hurt to the Christian World than the most bloody Wars of Princes And I must reduce the Causes to these three Heads I. The Abuse of POWER II. Of WISDOM III. Of GOODNESS or of the Names of these the three great Principles of Humanity That is I. By Clergie TYRANNY II. By OPINIONISTS or Dogmatists III. By SUPERSTITION and HYPOCRISIE or PRACTICAL BLIND ZEAL But among all these sorts selfish PRIDE IGNORANCE and UNCHARITABLENESS or want of LOVE are the great effectual Causes And departing from CHRISTIAN SIMPLICITY in Doctrine Worship Church-government and Conversation is the grand instrumental means of most of our Schisms Distractions and Calamities I. Only by Pride cometh Contention Prov. 13. 10. The Church-TYRANT is Proud of his Superiority and Wealth The OPINIONIST is Proud of his supposed Knowledge and Theological Wisdom on which account the Gnosticks troubled the Church of old The HYPOCRITE and the honester ignorant Zealot is Proud of his supposed Holiness or Goodness And for an eminency and precedency and praise in each of these they all conspire while they disagree among themselves to trouble the Church of Christ In a word Selfishness Ignorance and want of Love are the Causes of mens personal ruine and damnation and the same are the Causes of the Churches divisions and all the miseries of the World II. And that IGNORANCE is a Common cause even in the Gnostick Dogmatists that cry down Ignorance Error and Heresie needs no other proof than the diversity of Opinions which such contend for Every side pretend that it is ORTHODOXNESS FAITH or the Great Truths of God which they defend And in one Countrey or with one Party one thing is Orthodoxness and the Truth and another thing in another Countrey or Party and another thing with a third c. And did they all but know what is Truth and the Will of God indeed they would cease their Contentions and all the Sects would meet in Unity III. And did men but LOVE their neighbours as themselves and were as easily perswaded to think well of and deal gently with their neighbours as themselves and as hardly drawn to condemn hate hurt or injure them I need not tell you how easily quickly and universally we should be healed But before I speak of the Instrumental Means I will fullier open the three forementioned Causes I. Religious Clergie-TYRANNY hath so notoriously so long and so greatly made havock both of Piety and Peace that he that is not an utter stranger to Church-History cannot be ignorant of it I need not tell any Learned man how many even moderate Papists much more Protestants have thought that Constantine and other Emperours that over-exalted the Clergie poured out Poyson into the Church making great preferments a bait to invite all the worst of men to be seekers and invaders of Church Offices and Power and to corrupt those that otherwise would have been useful men especially when Christians having first made them their Arbitrators in obedience to St. Pauls counsel they were made the Legal Judges of the Causes of all contentious Christians and so set up Secular Magistratical Courts I need not tell them what work almost every General Council as those of one Empire were called did make what work even the first at Nice had made had not Constantine burnt their Bills of accusation against each other and personally lamented their divisions and driven them on to peace what work was made in that at Chalcedon and that at Ephesus and so of others what a horrid scandal the case of John and Dioscorus was and the murder of Flavianus and many others nor yet how the controversies against the Nestorians Eutychians and Monothelites were managed I need not tell them how soon Victor began at Rome nor what Socrates and others say of Cyril and Theophilus at Alexandria nor yet how Nazianzene was used at Constantinople nor how copiously and vehemently he accuseth the Bishops and wisheth that there were no such inequalities among them as gave them advantage to do hurt nor what he saith against their Councils nor yet of the quarrels of Basil and Anthymius nor of Basils sharp complaints of the Roman and other Western Prelates I need not tell them of the Usage of Chrysostome even by such men as Theophilus Epiphanius and their partakers nor of the dividing of the Constantinopolitan Christians thereupon nor how the violent Prelates made Separatists and Non-conformists of Chrysostoms adherents by the name of Joannites and how unlikely that Schism was to have been healed had not wiser Bishops succeeded who restored Concord by honouring Chrysostoms Name and Bones and dealing kindly with his followers I need not tell them of the sad work made at Ariminum and Syrmium and oft at Rome Constantinople and every great Episcopal Seat nor of the bloodshed between Competitors at the Election of Damasus nor of the separation of St. Martin from the Synod of Bishops led by Ithacius and Idacius nor of the difference of him and Ambrose from the rest about the complyances with Maximus The World knoweth of the doleful Rupture that hath continued between the Roman and the Greek Church about a thousand years And of the many Schisms at Rome by various Anti-Popes even at once above forty years together And of the reason of the calling of the Councils of Constance and Basil to end them And how the King of Rome keeps up his Kingdom to this day what work he hath made with Frederick the Henries and other German Emperours what divisions this caused among the Clergie what blood he caused to be shed for Jerusalem and how many thousands of the Waldenses have at divers times been slaughtered what work the Inquisition hath made in Spain and Belgia and elsewhere and the flames of Persecution in England and almost in all Christian Lands what work the Holy League did make in France and the English Bishops in many a War with their Kings besides the case of Becket and such others By whose instigation two hundred thousand Protestants were lately murdered in Ireland and many again in Piedmont I say to tell such things as these to those that are acquainted with Church History is vain And I would those that yet think cruelty the best way to set up themselves or Religion if that must bear the name and to repress their adversaries or Schisms would but among many others read the Epistle of great Thuanus before his Works to Henry King of France But is it only the old Bishops Greeks and Papists that have made such havock in the Churches Even those that pretended to moderation did by the German Interim make many hundred Churches desolate And the ten years imprisonment of Caspar Peucer vid. Histor Carcer and the silencing of many and many faithful Ministers and the banishment of many doth shew with what Spirit many of the Lutherans carryed on their work And doubtless had the Calvinists in Belgia been as wise and peaceable as the English Delegates were at
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
tempted to doubt of the certainty of this or that Book words or reading it followeth not that he must therefore doubt of the Christian Faith 11. A thousand Texts of Scripture may be not known and understood by one that is Justified but all the Baptismal Articles and Covenant must be understood competently by all that will be saved 12. Those Church-Tyrants Dogmatists or superstitious ones who deny the sufficiency of this Test and Symbol made by Christ and his Spirit to its proper use to be the Symbol of such as in Love and Communion we are to take for Christians do subvert the summ of Christs Gospel and Law and do worse than they that add to or alter the lesser parts of the Word of God 13. Therefore our further Additional Confessions must be only to other subordinate ends As 1. To satisfie other Churches that doubt of our right understanding the faith 2. To be an enumeration of Verities which Preachers shall not have leave to preach against though they subscribe them not 14. Object Hereticks may profess the Baptismal Creed Answ 1. And Hereticks may profess any words that you can impose on them taking them in their own sense All the Councils are not large enough to keep out subscribing Hereticks We must not make new Symbols Rules and Laws as oft as Knaves will falsly profess or break the old ones there being none that may not be falsly professed and violated 2. Many subscribe to the whole Scriptures that yet are Hereticks 3. Church Governours are for this to cast out those or punish them who preach teach and live contrary to the certain and sufficient Rule which they profess Judicatures are not to make new Laws but to punish men for breaking Laws A heart-Heretick-only is no Heretick in foro Ecclesiae He that teacheth Heresie must be proved so to do and judged upon proof which may be done without new additional Symbols Rules or Laws of faith So that all this contradicts not the sufficiency of the Baptismal Creed as the Symbol of Christian Love Communion and Concord I thought meet to add this more fully to what I said in the Epistle to convince men of the true terms of Union and of the heinous sin of all the sorts of Adding and Corrupting overdoers that divide us THE PREFACE AGAINST CLERGIE MENS Contentions AND Church-distracting Controversies THAT the Churches of Christ are dolefully tempted and distracted by Divisions no man will deny that knoweth them That the Clergie is not only greatly culpable herein but the chief cause cannot be hid But which part of the Clergie it is and what be their dividing Errors and Crimes and how they should be cured is indeed easie for the truly faithful and impartial Spectators to perceive but exceeding hard as experience tells us to make the Guilty throughly know and harder to do much effectually for the cure For the error and sin which is the true cause is its own defence and repelleth and frustrateth the Remedies And so each party layeth it from themselves on others and hate all that accuse them while they are the sharpest and perhaps most unjust accusers of the rest I shall here freely tell the Reader the History of my own Conceptions of these matters and then my present thoughts of the Causes of all these Calamities and the Cure I. I was born and bred of Parents piously affected but of no such knowledge or acquaintance as might engage them in any Controversies or disaffect them to the present Government of the Church or cause them to scruple Conformity to its Doctrine Worship or Discipline In this way I was bred my self but taught by my Parents and God himself to make conscience of sin and to fear God and to discern between the Godly and the notoriously wicked For which my Parents and I were commonly derided as Puritans the Spirit of the Vulgar being commonly then fired with hatred and scorn of serious godliness and using that name as their instrument of reproach which was first forged against the Nonconformists only And the Clergie where I lived being mostly only Readers of the Liturgie and some others that rather countenanced than reproved this course I soon confined my Reverence to a very few among them that were Learned and Godly but Conformists and for going out of my Parish to hear them my reproach increased About eighteen or nineteen years of age I fell acquainted with some persons half Conformists and half Non-conformists who for fear of severities against private Meetings met with great secresie only to repeat the publick Sermons and Pray and by Pious Conference edifie each other Their Spirits and Practice was so savoury to me that it kindled in me a distaste of the Prelates as Persecutors who troubled and ruined such persons while ignorant Drunkards and Worldlings were tolerated in so many Churches yea and countenanced for crying down such persons and crying up Bishops Liturgie and Conformity Before I was aware my affections began to solicite my understanding to judge of the Things and Causes by the Persons where the difference was very great But yet my first Teachers kept my judgement for Conformity as Lawful though not Desirable had we Liberty till I was ordained But soon after a new acquaintance provoked me to a deeper study of the whole Controversie than I had undertaken before which left me perswaded that the use of Liturgie and Ceremonies was lawful in that case of necessity except the Baptismal use of the Cross and the subscription to all things c. But in 1640. the Oath called Et Caetera being offered the Ministry forced me to a yet more searching Study of the case of our Diocesane Prelacie which else I had never been like to have gainsaid At a meeting of Ministers to debate the case it fell to Mr. Christopher Cartwrights lot and mine to be the Disputers and the issue of all that and my studies was that I setled in the approbation of the Episcopacy asserted by Ignatius yea and Cyprian but such a dissent from the English frame as I have given account of in my Disputations of Church Government My genius was inquisitive and earnestly desirous to know the truth my helps for Piety were greater than my helps for Learning of which I had not much besides Books sickness helpt my seriousness keeping me still in expectation of death All my reverenced acquaintance save one cryed down Arminianism as the Pelagian Heresie and the Enemy of Grace I quickly plunged my self into the study of Dr. Twisse and Amesius and Camero and Pemble and others on that subject By which my mind was setled in prejudice against Arminianism without a clear understanding of the case whereupon I felt presently in my mind a judgement of those that were for Arminianism as bad or dangerous adversaries to the Church and specially of the then ruling Bishops which yet I think I had not-entertained had I not taken them withal for the great Persecutors of Godly able
Slothfulness in Students in seeking truth 3. Hastiness in Judging before digested conceptions and proof II. Nearly Want of 1. Humility and self-acquaintance Pride 2. Knowledge Ignorance and Error 3. Love to others Envy Malice and Bitterness III. Instruments or Engines 1. In General Corrupt departing from Christian Simplicity 2. Particularly 1. From Simplicity of Doctrine by DOGMATISTS Words Notions 2. From Simplicity of Practice by SUPERSTITIOUS additions 3. From Simplicity of Discipline by CHURCH-TYRANNY II. CONSTITUTIVE Causes viz. DISCORD 1. In JUDGMENT of things necessary ALIENATION 2. In WILL and AFFECTION viz. 1. Privative by denying due Communion 2. Positive 1. By Contention 2. Malice 3. Hurtfulness to each other DIVISION 3. In Necessary PRACTICE III. The EFFECTS viz. I. On THINGS viz. on Church 1. Doctrine Preaching and Writing turning it into vain and hurtful wrangling 2. Worship Prayer Sacraments corrupting them by faction partiality and wrath 3. Discipline corrupting it into Secular or factious Tyranny or a dead Image II. On PERSONS viz. I. Particular 1. Themselves 2. Their followers 1. The Guilt and Deceit of false-Religious zeal 2. The Death of true Holiness and Heavenly Conversation 3. The Death of Love and Life of Wrath and injuries 3. Rulers viz. 1. Corrupting them by factious clamours against their Subjects 2. Tempting them unto persecuting Laws and Executions 3. Engaging them in bloody Wars abroad 4. The Innocent viz. Injuries to 1. Private persons 1. By censures slanders backbitings making them hated 2. Denying them due Love Communion and help 3. Persecution silencing and other mischiefs 2. Princes 1. Weakning and grieving them by the Subjects discords 2. Dishonouring them by defaming Excommunications 3. Urging them to be the Clergies Lictors or Executioners 5. Enemies and Strangers scandalizing and hardning them in Infidelity sin II. Societies I. Churches 1. Corrupting them in Doctrine Worship and Order 2. Weakning them by discord and division 3. Shaming them before the World 4. Making them less fit for Gods Love and Communion II. Kingdoms Weakning them dishonouring them and drawing them into the Guilt of Feuds Wars and Persecutions IV. The REMEDIES I. Persons 1. Christ the Prince of Peace and the Churches Head and Center 2. Wise Princes who understand the Interest of 1. Christ 2. Their people 3. Themselves 3. Able Wise Holy and Peaceable Pastors 4. The Mature Experienced Mellow Peaceable sort of the people II. Qualities 1. Diligent Study under wise Teachers 2. Sincere Holiness A dying life 1. Humility 2. Knowledge 3. Love to others as our selves 3. Deliberate Judging upon tryal III. Means 1. Returning to Christian Simplicity 1. In Doctrine The antient Creed c. 2. In Worship 3. In Discipline 2. Magistrates forcing the Clergie to keep the peace and forbear strife 3. Subjects obedience in all lawful things required by Authority V. HEALTH or Cure 1. Rulers Pastors and people of one MIND 2. One HEART in Love 3. One MOUTH and practice in things Necessary in Communion and mutual help And mutual loving forbearance in Infirmities and things unnecessary edified in Love VI. The EFFECTS hereof I. GLORY to God 1. In the Hallowing of his Name and Honour of Religion 2. In the increase of his Kingdom and Conversion of the World 3. In the Doing of his Will on Earth as it is done in Heaven II. Peace on Earth 1. Increase of Holiness Heavenliness and Love 2. Mutual Delight herein The Joy of Health and Concord 3. The Churches Strength and Glory III. Gods WELLPLEASEDNESS in MEN His Church will be meet for his Love Delight and Communion and be liker to Heaven and enjoy its foretastes An Appendix to this Premonition SInce the Printing of this the World hath seen a specimen of such contention as I lament in a contest between a young insulting Assailant and a jocular contemptuous Defendant in my judgment both running into extreams whether verbal or real their own explications must further tell us The extreams of the former are reprehended by many By the later a person of great wit and piety I perceive that some men have such conceptions of the Covenants of God as will give occasion to some Readers to think that by mis-describing them I have erred and misled men through this and many other Writings And men that are not able to conquer the obscuring and tempting notions of their Authors are still calling for Answers to every inconsiderable objection or contradicting word that is suggested to them and little things puzzle and stop such Readers though otherwise pious and worthy persons who have not by long and accurate studies methodized and digested the matter that is disputed of Not therefore to offend any man by opposition or to defend other mens extreams but to prevent the frustration of some of these Writings and the scandal or trouble of my Reader I must take notice I. That some think that the Covenant of Grace must be considered 1. in its Constitution and 2. in its Execution The Constitution of the Covenant is God's firm and unchangeable purpose of saving his Elect to the praise of his glorious Grace For the word signifieth a disposition appointment or ordering of matters whether there be a restipulation or no the English word Covenant seduceth our understandings The fixed purpose and determinate counsel of God in Scripture is called a Covenant Jer. 33. 20. II. The execution of this fixed Constitution is God's wise and gracious managing of all things for the accomplishment of that glorious design which he had in the prospect of his eternal counsel which he steadily and regularly pursueth through all the vicissitudes that his mutable creatures are obnoxious to c. pag. 718 719. 1. On God's part whatever grace and mercy was in his eternal purpose that is given out to us by Christ c. III. 1. Christ cannot be the foundation of the Covenant because Christ himself is promised in the Covenant as the great comprehensive blessing Isa 49. 8 9. 2. Free Grace is given as the true reason of the Covenant Heb. 8. 8. IV. The Constitution of the Covenant in God's purpose and counsel hath no condition at all nor is that the Condition of the Covenant required of us on our part which God promiseth to work in us on his part nor that which God in Covenant bestoweth nor that which presupposeth other Covenant mercies antecedent c. V. A promise of pardon and life on condition of believing and obeying is no Covenant of Grace at all and neither better nor worse than a threatning of condemnation c. It 's no more a Covenant of Grace than a Covenant of Wrath. It 's no great matter where it is founded p. 584 586. VI. God hath not dispensed with one jot or title of the moral Law but Do this and live is as strictly exacted as ever so that unless a Surety be admitted and the righteousness of another owned the case of all the sons of Adam is deplorable and desperate To deny the righteousness wherein
Ledesm de Aâ—xil dis 2. Ruiz de scient d. 15 16 33 36 c. For non entis non est Modus vel Relatio If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca I answer it must be then God himself only as denominated Knowing or Willing that This or that shall be which is not properly the futurity of the thing For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future Answ 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men as if it signified some being which is not so 2. God cannot know that a thing will be unless it will be But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true This or that will be unless it be true But 1. there were from eternity no propositions 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind whence it hath its first being 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions their Being is considerable before their Verity and the Verity hath its Cause But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself which is either his Decree of what he will Cause or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition causeth that the Thing will be nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent knoweth also that this agent will freely sin In all which the futurity is Nothing nor is any existent cause of it necessary But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not Answ 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false * * * According to Greg. and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other One as a future Cause and another as a future effect And if there were now no Being but hereafter per impossibile a Being would arise of it self it is future though there be none to know it But this futurity hath no Cause And it is no more but that this Proposition Hoc erit would be True if there were any to conceive it 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this that whether it be thought on or not this is a true proposition Hoc vel illud futurum est Which is true when there are propositions extrinsecal which no man thinketh of But 1. God hath no propositions 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity But if he had any they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge 3. And they have no Cause 4. If they had been uttered by words they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge and the object is a †††To the Question An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus Bonavent answereth in 1. dist 38. q. 1. a. 1. Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae non essendi sed aut Inserendi aut Dicendi Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum licet non omnino sed nullo modo è converso Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae quia mutuo antecedunt consequuntur antecedens est causa consequentis Secundum rationem Dicendi futurum est causa praescientiae non è converso Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius si scitum esset semper praesens esset scientia sed non praescientia Bonavent 1. dist 38. dub 3. saith Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth effectum bonitaâ—em but when it is called simplex Notitia it connoteth only the event but in it self is one Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified both of Knowledge and Will cause of the act God knoweth things to be future because they are future as he knoweth existents because they exist Answ Still I say 1. Futurity is Nothing and Nothing hath no Cause 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things because they will be but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be 86. Gods meer fore-knowledge nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action causeth not the thing future and therefore is not the Cause that It will be But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate they are true Causes of the thing And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be but what will Cause its being 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth that without him there would be no impossibles yea that non posset esse impossibile When it were impossible any thing should be were there no God and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause It 's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from those that are consequent The former sort are such as these God is God is eternal omnipotent c. These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them being before his knowledge of them The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface Non proprie distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio ignarus homuncio excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * * * Hervtus in his Quodlib puts the question Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary and to treat of curiosities But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought presumption and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith Religion and Charity and peace in a game
at words What is this Complexe object Deus est Is it any thing or nothing If nothing it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cause of it If any thing Is it God or a Creature A Creature is not before God nor a cause of his knowledge which is God himself If it be God is it his Essence as such or his Essential properties or the Persons None of these For Gods essence is the prime Incomplexe Being and not a Complexe proposition Dens est His Properties primary are Omnipotent-vital-power Intellect and Will But these also are the same Incomplexe essence and not propositions And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself nor the cause of it All the sense he can make of it is that this proposition Deus est est Aeternus c. if it had had an eternal being would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this Deus scit se esse or before his knowledge it self or that if man had been the Knower it had been first a true proposition that He is before he knoweth that he is But God knoweth not himself by propositions Words in mente vel ore are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by And doth God need such to know himself Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means as we do Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect as man as Propositions are And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect Deus est c. before he knew them yea and his self-knowledge which in Act is his pure eternal necessary Essence caused by these All that you can say is that poor creatures know by Propositions and phantasms and diverse thoughts and that God knoweth man and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours but not that he had the like eternally in himself and knoweth them in himself and that Himself as a proposition is the Cause of himself or self-intellection as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight But Bradwardine saith that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt per solam suam essentiam sicut alia vera incomplexa Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota sed per suam voluntatem vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate c. More presumption still He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe And who knoweth what sense those words have What meaneth he by complexa but Notions that is names and propositions as distinct from the Things And what is it to know propositions complexe but to know them as they are And what is it to know them incomplexe unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is or to know that it is no proposition that is to err If God know a Complexum or a proposition that Proposition is in being And where was it in being before God knew it If in God or no where 1. God then is a proposition 2. And God is before he knoweth himself 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge it is to say that God knoweth that he is before he knoweth that he is and his knowing that he is causeth him to know that he is If it be said that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions words nor propositions but the Verity of Gods Being Eternity c. I answer To know things is said to be to know some Truth because by knowing the thing we can make this proposition This is or This truly is But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours but by pure perfect intuition and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things But if it be the Truth of this proposition Deus est that you mean it supposeth that proposition to exist for quod non est non verum est and so to exist in God which is denyed And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of But if by Truth you mean nothing but Gods Essence that is not a Complex object which he speaketh of And he saith not that God knoweth suam essentiam creata vel futura but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est est Omnipotens Aeternus c. per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est So that it 's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propositions in it self and that antecedently to themselves and the Causes of themselves And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-sense to trouble themselves and the world with on false suppositions that Gods knowledge is such as ours or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it when we should tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain and pry into unrevealed things I have purposely been the larger on this instance to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastick Word-mongers who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis or Thoughts as real Divine entities and would perswade us that every nothing which they make a name for is therefore something yea some of them God himself What I have said of Divine Intellection I say of his Volitions of which cap. 20 21. Bradwardine saith that Voluta priora viz. Deum esse omnipotentem esse bonum cognoscentem c. sunt Causa But 1. It is too bold to say that Gods Will is an Effect 2. If it were so it must be his Essence Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will and not a Complex verity as Deus est omnipotens bonus est c. For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence Goodness c. is his Will in act se Velle which some call the third Person yet here would be no Cause and Effect but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity which hath no real diversity or priority SECT VI. Of Gods Knowledge and the Co-existence of the Creature 88. AUgustine well and truly saith that fore-knowledge in God is the same with the Knowledge of things present Past present and future through his Infiniteness and Eternity being alike to him even all as present 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity in which all the things of time are included and co-exist 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes ac
in Heylin's Life of Archbishop Laud and which you may still hear in all parties in their ignorant censures of one another by the names of Calvinists and Arminians And yet the Church of Rome is justly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty against Dissenters when thus we thereby condemn our selves SECT VIII More of Gods Fore-knowledge and of Permission of Sin 140. BUt to leave this Wilderness and speak more of things certain or such as belong to us in our measure to know It is certainly unknown to mortals formally what knowledge is in God as is aforesaid and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Futures or Contingents or any Creatures ex parte scientis 141. If any particular manner therefore offer it self to your minds as that which probably seemeth to be the right it may afford you reason therefore to suspect that it is not the right Because it is certain that the Manner is past our reach And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God 142. If the Case of Aarons Sons the Bethshemites Uzzah Uzziah and others that presumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was so dreadful what is theirs that profanely toss Gods own Name and pretend to know that of himself which they know not and turn his secrets profanely into matter of Contention against the Churches of Christ 143. Either Futurity as such is Intelligible in it self to God or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes We can think of no other way but God hath more than we can think of If it be Intelligible in it self or as things are In Eternity the Controversie is mostly ended The perfection of Gods understanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible But if it be only in the Causes it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause or else as freely and contingently The first Cause reacheth Pennottus propugn l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-science with contingency was quite past the power of mans understanding in this life in the opinion of these subtile Schoolmen Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ockâ—m ibid. q. 1. Marsil 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods Dâ—crees and most of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency Plainly and honestly saith Bonaventure in few words in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Causatur nec dependet ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti not our Controversie For sin hath no necessitating Cause but free The second is the same difficulty with that in question viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause mans Will will this or that way determine it self Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that 144. If we go to the Jesuites Scientia Media as it deserveth not that name so it is insufficient to this use For all those circumstances in which God sore-knoweth that the will shall determine it self are such as necessitate the will so to do or not If they say the first they give away their own cause and the cause of Religion speaking of sinful Volitions If the latter the case is still as difficult and the same as if they had never mentioned those circumstances or conditional knowledge viz. How God knoweth that a will still free and not necessitated will choose sin rather than duty For from non-necessitating circumstances it followeth not 145. If we go the way of Scotus and say that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his own will de rerum futuritione either that will is supposed to be a Causing efficient will or not If it be it reacheth not the case of sin seeing Gods will doth cause no sin But if not then still the difficulty is the same as before How God that willeth the Event but causeth it not doth know that his Will shall be done For it is not from the Cause to the Effect To say that his own Immutability proveth it is no proof For if his Immutability Cause not the Effect ariseth not from it And to say that his Omnipotency or Absoluteness inferreth it is no proof unless his Omnipotency Cause it And to say that it followeth Logically Necessitate Consequentiae though not Causally necessitate effecti vel consequentis that what God willeth to be shall be is most certain And so is it from his fore-knowledge which medium yet the Scotists say is here insufficient But that is because it is here supposed that what God so knoweth or willeth to be future he willeth to be future by the causation of some Cause for he willeth not any thing to be without a Cause Besides that still sin is not willed by him to be future at all * * * See in Alliaco after cited the notable reasons by which the Nominals confute Scotus in this opinion which yet Dr. Twisse Praef. ad l. de scient Med. saith did first invite him to School-divinity 146. And here I am to confute the foresaid reason of Rada recited Thes 130. God saith he fore-knoweth sin in that he knoweth that he decreeth to permit it And Dr. Twiss often saith that all confess that Permission certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted I answer †††This also Annatus de Scient Media cont Twiss granteth him cap. 5. §. 1. But not as ex ratione permissionis but by hypothetical Connotation Because we use the word Permission about that which aliunde will be if permitted So that it is a Compound notion when thus used There is not so much as any great appearance of the Truth of the consequence unless limited To Permit is nothing but non-impedire not to hinder And if a thing will come to pass because it is not hindered then the world would have been made without God and man saved without God if he would not hinder it Try if your work will be done meerly by your not hindering it 147. Indeed the word Permission is oft used as a complicate notion signifying both the permission and the event permitted But that 's nothing to the nature of proper permission it self 148. A man may be hindered 1. Morally and that 1. By Commands 2. By Threats 3. By Promise and perswasion 4. By Gifts 5. By terrifying stripes on himself or others In all these respects God permitteth not sin but hindereth it by them all 149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically And that 1. By toâ—al restraint and disabling 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible but difficult God doth not alwayes thus hinder sin and therefore thus he permitteth it He doth not disable the sinner e. g. to lie And he doth not alwayes render it difficult to
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
ipsa Dei essentia quae est necessaria Alliac Camer in 1. q. 12. D. See in Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 24. how they are confounded about the ordering of Gods decrees as to the order of Intention and Execution His Solution supposeth that Unius objecti Volitio est ratio determinans ad aliorum volitionem When as ex paâ—te Dei there is but One Volition and that hath no cause and the Ratio is a deceiving ambiguous word and his Decrees are his Will and therefore are all but one 374. 4. They cannot deny but that all our conceptions of God are improper and analogical or metaphorical more or less and that what Knowledge and Will in God is formally no mortal knoweth And should we dispute then audaciously about this Order 375. 5. None can deny but that these Mysteries require the highest reverence and that it 's dreadful to take Gods Name in vain and dally with the Consuming fire And yet shall we presume 376. 6. They all confess that our Lord Jesus his Prophets Apostles or Scriptures lead them not this way and decide not these Controversies so as that they can stand to their decision alone 377. 7. They cannot deny but that desiring arrogantly to be as Gods in Knowledge was our first Parents sin that ruined them and us and that this was Satans first successful game And that our disease is like to be such as its original 378. 8. Lastly They cannot choose but know that it is the troubling of the Church with new Articles and new practices and leading them from the simplicity that is in Christ even as the Serpent beguiled Eve with the promise of more knowledge which hath been the great plague and divider of the Churches in all Ages though the Apostle foretold them that It was this that he feared of them And are we not self-condemned if after all this we will censure and reproach one another and foment divisions for that which most certainly no mortal understandeth 379. I. And first your very foundation is uncertain that God doth properly Intendere finem Nay it is certain that as Aquinas afore-cited Vasquâ—z saith that Gods own Goodness is not a final Cause of his Volition supposing that movere ad Electionem medii is final Causality Ruiz asserteth the contrary taking final Causality to be first esse primum objectum And thus men strive about artificial notions Vasq 1. d. 82. c. 1. Ruiz de Voâ— Dei d. 15. §. 1. p. 159. But that nothing is the Ratio Volendi but his own Goodness see Albert. 1. p. tr 20. q. 19. m. 1. a. 1. Alex. 1. p. q. 35. m. 3. Henric. quodl 4. q. 19. Gabr. 1. d. 14. q. 1. a. 2. Dried de Concord p. 1. c. 3. Vasq disp 82. Scotus 1. d. 44. Molin 1. q. 19. a. 5. saith though Vult hoc esse propter hoc non tamen propter hoc vult hoc He prescribeth Ends to Man and setteth Ends to Means which are fiâ—es operis But that he Intendeth an End Himself must be said very improperly or very uncertainly or not at all The truth is that we must say that God doth finem intendere because we must speak of him after the manner of men or not at all But it is not true in the same sense as we speak it of man and as the word properly signifieth but equivocally 380. For 1. To Intend an End is to make that End a Cause why we choose the means as most say But Gods Election or Actions have no Cause All deny that there is in God Cause and Effects or that propter hoc vult hoc 381. 2. In man to Intend an End doth imply that a man yet wanteth his end and that it is somewhat that he needeth or at least doth not yet obtain But God needeth nothing and hath no end that is desired or wanting nor but what he continually possesseth or enjoyeth as well now as hereafter 382. 3. We know no such thing as Intendere finem where the Act and the End are the same Intendere is not the same with Finis But in God they are the same He that is most simple hath no Intention which is not Himself and no End which is not Himself and so both are one 383. 4. Our Intendere finem is not the same really with Electio mediorum But God hath no Intention but what is really the same with Election though not denominatively connotatively and relatively 384. 5. Divines usually say that Nothing below God himself can be his End But where there is no means there is no End or intention of it But to God there is no Means He is not a Means of himself And no creature can be a means of him If we say that any thing can be a means ut Deus sit vel ut sit Maximus Sapientissimus Optimus it were no better than Blasphemy God then hath not an End like man 385. Yet necessity constraineth us to use the phrase but these things must still be understood when we use it 1. That no creature can be Gods End unless you will call an object as terminative an End or else an Effect 386. 2. That it is not Gods Essence and perfections that is an end as to any medium But it is his Will For his Free Will is the Beginning and the Complacency of that Will is the End of all things But if you call God his own Object and so call the final Object an End so we must consider God as Loving Himself and Himself is the End or final object of his own Love or Complacency and he himself as Loving himself is said to Act on that End or Object And indeed eternal self-knowledge and self-love which some of old ventured to call the second and third Persons are the Great Immanent Acts of the Divine Essence with the sibi vivere And it seemeth the chief Notion of Holiness in God that he Loveth Himself in primo instanti and that he is most Amiable to his Creatures in secundo instanti and that he is the Cause and End of all that is good in them Thus a final object of his own and our Love or Complacency God is past all doubt And secondarily his Will is pleased and fulfilled in all his works 387. 3. Yet by that Complacency we mean not that God is passive or receiveth any Delight from the Creature or hath any addition by it to his felicity But as he is a Communicative Good by way of Efficiency as the first efficient Cause so is he a felicitating Good to the Creature as its End and he is Love taking the creature into its nearest Communion with him which is his Complacency and the End of all things And hence it is that God is said when he had finished his works to Rest complacentially in all as very Good 388. 4. As the Complacency of Gods Will is his End in the formal notion so far as it may be said of God
a Means 2. Making one little parcel of that means to be the end 3. Inserting two acts or parts only of that which they themselves confess to be but Means For what should the names of Salvation and Damnation do in the description of the end Are they any part of the end Why is not Redemption Justification Sanctification Preservation Resurrection c. as well put in Is he not Glorified in them as well as in final salvation or damnation Yea and in Creation and the frâ—me of nature too Yea why is not the glory of Angels and all the world put in as part of the same means to his end 406. If it be said that it is only Gods Glory of Mercy and Justice in menâ— salvation and damnation which is the end of Redemption Conversion Preaching Ordinances Sanctification Adoption c. 1. I deny it His Power Wisdom and Goodness and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means 407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate ends than one And undoubtedly the means consisting of innumerable parts make up one perfect whole in which Gods Glory shineth so as it doth not in any part alone And he that will cut Gods frame into scraps and shreds and set up the parts as so many wholes will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture or a Watch or Clock or House or the pipes of an Organ or the strings of a Lute and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly Well therefore did Dr. Twisse reduce all the Decrees de mediis to one But they are one in their apt composition for one end And the Glory of Sun and Stars and Angels and the whole Creation is a part and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part 408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is onâ—y fit for our debate Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert And about this our Controversie is next to none at all Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius quid superius quid inferius c. and that to our edification 409. Seeing then that we are agreed as is said with Aquinas that * * * Ruiz de Voâ—â—n Dei disp 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius â—olitionis divinae sed solius denominations extrinseâ—ae resultantâ—s ab eâ—â—â—â—lis creatâ—â— sequitur â—anas esse plurimaâ— Thâ—oâ—ogorum de ordine dependâ—â—tia vel ratione diviâ—â—â—um volitionum post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem dependentiam vâ—l rationâ—m habeant externa objecta inter se The conscquent is true They are vain indeed though he deny it And all his reasons p. 161 162 c. to prove that dantur iâ— creatâ—â—a rationes finales moventes divinam voluntatem are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa having before confessed that there is no Real Cause And are there Causes that are not Real 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will and the object is bâ— some called the material cause of the act in â—â—â—â—â—â—â—â— numero 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx 3. It may therefore â—e causa materialâ—s of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in patiente ex diâ—ersitate dispositions 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volitions 5. And may be second Causes of other effects 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man 7. Where our acts are not causes they may be conditions sine quibus non of many of Gods acts quoad effectus as sin is of punishment at least 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects which therefore are the Ratio nominâ—â— And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause the will of God or any of his acts as in himself must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theologie at least He citeth Durand Major Richardus c. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours ut n. 7. and not â—uxta rei veritatem Richard is full for what I say 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur non est aliud Velle aliud Esse But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut velle it is his Essence but to say Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est Et Voluntas Dei est prima summa Causa omnium cujus Causa non est quaerenda non est diversa Voluntas sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis And Richardus in loc p. 141. saith but this that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva cum realiter idem sit quod Deus Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti Which is no more than I have said And as to Major Ruiz did ill to cite him who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis denominatio extrinseca as to God And his ordo signorum in mente divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to mans Deus non propter hoc vult hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc that which we have to do is but to enquire 1. De re how one thing is a Cause or other means of another 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be 410. And 1. It is agreed that the Creation was Gods first work that we know of or have any thing to do with This had as to the first part no Antecedent Object but produceth its effect which some call its object But the latter dayes works had an antecedent object and also a produced effect And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work From whence by connotation that may be called his first Decree 411. That sin or the Permission of sin or other meer Negatives are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees I am anon in due place to
it 's clear 1. That in the first case the Motion will be if it be not hindered But that it is not caused by not-hindering it but by its proper moving causes In the second case the consequence of futurity is false And where the inclinations to good and evil that is to superiour and inferiour prohibited good are equal yea though antecedently somewhat unequal Yet bare permission ascertaineth not futurity 3. Much less in the third case where the soul must have positive help or provocation Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly Love God if God did but Permit them But Gods Permitting or not hindering sin may respect divers acts 1. Iâ— God continue not his natural support man will be no man but be aâ—â—â—â—lated and so will neither do good nor evil 2. If God uphold mans nâ—ture in its Integrity as it was in Adam and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace and his natural concurse Adams sin would have necessarily followed 3. If God give Adam both such support and means to stand and do no more Gods permission would not have inferred the certainty of Adams sin when he fell any more than before For God withdrew no grace from him which was necessary to his standing 4. Iâ— God give a lapsed sinful man Nature and common grace it followeth not necessarily because God doth no more that he will commit every sin that he is not further hindered from but it 's certain that he will not do the works to which special grace is necessary 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit and continue his influx necessary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions with necessary means and do no more this man will do some good and some evil and though he may be equally said to be Permitted to do this sin as another yet he may do one and not another 6. God totally permitteth no man to sin but hindereth them many wayes though he hinder not all alike 7. It 's possible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to sin or the same man at several times and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the sin and the other to commit the sin and omit the duty As many Schoolmen have copiously proved Yet in this case Permission would be the same thing to both But if you use the word Permission as connoting the Event then indeed you may say that the event from another cause will follow And Gods non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinsecally denominated Permission in the one case and not in the other But this is but from your arbitrary use of the word 615. Next the Doctor assaulteth Durandus who thus argueth Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge But he knoweth not sin approvingly being of purer eyes c. He answereth 1. God approveth that sin be though he approve not sin 2. God willeth the manifestation of his mercy and justice Ergo he willeth the existence of sin as that which is necessarily required to it To which I reply 1. The first answer is unproved and false God approveth not that sin be If he did few wicked men do more as Estiâ—s saith For it is not sin as sin or evil that they will but that it be for other ends which seem good 2. He phraseth it with his ad quâ—d necessario c. as if God first willed this manifestation of his Justice c. as the end and then sins existence as the means yea the necessary means But this is false as I have fully shewed 1. And his own opinion should confute it that maketh one Decree only de mediis And this particular Manifestation being some Acts of God and not God himself â—or the Complacency of his Will must needs be part of the media ad finem â—â—timum 2. And indeed sins existence is not a necessary means willed for â—ods glory but it is a presupposed mischief our Deliverance from which â—â— punishment for it is willed for his glory It is indeed necessary but â—â—ly necessitate existentiae in esse praecognito as a foreseen evil and so preâ—pposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory Therefore his assertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in â—nere Conducibilis etsi non honesti is detestable 616. Ibid. p. 196. He again saith that Though it be dishonest in the â—eature to sin because forbidden it is not dishonest in God to will that he â—â— it by his permission it being unice conducibile to his glory â—nsw 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too 2. Fie upon this oft â—peated permittente non efficiente It is utterly lusory or immodest â—or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning but â—hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to even as to all â—e entity in act and circumstances imaginable and that in all omissions â— was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this â—edetermining premotion And for the man that in the next saith that â—alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis but ipsa effectio rei I â—y for this man yet to say that the creature effecteth sin and God effecteth â— not is too too gross The common evasion is that sin is not any â—â—ing and therefore not effectible But why then do they say that the â—eature effecteth it when they have said and defended that the creaâ—re doth nothing but what God doth and what he unavoidably maketh â—â—m do 617. Durandus argueth that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a â—â—ght understanding Ergo not by God The Doctor answereth That â—es own sin cannot be judged convenient but anothers may He inâ—anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury â— When a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by Maâ—â—met 3. When God willed that Absalom should defile his Fathers Concuâ—nes And he addeth that for us to sin is contrary to our right reaâ—â—n because it is forbidden and hurtful to us But for God to will that â—e sin is not contrary to his right reason as not forbidden or hurtful â— him Repl. 1. No man should will unlawful usury He that willeth to Borâ—â—w though he cannot have it without usury doth not will the usury â—ut the money non-obstante usura As he that chooseth to travell with Blasphemer rather than to go alone in danger he doth not will his â—lasphemy but his company non obstante blasphemia 2. The same is to â—e said of swearing by Mahomet It is only the Oath as an Oath that is â—â— be willed and not as by Mahomet that is not willed but unwillingly â—â—dured 3. Absaloms instance is answered before God willed only â—avids punishment and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin â—n a foresight of Absaloms active Volition and sin and not as
Holiness The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators as is his Works of Mercy and Justice And Gods glory shineth as much in them And it is the glory of his Goodness if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery yea and of Mercy too For though mercy relate to misery it is as well to possible misery prevented as to existeâ—â— misery removed And if he speak not of Subjects but Proprietors the Boâ—um Creaturae is also Creatoris SECT XIX The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants and The summ of their opinion I think soundeth not well in Christians ears The summ of which is this Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil but God is the first willer of its existence because it is in its own nature summe unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy And willing and Loving being all one in God he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin above its contrary holiness for this end And by Predetermining premotion which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth But it is sin in man because forbidden him but not in God because not forbidden him And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin though he cause all that is caused but to permit it because he causeth it not in himself nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions because he is not bound to Actuate us but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause because he is under an obliging Law Though God made that Law And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination nor forbear acting when so acted yet he is to be called free because he is actually willing or his will doth act and because he is predetermined by none but God This is the true sence of their opinion as opened by themselves I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sence 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying Gods permission of sin because he maketh him the * * * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit Twiss recitante etiam Rutherf de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 26. p. 262 263 264 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati disp 27. p. 270 c. disp 28 29 30 c. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin all men will confess Dr. Twiss often that neither doth a wicked man do so Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato seu carentiam conformitatis sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs which may occurr to others God caused e. g. in Nathanaâ—l Peter c. this act of saith before Christs coming the Messiah is to come hereafter When Christ was come this was false and so evil God still caused the faith which he gave them Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil and that supernaturally But I answ 1. God caused the habit of their faith and the act The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations and in special A belief in the promised Messiah The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate required nothing positive in the Habit The same Habit served to both acts unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition but the former needed none 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance no more was necessary but 1. Gods word Christus venturus est 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit So that when God had reversed that word Christus venturus est he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ But not at all sub ratione venturi For the determining word was called in and it was an imperfection not to know so much where it was not a sin Cause of the Act the Liberty and the Prohibition and to Cause is not to Permit he hath no better answer than to say that God doth not permit the Act nor the Evil of the Act but he permitteth the evil act and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he Which is to jest with holy things and not to argue As if he said God made neither the soul nor the body and yet he made the man What! is it as it 's said that non animased unio est vita so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Malâ—m No that he pretendeth not 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts His replyes to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin Nothing so much deceiveth them as not distinguishing between the sinful act and the effect or passion when they are called by the same name as Selling Killing c. 628. His next instance is of Christs death of which I said enough before But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to Gods will which is his mistake It is Crucifixion it self passivè sumpta which they ascribe to it some of them at least And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers but only foresee it as aforesaid And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty which they so deride 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus Isa 53. Deus voluit eum conterere Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem and God delivered Christ to death I answer It is too too gross to perswade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. God sent me speaketh Gods act that is his disposal
of the effects and consequents of them But doth this signifie God willed your malice or your act God did bruise Christ which signifieth that he was a concause of his death but not that he willed or Caused the Jews to will or act his death And so of the rest 629. The rest of his instances are such as I have answered before or as the former answers fully invalidate And therefore I will not weary my self and the Reader with them 630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he asserteth that Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory and that not per accidens but per se Because sin by how much the worse it is in genere mali inhonesti by so much the better and fitter means it is in genere boni utilis conducibilis to Gods glory c. All which I have before confuted and think not his defence of it worth repeating 631. Many assertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the false supposition that Sin is a medium per se of Gods glory and the unproved supposition that God positively willeth the Permission of it which is nothing whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order and much other vanity And still they confound sin in esse reali which is no medium with sin in esse objectivo which may be a part of holiness and no sin at all 632. Cap. 19. he argueth God useth men and devils in the very act of sinning as his instruments viz. to punish to try to humble c. ergo he willeth the event that they sin Resp Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words instruments and useth Properly an Instrument is an efficient cause moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue And so a sinner in and by the Act of sinning is no Instrument of God For God moveth him not to that Act as specified or circumstantiated so as is prohibited And being not at all so moved by him as David to murder Urias and to vitiate his Wife he is not properly thus his Instrument But sometimes the word Instrument signifieth a presupposed Agent whose Action another can improve to his own ends As the wind and water are improperly called the Millers Instruments of turning his Mill and the spring and poise are the Clock-makers Instruments of moving his Clock or Watch and a Mastiff Dog is my Instrument to keep away Thieves and a Greyhound is my Instrument to kill a Hare and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet and a Hawke to catch a Partridge c. And yet we cause not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind or Water but we can hinder the Water nor the nisus of the spring nor the gravitation of the poise but set the recipients so as that the effect shall be done as we would have it nor cause we the fierceness of the Mastiff the inclination or motion of the greyhound ferret hawk c. but only tye them up and let them loose as our ends require But zeal maketh some men deride that God should be said to be no more the cause of sinning and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer or at least a will to use it without willing and causing the thing which he forbiddeth 2. And the word using signifieth sometime using by motion as I do my pen and sometime by ordination and adjoyning some concause or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as aforesaid as we use wind water dogs hawks Thus only sinners by sinning are Gods used instruments supposing his natural concurse and support And they are not his Instruments thus neither in the same sence as these creatures are ours For their fierceness craft inclination action is good and we do and may will it for our ends But sin is not good And therefore God willeth not it at all but only the consequent of it or effect And that Effect is not Good as it is the effect of sin but as God setteth in and causeth the same effect which a sinner causeth as in generation per concubitum illicitum But when God willeth and causeth the effect and foreseeth and permitteth the sinful Volition and act which concurreth to that effect such a sin is improperly called his used instrument or medium but properly is none 633. To Gibieuf and others saying that God acteth not by sin as an instrument and willeth it not but the effects he answereth that It 's absurd because the sin it self is castigatory and hath such like effects and therefore God need not will that effect as after it But all this is from the fore-noted confusion It is not only the distant effect but the very immediate effect which is the Act it self ut recipitur in passo which God sometime is said to Will As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away and that Christ were killed and that Malchus eare be cut off and that Paul be scourged and smitten on the mouth and that the Apostles were oft imprisoned c. And yet God only foreseeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent which he forbiddeth 634. And here note that when the name of the Effect or Passion connoteth the sinfulness of the Act then it is less meet to say that God willeth it As to say that he willeth that we be persecuted murdered slandered belyed c. But if any will so speak they must mean only the Passion as distinct from the action And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi 635. To those that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of sin the effect being more to be ascribed to the Principal Cause than to the instrument he first ill-applyeth some frivolous distinctions and instanceth thus The hangman as the Judges instrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge Ergo the Judge much more in revenge Non sequitur Putting in Revenge which is but a Cause as if it had been the Effect which was in question And thus The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable ergo nor the striker Non sequitur As if the question had been of the Negation of an effect and not of the position of it And thus If two servants role a stone one being commanded and one forbidden one being father to the other The Son forbidden roleth it unlawfully ergo the father commanded much more non sequitur Resp 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the same act because the effect is the same which is notoriously false unless de specie 2. Whose Instrument do you suppose the Son to be If the Fathers it is because the Father commanded him contrary to the Master And if so the argument is good The Sons act was a fault who obeyed ergo the fathers more who commanded him saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument because he can disobey But Gods premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us 636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true
answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
do Gods will and yet pray Let thy will be done are heard in that which is Gods will that the imitaters of the Devil be judged with the Devil For they that have despised Gods inviting will shall feel his revenging will SECT XXII The words of Fulgentius to the same sence 663. I Must crave of the Reader that he remember that my reciting the Judgement of these Fathers for the falling away and perishing of many that were in a state of Life is not at all as declaring my own judgement but Theirs none then that I read of thinking otherwise * * * Except Jovinian be truly accused by Hierome the brevity and obscurity of whose accusation and confutation leaveth us very uncertain what it was that Jovinian held But we are sure that the spirit oâ— uncharitableness and concention though in a good â—â—â—â— learnâ—d man had no â—â—all hand in the stigmâ—â—zing of him and Vigilantius as Hereticks I shall for the End sake be yet a little more â—edious in citing some of the sayings of Fulgentius Fulg. l. 1. de Verit. praedest cap. 6. To good men God giveth what good they have and keepeth it But to the wicked and ungodly God neither ever could prepare or give evil works which they should damnably serve nor did he ever put into them evil wills by which they should culpably will things unjust but he prepared for them the punishment of Hell that they might feel revenging justice in endless fire An evil will is not of God And therefore the just Judge doth punish it in men because the good Creator findeth not in it the order of his Creation And perseverance and contumacy in sin and pride because it is not of Gods giving is condemned by God revenging Et l. 1. ad Monim c. 26. He will punish in the wicked that they are bad which he gave not nor did he predestinate them to any iniquity and that they willed unjustly was none of his gift And because the persevering iniquity of an evil will ought not to remain unpunished he predestinated such to destruction because he prepared just punishment for them Observe that God predestinated wicked and ungodly men to just punishment not to any unjuâ—â— work to the penalty not to the fault to the punishment nâ—â— to the transgression to the destruction which the anger of a just judge requiteth sinners with not to that destruction or death by which the iniquity of sinners provoketh Gods wrath against them The Apostle calls them Vessels of wrath not Vessels of sin Cap. 27. The wicked are not predestinated to the first death of the soul but to the second death they are That which followeth the sentence of a just Judge not that which preceded in the evil concupiscence of the sinner Ibid. c. 23. It beseemeth believers to confess that the good and just God fore-knew indeed that men would sin for all things to come are known to him For they were not future if they were not in his fore-knowledge But not that he predestinated any to sin For if he predestinated man to any sin he would not punish man for sin For Gods predestination prepareth for men either the godly remission of their sins or the just punishment of them God therefore could never predestinate man to that which he had resolved both to forbid by his precept and to wash away by his mercy and punish by his justice God therefore predestinated to eternal punishment the wicked who he foreknew would persevere to the death in sin Wherein as his fore-knowledge of mans iniquity is not to be blamed so his predestinatioâ— of just revenge is to be praised That we may acknowledge that he predestinated not man to any sin whom he predestinated to be punished deservedly for sin And ad Monimum li. 1. pag. edit Basil 68. reciting Augustiâ—â—â— words he saith He taught that only pride was the cause of mans iniquity and that God predestinated not men to sin but to damnation and that they are not helped by God the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he reciteth again ex lib. 2. Aug. de baptis parvul that their wills be not helpt by grace the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he again repeateth pag. 69. 70 71 72. and that Augustine's mind was that good works God both fore-knew and predestinated But evil works that is sin he foreknew indeed but did not predestinate or decree For there is not Gods work but his judgement Therefore in sin Gods work is not because that sin should be done was not decreed by him But therefore there is his judgement because it is not left unrevenged that an evil man worketh without God working And ib. li. 1. pag. 15. That which is not in his work never was in predestination Therefore men are not predestinated to sin So p. 29. And p. 31. and forward And p. 29. No man justly sinneth though God justly permit him to sin For he is justly forsaken of God who forsaketh God And because man forsaking God sinneth God forsaking man keepeth justice 664. I am loth to weary the Reader with more Should I do the like by Augustines words it would be too wearisome His judgement is the very same as theirs I will only cite one passage out of him about mans Power to believe Tract 53. in Johan having shewed that God only foreknoweth mens sin and foretelleth it as the Jews but causeth it not he cometh to answer John 12. 39. They could not believe c. If they could not how was it their sin saying You hear the question brethren and see how deep it is But we answer as we can Why could they not believe If you ask me I quickly answer Because they would not For God foresaw their evil will and foretold it by the Prophet He blinded their eyes c. And I answer that their own wills deserved this also For God blindeth and hardeneth by forsaking and not helping which he may do by a judgement secret but not unjust This all religious piety ought to hold unshaken Far be it from us then to say that there is iniquity with God If he help he doth it mercifully if he help not he doth justly 665. By all this the Reader may see past all doubt that Augustine and his two disciples than whom none known to us in the whole world then went higher for Predestination and Grace did plainly take up with this that 1. GOD NEITHER CAUSED OR WILLED SIN no not ITS BEING or the forbidden ACT. 2. That OUR SIN was of OUR SELVES 3. That ALL GRACE and perserverance was OF GOD. 4. That ELECTION was ABSOLUTE of GOD's meer will and not upon his foreknowledge of any merits of mans 5. That God predestinated none to sin but predestinated men to Punishment ONLY ON THE FORESIGHT of their wilful sin 6. That he hardened men but by deserting them 7. That he never forsook them till they forsook him first
to God And so Faith is below Repentance as a means of it 204. By this the question whether Faith or Repentance be first may partly be resolved and partly cast out as founded in confusion As they are both one thing neither can be first any otherwise than the same Motus ut a termino a quo ut ad terminum ad quem But as they signifie divers things they have each of them divâ—râ— acts and in respect of each are before each other The Assenting act of Faith in general must needs be always before Repentance as it is an Act of the Will But the consenting Act of faith is also part of Repentance and must folow that part of Repentance which is a change of the understanding But whether the Repentance as towards God or Faith in Christ be first or Love to God and Faith in Christ I have discussed as accurately as I can in my Christian Directory Par 1. cap. 3. pag. 182. and therefore thither refer the Reader 205. And how Faith and Love differ I have there also opened and therefore shall now only say that Faith as it signifieth meet How Faith and Love differ Assent differeth from Love as the act of the Intellect from Volition And Love formally taken presupposeth the Assent and doth not contain it But Faith taken largely in the sence of the Baptismal Covenant containeth in it Consent which is the Wills Volition and therefore must needs have some initial Love in it as it acteth iâ— Desire This Faith in God hath some Desire and Volition of God and Faith in Christ which is the Souls Practical Affiance in him hath some Love to Christ in it But the denomination is not from the same ratio formalis in each It is eminently called Faith when giving up our Souls to Christ to be saved in practical Affiance is the great work of the Soul though it have something of Love essential to it And it is eminently called Love morally when the Complacency of the Soul in Christ thus trusted and in God our end is the great work or business of the Soul 206. This Holy Love as a fixed habit and employment of the Soul and our Relation to the Holy Ghost to work it in us is it that is promised and Given quoad jus in the Baptismal Covenant of which Faith though it have somewhat of actual Love or Volition in it is the antecedent condition which also I have so fully opened as afore cited that I refer the Reader to it for this also And somewhat was said of it before SECT XIII Of the degrees of Pardon or Justification 207. Some men lest they should yield that Justification is not one perfect finished act done but once do feign that it is only the first act of Faith by which a man is justified Indeed it is only the first act by which he â—s changed from an unrighteous to a righteous state But to think that therefore we are never after justified by Faith and so have no actually justifying Faith all our lives but for one instant only is fitter for a Dreamer than a theological Discourser 208. Our first constitutive Justification being in its nature a right to â—mpunity and to Life or Glory * * * â—â—â—â— tells us that 〈…〉 which 〈…〉 by Regeâ—â—ra â—â— and Just â—â—â—â— on â—uâ— what they mean by Râ—â—nission they cannot tell themselves as a â—oresaid Pardon of the guâ—â— they mean not or else they mean several things in one word is a Relation which must be continued to the end and therefore must have the true causes and condition continued and would cease if any of them ceased 209. As to the question therefore whether Justification be lossable and â—ardon reversible I answer that the grant of them in the Covenant is unalterable But mans will in it self is mutable and if he should cease believing by Apostacy and the condition fail he would lose his Right and be unjustified and unpardoned without any change in God But that a man doth not so de facto is to be ascribed to Election and special Grace of which afterward 210. Though all our past sins are pardoned at our first Faith or Conversion or as the Ancients speak in Baptism yet it is most certain that Pardon or Justification is not perfect at first no nor on this side death And the saying of many that Justification is perfect at first and Sanctification only by degrees is a palpable error as I have else-where oft shewed For that is not perfect 1. Which is not continued and brought on to its end but upon continued conditions and diligent use of means to the â—ast * * * Neque enim peccati sui veniam impetravit Adam ut a morte temporali immunis esset Twiss contr Corvin pag. 343. col 2. 2. Which leaveth many penalties unremoved which have further means to be used for their removal and further Right to it to be obtained To have more and more Grace and less and less Sin and to have â—earer communion with God are blessings as to the degrees which we must by degrees attain a further Right to and the privation of them are â—ore penalties to be removed 3. We have new sins to be pardoned every day 4. Our remaining Corruption is such as needeth a continued Pardon till it be perfectly done away 5. The Day of Judgment is not come for which the most perfect Justification is reserved SECT XIV Of Justification by Sentence of the Judge 211. The second sort of Justification which is by Sentence is done by Christ as Judge and so is an act of his Kingly Office 212. Therefore were it true as it is not that justifying Faith were only the receiving or believing in Christ as a Justifier of us it would not be a believing in him in his Priestly Office only but in act For he merited our Justification as a humbled Servant and a Sacrifice He giveth it us in Right by his Covenant or Law of Grace as King and Benefactor He promulgateth it as Prophet He passeth the Sentences as King and Judge He executively taketh off the penalty and glorifieth us as King and Benefactor There is no Justification by a partial Faith 213. Though the estimation of a man as just called the Sententiâ— judicis concepta as distinct from the sententia prolata be said to be â—â— immanet act of God and therefore from eternity yet it is a mistake For though it be not transient effectivè and do nihil efficere ad extra yeâ— it is transient objectivè and doth presuppose the existence of the qualified Object For though Gods Knowledge and Will in genere or as such are his eternal Essence yet Gods Knowledge and Love of John or Peter â—â— Believers are terms which signifie not his Essence as such but as transâ—â— and terminated on those existent persons relatively So that the extrinâ—â—cal denomination from the existent Object is temporary as it is 214.
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
can do no more than this nor this but by the Power given him of God § 7. Vainly therefore do the Dominicans pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various ORDER of mans Actions by meer moral helps without Gods predetermining premotion to that order For this is to cause no Real being And he that is moved to the Act in genere needeth no more premotion from God to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act. § 8. And they that will call the production of faith a Creation in the strict and proper sense do not understand that Creatio est Rerum non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum vel existentium An Act is of it self improperly said to be created in a pre-existent Agent That is not called created which is educed è potentia materiae nor that which is produced by the Potentia Activa prae-existentis forma Faith is an Act of the same Natural Power or faculty which we had before And Grace or rather Nature usually suscitateth that faculty to the Act as an Act in genere And Grace doth cause us to ORDER that act aright as to the due object and other circumstances But if any will call it a Creation I contend not about the name § 9. But the whole state of the Man Habitual Relative and Practical set together is called in Scripture a New Creature and the New Man tropically but not unfitly Partly because we are really new though not by another Humanity or Species of Natural Essence yet by many Accidents And partly because those Accidents are so great and make so great a change of our state as that they emulate a natural Essence and we use to say in common things that when an unlearned man is made learned and a poor man a Prince and a dying man healthful he is another man § 10. Though God be one and the same and Christ the same and the Law and Word and many Antecedent means the same to many on whom they have different effects This difference may be caused many wayes The Causes of difference As 1. By the diversity of other inferiour or concomitant second causes 2. By the diverse Disposition of the Receivers a common cause of varieties in the World 3. By the diversity of Impediments and temptations And many other wayes § 11. * * * I know that Bradwardine li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. saith that Deum non dare scientiam eratiam aut perseverantiam seu quodlibet munus suum creaturâ— capaci est causa quare ipsa non accipit non habet non è contra Et p. 614. Quicquid obex dicatur potest illa respâ—nsio corripi cum nullus possit hunc obicem tollere nisi Deus vel per Deum prius praetollentem si ipse cum voluerit tollere irresistibiliter tollitur Auferam cor lapideum c. The great question is How far the diversity of Receptive Dispositions is from God Answ 1. God made all equal at first in Adam 2. All were equal in sin by his fall 3. Cain and Abel differed from several causes and not one alone Abel differed from Cain in faith and obedience by Gods grace as the chief cause and his own will and agency as the second cause Cain differed from Abel by unbelief and sin by his own will and Satans temptations 4. The sins of later parents as of Cain Cham Esau Achan Gehezi c. make a further difference by depriving their posterity of some means helps or grace which else they had been equally capable of with others 5. It is certain that man hath much to do about his own heart by which he is to be the second cause of his own Receptive disposition and if he fail is the only cause of his indisposition § 12. Difference is but Dissimilitude And an alteration of one of the subjects which soever will make it dissimile or to differ from the other When the good Angels stood and the evil fell if you ask Who made the difference It was the Devils by forsaking their first estate Though Constitutively both their sin and the Angels obedience made the dissimilitude If you suppose Cain and Abel equally under grace at first and ask Who made the difference I answer Constitutively Cains sin and Abels righteousness maketh or is the difference But as to Reputative efficiency Cain made the difference by rejecting grace So if you should suppose two equally qualified with common grace and one of them to lose it the efficience of the difference is Imputable to him But if you suppose two equally lost in sin and one converted and not the other the Constitutive Causes of the difference are ones sin and the others repentance But the Imputable efficiency is Gods grace and mans repentance or will that is recovered § 13. But when Paul doth ask Who made thee to differ he meaneth Who gave thee that good by which thou differest and expoundeth it by What hast thou which thou hast not received And no doubt but all good is received from God And this would have held true if God had by equal operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indisposition or rejection § 14. Nature and Scripture perswade us that the same measure of help or influx is not enough to make one repent or believe which is enough to make another For the difference of souls and temptations and impediments plainly prove it The same strength will not move a Mountain which will move a Feather nor the same Teaching make an ignorant Sot to understand which serveth a prepared person § 15. Bodily aptitude or ineptitude do much to vary receptivities which are usually Gods punishments or rewards for Parents actions And oft-times for mens own Some by fornication gluttony drunkenness sports and idleness make themselves even next to Brutes § 16. But we have great Reason from Scripture to believe that though Gods Laws be equal and his Judgements where men do not make an inequality yet as a free Lord and Benefactor he dealeth not equally with all that are of equal merit Though he do no man wrong nor deny any what he promised in his Word but keep perfect Justice as a Governour yet he may do with his own as he list and he will be specially good to some though others see it with an evil eye § 17. Whether all that are elect have at first a greater measure of the Divine help and impress than any that are not converted no man can say of which more anon But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by Gods will to that certain conversion which others were not so decreed to SECT VI. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul § 1. THat which sticks in the minds of many is that God being Omnipotent all his operations must be equally unresistible and efficacious because none can conquer God But they must
consider that though he be Almighty yet he doth not all that he can do nor do his works equally manifest his Omnipotency And there are these causes for Limiting his operations in the effects § 2. 1. * * * Gemina operatio Providentiae reperitur partim naturalis partim voluntaria Naturalis per occultam Dei administrationem quae etiam lignis herbis dat incrementum Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera hominum Vid. catera August de Genesi ad lit l. 8. cap. 9. plura li. 9. cap. 15. The chief cause is his Wisdom and Free-will It is his Will to do what he doth and to do no more which hath no cause § 3. 2. Another cause is that God operateth by Jesus Christ whose Humanity is finite being a Creature and God worketh according to the Instrument or medium As he shineth by the Sun Moon or Stars according to their several natures and not according to his meer omnipotency so doth he communicate Grace by Jesus Christ § 4. †††Mark 6. 5. He Christ could there do no mighty work because of their unbelief and 7. 24. He could not be hid and 1. 45. Jesus could no more openly enter into the City with many such places all speak of an Ordinate power working not ad ultimum posse And Christ by Office being King and Prophet will operate upon certain terms which in his Sapiential Government he sets down And God will not violate those terms § 5. 3. Also under Christ there are many subordinate Causes There are his Word Preachers and all the forementioned means and helps and Christ will work according to these means Though he tye not himself from doing more or otherwise I have proved that this is his usual way And the effect will be limited according to these second causes § 6. As the Sun shineth on us first in and through the air which abateth somewhat of its force and then through the exhalations and then through the glass window and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us so is it in this case § 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver Every eye hath a tunicle which the Suns light must penetrate But he that hath a suffusion or he that winketh hath a greater impediment to limit the effect so is it with the various degrees of Indisposition or moral incapacity which yet be nothing if God did work ad ultimum posse and did not as aforesaid work according to his free will and second causes SECT VII Of the Resistibility of Grace § 1. TO Resist Grace signifieth 1. Either Not-to Receive it Passively * * * Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 1◠§. 6. p. 187. distinguisheth of Gods will 1. As to its ratio totalis including not only the viâ— aut causalitas effectiva but also the formal reason of Volitio effiâ—ax which includeth the prescience of future contingents And so he saith It is never resisted 2. Secundum partialem inadaequatam rationem praecise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum prout offert motiva confert causas secundas suum concursum abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis quae quidditativè supponit formalissimam rationem praescientiae c. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo ut praecisus ab actu secundo potest non sortiri effectum as a stone receiveth not the rain ad intus or as oyl resisteth water or hard things receive not impressions as the soft 2. Or Not-to-Receive-Actually which is Receptio Moralis as a man receiveth not a gift who consenteth not or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes The bare Not-Consenting with the Will or not using the senses or organs not opening the hand c. is such a Resisting 3. Or an Active opposition which is more As a man resisteth an Enemy with heart or hand or a man by Nolition and not only Non-volition resisteth a suiter § 2. Mans sinful soul resisteth Gods gracious operations all these wayes 1. It is Passively become undisposed to Reception And thus he is said to have a hard heart of stone and a seared conscience and to be dead and past feeling Eph. 4. 18 19. 2. 1 2. 2. It doth not do what it can do morally to receive grace that is it doth not Conari or suscitate it self to be willing of it 3. Yea it doth Positively resist by Action and is unwilling of Gods gracious operations And this is twofold 1. By willing the contrary and prosecuting carnal interest over-loving the pleasures of the flesh and so turning away from the motions of grace 2. And therefore by an enmity to that grace and work which would †††Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is universaliter efficax nec impedibilis frustrabilis aut defectibilis which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not meerly final and complacite But yet the Schoolmen that say he is not Omnivolens give reason for it convert him and take him off his chosen Idols § 3. No creature by resisting God doth abate or retund his essential Power or Activity nor make any thing properly difficult to him § 4. All the Elect resist Grace before it overcome and convert them And all our lives after we resist it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty and draweth us from sin § 5. He that repenteth not of his Resisting of Gods Spirit and Grace doth not understand and well repent of his sin § 6. All Resisting is not Overcoming All Resist grace but all overcome it not that is do not frustrate it as to the due effect § 7. There are several Degrees of yielding to Gods motions and operations and so several degrees of overcoming He is fully overcome by it who yieldeth to it wholly He overcometh it in some part who yieldeth to it but in part And because Gods grace moveth us to more than we ordinarily yield to therefore we do ordinarily overcome it in too great measure even when we are happily overcome by it § 8. God worketh not alike on all sometime as on Paul he so suddenly changeth the mind and will as that at once he both produceth the Act of mans consent and also taketh away even the moral though not the natural power to the contrary in the antecedent instant So that no man ever denyeth consent who is so moved And sometimes he procureth Actual Consent by such an operation as in the antecedent instant might have been resisted and overcome there being a Moral Power to the contrary So that there is Actually-Converting Grace which was superable in the antecedent instant as to Moral power and there is such a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome § 9. Gods grace when it prevaileth doth not take away but determine
the Natural power in it self but by so doing formaliter relativè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary in that instant Of which more anon § 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event is never overcome For Gods decree is not frustrate § 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of as an Act For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts For God doth not militate against himself § 12. The case lyeth thus God antecedently to his Laws framed Nature that is the Being and Natural Order of all the World and so he became the Head or Root of Nature the first Cause who by his wise decree was to concurr to the end with that Natural frame and to continue to things their proper forms and motions And man is one of his creatures having a Nature of his own to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concurr By this natural concurse of God the fomiâ— cator the murderer the thief c. are naturally able to do those acts But being free agents that can do otherwise God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them And when they break this Law they resist that gracious concurse which suitable to the organical cause God conjoyneth with the means But they do this by their Natural power and activity not used as God requireth them but turned against his own Law So that if God would withdraw his sustentation and destroy mâ—ns Nature they could not resist his grace But that he will not do being his antecedent work and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act disordered and turned against his grace § 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will de debito 2. And his will of purpose to give man so much help and no more by which he can and ought to believe and Repent is said to be resisted or frustrate so far when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done § 14. Gods Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * * * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora and work by means not for want of them but from the abundance of his Goodness so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. 3. m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace § 15. But it is not the barâ— Word or Means alone but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted For though no moâ—tal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means yet we may know that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily and that he worketh with and by them not according to his Omnipotency in it self considered but according to the means or organs And as in Nature he operateth nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes so in Grace he operateth non quantum potest but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace § 16. When the preaching of the Word Education Company and other visible Means seem equal God hath innumerable means supernal internal external invisible and unknown to us by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls without any second cause or means at all though we cannot prove the contrary neither And therefore he that resisteth all means for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul § 17. * * * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aâ—x l. 7. disp 59. p. 264. Eadâ—m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam in genere cause materialis antecedit illam In genere tamen causae formalis efficientis est effeclus ejusdem gratiae propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae est tamen meritoria vitae aeternâ— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis est meritoria vitae aeternae ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nisâ— procedat à gratiâ— habituali ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from Unless he mean eadem specie and not numerically which yet is false For it is not eadem or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh Whether Gods condional will and so his operation be Volo te velle modo velis or credere modo credas to give us faith if we believe and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself This semi-subtilty though it beget voluminous confidence must cry peccavi if a little more subtilty do but detect the defectiveness of it We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi but of the Rationes non habendi nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions But whether he deny or give-not grace for actual faith effectual or sufficient to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform even preparatory Volitons Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi not de causis Actus donandi Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith in that soul which doth not wilfully resist and omit such preparatory acts as it could do even Volitions And so I answer 1. It is not I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing But it is 1. If by resisting common preparing grace thou so harden â—hy heart or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self as that the same degree of grace means help impress will not change thee which otherwise would
481. An Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratia pâ—ssit demonstrari naturali ratione vel cum Infallibilitate Praescientiae Providentiae praedestinationis Divinae Where he tells you that one opinion of some Catholicks is that It is certain by the doctrine of faith that man hath Free-will but it cannot be proved by natural reason The second opinion is contrary that It is not only evident to natural reason that man hath free-will but also the concord of it with the infallibility of Divine prescience and providence may easily and clearly be made out by Scientia Media which is the Jesuites way But the third opinion which he defendeth is that Free-will may be evidently known and proved by natural reason alone But how the actual use of it consisteth with the infallibility of the prescience providence and predestination of God and with the efficacy of the helps of grace cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by natural light alone and therefore the reason of it must be Believed and the understanding captivated to the obedience of Faith Where note 1. That though he say perfectè he proveth that it cannot be known by that which is below a perfect knowledge 2. And that he denyeth not only a practical saving knowledge but a proper theoretical or dogmatical knowledge For this he citeth those words of Cajetan at large in 1. p. q. 22. art 4. which many others cite and commend In ignorantia sola quietem invenio c. And there is no man besides Alvarez higher for the Dominicans way of Absolute predetermination than D. Bannes who is of Cajetans opinion in 1. p. q. 23. art 5. 2. 2. q. 10. art 1. Siquis non intelligit quomodo usus liberi arbitrii sit liber nihilominus sit effectus jam praedefinitus à Divina providentia oportet eum credere Primum omnium debuisset credere quod aiunt se non posse intelligere Credimus enim Catholicum mysterium Trinitatis etiamsi non intelligamus And Alvarez citeth Calvin lib. de aetern Dei praedest cont Pigh p. 136. saying Siquis hoc mentis suae captu superius esse excipiat idem de me fateor Sed quid mirum si modulum nostrum imcomprehensibilis immensa Dei majestas exsuperet Atqui tantum abest ut pro carnis ratione explicandum suscipiam sublime istud reconditúmque arcanum ut quod initio praefatus sum assiduè in memoriam redire velim desipere qui plus scire appetunt quà m Deus revelaverit Quare nos potiùs docta ignorantia delectet quam intemperans ebria plus quam Deus permittit curiositas What Augustine confesseth you may see a little in Alvar. ib. p. 482 483. but more in himself often What Suarez Hurtado Mendoz. and other the most subtil philosophical Divines confess commonly of the incomprehensibility of these things and the darkness and uncertainty of our conceptions I have elsewhere partly cited and any that readeth them may find Now all this being so notorious and their ignorance commonly confessed may I not confidently inferr 1. That then seeing all must be reconciled by Believing we must have nothing obtruded on us herein which is not to be proved by the Word of God What the Word saith of Predetermination of the manner of Gods operation on second causes and influx on souls and of the nature of his first effect or Vis Impressa c. we will receive But yet men must not snatch up a metaphorical expression in one or a few Texts and urge that against the frequent and plain expressions of the Scripture of the spirits Operation on souls Christ himself saith which is more than all forecited The wind bloweth where it listeth and ye hear the sound thereof but ye know not whence it cometh and whither it goeth so is every one that is born of the spirit But as for the operations of God by the word preached and other means and the Holy Ghosts operation by and with those means and the Holy Ghosts indwelâ—â—ng and operating after in Believers these are frequently asserted in Gods Word And that all Christs members have his Spirit regenerating illuminating quickning sanctifying them both as he is in Covenant with them to be the sanctifier of their souls and as the Love of God and all his Graces are by him caused in us all this is sure But if men will go further with us and give us as many distinctions of Gods Grace as Alvarez doth and tell us that besides God himself one of them simultaneous operation is nothing but mans act and another previous motion is somewhat else but no man knoweth what but may be named motio Virtuosa though it be neither God nor a quality nor a humane act And then will dispute how much of this some thing this motio virtuosa will serve to such an effect and how much to another and how and by what reason it is efficacious and will build on his assertions such a systeme of consequents as shall make up the doctrines of a sect or party which shall set up with this stock to militate against the Love and unity of Christians this is the course that I oppugn Once more Let the Reader note that the waies of reconciling Grace and Free-will as Alvarez mentioneth them are these four I. The Jesuits way by scientia media which I need not recite to the Learned but think it meet to recite Alvarez words of their description of Grace Supponunt gratiam praevenientem excitantem esse formaliter actiones quasdam vitales quas Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur sine nobis inquam libere co-operantibus non tamen sine nobis vitaliter efficienter concurrentibus consistere in illustratione illuminatione Intellectus atque excitatione suasione voluntatis quae efficienter procedunt ab intellectu voluntate non quidem ut Libera sed ut Natura est quamvis antecedenter dependeant à Voluntate ut Liberum arbitrium est quatenus viz. ex ejus libertate fuit dependens quod homo compararet notitias mysteriorum fidei vel eorum quae facienda erant accedendo ad praedicatores vel alio modo eos propriâ industriâ acquirendo quibus notitiis Deus se insereret eas elevando suo speciali influxu ut supernaturales sint quales ad salutem oportet sic sortiantur naturam gratiae praevenientis Suppositâ ergo Illuminatione quâ Deus illuminat Intellectum proponit Voluntati bonum ut sibi conveniens affirmant quod statim absque ulla libertate oritur merè naturaliter in voluntate motus affectionis ad bonum sibi propositum quo motu allicitur quasi invitatur ad amandum illud bonum imperandum potentiis executivis ut illud exequantur ut v. g. ad imperandum intellectui ut assentiatur rebus fidei propositis explicatis In his ergo duobus motibus viz. in illustratione Intellectus affectione
yet he commandeth it and requireth it of us But exciting and adjuvant Grace are all one on Gods part And if you will difference the same things as connoting divers effects you must denominate it more fitly from the effects by words that notifie the difference IX Adjuvant Grace and Free-will are not Partial Causes of supernatural Consent as two drawing a Boat so as neither is premoved by the other or maketh it co-operate with it Answ True For God premoveth the will of man though through mans fault it be not ever effectual And though Gods will and mans be two Causes of the same effect the term Partial is scarce fit while man hath his whole power and activity from God X. Scientia media is not to be ascribed to God But all prescience of the future co operation of the will even from the foresaid Hypothesis presupposeth in signo rationis the free decree of Gods will by which absolutely or granting that Hypothests he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good and permit it if Evil. Answ Here come in your presumptions of things unknown or false 1. That God knoweth future contingents and conditionals is certain But I think this scientia media unfitly named and an unnecessary distribution and insufficient to the Jesuits ends 2. And your fiction of signa rationis and the necessary antecedence of a decree of Gods to his knowledge of every Volition of man is a more ungrounded and perillous figment which you have not proved It seemeth a denyal of Gods Omniscience or perfection that he cannot know an act future as future but only as decreed to be so 3. You deceitfully talk of permitting evil while you plead for the irresistible predetermining premotion of the will by God to every evil act with all its circumstances Is that but Permitting 4. To permit is Nothing no act of God but a non-agency not to hinder And how prove you that God must of necessity have a Positive Decree for every Nothing or non-agency Is not the not-willing or not-decreeing to hinder a lye e. g. supposing natural concurse or to make more worlds enough to the production of that lye by an ill inclined nature or to the not-being of more Worlds We are in the dark and God is infinitely above us and these tremendous mysteries are not to be so presumptuously handled by unproved assertions XI There is on our part no Cause Reason or Condition assignable for which Gods supernatural providence in comparison of this or that hath the formal reason of predestination or retaineth the common reason of providence but predestination is to be reduced into the sole free-will of God Answ Most of this is about meer words The word Predestination connoteth various effects and objects and so is called various Acts. There is no efficient Cause in the Creature of any act of God But there are objects without which Gods Acts have not their special denominations and these objects are the termini and called Material Constitutive Causes of those various acts as denominated various specially or numerically And so Gods Decree or Will to Justifie and Glorifie man hath something in the object as a necessary condition of it * * * That is of that object which is not â—â— the object of his decree of giving faith And that hath something in its object which is not in the object of the decree of giving a Redeemer to the World or making the World c. if you will at all distinguish Gods decrees by their objects or effects But if not there will be no matter for any Controversie And Predestination is an ambiguous word If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing or all about man or all of Good to us then our Being is the first effect of it in us and the making of the World a preparatory effect c. And so no doubt the first effect supposed us no men before and therefore no condition in us But if you take Predestination for Gods decree of Giving us Grace and Glory only then it is presupposed that we are lapsed sinners And the decree of damning men is exercised only on them as foreknown damnable sinners And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to sinners for sin supposeth them such punishable sinners But the bare Negation of a Decree to give faith to one to whom the absence is no privation is unfitly called Reprobation though men may talk at their own rates And we grant that some such no-decrees have no condition in the objects for they have no objects e. g. If you will feign that God decreed from eternity to give me no faith before the Creation or before I was born or to give Innocent Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him this were no reprobating act But when God hath given men a Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept here if he deny them necessary grace to believe it is a penal act And note that Christ and Common grace as absolutely given to mankind and offered to individuals ever goeth before mens accepting or refusing him And no man to whom he is offered refuseth him for want of necessary help till by sin against that grace he forfeit it XII God by an absolute and efficacious decree of his Will antecedently to the prescience of the future good use of free-will predetermined all good acts which are done in time specially those by which the predestinate come to eternal life Answ The substance of this seemeth true only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree efficacious from eternity which effecteth nothing till the Time I leave to them that dispute of words 2. You presumptuously determine Gods Decrees to be antecedent to his prescience herein when they are neither before nor after one another 3. If by predetermining you mean more than predecreeing or prevolition as if mans will was predetermined when it was not determined or determined before it had a being you speak contradictions But Gods own will was eternally determined if we may so say of that which was never undetermined to give all the grace that he giveth in time and to cause all the good acts that he causeth as he causeth them XIII The Co-operation of free-will with the gifts of grace is in the predestinate an effect of predestination and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to co-operate and consequently dependeth not on the sole and innate liberty of the will Answ I think so too XIV We must necessarily distinguish of a twofold help of Grace one sufficient by which man may be converted to God or work piously The other effectual by which God effecteth that he be actually converted and act piously Answ Hold to that and contradict not the terms in your description and all 's well XV. The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth mans free-will to act not only by perswading alluring inviting or other
doctrine of faith and Law and promises of Christaâ—e the Means which the Spirit useth in operating our Faith Love and Obedience And it is not two Covenants that give these two but as soul and body make one man so the Word of Christ and his Spirit make up one total cause of our sanctification The Spirit causeth us to believe that which the Word revealeth and to love the good which it proposeth and to obey the Precepts of the Word Therefore the Gospel is Grace and the Spirit is Grace that is a free gift of God to miserable sinners for their recovery and inward holiness is the effect of both And to feign that all obedience as it is performed to Christs Law upon its proper motives is therefore not of the Spirit or is our own Righteousness opposed to Christs because our own reason and free-will is exercised in it is Phanaticism and subverteth the Gospel and the Prophetical and Kingly Office of Christ II. God never gave a Law no not to the Jews only to convince them that they could not keep it but to be the Rule of their obedience And the Just did keep it in sincerity But the Law of Moses as separated by the ignorant Jews from the promise and grace of Christ could not be kept by any to Justification To say that Christs Laws now have no higher end than to tell us that we cannot keep them is Antichristianity Are we commanded to repent believe love God only to tell us that we cannot do it It 's true that without the Spirits help we cannot But it 's as true that the Command is the Rule of our duty and all the Gospel and Covenant of Grace is the means of exciting us to our duty by which the Spirit worketh in us faith repentance love and obedience But saith Jansenius the Law of Christ is to humble men in the sense of their disability and drive them to seek to Christ for his grace I answer 1. Is not humbling men and driving them to Christ a good effect If so then his Law is the means of all that good 2. Were the Gospel and all the Apostles Epistles written only to drive men to Christ and not to edifie them and make them perfect to salvation Were not the Precepts of Love and Holiness means of working Love and Holiness in men Is not the Word the seed that begetteth men to eternal life and is not the receiving of this seed into good and honest hearts made by Christ the cause of holiness and salvation Were not the Disciples clean by the word that Christ spake to them and doth he not say that his Word was spirit and life as being the concause of the Spirits vivification He that never received more benefit by Christs Doctrine Law and Gospel than to be convinced that he cannot believe repent obey or love God hath not yet the benefit which they are principally intended for But suppose that by Law he had meant the meer penal part or threatning as some words would make a man suspect 1. It 's a strange description of a Law to exclude the precept and premiant part and include only the penal part which is the last and least 2. As it is the same Man that hath Love and Hatred Hope and Fear so it is the same Law of Christ which hath precept and prohibition promise and penalty And it is the same Holiness or New Creature which is a conformity to all together Of which more anon III. He can never prove that all unbelievers have no Power to â—â—e any means which tendeth to â—aith by a preparatory grace nor that the use of all such means is Impossible to them XIII His distinction of Natural and Moral Impotency is good But then that Moral Impotency it self must not be made the same with the Natural else there will be the same reason for excusing sin by it If mans Will had been made by God such as could not possibly love him or holiness it would not have left a man unexcusable in judgement that his enmity was Voluntary It is reason enough for a man to kill a â—oad or Serpent as malum sibi naturale because it is a hurtful creature But this is no Moral Evil in them nor is their death their punishment nor yet in any ravenous creature which preyeth on the rest that are innocent And so would it be with bad men if God had made them bad Indeed if Adam have made them all bad and God have given no Saviour Grace or Remedy they are conâ—emnable and unexcusable as they were virtually in Adam if judged only by the Law of Innocency as made to Adam But they are excuseable if judged by Christ by the Law of grace which condemneth no man meerly as not innocent or a sinner but as a rejecter of grace These things are so plain and weighty that Jaâ—senius should not joyn with the Antinomians in opposing them XIV While he confesseth that Christ so far dyed for all as to procure them all the mercy which he giveth them I have no further quarrel with him but to prove that a Condition pardon of sin and grant of Life eternal with much means and help to make men perform the Condition which is but a suitable Acceptance is indeed mercy XVI That Christs grace is Love or Complacency in good is a truth which I highly value but with all these exceptions to his doctrine 1. It is the Heart of the new Creature and that which must communicate it self to all the rest or else they are lifeless and unacceptable For the will is the man in Gods account And complacency or love or appetite is the first act of the will which is it that he calleth with Augustine Delectation Grace lyeth principally in a Placet But the man hath more parts than his Heart And all other parts of sanctification are graces of Christ in their several places and not love only 2. Though no man is to love himself as God nor instead of God nor above God nor as the noblest ultimate object of his love yet all men are necessitated by nature to love themselves and therefore to desire their own felicity in loving God next to God as the final object of that love And so our end is finis amantis vel amicitiae which includeth mutual complacency and union though not in equality And to such an end grace causeth us to use the means And Christ is proposed to us as our Saviour and all his grace as for our good and all Gods commands as necessary for our happiness and sin is described to us to be hated as our oâ—â— evil and destruction and against our good as well as against Gods will and honour And with us this is denyed scarcely by the Antinoâ—ians themselves Much less by any judicious Christians 3. It is past the reach of any of us to prove that our actual love is the first effect of the sanctifying Spirit on the soul
the days of Arminius to this day especially between Prince Maurice and the States at the death of Barnevelt the imprisonment of Grotius c. The Synod at Dort and all the strife and discontent before and after it 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suecâ—nus Arminius Grevinchovius Corvinus Tilenus Episcopius Curcellaeus Grotius c. with many Lutherans And on the other side by Gomarrus Lubbertus Macchovius c. Molinaeus Amesius Dr. Twisse Rutherford Spanhemius c. and think how sad such Combats are 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries and much upon the account of these same Controversies And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written comparing the Calvinists to Papists Turks c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them and how small success all other Reconcilers have had though excellent learned judicious men such as Calixtus Johan Bergins Conrad Bergins Ludov. Crocius Mat. Martinius Isleburg Testaidus Amyraldus Placens Capellus Dallaeus Blondel Davenant Hall Carlton Abbot Morton Preston c. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders between the Jansenists and their Adversaries and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuites And of how many Ages continuance those contests have been 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis Cassianus and the Massilienses and their Adversaries and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men 7. From thence ascend to Chrysostome and his Reproaches and Austin's Censures on the other side with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times 8. And lastly read and pity almost all the Fathers especially of the Greek Church whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuites and after all this you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work if it be proved causless and you will think that it's time to end it if it be possible To which end an attempt is not discommendable if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men And some I doubt not God will bless it to at least to increase their love of peace A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished B. My Undertaking is this To prove that in the points of Predestination and Redemption there is no difference between moderate men of each Party * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis prima gratia sine ulla causa ratione aut conditione sine qua non sic etiam praedestinatur Neque solum negari debet ratio cur unus praedestinetur alii verâ— non ut quidam dicebant sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatioâ—â— siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam nisi per modum sinis Vasquez in 1. Them Disp 91 c. 7. You see how much a Jesuite granteth but what is resolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference but what is resolved into the question of the degree of Gods co-operating influx compared with mans agency and with it self as on several Objects which will prove either no difference at all or else about a thing past mans Understanding And that only in the point of perseverance there is a real perceptible difference but such as is not worthy to be insisted on to the breach of Charity or the Churches peace but must consist with toleration and mutual love A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come or frowningly on the Times past For if this be true what thoughts what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World so perniciously and distractingly with a feigned difference But I pray you tell me in general how you will manifest all this B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of 2. And then how I shall perform it I. It is not every violent Contender that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not and will say any thing rather than agree that I am speaking of About these matters there are two Parties that stand on each extream who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians but by other Names for their other Opinions These I intend to confute distinctly instead of reconciling them which iâ— impossible but by reforming them 1. On the one side I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants who hold That Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reason Lubentia juxta rationem and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacions premotion of God as is the motion of a Clock or other Engine or of a Bruit though they will needs call them free because they are Volitions as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature to say that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God at the first total Cause notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power and â—â— the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act it to deifie it also They that think that God cannot make a Creature whose Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated though God uphold all its powers and all natural concurrentâ— else and that a self-determined not predetermined by premotion is a God or a Contradiction I am to confute and not to reconcile A. How will you confute them B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point It shall now suffice to mind you that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity if not all Religion For when Adam's sin and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God as the first total Cause and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods or to Conquer God it 's easie to perceive whether God â—ate such sin and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it and whether he will damn men for not being Gods and whether he that is said unresistibly to predeterminâ— by immediate efficiency the thought will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken can have any word delivered by man which we can be sure is true In a word if this
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and
us in all this * Vid. Episcop Instit Theo. li. 4. sect 5. cap. 7. pag 415. col 1. 4. But as to presumption hereupon I answer you 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuse even Christ and the hopes of Heaven it self 2. As long as wickedness is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from he that is wicked may be sure that he hath not the benefit nor mark of Election and cannot have the least assurance that he is elect 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to persevere in godliness this is no rational inducement to him to forsake godliness any more than to renounce Heaven but rather to conclude I am decreed to persevere in holiness therefore I must so do 4. And to pass by the Controversie of perseverance till we come to it it is as all confess so few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election that this Objection can extend but to a few 5. Lastly None are certain of their Election but such as have strong clear active Grace and evidence that believe firmly and love God much and obey him carefully And such as these are fit to improve assurance and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude Did you ever know what love and thankfulness and delight in God and holiness are and yet can you think that they are the way to sin You know nothing in Religion if you know not that they are the life and soul of true Religion and the most powerful principles of Obedience and Perseverance Nor do you understand the Gospel-design if you know not that the greatest manifestation of the love of God is the greatest means of love and thankfulness and desire and delight in God and goodness unto man The ninth Crimination A. At least thus * Suetonius saith Tiberius was a neglecter of Religion because he thought that all things were ruled by fate Fate is set up in the World and all things are under necessity and unavoidable B. You had this Objection about necessity before and to the answer of it I refer you further 1. Immutable Election doth set up but a consolatory quietting certainty in the World without which mans mind must still be in troublesome unquiet if not tormenting terrours Is it a wrong to you if you can be sure to be saved Had you rather live and die under these apprehensions I know not whether I shall be in Heaven Kipping Philonatur l. 9. c. 11. p 431. voluntas ista absoluta hominem cum effectis suis ineluctabiliter necessitat hoc est ad unum oppositorum necessario constringit determinat omnia ejus acta eventa ut non aliter evenire queant quam eveniant where he confuteth Piscators Arguments for such necessitating Decrees p. 432 c. or Hell for ever If you have not certainty or a hope that is somewhat near it I think this conclusion if you be awake and in your wits must needs make your life a constant bondage and the fear of death your constant misery and must blast all the pleasures of your fulest Prosperity Thank God that his Foundation standeth sure and the Lord knoweth who are his and see that you keep his mark upon you professing Christ and departing from iniquity And do not cry out as if you were fatally carried to Heaven against your wills 2. As for the word Fate it is ambiguous Some by fate mean but the certainty that God's Predictions shall be fulfilled Quod fatur eveniet Some mean only the certain connexion of Causes and Effects under Gods sapiential Government of the World As Campanella maketh Necessity Fate and Harmony to be the result of Power Wisdom and Love but not accurately enough And some say but how truly I know not That the Stoicks took Fate for some primary necessitating Cause which did necessitate all Acts of the Gods and Men. It is a word that we have no need of they that will play them with it may 3. But as to Necessity again I say 1. Election maketh no mans sin or misery necessary nor tendeth to it 2. It maketh no mans Salvation Thus Fewrbornius in Fascicul Disser de termino vitae useth 17 Arguments contra sententiam Calvinianam de fatali simpliciter necessario termino vitae quasi Deus ex absoluto simplici decreto absque ullo ad causas secundas physicas voluntarias respectu câ—ique hominum genus horam mortis praesixerat And all upon the encouragement of some ill and unsound words of Piscator who is most extream in this whereas this is none of the Calvinists sense commonly who hold that sin is only fore-seen and not decreed but all true means are decreed with the end in one Decree therefore respected as decreed necessary against his will in sensu composito 3. The more it maketh our Salvation necessary that is certain and insuperable the greater is Gods mercy the greater our happiness and cause of gratitude and Joy The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their persevering blessedness If you shall Object That it necessitateth the perishing of all others because none can be saved who are not Elect. Remember that this was your third Crimination and is answered before I say again 1. Necessity and Impossibility are either Logical in ordine probandi or Physical in ordine causandi The first sort followeth upon your own Doctrine He that God fore-knoweth shall sin and perish it necessarily followeth Necessitate consequentiae and it is impossible but it should follow that he will sin and perish but not by Gods fore-knowledge Causal necessitating either taketh away the true power of escaping or depriveth of such power by prevention But so doth not the Election or Decree of God 2. Though we hold such absolute Election as hath been opened to you and that God decreeth to cause men to believe before he fore-seeth that they will believe in order of Nature according to humane Conception yet we hold as you do that Reprobation doth not so proceed but that God decreeth men to Hell only on fore-sight of final wickedness which he never caused or willed And if in this we agree with you you must accuse your selves as much as us 3. God doth both Decree to give and actually give men power to do more than they do And his decreeing that another man shall well use that power which he hath doth sure take away no power from you 4. Yea Gods not decreeing to cause you to use your own power well doth take none of it from you But includeth that such power you have much less his Decree to do more for others 5. All the World acknowledgeth that a Benefactor as such is free to give his own benefits as he pleases unequally And giving more to one taketh nothing from another Suppose that
The Jesuites themselves as well as the Dominicans deny as much as a possibility or power to unbaptized Infants of being saved And in their case are for as absolute arbitrary Reprobation as the highest not only Calvinist but Antinomian vid. Ruiz de praedes Tr. 3. disp 15. sect 1. p. 202 c. And this upon the irrational Doctrine that for want of baptism the Children of the holiest persons shall be condemned though the Parents did their best to procure it and so there is no will or sin the Cause And yet godly persons have Merits to spare for souls in Purgatory and none for their own Children Though you say that God decreeth to give men more power than they use yet you add that none of that power will ever be well used unless he fore-decree it For you say that God absolutely willeth or decreeth every good Act as well as the Power And so no such Act followeth any Power where God decreeth it not And what good doth that Power do them B. Still you anticipate those Controversies which belong to the point of Grace But I answer 1. You must answer this for your selves first for it as much concerneth you as us For you teach that what ever Power God giveth men it will never be exercised unless he fore-know that it will be so Yea unless upon fore-knowledge of mans due cooperation with God it be decreed For you say that God fore-knoweth all the Acts of Grace and Power that will be exercised yea and decreeth them on the said fore-sight as your Doctrine de scientia media inferreth 2. By this Objection there is no way to reconcile you to Gods Providence unless he will be ignorant of all mens future sinful Omissions or unless he will not be before-hand willing of all the good that is in the World or at least not decree it and be the Author of it Or else unless he will cause all men equally to use their powers and do good alike Now you dare not say that ever any of these shall come to pass You see and confess that all men do not use their power equally nor do good alike And you know God will not be before ignorant of it And you shall never abate Gods goodness so as to keep him from willing and working too all the good that is the world And will you therefore be unreconciled to him 3. And where you say what good then doth such power 1. I pray you mark that you confess that we hold that they had power And if they had power to do good they could have done it For what else is power but that by which I can do the Act. 2. The power given was a proportionable demonstration of Gods Power Wisdom and Mercy and therefore it did good 3. That it was not used to their own Salvation was their own fault for which they suffer And in all this we are agreed And now I appeal to your considering Reason whether there be any difference hitherto left in the point of Predestination between you and me And I again mind you that were it not for the importunity and prejudice of contenders all that I have said of this had been needless for it is obvious that while we are all agreed of these generals 1. That God decreeth to give all men just so much Grace or Mercy as in time he giveth them * Apud veteres ecclesiae patres eadem omnino suit controversia de causae gratiae Praedestinationis ex parte nostra Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. disp 9. pag. 658. 2. And that he absolutely decreeth not to give them any more but what he giveth them All this Controversie of Decrees or Predestination depends on the Controversie of Grace how much it is that God giveth unto men A. I confess that you have indeed proved your self reconciled to me But that is because you are an Arminian and do not know it For you grant me all that I can justly desire But the Calvinists will not be therefore reconciled to you or give you thanks B. Except the few Predeterminants afore-excepted and some odd words that drop from passionate or injudicious men I am past doubt that the generality of sober moderate Calvinists will stand to what I say or may do it I am sure in consistence with their main cause And I am confident that these are the healing-terms that must unite us And remember that you confess that thus far we differ not Had you but this following Doctrine from one of the greatest Jesuites Vâ—squez in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp 91. c. 11. p. 659. it might put you to your study to be able to disagree Catholica sententia est nullam causam nulâ—â—ve initium aut occasionem ex parte praedestinati excogitari posse ob quam Deâ—s aut in tempore gratiam ipsi donaverit aut in praescientia dare decreveâ—â— Doctrina haec non solum intelligenda est de initio fidei orationis aut See all this largely proved by him to the end of the 18th Chap. ibid. â—oluntatis consequendi salutem vel de aliis operibus quae circa Deum versanâ—ur qualia sunt religionis verum etiam de quovis opere moralis virtutis â—â—od in ipsum solum bonum honestum referatur Et non solum excludimus initium quod sit meritum condignunt sed etiam meritum congruum seu impetratorium aut dispositionem quamlibet causam occasionem ob quam Deus huic potius quam alteri gratiam donaverit aut donare praefinierit Ita â—â— totaratio praeparandi huic potius gratiam quam illi fuerit beneplacitum divinae voluntatis nihil autem vel minimum ex parte praedestinati Ita Thom. Marsil Gregor Armi. c. And yet must we disagree THE Second Days Conference OF PREDESTINATION Between C. a Calvinist and B. the Conciliator C. I hear of your undertaking to manifest the smallness of our Differences in the long controverted Articles of Predestination Redemption Grace and Free-will * Le Blank de dist Grat. Thes 80 81. Tanta varieâ—as sententiarum opinionum circa naturam essentiam gratiae efficacis rationem ac modum quo in animis hominum operatur quae a tot jam seculis scholas Christianas exercet arguit rem esse perplexam obsâ—uram quae undique multis difficultatibus scatet Nec spes est fore contentionum â—inem nisi curiositati modus aliquis statuatur omittantur quâ—stiones arduae nonnecessariae Ac profecto longe consultius foret paci ac pietati Christianae conducâ—bâ—lius in totum ab ejusmodi quaestionibus abstinere quam sine fine rixari de rebus quae difficultate sua ingâ—nium humanum obruunt in quibus vix quisquam sibi potest satisfacere Praesertim quaestionâ—s illae apud plebem Christianum in homiliis concionibus non tantum nullo cum fructu sed maximo saepe cum damno
may be said that God indeed is some cause of that without culpability yea by his Holiness and Power For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum as compared to the Correlate or terminus so he that causeth any of them hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation And so God by forbidding Adultery Lying c. by his Law doth by Institution make those acts to be sin that is He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed That Adultery is committed is long of man that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man God by his Law and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence but the existence or futurity you are so far out as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him as to the existence than the essence 2. But what is the existence but the essence existing or extra causas And what is it to cause sin but to cause it to exist And what is it to cause it to exist but to cause it or give it a being And what is it to will that sin shall exist but that the essence of it shall exist And what is it to will the event or futurity but to will that sin shall be And what more can man will or do about it to shew himself to be bad as Estius and others fully manifest C. I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin so he do not will it * Twiss Vind. li. 2. Digress 4. p. 201. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab hominâ— ut est peccatum Licet sit peccatum ut fit ab homine non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum hoc est sub ratione peccati Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit cum hoc â—â— in humanam voluntatem competat as sin and so may cause it Quod peccatum but not Qua peccatum B. Here are three things before us 1. The common substratum or â—atter of the sin which is the Faculty and the Object and the Act only in genere act us or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumstances 2. The Act thus circumstantiated 3. The Relative form of sinfulness 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first the Faculty Object and the Act as an Act e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder and Peter's denying Christ God gave them the Faculty by which they did it He â—pheld their natural power and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act But 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed but permitted only that is that David should hic nunc lust after her that was another mans wife that he should vitiate her that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword that Peter should speak those particular words c. In the first sense God willeth the Act which is sin and the Faculty which is sinful but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated And as for your Qua peccatum I tell you again few Sinners if any will it qua peccatum C. What say you to this undeniable Argument If God will not that Act which is sin he willeth almost nothing that men do For we sin in all someway or other And so God hath little to do in the world B. The last answer fully serveth to this If we sin in every Act yet all that is in every Act is not sin or prohibited All that is good in the Act is of God and willed by him But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act which God doth not cause or Will which morally specifie it as sin As when I pray I sin in praying coldly unbelievingly with wandring thoughts God causeth not these though he cause the Prayer Or to come from compound Acts to simple Those wandring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts but as they are upon an undue Object A lye is not a sin as it is a word but as this word which is false And so in all others C. But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves and not only in their circumstances Therefore if God there cause the Act he causeth the Sin B. No Act as an Act is forbidden but as circumstantiated by Object Time Mode Place c. Mr. Capell * Lib. of Tempt chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se But I answered before that all the Act in lying is Volition Intellection and Speech And these as such are not forbidden But only these particular words which are false The common instance is Odisse Deum But here hatred in it self is not the sin but â—s unduly terminated on God as the Object And this God willeth not C. By this you deifie man For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of And so man is made a first cause that is a God For the particularizing of the Object and the circumstantiating of the Act is aliquid something and must have some first cause B. The truth is this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants Which I have answered in due place and here briefly tell you 1. That when two Objects are before me a commanded and a forbidden one there is * I have noted after that Dr. Twisse saith Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale Armi. dic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile jucundum in many instances And God maketh the Object e. g. Honey or Eves fruit and God maketh the Appetite so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity that is that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee But whether thou wilt eat it he hath left free so that if God also caused that determinate act he caused all And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law the Object and the man and thereby maketh that if thou wilt cause such an Act so disordered it shall be thy sin and misery so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him ascribe all to him But as to Bonum utile he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile For it may be Conducibile ad malum interitum But it is not utile unless it be conducibile ad bonum yea ad finâ—m ultimum For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will And God is the Author
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially
usu ut in auditâ— verbi cum attentione meditatione virâ—ute sua efficaci singulis excitis liberrime sine coactionis impulsu raptâ— nova luce accensa in mente nova vero virtute voluntati communicata c. Qui assentiuntur obsequâ—ntur spiritui sancto virtute ejusdem id faciunt non tamen sine actione motu annixu Id. p. 722. Still note that the Grace called sufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able so do they to sufficiency of Grace Malderus in 12. qu. 111. â— 3. d. 3. saith Recte quidam eruditus annotavit neque praedicationem aut excitationem externam neque internam illuminationem intellectus simpliciter esse gratiam sufficientem quamvis in sâ—o genere quaeque sufficiens dici potest c. sed voluntas per boni affectus aspirationem supernaturali motione excitanda est Our Bradward shortneth all the Controversie li. 13. cor p. 208 109. telling us that Gods Will is the cause of every future and so of the future form of sin and that if there were no God there would be no Impossibile Whereas I think there would be nothing but impossibles For it would be impossible that any thing should ever be But there would be no propositions de impossibili Nay he talks of a non-posse esse impossibile and calls this mirum corrollarium Adrian Quodl 3. fol. 16. Quis duplicitur potest crederese a peccatis abstinere non posse 1. Quod non posset sine speciali Dei gratia adjutorio sic non errat 2. Absolute credendo se non abstinere posse a peccata aut non posse ad vitandum peccata a Deo sufficiens auxilium impetraâ—â— etiamsi fecerit quod in se est Et hic error est species infidelitatis opposita fidei ad quam obligatur credendo Deum juste pie miscricorditer mundum gubernare Illi-enim manifestissime repugnat apud nunquemque sanae mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit nec dare paratus est sufficientem facultatem homini inquam facienti totum quod in se est medium helps concauses c. B. You say true But remember still that this is from no change in the natural faculty as you confess For it was never in any man a power e. g. to act without dependance on God nor to act without an Object in Specie nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object nor without a due medium and necessary concauses Now if you mean that the change is not on mans faculties but on the Objects Medium Causes c. that men do not love God while unholy you are notoriously mistaken For it is Sin that hindereth And God is the same God and Christ the same Christ and the Word the same and oft the preaching the same to a Believer and an Unbeliever So that though outward helps and hinderances do much the inward cause is most considerable And if all were right within it were no sin in us to be disabled by outward changes It is no sin not to hear without a Preacher or not to see that which is invisible or not to understand that which is not Intelligible or not to love that which is not Amiable or that which is by distance or unfit mediums made no Object of our Acts no more than not to touch the Moon or not to see into the bowels of the Earth Therefore though it 's true that the Will is related as a power to capable Objects and not as a power to things that by incapacity are no Objects yet the change that is made on it self by Sin and Grace doth not make it no power and a power in this natural essential sense It is one thing that is called natural power or faculty and another thing that is called Aright disposition or habit Therefore as to the first the Soul of every man hath a true natural power to repent believe and love God and they omit it not for want of natural power but of something else A. Call it then a moral power if you will B. We must so call it But you must know what that is It is not a power of the same sort with the natural power The very word Power is equivocal or analogous to them Else Grace should increase the Essence of the Soul or make a man to be more a man than he was before And Dr. Twisse derideth the Arminians for saying that potentia fundatur in potentia viz. Moralis in naturali which were very just if it were powers of the same kind that were spoken of but now being otherwise it is unjust for no doubt but potentia moralis is in potentia naturali as health is in the Body Quest 4. But I further ask you Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate state love God above all and live a holy heavenly life yea or effectually and savingly believe by the meer power of their natural faculties till they are changed A. No that 's a contradiction to be unholy and holy I am none of those Pelagians that make Grace unnecessary to mans cure B. Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is existent something is wanting without which the acts of Holiness will not be performed Tell me then what that is A. That which is wanting to a man that hath sufficient Grace is nothing but his own Concurrence or Will For without any special Grace differing from sufficient he can believe But that which is wanting to them that have it not is sufficient Grace it self for believing which they want for abusing the antecedent Grace sufficient for preparation B. We speak not now of Grace as efficient ex parte Dei agentis But of Grace as it is in us or an effect of the former what is it in man that is wanting to believing Is it a natural Power or a right Disposition or what A. Till a man have sufficient Grace to believe it is proper strength or power it self that he wanteth and sufficient Grace is such a power But when he hath it he wanteth nothing but the Act which he can excite and doth not B. I confess I find Arminius Arnoldus Corvinus and others granting that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them and more than so saith Arnoldus There is more strength or power necessary now to believe in Christ than was necessary to Adam to keep all the Law partly because of the mysteriousness of Faith and partly because we must first be restored to a new ability which requireth more power than to keep what we had A sly equivocation turning the question from the potentia operata to the potentia operans If it did require more power in the efficient so to renew us it followeth not that he thereby putteth more power into us than Adam had But Gods Power hath no degrees
comparison of the ratio poenae in it But I much suspect that there is much Logomachie in the controversie and that it is mostly de nomine peccati non de re For I perceive some of them conceive of peccatum as a word that hath only an active signification from peccare And because an Infant doth not peccare actualiter therefore they say that Original Sin is not strictly called Peccatum meaning that the Name properly agreeth only to an evil Act. And can a Controversie de nomine make a heresie Ask them these Questions 1. Whether an Infant be not animal rationale liberum as having the same natural faculties with the Adult 2. Whether he be not then capable of virtuous and vicious Dispositions 3. And whether these are not bonum malum morale If he be not capable of malum morale than neither of bonum morale And if so then not of Holiness nor any moral aptitude for Heaven any more than a Beast This they all deny and therefore must needs say that their vicious inclinations are malum morale adapting them not only physically for physical evil but morally for punishment And truly if they will call Sin such a moral evil I will not break communion with them about the sense of Peccare C. But Amesius tells Grevinchovius that it may be proved by good witnesses that he denied Original Sin which Dr. Twisse many times over and over reciteth contra Corvinum B. As the instance of three or four single persons is nothing to my business so I am no judge of any such Reports unless I had heard the witnesses my self I have had so many notorious lyes confidently reported of me by men not contemptible that it hath taught me to be backward in receiving any Accusations and judging before I hear the accused Especially a man that writeth much is more to be judged of by his Writings than by Back-biters Reports C. But Episcopius is no way to be excused Nor Bishop Jer. Taylor who copiously plead against Original Sin B. Therefore they are not the persons that I have now to do with but have else-where as copiously proved Original Sin and confuted such Arguments as they use But the chief of my Arguments they touch not The second Crimination C. They say that man before regeneration can do that which is spiritually good and hath power to use his naturals well so that by degrees he may thereby come up to a state of saving Grace or be fitted to be a Believer And that some can believe and repent that do not Whereas the Scripture maketh men dead in sin and out of Christ we can do nothing B. This unhappy CAN I tell you is our Cannon that battereth our Peace and Love and pardon me if I tell you as I did them that I doubt whether you understand well what it signifieth Tell me Quest. 1. Have not wicked men natural life Or are they dead C. No man doubteth of that B. Quest 2. Have they not natural powers or faculties for natural Acts C. Nor is that denied by any man B. Quest. 3. Is it not the same natural faculty of Intellection by which we understand and believe things common and spiritual And the same natural faculty of willing by which we love or will them both C. Nor is that questioned by any B. Quest 4. Is there not such a thing as common Grace distinct from and short of true Regeneration or Sanctification C. Yes we are all agreed of that B. Quest. 5. Is there any Nation or People in the World that are not obliged by God to use some means towards their own Conversion and to forbear their Sin C. No doubt of it but they are obliged to perfect Obedience and they are specially obliged to repent and use some means thereto B. Quest 6. Is there not such a thing in the World as a true power to do something that never is done and forbear what is not forborn C. I know not what to say to that An hypothetical power and secundum quid so called there is But of proper power I doubt Dr. Twisse against Hord li. 1. p. 71. saith Suppose all men had power to do any good If God will not give them velle quod possunt is it possible that they should velle bonum if God will not work it in them B. It is a logical impossibility of consequence nothing to the purpose which also fore-knowledge would infer But as to real power denominating the Object possible it is a palpable contradiction to say I have true power to do an impossible thing when to say I have power to do it and to say it is possible to me are all one Else-where Dr. Twisse can say that Gods velle eventum is not necessary ad possibilitatem sed ad eventum Do you doubt whether Adam was able to have forborn the sin and so sinned for want of power to do otherwise C. An obediential and passive power he had and faculties that were able hypothetically if God had predetermined them by premotion and effectual Grace But of the rest I doubt B. We will not be diverted with empty words A dead man hath an obediential passive power as the School mean it An hypothetical or conditional power is no power when the condition is not existent If you say Adam could not but sin you make his standing a natural impossibility and God the cause of all his sin whom he could no more overcome therein than make a World And will men then believe that God hateth that sin which he unresistibly causeth and sent Christ to die for it and will damn men for not doing natural impossibilities C. Well! suppose as commonly we do that Adam was able to have stood and consequently that there is a true power in the World that 's never acted B. Quest. 7. Is no man by Nature with common helps and Grace able to do more good than he doth and forbear more sin C. No doubt he can if he will But the doubt is of his Will B. Quest. 8. Is no man by Nature and common Grace able to will the doing of more good and forbearing more evil than he so willeth C. His Will hath natural power but it is contrarily disposed B. Quest 9. Can no man by Nature and common Grace notwithstanding the undisposedness of his Will yet so far restrain or prevail against his undisposedness as actually to will and do more good and less evil than he willeth and doth C. If Adam could have forborn all sin I must think common Grace Pâ—aecipitur nobis bene agere non quod possimus ex nobis illud facere sed quia si faciamus totum quod in nobis est semper Deus paratus sit facere quod in se est Aegid Colum. Quodl 2. qu. 30. p. 121 122. Nostrum est enim secundum Damascenum sequi Deum vocantem ad virtutem vel diabolum vocantem ad malitiam unde Damas l. 2.
And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts 2. That Free-Will is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts and the first motion of the affections before deliberation and choice or liberty as Vasquez also saith which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of Ockam Buridane and the rest of the Nominals who call it Complacency as antecedent to Election yea and Intention To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act Though the Scotists say that quoad exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis even that is free And it seems the same which Augustine and Jansenius call primam aelectationem But converting Grace it self Molina takes to be a habit wrought by Gods special help in and with the word or means His words are of men that are hearing Gods Word or thinking on it Influit Deuâ— in â—easdem notitias inâ—luxâ— quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat tum ut res melius dilucidius expendatur peâ—etret â—umâ—etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitia supernaturalis ad finem supernaturalom in suo ordine attingat Inde oritur in voluntate motus affectionis c. Yet no Jesuite is supposed to go further from the Calvinists than this man In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuites Arminians Lutherans and all such are willing to ascribe as much to Gods Grace as they think consistent with mans Free-will and Gods not being the cause of sin which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour thoughâ—hey seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired save themselves and those that hear them 1. Tim. 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death James 6. ult And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again and which remaineth in us Are you now in doubt of this C. It is one thing for God to work with the Word and another thing to work by the Word The first we confess But if God work by the Word then he must operate first on the Word which is the Preachers act and so by that Word on the soul and not immediately Therefore I rather think that the word is a concomitant than an instrumental cause B. 1. You wrong your self and Christ in that you will not believe him John 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear Do you not know that you do not know how Gods Spirit moveth our intellect and wills and how he maketh use of instruments except secundum quid in some particles revealed 2. An hundred Texts of Scripture which I omit lest I be tedious tell us that the Word is a means or subordinate cause to God of his informing and reforming operations on mens souls And it 's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so concomitant as to be but co-ordinate with the first cause and not subordinate to it And the word is not only subordinate to God as Instituter by Legislation and Declaration but also to God as efficient operator 3. God can work two ways by the Word which are within our reach besides others 1. As it is the act of the speaker by exciting and illuminating him 2. As it is the species as they call it received by the senses and imagination which God can by his power set home to the attainment of the due effect 4. And yet I know not any or many of your Adversaries that deny that besides this Divine operation by the VVord God hath another immediately on the soul exciting it to operate upon the VVord as the vis plastica vitalis materna operatur in semen jam receptum But I will here forbear to trouble you with the physical difficulties whether the VVord heard be only objectum intellectus or also causa efficiens as light is both to the eye And whether it be operative on the intellect or only terminative with other such like C. Well I must grant you that all Infused Faith as to the act is Acquired But all Acquired Faith not Infused but infusion is added to our own endeavours like the creation of the humane soul B. I am glad that we are got so far on towards peace But Quest. 4. What mean you by Infusion Is it not a Metaphor C. Yes and we mean that immediate perswasion of God which you even confess to be besides his operation by the Word and by our Cogitations Even a Creation of an act or habit B. Quest. 5. Is it the name Infusion or the thing that you plead for C. The name though I confess Metaphors must not be used unnecessarily in Disputes is yet convenient but that I leave indifferent B. Quest 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of mans own Intellect and Will or Soul and that immediately C. Yes that cannot be denied B. If so then when you say that our act is Infused I hope you will confess the term to be none of the plainest and you only mean that Gods Grace doth so operate on the faculty as to excite it so to act and consequently that the thing first and properly infused is not the act of Faith it self but the vis impressa facultatem before described by which the act is caused And so in a secondary sense the act may be called Infused but not most immediately C. I confess it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infused and therefore we use to distinguish habitus infusos ab habitibus acquisitis rather than actus infusos ab actibus acquisitis B. Is that Habit before the Act or after it C. You know that it is a Controversie among our selves Mr. Pemble saith it is before and the common opinion is that it is after the first special Act. B. 1. I once received that from Mr. Pemble ignorantly But that cometh to us by not distinguishing the vis impressa or first received influx of the spirit from a Habit when as Amesius well saith it is fitter called semen fidei vel dispositio quaedam than a Habit of Faith For 1. no man can prove such an antecedent habit and therefore none should assert it 2. The true nature of a Habit consisteth in a promptitude to perform that special act with facility But that we should have such a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Christians but no Christians as having not yet believed in Christ is not probable according to our
commonest observation 3. All other Habits follow the Acts and therefore we have little reason to say it is otherwise here C. Doth the Soul believe before it is inclined or disposed to it B. Inclination is a hard word and belongeth both to Natural Inclination such as we have to Felicity and to Habits and to meer Dispositions And a pre-disposition we grant As when you spur your Horse you make him first the patient of your act and by suscitating his natural faculty you dispose him to a speedy motion though the similitude doth not quadrare per omnia because Gods influx is on the whole Soul it self But this Disposition to the present act is far less than a proper Habit or it 's another thing C. When I spur my Horse or whip my Dog I do but stir up a former faculty or slothful power But God giveth a new life and power to them that were dead in sin B. Yet I cannot take words for matter 1. It 's nothing but the natural faculty or power which you suscitate in the beast And hath not an unbeliever the Natural faculties or power Is he not a man Why do you not bury him if he be not alive 2. Death in sin is relative or real The Relative is Reatus mortis which denominateth men filios mortis and is done away by pardon The real is the Privation of a holy disposition to the act of Faith and Repentance c. or of the Act it self or of the Habit. You can name no other Now 1. the death which consisteth in the privation of the first disposition to act supposing all natural dispositions is taken away by the first influx or suscitation of the Holy Ghost 2. And by the same in secunda instanti is caused the Act and the death gone that lay in its privation 3. And in the third instant or afterward by degrees is taken away the death which lieth in the privation of the Habit. And this giving the Habit is called in Scripture and by Divines Sanctification as following Vocation and it is wrought in us by degrees and not all at once and that by the Spirits power with and by our exercised Acts. In my youth I was so prematurely confident of the contrary that the first Controversie that ever I wrote on was a Confutation of Bishop Downam Amesius Medall de Vocat Mr. Tho. Hooker c. in Defence of Pemble herein but riper thoughts made me burn that Script C. But the spur or rod putteth no new power at all into your Horse but Gods Spirit putteth a new Power into us B. I have talkt long enough to you about Power before and therefore would not turn back needlesly to say it over again Gods Spirit putteth no such thing into us as we call a faculty or natural power For that is the form or essence of the Soul and our Species is not chang'd by Grace But he giveth us that which is called a Moral Power which consisteth conjunctly in the concurrence of means and objects and the disposition of our faculties to the act Hear Dr. Twisse against Hord pag. 12. lib. 2. He secretly maintaineth that every man hath such a power by Grace by which he may repent if he will Concerning which Tenet of his we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power but we say it is nature rather Page 18. Truly I see no cause to deny this that even the wicked could do good if they would We may safely say with Austin Omnes possunt Deo credere ab amore rerum temporalium ad Divina praecepta servanda se convertere si velint Here is posse se convertere id est velte si velit But saith Twisse pag. 170. l. 1. But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency moral with impotence natural as if there were no difference which he oft sheweth is but the want of actual and dispositive willingness Now the rod or spur may cause both a present disposition and an act of will C. But is this all the new Life and Spirit and Divine Nature that is given us Sure it is much more B. No doubt but it is much more But that Spirit Life and Nature is promised and given to Believers and is promised on condition of our accepting Christ in whom is our life And therefore it is that habitual Grace which followeth the first act of Faith and is a nobler disposition to the following acts C. Will one act of ours cause a Habit B. Not as ours only But when the Spirit will work by it it will But even that Habit I told you is weak at first and increased by degrees But proceed and tell me Quest 7. Are you sure that in the Acquisition of Habits there is no immediate operation of God on the Soul that causeth them C. We all hold an immediate Influx necessary to the Being and Action of every Creature natural and free but not an immediate Infusion B. What 's the difference between Influx and Infusion C. The first is an universal operation the other a particular B. Do you mean that the difference of the acts or operations is at all ex parte agentis sen act us ut est agentis antecedent to the effect or only in the effect it self C. I dare not say that there is any difference in God for it is against his simplicity and his very will and act as in himself is his Essence though varioâ—sly related and denominated by cannotation Therefore I must needs confess that the diversity is only in the effect B. Do you not see then what a delusory and troublesome stir men make for and about meer words What 's the Crimination come to then about Acquired and Infused Habits when the difference is only in the effects You confess that all proper Habits Infused are by our cogitation and use of means and so are also acquired And you confes that all Acquired Aabits are wrought besides our cogitation and use of means by an immediate influx of God so that as to the Causes you can name no difference And yet the words Acquired and Infused signifie a difference in the Causes and their operation and not in the Effect by their notation Is not this deceit then C. Tell me what you take to be the difference your self B. 1. I suppose that ab uno omnia God without diversity causeth all diversity which is only in the Creatures and not in him 2. I suppose that God hath appointed natural means and second causes for common natural effects and his Will is that they shall operate according to their aptitude And that he hath appointed extraordinary means even Christ and supernatural Revelation for the production of saving Faith And it is his will that they shall work usually according to their aptitude 3. It is his command that we use these several means natural and supernatural accordingly 4. As these means are special extraordinary and for a special end
by it self anon Before we come to that these things I here conclude of 1. That the Diversity of Nature or Receptive Dispositions being presupposed God hath an established order of means and a congruous established universal Concurse which quantum in se as far as belongeth to it to do worketh equally on all 2. That this established measure of aid or concurse recipitur ad modum recipientis and operateth variously as to the effects according to the various disposition of the Recipients from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetcht and not from it 3. That this established measure of Concurse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient be both resisted and overcome or frustrate 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace so do all wicked Hi praecedanâ—i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti rebellis voluntatis vitio suffocari penitus extingui pâ—ssuâ—t in multis solent adeâ— ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impressâ— fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae c. mutentur plane in contrarium c. And even Alvarez Disp 18. n. â—0 saith Si non operatur actione qui est in praeceptâ— imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod suâ— culpa se impedivit ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat ut actualiter operaretur sicut si Deus imponeret homini prâ—ceptum volandi quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas adjutorium necessarium uâ— volaret ipse autem responderet Dâ—mine nec vâ—lâ— alas accipere nec volâ—re meritâ— reputaretur reus etiamsâ— non possit absque alis volare qâ—ia sua culpaâ—se impedirit ne illi dâ—narentâ—r a Deâ— men in some cases now And so do all godly men in most of the sins if not all which they commit 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us and when he leaveth his ordinary way but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes even in his wonders So it is very probable that in the Works of Grace Recovery and Salvation he ordinarily keepeth to his established order his Ordinances and fixed degree of Concurse 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works and a free Agent and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concurse than he tieth himself by his Wisdom and Free-will so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace and can when he please forsake that order and work Miracles by Grace as well as on natural things above nature He can strike down Saul and convert him by a voice from Heaven and in a word can do what he will 7. And as in most wonders its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order and work contrary to it or without such second causes as are unknown to us though we can tell when he acteth unusually So is it in this case about his works of Grace A Comet or Blazing Star is an unusual thing whose necessary antecedent cause we know not And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes operating in their established course so are ecclipses better known and unusual Tempests and terrible Lightnings c. So great and sudden unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners and yet all in Gods established course of working and by those second causes which are to us unknown C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent and Grace is hiâ— immediate work or off-spring B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation Preservation and in all the works and changes of nature and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course 2. It s unknown to us what means he useth out of our reach in his operations upon souls as well as in nature 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature yeâ— as morality is but the modality of things natural so we may conceive that God may possibly work it by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions and the recipients 4. Immutability and constancy is one of Gods perfections and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits that is not as they are mutable and the acts contingent but as they have a higher object But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified Angels and Saints are far better than ours And why should we think unsetled mutability of efficiency to be the best discovery of Gods Immutability 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature B. What will you say if I name you such a second universal cause though if I could not it followeth not that therefore there is none such I think I can name you one that all Christians should know and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered JESUS CHRIST as MAN and MEDIATOR is Gods Administrator General of the humane world and is compared to the Rising Sun which illuminateth all the world with a light suitable to it and them So Christ is the light of the world the Sun of Righteousness that ariseth with healing Grace and enlightneth every man that cometh into the world or as Crotius and Hammond render it which coming into the world enlightneth every man supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender and not the Accusative Masculine In him was Life and the Life was the light of men not only to the sanctified who received but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently the light shined in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not The world that was made by him knew him not He came to his own and his own received him not yet he came to them But as many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God John 1. 3 10 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ Matth. 28. 19 20. that all things are delivered into his hands John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church Ephes 1. 22 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour 1. Objectively 2. And as to his Doctrine Covenant and Example But what 's that to internal efficient Grace which is immediately from God
B. Great is this mystery of Godliness there is more in Christ than you take notice of even the Spirit which must work Grace in mens souls is two ways given first to Christ 1. In that as Administrator general the power of giving out the Spirit to mankind is now given to Him even in his humane Nature And he giveth it out in manner and measure suitable That Grace habitual is participatio naturae divinae and how and in what sense Vide Caceres sum Theol. 2. 2. cap. 1. And abundance of Jesuites and other School-men go as far in asserting its supernaturality and some in ascribing it to Christ as Protestants do But Vasquez and many go farther than many Protestants in supposing Christ the cause not only of Grace but of our Election to Grace And yet even there the difference is most if not only in words The Thomists maintain even that Christs humanity is the Instrument of the Deity in operating Grace in us which the cause of the Eucharist leadeth them to 1. To himself 2. To us 3. To his established means and Ordinances by which he worketh So that now the Spirit with its aid common or special is not given to any sinner immediately from God as Creator and as it was given to Adam before his fall but by the Mediation of Christ the Redeemer I mean not only the moritorious and procuring mediation but also the powerful conveying mediation Though God the Holy Ghost be still proximately the cause of Grace yet Christ as Mediator is made by office the Mediator and authorized giver of that Spirit and all its Grace and so the measurer and orderer of his helps and appointer of the conditions 2. And Christ is first filled with this Spirit personally himself that he may be a fit Head of vital Influence to all his Members who by the previous operations of his Spirit are drawn and united to him C. How prove you all this universal power in Christ B. You have heard the express proof And study further 1 John 5. 11 12. And this is the record that God hath given us eternal life and this life it in his Son He that hath the Son hath life and he that hath not the Son hath not life Rom. 8 9. If any man have not the Spirit of Christ the same is none of his Mark that it is The Spirit of Christ John 15. 26. The Comforter or Advocate whom I will send to you from the Father John 16. 7. If I depart I will send him to you John 14. 26. The Comforter whom the Father will send in my name Gal. 4. 6. And because ye are Sons God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying Abba Father Gal. 2. 20. I live yet not I but Christ liveth in me and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the Faith of the Son of God who loved me John 5. 21 22. The Son quickneth whom he will for the Father judgeth no man but hath committed all judgment to the Son 26. For as the Father hath life in himself so hath he given the Son to have life in himself And that you may see that he giveth the Spirit with and by means he saith Verse 24. Verily verily I say unto you He that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me hath everlasting life John 6. 27 32 33. Labour for that meat which endureth to everlasting life which the Son of man will give you For him hath God the Father seated that is openly owned as appointed to this Office He giveth life unto the world Whoso eateth my Flesh and drinketh my Blood hath eternal Life Dwelleth in me and I in him My Flesh is meat indeed As the living Father hath sent me and I live by the Father so he that eateth me even he shall live by me Verse 63. It is the Spirit that quickneth the Flesh profiteth nothing John 3. 34. God giveth not the Spirit to him by measure John 7. 39. This he spake of the Spirit which they that believe in him should receive John 1. 5. 4 5. Abide in me and I in you As the branch cannot bear fruit of it self except it abide in the vine no more can ye except ye abide in me I am the vine ye are the branches He that abideth in me and I in him the same bringeth forth much fruit for without me or out of me ye can do nothing Matth. 28. 20. I am with you always to the end 1 Cor. 6. 17. He that is joyned to the Lord is one Spirit 2 Cor. 3. 17. The Lord is that Spirit and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty Phil. 1. 19. Through the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. Col. 3. 3 4. For ye are dead and your life is hid with Christ in God when Christ who is our life shall appear then shall ye also appear with him in glory Ephes 1. 22 23. And gave him to be head over all things to the Church which is his body the fulness of him that filleth all in all Do you need more to prove this great Office of Christ C. Here is more than I have well thought on But I find more to prove Christ the vital Head to his Church than to prove him the universal dispenser of all Grace whatever is given to the world B. Read them over again what would you have more than all Power all things all Judgment given or committed to him And to be by Office the Redeemer Saviour and light of the world coming as such even to them that neither comprehend him know him or receive him I add another Text Prov. 1. 20. to the end Wisdom crieth without she uttereth her voice How long ye simple ones will you love simplicity and the scorners delight in their scorning and fools hate knowledge Turn you at my reproof behold I will pour out my spirit unto you I will make known my words unto you Because I have called and ye refused see the rest Ver. 32. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them And two things more I offer for your conviction 1. That to shew both his Power and that he will exercise it orderly by means Christ impowred his Apostles and Ministers under him to give the Spirit And if the extraordinary Gifts were given by the laying on of their hands no wonder if the ordinary were given by their Doctrine 2. That on this ground Christ shall be the universal Judge of all the world as he was the universal Law-giver and light to all But what need I more when it is his very Office as Christ as Prophet to be the universal Teacher by Spirit and Word and as Priest to sanctifie by Spirit and Word and as King to rule by Spirit and Word C. I am amazed to think how little we well understand of our very Fundamentals and Catechism which we teach the ignorant Methinks in this universal Light
I see more than ever I before observed that God indeed hath set up a Sun an universal medium a Christ who in our nature is a Creature to be the Donor and Convey or of all Recovering Grace to man and to give out the Spirit in that stated order and measure as is suitable to his design and Subjects And as on earth he gave out much light and help which was resisted and rejected I now less wonder that it is so now he is in heaven even as to his Spirit as well as his Word When I consider that though God be Infinite his Grace is given out to mankind finitely by a finite Creature Christ as man even as God shineth to us not immediately but by the Sun I will no more then account it an injury to God that he should be said to give limited and resistible degrees of Grace by Christ but repent that I have so much grieved and resisted the Spirit of Christ my self B. Proceed now to your other accusation The eighth Crimination C. They make mans Free-will and not Gods differencing Grace to be the cause that one man by Faith doth differ from another that hath Remonstr Synod ubi supra Si quaeratur quae sit causa cur hic convertitur non autem ille Respondemus hic convâ—rtitur quia Deus bunc non apponentem novam contumaciam convertit Ille non convertitur quia novam contumaciam opponit Quaeres cur hic opponit novam contumaciam alter nons Respondemus Hic opponit quia oppoâ—ere vult Ille non opponit quia a gratia movetur ne opponere velit Quaeres annon ille qui non opponit novam contumaciam per consequens convertitur majorem â—abebat gratiam quam qui opponit per consequens non convertitur Respondemus Antecedentem praevenientem gratiam aequalem esse posse sed coopelantem habâ—t prior non posterior no Faith Contrary to Paul's supposition who made thee to differ Tilenus could not answer Camero to this charge B. I doubt here again is a Controversie about words I will speak to you as to one that would know the truth 1. De re as to the Controversie 2. As to the meaning of the Text. I. Let us here consider 1. What it is to Differ 2. What are the causes of such difference I. To DIFFER is nothing but to be dissimile unlike Dissimilitude or Difference is a Relation This Relation as Ockam truly and largely sheweth is nothing extra intellectum besides its fundamentum subjectum terminus the Absoluta II. Difference then being a Relation is the dissimilitude of divers persons compared Here the natural numerical difference of persons and abundance of other differences are presupposed And it is the Difference between a Believer and an Unbeliever the Penitent and Impenitent as such that we have to consider of Now here are two Subjects differing and in each one if not two differences from the other So that here are two if not four several Relations of dissimilitude between them 1. Paul is a Believer by which he differeth 1. From Nero as a Privative Unbeliever 2. As a Positive Unbeliever On the other side Nero 1. as a privative Unbeliever 2. and a positive differeth from Paul Now every one of these Differences or dissimilitudes have a several cause 1. The fundamentum of both Paul's differences from Nero are hiâ— own Faith and the Termini are Nero's Privative and Positive unbelief 2. The fundamenta of Nero's difference from Paul are his Privative and Positive unbelief and the Termini are Paul's Faith to both Now if the question be what doth Constitutive make Paul differ from Nero it must be answered Paul's Faith and Nero's unbelief For dissimilitude resulteth from the one compared with the other And if both had been Believers there had been no difference And so were this the question there were no difficulty in it at all But the meaning of the question is not of the constitutive cause of the dissimilitude or the fundamentum but of the efficient cause of that fundamentum or else of the diversifying Dispositiv Receptiva Now supposing that Faith and Unbelief are the constitutive differencing causes the efficient causes of both must be sought as the Ratio discriminis and not of one only Quest 1. What is the cause efficient of Nero's unbelief Ans His own will or wicked heart Quest 2. What is the efficient cause of Paul's Faith Ans 1. The Principal efficient is God by his Spirit 2. The meritorious cause is Christ 3. The chief ministerial efficient is Christ as giving the Spirit to work it 4. The Instrumental efficient is the Gospel 5. The Immediate efficient is Paul For it is he that believeth and not God Is there any one that denieth any of this C. I doubt they think that mans will is more the cause than the Spirit because they suspend the Spirits success upon mans will B. Accuse not men by suspicions and doubts without proof yea contrary to their own professions Your crime of uncharitableness is not theirs nor doth it follow that they are faulty because you are suspicious * Alliac Camer â— â— q. 12. B. Dâ—us nullum praedestinavit ant praedestinat accipiendo predestinationem secundo modo propter aliquod bonum aut aliquâ—m causam praevisam in praedestinato quia non stat aliquem noviter aliquod bonum habere quin Deus prius voluerit aâ—â—terno c. You may read Corvinus to Tilenus expresly assigning the efficiency of all that Grace that maketh us to differ principally unto God Some of them only say man cannot effect or convert himself but he can resist and so require no more of man to his conversion but not to resist yea not to resist in an obstinacy and high degree Others of them require of man also an actual concurse of his will by his power received with the concurse of God But they make God here incomparably the chief efficient not only as to Priority of operation but as to his causation of the effect And they use to illustrate it some time as Scotus by the similitude of two drawing at a Ship sometime by a Father that should bid his Son lift at a heavy weight and resolveth to put to 900 degrees of the force himself if his Son will but endeavour and put forth one degree In this case if the Son will not put forth that one which he can do and so the event fail it is not by the Impotency nor absolute unwillingness of the Father And if the child do put forth that one degree will you say that he doth more to the effect than the Father that doth 900 parts and that only because that the Father would not do all himself But this carrieth us from the matter in hand and is after to be spoken to C. But if you make so many things go to make the difference the question who made thee to differ must have
just but needing a particular remission For if a man cannot fall away however he live he may give up himself to lewd carnality and say I cannot fall away B. This is the same shameless self-contradicting Accusation and needs no other Answer As if you said If a man cannot fall away he may fall away To give up himself to carnality is to fall away And you say that he may do this because he cannot The Doctrine of your Adversaries is That God will certainly keep the godly from turning from him to an ungodly fleshly life And how doth this conduce to ungodliness A. The conceit of safety will make them careless B. Not if they conceive that their safety and their carefulness are equally decreed The bad and ignorant will abuse any thing But I am perswaded that very many live the more holily for this belief 1. Because as Prophecies conduce to their own accomplishment in that what men believe will certainly come to pass they all promote and will not oppose So it is in part in this case 2. And when they believe that God will have it be it greatly animateth their endeavours by hope and taketh off their discouragements 3. And when they find that God hath in his Decree conjoyned their care and labour to the end and hath no more decreed their perseverance than that they shall carefully avoid sin and temptations it maketh them fear that they are not Elect when they find these signs of Election to be doubtful and so preserveth them from presumption and security The third Crimination A. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable in two respects 1. In that it alloweth no man to be sure of his present Justification Pardon and Adoption who is not sure that he goeth further yea that he is not quite in another statâ— than any man that ever fell away which it is not possible that many if any one at all should be 2. In that it alloweth no man to be sure of his Justification and Adoption till he have so much Grace as that no Temptation how great soever would turn him from Christ if he were tried by it B. Wherein is the uncomfortableness of these A. I. I have known my self some fall to Socinianism Arrianism yea Infidelity denying Christ or his Godhead which is his chief Essence and the Scriptures and therefore sure had no saving Grace then and died so who had forty years lived in as eminent Piety Humility diligence in all religious Duties charity to others neglect of the World and patient suffering for their Religion oft times as almost any men that ever I knew And that they did not dissemble not only their constancy suffering and whole Conversation shewed but my own intimacy with them assured me by which I knew the very thoughts of their hearts Some of them were not of judgments clear and strong enough to discern the fallacies of Deceivers Others of them were naturally too hasty in judging And some were carried away by the advantages of the constant company of extraordinary able and insinuating Seducers But divers of them even after they apostatized did continue so much strictness of life and charity to all men and religiousness in their Theism and Infidel way and neglect of the World as convinced me that it was more the insufficiency of their judgments than the hypocrisie of their hearts which was the cause of their Apostacy Now by the Calvinists Doctrine none of these men were ever in a state of Grace And of the strictest Professors round about us there is not one of many hundreds that goeth so far as they did And all these must be left uncertain of their Justification till they are certain that they went beyond them all yea and certain that they are unjustified while they are certain that they came short of any one of them B. The case that you describe I have known and it is sad But we know not the hearts of other men There might be more sin and hypocrisie in them than we know of A. Though God only be the searcher of hearts yet long intimacy and near experience may make us so confident of some mens thoughts as that I confess to you you will never change my mind if you plead against so great experience I know their judgments were insufficient But I will never believe that their hearts were false as to what they knew B. God hath made his Word and not other mens hearts the rule for us to judge our selves by A. But if you think that his Word tells us that we are the Children of the Devil till we go beyond any that ever fell away we must look both to that Word and to such Apostates B. The truth is assurance of Justification and Salvation is not easily nor commonly attained And it is not Opinions alone that will procure it And while we have that sin and weakness which is the cause of doubts which Opinion soever we hold we shall find occasion for our doubtings But let us hear your second part of the Accusation A. II. They hold that if any man fall away by what temptation soever it is because he was never sincere And consequently that he is not sinâ—ers that would fall away by the strongest temptation that possibly may assault him So that every poor weak Christian whose Infant-strength is not proportioned to the greatest temptations must needs take himself to be still but an Hypocrite B. We stand not by our own strength of habitual Grace but by the upholding Love and Will of God * Carbo ex Aquin. 1. 2. q. 137. a. 4. Si persevâ—rantia sumatur pro ipso habitu indiget dono habitualis gratiae ut caeterae virtutes infusae si autem accipiatur pro actu perseverantiae durante usque ad mortem non jolum indiget habituali gratia sed etiam gratuito Dei auxilio conservante hominem in bono praedestinatis per gratiam Christi non solum datur ut perseverare possint sed ut perseverent ut Augustin Per se potest perseverare in malo non autem in bono Bradwardine who holdeth that no temptation can be overcome without special help that is a divine Volition or Decree doth yet hold that the same Will of God which saveth one man by overcoming his temptations saveth others by keeping temptations from them A. 1. When we dispute against their Doctrine it is from the immortal quality of the seed of God abiding in them that they plead for certainty of perseverance 2. Who findeth not by constant experience that God worketh on all things according to their Natures And so on man as man and so on Saints as Saints and on the weak as weak and on the strong as strong Do we not see that he giveth men wisdom and all Intellectual abilities before they speak and do as such abilities must fit them to do When did you see Gods Grace make ignorant injudicious fools or weak persons judge speak and live in
that we are commanded not only Thankfully to Accept but Thankfully to obey our Lord Redeemer and Saviour Lib. No. P. Quest 3. Date you deny that life or death eternal dependeth on this as a Condition or Moral means and that we shall be judged according to it Lib. No. I deny it not P. Quest 4. Is it not a Law that thus commandeth us and by which we must be judged Lib. Yes If it were no Law there were no duty and sin in belief and unbelief P. Quest 5. Is not a man so far just and justifyable by that Law as he keepeth it and justifyable against the charge of being one that must be Damned by producing the Condition of pardon and life performed Lib. Yes I deny it not P. Quest 6. And doth not the same Law virtually justifie the performer now whom it will justifie as the Rule of Judgement at last Lib. Yes no doubt P. Quest 7. And is not the Name of Righteousness many score times given in Scripture to our own actions done by Grace and measured by the New Covenant Lib. Yes I cannot deny it P. Why then while you deny neither Name nor Thing what wrangle you about And let me plainly tell you that such men as you by indiscreet ever-doing are not the least of Satans instruments to bring the Gospel under scandal and harden the world in Infidelity and the scorn of Christ while you would so describe the Christian Religion as if this were the very heart and summ of it Believe that all the Elect have fulfilled perfectly all Gods Law by another and that Christ did it as personating each of them and therefore no crime of their own is imputable to them nor any kind or degree of Goodness or Righteousness in and of themselves is at least required of God as any means or condition of their present or future justification by their Judge or as having any hand therein As if God were become indifferent what we all are so that Christ be but Righteous for us when as it was Christs grand design to restore lapsed man to God which he doth not only by Relative benefits but by Renewing them to his Image in love and holy obedience Lib. Have you not lately and oft been told that holiness and obedience are necessary now but it is to other Ends than to justifie us as for Cratitude c. P. 1. We easily grant it is for other Ends than Christs Merits were and not to justifie us as they do nor in that Causality They are not to purchase for us a free gift of pardon and life nor the Holy Ghost c. as Christ did 2. But again tell me Hath not Christ a Law that commandeth our obedience to those ends as Gratitude which you mention And is not the keeping that Law a thing that the same Law will so far justifie us for Yea a Condition that life dependeth on And if the Cause in Judgement be Have you kept it or not must you not in that be accordingly Justified or Condemned Give over cavilling against plain necessary truth Lib. By this you will fall in with the Papists who take Justification to be partly by Christs Righteousness and partly by our own and partly in pardon and partly in faith and holiness P. Tell not me of the Names of Papists or any to frighten me from plain Scripture truth 1. Why may not I rather say Why go you from all the antient Writers and Churches even Augustine himself by your new and contrary opinion Was true Justification unknown for so many hundred years after the Apostles 2. The most zealous Antipapists do confess that some Texts of Scripture do so take the word Justification And multitudes of Texts so take the words Righteous and Righteousness And he that will impartially consider them may find that more Texts than are by us so confessed do by Justifying mean Making us Just and so Accounting us on all these causes conjunct 1. As being Redeemed by Christs Merits 2. And freely pardoned 3. And having Right to life 4. And renewed to Gods love and Image 5. And so justifyable at the Bar of Grace by the Law of faith and liberty 3. And the reality of all the Matter of this Doctrine is past doubt if the Controversie de nomine Justificationis were not so decided CHAP. IV. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ Lib. III. YOu bring in your doctrine of personal Righteousness to Justification by feigning Christ to have made a new Law whereas the Gospel is but a Doctrine History and Promise and not a Law and so no Rule of Righteousness and Judgement And this many Protestants have asserted P. I have read some such sayings in some men And some I think meant no more but that Christ did only expound and not add to the Law of Nature called by them the Moral Law And these I have excused for their unhappy kind of expression But for the rest that mean as the words sound universally they subvert Christianity and as the Arrians denyed Christs Godhead so do they his Office and Government and are somewhat worse than the Quakers who say that the Spirit within us is the Law and Rule of Christ which is better than none I pray answer me Quest 1. Is Christ the King and Ruler of the Church Lib. Yes P. Quest 2. Is not Legislation the first and principal part of Government Lib. Yes P. Quest 3. Do not they then that deny Christs Legislation deny his Government Lib. Yes P. Quest 4. Is it not essential to Christ as Christ the name signifying Relatively his Office to be King Lib. Yes P. Quest 5. Do they not then by this deny Christ to be Christ Lib. No for they confess that he hath a Law but not that he made any since his birth P. We grant 1. That the Law of Nature now is His Law 2. And that the first Edition of the Law of Grace to Adam after the fall was his Law 3. And Moses Law was partly his But you will not say that we are under this last nor I hope that he hath no other than the two first Lib. Why what other can you prove P. It is the Name or the Thing that you deny for you use to confound the cases 1. Whether the name be fit judge by these Texts Gal. 6. 2. Bear ye one anothers burdens and so fulfil the Law of Christ James 1. 25. The perfect Law of Liberty Rom. 8. 2. The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus c. Rom. 3. 27. Boasting is excluded By what Law Of Works Nay but by the Law of faith Mic. 4. 2. For the Law shall go out of Zion c. So Isa 2. 3. 8. 16 20. 42. 41. The Isles shall wait for his Law 1 Cor. 9. 21. We are under the Law to Christ Heb. 8. 10 16. I will put my Laws into their minds and hearts James 4. 12. There is one Law-giver c. Isa 33.
but the Baptismal Covenant where sure the condition is notorious and every Baptizing Minister prerequireth the profession of it CHAP. VII Whether Justifying Faith be a Believing in Christ as a Teacher Lord c. or only a Receiving of his Righteousness P. VI. AS to this your sixth Charge I have said so much elsewhere in my Disputations of Justification and in other Books that I cannot justifie the tiring of Readers by repeating it And will say now but this little following 1. That Paul doth not distinguish between justifying faith and saving faith but excludeth the Works excluded by him from being the causes either of Justification or Salvation 2. That if Receiving Christs Righteousness be meant by them properly and physically it is no sort of faith at all but only the effect of the donation which they call Justificari or passive Justification But if it mean a moral metonymical Reception that is nothing but Consent to have the offered gift And if only Consent to have Christs Righteousness be Justifying faith then all the Assenting part is excluded in which Scripture much placeth it and most Divines in part and many in whole besides Camâ—ro and his followers And so also all the Affiance or Fiducial â—cts are excluded which almost all include even that which they call Recumbency being distinct from Consent 3. All these acts following are essential to Justifying faith as well as this Consent to be Justified 1. An Assenting belief in God in the baptismal sense 2. An Assent to the truth of Christs Person Office and Doctrine 3. A belief in the Holy Ghost 4. A belief of Pardon Sanctification and Glory as possible purchased and offered by Christ 5. A Consent that God be our God in Christ 6. And a Consent that Christ be our Teacher 7. And our King and Ruler 8. And our Intercessor 9. And our Judge and Justifier by sentence and as our Advocate 10. A belief of his Resurrection Power and Glory 11. A Trusting to the Father and the Son according to these forementioned Offices 12. A Consent to be Sanctified by the Holy Ghost 4. Plainly our Justifying and Saving Faith in Pauls sense is the same thing with our Christianity or becoming Christians And the same thing with our Baptismal faith and consent 5. To believe in Christ as Christ is in Scripture Justifying faith But to accept his righteousness only and not to believe in him as our Lord and our Teacher and Intercessor c. as aforesaid is not to believe in him as Christ 6. In my Answer ubi sup to Mr. Warner and elsewhere I have detected the fraud of their quibling distinction who say that All this is in faith quae justificat but not quà justificat as supposing a falshood that any act of faith quà talis justifieth 7. They that say that only our Acceptance of Christs Imputed Righteousness is the Justifying act of faith and that to expect to be Justified by any other viz. by Believing in God the Father and the Holy Ghost and believing a Heaven hereafter and believing the Truth of the Gospel and of Christs Resurrection Ascension Glory c. and by taking him for our Teacher Ruler Intercessor c. is to expect Justification by Works in Pauls disclaimed sense and so to fall from Grace I say they that thus teach do go so far towards the subverting of the Gospel and making a Gospel or Religion of their own as that I must tell them to move them to repentance not only the adding of Ceremonies is a small corruption in comparison of this but many that in Epiphanius are numbred with Hereticks had far lesser errors than this is CHAP. VIII Of Faiths Justifying as an Instrument P. VII ANd I have said so much in the foresaid Disputations of Justification and other Books of Faiths Instrumentality and the reason of its Justifying interest that I cannot perswade my self now to talk it out with you all over again but only to say 1. That I have fully oft proved from many plain Scriptures that pardon and salvation are given with Christ in the Covenant of Grace on Condition of a penitent believing fiducial acceptance And therefore that it is most certain that faith is a Condition of our Justification and so to be profest in Baptism 2. The name of An Instrument given to faith and its Justifying as an Instrument are of mens devising and not in Gods Word 3. But as to the sense It is certain that faith is no Instrument of our Justification Gods or Mans if it be meant properly of an Instrumental efficient cause 4. But if it be taken Metaphorically for an Act whose Nature or essence is An Acceptance of a free Gift and so by Instrumentality be meant the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere that is Faith 's very Essence in specie then no doubt it is what it is 5. Or if by an Instrument be meant A Moral aptitude or Disposition of the person to be justified answerable to the Dispositio Recipientis vel materiae in Physicks then it is such an Instrument But how well this is worded and what cause there is to contend for a word both of humane invention and metaphorical and this as if it were a weighty Doctrine I leave to sober judgements 6. But it is certain that the Accepting Act of faith is but its Aptitude to be the condition of the Gift and therefore that its being made by Christ the Condition is its Moral nearest interest in our Justification CHAP. IX Whether Faith it self be imputed for Righteousness Lib. VIII WHat do you but subvert the Gospel when you put faith instead of Christ or of his Righteousness When the Scripture saith that we are justified by Christs Righteousness Imputed to us you say it is by faith imputed P. Do you think any sober Christians here really differ or is it only about the Names and Notions Which ever it be 1. Of the name Is it not oft said that Faith is and shall be imputed for Righteousness Rom. 4. 22 23 24. James 2. 23. Lib. Yes I must grant the words but not your meaning P. Where doth the Scripture say that Christs Righteousness is Imputed to us Remember that it is only the Name that I ask you of Lib. It saith that Righteousness is Imputed and what Righteousness â—an it be but Christs P. I tell you still it is only the phrase or words that we are first trying Are these the same words Righteousness is Imputed and Christs Righteousness is Imputed If not where are these latter words in Scripture Lib. Grant that the words are not and your words are P. Then the question is Whether Scripture phrase or mans invented phrase be the better and safer in a controvertible case And next Whether you should deny or quarrel at the Scripture saying that faith is imputed to us for righteousness and not rather confute our misexpounding it if we do so Lib. Well Let us examine the sense then What
against those things which their ignorance misrepresenteth to themselves And so Gods ordinances are made a snare to souls which are appointed for their salvation and the man that can kindle in his hearers a transporting passion against this or that opinion or form as Popish is cryed up for an excellent preacher and seemeth to edifie the people while he destroveth them 11. And by this means you seem to justifie the Papists lyes and calumnies against the Protestants by doing as they do They belye Luther Zuinglius Calvin Beza c. with just such intentions and such a kind of zeal as some over doing Sectaries belye them And is it bad in them and good in you 12. You teach the people a dangerous and perverse way of reasoning à minùs notis which will let in almost any errours From a dark text in the Revelations or Daniel or from the supposition that the Pope is the Antichrist and all Papists have received the mark of the beast you gather conclusions against the notorious duties of Love and peace which the light of nature doth commend to all Not that I am perswading you that the Pope is not Antichrist but that all things be received but according to their proper degree of evidence S. Now you open your self indeed All that revolt to Popery begin there with questioning whether the Pope be the Antichrist and telling men of the darkness of the Book of Revelations P. I tell you I will abate no certainty that you have but increase my own and yours if I could but I would not have any falsly to pretend that they are certainer of any thing than they are And no certainty can go beyond the ascertaining evidence And if all Scriptures be equally plain St. Peter was deceived that tells us of many things hard to be understood which the unlearned wrest as other Scriptures to their own destruction And if the Revelations be not one of the hardest I crave your answer to these questions 1. Why are five Expositors usually of four opinions in the expounding of it when it is those that have spent much of their lives in studying it as Napier Brightman c. who are the Expositors 2. Why will none of you that find it so easie at last write one certain Commentary which may assure which of all the former if any one of them was in the right 3. Why did Calvin take it to be too hard for him and durst not venture to expound it 4. And if you take it to be so necessary as you pretend tell me whether it was so necessary and so taken by all those Churches that for a long time received it not as Canonical Scripture Surely they were saved without believing it Though no doubt but the book of Revelation is a great mercy to the Church and all men should understand as much of it as they can But all that I blame you for here is the perverting of the order of proof in arguing à minùs notis 13. And these over-doers that run things into the contrary extreams do most injuriously weaken the Protestant cause by disabling themselves and all men of their principles to defend it and arming the Papists against it by their errors When it cometh to an open dispute by Word or Writing one of these mens errors is like a wound that lets out blood and spirits and puts words of triumph into the adversaries mouth A cunning Papist will presently drive the ignorant disputant to resolve his cause into his mistake and then will open the falshood of that and thence inferr the falshood of all the rest And what an injury is that to the souls of the auditors who may be betrayed by it and to the cause it self For instance If one of our over-doers hold that we are reputed to have kept all the Law of Innocency and merited salvation our selves by Christ or that no act of faith is Justifying but the accepting of his righteousness or that faith Justifieth only as the efficient instrumental cause or that we have no righteousness which hath any thing to do in our Justification but only Christs imputed Merits or that mans faith Love or obedience are not rewardable c. how easily will a Papist open the falshood of such an opinion to the hearers and then tell them that they may see by this who is in the right And alas what work would one Learned Papist make in London by publick disputing if we had no wiser men to deal with him than these over-doers They may call Truth and Sobriety Antichristian and talk nonsence as against Popery successfully to their own party but I hope never to see the cause managed by their publick disputes lest half the Congregation turn Papists on it at once If Chillingworth had not been abler to confute a Papist than those that used to calumniate him as Popish or Socinian he had done less service of that kind than he did 14. And it is an odious injury that these Over-doers do to the ancient and the universal Church while in many cases they ignorantly or wilfully reproach and condemn them as if they were all the favourers of Popery and call their ancient doctrine and practice Antichristian Some of them ignorantly falsifie the Fathers doctrine and upon trust from their Leaders aver◠that they held that which they plainly contradict and that which they held indeed they cry out against as Popery Such an instance we have newly in a Souldier Major Danvers an Anabaptist which I have detected And will Christ take it well to have almost all his Church condemned as Antichristian 15. And hereby what an honour is done to Popery and what a dishonour to the Reformed Churches when it shall be concluded that all the Churches heretofore even next after the age of the Apostles and almost all the present Churches were and are against the doctrine of the Protestants and on the Papists side And yet how many do us this injury and the Roman Church this honour About the nature of Justifying faith and its office to Justification and about the nature of Justification it self and Imputation of Righteousness and free-will and mans Works and Merits and about assurance of salvation and perseverance how many do call that Popery which the whole current of Greek and Latine Fathers do assert and all the ancient Churches owned and most of all the present Churches in the world And those that call all forms of prayer Popery or the English Liturgie at least when almost all the Christian world have forms and most such as are much worse do but tell men that the Christian world is on the side that they oppose and against their way 16. And it is a crime of infamy to be taken for Separatists from the universal Church And in doctrines and forms of Worship not only to avoid what we take to have been a common weakness but also to condemn them as Antichristian or as holding pernicious errours is but