true of the last end of all things which is God for he is as we may say finis communissimus ergo optimus Efficiens est causa a qua res est We have heard of causa and of his kinds and that they are disjoyned by which means there is made two couple of causes the two first working joyntly even as the other do Efficiens materia here is a second distribution and here the efficient is first for it is first eujus vi res est again by the rule of method it is first in nature because it giveth light to that which followeth and that the efficient moves first we see it in every thing he layes hold on the matter which in respect of the efficient is moved and by a natural appetite moves and runs to make an effect of it self and doth effect the effect as well as the effiâ—â—ent and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect but the mover or efficient is before the thing moved and before the effect also Efficiens Efficiens quasi exfaciens moving quite through for besides his first moving as being the first cause he moveth also together with the matter form and end and his working with the rest is the cause of his name Est Every cause is required to the effect efficiens est causa ergo again first there must needs be a mover to move the matter before there can be a table wrought this appears plainly by the creation of the world and because every thing is an effect therefore the efficient is the first cause for take any thing and you shall see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same so look into the world and every part thereof and you shall see Gods finger in every thing without which they could not be so that efficiens est causa and because an effect cannot be without its esse ergo it is of the esse of it a qua from whom it is as if he should say it is terminus a quo c. so as the world began with God so in every thing in nature the beginning of motion is first from the next cause so that efficiens est causa a qua telling us that this is the first being the effect hath Res. Here res is general as before to all the Arts and it is the subject of the general Arts. Ramus doth not here break the rule of method not defining what res is Again if he had said a qua est we should have had reference to res again if he had named effectum it had been a posteriore not having learned what effectum est Res est this is general to every cause ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general but that he may not be so obscure he borroweth some thing that went before for else the perfect definition had been efficiens est a qua Now this teacheth us to look first at the efficient in every thing for Logick tels us not onely of an esse in general but of four several esses from which existere doth arise as efficiens est causa a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia why doth he not say causa est cujus vi res sit because something may be a cause and yet is not but if it do causare then it is a cause So if I say will do a thing and yet do it not yet am I an efficient for est doth here commend to us the adsignification of time but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move so soon it is an efficient though the effect be not till the matter form and end be there Cujus et si vera genera c. Here Ramus doth commorari telling us that those many species which the Aristotelians make are not species but modi efficientis because more of them may be in one and the same efficient as one man may be causa precreans and conservans sola and cum aliis per se per accidens because they may be in the same efficient Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing but are divers modi of the same thing Here Ramus will find no species of efficiens neither are there any of the other three for the matter that is lowest ergo it hath nothing under it but examples and so is the efficient ergo he needed not say Cujus etsi vera genera c. for how could rhat appear to him that is not we know the effect is single ergo as the single matter form and end make that so the thing efficient makes it neither hath it any species Vbertas tamen per magna c. There is great and plentiful use of the efficient and as it is first of all so is it most general of all for matter cannot be a matter till the efficient move it and so of all other arguments now these make cause the efficient to be commended or discommended and according to these modi is the effect more or less argued as if a child kill his father it is parricide so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone he is more to be commended than if he had done it cum aliis aut contra Again if a thing be done well natura it is better than if it had been done necessitate and more commendable when a thing is done by counsel than fortuna now because these modi doe urge and press the effect more or less ergo there is reason in them and therefore they belong to Logick modi that is adjuncts not making these effects species but onely distinguished by accidents that fallacian non causa pro causa is general to causa and it is also particular to efficiens making that causa efficiens which is not as the Hereticks in Divinity were deceived which said that the Angels did make the world Primo quod procreat qut tueatur These are first because they are more general than the rest and also they are more in use for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to the other modi so we respect God as causa procreans and tueans before we respect him alone then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse and the preserving cause is the Keeper of the thing in his esse Now in reason he that is the procreating cause should also be the preserving cause as God is not onely causa procreans of the World but also causa conservans and so should parents as they procreant children so should they in like sort preserve them The procreant cause is first because things must needs have a being before they can be preserved now they are distinguished because when a thing is procreated it is not preserved aut contra and the modi are joyned with the cause not with the effect because they are first in the
which worketh an effect but non sua facultate but is moved by some other thing and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua facultate but not sua facultate if we respect the effect as fire drieth a cloth by removing the moisture and so leaves the cloath dry which drought is in the cloth Vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum Here we see a necessity in invention which is all one with coaction By fortuna we are to understand the special providence of God or ignorance of the next cause for ignorance of the providence of God in all things and of the next cause hath caused that men say what fortune had I when they are crossed in play or such like Now necessity answereth to nature cum efficiens cogitur so that this necessity here is a coaction and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur cogitur when as the work of it per se is rather of some other thing now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se and in another respect causa per accidens for they are but modi vi externa ad effectum so that it doth it not natura or consilio Object Why saith he effectum rather than res Answ All comes to one for he means res neither doth he define effectum here Here he means violence not that vis in causa this vis doth not work the effect but works upon the cause and is that facultas whereof he spake before Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio At mihi quidem ait Orator si proprium verum nomen c. Before he said he was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate and hither belongs fatum in Schools Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter c. Our Author before did tell us of fortuna in the ablative case here he puts it in the nominative because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another doth per accidens the arguing we ascribe it to fortune and say fortune did it so that our Author would have us consider first that it was fortune did it secondly that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it Per accidens That is working externa facultate now whereas he saith he doth it per accidens he meanes fortune as it is commonly taken when we make her blind not seeing what she doth for hence it doth arise when we doe not a thing by counsel but â—ab nab as they say that causeth us to make fortune blind Quando aliquid accidit That is happeneth for here it is principal the improvidence as it were he neither sees himself a cause neither doth he see who is the cause and therefore he saith accidit not efficit for he saith I did it not so again ask him who did it and â—e will say I know not so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus Praeter scopium efficientis Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel which evermore hath a scope whereat it levels now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum it is fortuna we say Now things in nature may have a scope which is beyond their nature and then it is fortuna so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have said praeter scopum fortunae if it be causa fortuna or praeter scopum naturae if it be causa natura Sic Pheraeo Jasoni profuit hostis c. here his enemy going about to kill him healed him In hoc genere causarnm imprudentia connumerari solet Imprudentia is one modus of fortune as here Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est c. I unawares have seen that which hath done me harm Then Ovid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her self and here Ovid reasons a simile as Acteon was torn in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares so am I banished for seeing that I would Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est c. He means Augustus So if a man go forth and a tile fall from an house and break his head this is causa fortuna it is natura as it break his head being harder than his head and fortuna as it hit him and consilio it breaks his head if it be flung for it hath a scope true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh Hinc sumitur deprecatio c. For our Author said before accidit therefore we are causes ergo it ought to be pardoned deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna so they will say he is a proper man but hath no luck Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit c. Here Ramus doth commorari in the name lest he should be mistaken it is an unchristian word it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsel but as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by fortune Many other modi there are among other Logicians all which may be brought hither as causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either causa necessitate or efficiens in genere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is causa per se if he shall say anger did it then there is a trope in it as when I say he writes I mean his pen writes if I say he writes with his pen then I make him causa cum aliis if I say he writes he is efficiens Now for the order of causes one efficient may be cause of another efficient c. and so causa causae be causa causati but this will fail as when I look at a child and commend him from his grandfather not respecting the mean causes there is not causa causae but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio c. Hactenus de efficiente and this we must alwayes look at first in artificio rei moreover observe here in every thing the manner of working for so God is said to do some thing necessitate as when we say he doth that he would not though he would it in another sense and fortuna as mans fall was praeter scâ—pum Legis CHAP. VI. De Materia Materia est causa ex qua res est VVE have heard of the efficient cause and his manner of moving in that work of his now these are essential to Logick because in the very manner there lyeth the force of the argument and whatsoever hath reason belongeth to Logick many distinctions there are among the Logicians all which may be brought to these that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally the
Physitians call it causa evidens and meat and drink is causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a disease 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that cause that worketh externally the Physitians call it causa continens but here is no distinction of cause neither have these quatenus causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any force to argue the effect but onely quatenus efficiens whereas we hear in every special modus of Ramus that they did press the effect strongly as didst thou kill thy father or didst thou it alone c. so also in causa per se and per accidens there is great difference in arguing a conclusion if he did it natura there is no rebuking of that for it was from his nature if he sinned by counsel the punishment is so much the greater if he did it well consilio he deserves the more praise Fortuna indeed is such a cause as it is not a cause by Ramus definition for fortune is but Gods providence unknown now if there be any other respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis Now we come to materia that as we have heard had a community with the efficient which community was to move with it a great while before the form and end come so soon as the efficient moves presently the matter moves but the form and end move not a good while after Now because this difference which causeth the distribution of causa appears in greater things ergo it is also in less things but our Logick tels us that the efficient must go before the matter and how agreeable doth our Logick go to Gods work in the creatures if we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes and make them effects and look at their causes for so when we look at their causes we make them effects so that absurd is that definition of causa to be either going before or concomitans to the effect at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him ergo he was not made ergo he ever was ergo all other things once were not for they were made ergo they now being were from the first ergo the first matter was not eternal as Aristotle dreamed but indeed he would cross Plato in what he could yet one may confute him by his own rules for he grants there is a primus motor ergo he is movens but not moved for then he should have some thing to move him and so not be first ergo it is easie to make Aristotle beleive he is immoveable because he is first ergo he must move others onely for he is infinite ergo without limits of place ergo in every place ergo nusquam inclusus or exclusus ergo unmoveable Now the first matter is first in his kind namely the first matter but not the first thing and we may conclude from this that the first efficient was before the first matter for if both were first neither were first for if the one should say he were first the other would say nay I am as forward as thee and so there would be none absolutely first and again one is before two ergo he that is absolutely first can be but one Materia For his name as efficiens was extrafaciens moving all the rest and not moved of them but as it were pater so materia is quasi mater out of which the thing springs as out of a mother so that we may see the name to be given a simili but yet with very good reason as the child is not a patre but of the mother so the effect is from the efficient but springs out of the matter Now that there is such a matter thus it may appear there is nothing composed but its essence and it self a distinct for to make essentia and ens to be the same is peculiar to God Again whatsoever is finite that may be limited in his essence now God onely is infinite and every other thing finite ergo may be defined ergo it self and its essence are distinct ergo it must have a matter Again if every thing have not essence as they speak of Angels why are not they finite ergo they may be defined ergo their essence and themselves are distinct again if they have not a matter what have they nothing but an efficient and an end then they should be imperfect and be either the first matter or the first form again if they have a form and no matter then this form must be another thing from them and how is that possible for if the form and they be all one then the cause and effect will be the same But Logick is a general Art and because every thing hath a matter ergo materia belongs hither and the first matter had not a matter for then it should not have been first but was incomplete Materia est For it gives esse and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing so the matter much more for not onely its esse but its nature and self couches in the effect and makes a bulk and if the vis of the efficient were essential because there could be no essefication of the effect without it much more must the matter be essential for if we take away the matter we take away both the force and the thing it self Now we must understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logick and as argumentum was concretum and also causa so when I say materia I mean a thing that was made of a matter Ex qua That is out of which it is raised it is the mother of every thing as we often speak of the earth because every thing indeed is made of the four elements but more especially nourished of the earth Now the matter doth not onely by his vertue cause the effect but is interessed in it and the effect riseth out of it as if it were a child springing out of the mother onely it goes further in that its essence goes to the making up of the effect now though the essence be from â—atter and form yet the ens it self is from all the causes Res est That effect as we shall hear hereafter for in this doctrine of causa effectum is the aliquid which we must call res till we come to it Est Every cause gives an esse to the effect and this esse is the bulk of it and from whence ariseth the greatness or littleness of the effect by the form now it is a great question in Schools whether the matter doth any thing indeed in respect of the efficient it is patiens but in respect of the effect it doth causare and so doth agere For if it be an effect in respect of every cause then every cause is after a sort the efficient of that
method there comes to be contiguity of every thing so that there cannot be vacuum for then the world should not be one and so we should make two worlds and make nothing something And though Gods wisdom Power and other Attributes be and in God yet he would have them appear instar omnium and to be sufficient for all things and so he made them many to shew the variety of this wisdom Now again as they are many in themselves yet they must be but one to shew that the variety of this wisdom is but one in him And they are in one method and so make one world So we say in Logick and 't is sometimes true That the cause and the effect be like and so is God and the world So the world is but one and is round as being the most capacious figure of all now 't is one not in continuity for then it should but have one quantity and so one forme but as before in contiguity as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. an heap but an orderly heap and so is but one in method And hence every thing desireth its place and order by the rule of method which commands that naturâ prior must praecedere ergo the outmost things must first be made and ergo they must have more forme than matter that they may ascend and so by order from the highest nature goeth down to the lowest And for those Philosophers which make Nature to be God I doubt it and methinks 't is like their opinion which made the God-head the form of every thing But we must not wrong God but acknowledge the principia to be causes of things and give them their effects for they say in that such qualities such a thing 't is from God But as a man doth write with pen so God hath made a creature which worketh of it self even as the Pen writeth but is governed by God even as the pen by the writer So that natures work is when the two causes do work according to Gods Logicum artificium and Nature is the cause of natural effects and is to be distinguished from God So that here we see the disposition and order of every thing So when I see a Tree bring forth fruit I conclude there is Logick and yet neither tree nor fruit hath reason ergo there is one greater that hath reason which methinks were sufficient to convert any Atheist And from this order of things comes contiguity for there must be no vacuum as before since that would be a breach of method So we see Water and Earth will go up even into the element of Fire for the preservation of the unity of this world And if there should be a vacuum it must needs be something or nothing then in the world or out of the world if out of the world then it were not all things if in the world then a part of the world then as before in ens it should be ens if in the world and not ens then the world must be two And from method 't is that the Load-stone desireth to stand North and South and so doth every thing yea naturally not guided by counsel desire natale solum And when we do transplant trees 't is a monster and against nature and so that one woman should nurse an other womans child And one woman may have three children though she have but two dugs so that she have milk for them And from sympathy it is that the iron goeth to the load-stone for 't is his food ergo his preserving cause and the stone may act through a Table For descensus What is the reason that fire cometh down Common Philosophers ascribe it to plate which belongeth to subjectum but 't is place which is order and belongeth to method and that is the next cause though the final cause be as before ne detur vacuum So when I cast a stone that it flies 't is propria forma the reason why it flies from me is that it doth pati and ergo doth flie his enemy The common Philosophers ascribe it to the air which in very deed doth hinder it as themselves shall confess for cast a stone upward and when it falleth down again what is the reason it moveth faster when 't is near the center than when t is farther off but because when t is near the center there is less resistance of the air than there was above So what is the reason we take force to strike with an Ax and that goes farther than if we set it upon a thing and lay great weight on it because the wood can resist the Ax well enough Now we lift up our hands because all the vital spirits in the legs and other parts of the body come to inable that part which acteth most and the higher it goeth the more forciblly it cometh for that it is more able to resist the air as also there is a double motion natural and violent and it will come down more easily because it is a natural motion not upward so well because t is violent unto it So a thing that hangs down that part moveth most which is farthest from the center for that it suffereth violence So what 's the reason that put salt Beef into the Sea and it will be fresh but put fresh in and it will be salt because t is the nature of salt to constringe and that 's the reason salt Beef occupieth less place than fresh doth now its pores being filled with salt the salt water cannot get in but only the fine water pierceth in and so takes away the salt but if it be fresh the pores be so open that the salt water entreth in and so it becometh salt Materiale est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in naturâ primum substratum and this is fons passionis Formale est essentia in naturâ prîmum superstratum as before and this is fons actionis And from these principia many things in nature may be made manifest As from hence things natural have finitness of essence which belongeth to every nature and thence limits of quantity as the Angels have and thence they are alwayes under some figure thence also have they limits of place and so Zanchius saith an Angel is in his own place Again if every natural thing have these principia then t is principiatum ergo tis in tempore and had a beginning hence nature must have an efficient ergo not eternal and this efficient only can turn the constant nature into nothing but they are not resolvable per se because they are proxima to nothing in their kind otherwise if nature should resolve them it could work a miracle which is above nature for nature found them created and must so leave them for creatio and annihilatio are not effects of nature but above it Hence the soul of man could not be created by nature for then either of something or nothing not of nothing
Esse indeed is general to all the causes and existere is from them all which appears by this we say mundus est a Deo est ex nihilo est formata c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause to make the effect so we shall see in a knife there are all the four causes to be in it and the three former for the end and therefore if we will not be deceived here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause res not effectum for we have heard what res est that is the subject of Art but if we had said effectum it had bene a posteriore for we have not the effect wrought Again we are but yet in causa in general by res he meanes res efficienda not yet effecta Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa when we take that to be the cause which hath the potentia efficiendi but doth not efficere but is causa quatenus it hath an hand in that effect so that if one bring a cause that is not a cause though it have vim efficiendi yet is it not causa Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientiae This is a deduction out of the first rule following this if the thing be causae vi then this is primus locus inventionis for it is first in the cause before it be in the effect then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must look at Locus here Ramus tels us closely that the Aristotelians topick places are these arguments the first whereof is causa Fons We know the fountain is the first place where waters spring so all things spring from the causes yea subjects adjuncts c. Fons scientiae For if we know the causes then we know the effects because they arise from them and subjects c. and again that is the principal part of knowledge Scirique demum creditur c. For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing and that which may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing but knowing the causes of a thing we know it as it is the things being arising from the causes and thus knowing the thing we know it intus and in cute Here Ramus doth commorare telling us what Aristotle meant by these words And again too tels us that Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiome consisting of causa and effectum and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient matter form and end No Aristotle saith that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by the definition because that layes forth the essence of a thing but it doth not tell us all the esse ergo not all the scientia for the esses of the efficient and end do not go into a definition Vt merito dicatur a Poeta c. Here he prefers the Poets authority before Aristotle for Aristotle being more imployed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man but the Poet as a publike man foelix meaning a contemplative happiness not a practick Causa est efficiens materia aut forma finis Every cause yeelds an esse but all together make the effect now it is of two sorts efficiens materia aut forma finis for he cannot give it to us in two words but makes a distinct axiom and couples the parts with a conjunction copulative by reason whereof they have a community but where lyes it this it is I may call the two first potential causes the other two acting causes this the Schools tels us when they call materia potentia and the form actus and this is Ramus meaning as we shall see in many examples as when a Taylor sets buttons on a doublet with thread they are not done till all the causes are there so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient and matter but when it hath also a form and end Now our Author would not use potentia and actus first because they are barbarous words secondly they are improper because they cannot be called potentia and actus but potentiating and acting then again the form and end are potentia as well as efficiens and materia contra therefore he makes two couple of causes for so we see the efficient is the first mover moving quite through with the matter singly and the form and end move them inseparably together therefore they are thus distinguished efficiens est motus a quo in a line the matter ex qua and form per quem finis ad quem but because there is a scope at matter therefore there is a distinction For as the efficient and end terminate the thing so the form and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same So God made a matter and gave it a form and so an end ergo reason must see them thus The same order there is also in Gods providence so man also doth imitate God when he doth any thing orderly the first care is for a workman then a matter then a form and then an end though we may have cloth before a Taylor yet it is not a matter till it begin with the Taylor to bring an effect to pass So then the efficient is in nature before the matter and the matter before the form for the form is an adjunct to the matter and the form before the end the end being an adjunct to the form and again a thing must be formed before it can have an end The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him the second forms are adjuncts to the matter Now the first efficient is absolutely first for it hath nothing before it the first matter is not res prima nor causa prima but first for matter ergo it is from the first efficient onely ergo never hath any existency in the world but is ens incompletum so the first form is from the first efficient not of the first matter but onely in it ergo it is ens also completum hence our soules are not our forms for then our forms should be res incomplâ—tae Now the end is last and the first end is the last end it is first because it is most general last because it is not made for another end ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made so that the end as it is last as the thing is acted so it is first as it is most general for all the former causes work to effect the end As we say in Schools finis est primus in intentione posterius in executione so God made all things for his glory here his glory is first in intention of him that works by counsel but is acted last of all by all things that he made And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo melius is
proprius secondly a denyed of all sorts but not every denied for if the antecedent part disagree with the third argument then it will be concluded in the first kind of an explicate and therefore argumentum antecedit the consequent part of the question sequitur affirmatum the antecedent in the assumption as we heard generally in a simple syllogism as for example the question is whether profit attend honesty the third argument is justum for the proposition if it be not well gotten it will not thrive for the assumption the truth of that appears because justitia generalis or virtus and honestaâ— are all one Affirmatum generale Omne justum est utile Cicero 2. officiorum it a concludit Summa quidem authoritas Philosophy c. Here the proposition is first being backt with a prosyllogism a testimonio then the assumption and then the conclusion and this is generalis quia est ex propositione assumptione generalibus quia ex omnibus partibu affirmatis and the rest following are so for the reason out of their definitions Neg. gene Timidus non est liber Hoc ita concluditur judicatur ab Horatio 1. Epist Quo melior servo quo liberior sit avarus c. The question is whether a covetous man be free no for he will make himself a slave for a farthing the proposition is argued in the example with a prosyllogism and that is argued by another prosyllogism from his effects nam qui cupit c. there is the assumptionâ— porro qui metuens vivit c there is the conclusion backt with a prosyllogism Consslii expers consilio reginon potest Terentius in Eunucho Here quares in se neque consilium neque modum Habet ullum Love cannot be governed by counsel why because it is expers consilii any affection whatsoever if it be in excess it will hear no reason love especially for it is hot and that intoxicates the head and sets fancy on work and will hear no judgement the proposition is first here quae res In amore haec omnia insunt vitia here instead of the assumption the causes of love are reckoned up Incerta hac situ c. there is the conclusion backt with a prosyllogism a contrario Affir spec Consules virtute facti studiose rempub tueri debent The question is whether Cicero was to be causa quae â—ueatur Rempublicam yes because he is made Consul for his vertue Sic Orator diligentiam suam c. The proposition is first being argued with a prosyllogism a minore qui non in incunabilis that is not by being born of them who have been Consuls sed in campo that is when they go to the fields not to their progenitors and that he shews by a contrary to himself then the assumption nulli populo and with a prosyllogism the conclusion me ipsum c. he doth commorari upon the assumption by a digression and upon the occasion of the prosyllogism he repeats again the conclusion Quod optatum redierit gratum est The question is whether Lesbia be welcome to Catullus yes because she is the subject of his desire it is a connex axiom but we are to look at it as it is a simple axiom as the verb is the band that ties it Caâ—ullus sic concludit Si quicquam cupidoque optanti obtigit unquam The proposition is first then the assumptio argued a minore carius auro lastly he doth commorari upon the conclusion Lesbi animi cupido where there is also a comparison added a minore Neg. spec Deceptor amantis puellae non est laudandus Phillis apud Ovidium Fallere credentem non est operosa puellam Now followeth a negative special Demophoon non est laudandus from his effects the proposition is first fallere with a prosyllogism simplicitas c. then the assumption sum decepta then the conclusion with an execration by a testimony of the gods and now in these kinds of simple syllogisms the question is made much more clear and evident then in composite syllogisms because here we sever the question into his parts and lay the third argument with each part to see the truth thereof whereas in a composite syllogism we dispose the third argument with the whole question and do not sever it at all Now then that we may know readily where any question may be concluded it is but this look at the question whether it be affirmed or denied general special or proper if it be a general affirmed it can be concluded onely in the second kind of an explicate not in the first explicate not in a contract if it be a general denied it may onely be concluded in the first explicate and also in the second explicate if the third argument agree with the antecedent part of the question if it be a particular affirmed it may be concluded in a contract not in the first explicate but in the second explicate if the third argument agree with the antecedent if it be a particular denied it may be concluded in a contract and in the first explicate if the third argument disagree with the antecedent part of the question and in the second explicate so that this is the most general if it be a proper affirmed it can onely be concluded in the second explicate not in the first explicate nor in a contract if it be a proper denied then it can be concluded onely in the first explicate or in the second explicate if the third argument doth agree with the antedent part of the question not in a contract CHAP. XIII De Syllogismo connexo primo Adhuc syllogismus simplex fuit syllogismus compositus est syllogismus ubi tota quaestio est pars alâ—era propositionis affirmatae compositae argumentum est pars reliqua VVE have heard of a simple syllogisme and how it came to be simple now it is called a composite by reason the whole question is placed in the proposition with the third argument now which goes first and which goes last we shall hear in the specials Again this proposition must be affirmed meaning the parts affirmed and also composite the assumption and conclusion are alwayes or at least may alway be simple and it is called composite not so much in respect of the proposition but of the disposing of the whole question with the third argument Here we must not bring any part of the question into the assumption for if we bring in one part we wrong the other part and if we bring in the whole question we commit a tautology making the proposition and assumption the same but the third argument must come into the assumption because it is the light to clear the question ergo it is first placed in the proposition with the whole question then alone in the assumption as if I should say this is it that is two foot long do you mark it or as if I should shew you corn and
as of a man with a Lyon we say the one is hot or cold in respect of the other for because mistum attends elementarium according to the variety of the composition divers qualities arise Now in things composed of similar parts only as worms eels they ergo having their life a-like in every part hence they live after they be cut and they have the like temperament but these things that have organical parts when they are cut in peeces their parts will not live for the life hath one principal seat and is not in every part a-like Now in comparing the temperature of things together if one exceed the other above the common rate we call it a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 otherwise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 under 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is putrido rottenness when the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is in heat and moisture where the heat is only able to set it up and make it rotten and so nature is dissolved and this is general to the elementaries and to the air and water so far forth as they be mingled with vapours so we say in sickness-time the air is infected Now temperature ad pondus proves another reason because in nature it would be fit for no office as not to cool because heat is equal to it not to dry because moisture will hinder it or contra There must be inequal proportions of the elements and consequently more temperaments because things are made to diverss ends so that ergo they must have elements predominating in them whereby they may be fitted to such and such ends secondly Temperament must be unequal because they must be mutable and there must be dissolution Ergo the temperature must be unequal and one element too strong for an other And these predominating elements do so much destroy themselves to our sence as they do by our act though they do to our sence also as I can tast ginger and find it hot Where one only doth predominate t is either heat cold moisture or drith for as before according to that for which the thing was made such elements shall it have predominating in it for the attainig of that end so we say the heart is naturally hot for to turn the chylus into chymum so the brain cold per se but accidentally hot which heat is brought from the heart to it by the vital spirits so that according to things ends so must they be made as bones have drith in them predominating because they are the foundation of the body even as the earth is the foundation of the world So again we say the four humours caused in the liver are fluid and ergo have air predominating in them because t is their office to run up and downe to nourish every part and for the humours first our meat and nutriment comes to our stomack and there is turned into chylus and hence it comes into the liver and is turned into chymum and the humours are made of the succus of this nutriment in the liver and of these humors is made semen and that part of the semen which hath most drith in it makes a bone which is a similar part and so of the rest Now in some things there are two qualities predominating in respect of a double use of the thing and these predominting qualities must evermore be disparates not contraries for then they would destroy one another Now man of all things comes neerest to the temperament ad pondus and ergo he is most sure to mark others temperature being compared with mans temperature Crasis and temperamentum are all one But now the degrees of temperature are not infinite but they distinguish them into four only and where any element is predominate above these degrees there is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in living creatues is called morbus which Adam was not subject unto and yet had the art of medicina ergo morbus is not the object of medicina hence is putredo now putredo and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differ in that one quantity must drive out another so as that there be a dissolution but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be without any dissolution again the common philosophers make putredo only where moister predominates and thirdly putredo is where only external qualities uniting with internal do make a dissolution as by external heat united with internal heat do make a dissolution as by external heat united which internal heat water is expelled and so in wood the heat and the moisture that hold it together being taken away by rhe fire falls into ashes And by reason of this putredo things come to stinke which we call faetor yet where this putredo is but in any degree for there be degrees of it there it doth not stink So moisture external will putrifie as wood in water which we call martor for we have no proper word so drith will cause putrefaction so wood will rot which we call caries so will cold also putrifie by quenching heat so rust is a kind of putrefaction which caused by external moisture united with internal and so makes things as it were ' sweat and becomes rusty And these are the effects of putredo and these are general c. The rest is wanting ETHICAL NOTES DIvinity is the rule to make a man happy And this man in his life hath a double respect First As he is a man alone Secondly As he is sociate and sociate is either in a Family or in a Common-wealth Hence must the distinction of the proles of Theologie go accordingly and all these must tend to happiness now these are proles of Theologie arising from the second part thereof namely from the second table of the law which by reason of man's Fall is almost dasht out of him yet there is so much left in him as is able to shew him that he was made able to please God and secondly to live well So that this work of being a good Divine is wrought in man from several causes for the sanctified man because be hath Faith he keepeth the rules of Ethicks Oeconomicks and Politicks by the spirit of Sanctification but the only civil man which wanteth Faith doth therefore fail in a Divine and so all is spoiled yet he keepeth the rule of Ethicks by the spirit of restraint which spirit keepeth him from those enormous sins which otherwise he would have committed For we are to imagine every one of us by nature committing all kind of sins in that measure as he which is the most sinful committeth the greatest sins that he is given unto So that no man is at liberty in this kind to do so much as one civil act without the spirit of restraint and therfore much less an action of Faith Ethica est ars bene gerendise Ethica is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mos custome or manner it is more frequent in the plural number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manners and hence were the