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A09386 A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.; De prædestinationis modo et ordine. English Perkins, William, 1558-1602.; Cacot, Francis.; Tuke, Thomas, d. 1657. 1606 (1606) STC 19683; ESTC S103581 116,285 285

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sanctifie Any but Those who are cleansed and dead to sinne Redemption washing away and sanctification are partakers together The Application is when as Christ is giuen vnto vs of God the Father by the Spirit in the lawfull vse of the Word and Sacraments and is receiued of vs by the instrument of a true faith And Christ being giuen is made vnto vs of God wisdome righteousnes sanctification and redemption 1. Cor. 1. 30. The accomplishment of the application is Glorification whereby God shal be all in all by Christ in all the elect By this which hath been said it is apparent that the decree of election is the cause and foundation of all good giftes and workes in men From hence is true faith Act. 13. 48. As many as were ordained vnto eternall life beleeued And calling Rom. 8. whom he predestinated them he called And who are called of his purpose Hence Adoption Eph. 1. predestinated to Adoption And sanctification Eph. 1. He hath chosen vs that we should be holie and blamelesse Hence good workes Ephes. 2. Which he hath prepared that we should walke in them And perseuerance Ioh. 6. All that the Father giueth me shall come vnto me and 〈◊〉 6. 37. 39 him that commeth to me I cast not away Againe And this is the Fathers will that of all which he hath giuen me I should lose nothing 2. Tim. 2. 19. The foundation of God remaineth sure and hath this seale the Lord know●te who are his Excellent is that saying of Augustine He did choose no man worthie but by chusing he made him worthie Againe Cont. Iul. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. In Psal. 41. It is the grace of God whereby he doth elect me not because any worthines is in me but because it doth vouchsafe to make me worthie Againe And did not they also afterwa●ds chuse him and preferre him before all the good things of this life but they did chuse him because they were chosen they were not chosen because they chused him And thus much of the decree of election The decree of reprobation is a worke of Gods prouidence whereby he hath decreed to passe by certaine men in regard of supernaturall grace for the manifestation of his iustice and wrath in their due destruction or it is his will whereby he suffreth some man to fall into sinne and inflicteth the punishment of condemnation for sinne It hath in like manner two actes The first is the purpose to forsake some men and to make knowen his iustice in them This act hath a finall cause but no impulsiue cause out of God For it ariseth of Gods meere good pleasure no respect had of good or euill in the creature For the will of God is the cause of causes therfore we must make our stand in it and out of or beyond it no reason must be sought for yea indeed there is nothing beyond it Moreouer euery man as Paul Rom. 9. 21. auerreth is vnto God as a lumpe of clay in the potters hand and therefore God according to his supreme authoritie doth make vessels of wrath he doth not find them made But hee should not make them but find them made if we say that God willed in his eternall counsell to passe by men only as they are sinners and not as they are men for causes most iust though vnknowen to vs. Thirdly if God did reiect men because he foresaw that they would reiect him reprobatiō should not depend vpon God but vpon men themselues And this is all one as if a man should say that God foresaw that some would chuse him and others refuse him And the contempt of the Gospell doth not befall infants which die out of the couenant of the Gospell Fourthly Paul who was a most skilful defender of Gods iustice doth exclude all workes in the first place out of this wonderfull election of one from another made in the counsell of God Not by worke● saith he and therefore excludeth all respect of sinne then Rom. 9. 11. afterwards being rauished with admiration he quieteth himselfe in the alone will of God Who hath resisted his will But O man who art thou which pleadest against Rom. 9. 19. 20. Rom. 11. 33 God Againe O the deepenes of the riches both of the wisedome and knowledge of God how vnsearchable are his iudgments and his waies past finding out To conclude if it be demaunded why God created this world and no more we must haue recourse 〈◊〉 ●he meere will of God and why must we not doe so if it be demaunded why God electeth this man and forsaketh that man or another Author de vec gent. A part of mankinde is redeemed a part perisheth But who can tell why God doth not pity them and pitieth these the reason of the distinction is vnknowen but the distinction or separation it selfe is not knowen The second act is the ordaining of them to punishment or due destruction This ordination in respect of the diuerse consideration thereof may be distinguished and so it is either simple or comparatiue The simple ordination is that wherby this man suppose Peter or Iohn is ordained to punishment And this ordination is of the most iust will of God yet not without respect of originall and actuall sinnes For as men are actually damned for sin so God hath decreed to damne them for the same sinne Yet notwithstanding sin is not the cause of the decree of reprobation but in regard of order it goeth before in Gods fore-knowledge not that former but this latter act The ordination which stands in comparison is that whereby one man and not another and this man rather then that being in the like condition is ordeined to punishment This serueth to shew the libertie of Gods will in the dispensation of supernaturall benefits For in that God chuseth this man and not that it declareth the libertie and very great perfection of God and therefore vnder the name of an housholder he challengeth the same vnto himselfe when he saith May I not do● Ma● 20. 15. with my own what I list And verely though God destroy and condemne all those whom he doth forsake yet should he not be iniust For we our selues in the daily killing and slaughtering of beasts will not be counted vniust neither indeed are we and yet in comparison of God we are not so much worth as a flie is in respect of vs. If it be lawfull for thee to receine in or to thrust out any out of thine house because thou wilt it were a point of desperate boldnes to take the same right from God in his house The cause of this comparatiue ordination is the sole wil of God yea euen without respect of any sinne at all So Augustine God deliuereth no man but of his free mercy and condemneth no man but m●st righteously Now why he deliuereth this man rather then that let him search who can diue into the great depth of his iudgements Againe why is
Anselmus It Comment in Math. c. 11. is not ours to know why God demeth grace to them which would gladly receiue and consent to grace and neglecteth another that would so well consent vnto it This is onely In Rom. cap. 11. knowne ●●to God Againe No creature is able to search out why he is mercifull to this man rather than to another x The same doe other Summ. 1. par quae 23. art 5. Schoolmen affirme in ●e midst of Papacie Gregorius Ariminensis laieth downe sixe conclusiōs cōcerning Predestination First that there is no bodie predestinated for the well vsing of freewill which God for●knew that he should haue Secondly that no man is predestina●ed because he was foreknowne to cōtinue to the end without Cont. Gent. lib. 1. c. 44. any let of habitual grace 3. That whomsoeuer God predestinated ●●m hee did predestinate freely purposedlie and of his pure mercie Fourthly that no man is reiected for the euill vsing of free-will which God foresaw he would be tainted with Fiftly that there is not any reiected because hee was foreknowne to haue finally an impedimēt of diuine grace Sixtlie that whomsoeuer God reiected him hee did reiect without anie cause in him The very same conclusions hath Petrus de Alliaco lib. 1. sent quaest 12. art 2. and Marsilius of Inghen lib. 1. dist 42. q. 4. Some of whose words I will set downe He is predestinated saith he to whom God hath purposed to giue euerlasting life And he is reiected on whom God hath determined not to bestow the same as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 9. Againe No man that is predestinated is predestinated for any thing which should bee in him in time to come so also there is no reprobate reiected for any cause which was to be in him in time to come And euery one that is predestinate is predestinated only by grace by Gods mercifull disposition not for any cause either actuall or priuatiue to bee found in him whiles hee liueth Againe To reiect is to nill to shewe mercie and this is not for the euill workes of In sent lib. 1. quae 22. art 2. any creature for how holy soeuer the workes were God would shew mercie as he listed So also Francis Mar. lib. x. q. 31. art 2. 3. saith that there are foure signes necessarie for the vnderstāding of the proceeding of predestination and reprobation First in which Peter Iudas are offred to the diuine will as to neither of thē both And ●hen the diuine will 〈◊〉 preordaine P●ter vnto gl●●ie but it had no posi●ne act about Iudas according to ●u●ustine The second s●gne is in which hee preordained Peter to grace and thē he had ●o posi●●ue act as yet about Iudas The th●●d signe 〈◊〉 in which they are left to themselues and bot● o● them doe fall into sinne The fourth s●gne is that in which Peter riseth againe ●or he cannot continue because he is predestinated by the first signe But Judas riseth not againe because he hath not God to raise him vp therefore hee is reiected D. Bannes in 1. Thom. q● 23. The cause and reason of the whole worke of reprobation cannot be said to bee in the reprobates for sinne it selfe cannot be the cause of that pennission of sinne for which a man is damned whether it bee originall or actuall as it appeareth in infants who die only with originall sinne which verely howsoeuer it may be the cause why infants are forsaken in it yet neuerthelesse it cannot bee the cause and reason why the whole nature of man should be suffered to fall in Adam And Ferrariensis in Thom. cont Gent. pag 603. saith that foure things are found in a reprobate to wi● a sufferance to fall into sinne the sin it selfe Gods forsaking not raising him from sin and the punishment or damnation Now reprobation is not alike but diuersly affected to all these For if we consider sinne in it self reprobation is not caused by i● Although nothing on our parts to wit no worke of ours bee the cause of the whole work of reprobatiō for of al these together namely of the permission forsaking and punishment the manifestation of Gods iustice is the alone cause considering that no worke of ours is the cause of the permission yet notwithstanding our wicked working or sinne is the cause why wee are damned and punished Againe We denie that God is cruell for we say that God doth not punish and torment the reprobate for the fulfilling as it were of his owne fancie but for sinne eternally foreknowne which he determined so to dispose of by punishing of it that his iustice might be made manifest Thomas Why hee ele●teth these vnto glorie and reiecteth those he hath ●o reason but the diuine will Againe The difference of those which are to be saued from them that are to be damned proceedeth from the principall ●●●ention of the first Ag 〈◊〉 Againe Wee 〈◊〉 not enquire why he conuerieth these and not those For this commeth of his owne meere will And Augustine vpō Iohn Why Lib. 3. c. 161. hee draweth this man and not that do not desire to iudge if thou wouldest not erre Neuerthelesse reprobation in regarde of the second act that is in respect of the purpose to damne is not absolute but for sinne For no man perisheth but thorough his owne default and no man is absolutely ordained to hell or destruction but for his sinne hauing also receiued before in Adam power whereby hee was able to liue holily and happely if so be that hee would And therefore I say that that which they alleage is a very calumnie Secondly I answer that God did not simply create man to destroy him but that he might manifest his iudgement by the iust destruction of the sinner Now it is one thing to will the destruction of a man as hee is man and another thing to will the deserued destruction of a man as he is a sinner Heere also the iudgemēt of Cameracēsis a iudicial Scholeman is to bee heard and obserued According to the Scripture saith hee although God should punish or afflict some creature eternally or vtterly abolish it without any sinne in it yet he should not deale vniustly or cruelly with it Whence it is Wisedome 12. 12. Who dare accuse thee if the nations perish which thou hast made God is not bound to lawes created as if any thing were iust before God did will i● whereas indeed the contrarie is true The third Crimination is That the Stoicall predestination and fate is brought in by vs because as they say wee teach that all things come to passe by the necessarie and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Powerfull in working energetical decree of God yea euen the fall of Adam the which say they God according to our opiniō did decree and will Answere We say that Adams fall came to passe God not only foreknowing but also willing and decreeing it and that without blasphemie if thou wilt
to worse maketh a necessitie to sinne and yet the necessitie although it be voluntarie is not able to excuse the will nor the will although it bee enticed to exclude necessitie If any man shall say that by this our platforme many are tied by an ineuitable necessitie to bee damned I would haue him giue care to Augustine who saith Hold this most stedfastly and doubt not in De fide ad Pet. cap. 35. any wise that any can perish whom God before the creation of the world hath of his free goodnesse made vessels of mercie or that any of them whom he hath not predestinated to eternall life can by any meanes be saued And yet I say that the decree of reprobation doth not cause a necessitie of damnation in any man For the first act thereof which is a purpose not to shew mercie causeth not this necessitie in men but goeth before it as an antecedent and man himselfe verily hath brought vpon himselfe this necessitie with his owne most free yet rebelling will Now the second act of Reprobation which is a purpose of condemning causeth not any necessitie of damnation but by the sinne of man comming betweene Moreouer the necessitie of damnation followeth after the same manner by the foreknowledge of God and yet this neuer seemed a thing strange vnto any one But some will say that the foreknowledge of God doth neuer cause in men any necessitie of damnation although it doe assuredly foresee the same And I say also that Reprobation doth either not at all cause damnation in man or that it doth not cause it but for sinne But it may be obiected They that are predestinated vnto damnation cannot be freed by repentance although they would Whereto I answere with Augustine As they did fall by their will so by their will they are content to lie and he that turneth himselfe Ar● 15. away from God hath both depriued himselfe of will to doe that which is good and also of power It doth not therefore follow as they imagine which obiect such things that God hath taken repentance from those to whom he gaue it not and hath throwne downe those whom he hath not taken vp Moreouer the selfe same necessitie followeth of their hypothesis who affirme a bare permission For that which God permitteth the selfe same thing will hee not hinder and euill if God hinder not cannot bee auoyded and that which cannot be auoyded shall come to passe infallibly And therfore euill permission being once graunted of necessitie cōmeth to passe although most freely on mans part Whereupon it is plaine that the decree of God is not more ineuitable than is the very permission separated from the decree I doe wish that they would well weigh and cōsider this who obiect vnto vs either the Stoicall fate or the do●ages of the Manichees For we differ from them as much in certaine iudgement opinion as whosoeuer doe differ most For first the Stoickes doe tie God vnto the second causes so that he cannot doe otherwise then the nature of them will suffer wee on the other side doe hold that all second causes do depend vpon and are ordered by God Secondly the Stoickes say that neither God nor second causes can doe otherwise by their nature than they doe wee say that some second causes are by Gods ordinance mutable othersome immutable and that God himselfe can either not doe that which hee doth or else doe it otherwise But now to come to the Manichees who make two coeternall gods we but one They of their two Gods make one good and another euill we say that there is one absolutely good iust God Thirdly they wil haue one of their Gods to bee the cause and worker of good things and the other of euil we make one true God the creatour and ruler of all things and working nothing but that which is most good and most iust Fourthly they say that they which are created by their good God cannot sinne we say that God doth most freely conuert whom hee will and when they are conuerted they can neuer in this life perfectly be free frō sinnes but doe sometimes run into such sinnes as doe grieuously wound the conscience Fiftly they say that they that are created by the euil God simply cannot be conuerted wee say that vncleane spirites and men were created both good and holy but yet they fell by their owne will and fault and not by any fault but the iust permission of the Creatour and brought vpon themselues a necessitie of sinning And although it be true that man cannot withhold himselfe from sinning vnlesse God giue him that grace yet doth he not sin of necessitie that is of compulsiō but willingly And the will hath sufficient libertie if by it selfe or the nature therof it be inclinable to the cōtrary of that which it chooseth and doth of the owne accord choose that which it chooseth although the same liberty bee gouerned and one way limited by God Wherefore I am flat of Anselmus opinion who saith Although Lib. de concor grat lib. arbitr it bee of necessity that those things do come to passe which are foreknowne and predestinated yet some things foreknowne and predestinated doe not come to passe by that necessitie which goeth before a thing and causeth is but by the same necessitie which followeth a thing For God doth not cause although he doth praedestinate them by forcing the will as by resisting it but by leauing them in the power thereof And I am also of Gaudentius his opinion who saith The Iewes Ser. 3. ad Neophy were willing to doe that euill which they did And verily if they had bin vnwilling to doe it they had not done it And it is a grosse sinne but to thinke that God who is not onely good and righteous but also goodnesse and righteousnesse it selfe doth either command or compel any thing to be done which he condemneth when it is done But that I may in a word fully deliuer my opinion if it bee demanded how the will of God carrieth it selfe to good or euill I answere that in a good act God carrieth himselfe positiuely For first he determineth the euent of good by willing effectually to worke it and secondly hee inwardly inclineth the will of the creature to doe that good which it doth Thirdly he sometimes laieth a necessitie of immutabilitie on him that doth well but yet it is ioyned with an exceeding freedome After this sort the elect Angels doe necessarily obey God yet not by constraint but greatly coueting and with all the strength of their will desiring it not being thereunto compelled In an euill act I say that God carrieth himselfe priuatiuely not by a logical but a natural priuation foregoing the habit For first he willeth that euill come to passe not by doing it himselfe but by willing not to hinder it to be done by others Secondly he doth not inwardly incline the will to doe euill but