Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	necessary_a	produce_v	sufficient_a	2,945	5	8.9424	4	true

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A45645	A refutation of the atheistical notion of fate, or absolute necessity in a sermon preach'd at the cathedral-church of St. Paul, November the seventh, 1698 : being the eighth of the lecture for that year, founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq. / by John Harris ...	Harris, John, 1667?-1719.	1698 (1698)	Wing H853; ESTC R15217	16,696	30

attendit vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collimat Quod profectò nihil aliud est quam Deum Fato subjicere Now I think nothing can more shew the wicked Perversness of this Writer's Mind than this Passage For he could not but know very well that when Divines assert the Deity to be Essentially and necessarily Good they do not mean that Goodness is any thing Extrinsical to the Divine Nature much less that it is something which hath no dependance upon it but only that the Excellency and Perfection of his Nature is such as that it is in every thing exactly conformable to Right Reason and therefore this was certainly a wilful Perversion of their Sense set up on purpose to overthrow the Notion of Moral Goodness in the Deity But how vain is it for him to tell us that for the Deity to Act sub Ratione Boni is for Him to be Subject to Fate when at the same time he Himself Asserts that God is in every respect a Necessary Agent without any free Will nay without any Knowledge or Understanding in his Nature at all This is so plain a Demonstration that it was his chief and Primary Design to banish out of Mens Minds the Notion of Moral Goodness that nothing can be more and therefore tho' he was resolved to Introduce absolute Necessity into all Actions both Divine and Human yet it should be such an one as should leave no Umbrage for any distinction between Good and Evil or any Foundation for Rewards and Punishments And in this Notion of Necessity these Writers follow Democritus Heraclitus Leucippus and that Atheistical Sect who maintain'd that there was Nothing in all Nature but Matter and Motion And therefore when these Modern Writers assert that there is nothing in the Universe but Body as they do they run Fate farther than most of the Old Heathen Patrons of Necessity did For there was none but the Democritick Sect that supposed Fate to have a Power over the Will of Man and in this particular even they were deserted by Epicurus as I observe below The Pythagoreans Platonists and Stoicks agreed that the Mind of Man was free And 't is well known that the Stoicks did in this Free Power of the Will of Man found that arrogant Assertion of theirs That a Wise Man was in one respect more excellent than the Gods for they were Good by the Necessity of their Nature and could not help it whereas Man had a Power of being otherwise and therefore was the more commendable for being so There was indeed some of the Poets and some few of the Philosophers too who did subject the Gods themselves to Fate or Necessity Thus Seneca in one place saith Necessitas Deos alligat Irrevocabilis Divina pariter ac Humana Cursus vehit Ille ipse omnium Conditor ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata sed sequitur semper paret semel jussit Which Opinion is effectually refuted and exposed by Lucian in that Dialogue of his called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As also by Lactantius in his First Book De falsâ Religione Chap. 11. But this as I doubt not but Seneca and some others understood in a softer sense than at first sight it appears to have so was it the Doctrine of but a few for generally the Heathens did fully believe that Prayers and Sacrifices would alter a Man's Fortune and Circumstances for the better that they would appease the Anger and gain the Favour and Blessing of the Gods and that Their Nature was not so absolutely Fatal and Necessary but that they could freely deal with their Creatures according as they deserved at their hands For we find Balbus the Stoick mentioned by Cicero telling us That the Nature of God would not be most Powerful and Excellent if it were Subject to the same Necessity or Nature Quâ Coelum maria terraeque reguntur Nihil Enim est praestantius Deo Nulli igitur est Naturae Obediens Subjectus So that these Writers tread in the Steps of the worst and most Atheistical of the Heathen Philosophers and maintain a more rigid Fate and a more irresistible Necessity than most of them did But 2. I come next to shew the Groundlesness of those Reasons and Arguments on which these Men build their Hypothesis of Absolute Necessity And first as to the Reasons of Mr. Hobbs The Chief that he brings against the freedom of Human Actions are these saith Mr. Hobbs In all Deliberations and alternate Successions of Contrary Appetites 't is the last only which we call Will this is immediately before the doing of any Action or next before the doing of it become Impossible Also Nothing saith he can take beginning from it self but must do it from the Action of some other immediate Agent without it if therefore a Man hath a Will to something which he had not before the Cause of his Willing is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing So that whereas 't is out of Controversie that of Voluntary Actions the Will is the Necessary Cause and by this which is now said the Will is also Caused by Other things whereof it disposeth not it follows that Voluntary Actions have all of them Necessary Causes and therefore are necessitated Agen also Every sufficient Cause saith he is a Necessary one for if it did not produce its Effect necessarily 't was because something was wanting to its Production and then it was not sufficient Now from hence it follows that whatsoever is produced is produced Necessarily and consequently all Voluntary Actions are Necessitated And to define a Free Agent to be that which when all things are present which are necessary to produce the Effect can nevertheless not produce it is Contradiction and Nonsense for 't is all one as to say the Cause may be sufficient i. e. Necessary and yet the Effect shall not follow This is the Substance of all Mr. Hobbs his Proof against Free Will in which there are almost as many Mistakes as there are Sentences and from hence it plainly will appear that either he had no clear Idea's of what he wrote about or else did designedly endeavour to perplex darken and confound the Cause For in the first place He confounds the Power or Faculty of Willing in Man with the last act of Willing or Determination after Deliberating And consequently doth not distinguish between what the Schools would call Hypothetical and Absolute Necessity which yet ought to be carefully done in the Point between us for an Agent may be free and no doubt every Man is free to deliberate on and to compare the Objects offered to his Choice and yet not be so after he hath chosen Then indeed Necessity comes in 't is impossible for any one to choose and not to choose or to determine and not to determine and after the Election is made no one ever supposed that a Man is free not to make it And

therefore if by the Will Mr. Hobbs means that last Act of Willing or Electing which immediately precedes Acting or which is next before the doing of a thing become impossible as he expresseth himself he fights with his own shadow and opposes that which no body ever denied for no Man ever supposed Freedom and Determination to be the same thing but only that Man before he determined was free whether he would determine so and so or not And accordingly he himself defines a voluntary Agent to be him that hath not made an end of Deliberating Agen 2. 'T is hard to know what he means here by Nothing taking its beginning from it self he is talking about Voluntary Actions and about the freedom of Human Nature and therefore should referr this to the Will of Man but the Instances he afterwards produces are of Contingent Things which are nothing at all to his purpose But if this be spoken of the Will what will it signifie I grant Nothing can take its beginning from itself the Will of Man took its beginning from God and Voluntary Actions we say take their beginning from the Faculty or Power of Willing placed in our Souls But what then doth it follow from thence that those Actions we call Voluntary are Necessitated because that they take their Original from that free Power of Election God hath placed in our Natures and not from themselves I dare say no one can see the consequence of this part of the Argument And it will not in the least follow from hence that the Cause of a Man's Willing is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing Which yet he boldly asserts It is the Power of Willing or that Faculty which we find in our selves of being free in many Cases to Act or not Act or to Act after such a particular manner which is generally called the Will and this is commonly said to be free Tho' I think as one hath observed it is not so proper a way of Speaking as to say the Man is free For besides that 't is not usual nor indeed proper to predicate one Faculty of another 't is hardly good sense to say the Will is free in the manner now explain'd for that would be the same thing as to say that a free Power is free whereas it is not the Power but the Man that hath the Power that is free But however the Other way of Expression hath prevailed and doth do so and I don't think any one is misled by it into Error for that which every body understands and means by saying the Will of Man is free is that Man hath in his Nature such a free Power as is called his Will Now from hence it will not follow that a Man is free whether he will Will or not for he must Will someway either to Act or not to Act or to Act after such a particular manner But it will follow that when a Man hath made any particular Volition or hath determined the Point whether he shall Act or forbear to Act he is then no longer at Liberty as to this particular Case and Instant for the Determination is then actually made and the Man no longer free not to make it But this proves nothing at all against the Liberty or Freedom of the Mind of Man Again what doth Mr. Hobbs mean by the Will 's being the Necessary Cause of Voluntary Actions Doth he mean that the Will of Man must of Necessity act freely and produce Actions voluntarily if he doth we are agreed but if he means that the Will is previously necessitated in every Act of Volition to Will just as it doth and could not possibly have willed otherwise this is to beg the Question and to take for granted the great thing in Dispute 't is to call that out of Controversie which is the only thing in Controversie which indeed when a Man contradicts the Common Sense and Reason of Mankind without Proof is the best way of Proceeding But that which looks most like an Argument for the Necessity of all Humane Actions is this which he brings in the last place That Cause saith he is a sufficient Cause which wanteth nothing requisite to produce its Effect but such a Cause must also be a Necessary one for had it not necessarily produced its Effect it must have been because something was wanting in it for that Purpose and then it could not have been sufficient So that whatever is produced is produced necessarily for it could not have been at all without a sufficient or necessary Cause and therefore also all Voluntary Actions are necessitated Now all this proves to his Purpose I think just nothing at all He proceeds on in his former Error of confounding the Act of Willing with the Power of Willing and of making Hypothetical the same with absolute Necessity for not now to dispute what he saith of every sufficient Cause's being a Necessary one allowing that when ever any Volition or Determination is made or when ever any Voluntary Action is done that the Will of Man was a sufficient Cause to produce that Effect nay that it did at last necessarily produce it he can inferr nothing from hence more than this That when the Will hath determined or willed 't is no longer free to Will or Nill that particular thing at that particular Instant which I don't believe any Body will ever or ever did deny But this will not prove at all that the Will was necessitated to make that Determination à Priori and that it could have made no other which yet is what he means and ought to have clearly made out For the same Power or Faculty of Liberty which enabled it to make that Determination would have been a sufficient Cause for it to have made another contrary to it or differing from it and then when that had been made it would have been as necessary as the former And therefore that Definition of a Free Agent 's being that which when all things are present which are needful to produce the Effect can nevertheless not produce it tho' I don't think it the best doth not when rightly understood imply any Contradiction nor is it Nonsense at all For the meaning of it is That he is properly Free who hath the Power of Determination in himself and when all Requisites are ready so that nothing shall extrinsecally either hinder him from or compel him to Act can yet choose whether he will Act or not Thus if a Man hath Pen Ink and Paper and a place to write upon his Hand well and at Liberty and understands how to write he hath all things present that are needful to produce the Effect of Writing yet he can nevertheless not produce that Effect because he can choose after all whether he will write or no. Mr. Hobbs defines a Free Agent to be him that can do if he will and forbear if he will and that Liberty

A Refutation of the Atheistical Notion OF Fate or Absolute Necessity IN A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul November the Seventh 1698. BEING The Eighth of the LECTURE for that Year Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq By JOHN HARRIS M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY LONDON Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin at the King 's Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard 1698. JEREM. ix 24. Let him that glorieth glory in this that he understandeth and knoweth me that I am the Lord who exercise loving kindness judgment and righteousness in the earth for in these things do I delight saith the Lord. I Did in my last Discourse begin to Speak to the Second Particular considerable in these Words viz. An Account of some of those Attributes which God is here said to Exercise in the Earth and in which he Delights On which I did not think it necessary to Discourse particularly but from thence took an Occasion to Remove two Great Bars to the true Knowledge of God and of his Attributes which Sceptical and Unbelieving Men had raised in the Way Which were These I. That there is in reality no such Thing as Moral Good or Evil But that all Actions are in their own Nature indifferent II. That all things are determined by absolute Fatality And that God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are Necessary Agents without having any Power of Choice or any real Liberty in their Natures at all The former of These I did then dispatch plainly proving the Existence of Moral Good and Evil and answering the Objections against it I proceed now to speak to the latter which is an Objection that our Adversaries are very fond of and do all of them upon Occasion have recourse to And it is indeed a great Point gain'd if they could make it out and will effectually destroy all manner of Religious Obligation and all dread of Punishment for doing amiss For as one observes on these Three things all Religion is founded 1. That there is a God who made presides over and governeth all things 2. That there are some things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in their own Natures good and just 3. That there is also something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 something in our own Power to do whereby we are Accountable for our Actions and become guilty when we do amiss But there can certainly be neither Good nor Evil in any Man's Actions and no Rewards or Punishments can be the Consequents of them if nothing at all be in our own Power if whatever we act or commit it is absolutely impossible for us to avoid acting or committing Which yet must be the case if as they assert Things are determined by absolute Fatality and that God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are necessary Agents without having any Power of Choice or any real Liberty in their Natures at all I shall therefore at this Time 1. Shew you that this is plainly their Assertion from their own words 2. I shall endeavour to shew the Groundlesness of of those Reasons on which they build their Hypothesis And 3. from some Arguments Establish the contrary Position of the Freedom and Liberty of Human Nature 1. And that this is the Assertion of the Two great Atheistical Writers is very plain Mr. Hobbs declares himself to be of the Opinion That no Man can be free from Necessitation That Nothing taketh beginning from it self but from the Action of some other Immediate Agent without it self And that therefore when first a Man hath an Appetite or Will to something to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will the Cause of his Will is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing So that whereas it is out of Controversie that of Voluntary Actions the Will is the Necessary Cause and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not it followeth that Voluntary Actions have all of them Necessary Causes and therefore are necessitated This saith he also is a certain Truth that there are Certain and Necessary Causes which make every Man to will what he willeth Ib. p. 306. And then as to the Deity I have already more than once taken notice That Hobbs denies Him any Understanding Sense or Knowledge and asserts him to be without any Ends or Designs in his Actions and Operations Which plainly makes Him an Agent absolutely and physically Necessary as indeed follows also from the Notion of his Being Corporeal which the same Writer every where maintains Spinoza also is very Express in this Matter as I have already shewn in some Measure In mente saith he nulla est absoluta five libera voluntas sed Mens ad Hoc vel illud Volendum determinatur à Causà quae etiam ab aliâ haec iterùm ab aliâ sic in Infinitum And in another place Voluntas non potest vocari Causa libera sed Tantum necessaria And yet on another Occasion and in another Book he hath these words Clarè distinctè Intelligimus si ad Nostram naturam attendamus nos in nostris actionibus esse liberos de multis deliberare propter id solum quod volumus Which is as plain and palpable a Contradiction to what he with the same air of Assurance delivers in other places as can possibly be Mr. Hobbs also cannot be acquitted from expresly contradicting himself as to this Point of Liberty and Necessity for he tells us in his Reasons for his Opinion That he that reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied That a Free Agent is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will And such an Agent he allows Man to be and saith he hath proved it too But how he will reconcile this with his Assertion that no Man can be free from Necessitation and that all our Actions have Necessary Causes and therefore are necessitated I cannot imagine As to Spinoza's Account of the Deity in Reference to this Point I have given a hint or two of it already He makes God to be the same with Nature or the Universe to be Corporeal and an absolutely necessary Agent one who cannot possibly help doing as he doth one who hath no Power of Creation nor doth act according to free Will But is Limited and Restrained to one constant Method of Acting by the Absolute Necessity of his Nature or by his Infinite Power And lest any one should misunderstand him so far as to imagine that he means by this that God is by the Excellency and Perfection of his Nature in all his Operations exactly conformable to the Rules of Justice Goodness and Right Reason He plainly excludes that Notion in these words Qui dicunt Deum omnia sub Ratione Boni agere Hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere quod à Deo non dependet ad quod Deus tanquam ad Exemplar in Operando