the Judgment of those great Divines and so from Gods special Favour and Providence as all other paternal castigations are yet the Apostle saith in the place alledged by you * Ver. 11. That no chastning for the present seemeth to be joyous but grievous and therefore you ought to be grieved and to mourn upon this account Praesumptuosus The Apostle in those words tells you how chastisement is usually resented according to the judgment of the flesh Ex carnis judicio nulla castigatio videtur esse materia gaudii sed tristitiae tantum as Mr. D. Dicson doth expound it and as the most Learned and Reverend Dr. Hammond paraphraseth the words 't is true indeed that there is in all affliction that which is ungrateeul to flâ—sh and blood But such as have made a further progress in Christianity and are advanced to a higher state of spirituality they can glory in Tribulations * Rom. 5. 3. and if the Apostles being beaten * Acts 5. 40 41. could reâ—oyce that they were counted worthy to suffer shame in that kind for Christs Name much more may they rejoyce and glory in those other paternal castigations their sweet sins which are altogether agreeable to their sensual appetites Diotrephes The Apostle saith That without holiness no man shall see the Lord Hebr. 12. 14. Praesumptuosus Is not the Apostles injunction for following peace with all men as strict as for following holiness Do you think this duty necessary to salvation too But to praetermit that I hope Gods paternal castigations are not such enemies to holiness but they may very well be reconciled and dwell together 2. Dr. Twiss * Ubi supra p 20 See also what iâ— cited out of hiâ— above in the Margin ibid. p 116 tells us That the very Children of God have savage lusts and wild affections in tâ—em he takes the observation from Davids prayer Psal 51. 10. the curing and mastering whereof is no lâ—ss work then was the work of Creation or ma king of the World He saith also that after their effectual Calling They have cause sometimes to expostulat with God for hardning their hearts against his fâ—ar Whatever you alledged before out of this Dr. as del vered in his passion you see his judgment in cool blood nay Mr. Baxter * Of Right â—â— Sacram. Disp 3 pag. 326 32â— delivers it as the opinion of most of our Divines That a man that is unsanctified must be a greater sinner than Solomon was 3. Our Right and Title to the Kingdom of Heaven and consequently to the Vision of God is not derived from any actions of our own or placed in them or built upon them Inter Acta Syn. Nat. Dord pag. 194. par 2. Theol. M. Brit. Judic de Artic. quinto but it is placed in a free adoption and in our conjunction with Christ And therefore our right unto the Kingdom is not taken away unless that be taken away wherein it is founded If sons then heirs heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ Rom. 8. 17. Manente ergo adoptione in Christum insitione extra viam regni aberrare potest fidelis at jure regni haereditario excidere non potest Therefore the faithful his adoption and engrafting into Christ remaining may wander out of the way of the Kingdom but he cannot loose or fall from his hereditary right to it * Thus the Brittish Divines at Dort This is that which supported the death-bed faith of his late Highness O. C * A Collection of several passages concerning his late H. O. C. in the time of his sickness pag. 6. who speaking then of the Covenant is reported to say Whatsoever sins thou hast dost or shalt commit if thou lay held upon free-grace you are safe but if you put your self under a Covenant of Works you bring your self under the Law and so under the Curse then you are gone For holiness therefore to appear before the presence of God in Deus providebit God will take care to put it upon us The Elect with that blessed Apostle desire to be found in Christ not having in their own inherent righteousness * Renouncing all Righteousness in my self by the works of the Law and having only confidence in that which is by Faith Non in meorum operum iâ— haerente justitia sed in illa Christi imputata quae à Deo gratis datur Dicson ad Phil. 3. 9. but that which is imputed through the faith of Christ the righeeousness which is of God by faith Phil. 3. 9. Diotrephes I am of that opinion that the dominion of any one sin is inconsistent with saving grace and justification Mr. Baxter's Account of persever pag. 40. Praesumptuosus Though your Authour be a singular man yet I will not say that that 's but one Doctors opinion but I am sure St. Paul found it otherwise by experience at least if our ablest Calvinists do rightly interpret him for he saith Rom. 7. 14. I am carnal sold under sin that is as Deodati * Ad locum expounds it altogether subjected as a slave bought for a certain price of money and he alledgeth to this purpose 1 Kings 21. 20. where it is said of Ahab Thou hast sold thy self to work wickedness in the sight of the Lord. To whom agreeth Mr. D. Dicson upon the place Cogor meipsum carnalem agnoscere I am constrained to acknowledge my self carnal and as a slave sold that I might be subject to sin out of whose Fetters I cannot free my self but am often carried whether I would not This is acknowledged to be the Apostles condition who doubtless was in the state of grace and justification If by the dominion of sin you mean something else then I demand 2. When may we conclude that sin hath dominion over a man David you know after he had been wounded with the beauty of Bathsheba he sent Messengers to court and woo her for his entertainment when she was brought he lay with her after that he sent for her husband from the Leaguer to cloak his shame but because he could not tempt him by shewes of pity and other fair means to go in to her he made him drunk that in that distemper he might serve the ends of his lust upon him and because this device would not take neither he conspired his death and sent an express Order to Joab to take a special care to murder him though many gallant men were exposed to the slaughter to bear him company Notwithstanding all this our Divines do conclude That sin had not dominion over David at that time his state of justification was not dissolved or interrupted and his 2 Sam. 11. 15 17. Act. Syn. Nat. Dort p. 194. par 2. adoption remained immoveable for such as are once regenerated sin can never have dominion over them to their condemnation they are not under the Law where sin hath dominion to that effect but under grace *
is the first cause of it and consequently whatsoever we do we do necessarily in respect of Him This is one of the Arguments which proveth more than our Adversaries would have them and by these Rules have I formerly Answ in the second Argument proved that they make God the Author of sin for if causa causae be causa causati as doubtless it is while they make God the cause of all those actions which either are sins or the causes of sins questionless they make God according to their own Argumentation the cause of sins But they have a limitation for this Rule and say that it holdeth in causis essentialiter subordinatis as they say that God is the cause of all those things which are essentially and districtly done by our wills but sins proceeding from the depravation of our wills are effects of a cause not directly subordinate to God The limitation is sound but not applicable to their instance ye◠the limitation it self quite spoileth them For 1. While Adam's will was yet sound they teach that God decreed that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit now at that time they cannot say but that Adam was a cause essentially subordinate to God 2. They teach that God is a cause not onely of our actions but also of our volitions as I may say then these being the causes of our sins are directly subordinate to him 3. Let us consider not onely the subordination between God and our wills but also between our actions and their moralities and we shall perceive that according to the abuse of these Rules they make God the cause of our sins For that Rule Causa causae est causa causati is infallibly true expounded thus The cause of any effect is the cause of all such events as necessarily follow that effect Now then if as they say God be a necessary cause of all our particular actions seeing our actions in reference to such and such objects must needs be sinful it is manifest what followeth For example Though to take money in general be no sin yet to take this or that money being none of our own is a sin Now then if God be a cause of this action in reference to this object as he is if he be the cause of this particular action it is impossible their Doctrine should excuse God from sin Eating in reference to the forbidden fruit was a sin but according to them God was a principal cause of eating the forbidden fruit Ergo. Minor prob They say he was the necessitating cause of this particular action Eating was a natural action the individuation of this eating by an unlawful object was a moral obliquity But God was the cause of this individual Ergo. The like may be said of all our sinful actions When I have drunk sufficiently both for the necessity and comfort of nature to drink a cup more is sin But our Opposites teach that I cannot take up this superfluous cup without Gods speciall determination Ergo. This Doctrine is enough to make ones hair stand an end making God whatsoever they say the cause not onely of our actions but also of our obliquities for what are the obliquities of our actions but the placing of them upon wrong objects If therefore they make God the principal cause of all our particular actions most of which are particularized by bad objects what do these men make of God But Recrimination is no answer Hitherto I have shewed though perhaps without method yet I hope not without profit how our Opposites are wounded with their own weapons Now I will take their weapons out of their hands and teach them the right use of them shewing how God is the cause of all things onely not the cause of sin a cause of all good things yet so as that many good things are contingent also We have shewed in the third Argument how God hath ordained that all sorts of Inferior or second causes should work according to their proper kinds that voluntary Agents should work voluntarily c. God then is the first cause that all things do work and that they do work in certain kinds If so then God is the cause that many things are done contingently one of the chiefest sorts of second causes by this appointment working voluntarily and therefore contingently which connexion we have formerly justified This being well understood will instruct us not onely that it may be so but also that it must be so That God being the necessary cause of all good things yet all such things are not necessary effects of Him For example It is impossible that man should do any thing without God therefore God is a cause necessary to the being of all things effected by him yet because many things done by the free choice of man might as well have been omitted God no ways constraining him to them these are not necessary effects of God The Reason of this is because God hath decreed that man should work voluntarily having liberty to do as well one thing as another yet so that God giveth him the strength to do whatsoever he chooseth to do and ability to choose what he will without limitation of his choice for this were else ☜ to take it away and to make man an involuntary Agent For example God hath given thee strength of body he hath given thee also ability to choose in what exercise thou wilt employ it thou choosest to Ring or Dance God then the Author of thy strength is the chief cause of these exercises yet so as they are contingent in respect of Him because thou mightest have omitted them hadst thou pleased By this we may plainly see how God is the principal cause of all things of which he is capable to be a cause and yet many things are contingent in respect of him This being cleared we may with more facility conceive how and in what sense God is the cause of all we do and yet we onely the cause of sin God sustains us when we are about our sins even then in Him we live and move and have our being as well as when we are better busied God giveth that strength by which we commit any sin yet because he doth not necessitate or incline unto it but we of our selves abuse it to wickedness God hath still the part of a Creator we onely are sinful An example will make this clear Suppose a King delivereth to his Subject Men Weapons Mony and Warlike provision that he may fight for his Honor against his enemies his Subject proves a Traitor and useth all his Soveraigns strength against himself His Soveraign here is a cause that he hath the command and doth the Office of a Captain but he is no cause of his Treachery the offence is onely the Captains and the wrong is onely the Soveraigns This is just the case between God and us God hath given us many excellent faculties both of body and soul which he intended we should
did actually harden or had a will to harden any but such as had formerly rebelled against the fight abused his patience and despised his gracious dispensations * Rom. 1. 22 26 Because when they knew God they did not glorifie him as God c. for this cause God gave them up Rom. 1. 21. with 26. Psal 81. 11 12. But my people would not hear my voyce and Israel would See also Luke 7. 30. Acts 13. 26 40 41 45 46. Hebr. 2. 3. not obey me so I gave them up to their own hearts lusts We find that the Lord though he had fore-told what would be the issue of Moses Ministry to him is not said to have hardned Pharaoh till he had multiplied his Rebellions and dallied with five plagues The last whereof when Moses undertakes the removal of it he gives him a fair warning of his danger Exod. 8. 29. I will intreat the Lord but let not Pharaoh deal deceitfully any more And because he neglected to quit himself of the danger upon this hot Alarme therefore with the sixth plague this judgment came upon him also 't is said the Lord then hardned the heart of Pharaoh Exod. 9. 12. and ver 14. with the judgment following the Lord threatens I will at this time send all my plagues upon thine heart Therefore do not resemble God to a mad or â—nwise Potter that layes out his cost and skill in making up a Vessel for no other purpose but only to make ostentation of his power will and liberty to break it Perhaps the Apostle by that comparison takes upon him to demonstrate not what God will do but what he can for he saith What if God willing to shew his wrath c Besides God is compared to the Potter and men to the Mass or Lump of Clay but what men are they that are entred into this comparison not innocent men or men made guilty by imputation only as your Doctriâ—e supposes them but men corrupt through their own vâ—luntary pollutions as such This is evident from the Apostles Discourse in the three first Chapters of that Epistle He declares then that out of this Mass or Lump it is lawful for God according to his own Beneplaciture to select some unto life namely those who would believe in Christ upon his being tendred to them * Rom. 9. 30 31 32. Chap. 11. 20. See also John 3. ult and to harden the rest and reserve them to wrath that is to say those who would augment the number and mount the heap of their other sins by the addition of a wilful unbelief This to my sense is most clearly that liberty * 1 Cor. 1. 21. which the Apostle asserts and vindicates to Almighty God in that present juncture and current of his Providence over Jewes and Gentiles though the Jewes cryed it down with utter detestation as a violation * Rom. 11. 1. of those signal promises which he had anciently made unto their Nation For your other Allegation Matth. 20. 15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own It can conclude nothing but that God may distribute equal portions of reward to those whose labours in his Vineyard have been unequal for when he that hath done most receives the utmost they did contract for why should he repine at the Lords bounty which is no injury to him though a benefit to others But what is all this to the vindication of Gods justice when he invites men to a new Covenant wherein he promiseth to proceed with them upon a gentler account and tyes them to new conditions and yet denies abilities sufficient to perform those conditions though he binds them to that performance under the commination and peril of a soarer penalty And I ask't you further in what sense this Covenant with Mankind could be properly called a Covenant of Grace which demand and I conceive it a material one you were pleased to take no notice of in your last Reply Diotrephes You must know Sir that your natural Reason without a supernatural illumination is no competent Judge of the sense of holy Scripture which contains the mind of God yet I shall not now reply to your interpretations but address my self to give you satisfaction to your lâ—st demand which is in what sense the Covenant which God hath sealed to us in the blood of Christ is styled a Covenant of Grace To this end you must understand that there are a certain number of persons predestinated unto life and glory and these are called the Elect These Elect God Almighty before the foundation of the World was laid according to his eternal and immutable purpose and the secret The Declaration of the Congregational Churches at the Savoy Chap. 3. n. 5 6 7. counsel and good pleasure of his will hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory out of his meer free grace and love without any foresight of faith or good works or perseverance in either of them or any other thing in the Creature as conditions or causes moving him thereunto and all to the praise of his glorious grace And as God hath appointed these Elect unto glory so hath he by the eternal and most free purpose of his will fore-ordained all the means thâ—â— unto wherefore they who are elected being faln in Adam are redeemed by Christ are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season are justified adopted sanctified and kept by his power through faith unto salvation All these benefits are infallibly and irresistibly conveyed to those Elect by vertue of the said Covenant and upon this account I hope you will allow it to be very fitly intitled a Covenant of Grace Paganus I do readily allow of the title in respect to those Elect you speak of but I pray satisfie me in this particular what interest have the rest of mankind in Christ and this Covenant Do not the benefits you have now mentioned belong to them Diotrephes For your satisfaction you may assure your self it is the Determination and PUBLICK FAITH of the new Congregational Churches in England * Ibid. n. 6. agreed upon and consented to by their Elders and Messengers That not any other are redeemed by Christ or effectually called justified adopted sanctified and saved but these Elect only Paganus I pray to what end did God create the rest and what Acts hath he passed against them and what Providence doth he exercise towards them Diotrephes There is a Text of holy Scripture that saith thus Before the children were born and when they had neither done good nor evil that the purpose of God according to Election might stand Rom. 9. 11 1â— 13. not of works but of him that calleth it was said The elder shall serve the younger as it is written I have loved Jacob and have hated Esau Out of which words a Renowned Divine doth conclude That Gods ordaining men unto salvation proceeds meerly according to
one kind * Dato quod voluntas sit causa actionis liberae addam si placet totalis in suo genere ergone Deus ejusdem actionis non est causa in suo genere Mr. Hickman in Br. Refut Tilcâ—i ad â—inem yet man is the cause of the same action in another kind God preserves his Creatures in their nature and properties he moves them also and applies them to act or work agreeably to their nature He affords them his concourse and so concurs with them and so immediatly influenceth the action of the Creature with his action that one and the same action is said to proceed from the first and second cause iâ—asmuch as unum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one production or work derives its existence from them both in which work if there be any thing inordinate it is from the action not as it is the Creaâ—ors but as it is the Creatures Thus the Belgick professors Ibid. Thes 13. Paganus If God as the first Cause and Author of Nature to conserve that order and manner of working instituted in second causes at their first Creation doth afford his general concourse * Deus enim â—t Author naturae tenetur se voluntati creaâ—â— paratum praebere ad concurrendum ad opposita ut ipsa uti possit sua naturali libertate Hence they say Actus pravus quatenâ—â— Ens est 〈◊〉 Deo non ut induâ—enâ—e ad illuâ— sed ut non subtrahente suum necessarium concursum volâ—ntati quae dum ad illum se determinat abutitur sua libertate influxu divino in actu primo ad opposita sibi â—blato Et id 〈◊〉 magis proprie dicitur Dâ—us congerâ— voluntati in talem actum causando quaâ— voluntas dicatur coagere Deo Vid. Greg. in 2. d. 34. 37. q 1. ar 3 ad 8. ad opposita that his Creature may have power and liberty to do good or evil and suffer the will of man to determine its self freely to the evil act and then fore-seeing it so determined upon supposition of his concourse doth yield his simultaneous influence to the production of that evil act then it is possible to conceive how a man may avoid sin notwithstanding that Divine influx for in this case man doth abuse his own liberty and the Divine concurse offer'd to him ad opposita and so doth freely determine himself unto the sin when he might do otherwise and God should co-operate with the created will as the Author of nature according to the exigence thereof rather than the will co-operate with God as its first determiner Diotrephes That opinion doth cast fetters * R. B. P. ubi supra p. 27. Hoc unum asserimus hunc concursum quicunque tandem is est male statim subordinatum aut posteriorem influxâ—â— voluntatis in actum suum quia cum Deus non â—sset causa pâ—ima omnium entium sed secunda deinde quia voluntas in primo motus sui initio non dependeret a Deo sed contra Deus a primo initio mortuuâ—â— voluntatis Râ—sp A. Wallaei ad Censur Coâ—vini pag. 103. upon the Divine Liberty and Providence for if mans will doth freely determine itself before the Divine Determination then it would follow that the power and providence of God can dispose nothing till the assent of the created will be expected and first had with which it may concur as a partial cause to produce the effect and so God should not be the first but the second cause of this act and the will should not so much depend upon him as he depend upon the first motion of the will Paganus If God preserves to his rational Creature its natural propriety and manner of working I suppose he doth ordinarily allow it the liberte of a self-determination And I understand not how this should be any derogation to Gods Power or Providence for the Creature still acts not only under the general concourse of his Providence but also under the special egressions of it and God can and doth as it seemeth good to him put in an immediate and extraordinary finger of power to over-rule and order the actions of it the Creature therefore is not exempted from the conduct of his Providence by this means as you pretend Diotrephes We look upon all created beings as so many emanations from the first cause upon which they depend in Ibid. page 2â— esse operari in their being and working as the Rayes depend upon the Sun neither is the intellectual Creature in the actions of free-will exempted from this order * Synops Pur. Tâ—col ubi supra Thes 10. for it is necessary that every Creature and every action of it and every mode and perfection of every action of it be reduced unto God as unto the first most perfect and therefore most effectual cause We conclude therefore That * Mr. Bagshaw Pract. Dâ—sc pag. 3. Our wills are tyed up so close to the will of God that like lesser wâ—eâ—ls they move only as that great mover doth guide them Paganus Methinks this Doctrine should be very apt to tempt men to believe that God doth very much promote and assist them in their most prodigiously sinful courses Diotrephes The Acts of Gods Omnipotency are carefully to be distinguished from his Legislative Acts by these last God alwayes forbids sin but by those former he secretly incites * Deus homines ad suas pravas actiones incitâ—t seduct traâ—it jubâ—t indurat deceptiones immittit quae pâ—ccâ—ta gravia sunt efficit Mart. in Judic 3. 9. men unto it either by moving their wills tongues and members unto sin or else by not moving them to the contrary virtue but withdrawing his grace and necessary assistance whence it comes to pass that they cannot but sin Paganus This makes God the Author of the sinful act and consequently the cause of all sin in the world Diotrephes Though it sounds ill to weak and tender ears yet Mr. Calvin * Instit lib. 1. Cap. 18. Sect. 3. mihi p. 128. hath openly avouched it Satis apertè ostendi saith he Deum vocari corâ—m omnium Authorem quae iâ—ti câ—nsores volunt otioso tantùm ejus permissu contingere I have cleaâ—ly shâ—wed that God is called the Author of all those sins which these censurers would have come to pass only by his idle permission But that we may clear God of all imputation We are taught to distinguish when we speak of sin betwixt the act and the malice Dr. Twiss ubi supra page 73. or betwixt the act which is sinful called by some the materialty and the sinfulness thereof which is called the formality God is the cause of the former but only the permitter of the latter Paganus This permission then by which you endeavour to free God from the imputation of being the Authour and Cause of sin must not be an action by which God makes us to operate but only
that insuperably he that produceth the act and that immediatly shall he be blameless What is this but to condemn an accessary and acquit the principal Diotrephes But there is a great difference betwixt Gods concourse unto our good and evil works to good works he concurs not only efficiently Ex parte Potentiae predetermining the very faculty to the work but also morally Ex parte Objecti in that he doth counsel command perswade and aâ—â—ure us unto the lawful object In sinful acts he does only the first and not the latter so that of our sinful actions he is the physical cause only not the moral but of our good he is as well the moral as the physical Paganus You should consider that moral motion doth not give God the honour of a true and proper cause but only of a Metaphorical for the influence it hath into the Agent is not ipsum agere the very act it self and consequently the effect doth not follow that motion If therefore God should move us no otherwise than after such a manner your Partizans do conclude that while we work God should not discriminate us but we should discriminate our selves from such as work not therefore though God concurs unto the good act by a physical predetermination and morally too but unto the evil act by a physical predetermination only yet there remains the same manner of working in respect of good and evil in that which is chiefly considerable and by it self alone attributes the true and proper nature of a cause to God and assigns him the first and perfect original of that determination that this act should rather be than not be But 2. What is this moral motion and from whence and what doth it work upon in its seduction of us to an evil work be it in the understanding or the will in the imagination or the sensitiue appetite if you allow it to be an act you must confess according to your principels that it is from God and of his product on seeing therefore that the total sum of Gods concurse unto the act of sin amounts fully to thus much in your own account That he predetermines man to produce the whole entity of it and the whole reality also of every other act prerequired unto it that besides he predetermines and applies the Divel * Imoâ—â—ne ipse quidem Diabolus quicquam potest nisi determinante Deo Proinde pro certo tenendum Dominum omnes actiones decâ—rnere atque agendo concurrere suo sancto modo cooperari quando peccatum est in fiâ—â—i c. Malcom Com. ad Act. 4. 24. Passio Christi in individuo fuit a Dâ—o praedefinita praedefinitione perfecta Ergo omnes circumstantiae quae concurrunt ad individuationem illius praedeterminatae sunt aeterno Deâ— decreto sed ad talem individuation in etiam concuâ—rit inâ—â—â—sio actus extensio ad tales personas Alvarez Disp 22. 19. Câ—tance approbante Amesio iâ— Bel. ener Tom 4. lib. 2. cap. 2. n. 12. p. 27. and every other cause de facto conâ—urring to propound the unlawful object and allure to it since he predetermines the will and directs the intention and provides the object and applies the Tempter and addresseth all other circumstances that concur to the individuation of the sinful act there seems to be no moral or physical causality wanting that God should therefore be said to produce mens evil works otherwise than he effects their good works Diotrephes But the efficiency of God though he be Author of the act of sin doth not reach the formal malice of it Paganus No more do Men nor Divels in their most importunate contrivances solicitations and actings towards the sins of others notwithstanding they communicate in the fault * Quatenus incredulit adhabâ—t rationem peccati Deus illam non efficit sed Diabolus juxta illud 2. Cor. 4. 4. Piscator Apol. Resp Amicae Collat. Oppos cap. 3. and guilt by impelling to them such acts as are inseparably attended with a moral pravity neither doth any man produce the formal malice of his own wicked act but inasmuch as he produceth the entity of that act * Aquin. 12ae q. 79. ar 2. 2. to which that malice is annexed If the resolution of your Casuist * Amesius ubi supra lately mentioned be authentick he doth indirectly cooperate and so communicate in the sin of others who is deficient in his diligence to prevent it and he is sufficiently diligent to prevent sin who doth predetermine the will to it Diotrephes Now I have freed God so fully from having any hand in sin by a Metaphorical distinction you endeavour to make him communicate therein by a moral interpretation but that one may be accounted the Author of sin he must be culpably deficient saith Dr. Twiss * Ubi supra p. 72. and thus man may beguilty saith he either by doing what he ought to omit or by omitting what he ought to do but this cannot be incident to God He could I confess saith he keep any Creature from sin â—f it pleased him but if he will not and doth not he commits not any culpable defect for he is not bound to preserve any man from sin Therefore all that can be infer'd from hence is this * R. B. Prid. ubi supra p. 13. That man doth necessarily fall into sin if God doth not uphold him not that God sins because he doth not give what he doth not owe him Paganus You grant then that God is the cause of mans fall though inculpable but your Doctors do acknowledge That to love God in such a measure as to contemn our selves in comparison of him and his service is above the power of nature A Dr. Twiss nbi supra p. 49. man mvst be endued with heavenly grace and the Spirit of God to enable him hereunto and that accordingly God created our first parents in a state of grace and endued them with the Spirit that in this capacity such a law of love might be justly impos'd upon them Now I would fain be satisfied with what equity God could withdraw * from his innocent creatures and such were our first parents before the fall * Si Deus hominem sibi obedientem a pietate deturbat bene currentem cadere facit ergo pro bonis mala retribuit injuste punit quod ut fiat impellit Quid tam perversum quid tam insanum dici aut cogitari potest Prosp Aquit ad 12. Gal. Object that supernatural and necessary assistance and yet being thus without any fault in them strip't off their abilities leave them under the obligation of that now become an impossible Commandment that they might inevitably fall and perish yet this he did as you concluded above out of your Divines Diotrephes We satisfie our selves in that God did this for a greater good and that we may have no cause to complain our Divines conclude *
Arguments for all his are reputed for such Vbi supra p. 6â— is drawn from Bradwardine's Demonstration that no will of God is conditional but absolute throughout The Demonstration is this if there be any conditional will in God the condition of that will of God is either willed by God or no. If not willed by him then that must be acknowledged to come to pass in the World without the will of God which he holds for a great absurdity but if that condition be also in some sort willed by God then either absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then also the thing conditionated shall be absolutely willed by God As for example if God doth will that a man shall be saved in case he believe and withall doth absolutely resolve to give him Faith and make him believe this is in effect absolutely to resolve to save him But if it be said that the condition spoken of is willed by God not absolutely but conditionally then a way is open to a progress in infinitum which all disclaim For as touching that second condition I will renew the former Argument enquiring whether that be also willed at all by God or no and if it be whether it be willed absolutely or conditionally so that either we must subsist in something that is absolutely willed by God and consequently all that depend thereupon as conditionated shall in like manner be absolutely willed by God or a progress from one condition to another and that without end cannot be avoided This is Dr. Twiss his demonstration taken from Bradwaraine and Mr. Baxter * In his Preface to the Grotian Religion Sect. 9. triumphs in the use of it against the Authour of the Examination of Tilâ—nus But this is not all for the Dr. hath another irrefragable Argument to prove that Faith and Repentance are not confer'd by God upon man conditionally to wit upon the performance of some condition by man for saith he * Vbi supra p. 161. 152. if it were so then these graces should be conferr'd according to mens works which is clearly and undeniably stark Pelagianism So that all endeavours after Faith and Repentance are not only impertinent but 't is heresie also to maintain that the bestowing of them depends upon any of our performances Diotrephes Sir if you will receive what that Reverend Dr. holds forth in another place you will understand his opinion more fully He is not against the use of means for the obtaining Faith and Repentance take his words at large God saith Vbi supra p. 195 196 c. he hath regard both of our Faith and Prayers not that upon the fore-sight hereof he did elect us but in that as he did ordain us unto everlasting life by way of reward of our Faith Repentance and good Works so likewise he did ordain us to the obtaining of Faith Repentance and good Works to be wrought in us partly by the Ministry of his Word therein speaking unto us and partly by our prayers seeking unto him to bless his Word unto us and fulfill the good pleasure of his goodness towards us and the work of Faith with power for God doth expect that we should â—eck unto him by prayer for this as we read Ezek. 36. 37. Neither do we maintain that God doth ordain any man of ripe years unto eternal life in any moment of nature before he ordains him to Faith Repentance and good Works and that to be wrought in him by the Ministry of the Word with Gods blessing thereupon according to the prayers in common both of the Pastour and the People This is the Drs. opinion fully Securus If the Dr. will contradict himself who can help it and 't is evident he doth contradict himself if he suspends the bestowing of Faith and Repentance upon our hearing and prayers as conditions imposed upon us for obtaining them 2. If to hear and pray be a work of ours 't is Pelagianism in the Drs. opinion to say that God gives Faith according to them for supposing Tilenus his meaning to be That God is ready to work Faith in man upon a condition he disputes against Ubi supra p. 46 it in these words Now what is that condition can it be any other thing than some work of man And what follows here hence but that God gives faith according to mens works which saith he is pure Pelagianisme condemned for heresie in the Church of God from time to time 3. And therefore elsewhere this Dr. declares the invalidity of the Word to this effect and slights the use of prayers in order towards it in these scoffing words * Ibid. p. 84 85. This Authour would have men effectually called by vertue of their prayers 4. Hereupon I shall satisfie my self with that resolution of the point which I find given by Dr. W. Spurstowe * The Wells of Salvation opened Cap. 7. Sect. 1. Rule 2. pag. 67. having propounded a distinction concerning the promises which is this There are promises of grace and there are promises which are made to grace The one saith he are so absolute as that they do not depend upon any grace in us fore-going or suppose any good qualifications in us to be partakers of them such are the promises of Conversion and Regeneration in which grace makes way for it self and works all the initial preparations without any concurrence or activity on our part we being as fully passive in our second birth as we are in our first birth in our Regeneration as in our Generation Diotrephes But the same Dr. tells us in the same place That the absolute promise of Conversion and giving of spiritual Ibid. seq life though it have a kind of opposition unto conditional promises in not requiring that aptitude and qualification of the subject by grace for the fulfilling of it as the other promises of pardon glory do for the performance of them yet is it not absolute in opposition to the use of external means which God hath appointed us a necessary way to obtain converting grace for as the Decrees of God though peremptory and unchangeable do not exclude the endeavours of the Creature and the working of second causes no more doth the absoluteness of Gods promise in Conversion shut out but rather include the uâ—e and exercise of all means that lead to the end Thus Dr. Spurstowe Securus How far the absoluteness of Gods promise doth shut out the use of means we shall further see hereafter in the mean while I pray what is the means you think so necessary to be exercised in order to our Conversion Diotrephes I shall give you my Answer in the words of Dr. Twiss I know no industry of man saith he required to his effectual Vocation which is conversion but the hearing of Gods â—upra p. 84. Word Securus He required hearing of Gods word and prayer too even now and hath he cashier'd half his means already But to let
effects without respect to some qualifications in them would argue injustice even by St. Austin's own confession for he saith Numquid In Eâ—chirid c. 98. iniquitas est apud Deum absit Iniquum enim videtur ut sine ull s bonorum malorumve operum meritis unum Deus eligat odiatque alterum Is there unrighteousness with God God forbid For it seems unjust that God should love one and hate another without any merits of good or evil works But grant Almighty God his liberty to love freely as no doubt he may do yet the Apostle tells us He is so just His wrath comes onely where he finds sin a sufficient cause to send it upon the children of disobedience * Ephes 5. 6. Col. 3. 6. That Their Progenitors or God upon Their account have entailed that Title with the wrath annexed upon Them * Jer. 31. 29. Ezek. 18. 2. Jon. 4. 11. and never cuts it off in a matter of this everlasting concernment ought not to be affirmed without great authority Those who are said to be children of wrath by nature Ephes 2. 3. are not said to be so by the nature they were born in but by the nature * The word nature is put for custom 1 Cor. 11. 14. they walked in which was their evil custom and course of trespasses and sins vers 1 2. 3. Grant Esau a Reprobate in his Mother's womb and what certainty can the Faithful for such without doubt was Isaac when he begot Esau have of the salvation of their dearest Babes So sad an Oracle had she met with such interpreters would have been more heavy to Rebecca than the double burthen she travell'd with But 4. There was no such word in the Oracle to Rebâ—cca Gen. 25. 23. nor any such heard of till the time of the Prophet Malachi of which I shall give a fuller account anon So that Esau in his own person is not like to be concerned in it 5. If the Oracle had spake to her in that very phrase and language it would have been capable of a milder construction than to signifie his eternal Reprobation For when the Scripture speaks of hatred it doth not always mean that which is Absolute but many times that which is Comparative which is no more than a lesse degree of love And so God may hate the Innocent that is love him lesse then another Innocent for God is not bound to love all alike and with an equal degree of love That the word hatred is frequently used in this sense you may observe as you read the Scriptures Gen. 29. 31. the Text saith The Lord saw that Leah was hated yet in the former verse 't is onely said that Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah So Luk. 14. 26. our Saviour saith If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother c. which signifies but to lovâ— them leâ—s as St. Matthew doth record it Mat. â— 10. 37. See also to this purpose Dut. 21. 15. Prov. 13. 24. Joh. 12. 25. with Matâ—h 10. 37. And iâ— can have no other sense when applied here to Esau or rather to his Posteriâ—y 6. Were it meant of Gods Decree of Reprobation I would fain understand wherein the Execution of that Decree consisted It must consist in the abandoning Esau to a state of tâ—mpoâ—al servitude a Gen. 25. 23. and his Hell must be an Earthly Wildernes b Mal. 1. 3. and his own Brother the Elect Jacob assigâ—'d him for his Torm â—tor c Gen. 27. 29. against whom he had a promise too that he should finally prevail d Gen. 27. 40. over him What gross Absurdities these are who wants a judgment to discern Yet all these are parts of the Oracle or Appendages in the process of the Affair as you will find by consulting the Sacred Text to this purpose Lastly there is no ground to conclude that Esau was a Reprobate for it doth not appear probable that in his person he fell off from God to serve Idollâ— and for that prophareness imputed to him Hebr. 12. 16. it consisted but in the divesting himself of a privilege e Gen. 25. 29 to the end annexed to his Primogeniture and what Sacrednesse soever was in Tâ—is he was supâ—lanted f chap. 27. 36. by his Brother's policy and induced to part with it in a case of extream necessity g chap. 25. 32. to save his life his Brother being so unnatural that he would relieve him upon no other tearms h vers 31 33. and Esau repented of This ill bargain too i ch 27. 36 38. Heb. 12. 17. For the Fornication associated with Profaneness by the Apostle in that place it is no part of Esau's Character but belongs to the Apostates of those times from the imitation of whose practices the Hebrews are there so earnestly disswaded As for the hatred k Gen. 27. 41. he did bear a while towards his Brother though it were kindled upon an exceeding provocation it was not implacable for such was his kindnesse to him at Their meeting that Jacob tells him l Gen. 33. 10. I have seen thy face as thoâ—gh I had seen the face of God and thou wast pleased with me He was not so happy as to please his Parents in his first Marriage his wives were distasteful to Isaac and Rebecea m Gen. 26. 35. but upon what account is not so easie to determine If we say with Diodati and others that it was for their Idolatries this was no more than that guilt that stain'd the practice and education of Jacob's Wives also as the sacred Story doth record it n Gen. 31. 19. 30 32. Josh 24. 2. However if herein he were guilty of some undutifulnesse too his Parents yet that the Elect and after their Regeneration to may fall into as foul and fouler sins than that amounts to and likewise continue in them God knows how long we have the opinion of a person of some note o Mr. Baxter See his Disputations of Right to the Sacraments pag. 327 c. amongst us And besides that he intended the displeasure of his Parents in those Matches is not probable that he endeavour'd their satisfaction afterwards an undeniable instance of his repentance is evident from Gen. 28. 8 9. where we read that when he saw the daughters of Canaan pleased not his father by his forbidding Jacob to match himself amongst them then went Esau unto Ishmael Abrahams son who was as near related to Isaac as Laban was unto Rebecca and took his daughter to be his wife and this was done without doubt to comply with the temper and desires of his Parents Who then dares condemn Esau for a Reprobate Though Pâ—reus exercise this intolerable severity Mâ—llrus durst not Oâ—colampadius durst not Dr. Prideaâ—x durst not Ex Genesi ve isimiles conjecturae sumi possunt quae ostendunt Esavum non ita reâ—ectum esse à Deo ut 〈◊〉 damnatus
decreed that I shall or I shall not use the means to escape it So that all the Absurdities that dog the Stoâ—câ—l dream of fatal necessity at the heels are inseparable attendants of this Opinion For I may not onely say If I shall die of the Infection I shall if I shall not die I shall not and therefore I need not use means to avoid it But also if I must use means I must if I must not I must not Seeing Gods decree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means as to obtain or lose the end For if their opinion be true all things whatsoever end or means of little or great moment come to passe necessarily and unavoidably by reason of Gods eternal Decree Here they have two Evasions The first is this A beit say they God hath most certainly determined what shall or what shall not be done concerning us Evasio 1. yet his Decree is hid from us and we must use lawful and ordinary means for the obtaining of such and such good Ends keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealâ—d to us See the vanity of this shift our Opposites teach that whatsoever God hath decreed shall be dâ—ne and whatsoever is omitted Confutatio shall be undone If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means it is impossible for us to use them iâ— he hath decreed that we should it is impossible that we should omit them And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say that although God in his secret will hath determined that we should not do such a thing yet we are to do it seeing his decree though it be sâ—cret yet it will have its effect and it is absolutely impossible we should do that which God hath determined we shall not do Howsoever say our Opposites our opinion is far from Stoicism for the Stoâ—cks thought that all things came inevitably to pass by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of natural Evasion 2. causes but we teach that all events are irresistably necessary by reason of Gods everlasting dâ—crees and His Omnipotency daily executing them This reason is so poor a one and yet so much made on by some worthy men that I am more troubled to wonder at it Confutation than to confute it yet that I may satisfie it distinctly I will divide the opinion of the Stoâ—cks into two particular Tenets 1. They hold that all things come to pass inevitably 2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes Our Opposites stifly maintain the former of these Tenets Now let the Reader observe that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error follow the first part of their opinion though sequestred from the second For if all things come to pass unavoidably what need I care what I do yea if I shall care I shall care whether I will or no and a thousand the like horrid conceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day that all things are done unavoidably and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Maranatha It s too apparent therefore that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence both of Stoicism and Turcism Again if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion we shall perceive that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced but that it will be compleat Stoicism The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events its true but what did they think to be the connexion of causes doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature which they supposed to be a Deity It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws but whatsoever they meant by the Fates its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta Parcarum Leges c. Yea the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree as Edictum from Edicere so Fatum from Fari Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod Deus de unoquoquâ— fatur saith Minutius Well then to apply Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together one necessarily following in the neck of another Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree Do they not defend compleat Stoicism What part of Stoicism do they disclaim Do they not maintain inevitable necessity Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this connexion Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point unless we will give them leave to grant the prezmises and deny the conclusion I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities as accounting those to be Deities which are not whose decrees they made the causes of all things but they were the common errors of Paganism and are beside the point in hand And truly these set aside I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks I have prosecuted this Argument more copiously because it includeth many others I mean all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with against the error of the Stoicks and they are many for I think verily there are few opinions which have a greaâ—er retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences than this of the unavoidable necessity of events Some of them may make one laugh and some of them may make one tremble I omit the former because they are obvious to every mans conceit and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter Of the last sort I will specific one in a second Argument That opinion which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin is gross and erroneous that I may say no worse but so I Arg. 2. speak it with horror doth the Opinion of our Opposites I know they are renowned Christians and as they abhor Stoical errors so they hold this damnable doctrine which is worse than ever any Heretick held which transformeth God into a Devil to be most accursed yet so the case standeth that as the See this Argument confirmed in the Answer to the 4th Objection error of fatal necessity so this of the cause of sin fatally followeth their opinion which I prove thus They teach That nothing is done in the world nor can be done but what God hath decreed to be done Now it 's too certain that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are
sins therefore according to this opinion God is the principal cause of sins Devils and Men are but His Instruments The usual Answer is That God is the cause of all the actions Evasio that are sinful but not of the sirfulness of the actions of all our works but not of our obliquities and imperfections As one that rides upon a halting Jade is the cause of his motion and yet not of his halting It s a hard case when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from sinning Might I here without wandring discourse Confutatio of the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way but I will keep my self as much to the purpose as I can and so answer it thus or rather confute it That which is a principal cause of any action is a cause of those events which accompany that action necessarily This Rule is most certainly true Therefore if God by His decrees do force Concomitants us to those actions which cannot be done without sin God Himself I am afraid to rehearse it must needs be guilty of sin For example If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit seeing the eating of the fruit which he had forbidden must needs be with a gross obliquity I do not see how this distinction will justifie God for Adam sinned because he ate the fruit that was forbidden but they say God decreed that he should eat the fruit which was forbidden necessarily and unavoidably The conclusion is too blasphemous to be often repeated The Reader may see how well that common distinction holdeth water yea if this nicety were sound man himself might prove that he committed no murder though he stabbed the dead party to the heart for at his arraignment he might tell the Judge that he did indeed thrust his dagger into his heart but it was not that which took away his life but the extinction of his natural heat and vital spirits Who seeth not the wild frenzie of him who should make this Apology yet this is all our Adversaries say for God They say His decree was the cause that Adam took the fruit and put it into his mouth and ate that which he had commanded he should not eat Yet they say He was not the cause of the transgression of the commandment The example of the halting Jade is a meer impertinency for suppose it were as it is not appliable to us who halt naturally yet Adam before this action was sound and therefore God necessitating him to such an inconveniency dealt with him as if one should drive a lusty Nag into rough passages where he must needs break his leggs Neither is it as I said appliable unto us the lame posterity of Adam for he who rideth an horse that was lame before although he be not a cause of the impotency which he findeth in the horse already yet in urging him to motion he is now a cause of the actual imperfection in the motion and so perhaps a cause of encreasing the impotency for the future though he were not the cause of his lameness yet he is of his limping at that time Let the horse stand still and see whether he will halt or no. Marry if the horse go of himself then the Rider is no cause of his halting and so we may say that all our haltings are from our selves without any instigation from God I know our Opposites have another shift teaching that God useth to punish one sin by making us to commit another so that although we sin He doth but punish Albeit I do not believe this to be true as 't is commonly expounded yet I abstain at this time from a farther examination of it because it weakens not my Argument about Adam for his sin was the first that ever he committed and the original of all that ever followed and therefore if Gods decree were the cause that he ate the forbidden fruit as our Adversaries teach its apparent whom they make the Author of all sin These two Arguments well scanned are sufficient to make any not fore-stalled with pre-conceits to be afraid of that opinion which believeth all things to come to pass necessarily by reason of Gods irresistable decree and therefore they shall suffice for the confutation of it Moreover seeing it is clogged with such monstrous consequences me-thinks out opinion should be far more amiable which giveth no countenance to such hideous mis-shapen errors as it will appear by the process of this disputation Now I proceed to the confirmation of our opinion concerning the contingency of some events in respect of God by two Arguments more The first is this That God hath decreed that all his creatures ordinarily and for the most part should work according to their Arg. 1. several kinds and endowments by which he in the Creation distinguished them For illustration they may be ranked into three several forms In the lowest stand the meer natural Agents inanimate and sensless creatures to these God hath given certain instincts and 1. inclinations by which they are determinately swayed to these or these certain effects and operations unless they are out wardly hindered for heavy bodies cannot chuse but descend fire cannot chuse but burn c. In the second stand the Sensitive creatures four-footed beasts 2. fouls and fishes to these God hath given sense and knowledge to discern what is good for their nature and what is bad and amongst diverse goods to prefer that which is best He hath given them also a free appetite or a kind of sensitive will by which they may either â—reâ—ly prosecute or avoid such objects as they like or mislike not determinately tyed to this or that certain operation as the other were A stone cannot choose but descend but a beast may as well go up hill as down c. In the upper Forme are Men reasonable Creatures whom God hath made more volunâ—ary than the other by giving them 3. greater freedom of choice and presenting unto their more elevated knowledge a great variety of objects Now then without doubt God distinguished thus his creatures in abilities and faculties that they might operate in their several kinds that the natural agents might work naturally the voluntary voluntarily as that eloquent French-man Du Vain hath well explained this point The truth of all this no man will deny explicitely Well then let them hearken to the consequences of this truth so common both in Logick and Metaphysicks among those who handle of natural and voluntary causes If God hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily by his creatures then also hath he decreed that many things should be done contingently in respect of him but the first is granted truth therefore the second should be The connexion I prove thus All things are done contingently in respect of God which for ought he hath decreed might with as much