hands and keepe us from falling into the hands of men yet if God calleth us thereunto to commit our selves unto God when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him certainly They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good even at such times when Lyons want and suffer hunger Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence but the revealed will of God For whatsoever Gods nature is hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us but hee hath revealed that he will never faile them that put their trust in him And this is that loving kindenesse of God as much as to say his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us which excites the sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature why God should give them a being neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature as you superficially use to discourse but meerely the love of himselfe For he made all things for himselfe And the creature before God made him was just nothing neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus It is a strange conceit to say that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being who is the Creator For what likenesse is there betweene an apple and a nut between an horne and a bagpipe an harp and an harrow Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator and the creature Certainly all do not love God whom he loves for he loved us when we were his enemies Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him as all shall either sooner or later it will not follow that all should bee saved For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase and such as Esau are hated rather And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncoth assertion That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine as denying Gods omnipotency then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it The apprehension of Gods love to us is the cause morall of our love to him though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love how dare you professe God loves the reprobate and that ardently and with excessive and infinite love Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption and not rather unlovelinesse throughout Neither will it serve your turne to say that he loves them as his creatures For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads yea and the Devills and damned Spirits 3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill as brethren in evill do love one another and our Saviour hath taught us as much Matt. 5. 49. If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have doe not the Publicanes even the same I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable The doing of things otherwise unlawfull in some cases may be dispensed with but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with it may be remitted but that is not to dispense with it I take your meaning and leave your words you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation I no way like such extravagant assertions though frequent in your writings as if you would innovate all both naturall reason and divinity I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost and finall impenitency which God will not pardon in his elect Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe as you doe of your selfe Be God never so louely yet if a man know him not how can hee love him And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God Suppose we doe know him to be most wise most powerfull yet if he be our enemie how should this move us to love him or put our trust in him If we know him to love us and to be our friend yet are not the best backward enough from loving him when we are easily drawne to sinne against him And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable what an uncomfortable doctrine is this and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements Ioh. 14. 5. Againe what is the love of God Is it not to love him above all things even above our selves as Gerson expresseth it Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui Is this naturall long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake is this sinne unpardonable You are a valliant Champion I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ. But alas what should become of poore Peter that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a follower of Christ denied that he knew him and that with oath and imprecation Yet Christ looked back upon him â—s before he had praied for him that his faith might not faile and Peter looked back upon himselfe and went forth and wept bitterly and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order that Peter by name should be acquainted with the first with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead that as he died for his sinnes so hee rose again for his justification The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate who take notice of it chiefly as touching blessings spirituall As for temporall blessings Gods love therein to man how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and bloud comming to passe onely by course of nature But that his intention in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked is to binde himselfe to instate them in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life which hee never meanes to performe is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes To the children of God there is
that he had cursed them already And equally and indifferently as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient and therefore calls heaven and earth to witnesse that hee hath set before them life and death blessing and cursing So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God as the Author of them like as life and blessing and both are in due proportion to the behaviour of man as it is found either in the way of obedience or in the way of disobedience And in this respect perhaps you may say that man is the cause of cursing not God To this I answer 1. By the same reason man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing and not God 2. If in this respect cursing be to be derived from sin it is onely in the way of a meritorious cause so doth not fruit proceed from trees but onely in the way of an efficient cause God and none but God can be the Author as of happinesse so of misery as of eternall life so also of everlasting death And as none is truly blessed but whom God blesseth so none is truly accursed but whom God curseth Yet no man I thinke that hath his wits in his head will say that this cursing proceedeth from Gods love but rather from his hatred Gods love towards the creature is essentiall his love to the creature is not so no more then to be a creator is of Gods essence And love is no more of Gods essence as a Creator then hatred is of Gods essence as a revenger And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alledged belong to God onely as a Iudge to execute the one by way of reward and the other by way of punishment Albeit there is another course of Gods blessing and of his cursing though you love not to distinguish but to consound rather as all that maintaine bad causes love darknesse rather then light I come to the second point wherein you insist In that he is the Author of being he is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are And this is very true for God saw all that he had made and lo it was very good And as it is very true so it is nothing at all to the purpose For when we enquire whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one wee presuppose their beings in their severall times and generations And secondly we speake of a love proper to mankinde which consisteth not in giving them their being for God hath given being unto Angels even unto Devils as well as unto men and as to men so to all inferiour creatures be they never so noysome and offensive unto man And it is a strange course of yours to magnifie the love of God to man in giving him being which is found in the basest creature that breathes or breathes not I have heard a story of a great Prince when one of the prime subjects of the land being taken in a foule act of insurrection and yeelding upon condition to bee brought to speake with that Prince presuming of ancient favour whereof hee had tasted in great measure and which upon his presence might haply revive he found nothing answerable but imperious taâ—ts rather and dismission in this manner Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad Yet you magnifie the love of God to mankinde in as comfortable manner when you say that hoe hath given us being which wee well know God hath given to lyons rigers and beasts of prey yea to snakes and adders to frogges and toads and fiery serpents Herehence you proceed to the third point and do inferre That because he hath made us therefore hee loveth us for He hateth nothing that he hath made as saith the wise man and to give the greater credit to the authority alledged by you you use an introduction of strange state for you say The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived that He hateth nothing that he hath made But to what purpose tends all this pompe Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all and can neither deceive nor be deceived May not fooles speake of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived as well as wise men and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this If the author of that sentence had beene such a one as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived then indeed the sentence had beene of greatest authority and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Iew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull take the author of it for such a one as could neither deceive nor be deceived If you did this were very foule play and no better then a trick of conicatching Yet we except not against the sentence but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours taken from the same ground above two hundred yeares ago You shall finde it in Aquinas his summes where his first objection is this Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit sed Deus omnem hominem diligit secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt nihil odisti eorum quae secisti Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat It seemes that God reprobates no man For no man reprobates him whom hee loveth But God loves every man according to that Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are and hatest nothing that thou hast made Therefore God reprobateth no man And the answer hee makes unto this objection followeth in this manner Adprimum dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diliget etiam omnes creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare To the first is to be answered that God loves all men yea and all creatures for as much as he willeth some good to them all but yet he willeth not every good to all There-fore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good which is life everlasting he is said to hate them or to reprobate them And you might have beene pleased to take notice not onely of that wise man though as wise as Philo who speakes herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived but of that wise God who is wiser then men and Angels and can neither deceive nor be deceived and affirmeth openly that He hath loved Iacob and hated Esau as also of the Apostle Saint Paul who by the infallible direction of Gods Spirit applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne
still I perceive your meaning reacheth further then you dare as yet to professe for your meaning is to prove that All that heare the Gospell and doe not believe it seeing they shall bee guilty of greater sinne and incurre greater condemnation at the day of judgement therefore they could believe it if they would This is the point that sticks in your teeth and which you dare not openly and plainely professe as indeed it is manifest Pelagianisme and which the Arminians dare not at this day openly avouch but rather professe that no man can believe or repent without grace Whereas yet like as your selfe maintaine that no man in state of nature can doe otherwise of himselfe then sinne yet is he justly condemned for sinning none compelling him in like sort no man of himselfe can believe the Gospell yet hee may be as justly condemned for not believing For as for that naturall impotency unto that which is good which is in all derived unto us from our father Adam that is of it selfe sufficient to condemne us and therefore most unsufficient to excuse us And that impotencie being in all alike the condemnation therefore shall be unto all alike but the increase of it by actuall transgressions which are freely committed is not in all alike for neither doth inclination naturall or tentations spirituall or occasions temporall hinder a mans libertie in doing or refusing to doe any act so likewise neither can it hinder the aggravation of his sinne But neither can this naturall impotency bee cured in any part but by the grace of God habituall neither any good act according to this grace habituall he performed without another grace both prevenient and subsequent actuall If your minde serves you to deale plainly in opposing ought of this you shall not want them that will bee ready to enter with you into the lists and scholastically to encounter you Yet I confesse the providence of God especially in ordering and governing the wills of men is a misterious thing and the operation and cooperation of his will with the operation and cooperation of the will of man But I am a long time inured unto this and now I feare no bugbeares least of all from your selfe with whom I have beene of old acquainted in our private and familiar discourse on these and such like arguments and to tell you plainely my opinion I doubt you have written so much that you have had time to read but litle And truly as for my selfe as I have written little so also I have not read much But in these points I have spent not a little time in searching after truth and examining arguments As for the place of the Apostle Act. 17. 30. it seemes your meaning is it pleads for universall grace now after Christs death yet your selfe immediately before profested that onely they that heare it and doe not believe are guilty of greater sinnes implying manifestly that since Christs death all doe not heare it Yet if you have any other meaning and will deale roundly in propounding it I will be ready to consider this or any other place that you shall bee able to produce to what purpose soever if orthodox in my judgement to subscribe unto it if otherwise to doe my best to confute it 3 In the next place you are so farre from maintaining universall grace that you undertake to give causes why all men in the world have not heard of this love of God in Christ. But these causes to be assigned by you are put off till hereafter and that not of certainty neither you onely say They may bee assigned T is your usuall course to feed your Readers with expectation as it were with empty spoones If you doe not gull them in putting them off to expectation t is somewhat the better The reason you give why many might have heard of Christ which yet have not heard of him and might have beene partakers of his death I thinke you meane of the benefit of his death which yet have not beene partakers of it is starke naught For that evill courses of men cannot hinder them from the participation of Christs death appeareth by the calling of the Gentiles and casting off of the Iewes For were the deeds of Babylon thinke you better then they of Sion Wee Jewes by nature and not sinners of the Gentiles saith the Apostle Gal. 2. 15. The Apostle in divers places puts no difference betweene them that are called and them that are not as touching their manners before grace 1 Cor. 6. 11. Eph. 2. 23. Tit. 3. 23. God sindes us weltring in our bloud when he saith unto us Live Ezech. 16. and Saul was taken off from his bloudy courses to be made a member of Christ. And your doctrine to the contrary tends shamefully to the obscuring and disparaging of Gods grace and to the advancing of the power of nature and liberty of will the trick of the Pelagians of old of whom Austine professed thus Inimici gratiae Dei latent in commendatione naturae The enemies of Gods grace welter themselves under the commendation of nature And Austine professeth it to be impiety and madnesse to deny that God can convert any mans will when hee will and where hee will And you blush not to professe in another discourse of yours that humility is the disposition which prepares us for grace I doubt you will finde little comfort in such humility and that at the day of judgement such humility will be found abominable pride What you meane by pledges I know not you love to walk in cloudes and in the darke if you mean the fruits of Gods temporall blessings how will you prove that these were evidences of that love which God man fested in the death of his Sonne And if it were so then this evidence should be manifested to all of ripe yeares for all are partakers of Gods temporall providence even they that have filled up the measure of their iniquity Yet then you usually professe God withdrawes his love from them but how can that bee if hee afford them the unquestionable earnests thereof as before you called these pledges whereas in the close you say that many are not acquainted with this manifestation of Gods love and that out of meere mercy it may well passe for one of your paradoxes I never doubted but that it was a mercy to know Christ and the love of God to the world in him but that it was a mercy to want Christ I never read nor heard till now Neither is it necessary that men though reprobates should be enraged to evill by the Gospell for God can make even reprobates to profit by it ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quà mitius puniantur To the outward emendation of their lives to the end their punishment may be the milder And we finde by experience that all were not enraged against it CHAP. XVIII Want of consideration or ignorance of Gods unfained love to such as perish a
judge there is no chang or alteration at all in God but only in men and in theire actions Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration your selfe proposed in the former chapter but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence that is the fruitfull Mother of all things and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe which usually falleth out whē men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation And yet that which you say here I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power But you have not discovered unto us if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children especially consideringe that will is found in the Father as well as in the Mother yea and love also if not in greater measure But I deny not but that God made the world out of love but out of love to whome to the creature Nothing lesse I should thinke as before I have shewed but rather out of love to himselfe as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe And greate reason God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things should be the supreame end of all things But let this passe Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous but very preposterous and unsound First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it and then a qualification or limitation thereof by way of exception unto a certayne time The proposition is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory but our temporall being also and the preservation therof For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any For they are merely gratuita dona and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne in bestowing it on whome he will and denyinge it to whome he will And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will and whome he will he hardneth But more then this as God was not bound to create any so neyther can any thing save his owne will binde him to preserve any thing in being But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men even take theire temporall being from them without any purpose ever to restore it and not only the being of theire bodyes but of theire soules also turning both into nothing Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent never so holy as Arminius confesseth But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this Now these are two the one because God hath created our natures Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this that God hath created other things as well as man Yet who will conclude herehence that God must needes preserve them and not exclude them from this fruite of his love Your other reason is because God cannot change and this is as weake as the former For like as God though at one time he gives us life another time takes life from us yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe like as in course of nature though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether in the heavens in the earth in the Sea in the states and Kingdoms of the World and in the bodyes of all creatures yet without any change at all in himselfe yea though he set an end to this visible World this can inferre no variablenesse in God so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells and so exclude them from all fruits of his love Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God Yet you have a third reason which is this Love is the nature of God as Creator You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good and what other sense you imply when you say Love is Gods nature as a Creator I discerne not You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love it is very incongruous to say that this love of God wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition and that is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill come to that hight as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour First touching your meaning in this then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning your meaning in briefe is this No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity Of this your opinion I have spoken often I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it And that is
A DISCOVERY OF D. IACKSONS VANITIE OR A perspective Glasse wherby the admirers of D. IACKSONS profound discourses may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them in sundry passages and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received Written by William Twisse Doctor of Divinitie as they say from whom the Copie came to the Presse Iob 38. 2. Who is this that darkeneth counsell by words without knowledge Imprinted ANNO M. DC XXXI To the understanding Reader TWo sorts of men there are to passe by the meer Politicians ready to serve the times and their owne turnes without any fear of God or man which now undermine that doctrine of grace which formerly they themselves have beleived and by the preaching wherof they have receyved the grace wherby they are what they are in any true good Some under a shew of modestic and simplicity hold off themselves and others from admitting so high poynts as not willing to beleive that which is above their comprehension But others take up the cause a clean contrary way and would bear the World in hand that the failings of our divines in this doctrine came from shallownesse and want of profound knowledge in Metaphysicall speculations Of this later ranke Mr. D. Iackson is the ringleader This man doubteth not to professe that he hath found no character of the incomprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence no not in the Holy Prophets and Apostles writings from which he hath receyved so full instruction or reaped the like fruits of admiration as from one of Trismegist an Egyptian Priest part 1. pag. 55. So that the sentence which he passeth upon Vorstius whom he seemeth more to aemulate in overturning the divine attributes then any other doth shreudly reflect upon himselfe The evaporations of proud phantastick melancholy hath ecclipsed the lustre of glorious presence in this prodigious Questionists braine which would bring us out of the Sunne-shine of the Gospell into old Egyptian darknesse From the same Aegyptian learning thorough Plato and Plotinus he taketh his draught of the divine decrees For he acknowledgeth no decree of God concerning humane actions good or bad no not of those which God promised to effect either concerning his mercy in Christ and Christians or concerning his judgements to be effected by the wicked but onely disjunctive that is by his owne instances part 2. Sect. 2. cap. 17. Aut erit aut non erit it shall eyther raine all day tomorrow or befaire all day tomorrow in which example of a false disjunction he may seem to teach that Gods decrees may also be false the Sunne will eyther shine or not shine this day at twelve of the clocke Surely from this character of a divine decree though we can receyve no good instruction yet have we as much fruit of admiration as D. Iackson himself receyved from the former of ubiquity For what Christian can satisfie himself in wondering how erit illa die which is the usuall expression of Gods decree in the Prophets phrase can be interpreted by erit aut non erit how all the promises which declare Gods decree of dispensing his grace upon all nations by the ministery of men as ra ne or dew upon hearbs should be so glossed it shall eyther raine or not raine or how all the decreed promises concerning the prevayling course of the Sunne of righteousnes in by his his servāts activitie should be flouted with this disjunction it shall shine or not shine It would bring some fruit of admiration if any Prince or Law maker should make no other decree about such things as concerne their and their subjects good but meerly disjunctive eyther men shall doe so or not so eyther they shall doe good or suffer evill For though men have not power of determining absolutely future actions yet they come neerer to that then the indifferencie of an even-weighing disjunction doth import They putte so much weight as the efficacie of their will can bear to that scale wherin they place this shall be But Plato and Plotinus conceyved or rather in some of their discourses expressed no more then this All Christians therfore are by D. Iackson called back agayne to this as if by the Prophets and Apostles they had been caried too farre It can not indeed be denied but the Platonists did commonly so decipher their humane ideas of divine decreeing as D. Iackson doth For Alcinons de doctrina Platonis cap. 12. hath the same relation in plaine termes which D. Iackson hath turned into his strong lines of Oxford Sic fatum ex sententia Platonis pronunciat quaecunque anima talem vitam elegerit hujusmodi quaedam commiserit consequenter talia patietur Libera ergo est anima in ejus arbitrio vel agere vel non agere ponitur quod autem sequitur actionem ab ipso fato perfinitur Veluti ex eo quod Paris Helenam rapiet quod quidem in ejus erat arbitrio sequetur ut Graeci de Helena decertent Indeterminatum atque indifferens natura sua libertate nostra in utram placuerit statere lancem quodam modo declināte mox aut verum aut falsum ex possibili sit But if D. Iackson had not too much been caried away with admiration of these ideas he might have receyved a double inctruction from this Alcinons 1. That Plato did overthrow his owne idea by granting a fatall decree of the Grecians fighting against Troye in which warre were conteyned so many thousands of humane actions as there were soldiers in the Grecian army in exemplifying the liberty of humane actions from fatall decree 2. That Plato went before Aristotle of whom he was forsaken in better notions in denying upon that libertine ground any contingent especially free actions to come to be true before they be acted Which Swarez himselfe in his Metaphysicks confesseth to be no lesse an error then the overturning of Christian faith doth amount to libertate nostra mox aut verum aut falsum ex possibili sit Had not the same passion of admixation stood in the way he might have learned out of Marsilius Ficinus to whom he is beholding for other Platonicall notions that Plato himself was by fits of another minde For so sayth this Author de Theol. Platon cap. 13. Deus naturarum omnium temperator dum regit cuncta singula pro singulorum regit natura Quoniam vero motor primus praevalere debet dominari ideo sic animos ut Plato vult quasi cogit ad bonum ut bonum ipsum nolle non possint And that these secōd thoughts of Plato were more agreeable to Christian faith the same Marsilius Ficinus is witnesse Epist. lib. 2. Epist. cui tit Homo quam difficile extra habitum naturalem posilus felicitatem sequitur tam facile hanc in naturalem habitum restitutus assequitur where treating of the like question he saith Quid respondebimus Magi Pythagoraei Platonici Peripatetici forsan sic
generations as of thâ— Sonne by the Father the progresse upwardes cannot be infinite Therfore at lengthe we must ascend to thâ— first of Men as Adam who was not borne by generation of Man for then he had not bene thâ— first but otherwise and in like sort of the generations of all other thinges that they had their beginninge from some superior cause to their owne natures which supreame cause of all we accoumpt to be God But yet I thinke you are not ignorant that some Schoolemen maynteyne the world might have bene everlastinge and that by creation in which case there shoulde be an infinite progressâ— in generations unles as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeminge contradictions in Aristotle to praevent an infinite number of immortall soules hence ensuinge devisethe that thoughe the World had bene from everlastinge yet shoulde it not be necessary that there shoulde have bene an infinite number of Men deceased because saythe he God coulde have praeserved the first Man from generation propagation of his like untill some five or sixe thousand yeares agoe so you shoulde take some such course to praevent an infinite progresse in naturall generations But I meane not to put you to any such shifts For I holde creation from everlastinge to be a thing impossible and that the impossibility therof may be made evident by demonstration and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned to be of a thing merely impossible allso So that in fine this argument of yours though with litle accuratenes proposed by you is drawne from the creation which kinde of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of till another time yet in the first place you have fallen upon it ere you are aware Bradwardine writinge against the Pelagians layethe downe two suppositions as the ground of all wherof this is the second that there is no infinite progresse in entities but that in every kinde there is one supreame The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more And least he should seeme to suppose this without all proofe one argument but one he produceth to prove this And the proofe is to this effect It implyeth no contradiction to say such a one there is therfore it is necessary that such a one have beinge it is impossible there shoulde be no God If any Man deniethe the Antecedent it behooveth him to shewe wherin the contradiction dothe consist And it is very strange so strange as incredible that for the best nature to have existence it shoulde imply contadiction As for example we finde these manifest capitall degrees of perfection amongst entities corporall Some liave only beinge some have beinge life allso some have beinge life and sence some unto all these adde reason allso Nowe that nature which includes bothe being life is of greater perfection then such as have beinge without life and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist Agayne that nature which includes bothe beinge life and sense is of greater perfection then that which includes only beinge and life without sense and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist Agayne that nature which besides all these in the notion therof includes reason allso is of farre greater perfection then the former and it implyeth no contradiction for natures of such perfection to existâ— Lastly there are besides all these natures purely spirituall which we call Angells or Intelligences of farre greater perfection then natures materiall corporall it implyethe no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist as the Philosopher hathe demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all materiall concretion Why then shoulde it imply any contradiction for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist unles they are supposed to be of greatest perfection even able to make a World out of nothinge and consequently to be of a necessary beinge themselves For if possible not to be howe is it possible they shoulde atteyne to beinge Not of themselves For that which is not hathe no power to give being to it selfe Nor of any other whether of a nature superior or inferior Not of any of inferior nature For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angell neyther by generation nor by creation If by a superior this is to acknowledge that there is a nature existent superior in perfection unto Angells And if Angells had a necessary being then seinge they are of a certeyne number their number allso must be necessary Nowe if it implyeth no contradiction that God shoulde be it is most necessary that he is and must necessarily be granted that he is For being supposed to include greatest perfection if he had no being it were impossible he shoulde have beinge seing nothinge can bring it selfe from nothinge to beinge neyther can ought els produce him For if any thinge coulde then that whatsoever it were shoulde be of greater perfection then he This is the argument of Bradwardin And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before and but one of the five wayes which he takes in the proofe of this The first way more manifest as he saythe is that which is taken from the consideration of motion wher hence he concludethe that we must at lengthe ascend to one who moovethe and is not mooved that is the first moover which saythe he all understand to be God The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient For saythe he we finde even in insensible thinges an order of efficient causes one subordinate to another wherin he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progresse secondly that nothing can be the efficient cause of itselfe Hence it followeth saythe he we must ascend rest in one supreame efficient which acknowledgethe no efficient of it and that all understand to be God The third way is that which hathe bene allready prosecuted from the consideration comparison of thinges possible with thinges necessary The fourthe is from the degrees that we finde in thinges as some thinges are more or lesse true more or lesse good more or lesse noble whence he concludes that somethinge must be acknowledged to be most true most good most noble that to be the cause of truthe goodnes perfection in all others as fire is the cause of all heate And that which is the cause of all others we acknowledge to be God The first and lastis drawne from the governement of the World the consideration of the order of thinges amongst themselves whence he concludethe there is some thinge that orderethe them and that must be God This last argument is that which Raymund Sebond dothe so much dilate insist upon And wherof he is very confident like as of the successe of his undertakings in generall as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine within the space of a monthe and that without any knowledge to
rule of Decorum in all resemblances that so you may make way to betray your learninge in Hieronymus Vida his Poetry passinge his censure upon a comparison of Homer wherin he compares Ajax retiringe from the Troians unto an hards kinned asse driven with batts or staves out of a corne fielde by a company of children The comparison is justified by Vida but thought not fitt to be applyed in like sort unto Turnus unles a Lyon be put in the place of the asse in the judgement of those courtly times wherin Virgill lived therby desiring belike to justify Virgill allso I still attend when those scattered rayes you promised us of that glorious light you spake of will breake foorthe But it may be we are not yet come to the Horizon whose edges and skirts alone can discover them But yet to stay our stomachs you tell us by the way that the Holy Prophets in their courtly Decorum observed in framinge comparisons are nothing inferior to any Poet though as good as Virgill Homer allso They are something beholden unto you for your good woord Your instance is out of Esay 31. 4. Like as the Lyon yong Lyon roaring on his pray when a multitude of sheepheards is called foorthe against him he will not be afrayde of their voyce nor abase himselfe for the noyse of them so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for Mount Sion for the hill therof I beginne to conceive this was it you went with childe withall in casting your selfe upon this digression touching the resemblinge of the nature of God And because the comparing of Virgill with Homer is a prety point of humanitie learninge and you had observed this passage in Scripture suitable to that of Turnus his description in Virgill to vent this piece of learninge you have drawne in by the cares a discourse or rather an inquiry Howe Gods essence is to be resembled the issue wherof is but this that the Prophet observes a very courtly decorum in resembling him vnto a Lyon Yet by the way take this If it were not courtly enoughe to compare Turnus to an asse as Homer compares Aiax but rather to a Lyon doe you thinke it courtly enoughe to compare the Lord of hosts to a Lyon And what courtly decorum is observed thinke you when the second comming of Christ is compared to the comming of a theife in the night Persuade your selfe the holy Ghost affectes no courtly decorums his language is allwayes savoury to a gracious spirite not otherwise The witts of Virgill Homer both at the best savoured but of the fleshe So dothe not the woord of God I honour them bothe in their kindes but I would not have them remembred the same day wherin we consider the spirituall decorum of the language of Gods spirite Well the childe is delivered these panges are over Now we may expect to be advanced to the Horizon you spake of for the discovery of those scattered rayes of glorious light wherwith you inamoured us But first we are to be acquainted with three sorts of errours out of Austin in settinge footthe the Divine nature The first you say ariseth from comparing God to bodies as by sayeng that he is bright or yellowe the second from comparing him unto soules as by attributing forgetfulnes unto him The third by attributing such things unto him as are neyther true of him nor of any other as in sayenge that he is able to produce or begett himselfe Yet you tell us fictions or suppositions must be used of things scarse possible wherby to represent God in default of better And thus you make way for a fiction of yours wherby to represent God that is of a soule diffused thoroughe the whole Vniverse Nowe that Deus was Anima Mundi was an olde opinion of certeyne heathens two thousand yeares agoe And what necessitie I pray of any such fiction And withall it is a fiction full of absurditie considering that a great part of this Vniverse is a World of soules of diverse kindes and the rest are uncapable of soules whether they are inferior to animate thinges as baser bodies or superior even to reasonable soules themselves as Intelligences And I woonder what you meant by that sory qualification when you say You must use fictions of thinges scarse possible Implyinge that this fiction of yours which here you introduce is of a thing scarse possible Wherby you seeme to conceave that this is a thing not absolutely impossible Neyther doe I finde any congruitie why bodies abstract or Mathematicall shoulde be of fitter capacity to receave this imaginary soule wherby to represent God Only I confesse that an imginary body is most fitt for an imaginary soule but neyther fitt to represent God by For what vertues I pray can you finde in them fitt to resemble him Yet you are not at ende of your extractions thoughe the ende of this Chaptor touchinge Gods resemblance moovethe us to sende an ende to our expectations and to looke no more for those seattered rayes of that glorious light you spake of The childe you travayled with was Homers comparinge Aiax to an asse Virgils comparinge Turnus to a Lyon Vida his judgement therupon and the Prophets concurrence with the witt of the latter and three errours mentioned by Austin in resembling the nature of God And last of all a fiction to this purpose of a thing scarse possible and that something refined and the whole put of to further extractions all the glory we were put in hope of is the glory of a fewe phrases wherwith you wishe your Reader seing his cheare to be merry for he is wellcome And thus you have given us a flashe of powder without shot but not without smoke Our enterteynment may be better in the chapter followinge CHAP. II. Concerning two Philosophicall maximes which are sayde to leade us to the acknowledgement of one infinite incomprehensible essence FROM leight shewes we come to solid discourse at least we are promised such The principles wherof are two termed springs founteynes that they may be the fitter for the baptizing of Atheists so you speake as they are fitt enough for the confirminge of Christians The first is Whatsoever hath limite or boundes of being hath some distinct cause or author of beinge This is taken for a proposition knowne of it selfe yet are the termes very ambiguous as namely the terme limite or boundes In one place you professe that beginninge of beinge is one speciall limit of being Newe I confesse that in this sense the proposition is evident thus Whatsoever hath a beginninge hathe a cause therof distinct from it selfe because nothing can have a beginninge of beinge without a cause Neyther can any thing give beinge unto it selfe And therfore if all thinges in this World are acknowledged to have had a beginninge it must be acknowledged that they had a Maker which is God But that this World hathe had a beginninge hathe not bene
acknowledged by all Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God as Aristotle and his Followers have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe And therfore unles the contrary be prooved these Philosophers confuted we have herby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this truthe by the light of reason That there is a God and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost And therfore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense but rather you extende the word limites or boundes to a greater generalitie of signification in which sense you woulde have it supposed that All thinges besides God himselfe have limite and boundes of beinge not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable but in regard that they are Entia finita which is out of question In like sort the woord being is of ambiguous signification For it may be taken eyther for beinge of essence or for beinge of existence The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby thinges are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende and that at such a time or other But the limits boundes of thinges according to their essence are such in respect wherof Entia are sayde to be finiâ—a or infinita Nowe in this latter sense your proposition hathe bene very questionable amongst the most learned Philosophers that have bene For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted but that this visible World was finite Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it is no where evident Nay he opposethe Plato the rest before him who maynteyned that the World was made so accordingly that it had a beginninge wherby it seemes that he denyinge the creation of the World denyed therwithall that the World had any efficient cause And indeede whosoever maynteynes that the world had a beginning by creation must therwithall maynteyne that eyther it was made of somethinge or of nothinge You will not say that t is a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter which matter had existence without creation For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe Therfore you must be driven to maynteyne that it is a truthe evident of it selfe that the World was made originally out of nothinge or at least that it may be immediately concluded evidently by a principle which is evident of it selfe thus Whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made the World hath boundes of beinge therfore it hath bene made and seing it was not made of any thing pre-existent therfore it was made of nothing Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceaved it to be a thing impossible that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement herof not to any naturall evidence but only unto faithe as where the Apostle saythe by faithe we believe that the World was made so that things which we see were made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not of things that doe 2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position tell us that this maxime is simply convertible thus Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge because it hathe beginninge of beinge For omnis causa principium omne causatum principiatum There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this For to say that a proposition is simply convertible is in a Logicall phrase to say that it is a good consequence which is drawne from the proposition converted to the convertent that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made But this is untrue of the proposition convertible which you speake of For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion but only an Vniversall negative a particular affirmative But I leave your wordes and take your meaninge You say it is allso true that Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge Nowe bothe this proposition is naught and the reason worse For the Sonne of God the second person in Trinity hathe cause of beinge from his Father for he is begotten of him And the H. Ghost hathe cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne For he proceedethe from them bothe Yet neyther God the Sonne nor God the holy Ghost have any limits of their beinge If you say the Persons are limited thoughe the nature of the Godhead be not I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father For of the Sonne and H. Ghost I knowe no other limitation then this that the Sonne is not the Father nor the H. Ghost Likewise the H. Ghost is neyther the Father nor the Sonne And in this sense the Father is limited as much as eyther For as the Sonne is not the Father so the Father is not the Sonne and as the H. Ghost is not the Father so the Father is not the H. Ghost You shoulde have sayde All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation have allso limits or bounds of being Or thus All thinges that have cause of beinge in time and not from everlastinge have limits and boundes of beinge Or if you woulde apply it to generation thus All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge Yet none of these is to the purpose save the first And that first proposition supposethe the creation which yet is not evident but unto faithe So then you see howe weake this proposition is Yet the reasons you bring for the proofe of it are much woorse Your first reason is this because it hathe beginninge of beinge Nowe if by limits of beinge you meane limits of existence such as is the beginninge of duration then your proofe is merely identicall But if you meane by limits of beinge limits of essence wherby a thing is sayde to be Ens sinitum the consequence is true I confesse but nothing more evident is the conclusion by this reason then it was before of it selfe For that it hathe a cause efficient which producethe it dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced then that it hathe a beginninge Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue that the effect produced is finite unles the efficient cause be finite For to say that a finite thinge coulde produce an effect infinite is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity But there is no place for this exception in case the efficient cause be infinite And I have knowne some inferre herehence that the World is infinite Otherwise say they there shoude be no effect of God
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole and for avoydance of all vacuity I see no reason for that other assertion of yours that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall but rather is limited in them What thinke you of the soules of men doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter Materia prima was accoumpted in our Vniversitie to have dimensiones in determinatas and that it receaved the determination therof from formes but by the operation of Agents in their severall generations I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God who is the God of nature as well as of grace But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature as the World hathe dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof is such a question wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe our acknowledgement of the Creation 4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge can have no limits or boundes of beinge This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge the same hathe no beginninge of beinge But if it proceede of limits of essence or of qualitie or of quantitie it requires helpe of reason to make it good For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge denyed as it seemes that it had any cause of beinge and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie and qualitie For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible as Aristotle by name By your distinction followinge of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof which yet hathe bene the cheife if not only limit which hitherto you have mentioned Agayne why shoulde you make but two wayes confoundinge the limits of quantitie with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie with limits of qualitie which yet are both accidentall But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge therfore he hathe no limits of beinge Nowe I pray apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge Is he without limits in number why then belike he is numberles Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature and in persons can be but three must needes be three Is he without limits in quantitio and so infinite therin But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all Is he without limits in qualities not materiall for such are not incident to him but spirituall so infinite therin Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes why but consider in God there are no degrees no qualities at all As touching perfections created therof indeede we have severall kindes but none such are to be found in God Only because God is able to produce them therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God thoughe not formally But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute as of spirituall For God can produce all alike Therfore all are eminently alike in God Of thinges visible the most perfect you say are but perfect in some one kinde It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created But you may not say that God is perfect in all such kindes but rather in none of them For that were to be perfect in imperfections Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes and he is the Author of them producinge them out of nothing They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall maynteyne it to have bene so by necessitie of nature And all such would peremtorily deny that it was possible for the World not to have bene and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary then to suppose it Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not seing they are not capable of life And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule which is not incident to Angells much lesse to Heavens which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist Neyther dothe Seneca in the place by you alleaged speake of Angells in my judgment but rather of the Species of thinges generable particulars thoughe subject to corruption beinge inabled for generation and therby for perpetuation of their kindes and consequently for the mayntenance of the World and that for ever It is well knowne that the Platonickes thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made to have had any beginninge Of the same opinion were the Stoicks Their common voyce was De nihilo nihil in nihiluâ— nil posse reverti accordingly they might well conceave that God might be hindered in his operation by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers I conceave to be just Yet by your leave I doe not thinke that any creature capable of immortalitie in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men can be made immortall by nature Yet I doubt not but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be For it is apparant that God hathe many such as namely the Angels and soules of men Yet still their natures are annihilable in respect of the power of God Neyther can I believe that to be immortall in Senecaes language was to be without beginninge For I doe not finde but that the Stoicks together with Plato conceaved that the World had a beginninge But in this respect he calleth them eternall I shoulde thinke because the World together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned subject to corruption and generation in particulars should have no ende and that by the Providence of God We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary but God But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge of absolute necessitie For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge all Philosophers helde impossible and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge and of absolute necessity wherof the World was to be made that seemed impossible unto Aristotle and that upon good reason The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument and not avouched only by bare contestation That which followethe
neyther universally true nor at all to any purpose you insist liberally in your followinge discourse You should proove that whatsoever hath limits of extension the same allso hath beginninge of duration which yet I deny not to be a truthe and demonstrable but of the demonstration herof your discourse hathe fayled hitherunto When you argue thus It is as possible to put a newe fashion upon nothing as for any thing that is to take limits or set forme of being from nothinge You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it For they that maynteyne the World had no beginninge doe allso maynteyne that it tooke no beginninge of the limits therof And as they doe not say the World tooke his beginninge from nothinge so neyther doe they say that the World tooke the beginninge of his limits or tooke his limits or forme from nothinge Nowe you by this forme of your dispute doe instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World thus If God made the World out of nothing then he put a newe fashion upon nothinge But it is impossible that any newe fashion shoulde be put upon nothinge therfore it is impossible that God shoulde make the World out of nothinge Nowe in this Syllogisme the minor is most true For not any thinge can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion as the forme therof But the consequence of the major is most untrue For when we say that God made the World out of nothinge our meaninge is not that nothing was the matter wherof the World was made but only that it was the terminus a quo not materia ex qua As much as to say God made the World wheras nothing went before neyther had God any matter wheron to woorke when he made the World And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginninge doe therwithall deny that the World tooke eyther being or limits from any thinge You turne their negative into an affirmative so to corrupt their opinion in steade of confutinge it They thought it needed not any thinge to give it beinge or bounds of beinge least they shoulde be driven to affirme that somethinge coulde be made out of nothinge wheras they had rather maynteyne that the world ever had existence by necessitie of nature Neyther did they maynteyne that the world tooke limits or beinge from it selfe any more then from any other which you devise and impute unto them in steade of convictinge their Tenet of errour by force of argument in the way of naturall reason which you undertake And therfore havinge so weakely disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited you doe therby betray the weakenes of your proofe of Gods illimited condition from the everlastingnes therof 6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived in the point of creation you proceede magnificently to suppose that the conceyte of beinge without limits is essentially included in the conceyte of beinge without cause precedent which if it were true then were it a truthe per se notae and consequently the creation of the world evident of it selfe even to common reason seinge it is supposed to have limits And agayne your discourse is so fashioned as if Philosophers maynteyned that the world tooke beginninge of it selfe which is untrue and indeede a thinge evidently impossible namely that any thinge shoulde take beginninge of it selfe And indeede if a thinge coulde give beinge to it selfe it might give what it lusted to it selfe if so be it had a lust which the Elements and Heavens have not Yet those Aristotle maynteyned to have bene from everlastinge not that they gave beginninge to themselves but that they tooke no beginninge from any thinge The reason wherof was because they coulde not conceave howe any thinge coulde be made out of nothinge a thing contrary to all naturall experience upon which kinde of ground your selfe but erst builded your discourse when you sayde thinges caused as induction manifestethe are allwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes Yet notwithstandinge upon this fiction of a thing able to give beinge to it selfe you dilate at large I grant that upon this fiction nothinge coulde restrayne it from takinge all bodily perfection possible to it selfe in case it had power to give beinge to it selfe But never any Philosopher maynteyned that it had power to give beinge to it selfe For they that maynteyned a Chaos precedinge the production of the world maynteyned that out of this Chaos God produced all thinges and not that the Chaos or ought els gave being to itselfe And Aristotle that denyed such an eternall Chaos maynteyned the world had no beginninge was farre from maynteyninge that the world gave beinge to it selfe Secondly I answeare that thoughe it shoulde thus receave all bodily perfection possible yet this shoulde not be infinite and without limits as you woulde have your Reader to suspect without proofe and indeede unles this be imagined t is nothing no the purpose The reason why in this case it shoulde not be infinite is this because all bodily perfection possible is but finite as they conceaved and therin conceaved nothing amisse So of quantitie or qualitie the impossibilitie of eyther to be without measure in bodies whose perfection is only finite is a sufficient hinderance from takinge eyther quantity or qualitie without measure In like sort let Vacuitie as you speake be left free to give it selfe full and perfect act let it take all possible perfection yet since all possible perfection of bodies is supposed to be only finite it will not followe that the perfection taken shall be without limits which yet you must proove otherwise your discourse is of no force to proove that whatsoever hathe nâ— cause of bringe distinct from itselfe is without limits Allthoughe the Philosophers that maynteyned the world or matter therof preexistent to be without beginninge driven herunto because they conceaved not how it was possible that any thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge yet did they never maynteyne that the one or the other gave being to it selfe Yet this fiction you pinne upon their sleeve to supply the weaknes of your discourse Much lesse coulde it enter into any sober mans conceyte that they gave power to a Vacuitie to give it selfe ful and perfect act seinge Vacuitie is starke nothinge which the Chaos was not but a materiall thinge thoughe merely passive and nothinge active But as for vacuitie that is neyther active nor passive as being starke nothinge And yet to this you adde a further solecisme in this your fiction as when you suppose this vacuitie to have power to assume eyther bodily substances or spirituall which the Chaos had not no not so much as in capacitie being wholy materiall wheras spirituall substances are immateriall And yet I confesse as you give unto that which is nothinge power to assume which it list eyther bodily or spirituall substances it may well be sayde that nothing hathe power indifferently
to assume eyther or both of them This I propose by way of an universall negative not by way of a particular affirmative as you doe making the terme nothing to be the subject in your propositions and not an universall signe only Yet all thus assumed as you speake shoulde be but finite because all possible perfection besides the nature of God it selfe is but finite Therfore I say it shoulde be but finite if any thinge at all which caution I doe put in because upon due accoumpt it will be founde that the summe of all this in a good sense will proove to be no more then just nothinge For suppose nothing dothe assume bodily substances agayne suppose nothinge dothe assume spirituall substances put this together and adde nothing to nothing and see whether the totall will proove to be any jot more then just nothing You proceede further and tell us that while we imagine it without cause of existence or beginninge no reason imaginable coulde confine it to any set place of residence or extension why rather in the center then circumference or eyther rather then bothe In this you seeme to have reference to that which immediately went before and that was a vacuitie And in very truthe upon this supposition where nowe the center is nothing was where nowe the circumference is nothing was and in all the bodies betweene nothinge was For you suppose a vacuitie of all and nothing to be where now there is some thinge Yet this nothing by your leave must be confined in reference to the places where bodies were before or after And the places where bodies were before being the same by your supposition with the places which nowe are must needes be finite For undoubtedly the space of this whole world betweene the center and circumference yea including bothe is but finite But foortwith you relapse to the former iniquitie of your supposition and in steede of havinge a being without beginninge which was indeede the opinion of some great Philosophers concerninge the world or concerning preexistent matter wherof the world was made driven herunto upon supposition as of a thinge impossible that nothinge coulde be made out of nothinge wherin all agreed thoughe otherwise of different opinions nor different only but contrariant allso I say from this true state of their opinion you relapse to the worlds taking of beginninge to it selfe which is rather to maynteyne that it had a beginninge thoughe of it selfe then that it had none at all yet this alone was affirmed by them and not the other Of which other namely of takinge beginning to it selfe imagination only you say is the true cause And therin you say true but this cause is to be understood of your imagination not theirs For they imagined no such taking of beginning to it selfe eyther in the world it selfe or in the preexistent matter therof Yet upon this you founde a newe imagination of extendinge forsoothe its existence bothe wayes and drawing a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes to witt where it beginnes in your imagination not in theirs for they imagined no such thing And indeede he that imaginethe white to be blacke I see no reason why he may not proceede further and imagine black to be white and adde unto this a third to witt that white is neyther white nor blacke and blacke is neyther blacke nor white Of circular motions I have read but of circular durations I have neyther read nor heard till nowe well let us understande it of duration in circular motions But if you please imagine time to be circular like the motions of your orbes and in course of time to returne at lengthe to the beginninge of it For what els to make of the instant where it beginnes I knowe not It seemes by this discourse that you have seene the gigge and if your braynes have not runne round I assure you mine have all most in followinge you At lengthe you come to a more sober supposition and expression as when you relate their opinion thus that the world hathe a true present beinge without any cause precedent This I confesse is suitable to their opinion whome you impugne who were driven herunto as I sayde because they coulde not comprehende howe any thinge coulde be made of nothinge But when you adde without a superior guide to appoynt it a set course you something swerve from the right All maynteyned the world coulde not be made out of nothinge But all of them did not deny that it had a guide to direct it The Platonickes and Stoicks acknowledged a divine understandinge to have made the world but out of a prejacent matter which they conceaved to be eternall and to acknowledge no maker Nowe as they acknowledged a maker so they acknowledged a Governour thoughe sometimes hindered in his course by the stubbornes of the refractary matter which acknowledged no maker Aristotle maynteynes allso a first moover therfore he acknowledged a guide allso But wheras he acknowledged him to be a necessary Agent as I conceave it was in effect as much as if he had acknowledged no Governour But all agreed that the duration eyther of the world or of the prejacent matter was everlasting for the time past and that the world shoulde be everlasting for the time to come To this Plato yeilded And so conteyned all duration imaginable bothe wayes namely both for the time past and for the time to come but with this difference that for the time past it was actually infinite only the duration for the time to come not actuall but in such sort infinite as it shoulde never have an ende Now this consideration openeth a fayre way to a discovery of the impossibilitie of this conceyte of theirs concerninge the eternitie of the world or the eternitie of time and that by very evident reason thoughe I deny not but men have and may sett their witts on woorke in quashinge the evidence therof in their zeale I thinke to defend the honour of Aristotle For if the world were everlastinge Paulus Venetus thoughe zealous to defend the possibilitie herof yet acknowledgethe it woulde followe that the part is equall to the whole nay greater then the whole and that in so evident a manner that he hathe no other way to answere it then by professinge that this maxime Totum est majus sua parte is of force only in materia finita not in materia infinita which in effect is as much as to say The world may be everlasting I will maynteyne it but I forbid any man to dispute against it For I purpose to deny all maximes that are made use of in disputing against it and will be bolde to say that they all have force only in materia finita and not in materia infinita And because seing I have excepted against weake courses of argumentation in defense of the creation it may be expected I shoulde substitute stronger arguments in the place of them I will not spare
a beginninge so we believe it shall have an ende And consequently the producing of more individuall substances shall have an ende And wheras all Species and individualls formerly produced being put together doe make up a number only finite howe can this inferre that God is infinite especially if so be more Species might be produced then have bene produced For eyther it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things or no. If it dothe then the producing of those that are produced is no evidence of Gods greatest power If is dothe not then the number of thinges produced were they double to that they are or shall be cannot evidence that Gods power is infinite Agayne seinge God is yet in producing more and more we can have no evidence herby of Gods greatest power till he come to the ende of his workes therfore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power or that his power is infinite thoughe perhaps the world may have to witt when God is come to the ende of his workinge Yet when that time is come wherein God shall cease from producinge newe all his workes put together being but finite howe can that consideration evince a power infinite Wherfore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea c. maynteyned that the World allready made was infinite because it was fitt as he thought that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent and therfore saythe he the world must be infinite To proceede a litle further when the time shall come that God shall surcease to produce any newe thinge eyther in kinde or individuall the particulars produced put together from the beginninge of the world to that day shall be but finite and howe can this inferre a power infinite Nowe all this discourse of yours proceedes upon supposition that all thinges are produced by God and not only by course of nature but by such a cause as was first created and since maynteyned and governed and ordered by God which truthe was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were And you well knowe that the creation of materia prima was denyed by them all And therfore I should conceave that the infinitenes of God is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things then by the number of thinges produced as namely by his creating of the World that of nothing For if God hathe power to give beinge unto that which hathe no beinge but only is capable of beinge as put the case to a man or Angell and that by his word will he is as well able to give being to any thinge conceavable that is capable of beinge by his word and will and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotens He that can give beinge to any thinge that is possible to be he is Allmighty Agayne if God were finite in perfection of entity then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God then that allso should have an existence For if the essence or existence of a nature lesse perfect shoulde be all one how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect And consequently there shoulde be many Gods one different in perfection above another CHAP. IV. There is no pluralitie of perfections in the Infinite essence albeit the perfection of all thinges be in him Of the Absolute Identitie of the Divine essence and attributes AS for the argument which you propose We must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies or deny them sense because sense is never founde without a body I see no great cause to mislike it especially if it be rightly proposed as it may be thus because sense to witt in proper speeche cannot be founde without a body For is not sense an organicall facultie that is such a facultie as cannot exercise its function without materiall instruments How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument let the Reader judge God the supreame Artificer can make Virtus formatrix you say doe more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason and hence you conclude that therfore God hath both sense and reason Wheras you may as well proove that God hathe bodily substance in him both because he setts virtus formatrix on woorke in producing bodies and can doe more then we can withall our bodies and soules Therfore if you please you may in confidence of such illations proceede to say that God consists of a body and soule too The Psalmists Philosophy is a poore ground for you to builde on For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist that God hathe eyes and eares and handes allso as when he say the The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous his eares are open unto their prayers The right hand of the Lord is exalted the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God why doe you not attribute unto him feeling and smelling and tastinge allso Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses why may not God understand the same without sense as well as Angells That God only is and all thinges numerable are but mere shadowes of his beinge are your owne principles and phrases to drawe conclusions from such groundes is to builde Castles in the Ayre You thinke to helpe it by sayinge that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patternes or perfections you might have taken in three senses more as well and have sayde that smelling â—astinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patternes and perfections and justify Epicurus too in maynteyninge that the Gods have bodies For thoughe our Saviour sayde a Spirite hath not fleshe and bone yet you knowe howe to justifie that bodies and soules and fleshe and bone and braynes and senses yea and the basest thinge that is are in God to witt according to their ideall patternes and perfections For we make no question but that all these thinges are knowne to God and he is able to produce them no more doe you require in the next Section unto this that all thinges are in God yea materia prâ—a and all And this conceyte of yours you prosecute with a great deale more Rhetoricke then Philosophy or Logicke Certeinly not to be and not to have operation are farre more different betweene themselves then nihil agere and otium esse For these are formally the same the other are not For like 〈◊〉 to be and to worke are in themselves manifestly distinct so must be their negations allso so are not nihil agere otium esse 2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge more like a Rhetorician then a Philosopher makes you overlashe and cast your selfe upon resemblances without all proportion As when you say all thinges are in Gods power as strengthe to moove our limmes is in our sinewes or motive faculty Now in this I say is no proportion For seinge all thinges are
to the purpose partly as questionable as ever where it is to the purpose For that that which is infinite in essence must be one and not many I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes that have any learning in them allthough a man may fayle in the demonstration of it as here you doe For to be infinite in essence is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall For such as such differ not in essence And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie then infinity of essence in my judgement But be it not only without question but allso supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours yet is it nothing to the present question For the question in present is not whether there may be two Gods but only whether in the one nature of God there be not thinges different to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power and both these different from his goodnes that is in a word whether there be not any accident in God And yet unto this question you are arrived but in a very indecent and incongruous manner For wheras before you had undertaken to proove that all thinges were in God accordinge to ideall perfections by all thinges understandinge substances cheifly as of Angells and men and beasts of all sorts And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe that all things thus being in God are not in him by way of pluralitie but drawne to unitie and accordingly should herby proove that the essence of an Angell and the essence of a man yea and the essence of a beast and of every base thing is so in God as one with him and one with every thinge You shift of from this and in the place therof only mention how Gods life and wisedome and power and goodnes are all one in God And this you proove only from this that God is illimited which is as sory a consequence as that wherby you prooved his illimited condition to witt from this that he is independent and receaved not his being from any thinge Which consequence of yours is so farre from naturall evidence that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde who maynteyned eyther the World or the first matter not to speake of Intelligences to be independent of any efficient cause and without all makinge yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe that eyther of them should be infinite No lesse inconsequent is that which followeth allso as when you say Whersoever it can be truly sayde this is one and that another or this is and is not that each hath distinct limits I say this is untrue For suppose a body were infinite In this case bothe lengthe and bredthe and thicknes were infinite yet lengthe were only lengthe and not bredthe yet never a whit the lesse infinite Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe though breadthe be not thicknes nor infinity in breadthe any hinderance to infinity in lengthe thoughe lengthe be not breadthe In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisedome though his wisedome be not his power Nor the infinitie of his goodnes any prejudice to the infinitie of his power and wisedome thoughe his power and wisedome and goodnes were different in themselves But to come nearer what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie The Father is the Father and neyther is he the Sonne nor the Holy Ghost will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite The Sonne is the Sonne but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost will you therfore say he is not infinite The Holy Ghost is the Holy Ghost but neyther the Father nor the Sonne will you hence inferre that he hathe limits and is not infinite And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen but even by our divines allso that the Sonne is produced of the Father per modum intellectus Is he not the wisedome of the Father and what difference betweene the wisedome of God and the understanding of himselfe And doe they not allso confesse that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe per modum voluntatis And as we say Gods understanding is not his will though it be no different thing from his will and Gods will is not his understandinge thoughe it be no different thinge from his understandinge so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons thoughe we are not able to comprehended the mystery herof It is true our understanding is such as that oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari imaginatio non transcendit continuum Yet notwithstandinge we atteyne by discourse to the acknowledgment of thinges immateriall as of our soules yea and of Angells yea and of the God both of men Angells yet not by materiall thinges as by the pictures of them as you phrasify it but rather as in the effects wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hathe inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them And we commonly say that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments wherby you proove it as allso the soundnes of those consequences which you make from it And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faithe in believinge of God what Gods word teachethe us then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause then justify it We believe that God is one and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him but only of Persons And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of vis unita fortior which you speake of doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity as to deny the Trinity And touchinge the attributes of God as neyther distinct from the essence of God nor from themselves we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske we looke for substance of sound proofes and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him as man dothe for man to gratify him You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power above all conceyte of infinite power of Gods wisedome above all conceyte of infinite wisedome of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite
diaculation only but as a serious maxime to rely upon in Philosophicall discourse where the best decorum is to make no use of tropes and figures but of playne and proper termes that we may not be to seeke of our owne meaninge 8. Your former discourse about the Spheare together with the Center and Circumference spoken of of Gods immensitie you perceave is likely to rayse some Spirits and therfore aforehand you shewe a course how to lay them The first is How a Center should be conceaved to be every where The second How the indivisibility of Gods praesence should be compared to a Center To the former you answeare that As the Divine essence by reason of absolute insinity hath an absolute necessitie of coexistence with space or magnitude infinite so were it possible there should be as some Divines holde it possible there may be a magnitude or Spheare actually infinite this magnitude could have no set point for its center but of every point designable in it we might avouche this is the Center Every point shoulde have the negative properties of a sphericall center there coulde be no inequalitie betweene the distances of severall parts from the Circumference of that which is insinite and hath no boundes of magnitude So then God by absolute necessitie of nature must coexist with that which neyther doth exist nor can exist by the opinion of most For that an infinite body should exist is not only by Aristotle and Aquinas prooved but most generally helde to be impossible But if such a thing be impossible to exist it is allso impossible that God should coexist with it consequently most false is that which you say namely that by reason of his infinity it is absolutely necessary that God should coexist with it Now will it not followe herehence that it is absolutely necessary that God should not exist at all and that by reason of his infinity For to coexist with that which is impossible to exist what is it but not to exist at all O' what dangerous consequences doe your wilde assertions goe as it were with childe withall and howe fitt are such lettice for the lipps of Atheists marke how Durand discoursethe against this conceyte of yours as when you say that by reason of his infinity God must be every where Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique ita quod infinitas suae substantiae sit ei ratio ubique essendi Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae hinc competi ei esse necessario ubique vel in loco infinito nullo modo finito sicut a contrario dicitur de Angelo quod ratione suae essentiae finite convenit ei esse in loco finito nullo modo in infinito By the same reason we must say it agreeth not to God to be every were so as that the infinity of his substance is unto him the reason of his being every where For if it belonged to God to be every where in regard of his essence infinite then necessarily he should be every where or in an infinite place and by no meanes in a finite place like as on the contrary it is sayde of an Angell that in regard of his essence finite it agreeth to him to be in a finite place by no meanes in a place infinite Secondly you tell us that some Divines holde it possible there may be a magnitude or materiall spheare actually infinite But you doe not love to betray your Authors I have read in a late Spanish Iesuite a discourse to proove that infinitum potest dare But in this he is a meere mountebanke and affectator of singularities I have hertofore read allso in Hills Philosophia Lencippaea Democritica so bold an assertion as this That the World is infinite Otherwise sayth he the effect were not suitable to the cause For God the Author of the World is infinite But he was conscious of this his heterodoxy in the opinion of the World therfore would professe as I have heard that if in Oxford he should dispute thus we in the Vniversitie would cry out for a Limitor for this Infinitor And truly these and such like disputes I reckon not woorthy to be named the same day with the demonstrations that are brought to the contrary And I may take libertie to professe thus much how that observinge the Iesuite before spoken of Hurtado di Mendosa by name to affect subtilties and curiositie of demonstration in zeale of maynteyning the truth which as Austin sometimes saydo A Deo dicitur verum quodcunque dicitur I tooke leave of my better studies destinated to the mayntenance of Gods grace against all Pelagian Iesuiticall and Arminian oppositions and to examine the arguments of Hurtado in that point and went a large way in the solution of them confutation of his insolent assertion until I thought it highe time to returne to such aliene meditations considering it might be a practise of Satan to cast a ball of provocation in my way and therby to cause a diversion from more grave more seasonable and more profitable contemplations But yet I professe I never heard or read before of any that maynteyned the possibility of a Spheare to be infinite as that which implyes a manifest contradiction For figures beinge the boundes of quantities it shoulde imply a bounded quantitie without boundes But in the fiction proposed you say every point should be the center as pertakinge of the negative properties of a Center that is there should be no inequalitie betweene the distances of severall points from the Circumference of that which is infinite as for example Suppose the world were infinite Eastward infinite westward Nowe consider a direct line passinge over S. Michaels mount to Dover and so forwards Eastward in like manner from Dover to Sainct Michaels mount and so forward westward From dover Eastward is infinite and from Saint Michaels Eastward is but infinite So then these two are equall that is the part is equall to the whole For the line from Dover Eastward is but a part of the line from Saint Michaels Eastward in infinitum This contradictious absurdity amongst many other followeth upon supposition of any body or extension infinite By the way observe a great incongrutie thoughe you suppose a spheare infinite yet you conceave it to have a Circumference But to have a Circumference is not to be infinite Touching the second difficultie to witt how the indivisibility of Gods presence in every place may be compared to a Center You say this comparison is right in as much as God hath no diversitie of parts And indeede I finde no small uniformitie betweene the beginning of this your discourse of Gods immensitie and the ende of it For about the beginninge you professed that No creature no positive essence no numerably part of this Vniverse was so like unto God as notting And nowe you say he is
that the greater force ariseth from the contraction of parts Now hath God any parts to be thus contracted and united that so his vigour might be greater what base comparisons are these to represent the infinite power of God by them Then you roule in your woonted Rhetorick to amplifie the vehemency of his motive power in that it cannot be exprest by a motion that should beare levill from the Sunnesetting in the west to the Moone riseing in the East which is a very faire marke I confesse for the case put is in plenilunio when the Moone is att full Then to cast the fixed starres downe to the center belike you meane one after another otherwise there would be no roome for them in the center and hoyse the earth up to the Heavens within the twinkling of an eye or to send both in a moment beyond the extreamities of this visible world into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued would not straine his power motive Yet all this you confesse to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something that is to take not your words but rather your good meaning to create out of nothing Wherby nothing doth not become something but something hath a being which before it had not But here you power out many wilde conceits besides this first as when you say Essence swallowes up infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant I had thought rather this had bene the property of eternity not of essence You might as well say essence swallowes up all places into an indivisible unitie or point Then how may eternitie be sayde to swallow up that which it doth not contayne neyther formally for certeynly there is no formall succession in eternitie nor eminently For to conteyne eminently is to be able to produce succession but it is not Gods eternitie that denominates him able to produce time or the existence of thinges in time but his power So neyther his essence nor his eternitie swallowes up motion for the same reason But as for the swallowing up of motion into a vigorous rest to witt by mooving the eighth spheare round in a moment Of the nakednesse and absurditie that is shamefull nakâ—dnesse of such an assertion we have discoursed enough Againe is it not enough for you to maynteyne motion in vacuo but you must needes affirme that this visible world issued from the vacuum which now we imagine without the extreamities of it where now the world is was a vacuum before the world was but yet the world issued not from it neyther in the kinde of a materiall cause nor in the kind of a formall cause nor in the kind of an efficient cause much lesse did it issue from that vacuum which you terme without the extreamites of this world Then againe I know no measure of perfection derived unto the creature from Gods immensitie but only from the counsayle of his will by his immensitie he fills all places but distributes not the measure of perfections therby When you call Nothinge the mother of Gods creatures tell mee I pray did you affect poeticall witt or Metaphysicall truth I had thought Nothing had not afforded so much as the matter of any thinge as the Mother doth the matter at least of the childe It is true we were not any thing before God made us And as sure I am that this which we call nothinge did not contribute any thinge to the creation of men The basenes of mans originall is a common place of another nature Now your text is the Infinity of Gods power but you may squander from it as you please Whatsoever implyes not contradiction the production therof is within the compasse of Gods power and whatsoever God can do he can doe with ease His head aked not in the makeing of the World neyther doth it ake in providing for and preserving all things But to talke of the possibilitie of more worlds hand over head under colour of gratifying God in the amplification of his power I leave unto them that are not satisfied with the demonstration of his infinite power in this Yet as touching Gods omnipotency for the strengthening of our faith we are promised somethinge hereafter as if all hitherto tended to the strengthening of our imagination by comparing it first to the susteÌ„tative force of a center which is a matter of nothing and then to the force of gunpowder which undoubtedly is a matter of something Whether we are like to meete with a more wise discourse concerning Gods infinite Wisedome if others know yet I know not CHAP. VIII Of the Infinitie of divine Wisedome That it is as impossible for ought to fall out without Gods knowledge as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence 1. IN the first Section there is nothing that I mislike we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power unles he were infinite in Wisedome allso And that power ungoverned by Wisedome would bring forth very enormous effects But if a duble portion of witt matched with halfe the strength would effecte more then a triple portion of strength with halfe so much witt surely where the power is equall the Wisedome insinitly unequall there the effects cannot be the like Yet you have bene bold to affirme in another treatise of yours not yet extant I confesse that If a man had the same infinite power that God hath he might well thinke he coulde dispose thus of thinges as God hath disposed by the Wisedome which man allready hath And you give this reason for in thinges wee can lay any necessitie upon wee can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seeke As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or penne of any man For we manifestly perceave that the difference of artificiall operations in the World doth not arise from the difference of mens powers but merely from the difference of theire skill and Wisedome in severall trades 2. You doe not well to confounde power with strength for strength is only power naturall but there is a civill power goeth beyond that And there is no question to be made but Wisedome is to be preferred before the strength of the body by how much the qualities of the minde are to be preferred before the qualities of the body But where civill power is supreame that ruleth over the wisest Counsaylers No question God is as infinite in Wisedome as in power But I take it to be very absurd to say that Gods wisedome is greater then his power For is it possible that God by his wisedome can thinke of any course fitt to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect and seing you confesse his power to be infinite as well as his wisdome what should move you to maynteine the one to be greater then the other I can not devise Princes have guides to governe them which yet are not therfore greater theÌ„ they but inferior by farre
affirme the other namely that whatsoever God hath not decreed it is impossible that it should come to passe wherhēce alone is derived the first abstract you speake of Nay rather if we consider the analogy of propositions aright we shall find that these propositions are onely proportionall Whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe the same shall necessarily come to passe Whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not come to passe it is impossible that it should come to passe These are suitable indeede and accordingly we professe that it is impossible that any thinge which is not because God hath decreed that it shall not be I say it is impossible that it should be So likewise as touching the second extract we say that every thing which hath beene so farre forth as God hath decreed the being thereof it is impossible not to have beene Your third extract is of the same nature with the first and so admitts the same answere Well I still attend the discovery of the fallacy It may be we shall meete with it in that which followeth and that is this But if it bee as I suppose very consonant to infinite wisedome altogether consonant to infinite goodnes and to decree contingency as well as necessity a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred will be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime or Major proposition matched with a Minor proposition of our owne choosing c. Is this to discover the fallacy of the former syllogisme Or are you to seeke in the solution of a fallacy If it be not concluded in moode and figure you might have signified so much but indeede no exception can that way be taken against it If any terme had beene aequivocall the answere had beene by distinction But no colour of any such just exception so that every way the forme is unquestionable And therefore no exception is here to be taken but against the truth of one of the premises And I verily beleive there is one of the premises that disliketh you though you are ashamed plainly and directly to manifest so much For so the answere had beene fayre and facile by denyinge it if not the Major because thereof you make use in your owne syllogisme wherewith you doe as it were requite this yet at least the Minor which was this But God hath decreed every thinge that is For I verely beleeve this is such a dish of lettice as fitts not your lipps This you say you might have done but now the liberty hereof is taken from you and that by your selfe For although the Pope never bindes his owne handes yet you have bound your tongue and sealed up your owne lippes from taking any such exception as this For you call the syllogisme a fallacy and that a simple one Now fallacies are such formes of argumentation as offend onely in forme of argumentation which kind of exception is to justify the matter of it and the truth of the premises especially whereas you doe not professe that it offendes both in forme and matter nor shew any forwardnes to deny either of the propositions Well we gave you a syllogisme to answere in steede of answering it you thinke to make us amends with another syllogisme I have read that when one presented Augustus with verses looking for a reward Augustus in steede of a reward gave him verses of his owne making The Poet hereupon very liberally bestowed a reward upon Augustus We expected at your handes not another syllogisme but the answearinge of our owne But though you fayle to answeare ours I will not fayle to doe my best in accommodating an answere unto yours You undertake to inferr the contradictory to our conclusion which is to outface your opposites and to cry a syllogisme downe without answearing it Yet let us see how well you performe that you undertake Your syllogisme is this Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe but God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity therefore of necessity there must be contingency And for the better strengthning of your discourse or argumentation you make a motion that an additionall to the Maior which is this Nothinge can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe Now the judge or Chancelour in Logicall Courts to whome such a motion should be made would cry out shame upon it For that proposition is an universall affirmative and you desire that an universall negative should be added to it to make up an entire Maior proposition which were like a sixt finger upon an hand And indeed in that case it were neither Categoricall nor Hypotheticall For though two propositions with a copulative have place in some Hypotheticall syllogismes yet it is alwayes by way of negation thus Non dies est nox sed dies est ergo non nox Againe upon a second consideration the motion would be rejected as being altogether without witt For as much as the conclusion intended is well enough inferred without it and this additionall conferres no strength to improve the inference I appeale to every schollars judgment in this Thirdly the proposition it selfe as touching the latter clause of the disjunctive hath as little witt as the motion made for the admittance of it As where it is sayd that God hath decreed that thinges may come to passe you might as well say that God hath decreed that the World may come to passe For the possibility of the event of thinges is not from Gods decree but rather from Gods omnipotency For because he is able to produce every thinge that implyes no contradiction therfore they are denominated possible Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Troian horse it will doe you more harme then good as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest Yet what neede you desire more your conclusion is granted you namely that of necessity there must be contingency supposing Gods decree For Gods decrees are onely of doing or suffering some thinges as it is free for God whether he will doe them or suffer them yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency yet decreing any thinge of necessity there must be contingency though he had decreed nothing else but such thinges as we count most necessary in the course of nature But we graunt also that God did decree contingency and decrees necessity in respect of second causes as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heate or burne necessarily the Sunne of such a nature as to enlighten the aire necessarily heavy thinges to move downewards and light thinges upwardes and all this necessarily Necessarily I say in respect of second causes though this necessity was mere contingency in respect of the will of God For he could have chosen whether there should have beene any fire or world at all yea and can hinder the fire from burninge if it
perfect knowledge of all thinges that have beene are or shall bee It includes I confesse the knowledge of all necessary truthes and of all thinges possible but as for the knowledge of contingent truthes and of these to come it includes not that unlesse under the essence of God you comprehende the will of God And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truthes God knoweth by necessity of nature but all contingent truthes he knoweth by the determination of his owne will which indeed is a truth but flatt opposite to your opinion But that thinges contingent cannot be knowne to be future but upon the determination of Gods will I prove thus Things cannot be knowne to be future untill they are future for to apprehend or conceive things to be future when they are not future is not to know but to erre but contingent things and onely possible to be or not to be doe not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future Therefore contingent things cannot be knowne to be future but upon the determination of God will The minor I prove thus Of their owne nature they are not future but onely possible and they cannot passe from the condition of things meerly possible to the condition of things future without a cause from without And no cause of this translation can be devised but the will of God Which I prove thus If some other cause then either without God or within God not without God for these things were future from everlasting but from everlasting there was no cause at all existent without God Therefore the cause hereof if any where to be found must be found within God Wee say it is his will which if you deny you must shew what else can be the cause you commonly flee to Gods knowledge and the infinity thereof but in vaine for already they are supposed to bee future before God knoweth them And indeed it belongs to knowledge to know all things that are to come not to make them to be to come Fourthly it is possible that Antichrist shall fall in the yeare 1630 it is possible that he should fall the yeare before it is possible he should fal the yeare after it was possible he should have fallen ten yeares agoe it is possible hee should fall ten yeares hence all these being reall effects possible must by your doctrine be found eminently in the divine essence and God knowing his divine essence must know them all and not onely that they are possible but that they shall all come to passe For in this sense you speake of Gods knowledge of future contingents namely of knowing that they shall come to passe and when they shall come to passe Againe set we the fall of Antichrist at an hundred different points of time whereof let us suppose one to bee true and the other false yet all in their owne nature alike possible why should the fall of Antichrist in the true point of time bee included in Gods essence more then the other all being alike possible and that very instante wherein the fall of Antichrist shall be it being as possible that it should not be and that possibility also being included in the essence of God as well as any other Perhaps you will say that this being a truth is included in the essence of God and not the others being untruths But then I demand how this became to be a truth that Antichrist should fall at such a time rather then at another it being as possible to fall out at any other time as at this and as possible not to fall out at this time as at any other and all these possibilities equally included in the essence of God I say againe how came this to be a truth answer mee not of its owne nature for the contrary hereunto is supposed on both sides namely that of his owne nature it was onely possible therefore you must assigne some cause from without and because you like not to acknowledg the determination of Gods will to be the cause hereof you must alledge some other cause I see you usually flye to the infinitie of Gods knowledge but in vaine for Gods knowledge is to know truths and not to make them Lastly by this doctrine of yours it will follow that God knew the world would be made before ever God determined to makeâ—â— to wit by vertue of his infinite knowledge Now what a faire way this openeth unto Atheisme let the wise and learned Reader judge indifferently Heretofore I confesse you seemed to maintaine the existence of all things from everlasting in eternity which if it were true then this might minister an apparent ground of Gods knowledge of all things be they never so contingent for as much as they are supposed to exist before him But here you have assigned nothing for the ground hereof hitherunto but onely the infinity of Gods knowledge But in the next sentence I thinke you cast about for this also As Balaam did many wayes to serve his turne in the course of his divinations and all is fish that comes to your net so it may serve your turne to oppose in this question the determination of Gods will Well thus it is For as Gods essence is present in every place as it were an ubiquitarie center for indeed if a body were infinite everywhere might be imagined a center and you doe much affect to compare the nature of God to impossibilities and sometimes preferre him so farre as to compare him to just nothing so is his eternity or infinite duration coexistent to every part of succession and yet withall is round about Hee it is that drives things future upon us being from eternity as well beyond as on this side of them Wee have beene acquainted with these absurd paradoxes of yors heretofore so that now wee cease to admire them But first we do deny the comparative coherence So which hath force of an argument by way of comparison but it hath no force here because there is no proportion betwixt the things compared Gods presence is in every place no marvell for all places doe exâ—st together And so if all times did exist together God eternity should coexist with all times But it is impossible that all times should exist together because time consists in succession of parts But as one time and the things therein shall exist after another so God shall coexist with them So then Gods presence is in every place and Gods eternity coexists with every time and that indivisibly but with a great difference for God all at once coexists with everie place but not all at once doth he coexist with every time but successively for as much as time doth not otherwise exist then successively Nay the comparison is flat against you For like as God not onely coexisteth at this present with everie place that is existent but shall coexist with a world tenne times as big whensoever by the will of God such
should he have to doe with governing of States Our Saviour would not meddle with dividing of inheritances and professed his Kingdom was not of this world Peter is commanded out of his love to his Master to feede his sheepe not with any civill coercâ—tive power and authority to governe them Yet Popes have layd title I confesse to both swordes but the unfittest that ever were to manage either such abominable abuses and corruptions have beene found amongst them in the managing of both as I think are without example But that rule of the Canonists Papa â—nquam sibi ligdt manus doth much inamour you and greate zeale â—oth inflame you to applye it unto God to free him from impotent immutability as hereafter you call it and that his decrees may not oblige him and indeed they doe not for how can he be sayd to be tyed or restrayned that is confined to nothing against his will but to every thing according to his will But to free God from an impotent immutabilitie you would have his decrees not alterable for you dare not professe so much but something els I know not what which you call reservation of liberty and to be still as it were in making decrees but not having decreed any thinge till the time of execution or afterward mysterious inventions of your owne braine which if perhaps you seeme to understand your selfe I assure you I doe not but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this 3. In this Section you beginne with telling us that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction This is a truth and will nothing serve the turne of your reaches By the way you deliver unto us the object of Gods foreknowledge and that you say is whatsoever will be and the object of Gods decree and that you say is whatsoever may be which later is a most absurd position Looke we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men were they ever knowne to decree that a thing may be done But rather supposing many things may be done they make choyse to decree the doing of such courses as seeme most convenient Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God but only in reference to his power That is possible unto God which God can doe or which he hath power to cause that it be brought to passe As for example before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made was this by vertue of Gods decree Did God decree it to be possible If he did seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been pâ—ssible or no. Againe was not the creation of the World is not the end of the World decreed by God the rewarding of the godly the punishing of the wicked are they not decreed by God What moves you then to make only things possible the object of Gods decree and the things that will or shall be onely the object of his foreknowledge This witt of yours is able to make us a newe World of Divinity and Phâ—losophy both if it be let alone to runne a wilde goose race at pleasure Well God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction What of this In the next place you tell us that what grant or promise soever he makes cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time they last no longer then Durante bene placito seeing gracious equitie and only it is his everlasting pleasure Be it so that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises doe proceed from his gracious equitie and this you say is his everlasting pleasure and his grants and promises must last you confesse during his good pleasure is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make they doe so farre bind God to performance that we may assure our selves they shall stand good for ever and never be reversed Onely you discourse that they shall last no longer And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternity Or what wisedome is found in such discourse as laboureth to prove that Gods grant shall last no longer then during pleasure and withall confesseth that his pleasure is everlasting But no promise you say bindes the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time It is fit to consider this To my judgement Gods promises binde him as much as our promises bind us the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty but to keepe our honestie For what promise soever he makes he is still free naturally whether he will performe what he hath promised or no but if he breaks his promise he shall be untâ—ue In like sort God if he should doe otherwise then he hath promised he should be untrue though never a whit the lesse free And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the lesse free For even men doe freely keep their promises though not alwayes willingly because when they promised they might be of one judgement and disposition and when they come to performance they may be of another But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God Every honest Magistrate is free to recompence every man according to his evill wayes for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he committs he will not punish him And looke what a good Magistrate resolves upon when facts are committed eyther good or evill the like may God decree from everlasting For no Magâ—strate knowes so well what man hath committed as God from everlasting knows what he will commit And more then that God knowes how to keepe man from evill courses or to expose him to evill courses by having mercy on whom he will and hardening whom he will which power and wisedome is not incident to a creature Besides all this a Magistrate is bound by duty to recompence every man according to his works But God is not bound by any such duty to any such course He can pardon one and pâ—nish another have mercy on one and deale severely with another Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some deny repentance unto others And if he hath made any such promise as this If his children forsake my lawe and walke not in my judgements if they break my statutes and keep not my commandements then will I visite their transgressions with the rodd and their iniquity with strokes yet my loving kindnes will I not take froÌ„ him neither will I falsify my truth they to whome such promises are made may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much bound I say by morall obligation in such sort as it is impossible he should doe otherwise
attributes are The other That they doe not consider that the absolute infinitie of this his eternall happinesse is an essentiall cause of goodnesse unto all others so farre as they are capable of it As for the first of these what Heathen Philosopher that acknowledged the making of the world that acknowledged a God did ever doubt of his eternall happinesse and that as infinite as any other of his attributes As touching the other doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much when he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God and did this make them as happy as they might be It is true indeed their goodnesse they conceived to be from themselves Det vitam det opes animum mihi ipse parabo And doe not you I pray concurre with them in this even in this place For although you carry it in generall termes when you say he is the cause of all goodnesse yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodnesse as when you say God is a cause of goodnesse to all that are capable of it and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are none but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse And where is any mention of Christ Iesus in all this where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this which you make sufficient to bring them unto happinesse It is true God cannot be the author of evil of sin but God forbid that we should so maintaine God to be no Author of evill as withall to deny him to be the author of good Speake plainly doe you beleeve that God is the author of faith that God it is who gives repentance that workes in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure if you beleeve this then you must beleeve that God did decree to give men faith and repentance But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed who professe that God doth decree contingency but not things contingent And who doubts but the faith of Peter and his repentance the faith of Paul and his repentance were contingents and if God did never decree them surely he was not the author of them for God doth nothing in time but what he decreed to doe before all time And in case you did truly acknowledge God to bee the cause of all goodnesse we would not quarrell with you about the terme essentiall which with what learning you deliver I professe I know not but I observe you are very liberall of your words and phrases we were never acquainted with any more then foure causes can you tell us which of them is called by any essentiall unlesse matter and forme be called essentiall because they constitute the essence of that whose matter and forme they are But I hope you will not say that God in this sense is the essentiall cause of all our goodnesse CHAP. XII Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature I doe not like this Title the disjunctive argueth that Gods goodnesse communicative as communicative is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature I know no patterne of morall goodnesse which we must imitate but that which is commended unto us in Gods Law Gods communicative goodnesse was exercised in making of the World and us Is this a fitt patterne for us to imitate As touching his providence whereby he governs the World we are called by our Saviour to imitate him in some particulars as when he suffereth his rayne to fall and Sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good But in most particulars we can not in many we may not imitate him He caused two shee beares to come out of the wood and teare 42. children that mocked Elisha we must not imitate God in the like we must still blesse them that curse us and pray for them that persecute us The sense of imbecillity and indigence in our selves even in this corrupt state of man doth only provoke us the more to shewe pitty unto others in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. Dâ—do Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco But it doth not breede it for it is manifest that men litle exercised with the Crosse or not at all may shewe more mercy then such as have beene in great misery themselves Yet these mercifull natures having tasted of misery themselvs will be the more provoked to shew compassion unto men in misery 2. And this is true not onely in the corrupt state of man but even in the state of integrity for is it not sayd of our Saviour that being tempted himselfe he knew how to succour them that are tempted It is now a dayes without question among divines that mercy and pitty as they signify passions are not in God but attributed unto him per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as are the members of our body also But the will of succouring creatures in their necessity may with propriety enough be attributed unto God for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly Father how much more is his love enlarged towards man who when they were sinners sent his Sonne to dy for them and when they lay weltring in their blood sayd unto them live And washed them with water yea washed away their blood from them and anoynted them with oyle Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery and this will and grace and favour of God is in Scripture phrase called mercy But he sheweth this mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth I wonder you should applaud that saying Nemo sponte malus which hath no colour of truth Save in respect of originall sinne traduced to Adams posterity of which originall sinne the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant And you in another sense treading the authors stepps seeme to mainteyne it not in respect of any naturall corruption that hath sowred our natures but in respect rather of the perfection of our soules and their native inclination unto good for externall things you say doe so captivate the humane soule that she cannot doe as she would but these strings being cut she followeth her native sway And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this Nemo sponte malus manifesting thereby that you acknowledge the native sway of the soule to be unto good But by the way you cast your selfe upon an erroneous assertion convictable of untruth by the very light of nature as when you say that externall things doe captivate the soule as if the object had power to the will which is a conceipte contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity And nothing indeed but a mans owne corruption is it that captivates him unto evill For let
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love Of the distinction of Singula generum and Genera singulorum Of the distinction of Voluntas signi and Voluntas beneplaciti WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in certaine points of religion I know not neither am I acquainted with any such course I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will according to his good pleasure and passing by others as any Church in Christendome which I do not speake upon snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good as your fashion is but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England Yet you would perswade your Readers the Church of England concurreth with you in extending the love of God towards all But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause by walking in the cloudes of generalities as if you feared to come to the light and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde but you define not in what kinde but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal and that in an unspeakable manner But the question onely is whether God doth bestow or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all or salvation upon all If Gods love in these respects in your opinion doth extend to all say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus and predestinated all For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae gloriae Now the Church of England in her publicke and authorized doctrine plainly professeth that God hath predestinated none but those whom he hath chosen in Christ as vessells of honour If you say that the reason why God did not predestinate all nor elect all in Christ proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one and disobedience of the other he elected those and reprobated these for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft observes in his fifth proposition that In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God some are elected and not others unto salvation And he just fieth it by holy Scripture Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election not of works but of him that calleth Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and another to dishonour But consider the Article it selfe They which are indued with so excellent a benefit to wit as election and predestination is are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit working in due season they through grace obey their calling they be justified freely they be made sonnes of God by adoption they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ they walke religiously in good workes and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity Whereby it appeares that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance Againe consider these alone whom God hath elected in Christ and predestinated are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption But you make all to bee the sonnes of God and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one even towards them that have hated God all their life Lastly onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour not that any others are made unto honour which is nothing answerable to your tenet But proceed we along with you You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde which no Christian ever called in question but your meaning is that it extends to all and every one of mankinde and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one as appeares by the sequele and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church though it be not contradictory to our doctrine But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable and such as might be performed with a good conscience which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion it is rather to receive correction from the Articles then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe You enter upon it after your course with great state discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God in drawing those Articles for you tell us that No Nationall Councell though assembled for that purpose could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love then the Church our Mother even from the beginning of reformation hath done as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes Here we have a pretty Comedy towards and you have a poeticall wit for fiction Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point where I pray was it fit that she should doe this but in the Articles of Religion But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love but in the Liturgy and Catechisme Was that think you a fit place to fit
as for others Againe if sinne hath made them hatefull is there not sinne enough in the world in Iewes Turkes and Infidels to make them hatefull Wherefore though in case they were in the same state wherein God made them then they should not be hatefull to God and thereupon be thought fit matter of prayers yet seeing they are in the state of sinne and consequently hatefull to God for the same cause in just proportion of reason they are no fit matter for our praiers Though a full measure onely of enmitie against God exempt men from Gods love yet will you denie that such a full measure is found in many throughout the world and will not this be sufficient to forbid our praiers for all and everie one Sure I am if there be anie in the world that sin a sinne unto death we may not pray for such an one 3. From the authorized devotions in our Church you proceed to the Catechisme and aske what can be more cleare then that as God the Father doth love all mankinde without exception so the Sonne of God did redeeme all mankinde not onely some of all sorts but all mankinde universally taken And I thinke indeed that the one is as cleare as the other Throughout the Scriptures shew me one passage wherein the love of God is expressed to Reprobates If the Sonne of God did redeeme all and everie one then all and everie one have redemption in Christ through his bloud and consequently the forgivenesse of their sinnes For in Scripture phrase remission of sinnes is that redemption which we have in Christ so is reconciliation also all one with forgivenesse of sinnes Sure I am Christ professeth Iohn 17. 9. that he would not pray for the world but for those whom his heavenly Father had given him and for those that should beleeve through their word And for their sakes did he sanctifie himselfe for whom he prayed and to what did he sanctifie himselfe but unto his death and passion by the consent of as many Fathers as Maldonate had seene as the Iesuit himselfe professeth on that 17. of Iohn and he had seene very many as there hee signifieth namely Chrysostome Cyril Austine Theodorus Mopsuestenus and Heracleotes Leontius Beda Theophilact Enthymius Rupertus But to proceed out of our Catechisme you alledge that God the Father made us and all the world now the Church our mother hath taught us that God hateth nothing that hee hath made The booke of Wisedome saith so indeed but because of the little authority that booke hath in matter of faith from God our Father therefore you charge us with the authority of the Church our Mother Now you are not ignorant I suppose whence the Church our mother taketh this which hath its course amongst Papists as well as amongst us And you know of what authority Aquinas is amongst Papists and what interpretation he makes of this place though received to bee canonicall Scripture amongst them I have already shewed out of his Summes God saith he loves all things in as much as he willeth unto them some good or other but in as much as he willeth not a certaine good to some to wit eternall life he is said to hate them and reprobate them And indeed God saveth both man and beast as the Psalmist speaketh and so he may bee said to love them all and so the Apostle acknowledgeth him to bee the Saviour of all men but especially of them that beleeve And to professe ingenuously what I thinke I see no cause of controversie hereabouts if so be the question be rightly stated For when we say Christ died for mankinde our meaning is that Christ died for the benefit of mankinde Now let this benefit bee distinguished and considered apart and forth with contentious hereabouts will cease For if this benefit be considered as the remission of sinnes and the salvation of our soules these being benefits obtainable onely upon the condition of faith and repentance As on the one side no man will affirme that Christ died to this end namely to procure forgivenesse of sinne and salvation to all and every one whether they beleeve or no so on the other side none will deny but that he dyed to this end that salvation and remission of sinne should redound to all and every one in case they should beleeve and repent For this depends upon the sufficiency of that price which Christ paid to God his Father for the redemption of the world But there be other benefits which Christ merited for us also even the very grace of faith and of repentance For all Gods promises are Yea and Amen in Christ and amongst these promises one is the circumcision of the heart the healing of our waies of our rebellions These promises doe include the grace of faith and of repentance Now consider ingenuously did Christ die to this end that the grace of faith and repentance should bee bestowed absolutely or conditionally Not conditionally for before the grace of faith and repentance and regeneration comes there is nothing to bee found in man but workes of nature Now it is meere Pelagianisme to affirme that God bestoweth grace on man upon the performing of a worke of nature And the Apostle clearely professeth that God doth not call us according to our works Therefore it remaines that albeit remission of sinnes and salvation are conferred unto us conditionally to wit upon the condition of faith and repentance yet the grace of faith and repentance cannot be so conferred and consequently they must be conferred absolutely If then Christ died for the purchasing of faith and repentance to all and every one absolutely it would follow herehence that all and every one should beleeve and repent But this being found to bee a notorious untruth it followeth that Christ died for the purchasing of these graces onely unto some and who can those bee other then the elect of God Accordingly as our Saviour professeth that for those who were Gods and whom he had given unto Christ or should in time to come give unto him the rest excluded for those he sanctified himselfe that is offered himselfe upon the Crosse which interpretation of Christs sanctifying of himselfe Maldonate professeth was received by all the Fathers whom he had seene Now to goe along with you Secondly we are taught you say by the same Catechisme to beleeve in God who hath redeemed us and all mankinde What I pray is this more then to say He hath redeemed us and all men Is all mankinde more then all men and in the straining of this phrase we have tried your strength and the issue of all was to prove but this that God willeth not the death of any but the life of all whom of men and Infidels he hath made Christians By the way I observe an incongruity Of Infidels wee are made Christians as whereby we cease any longer to bee Infidels but I hope of men we are
any particular good therefore what good in particular soever he did did it freely So doe the Angels so shall we in the kingdome of heaven Hitherto under colour of consequence which yet indeed was no tolerable consequence you did stride very wide from the matter you had in hand to wit of Gods obligement in justice to make men taste of the fruits of his mercy after their wilfull contemning of it into an aliene matter farre removed touching impeccability Now you seeme to returne to your former discourse but in such a manner as if you meant utterly to overthrow it for here you give us to understand that so long as man doth lesse evill then he might doe he may be confirmed in goodnesse and translated unto happinesse Now I pray as bad as the Sodomites were yet were they not lesse evill then they might be For if God had suffered them longer and left them destitute of his grace had they not profited in pejus growing worse and worse And yet I confesse hereupon to bee confirmed in no better goodnesse then they had had not beene much seeing this their goodnesse had beene never a whit but you say not onely this that they that doe lesse evill then they might may hereupon not onely bee confirmed in that goodnesse which they have which may be very farre off from any goodnesse at all but also translated to everlasting happinesse Since mans fall you say wee are not capable of mercy but by free abstinence from some evills Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evills be of grace or no If of grace whether this grace be not a fruite of mercie If so then it appeares that before we abstaine from any evill wee are capable of mercy thereby to obtaine grace to abstaine from evill I know no state that makes a man uncapable of mercy in this life but onely the state of sinning against the holy Ghost I doe not like your distinction of doing good and doing it naughtily for whatsoever we doe naughtily therein we cannot be said to doe good but evill rather for therein we sinne and in sinning wee doe not any good but evill rather Yet I confesse wee may be said to doe good imperfectly but not naughtily in my judgement Though we doe both lesse evill and the good that we doe lesse naughtily then possibly we might doe God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us I professe at first sight I tooke this to bee a notorious untruth but when I considered a claw of your sentence which is this lesse evill then possibly we might doe I reverse my judgement and finde it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit though in the way of truth For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible For how is it possible that a man can doe at once all the evill that he can doe Now if he doth not doe all the evill that possibly hee can doe there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations and hee neede not feare lest God proceede to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst for certainly they had not done all the evill that possibly they might doe Now it was well worth the having to heare you explaine unto us what you understand by the influence of Gods gracious providence which you say God restraines and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickednesse to another suffering the reines of our unruly appetites to bee given into our uâ—ieldie hands Here be good phrases which if you would bee pleased to interpret unto us in plaine termes I doubt not but wee should finde good matter to worke upon But to the comfort of all profane persons bee it spoken God doth never deal thus with any by your computation but such as have done as much evill as possibly they can doe To be capable of well doing is to be capable of Gods mercy and you have already told us to our comfort that to do lesse evill then possibly wee can doe doth make us capable of Gods mercy yet here you say this cannot bee done without Gods love and favour Now to my judgement no person is so profane or impious but that hee doth lesse evill then possibly he might doe whence it followeth that to this state of impiety considered as lesse then possibly might be he is arived through the love and favour of God Yet what you meane by the love and favour of God I know not and throughout I finde cause to doubt that you meane nothing lesse then to advance the honour of Gods grace but onely your scope to advance the power of mans free will And I wonder you consider not how you enterfare and crosse your owne shinnes in your discourse when you conceive the love and favour of God as a meanes to make us capable of the mercy of God you might as well say that the mercy of God makes us capable of his mercy for love and favour shewed unto him that is in misery is in the way of mercy So when you make a great difference betweene withdrawing a mans selfe from the extremities of mischiefe and the doing of such good as may make a man capable of well doing you contradict your selfe for to do lesse evill then possibly might bee what is it other then to withdraw from extremities of mischiefe yet that is enough to make a man capable of well doing as you have signified in this very page more then once as namely both in the first sentence and in the third yet this is wilde enough to say A man must doe good to make himselfe capable of well doing By the sentence following it seemes that this good that is to be done to make us capable of well doing is to repent and this you say cannot be done without the attractions of infinite love yet usually you make a worke of nature to bee a preparation to grace and sometimes you call that worke of nature humility sometimes the doing of lesse euill then wee might doe And what you meane by the attractions of infinite love I know not for you make it incident to men without the Church who are not so much as drawne hereunto by the word so that as it seemes it can be no other then Gods patience in sparing them and so leading them to repentance that you meane in this place Yet see into what absurdity of conceit you cast your selfe while you make shew to honour the grace of God as namely when you say since Adams fall our love to sinfull pleasures is so strong that we cannot repent without the infinite attractions of love implying thereby that before Adams fall wee could repent without infinite attractions of love But I pray consider what need was there of repentance before Adams fall Yet such obedience as then was congruous to innocent and undâ—filed nature could he performe without speciall grace Yes you
thinke he could this is a bit you can swallow easily and digest with as great facility And so belike your opinion is of the Angels to wit that the good Angels stood by the meere freedome of their owne wils having no other adjutorium gratiae then the reprobate Angels had directly against Austin de Civitate Dei l. 12. c. 9. You beginne to discover the mystery of your meaning when you say that Many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace because they apprehend not it are never brought by the attractions of it to true repentance So then the attractions of Gods infinite love are the causa sine qua non but what is the cause qua posita ponitur effectus O this is our apprehending of it And I pray what stile doe the learned give to that causa sine qua non doe they not commonly account it causam fatuam So then you make shew to magnifie the attractions of Gods love and the efficacy thereof but t is onely in a fatuous manner and you make but a fatuous efficacy thereof but mans will alone in the apprehending of it hath the true efficacie of repentance in the course of your Divinity Now I pray what is this love you speake of and what manner of attraction is it and wherin doth it consist and how are we said to apprehend it and wherein doth that consist By the place alledged out of Rom. 2. 4. you signifie that this love of God is no other then that goodnesse whereby he leadeth unto repentance and that goodnesse there mentioned seemes to bee no other then Gods forbearance and long suffering Call you this the attractions of his infinite love Yet notwithstanding Austin was bold to professe Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nisâ— Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam Though God affords never so much patience yet who shall repent except God gives repentance your present discourse preacheth unto us another doctrine to this effect Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nisi homo apprehenderit quis aget poenitentiam Though God affords never so much patience yet who shall repent except he apprehends it And I pray what is it to apprehend Gods patience or his leading of us to repentance by his goodnesse and patience Can it be any thing else then the taking of the opportunity offered and to repent indeed So then your meaning is this in plaine termes Many whom this infinite love of God doth embrace to wit in leading them by his goodnesse and patience unto repentance yet are never brought by the attraction of it to true repentance and all because they doe not apprehend it that is because they doe not repent Is not this issue of your discourse very grave and Theologicall yet when you say the reason why by this love they are not brought to repentance is because they doe not apprehend it you seeme to imply that they may apprehend it if they will Yet because the Text alledged by you is expresly against this therefore you are contont to nicke your former assertion your selfe with a crosse blow that so your selfe may have the first credit of contradicting and confuting your selfe as when you say of whom speakes he thus of sueh onely as truly repent A mad question as ever was proposed as if there were any colour that the Apostle should say of them that repent that they despise the riches of Gods goodnesse leading them to repentance yet that you may have some matter to worke upon having erected an enemy of straw you foile him most valiantly by answering Nay but of them who for hardnesse of heart cannot repent Not considering how fondly herein you contradict your selfe Nay by the way I note an aknowledgement of yours to wit that a man may despise the goodnesse of God leading him to repentance though through the hardnesse of his heart he cannot repent at all 4. You demand in the next place whether the riches of Gods bountie were fained or whether hee did onely profer but not purpose to draw them to repentance which repented not I answer it was not fained neither doe I finde any thing that he profered at all in this passage of the Apostles But that this is a meere fiction of yours ut recto stet fabula talo and that hee did truly draw them to repentance but how as by patience and long-suffering he may be said to draw them and no other goodnesse of God drawing them to repentance is mentioned in this place Like as opportunity is said to draw and invite men to the doing of something in season In like sort the judgements of God invite unto repentance the mercies of God provoke unto obedience to thankfulnesse But yet Austin was bold to say Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nisi Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam So that this is a tacite exhortation and invitation to repentance by Gods workes And much inferiour to the power of the exhortations of his word yet God doth exhort by the ministery of his word many whose hearts notwithstanding he hardneth As is apparent in sending unto Pharaoh and commanding him to let Israel goe yet withall made knowne to Moses that hee would harden Pharaohs heart that hee should not let Israel goe And dare you professe this course of his so plainly testified in holy Scripture to be no part of Gods protection no fruit of that wisedome which is from above but a point of earthly policie devoid of honesty a meere tricke of worldly wit to whose practise nothing but weaknesse and impotency to accomplish great designes can misinâ—line mans corrupted nature And the truth is in this course of God nothing is profered at all but onely something suspended to wit the execution of just vengeance In his word something is profered but what is that Not repentance as you misconceive that rather is required and commanded onely upon repentance remission of sinnes and salvation is profered And if repentance were profered I pray upon what termes you will say in case they would apprehend it This have I already shewed to be all one as if you should say In case they did repent and of the sobriety hereof let any man judge Againe you professe that this is profered to such men as through the hardnesse of their hearts cannot repent and judge whether the same incongruities which you charge upon our Tenet are upon any other ground then this and while you maintaine this whether they doe not reflect upon your Tenet also Now on the contrary whereas we object against you that if God willeth and so ardently as you speake that all men should repent and be saved how comes it to passe that they doe not repent Considering that the Apostle professeth that Gods will cannot be resisted and that it manifestly implies an impotency or weaknesse in God in not being able to bring to passe what he so ardently desires Now to the latter objection of these you answer by deniall that it
teach when we make the work of faith a worke of power 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power and is not the worke of grace such a worke Eph. 2. 2 But you doe ill under colour of magnifying the love of God to dishonour both his love and his power his love in confining it onely to promises and threatnings as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance his power in denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe and that ardently And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme as wel'l as we doe In the next place you tell us We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him but constraines no mans will to love him But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint why did you not expresse your minde on this point you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse the author and finisher of our faith of our repentance of our obedience Did you acknowledge this there should bee no difference betweene us For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us by way of constraint And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes that which was pleasing in his sight you shall never finde in any of our Divines that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God I know no power in God but infinite and seeing what worke soever he workes is by the exercise of his power it cannot be denied but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite Againe is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts It is not as I presume you will confesse why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts and making us to love him be accounted a worke of power infinite And Austin divers times professeth that God doth convert our hearts omnipotenti facilitate by an almighty facility and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform us as it were of beasts to make us become men Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite as when Bernard confesseth of God saying Bernâ—n circumcis Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum As for Gods power to the immediate parent of our love to God it is no article of our Creed but a tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts whereby wee are brought to love him Neither doe we say that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us according to that of Iohn 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him because he loved us first and to that of S. Paul The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature and not to a seed of grace though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly as it were fit you should And no marvell For they which doe evill hate the light As for constraint we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained As for the will that non potest cogi cannot be constrained And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity whereof others doe not should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite as if they maintained that the will of man may be constrained yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him would this breed in God a loathing of him Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you Yet I have read My soule loathed them and their soule abhorred mee but I never heard the contrary My soule loathed them and their soule loved mee for while we abhorre God as enemies unto him yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love will he continue to love us and not turne his love into loathing as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes as being satisfied and disdaining to be scorned by them whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts yet could not winne their loues But God never makes us unwillingly to love him it is a thing impossible but as Austine saith Ex nolentibus volentes facit T is true God loves a cheerefull giver but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne Like as it is said of him that Corâ—nat non merit a nostra sed donasua he crownes not our works but his owne And where there is a willing minde there it is accepted not according to that which a man hath not but to that which he hath but whose worke is this willing minde Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us but makes us willing and ready and cheerefull in the performing of it not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth but in suffering what hee inflicteth or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse though with much a doe yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse will hee love his childe or his obedience or dutifulnesse the worse for this yet God more effectually and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts even omnipotente facilitate as Austine speaketh and shall hee love our obedience our thankfulnesse our repentance the lesse for this 5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme to wit In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard All
nisi credamus periclitatur ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens nisi quia quicquid vult potest nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus The other tenet as foule as the former is this that God changeth For undoubtedly at this time he hath no purpose to save the Divells and damned soules of men therfore if ever he had any such purpose it is now changed and consequently God is changed himselfe You have no way to avoyde this but by saying that Gods purpose you speake of is not absolute but conditionall as before you upbraided your opposites for maintaining Gods decree of electtion to be absolute Yet the Arminians at the conference of Hage utterly declined the maintenance of Gods decree of election to be conditionall Yet the shifre will not serve your turne being too narrow a leafe to cover the shamefull nakednesse of your assertion For to purpose conditionally is no more a purpose of salvation then of condemnation which is no way an evidence of Gods love to any man in particular the issue wherof is indifferent to be condemnation as well as salvation But you hitherto in this respect have insisted upon the maintenance of Gods love to all and every one The beginning which God found out for mankind was a being indifferent to stand or fall which indifferency fitted him no more for salvation in case he stood then for damnation in case he fell save that God was withall resolved to provide him of a Saviour upon his fall that should be as tabula post naufragium but to whome only to these whome he loved as he loved Iacob not unto those whome he hated as he hated Esau. For as he made all thinges for himselfe so also he made the wicked against the day of evill and ever that for himselfe also Why Gods love in respect of creation should be accoumpted his infinite love I know no reason considering that the meanest creature was partaker of that love as well as man And as he gave being unto all things so he maintaynes being to Divells and damned men and ever will doe We are knit unto God by faith as well as by love and of the two faith is the more noble as being the Fountaine and cause of love If God out of love be sayd to make us what we are it may as well be sayd that out of love he made all other creatures what they are If you reply that they were made out of his love to us for as much as they were made for our use and service In like sort I answeare that it was out of love to himselfe that he made us for as much as he made us for his owne use and service yea and all things else that were made For he made all things for himselfe In like sort if God made us what we are because he was lovinge to us he made also all creatures what they are because he was loving to them Yet by your leave He made all things for himselfe And this is the foure and twenty Elders acknowledgment Revela 4. 11. Thou art worthy o Lord to receive glory and honour and power For thou hast created all thinges and for thy wills sake they are and have bin created You say true where faith and love is found there is assurance of Gods favour towards us to set both his wisdome power on worke to make all things worke together for our good and so to preserve us to his heavenly Kingdome But the question is whether this faith and love be the workes of nature and wherof all are capable by power of nature or whether they are the meere fruites of Gods grace afforded to some denyed to others according to the good pleasure of his owne will as who hath mercie on whome hee will and whom he will he hardneth CHAP. XIX How God of a most lovinge Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge NOw because you cannot but perceave how this pincheth sore upon the unchangeable nature of God Therfore you spend two chapters in the clearinge of this difficulty wherin if you satisfie your selfe it is well As for my part I am so farre from receaving satisfaction that I am utterly to seeke in understandinge the course you take to give satisfaction Whether anger hate or jealosie have any seate in the omnipotent Majestie is litle to the purpose But to shew how God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge without any change this alone is to the purpose For the very māner of proposing it doth imply the ceasing to be a loving Father which he was but becomes a severe inexorable judge which he was not For to bee a loving Father and a severe judge all at once is not of a lovinge Father to become a severe judge And though this were granted you yet it is not congruous to your tenet to maintayne that God was an inxorable judge to any before the measure of his iniquity be full And as then he first begines to become an inexorable judge so it is requisite that then he ceaseth to be a loving Father And albeit you are loath to acknowledge this because it doth so manifestly imply a change in the nature of God yet you must be driven hitherto whether you will or no unlesse you maintayne that still God continueth a most loving Father unto the Divells and ever shall be both unto them and to all damned persons notwithstandinge the wrath of God continue upon them to everlastinge damnation And it is a very strange dialect to acknowledge that God is a most loving Father unto damned persons especially considering that in Scripture phrase we are sayd to be the Sonnes of God by faith in Christ Jesus Gala. 3. 26. And indeede if you can make good that to inflict everlastinge damnation doth consort with infinite mercy then you shall obteyne not that God of a most loving Father doth become an inexorable judge but that at once he is both a most loving father and a most inexorable judge also As for anger whether it be in God or no or whether Lactantius hath carryed himselfe well or no in this Argument it is nothing at all to this present businesse The question is whether God ardently desiring the salvation of any man doth at length cease to desire it or whether still he continueth to will and ardently desire a mans salvation notwithstandinge that he purposeth to inflict or actually doth inflict upon him condemnation For this seemes to be the intended issue of your discourse as when you undertake to illustrate how extreame severitie may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love As much as to say that God loves the Devills and loves the damned and continueth the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love towards them notwithstanding that he doth inflict everlasting condemnation