I need not use means to avoid it But also if I must use means I must if I must not I must not Seeing Gods decree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means as to obtain or lose the end For if their opinion be true all things whatsoever end or means of little or great moment come to passe necessarily and unavoidably by reason of Gods eternal Decree Here they have two Evasions Evasio 1 The first is this Albeit say they God hath most certainly determined what shall or what shall not be done concerning us yet his Decree is hid from us and we must use lawful and ordinary means for the obtaining of such and such good Ends keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealed to us Confutatio See the vanity of this shift our Opposites teach that whatsoever God hath decreed shall be done and whatsoever is omitted shall be undone If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means it is impossible for us to use them if he hath decreed that we should it is impossible that we should omit them And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say that although God in his secret will hath determined that we should not do such a thing yet we are to do it seeing his decree though it be secret yet it will have its effect and it is absolutely impossible we should do that which God hath determined we shall not do Evasion 2 Howsoever say our Opposites our opinion is far from Stoicism for the Stoicks thought that all things came inevitably to pass by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of natural causes but we teach that all events are irresistably necessary by reason of Gods everlasting decrees and His Omnipotency daily executing them ConFutation This reason is so poor a one and yet so much made on by some worthy men that I am more troubled to wonder at it than to confute it yet that I may satisfie it distinctly I will divide the opinion of the Stolcks into two particular Tenets 1. They hold that all things come to pass inevitably 2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes Our Opposites stisly maintain the former of these Tenets Now let the Reader observe that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error follow the first part of their opinion though sequestred from the second For if all things come to pass unavoidably what need I care what I do yea if I shall care I shall care whether I will or no and a thousand the like horridconceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day that all things are done unavoidably and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Mararatha It s too apparent therefore that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence both of Stoicism and Turcism Again if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion we shall perceive that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced but that it will be compleat Stoicism The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events its true but what did they think to be the connexion of causes doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature which they supposed to be a Deity It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws but whatsoever they meant by the Fates its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta Parcarum Leges c. Yea the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree as Edictum from Edicere so Fatum from Fari Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod ' Deus de unoquoqut fatur saith Minutius Well then to apply Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together one necessarily following in the neck of another Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree Do they not defend compleat Stoicism What part of Stoicism do they disclaim Do they not maintain inevitable necessity Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this connexion Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point unless we will give them leave to grant the premises and deny the conclusion I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities as accounting those to be Deities which are not whose decrees they made the causes of all things but they were the common errors of Paganism and are beside the point in hand And truly these set aside I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks I have prosecuted this Argument more copiously because it includeth many others I mean all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with against the error of the Stoicks and they are many for I think verily there are few opinions which have a greater retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences than this of the un avoidable necessity of events Some of them may make one laugh and some of them may make one tremble I omit the former because they are obvious to every mans conceit and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter Of the last sort I will specifie one in a second Argument Arg. 2 That opinion which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin is gross and erroneous that I may say no worse but so I speak it with horror doth the Opinion of our Opposites I know they are renowned Christians and as they abhor Stoical errors so they hold this damnalbe doctrine which is worse See this Argument confirmed in the Answer to the 4th Objection than ever any Heretick held which transformeth God into a Devil to be most accursed yet so the case standeth that as the error of fatal necessity so this of the cause of sin fatally followeth their opinion which I prove thus They teach That nothing is done in the world not can be done but what God hath decreed to be done Now it 's too certain that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are sins therefore according to this opinion God is the principal cause of sins Devils and Men are but His Instruments Evasio The usual Answer is That God is the cause of all the actions that are sinful but not of the sinfulness of the actions of all our works but not of our obliquities and imperfections As one that rides upon a halting Jade
of sins questionless they make God according to their own Argumentation the cause of sins But they have a limitation for this Rule and say that it holdeth in causis essentialiter subordinatis as they say that God is the cause of all those things which are essentially and districtly done by our wills but sins proceeding from the depravation of our wills are effects of a cause not directly subordinate to God The limitation is sound but not applicable to their instance yea the limitation it self quite spoileth them For 1. While Adam's will was yet sound they teach that God decreed that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit now at that time they cannot say but that Adam was a cause essentially subordinate to God 2. They teach that God is a cause not onely of our actions but also of our volitions as I may say then these being the causes of our sins are directly subordinate to him 3. Let us consider not onely the subordination between God and our wills but also between our actions and their moralities and we shall perceive that according to the abuse of these Rules they make God the cause of our sins For that Rule Causa causae est causa causati is infillibly true expounded thus The cause of any effect is the cause of all such events as necessarily follow that effect Now then if as they say God be a necessary cause of all our particular actions seeing our actions in reference to such and such objects must needs be sinful it is manifest what followeth For example Though to take money in general be no sin yet to take this or that money being none of our own is a sin Now then if God be a cause of this action in reference to this object as he is if he be the cause of this particular action it is impossible their Doctrine should excuse God from sin Eating in reference to the forbidden fruit was a sin but according to them God was a principal cause of eating the forbidden fruit Ergo. Minor prob They say he was the necessitating cause of this particular action Eating was a natural action the individuation of this eating by an unlawful object was a moral obliquity But God was the cause of this individual Ergo. The like may be said of all our sinful actions When I have drunk sufficiently both for the necessity and comfort of nature to drink a cup more is sin But our Opposites teach that I cannot take up this superfluous cup without Gods speciall determination Ergo. This Doctrine is enough to make ones hair stand an end making God whatsoever they say the cause not onely of our actions but also of our obliquities for what are the obliquities of our actions but the placing of them upon wrong objects If therefore they make God the principal cause of all our particular actions most of which are particularized by bad objects what do these men make of God But Recrimination is no answer Hitherto I have shewed though perhaps without method yet I hope not without profit how our Opposites are wounded with their own weapons Now I will take their weapons out of their hands and teach them the right use of them shewing how God is the cause of all things onely not the cause of sin a cause of all good things yet so as that many good things are contingent also We have shewed in the third Argument how God hath ordained that all sorts of Inferior or second causes should work according to their proper kinds that voluntary Agents should work voluntarily c. God then is the first cause that all things do work and that they do work in certain kinds If so then God is the cause that many things are done contingently one of the chiefest sorts of second causes by this appointment working voluntarily and therefore contingently which connexion we have formerly justified This being well understood will instruct us not onely that it may be so but also that it must be so That God being the necessary cause of all good things yet all such things are not necessary effects of Him For example It is impossible that man should do any thing without God therefore God is a cause necessary to the being of all things effected by him yet because many things done by the free choice of man might as well have been omitted God no ways constraining him to them these are not necessary effects of God The Reason of this is because God hath decreed that man should work voluntarily having liberty to do as well one thing as another yet so that God giveth him the strength to do whatsoever he chooseth to do and ability to choose what he will without limitation of his choice ☜ for this were else to take it away and to make man an involuntary Agent For example God hath given thee strength of body he hath given thee also ability to choose in what exercise thou wilt employ it thou choosest to Ring or Dance God then the Author of thy strength is the chief cause of these exercises yet so as they are contingent in respect of Him because thou mightest have omitted them hadst thou pleased By this we may plainly see how God is the principal cause of all things of which he is capable to be a cause and yet many things are contingent in respect of him This being cleared we may with more facility conceive how and in what sense God is the cause of all we do and yet we onely the cause of sin God sustains us when we are about our sins even then in Him we live and move and have our being as well as when we are better busied God giveth that strength by which we commit any sin yet because he doth not necessitate or incline unto it but we of our selves abuse it to wickedness God hath still the part of a Creator we onely are sinful An example will make this clear Suppose a King delivereth to his Subject Men Weapons Mony and Warlike provision that he may fight for his Honor against his enemies his Subject proves a Traitor and useth all his Soveraigns strength against himself His Soveraign here is a cause that he hath the command and doth the Office of a Captain but he is no cause of his Treachery the offence is onely the Captains and the wrong is onely the Soveraigns This is just the case between God and us God hath given us many excellent faculties both of body and soul which he intended we should use to his Glory in obedience to his commandements and resist His and our enemy the Devil we most traiterously siding with Satan have abused His gifts to His Dishonor God did the part of a Creator we of Rebels A man lives intemperately God gave him not strength to this purpose he necessitated not the man to this intemperancy Man therefore onely sinned God is dishonoured The King made his Subject able to rebel against him by delivering his military furniture
is the cause of his metion and yet not of his halting Confutatio It s a hard case when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from sinning Might I here without wandring discourse of the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way but I will keep my self as much to the purpose as I can and so answer it thus or rather confute it That which is a principal cause of any action is a cause of those events which accompany that action necessarily This Rule is most certainly true Concomitants Therefore if God by His decrees do force us to those actions which cannot be done without sin God Himself I am afraid to rehearse it must needs be guilty of sin For example If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit seeing the eating of the fruit which he had forbidden must needs be with a gross obliquity I do not see how this distinction will justifie God for Adam sinned because he ate the fruit that was forbidden but they say God decreed that he should eat the fruit which was forbidden necessarily and unavoidably The conclusion is too blasphemous to be often repeated The Reader may see how well that common distinction holdeth water yea if this nicety were sound man himself might prove that he committed no murder though he stabbed the dead party to the heart for at his arraignment he might tell the Judge that hedid indeed thrust his dagger into his heart but it was not that which took away his life but the extinction of his natural heat and vital spirits Who seeth not the wild frenzie of him who should make this Apology yet this is all our Adversaries say for God They say His decree was the cause that Adam took the fruit and put it into his mouth and ate that which he had commanded he should not eat Yet they say He was not the cause of the transgression of the commandment The example of the halting Jade is a meer impertinency for suppose it were as it is not appliable to us who halt naturally yet Adam before this action was sound and therefore God necessitating him to such an inconveniency dealt with him as if one should drive a lusty Nag into rough passages where he must needs break his leggs Neither is it as I said appliable unto us the lame posterity of Adam for the who rideth an horse that was lame before although he be not a cause of the impotency which he findeth in the horse already yet in urging him to motion he is now a cause of the actual imperfection in the motion and so perhaps a cause of encreasing the impotency for the future though he were not the cause of his lameness yet he is of his limping at that time Let the horse stand still and see whether he will halt or no. Marry if the horse go of himself then the Rider is no cause of his halting and so we may say that all our haltings are from our selves without any instigation from God I know our Opposites have another shist teaching that God useth to punish one sin by making us to commit another so that although we sin He doth but punish Albeit I do not believe this to be true as 't is commonly expounded yet I abstain at this time from a farther examination of it because it weakens not my Argument about Adam for his sin was the first that ever he committed and the original of all that ever followed and therefore if Gods decree were the cause that he ate the forbidden fruit as our Adversaries teach its apparent whom they make the Author of all sin These two Arguments well scanned are sufficient to make any not fore-stalled with pre-conceits to be afraid of that opinion which believeth all things to come to pass necessarily by reason of Gods irresistable decree and therefore they shall suffice for the confutation of it Moreover seeing it is clogged with such monstrous consequences me-thinks our opinion should be far more amiable which giveth no countenance to such hideous mis-shapen errors as it will appear by the process of this disputation Now I proceed to the confirmation of our opinion concerning the contingency of some events in respect of God by two Arguments more Arg. 1 The first is this That God hath decreed that all his creatures ordinarily and for the most part should work according to their several kinds and endowments by which he in the Creation distinguished them For illustration they may be ranked into three several forms In the lowest stand the meer natural Agents inanimate and sensless creatures to these God hath given certain instincts and inclinations by which they are determinately swayed to these or these certain effects and operations unless they are outwardly hindered for heavy bodies cannot chuse but descend fire cannot chuse but burn c. In the second stand the Sersitive creatures four-footed beasts fouls and fishes to these God hath given sense and knowledge to discern what is good for their nature and what is bad and amongst diverse goods to prefer that which is best He hath given them also a free appetite or a kind of sensitive will by which they may either freely prosecute or avoid such objects as they like or mislike not determinately tyed to this or that certain operation as the other were A stone cannot choose but descend but a beast may as well go up hill as down c. In the upper Forme are Men reasonable Creatures whom God hath made more voluntary than the other by giving them greater freedom of choice and presenting unto their more elevated knowledge a great variety of objects Now then without doubt God distinguished thus his creatures in abilities and faculties that they might operate in their several kinds that the natural agents might work naturally the voluntary voluntarily as that eloquent French-man Du Vain hath well explained this point The truth of all this no man will deny explicitely Well then let them hearken to the consequences of this truth so common both in Logick and Metaphysicks among those who handle of natural and voluntary causes If God hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily by his creatures then also hath he decreed that many things should be done contingently in respect of him but the first is granted truth therefore the second should be The connexion I prove thus All things are done contingently in respect of God which for ought he hath decreed might with as much possibility not be as be But all things which are done by the crea ures voluntarily may as well not be done as done therefore if he hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily He hath also decreed that they should be done contingently The Minor is evident because if the creatures may not as well omit them as do them they do them not voluntarily but necessarily This Argument both confirms