitable matter hath occurred let the Reader judge Though indigence be the mother of cruelty yet herehence it followeth not that it is not the mother of pitty for Rara est concordia fratrum Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother yet there is a great difference in indigence as the cause of these Indigence heretofore suffered is made the cause of pitty but indigence in present alone is the cause of cruelty and that onely in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty 5 Philosopher-like or rather meere naturalist-like you make errour of judgement the root of all evill as the cause of covetousnesse you make to be the opinion of want either that is for the present or may be for the time to come How farre are you different from Aquinas who maintaines that our wills are more corrupt quoad appetitum boni then our mindes quoad intellectum veri yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor Saint Paul I thinke was a man regenerate when he made that profession I see a law in my members rebelling against the law of my minde and leading me captive to the law of sinne It is true there are bosome sinnes as wee call them like familiar spirits to particular men and so they may be dispensed withall in these they will shew themselves very morrall in other points and thinke it reason God should be mercifull unto them in breaking one commandment so they keepe the other nine Herod heard Iohn Baptist gladly untill hee toucht upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife Iudas was content to follow Christ so he might bâ—are the bagge and so long as hee could make best wages by his service but thirty pieces of silver mooved him to give his master the bagge and to betray him A man for judgement able to arbitrate and voide of exorbitant affections which might expose him to partialitie or prejudice no doubt is the fittest arbitratour But if you aske me whereto this running discourse tends I cannot answer you yet it may bee you may answer your selfe hereafter Internall moderation mixt with outward competency is the onely supporter of true constancy I had thought integritie had made a man fit for arbitrament not constancy for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just I presume it proceeds from constant integrity That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiencie of estate not onely competent but more then competent And to my thinking even in the course of naturall morality a vertuous condition should not depend upon outward things the exercise of vertue doth I confesse but not vertue it selfe Bias his saying was Omnia meo mecum porto but wee are taught of a better Master that Godlinesse is great gaine with contentment and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his minde which is delivered without distinction of poore or rich like as that which followeth The belly of the wicked shall want And that a dinner of greene herbs and love with it is better then a stalled oxe with hatred and strife The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him who answereth to the joy of his heart and the most glorious King that ever was professeth that A good conscience is a continuall feast and David the father a great conquerour found no blessednesse in any temporall state but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects saying Blessed is the man whose iniquitie is forgiven and whose sinne is covered Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sinne and in whose spirit there is no guile The truth is if our pretences depend upon outward things they shall bee as fraile as those are mutable and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God As there is no being but from God so no permanence of being but from God till the time of temptation a man is not known let the raine fall and the flouds rise and the winde beat upon the house then it will appeare whether it were built upon the rock or upon the sand Wee know the Angells fell wee know Adam fell and how vaine a thing is it to discourse of any naturall permanency in vertuous courses amongst naturall men that knew not God By the way your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous of satisfying desires wee usually heare but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse You proceed to discourse unto us of another roote of unconstancy which you call contingency which is a terme of art with you and your peculiar dialect this roote you will have to be the infinite capacitie of reasonable creatures conceites or desires within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere And this applyed to the fall of Angels in whom wee finde a double change or alteration the one morall to wit a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created into the state of sinne the second naturall to wit a change from a blessed state into a wretched and damned condition the first change was their owne worke as wherein they sinned the second the worke of God whereby they were punished Their inconstancie in not standing upright but falling into sinne is onely pertinent to the present purpose and to enquire after the root of this is to enquire after the cause of their fall Now the cause hereof as it is plaine so if we please we may as plainly expresse it for as for their possibility to fall that rose from the condition of their natures being made by God free agents and so accordingly a law being given them by God they might freely obey it freely disobey it what need wee straine our wits for obscure expression of so plaine a truth as by referring it to the infinite capacitie of their conceits or desires within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular What need we affect such perturbation of speech in confounding conceits with desires and placing finite motions within the compasse of desires infinitely capacious which motions undoubtedly were their desires for they sinned questionlesse in desiring somewhat and comparing desires to spheres and againe desires to starres fixed in spheres that so
an unwoorthy speeche to denote the nature of God as indeede more false then true or rather false throughout and voyde of all truthe And why shoulde we expect any tolerable description of the nature of God from an heathen man and from a Stoicke as Seneca was So Lucan Deus est quodcunque vides quocunque mover◠out of the mouthe of Cato Vticensis a man of Stoicall profession as Seneca was And such sayings as these Deus est totum quod vides totum quod non vides savour hotly of an Atheifticall opinion of such as being ignorant of the nature of the true God deified the nature And commonly their severall Gods denoted only severall parts of the World as Vesta the Earth Iupiter the ayre Baal or Bel and as some say Hercules Tyrius the Sunne Yet severall Nations like enough had their severall opinions but all concurring in this namely in adoring the creature and specially all the host of heaven in steede of the Creator And then withall they had an universall Deitie whome they called Pan representing the whole Vniverse And according to Platonicall opinion God was accoumpted Anima Mundi And thus with them God was Totum quod vides totum quod non vides Yet I may well grant that more coulde not be sayde in fewer wordes but this is in the way of falshood and not in the way of truthe The best construction that can be made of it is to say that God is the Author of all that we see and of all that we doe not see Yet this was not the opinion of the Stoicks of whose profession Seneca was For thoughe he did believe the World was made as Aristotle professethe in his bookes de Caelo it was the opinion of all that went before him Yet did he not believe that it was made out of nothing but that the matter wherof the World was made was eternall Therfore they did not believe that God was the Author of all both of that we see and of that we doe not see Your selfe confesse they conceaved the matter to have bene coeternall with him and not so only but able allso to overmatch the benignitie of his active power by its passive untowardlines Agayne I doe not finde that any of them maynteyned that immateriall substances were made by God for then they shoulde all be made out of nothinge For Angells consist not of materiall extensions And it was their generall voyce that nothing coulde be made out of nothing 3. The analogy you speake of is without all proportion For the picture of a man thoughe it be no true man yet it may be a true picture and whether a true picture or no yet undoubtedly it hathe a true beinge thoughe imperfect in comparison to the beinge of a man And therfore herehence to conclude that no creature truly is is without all proportion Man indeede is but the Image of God as some things are the Images of men Whence it followethe as the Images of men are not men so man the Image of God is not God But to inferre that therfore man is not in truthe or hathe no true beinge hathe no ground no foundation If the beinge of a creature is but the shadowe of true beinge then humanitie which is the being of a man is but a shadowe of true humanitie brutality which is the beinge of a beast is but the shadowe of true brutalitie And is it proper thinke you to say that the truthe of all these are founde in God to witt true humanitie c. David and Solomon were types of Christ but I never read nor heard that the creatures are types of the Creator Effects they are and the workes of God and as the cause dothe shine in the effect so Gods eternall power Godhead are made manifest by his workes Yet the types of Christ were not types according to their essence but according to their course of life and actions And yet the very actions wherby they represented Christ were true actions in themselves separate from typicall signification thoughe the actions of Christ or office of Christ were of farre greater dignitie and price then were the actions of men which represented him Before the World was made this proposition was true God alone is and he could agayne make it true if it pleased him by turninge all thinges into nothing from whence they came But nowe other things allso are Otherwise there could be no place eyther for the name of creatures or for the representation of God in them And howe can that be sayde not to be or not truly to be which as you say participates of Gods beinge It is true God alone is in such sort as whose essence and existence are all one For as much as possibilitie in him is mere necessitie not so in any creature as who all were not before they were and agayne may returne to nothinge if so it please him that made them to dispose of them What is that ancient Philosophy of the heathen you speake of and howe well it accordes with this I knowe not As touching the nature of God I knowe no such discourses superior if equall to the discourse of Aristotle in a certeyne chapter of his Metaphysicks Your text I am God and there is none besides is faire short of congruitie with your present discourse For will it followe that because there is no God besides him therfore there is nothing that hathe any true beinge besides him 4. It is incredible that the Stoickes or any other helde nothing woorthy the name of essence which was not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such speeches rather make men unworthy to be esteemed of any facultie of witt But what thinke you is God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Have you forgotten the diversitie of errours which in the former chapter you mentioned out of Austin the last wherof was to conceave that God could beget himselfe Yet if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall be the propertie of God as your selfe confesse by Plotins Philosophy you might as well have sayde by the Philosophy of Heathens that denyed creation out of nothinge there shall be many Gods even as many as there be immateriall substances which they called mindes or Intelligences from their narure but from their office we call Angells But this error you say was easy to be checkt If the favourers of it had bene put in minde that these their demy Gods by necessary consequence of this opinion must have bene acknowledged insinite in beinge So that had you lived in their dayes you had easily brought of not Plotin only but Aristotle allso all others from this point of heathenisme For necessary consequences all must yeilde unto especially if the consequence be perspicuous allso as you seeme to suppose by the litle or rather no light you give unto it by force of argument For oportet ut lancem ponderibus ita animum veris perspicuis cedere And seinge Intelligences if made
speciall manner in the third Heaven as the Author of glory communicating himselfe in glorious manner unto his Angells and Saints all which diversities of being are rather in respect of his power then of his essence For how is God sayde to be in any thinge as conteyned by no meanes but rather as conteyninge which conteyning is a transient operation of God proceeding from his power his will Thus saythe the Apostle God is not farre from every one of us for as much as in him we live moove have our beinge And marke but the particulars of explication proposed by Vasquius according to the best opinion in his judgment to witt according to that of Aquinas God is in all things by his essence because his substance is not distant this is most true I confesse for certeinly he is no more distant in place from a mouse then from an Angell but he is joyned with the things themselfes whether in respect of himselfe or of his operation So then if Gods operation be joyned with the thinges themselves it suffizeth by this opinion to maynteyne that God is present with them by his essence yet if you consider it well you shall finde that this is all one with his presence in respect of his power for that was expounded thus God is in the whole Vniverse by his power because his operation reacheth unto every thing Next consider how God is in every thing by his presence First to say that God is in every thing by his presence seemes a very absurde manner of speeche for it is as much as to say that God is present in every thing by his presence Then consider the explication of it He knowethe all thinges therfore he is present with all things Now this seemes very absurd For we read that God revealed to Elishah what was done in the King of Arams privy Chamber might therfore Elishah justly be sayde to have bene present in the Kings privy Chamber We knowe the number of the Starres what therfore are we present with them God foreknowes things to come is he therfore present with them allso which yet are not Vasquius himselfe professed before in confuting the opinion of Durand that Nothing is sayde to be present with another unles that other thing were conscious therof and he prooved it out of the digests and out of the lawe Coram Coram Titio aliquid fecisse jussus non videtur praesente eo fecisse nisi is intelligat allso out of the 112. epistle of Austin plane sorsitan satis est si praesentia hoc loco intelligamus quae praesto sunt sensibus sive animi sive corporis unde etjam ducto vocabulo praesentia nominantur As if praesens were as much as prae sensibus To this I may adde that of Aeneas in Virgill when the cloud wherwith his mother Venus had covered him vanished away then he breakes out into these wordes Coram quem quaeritis adsum Troius Aeneas But now consider according to this interpretation of the word praesent God shall be sayde to be present with none but with intelligent creatures for such alone can knowe him and take notice of him and because but fewe of them take notice of him therfore he can be sayde to be present but with a fewe of them allso Yet Aquinas his explication of Gods beinge in all thinges by his presence is quite of a contrary nature to witt because God knowes them and not because they knowe or take notice of him Last of all to be every where by his power is sayde to be in this respect that his operation reacheth to every thinge Now who seethe not that this presence is rather in respect of his operation and actuall workinge then of his power to worke And if we ascend to the caâ—se of his operation we must ascend not only to the power of God but even to his wisedome and goodnes as which is the cause of his operation as well as his power And if we looke for some thing more proper to admitt this denomination then other we must take notice of his will rather then of his power as which is the most immediate cause of his operation For infinite power to be able to reache every possible effect is no more then to be able to produce it or being produced to preserve it or to worke in it or by it whatsoever it pleasethe which is nothing pertinent to the being of it therein as in a place which belongs to essence rather then unto power For when I am sayde to be here and there the meaning is not my power is here or there but my person which is properly sayde of me because I am a body to which kinde or natures place properly belongethe But as touchinge the essence of God that being spirituall infinite it is not capable of any place to conteyne it but rather it conteynes every thinge in which respect your selfe have allready observed that by the Hebrewes he is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place it selfe Nowe Iudge whether God may be sayde in any congruitie to conteyne bodies by his essence or Spirits eyther created and whether that were not to signify that bodies and Spirits created were of the essence of God Neyther is it proper to say that God by his essence dothe worke eyther the creation or the conservation of outward things but rather by his understanding power and will For to worke by essence is to worke in the way of naturall Agents necessarily but to worke by wisedome will is to worke after the way of free Agents freely If God were every where according to the sayinge reported and avouched by you before there was any distinction of times then surely God allso was every where before there was any distinction of place For certeinly distinction of time and distinction of place beganne together And must you not herby be driven to the acknowledgement of a Vacuum before the World was and that conteyning distinction of parts in such sort as to make way for the denominations of here and there and every where and that God was therein and every where therein before the World was which opinion your selfe in this very section have impugned To discourse of the effects of Gods infinite power in case his knowledge were not infinite or of the effects of his infinite knowledge in case his power were not infinite I judge to be a very vayne thinge because it is impossible that the one shoulde be infinite without the other For seing many things cannot be brought to passe without knowledge like as without knowledge none of such thinges can be brought to passe at all so likewise without sufficiency of knowledge such things coulde not be brought to passe as require such a proportion of sufficient knowledge to performe them And if God had but a finite power he coulde foreknowe no more thinges then coulde be brought to passe by that finite power
to say that our will is contingently free seeing this is as much as to say it is possible that the will of man should not be free But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought And the reason is this For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end to every antecedent possible a correspondent consequent which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility granted by his decree into act For what way soever of many equally possible mans will doth encline Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action and deede that hath passed from you this yeere like as he had beene the cause as you say of every thought and action that might have passed from you if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subject unto Gods will which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherin you pretend to give a reason of the former But this performes nothing lesse If you had done something the last yeere which you did not as you might then the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this yeare had beene altered and God had beene the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therin And the reason is this For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed a determinate end But I pray you consider are the thoughts and actions of men this yeare the proportioned end of somethinge that you did the last yeare Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last yeare Many man the last yeare was an opposite unto goodnes he is reformed this yeare and become a proselyte Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sinne The last yeare many a man was a formall professour this yeare it may be he is turned Papist or Turke is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent Yet many continue formall professours still wiâ—hout any such alteration some have changed theyr formalitie into realitie It may be some man the last yeare hath satisfied anothers silthy lust and this yeare is advanced by it Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God Some have prospered by impoysoning of others and proceeded in their sinfull courses so much the more without controll In a word by the last Clause it appeares that by proportionate end correspondent consequents you meane only the good and evill that doe befall men according to their former workes according to that God will rewarde every man according to his workes But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Authour of every thought and action of man this yeare which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last yeare and God to be the true and principall cause of every one of those thoughts and actions For what Are mens thoughts and actions this yeare the rewardes and punishments of the same mens actions the other yeare What a ridiculous conceyte in this Well still we holde you engaged to maintayne that which you have plainely avouched namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action and thought of man for a yeare together yea and of every thought and action of yours for the yeare past which you have delivered without any explication I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse in generall In particular consider further you say that mans will is necessarily subject unto God this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in the sentence before going but you understand it in respecte of rewardes or punishments succeeding proportionably unto former actions whether good or bad But by your leave it is not mans will but his person rather that herin is necessarily subject unto God For no wise man useth to say that mans will is rewarded or punished but his person rather Agayne suppose God decreeth not the actions of men but the rewards of them yet you have not explicated how in this case Gods will depends not upon the will of man the true explication whereof that I know is only this that the execution of his will may depend upon mans will to witt in rewarding or punishing but not the will of God himselfe Yet if good or evill actions of men be foreseene by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish neither have you offered to cleare Gods will in this case from dependance upon the will of man neither are you able to performe it Agayne it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible For many cogitations are possible which shall never be And it is absurde to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never bee Agayne by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent you understand rewardes or punishments But it is false to say that God hath ordayned to every cogitation a reward or punishment For to the evill thoughts and words and deeds of Gods children he hath ordayned neither reward nor punishment to befall them but his purpose is to pardon them Agayne punishments for the sinnes of men are many times inflicted by the sinnes of men So Sennacherib that blasphemer of the God of Israel was slayne by the sword of his owne children Davids adultery was punished by the filâ—hy actions of his owne Sonne Absolon deflouring his fathers Concubines If these were proportionate ends to former sinnes and correspondent consequents and everlastingly decreed by God what hindereth but that in your opinion actions notoriously sinnefull may be sayd to be decreed by God You say the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends needsno other cause or meanes but only the reducing of possibilitie granted by his decree into acte Which is plaine gibrish you instance in nothing for illustration sake not as if your discourse were so plaine that it needed it not but rather it is so unsound that you might well feare it And darkenesse is fittest for them that hate the light I will give instance for you Absalons deflouring his fathers Concubines was a disproportionate end and correspondent consequent to Davids defiling his neighbours wife for God punished David hereby and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absolon Inserviit castigandâ— Davidi Now this fact of Absolon by your doctrine in this place needed no other cause or meanes to produce it but onely the reducing of possibilitie granted by Gods decree into act Now what possibility doe you meane the possibility of Davids defiling Bethsheba
it to be a cleare thing that not only contingent thinges but even necessary thâ—nges also as we call them doe come to passe all contingently in respect of the will of God They that ground Gods foreknowledge of future contingents upon things without God doe usually ground it not upon any absolute necessity of the events themselves as upon the causes producing them which though they worke contingently and not necessarily yet this they thâ—nke nothing hindreth the infallibility of God knowledge because hee is able to comprehend all failings possible and to discerne in what case they take place and in what not which in effect is to rest upon the condition of Gods knowledge in it selfe as you here doe and because it is infinite therehence to conclude that it is infallible An invention of late yeares and brought in by the Iesuits together with their doctrine concerning scientia media For whereas before there was onely a double knowledge found in God the one antecedent to his will which they called scientia simplicis intelligentiae whereby hee understood his owne essence and therewithall all necessary truths and all things possible the other subsequent to the will of God which they called scientia visionis and hereby he knoweth all things past present and to come all which they acknowledge to be dependant upon the will of God the Iesuits have of late yeares devised a middle knowledge betweene thâ—se two and it consists in knowâ—ng not things necessary nor thâ—ngs contingent that have beene are or shall be but in knowing what would be in such or such a case as for example what a man in such a case thus or thus moved and induced unto good or evill would doe or not doe And the ground hereof they make the infinitie of Gods knowledge as I remember Vasquius expresly professeth so much and so as well they may make this infinitie of Gods knowledge the ground of knowing all future contingents For although Suarez takes upon him to confute Palatius who as he hath maintained that God knowes future contingents by reason of the efficacy of his knowledge yet judge I pray whether himselfe differ from him when he come to prove his owne opinion which is this In Deo sola essentia ejus est sufficiens ratio cujuscunque cognitionis possibilis cum in virtute efficacitate intelligendi sit simpliciter infinita In God his essence alone is a sufficient cause of all knowledge possible considering that virtue and efficacy of knowing it is simply infinite So Vasquez Deus quae sua est infinitas efficacitate sui intellectus omnia intelligibilia intellectu suo penetrat and againe Quia divinus intellectus infinitae virtutis est quicquid intelligibile est necessario debet amplecti intelligere Nam si aliquid ab ipso infinito intellectu non posset intelligi à quo alio posset And indeed were future contingents intelligâ—ble there were no further question to be made but that his knowledge were sufficient to comprehend them But it is apparent that no such contingent is knowable as a thing to come more thâ—n as a thing not to come in its owne nature and consequently God can no more know that it is to come then that it is not to come unlesse that which in its owne nature is onely possible be determined this way or that way and consequently made future or not future This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth Sicut divina potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine infallibilitate quia requirit adaequationem And to this purpose he alledgeth Thomas saying Scientiam non posse esse necessariam nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur necessitatem habeat Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam id est talem modum veritatis quae apta sit ut certum infallibile judicium feratur quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est In which latter words he gives in briefe a better and fairer answer then in the whole distinction following if he be able to make good what he saith For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge But I would know of him or you how comes it to bee true that such a contingent shall exist whereas in his owne nature it is onely possible to exist and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist As for example how is it true that to morrow it shall rayne rather then that to morrowe it shall not rayne seeing in it selfe it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other If the one were true and the other false then there were no question but God should knowe the one to be true and the other to be false But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez why the one should be true rather then the other there is no reason why one should be knowne of God to be true more then the other And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternitie a determinate truth but shewes not how they come to have their truthe nor how thinges merely possible in themselvs come to be future which as it is appareÌ„t could not possibly be without a cause But had he gone about this worke which indeede was most necessary the truth would soone have appeared in his colours For it will soone be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus and of Scotus and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it Neither could he be ignorant that Alvarez maintaynes it to have bene the opinâ—on of Aquinas also To the same opinion Durand not only inclines as Vasqu us writes in 1. disp 65. cap. 1. but to it only adheres as the same Vasquius notes in the saâ—e disputation cap. 2. Durands words are playne Not only Gods prescience of a thing to come is joyned with his will to have tâ— come in 1. dist 35. q 3. num 25. Deum prescire A fore coexigit Deum velle A fore But also that his prescience is built hereupon ibidem dist 39. q. 1. num 10. in these words Repraesentatur res fore vel non fore per essentiam divinam non ut est solum essentia virtualiter rem omnem continens sed ut est volens rem possibilem sore quia libere vult rem fore And Vasquius himselfe not only acknowledgeth that from the decree of Gods will may sufficiently be
flowres of Rhetoricke growing therein and especially preâ—ty similitudes but by applying them they are utterly cast away for commonly they serve either for the illustration of untruths or very vulgar truths And great pitty but they should finde a place among the toyes in London 12. In the last place for a congruous explication of Austines and Gregories meaning in passages before mentioned you commend unto us certaine observations as necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered This necessity I presume was no impeachment to the liberty of your will in broaching them for my part I see no necessity at all of them nor of this whole discourse of yours In like sort as little necessary it was that my braines should be surbeaten so often in hunting after the involved sense of many sentences thorow the thickets of wilde phrases and figures and affected obscure expressions As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge uncapable of addition therein we argue with you Your next position is worthy of consideration As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so knowne by him to be immutable or absolutely necessarie either in themselves or in respect of his eternall knowledge To this I answer first to the first member of your sentence that great Divines from Austines daies to these daies have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things And the reason they give is thâ—s because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis the knowledge of a crafts-master Now the case is cleare that craftsmasters by their knowledge doe worke and cause things Yet I am content to helpe you with a distinction if you will be pleased to accept of it That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer is the scientia simplicis intelligentiae whereby hee knowes all things possible and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of scientia visionis wherby God ever knew what should come to passe and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things But as for the later member of this your sentence it might have beenâ— so carried as to give your selfe satisfaction if I be not deceived and us also as thus So the certainty of Gods knowledge doth not make things certaine or if you would adde the word necessarie we could have boâ— with it though it marreth the proportâ—on which precisely is this As knowledge doth not make things to be so certaine knowledge doth not make things certainly to be But you leaving out the word certainly take away all evidence of proportion Belike you would acknowledge that certaine knowledge doth make things certainly to be But I doe not like the proposition and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion if it hath any force any way hath force against it Now if I doe not acknowledge that certaine knowledge makes things certainly to bee much lesse would I acknowledge that it makes things necessarily to be There is so manifest reason against it considering that all those things that fall our contingently are as certainly knowne to God as those things that come to passe certainly Yet you as â—imorous men never thinke themselves sure enough are not content with this but clogge your inference with other needlesse circumstances as in saying absolutely necessary and that not in respect of themselves but of Gods knowledge also whereas without these the comparison was incongruous enough And these circumstances I say are needlesse because I would grant what you desire without these But by your addition of these I perceive your meaning for hereby you imply that it is necessary that things knowne by God shall come to passe for though knowledge doth not make them to be much lesse to be necessary yet upon supposition of Gods knowledge it followeth necessarily by way of argument that such things as God foreknows shall come to passe This is of an undoubted truth which kind of necessitie is not any necessitie of being in the things themselves but only of externall denomination upon supposition of Gods foreknowledge And you doe in vaine seeme to strive against this For can you deny this argument God foreknowes that Antichrist shall be destroyed therefore it is necessary that Antichrist shall be destroyed according to the time foreseene by God neither will it herhence followe that therefore it is absolutely necessary that Antichrist should be destroyed as you very weakly suppose For necessitie upon suppositioÌ„ onely commonly called necessitie of consequence was never yet taken for absolute necessitie by any that I knowe I medle not with the terme immutable because it is nothinge congruous in the application For applyed to Gods knowledge it signifieth that knowledge which havinge being cannot be altered but applyed in this sense to the event that commeth to passe is untrue For no event especially contingent after it comes to passe is immutable If applyed to the manner of comming to passe yet it is not congruous For God knowing that it shall come to passe in a mutable manner that is in a contingent manner for if that be not your meaning I know not what is the immutability of Gods knowledge doth rather confirme the contingency of the event then diminish it Yet you suppose some would inferre the contrary but I assure you I am none of them and that for the reason before mentioned Yet still it holds good that if God foreseeth such a thing shall come to passe It followeth of necessity that the same thing shall come to passe albeit not necessarily but contingently when you say Gods knowledge of things mutable that is of the futurition of contingents give me leave to construe you so that I may fayrely understand you is absolutely necessary all Schoolemen I thinke that ever write are directly against you And for good reason for like as it was not at all necessary that such a course of contingent things should be in the world as now is so neither was it necessary much lesse absolutely necessary that God should know this course for if he had ordeyned another course of things as it was very possible then he had also knowne another course But your meaning though incommodiously expressed I conceyve to be this Vpon supposition that thing should come to passe it was necessary that God should know those things For it is impossible that he should be ignorant of any thing that is to come And this is a truth But you have marred it by adding the word absolutely For to be necessary in the sense before mentioned is to be necessary upon supposition only and not absolutely Thus you see I would fayne have healed the incongruity of your position but it will not be healed Agayne you tell us that It is most true which S. Gregory sayth that things future doe not come upon God as they doe upon us that things present doe not
of the reprobates after they suffer it shall be mutable Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touchâ—ng his elect that they shall ever be with the Lord and as touching the reprobate that their Worme shall never dye and their fire never be extinguished Yet I confesse either is simply mutable in respect that God hath power to alter it But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree For God doth not decreec to take unto himselfe power to doe this or that Yet it is true that by vertue of Gods decree some things come to passe contingently and some things necessarily But this is onely in respect of the agency of second causes some of them being made by God agents naturall working necessarily some agents rationall and free working contingently and freely Not in respect of Gods owne agency for whatsoever God doth work outwardly that must needs come to passe contingently or freely for it is not in the power of God to worke necessarily it is the perfection of God unalterable to be necessarily to worke freely Now the doome of any man is the work of God and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels and not the worke of second causes and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree God doth not decree that to fall out contingently much lesse doth he decree that after it is it shall be mutable speake your minde plainly and tell us whether the damnation of Iudas or of the Angels that fell or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable I presume you dare not affirme this and what is the reason not because God wants power to alter but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise and his will can neither bee changed from within nor resisted from without because it is omnipotent In this case therefore this consequence is good God hath decreed the damnation of Iudas and his decree is immutable and omnipotent therefore the damnation of Iudas is immutable to wit supposing the foresaid decree of God Now consider wee the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life hath God decreed it or no if no then his decrees are not everlasting the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words though I feare your meaning is otherwise Againe if God hath not yet decreed it then hereafter he shall decree it for he must first will their damnation before he damnes them and consequently there shall be a change in God and something found in him which before was not contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter sect 2. in these words Vnto infinite perfection what can accrew If then God hath decreed it and this decree or will of God cannot be changed for you confesse it is immutable nor can be resisted for you confesse it is omnipotent will it not necessarily follow herehence that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable This I speake in your phrase but in mine owne phrase I say onely that herehence it necessarily followeth that all such shall bee damned which necessity is meerly upon supposition of Gods decree and therefore not necessity simply so called but onely secundum quid and upon supposition So likewise concerning the salvation of Gods Elect who are yet surviving if God hath decreed it seeing his will is both unchangeable and unresistible their salvation must needs bee immutable to speake in your phrase but to speake in mine owne phrase it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved There is to way to help this but by maintaining that Gods decrees are not absolute but conditionall but it seemes you dare not venture upon this assertion in plaine termes though the face of your tenet bespeakes such a course And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certaine disjunctive decree of God It were a commendable thing in you to deliver your selfe plainly of your meaning for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement And indeed if you would deale plainly and maintaine that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely but to all conditionally and withall by sound arguments confirme it there should be no further question we would willingly subscribe that no mans salvation should come to passe immutably as you speake or necessarily as we speake no not so much as in respect of Gods decree if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely but conditionally and that in such sort as that he may bee either saved or damned as he will But then withall you must maintaine that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will beleeve and repent or no. For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon ther finall perseverance in faith and repentance yet if God hath withall decreed to give some men faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein and deny all this unto others herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation and not other and it will necessarily follow herehence that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance and perseveranâ—e they shall be saved and as necessarily that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the deniall of the like grace unlesse you will say that though God doth not give any such grace yet they may beleeve and repent if they will and therein persevere unto the end I see no reason to the contrary but this must be upon your opinion as before hath beene specified albeit you are not very forward in plaine termes to expresse as much And in this place you scatter somthing that seemes to me directly contrary hereunto For consider though Gods decree concerning the doome of every man be immutable yet you deny that hethence it followes their doome shall be immutable Now this of a conditionall decree is evidently untrue as I presume will appeare of it selfe For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doome then this If thou beleevest thou shalt be saved if not thou shalt be damned the case is cleare that this doome is immutable not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God Therefore seeing you speake of such a doome which you deny to be immutable it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doome as salvation or damnation but you must needs understand it of a single doome by it selfâ— as the salvation of Peter by it selfe or the damnation of Iudas by it selfe And withall you doe acknowledge this doome to be forset by the decree of God which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God Now I say if it be decreed by God seeing his decrees cannot be
changed noâ— his omnipotent will resisted it must necessarily follow that every one so destinated to salvation shall be saved every one so destinated to damnation shall be damned The best helpe you have against this and whereupon this discourse of yours doth most runne is that the object of Gods decree is contingency or mutability for so you are pleased to confound things that differ But you are nothing wary to keepe your selfe from contradicting your selfe For when you say that God decreeth contingency you doe withall deny that God doth decreâ— the thing contingent as you have expresly professed in your treatise upon Ier. 26. Did not Hezechiah feare before the Lord c. And withall to make your meaning the more plaine you have professed that albeit God doth not decree necessity but withall decrecing the things that come to passe necessarily yet in decreeing contingency you deny that he decreeth withall the things contingent But in this place you have plainly signified that the doome it selfe of every man is foreset by the immutable decree of God and not onely the contingency of it And no mervayle For albeit as touching the actions of men ther may be some colour for the exempting of them from being the objects of Gods decrees yet the doomes of men being the actions of God himselfe there is no colour at all for the exempting of them from being the object of Gods decrees And therefore this distinction of Gods decreeing contingency or mutability but not the things contingent themselves will nothing avayle you in this place For you plainly professe that the doome of every one is forset by the decree of God and it is impossible it should be otherwise For God could not execute it unlesse he did will it He cannot execute the salvation of Peter unles he did first will it nor the damnation of Iudas except he did first will it and his will was everlasting otherwise there should be a change in God And seeing his will can neither change nor be resisted therefore it necessarily followeth that whose salvation he did from everlasting will or decree they must be saved and whose damnation he did from everlasting will or decree they must be damned And thus much as touching the doome of every man foreset by Gods decree You adde unto this The course of every mans life and affirme that it also is foreset by Gods decree And this course of every mans life you understand in respect of good and evill morall as appeares by this that you proportion mens doomes unto the courses of their lives which can beare no other interpretation then in respect of mens good and evill actions â—w at the first I wondred what you meant to bring so unequall heyfers to plow under the same yoke considering that the courses of mens lifes in this sense are the actions or workes of men but the doomes of men according to their courses of life are the actions or workes of God much more have I cause to wonder to reade you professing them all indifferently to be foreset by the decree of God For as for the good yea the most gracious actions of men according to your opinion they are not foreset by the decree of God For your profession is and that as of some singular subtilty and invention that God decreeth contingency but not the things contingent whence it followeth that as touching the most gracious actions of men even faith and repentance they being onely contingent things that God decreeth them not but only the contingency of them How much lesse fit is it for you according to the tenour of your opinion to joyne all the courses of mens lives even the evill courses as well as good with the doomes proportionall and to consider them as fore-set by an immutable and omnipotent decree of God as here you doe Yet I see how some one in your behalfe might plead for you namely that this is delivered by you onely by way of â—upposition not positively affirmed but I see no likelihood that you would plead thus for your selfe but rather give your self to the emasculating of Gods decree by some frivolous distinctions For you acknowledge Gods concourse to every action And in the preface you make shew not so much of excepting against the doctrine of Gods decreeing all things as against the manner of decreeing them And when you speake of the worst courses of mens lives as of Iewish blasphemy against the Sonne of God and amplifie the hainousnesse of their opinion that maintaine it to have been decreed by God you rather except against the manner of decreeing it to wit ineritably and that as touching the obliquity of it onely then simply against the decreeing of it Yoâ—r words aâ—e these ch 1. sect 15. Shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy Which cautions whereunto they tend I know not unlesse to make some declination from maâ—fest contradiction to the words of the Holy Ghost Act. 4. 28. delivered with one mouth by the Apostles in their meditation unto God saying Uerily against thy holy Sonne Jesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel are gathered together to doe what thy hand and thy counsell had determined before to be done And indeed it is nothing but ignorance or wilfulnes in some and trafty perverting the state of the truth in others that makes those things seeme harsh which yet notwithstanding their harshnes are manifestly commended to us in the word of God For what harshnes I pray is in this God determined that all the evill that was done to Christ should be done by his permission And none give better evidence unto this truth ere they are aware then they that with might and mayne oppose it as Arminius who professeth that the Iewes proceeded so farre in their ignominious handling of Christ as God would have them and this he delivers without all temperament And Bellarmine profâ—sseth that it is good that evill should be by Gods permission And yet herein we say no more then Austin professed 1200. yeares agoe saying Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit velsinendo ut siat vel ipse faciendo And your selfe in this place joyne the doome of every man with the course of every mans life in good or evill and suppose them to beforeset by the immutable and omnipotent decree of God Wherefore it is not for your positive dictates and wild resemblances without all proportion that we doe beleeve God to be eternally and immutably free yet wee doe beleeve he is so not to decree a new for Gods decrees are eternall not temporary but to doe any thing that is possible to be done and to bring forth some creatures agents naturall to worke necessarily others agents rationall to worke contingently and freely As for the resemblance of Gods freedome and immutability your talke of it is like your other discourses For what resemblance doe you find of Gods
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love Of the distinction of Singula generum and Genera singulorum Of the distinction of Voluntas signi and Voluntas beneplaciti WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in certaine points of religion I know not neither am I acquainted with any such course I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will according to his good pleasure and passing by others as any Church in Christendome which I do not speake upon snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good as your fashion is but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England Yet you would perswade your Readers the Church of England concurreth with you in extending the love of God towards all But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause by walking in the cloudes of generalities as if you feared to come to the light and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde but you define not in what kinde but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal and that in an unspeakable manner But the question onely is whether God doth bestow or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all or salvation upon all If Gods love in these respects in your opinion doth extend to all say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus and predestinated all For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae gloriae Now the Church of England in her publicke and authorized doctrine plainly professeth that God hath predestinated none but those whom he hath chosen in Christ as vessells of honour If you say that the reason why God did not predestinate all nor elect all in Christ proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one and disobedience of the other he elected those and reprobated these for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft observes in his fifth proposition that In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God some are elected and not others unto salvation And he just fieth it by holy Scripture Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election not of works but of him that calleth Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and another to dishonour But consider the Article it selfe They which are indued with so excellent a benefit to wit as election and predestination is are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit working in due season they through grace obey their calling they be justified freely they be made sonnes of God by adoption they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ they walke religiously in good workes and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity Whereby it appeares that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance Againe consider these alone whom God hath elected in Christ and predestinated are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption But you make all to bee the sonnes of God and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one even towards them that have hated God all their life Lastly onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour not that any others are made unto honour which is nothing answerable to your tenet But proceed we along with you You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde which no Christian ever called in question but your meaning is that it extends to all and every one of mankinde and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one as appeares by the sequele and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church though it be not contradictory to our doctrine But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable and such as might be performed with a good conscience which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion it is rather to receive correction from the Articles then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe You enter upon it after your course with great state discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God in drawing those Articles for you tell us that No Nationall Councell though assembled for that purpose could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love then the Church our Mother even from the beginning of reformation hath done as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes Here we have a pretty Comedy towards and you have a poeticall wit for fiction Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point where I pray was it fit that she should doe this but in the Articles of Religion But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love but in the Liturgy and Catechisme Was that think you a fit place to fit
man or what is the effect of this love and I doubt not but when you say God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sinne your meaning is that God wills their damnation and that for this measure of their sin In proportion your answer should be this That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men yet here is very great disproportion for when you say God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin I finde herein a manifest difference between the reprobate the elect as touching the cause of damnation and that on mans part namely the making up the full measure of their sin which is found onely in reprobates not in the elect But when you say on the contrary side God wills the salvation of all men as they are men I finde no difference at all betweene the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation either on mans part or on Gods part for as touching Gods will that passeth you say upon the salvation of all without difference then on mans part likewise there is no difference at all if they are considered onely as men for the reprobates are men as well as the elect To help this you rest not in this consideration of them as men but adde a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the forme thus Or at having made up the full measure of their sinne Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent which is untrue for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second But I conceive the weakenesse of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helpes and thereupon you confound things that differ for in some cases the first consideration usually hath place as when t is said God hateth nothing that hee hath made therefore he hateth not man true say some he hateth not man as man and this distinction seemes plausible to some and therefore you seemed willing to help your selfe with this by the way for it might stirre some propitious effection in a pliable reader But then finding this bed a great deale too short to stretch your selfe thereon you added by way of disjunctive another consideration which is this As not having made up the full measure of sinne And because you rest upon it I thinke good to consider it Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates and in the particular of Pharaoh and argued that then Pharaoh had beene saved had he died before the seventh wonder for till then in your opinion hee had not made up the full measure of his sinne yet we doe not finde that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect Paul never filled up the measure of his sinne for if he had then had hee beene a reprobate but hee was an elect therefore if hee had died immediately after the sâ—oning of Steven hee had beene saved though accessary to his death For he kept the garments of them that slew him as himselfe confesseth In a word all the elect though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance should notwithstanding bee saved also My third exception is against the disproportion that neverthelesse is found in these propositions for when t is said God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sinne the filling up the measure of sinne is noted here as the cause of their damnation but in saying God willeth the salvation of all not having filled up the measure of their sinne the not having filled up the measure of their sinne cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation And therefore to mend this foule disproportion the Genius of your tenet drives you in conscience to proceede and professe plainely that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that doe not believe and repent and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sinn Now herein wee agree with you namely in justifying the truth of both these propositions But like as from the latter it followeth not that God willeth the damnation of all but of some onely namely of those that doe fill up the measure of their sinne and breake not off their sins by faith and repentance so from the former it followeth not that God willeth the salvation of all but onely that hee willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent And if you please further to infer that because perseverance in sinne of infidelitie and impenitencie as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also I thinke I may with as good reason take liberty to inferre from the former that seeing faith and repentance yea and good workes also are the disposing causes of salvation therefore they are to bee accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation that is of our election also And so your opinion shall appeare at full and to life in his proper coulors not an haires breadth different either from the Arminian heresie of late or from the Pelagian heresie of old 8 The deductions you speake of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions As for moderne Catechismes you are not the first that nibble at them it is a point of imperious learning now a daies from on high to despise such performances But to speake as a free man the lesse they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them the lesse shall they differ from the truth As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandements which you glorie of now a second time In this place it is hard if not impossible to discerne by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdome In the close of the second Section of this chapter you told us That it was not every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from Gods love and withall that this was observed by Bishop Hooper But in stead of alledging any passage in him to this purpose you referred us there to the fourth paragraffe of this chapter which is this present section Yet concerning that sentence I see a good construction may bee made of it taking love quoad effectum as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God and not quoad affectum and the chiefest effect of Gods love is salvation Now it is most true that nothing but finall perseverance in sinne doth bereave men of salvation of glory nothing but finall perseverance in sinne stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject Now albeit in that which followeth it
goodnesse And when Seneca saith Even in mindes drencht in the dregs of filthinesse there remaines still a sense of goodnesse this is no more then that which the Apostle informeth us of when he saith they have a conscience accusing them by vertue of that law that is written in their hearts yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drencht in the dregs of filthinesse Hee acknowledgeth elsewhere that some through the course of sinne become past all feeling and have their conscience seared with an hot iron And it is a proverbiall speech in the world Nemo senex metuit Iovem Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodnesse by the conviction of their conscience a farre different thing to have an impulsion unto goodnesse Be it that the minde of man in that it is indued with reason hath the rules of equity imprinted in it is it not as true that the rules of iniquitie are imprinted in it also doth he not know evill as wel as good Nay hath he not more knowledg of evil then of good at least as touching the compassing of it doth not the Lord complaine of this where he saith They are wise to doe evill but as touching good they have no understanding If this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God what was the condition of those that were aliens from the common wealth of Israel and strangers from the covenants of promise especially considering what dâ—fference the Apostle puts betweene these when he saith We Iewes by nature not sinners of the Gentiles And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferiour faculties she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity as rules of equity And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to bee stamped upon faculties that are not intellectuall appetites are guided by rules in their motions not instamped with them Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing not inherent in them And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will as well as on sensuall appetites or if it be so why should you reckon the will an inferiour facultie in comparison to the minde whereas indeed the will rules in man as king the minde is but his privie Councellor To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature as thus If the minde have such good rules and withall seekes to instamp them upon inferiour faculties how comes it to passe that there is so little love of vertue in many your answer is that this proceeds from their disposition being over-growne with sensuall desires But by your leave this is a weake reason for it onely transfers the difficultie but answers not the doubt for still I may demand how it came to passe that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensuall desires and without grace what place is left for any goodnesse in the nature of man Philosophers had a love of vertue but can you shew they had any love of God their most vertuous actions in the state of nature was not Austin bold to call them splendida peccata glorious sinnes For the discerning of true vertue aright he gives us this rule Noveris non officiis sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes I am sure they were not ordered by Gods word nor referred to his glory nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God yet they looked for justification by them and as for repentance and confession of sinnes they make that no part of their integritie So that whether their knowledge were in a mist or out of a mist it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God as the Sunne whether in a mist or out of a mist was never knowne to set moist stuffe on fire but â—st dries it then fires it And our Saviour was bold to professe that Publicanes and Harlotsâ—ntred into the kingdome of heaven before Scribes and Pharises If the notions of the minde be ideall characters you may if it please you bestow the phrase as well on notions of evill as notions of good and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the unseâ—led affection of youth it seemes the bad are more permanent yet these naturall notions of good are farre distant from true notions of God or of true goodnesse A heart hardned with vast desires you say 〈◊〉 hardly cured but I pray tell me when one man transgresserâ— for an handfull of barly or a morsell of bread another saith Si violandum est jus impij causa violandum est which of these is the greater hardnesse yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance may take another shape so you signifie the hardest heart may be wrought into a new frame I confesse to make a Camell goe through the eye of a needle is not impossible unto God and what naturall man hath not a body of sinnes to be cut off by spirituall circumcision but that this you make to bee a worke of grace you give not the least intimation nay you rather imply the contrary when you say that if hopes of supplies from internals bee intercepted a worke that may bee done by course of nature then you say the soule thus freed becomes more fashionable to reason a saying that would become Seneca well that knew no reason but naturall but full ill becomming a Christian Divine let desire be never so vast as you speake let seven devils possesse a man yet the strong man Christ by the power of his grace is able to cast them out and make even Ekron become as the Iebusite Without grace will any mans morality commend him in the sight of God As Lebanon is turned into Carmell so Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest And most morall men have beene as great enemies to Christianity as any other like as the Scribes and Pharises were greatest enemies unto Christ. Why you should call that a superficiall draught of reason that endeavoureth to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse I know no reason this in my judgement deserves to be accompted a substantiall operation And when you tell me that Affability consists in this you goe about to teach me more then ever I learned out of Aristotle I had thought affability might have place in all men as a morall vertue whether they were enabled to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse yea or no. This affability you grant to Epicures but not temperance yet Epicurus if my reading deceive me not was knowne to bee as temperate a man in moderating his appetite as most that then lived And that because he made mans happinesse to consist in pleasure the sense whereof was quickned by temperance and dulled by intemperance And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitablenesse to his