Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	necessary_a	produce_v	sufficient_a	2,945	5	8.9424	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A46699	A second part of The mixture of scholasticall divinity, with practical, in several tractates: wherein some of the most difficult knots in divinity are untyed, many dark places of Scripture cleared, sundry heresies and errors refuted ... Whereunto are annexed, several letters of the same author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning Original Sin. Together with a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.	Jeanes, Henry, 1611-1662.; Taylor, Jeremy, 1613-1667.	1660 (1660)	Wing J508; ESTC R202621	508,739	535

〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 custome or obedience to our lawfull Superiours may render decent that whatsoever some 〈◊〉 law of nature commands not the doing of that if it be but wearing such a garment which the Canons of any Church 〈◊〉 nay by parity of reason a Cloak or a but 〈◊〉 Doublet is absolutely unlawfull by 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Cor. 14. 40. 33. This being the bottome of those arguments of Amesius I may safely tell Mr. J. that they could no otherwise beat either Bishop Morton or Dr. J. 〈◊〉 out of the field 〈◊〉 that they thought them utterly 〈◊〉 their making reply's 〈◊〉 He that thinks 〈◊〉 is nothing 〈◊〉 nothing lawfull the omission of which is not sinne doth 〈◊〉 use other Dictionaries then we do discernes no difference 〈◊〉 lawfull and necessary 〈◊〉 as the 〈◊〉 of Fa all production of all things will not allow a cause to be sufficient to produce any effect which it doth not produce and so produce that it cannot 〈◊〉 produce it which is to tell me that I sit and walk at the very i me when I stand still it being certain that I am equally able to doe both those when yet I really doe the third 〈◊〉 so he will not allow any thing morally possible which is not morally necessary which is certainly the eiving new lawes to 〈◊〉 making the word lawfull or possible which was wont to be interpreted that which may or may not be done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only that which must be done and may not be on 〈◊〉 and not new reasons to 〈◊〉 old paradoxes Jeanes In these three Sections I shall stay upon nothing but your charge of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 who almost that hath heard of your great parts learning 〈◊〉 ingenuity 〈◊〉 who is there such a stranger in our Israel unto whose eares the same thereof hath not arrived but wil upon this conclude us both guilty whereas we are both free innocent and most untruly aspersed by you 〈◊〉 which I expect challenge satisfaction Sir herein I desire no favour at your hands 〈◊〉 shall 〈◊〉 you to put any of our words upon the 〈◊〉 and if by all your 〈◊〉 you can 〈◊〉 any such inference from them I shall confesse my 〈◊〉 worthy of all that disgrace which your pen can powre upon me To 〈◊〉 my self from this your 〈◊〉 I have joyned herewith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concerning the 〈◊〉 actions of man And as for Ames his own writings will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lib. 2. cap. 3. thes 13 he expresly affirmeth that many acts in the 〈◊〉 are in their own nature indifference and in his Cases of Conscience he hath a whole chapter de 〈◊〉 and there 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ac nuda natura antequam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aut 〈◊〉 Tales sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are c. lib 3. cap. 18 There he divers actions which in their common and bare nature before they be as it were 〈◊〉 with circumstances doe in lude in themselves no goodness or badness as to eat to 〈◊〉 to take a journey to walk c. Dr. J Burges impureth unto Bradshaw this opinion which you father upon Ames and Ames his defence of Mr. 〈◊〉 will serve for his own apology Dr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mr. Bradshaw 〈◊〉 good reason to reverse his opinion f things indifferent for 〈◊〉 all learning and 〈◊〉 be resolves that there is nothing indifferent and unto this Ames thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cap. 2 〈◊〉 8. 9 If this were so as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reason would persw 〈◊〉 some 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 only the Rejoinder his telling again without any shew or proof The 〈◊〉 raiseth up a report without 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 he received it which 〈◊〉 it be some other way confirmed then by an 〈◊〉 bare telling and that in a humour of 〈◊〉 his person it must he accounted a meet 〈◊〉 I for my 〈◊〉 can find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 words in Mr. 〈◊〉 shaw his 〈◊〉 neither any thing from whence such a raw 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be reasonably collected He concludeth 〈◊〉 cap. 3 that there is no 〈◊〉 indifferent 〈◊〉 i. e. every way a well in 〈◊〉 of nature as of moralitie He 〈◊〉 also cap. 7 there is nothing actually indifferent which is not potentially good or evill and cap. 8 there is no action of mans will so indifferent but the doing 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be evil There is no action that a man can 〈◊〉 by the power of his will 〈◊〉 is meerly and absolutely indifferent These passages come the nearest to 〈◊〉 which is here fathered upon the treatise 〈◊〉 all which this 〈◊〉 appeareth not there is nothing indifferent Nay the ha shest of these 〈◊〉 may be found not only in little Pamphlets made by 〈◊〉 Boyes against learning and sense but in great volumes written by those that goe for very learned and sensible in 〈◊〉 matters as this is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aquinas in the great book called his 〈◊〉 prima 〈◊〉 q 〈◊〉 or 9. hath this 〈◊〉 it must needs be that every individuall act of man 〈◊〉 from deliberate reason is either good or bad And all 〈◊〉 almost all 〈◊〉 which have written upon that place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and defend the same who yet wore men that in questions of such a nature did not usually write against all learning and sense Dr. Hammond sect 34. This argument of Amesius against things indifferent that learned Bishop was well 〈◊〉 with by his familiar conferences with Mr. 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against Ceremenies and whom the Bishop thought fitter to 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 instances of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 than by more serious attempts of 〈◊〉 i. e. in plain 〈◊〉 to despise and smile at than to dread and if Mr. J. have really read Mr. Hooker 〈◊〉 he somewhere entitles our Patron of Ceremonies 〈◊〉 may in him remember a discourse of Laws which will supersede all necessity or 〈◊〉 of my farther inlarging on it Jeanes Here we have a grosse mistake and a bitter jeer 1. A grosse mistake to 〈◊〉 no worse for Ames hath no where any Argument against things indifferent it is a Conclusion which he never dreame of and therefore you most injuriously fasten it upon him and hereof I hope you will repent and give some publique testimonial thereof Next we have a bitter jeere at Non conformists 〈◊〉 if their opinion concerning humane religious Ceremonies were so silly and ridiculous that Bishop 〈◊〉 despised it and smiled at it and could 〈◊〉 it easily by 〈◊〉 instances by unbuttoning and buttoning his Cassock There may be truth in this your relation concerning Mr Hynde and Glapthorne but your false accusation of Ames will render your bare word questionable if it be not backed with farther proofs but suppose your relation true yet all that you can gather hence is that they were weak Respondents and knew not the state of the Question and unto that you seem as great a stranger as they for you dare not say that Bishop

that is wholly depraved and defiled with lust he thinkes then that lust might be seated in the will nay 〈◊〉 himselfe though he thinke that concupiscence hath it's chiefe residence in the flesh by which he meanes the body and the sensuall powers of man yet he withall 〈◊〉 that there is something like unto it in the superiour part of the soule for even that is prone immoderately to desire honours vaine glory and the like vanities and therefore Paul Gal. 5 having said that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lusteth against 〈◊〉 spirit he nameth not only fornication drunkennesse and the like carnall sinnes but also idolatry heresies envyings c which were spirituall sinnes sinnes of the upper region of the soule thus you see that a great part of concupiscence is placed in the supreme the rationall faculties of man and extended unto spirituall and immateriall objects and hereupon it will follow that at least this part of concupiscence cannot 〈◊〉 from the condition 〈◊〉 the matter A third argument is because this assertion that the resultancy of this concupiscence from the nature and matter of man would have been besides the intention of God strikes against either the omniscience or omnipotency of God for either God foresaw this resultancy or not to say that he did not foresee it takes away the infinitenesse of his knowledge if he foresaw it then I demand whether he could not or would not prevent it to say that he could not prevent it denieth the infinitenesse of his power if he could but would not prevent or stay it then it followeth that this resultancy was not besides but agreeable unto his purpose and intention Secondly this answer is repugnant unto Bellarmine his own principles I shall instance in two First it is apparent that he maketh this concupiscence to be chiefly the naturall and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties unto their proper and naturall object and from this I thus argue Naturall and necessary propensions of the naturall faculties of any thing unto their naturall and proper object cannot be besides the intention of God the creatour for such propensions must needs be positive qualities and of every positive being God is the cause and author But now concupiscence is by Bellarmines discourse the naturall and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties of man unto their proper and naturall objects And consequently t is not besides the intention of the Creatour flowing as a naturall defect or disease only from the condition of the mould or matter of man A second thing in Bellarmine with which this his answer clasheth is his confession that concupiscence is contrary to the nature of man de gratiâ primi hominis cap. 7. From hence I thus argue Nothing that is against the nature of man can 〈◊〉 naturally and necessarily from the principles of his nature But Bellarmine confesseth that this concupiscence is against the nature of man And therefore he contradicts himselfe when he affirmeth that it results from the principles of man's nature the condition of his matter As for the similitude of the Smith and the Iron sword that will be nothing unto the purpose for First no Smith whatsoever can make Iron that is the matter of a sword but God alone is the author of the matter of man and consequently is the cause of all the naturall sequels thereof Secondly a Smith if he could would frame such a sword as might not be subject or inclined unto rust but it is not a thing in his power for he cannot alter the nature of Iron so that if he will produce an Iron sword it will be lyable unto rust The Papists seeme to ascribe such an impotency unto God himselfe for they suppose all along that God cannot make man to be compounded of a reasonable soule and sensible matter but that besides the intention of God the naturall and necessary result of such a composition will without supernaturall prevention be a headlong inclination unto sensible objects against the dictates of right reason but the falshood of this supposition I shall anon at large detect A second answer of Bellarmin's which we frequently sind also in Dr. Taylor is that this concupiscence is not a sinne but only a disease languer infirmity or 〈◊〉 of nature and therefore though God had been the cause of it it would not yet have followed that God was the author of sinne Unto this I shall oppose the cleare testimony of Paul who in 6 7 8. chapters of his Epistle unto the Roman's cal's it sinne fourteene times as Bishop Davenant and Dr. Francis White after Bishop of Ely calculate the places But unto all these places Bellarmine replyeth in which reply he is seconded by Dr. Taylor that concupiscence is called sinne by the Apostle not properly and formally but 〈◊〉 because it is the effect and cause of sinne the effect of Adam's first sinne and the cause of our sinne But that concupiscence is properly and formally a sinne I shall prove against both Bellarmine and his confident second Dr. Taylor from it's influence subject adjuncts opposites First from it's influence mediate and immediate First from it's mediate influence it is the cause of all actuall sin whatsoever whensoever we are tempted to any sinne we are enticed and drawne away by our own lust this is the mother that conceiveth and bringeth forth all sinne Jam. 1. 14 15 and doubtlesse the daughter resembleth the mother the cause and the effect have the same nature that which as a habit or quality is the cause of sinne must needs be sinne too but concupiscence or the originall pronesse of our natures unto sinne is the roote of all sinne and therefore to use the Apostles expression 't is exceeding sinfull Rom. 7. 13 for nil dat quod non habet vel formalitèr vel eminenter But for confirmation of this argument we have the testimony of him who is the truth it selfe Mat. 7. 17 18. A corrupt tree bringeth forth evill fruit a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit now concupiscence or an inclination unto sinne bringeth no fruit but that which is morally evill and corrupt and therefore 't is a tree morally evill and corrupt but this argument I shall insist on more fully hereafter in opening Jam. 1. 14 15. Secondly from it's immediate influence it naturally and directly produceth as it 's immediate effects those first motions unto sinne which are without consent and therefore if we can prove these first motions unto sinne to be sinne our adversaries will confesse that concupiscence is sinne also now that they are sinne may be concluded from the Apostles description of sinne 1 〈◊〉 3. 4. Sinne is the transgression of the law for the first motions unto sinne trespasse against that which our Saviour cal's the first and great commandement thou shalt love the Lord with all thy soule might mind and strength for if sinne God's greatest enemy hath any motions or inclinations of the soule any thoughts of the

of it first negatively that God is not the cause of it for he made man upright secondly affirmatively that man himselfe is the cause of it But they have sought out many inventions If it be objected that the Divell was also a cause of the corruption of man's nature and therefore the Preachers resolution of it into man alone is defective he might have found that Satan propounded unto our first parents many inventions as well as that they sought out many inventions For answer Satan was the cause of our first parents fall or sin only per modum suadentis not per modum 〈◊〉 determinantis he was only a counselling and perswading cause and that 's only an imperfect cause only a morall cause he was not of sufficient efficacy to make them sinne for nothing can be the sufficient cause of sinne unto man besides his own will as Aquinas rightly 2 a. 2ae q 43. Ar. 1. ad 3 m nothing can compell or determine him thereunto so then notwithstanding Satans temptations the Preacher saith truely touching the causation of that pollution which is in our nature that 't is only to be attributed to the fall of our first parents because they of their own accord have freely sought out many inventions There 's a second 〈◊〉 of the word translated only that makes it to amount to no more than chiefly and indeed some Logicians say that exclusive particles sometimes exclude not à 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉 but only à summitate 〈◊〉 and if the particle may be thus interpreted then Solomon by the addition thereof signifies that the principall thing that is to be remarked touching the sinfullnesse of men is that God was not the cause of it by his creation of man's nature but that our first parents were authors thereof by their fall from that rectitude in which God created them God hath made man upright but they have sought out many inventions now the preheminence of this above all other doctrines touching the sinfulnesse of man is very evident unto those that looke upon sinne as the scripture describes it for 't is the foundation of all true sincere sorrow for sinne and mortification of it the knowledge of an effect is ever confused untill we understand it's cause so our sight of sinne is never distinct and accurate untill we come to a veiw of the originall of all sinne and when this fountaine of sinne is found out originall sinne both imputed and inherent it will be then a farre more easy worke than formerly to discover the streames of actuall sins There 's a third interpretation of the particle yet behind which renders it seorsim apart or severally and by this exposition Solomon professeth that he hath separated in his consideration God's worke from man's worke God's work in the creating of man's nature upright and mans worke in the defiling of his nature by his fall wherein he sought out many inventions and 〈◊〉 separation of God's act and man's act being 〈◊〉 made may sufficiently instruct concerning the cause of 〈◊〉 irrectitude in men and women of which he complaines in the verse preceding that 't is not God but man himselfe Having thus briefly run over the praecognita proceed we next unto the conclusions themselves The first conclusion concernes originall righteousnesse the second concernes originall sinne The first conclusion concernes originall righteousnesse God made man upright not only with an uprightnesse of innocency but also with an uprightnesse of sanctity but of this before at large The second conclusion concernes originall sinne peccatum originale originans the fall of our first parents they have sought out many inventions these words describe the fall of our first parents not as 't is considered formally in it selfe but metonymically by it's motives or effects by it's motives if we understand them only of our first parents by it's effects if we extend them unto their posterity also First by it's motives if we understand them of our first parents only they sought out many 〈◊〉 that is plurima 〈◊〉 many reasonings as Junius and Tremelius render the word they found out many reasons arguments or motives to eate of the forbidden fruit and what they did in this their first sinne is reckoned to be done by us their off-spring because we were represented by them and contained in them even as Levi is said to pay tithes in Abraham because he was in the loines of his Father Abraham when Melchisedech 〈◊〉 him Heb. 7. 9 10. Against this interpretation there are two doubts The first these reasons or motives were first propounded by Satan and therefore not sought out by them they were his temptations and not so properly their own inventions Answer They are said to be sought out by them as their inventions because they so greedily and speedily embraced them their acceptation of them answer'd Satan's temptations as an eccho and there is such resemblance betwixt a voyce and an eccho as that standers by sometimes can hardly discerne betwixt them A second doubt is concerning the multitude of these inventions or reasons they have found out many inventions now Moses in his history mentioneth but a few motives or arguments that induced them to this fact Gen. 3. 6 and when the woman saw that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to the eyes and a tree to be desired to make one wise shee took of the fruit thereof and did eat and gave also unto her husband with her and he did eat improbable therefore that the Preacher speakes of these reasons or motives Answer These motives were very comprehensive though they were formally and expressly few yet they were implyedly many that one designe to be wise to have their eyes opened knowing good evill virtually comprehended many other plots dependent upon it or concomitant with it they hoped that their knowledge and wisdome would be backed or accompanied with an equall power and so able to effect whatsoever they desired they projected then not only to be as knowing but also as powerfull and in every thing as happy and glorious as Gods But some may thinke that this exposition is somewhat strayned and far fetched and therefore I shall propound a second which extends the clause not only unto them but to all their posterity also that descend from them in an ordinary way of generation and so the fall of our first parents is here set forth by it's mediate effects the inventions of them and their progeny touching their actuall sins which issue from originall corruption inherent in both as streames from a fountaine and branches from a tree they have all sought out many inventions First for the committing of sinne Secondly for the defending of sinne Thirdly for the extenuating of sinne Fourthly for the concealing of sinne First for the committing of sin so the clause may be verified either of the same or of several men both again of the same or several sins First of

if hee meane that a generall rule is as sit and full for the 〈◊〉 of us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as 〈◊〉 are then I think no man conscious of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wil beleeve him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I beleeve 〈◊〉 he himself is so fully 〈◊〉 in crossing the baptized by any rule which he hath out of Gods word for that as hee is for 〈◊〉 by the rule of 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 having as he thought 〈◊〉 grounded the generall that a 〈◊〉 Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 needs must unto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 goeth on to assume that in the worship of God all but particular 〈◊〉 of order might easily be 〈◊〉 indeed 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 by Christ and therefore need not be 〈◊〉 to the Churches wisdom Upon this it pleaseth the Rej. to say little to the purpose in many words 1. He saith that circumstances of order were not harder to determine than those of decency Now it is plaine enough that the 〈◊〉 here naming order did also understand decency though he named order only 2. He asketh what School of Divinity hath taught the Repl. to say that our Lord forbore the determining of such circumstances because all else was easie I answer no rule of Divinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 teach the Repl. to say so nor yet the Rejoinder to impute unto him what he never said But if he meaneth as it seemeth 〈◊〉 doth because it was not so easie to determine circumstances of time and place as real worship I then answer that this as I think the Replyer learned out of that Divinity School out of which the Def and Rejoinder learned That which they cite out of Calvin pag. 15 16 Janius is cited to the contrary out of Cont. 3. l. 4. cap. 17. n. 12. which place the Rejoinder looked upon by occasion of the Replyer his former citation of it But he in that very place distinguisheth betwixt Laws properly so called and 〈◊〉 leaving onely cautions to the Churches liberty which is the very same that the Repl. meaneth The plaine truth is that supposing Gods will to be we should worship him in any place and at any time fitting it was necessary that the particular choice of fitting time place should be left 〈◊〉 to any particular time or place exclusively Calvin also is cited as more comely expressing the cause to be that 〈◊〉 would not than that he could not 〈◊〉 such matters Now though Calvin being so excellent in his expressions may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner than the Repl. Yet here was no cause of noting disparity For the Repl in saying all things but particular order and decency may bee easily appointed did not say what Christ could doe but what might be easily for us appointed or with our case or with the ease which we doe conceive of in Law giving or of an ordinary Law-giver having such authority as Christ had And who doth not see that it is not so easie to appoint every 〈◊〉 place and time wherein God shall be worshipped throughout all the world as with that worship he shall bee served For that particular description a thousand books so great as our own Bible would not have sufficed The world as Iohn saith would 〈◊〉 bee capable of the volumes that must have been written The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber and much ado that would have been in naming every 〈◊〉 and is not this as much as lesse easie yet it pleased him to seek matter of 〈◊〉 about this 〈◊〉 and that which 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrels 〈◊〉 88. 10. A second reason of the Repl. his proposition was that whatsoever in worship is above order and decency is worship Because whatsoever is acted by him that worshippeth in that act beside 〈◊〉 civility must either 〈◊〉 an act or means of worship or an orderly decent disposing of those acts or else at the least idle and so unlawfull The 〈◊〉 answereth 1. that a significant Ceremony for Edification is lawful yet cometh not under any of those heads But he himself 〈◊〉 a significant Ceremony instituted of God to be essential worship and instituted of man to bee worship though nor in it selfe of which distinction enough 〈◊〉 been said in the head of Worship Yet this by the way A significant ceremony for 〈◊〉 is the same in it selfe by whomsoever it be instituted because institution is extrinsecal to the thing instituted and alters it not in it self internally If therefore it be essentiall lawfull worship in it 〈◊〉 when it is instituted by God it is also 〈◊〉 though not lawfull worship in it self when it is instituted by man Beside that Ceremony whose proper sole end is 〈◊〉 toward God is properly done to the honour of God and so properly divine worship 2. 〈◊〉 answer is that comeliness grounded on civil humane considerations is not meere 〈◊〉 in sacred actions and use but sacred by application Which is very true if civil application be meant by 〈◊〉 civil but then it is nothing to the purpose For sacred by application is seemly clothing 〈◊〉 on for to goe to Church in and yet is in it self 〈◊〉 civil The Question is not of application but of internal 〈◊〉 Sacred things 〈◊〉 to civill busines doe not therefore become civill for who will say that prayer at the beginning of a 〈◊〉 is a civil act though it were used in the upper and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and applied to that civil meeting as it ought to be And why 〈◊〉 shall 〈◊〉 application of civil decency unto sacred busines make it alter the nature or name of it 3. His answer is that all meanes of worship are not worship But he knew well enough that this was meant of proper 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 His fourth is that ordering and manner of disposing is ill divided from comeliness Neither did the Repl. intend so to divide but rather to 〈◊〉 them understanding by that manner of 〈◊〉 comeliness But if the 〈◊〉 not catched up some shew of confounding comeliness with order which was not intended by the Repl. he had been in this argument wholly at a 〈◊〉 His 〈◊〉 and last answer is that by 〈◊〉 leave somethings in 〈◊〉 may and sometimes must be tolerated But he should have 〈◊〉 bred that the question here is not of tolerating but of appointing and 〈◊〉 Now if it be lawfull to 〈◊〉 and use empty and 〈◊〉 Ceremonie in Gods worship let those worshipers judge that 〈◊〉 at the majesty of God and are afraid in any manner to appear empty and unprofitably before 〈◊〉 Nay to 〈◊〉 by our 〈◊〉 let the Papists themselves judge 〈◊〉 de Pontif. l. 4. c. 〈◊〉 ad 4. 〈◊〉 those Ceremonies to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are unprofitable altogether and vain precepts 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Ceremonies only by humane spirit invented And de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 2. c. 32. empty and good for nothing more then needs and not a jot 〈◊〉 to any 〈◊〉 and who not 11. Thus 〈◊〉 concerning the 〈◊〉 of our

of both Translators and Commentators though as you observe in the foregoing section 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lye more consonant in sound with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for I doe not think that the Apostle was bound alwayes to observe Paronomasies Dr. Hammond sect 48 49. I proceed then to the second thing that if what he pretends to be possible also were indeed the only possible or by way of supposition but not concession if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did really import no more than in Order as that is opposed to disorder or confusion yet I say it will soon appear that the Apostles commanding such order or orderlinesse and forbidding all confusion in Ecclestasticall 〈◊〉 must by consequence 〈◊〉 interpreted to command the instituting and observing 〈◊〉 of Ceremonies in a Church This I thus deduce First there is no possibilitie of worshiping God externally and publickly without use of some Ceremonies 〈◊〉 of time place and gesture c. 2. There is no possibility of order in a multitude without uniformity in the same circumstances 3. There is as little possibility of uniformity among many without either agreement one with another or direction of some superior to them all what shall by all be uniformely performed 4. The agreement one with another if it 〈◊〉 only voluntary and such as by which 〈◊〉 are obliged no way secures the end but if it be such an agreement that every single person is obliged to observe then still is that a law of that body as of a councel c. and as truely so as the constitution of a single Prelate can be thought to be And so the conclusion regularly followes that to the preserving but of order or orderlinesse in a 〈◊〉 it is necessary there be appointment what shall by all be 〈◊〉 performed confusion anavoidably coming in where no certain rules are prescribed 〈◊〉 uniformity What can be denyed in this processe I foresee not Here it shall suffice to note that time place and such like circumstances are so manifestly necessary in their kind that the 〈◊〉 may be deduced from them by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any institution but no man can deduce our 〈◊〉 from those kinds named Mans will is the only reason of them as Gods will is the only reason of Ceremonies truly divine by institution No man can conclude thus we must every where have some garment and therefore in England a Surplice We must alwaies in Baptisme have some admonition to professe the faith and 〈◊〉 in England a Crosse. We must use reverent gestures in receiving the holy `` 〈◊〉 and therefore in England we must kneel in the act of receiving But we may conclude thus we must have a fit place to meet in and this place is generally fittest for our Congregation therefore we must have this We must have a convenient time to meet in and this hour is generally most convenient for our Congregation therefore this The Monks may as well conclude we must have some garments therefore we must in one order have black in another white in a third black over white or white over black in a fourth gray a fifth 〈◊〉 coloured in some all woollen in some all linnen c. ad insinitum as well I say every 〈◊〉 as the Rejoynder can conclude from a garment to a 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 to the sign of the Crosse or from reverence in a table-gesture 〈◊〉 kneeling Jeanes Though you cannot see what can be denied in this process yet he that 〈◊〉 may read what is constantly denied by the Non-conformists if he ever read their books they deny over and over over and over c. Your two first conclusions if applied unto the Ceremonies in question Indeed they grant that circumstances of time place order and decency and the like are necessary genere in their kind but these I will tell you are not the Ceremonies in controversy the Ceremonies which they oppose are not circumstantial but doctrinal of moral signification and the mere divises of men such as the surplice 〈◊〉 c. And you may affirm but can never prove that there is no possibility of worshipping God externally and publickly without such ceremonies for it is 〈◊〉 that such Ceremonies are not necessary in their kind In hoc vertitur cardo 〈◊〉 therefore if you can prove this we shall yield you the cause and ly 〈◊〉 at your feet to be trampled upon and triumphed 〈◊〉 and until this proof be made you can never regularly inferre that to the preserving but of order or orderlyness in a Church it is necessary there be appointment what 〈◊〉 religious Ceremonies shall by all be uniformely performed If you shall say that by Ceremonies you understand onely circumstances 〈◊〉 time place decency order and the like I shall confesse my selfe to be mistaken but must withall for my own discharge 〈◊〉 that you alone ere guilty of this my mistake for who could reasonablely imagine that in a controversy with the opposers of Ceremonies you should exclude from the Ceremonies mentioned by you all such Ceremonies as they oppose Your 〈◊〉 conclusion call's for confirmation and until you shall bethink your selfe of some reason to confirme it I shall offer against it these following instances unto which it is no difficult matter to adde many more suppose the 〈◊〉 of Churches in a City meet at nine of the clock for Gods 〈◊〉 and in the Country Parishes adjoining where many people live at a great distance from their Churches they meet at tenne or halfe an houre after nine nay in the same Church at one and the same time whilst the word of God is read or preached those that sit in seats may have their heads uncovered and those that stand in allies may keep on their hats the whole Sermon 〈◊〉 because the crowd or throng may render it in convenient to keep them off Now in both these instances there is not uniformity in the same circumstances and yet there may be order observed and confusion may very well notwithstanding be avoided in all the parts of Gods worship and service But to give an instance ad hominem out of Parker some of our Churches in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Organs some not some discant and broken singing some 〈◊〉 here was no uniformity but you will not I beleeve 〈◊〉 that there was confusion This point of uniformity in rites and Ceremonies the Reader may find at large debated in the now mentioned Mr. Parker 〈◊〉 of the Cross part 2. pag. 91. usque ad 〈◊〉 These two conclusions being thus 〈◊〉 I need not stay upon the following which will be uselesse and 〈◊〉 without the two former be presupposed as true Dr. Hammond sect 50. 51 52 53 54. What can be denied in this processe I foresee not yet when 't is granted one reserve Mr. J. hath still left him For saith he 〈◊〉 it were granted that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies appointment or ordination yet still it will be incumbent on the Dr. to prove that this extends