to enjoy perfect Health and a sound Constitution of Body Riches purchased without Fraud and in short to spend his Life amongst his Friends Fragili viro optima res bene valere Atque indolem bonam esse sortitum Tum possidere opes dolo haud partas Tandem cum amicis exigere vitam Another Description we find in Martial who among many other things desires to enjoy a Paternal Estate acquir'd without Labour to be free from the vexation of Law-Suits c. Since Dearest Friend 't is your desire to see A true Receipt of Happiness from me These are the Chief Ingredients if not all Take an Estate neither too great nor small Which Quantum sufficit the Doctors call Let this Estate from Parents Care descend The getting it too much of Life does spend Take such a Ground whose gratitude may be A fair Encouragement for Industry Let constant Fires the Winter's Fury tame And let thy Kitchins be a Vestal Flame Thee to the Town let never Suits at Law And rarely very rarely Business draw Thy active Mind in equal Temper keep In undisturbed Peace yet not in sleep Let Exercise a vigorous Health maintain Without which all the Composition's vain In the same weight Prudence and Innocence take Ana of each does the just Mixture make But a few Friendships wear and let them be By Nature and by Fortune fit for thee Instead of Art and Luxury in Food Let Mirth and Freedom make thy Table good If any Cares into the Day-time creep At Night without Wine 's Opium let them sleep Let Rest which Nature does to Darkness wed And not Lust recommend to thee thy Bed Be satisfied and pleas'd with what thou art Act chearfully and well th' allotted Part Enjoy the present hour be thankful for the past And neither fear nor wish th' approaches of the last Here we may first observe as Horace according to Aristotle tells us that many are often disappointed in their search after Happiness imagining that it consiks chiefly in such things as they want and which they admire in others as the Ignorant suppose it in Knowledge the Poor in Riches the Sick in Health which Horace very well expresseth speaking of the Merchant of the Soldier and of the Husbandman the one envies and admires the other's Condition O happy Seamen cries th' Old Son of War With batter'd Limbs and half his Face a Scar. The restless Seaman when insulting Gales Toss the light Bark and Conquer all his Sails If fear allows one distant thought or word Trembling applauds the Brother of the Sword The Man of Law when pondring at the Door His wakeful Client knocks him up at four Wou'd leave the Bar to lie securely warm And part with all his Practice for a Farm The clumsy Peasant if when Harvest 's done A kind Subpoena call's him up to Town 'T is odds but ravish'd with the gaudy Scene He sells his Team sets up for Citizen Secondly To admire nothing as Horace again says is almost the only thing capable of rendring a Man happy and continuing him so Not to admire as most are wont to do It is the only Method that I know To make Men happy and to keep them so And this does not only shew the Tranquility of mind unto which he hath attained who perceiving the Vanity of all Human things does not admire nor any way seek after but rather despises the Glory of Power Honours and Riches which generally dazle Mens Eyes but it also shews that other sort of Tranquility which he hath attained who hath arrived to the knowledge of Natural Causes so that he neither wonders nor fears nor is any way disquieted as the Vulgar usually are Happy the Man who studying Nature's Laws Thro' known Effects can trace the secret Cause His Mind possessing in a quiet State Fearless of Fortune and resign'd to Fate Thirdly That the sweet Repose and Quiet which we meet with in a retired state void of the Incumbrances of the World contributes not a little to our Happiness for he that aspires to the true Felicity of Life which consists chiefly in the Tranquility of Mind must not as Democritus tells us incumber himself in much Business either Private or Publick And it is generally known that the Oracle esteem'd not the Great King Gyges so Happy as the Old Father Aglaus Psophidius who in a little Corner of Arcadia Husbanded a small Estate from which he reapt plentifully the Necessaries of Life and never departing thence spent his time comfortably free from Ambition and without the least sense of the Evils which torment the greatest part of Mankind 'T is this sweet Retirement that Horace hath so much commended in his Praise of a Country Life Happy the Man whom bounteous Gods allow With his own hands Paternal Grounds to Plough Like the first Golden Mortal happy he From Business and the Cares of Mony free No Human Storms break off at Land his Sleep No loud Alarms of Nature on the Deep From all the Cheats of Law he lives secure Nor do's th' Affronts of Palaces endure The same state Virgil describes in his 2d Georgic O Happy if his Happiness he knows The Country Swain on whom kind Heav'n bestows At home all Riches that wise Nature needs Whom the just Earth with Ease and Plenty feeds 'T is true no Morning Tide of Clients comes And fills the Painted Channels of his Rooms Adoring the rich Figures as they pass In Tapestry wrought or cut in living Brass Nor is his Wool superfluously dy'd With the dear Poison of Assyrian Pride Nor do Arabian Perfumes vainly spoil The native Vse and Sweetness of his Oyl Instead of these his calm and harmless Life Free from th' Alarms of Fear and Storm of Strife Do's with substantial Blessedness abound And the soft Wings of Peace cover him round Through Artless Grates the murmuring Waters glide Thick Trees both against Heat and Cold provide From whence the Birds salute him and his Ground With lowing Herds and bleating Sheep do's sound And all the Rivers and the Forests nigh Do Food and Game and Exercise supply As to Epicurus we shall speak more at large that he makes Happiness to consist in the Ease of the Body and the Tranquility of the Mind teaching at the same time and maintaining That the efficient Causes of this Felicity are neither the delicious Wines nor the delicate Meats nor any such thing but a sound just and enlightned Reason assisted by Vertue from which it is not to be separated and which duly weighs and examines the Causes and Motives that induce us either to embrace or shun any thing Therefore designing to treat afterwards of Happiness he earnestly exhorts to consider throughly of the things that conduce to it and because amongst those things the chief is That the Mind may be disengaged from certain Mistakes which cause continual Disturbances and vain Fears he mentions several Particulars which he believes to be of that Importance that when
Temper and Goodness O happy Nations where none but the honestest Man was to bear sway for he can do what he pleaseth who doth nothing but what he thinks he ought to do 'T was therefore in this Golden Age that the Government was committed to the Wisest They prevented Quarrels protected the Weak against the oppression of the Stronger they advised dissuaded and represented what was most useful and what not Their Prudence provided for the necessities of those who were under their Conduct their Valour drove away all Dangers and their good Deeds purchased daily new Subjects To Command was more a Burden than a Profit and the greatest threatning that a King could then offer to such as were not Obedient was to forsake them and depart the Kingdom But since Vice and Corruption had changed Rulers into Tyrants hence sprung the necessity of having Laws and wise Men were the first contrivers of them But without standing to examin these several Opinions which Lactantius looks upon as frivolous O ingenia hominum indigna quae has ineptias protulerunt Miseros atque miserabiles qui stultitiam suam literis memoriaeque mandaverunt Let us rather consider That the Laws according to Epicurus's Judgment being established for the publick benefit of Mankind that every one might enjoy his Right might live peaceably and securely and seeing there is nothing more agreable to Nature than this I think none has reason to upbraid him quod Leges Jura a Natura sejunxerit That he separated from Nature the Laws and Right seeing that he had rather join'd them inseparably together by the Tie of common Interest which is the firmest Bond according to the Rules of Nature Nor does there seem any reason to blame him because he hath rather derived the Laws and Right from Profit than from Nature seeing he could never have derived them from Profit but at the same time he must needs derive them from Nature Nay let us go further What cause have we to reprove him seeing there is no Person but will allow that both the primitive and modern Legislators had always this thing of Profit or publick Advantage still in their Eye and that no Laws can be just and useful but what tend to the publick Benefit and Advantage Civil Societies saith Aristotle seem to have not only their Rise but their Continuance also in this Foundation of Profit the Law-givers still aimed at this End and generally termed that Right which was found to be useful Cicero retain'd the same Opinion We must saith he intend all our Laws for the publick Good not interpreting them according to the strict Letter but what suits best with the publick Good and common Benefit For our Ancestors always used this Wisdom and Prudence that in making their Laws they still chiefly proposed to themselves nothing more than the Safety Welfare and Advantage of the Publick The Safety of the People saith he in another Place is the supreme Law Salus populi suprema lex He saith further That all Magistrates and Rulers ought to stick close to these two Maxims of Plato the First To be so careful of the benefit of their Subjects that they ought chiefly to aim at it in all their Proceedings forgetting even their own private Profit and Advantage when it comes in Competition Secondly To take heed in their Governments that they lose not one part by endeavouring to preserve the other Truly Cujas acknowledges that the civil Right or the Right of every particular Government is derived from the common Benefit but he denies it to be so in relation to the Right of Nations or of all Mankind in general for he supposeth that proceeds from Nature But since he owns that this Right which is common to particular Places proceeds from Interest which also is common to them all why may not he admit that the Right which is common to all Men is derived also from that Profit which is common to all Men So that natural Right is as it were the Genus Generalissimum of which the Right of Nations or of Men is an inferior Species and likewise this Right of Nations as a Genus more contracted whereof the civil Right or the Right of every City is a Species As to what Epicurus says That a true Law supposeth a mutual Compact or every Law is a kind of an Agreement 't is no more than what Plato Aristotle Demosthenes Aristides and several others assert Nay the divine Law it self so far as it concerns our Fellow Subjects may be reputed the noblest part of the civil Right is nothing else but a Covenant between God and Man There is nothing more common in Holy Writ than to hear them speak of the First and Second Law both the Old and the New as of a Covenant and an Agreement There is nothing more frequent in the Holy Scriptures than to read that God makes a Covenant as with Noah Abraham and Jacob who likewise engage reciprocally to God who had made this Promise to him I will be with thee and keep thee wheresoever thou goest and I will bring thee back into thine own Country c. Unto which Jacob answered If the Lord be with me and will keep me in the way that I go and will give me Bread to Eat and Raiment to put on so that I come again to my Father's House in Peace then shall the Lord be my God Erit mihi Dominus in Deum We need but mention the mutual Compact and Agreement between God and the People of Israel when God was pleased by the Mediation of Moses to proclaim the antient Law Thus God speaks If you hear my Voice and keep my Covenant I will look upon you as my peculiar Treasure and will have more care of you than of all other People And the People answered We will do all that the Lord hath commanded In relation to the new Law this is the Prophesy of Jeremiah The Days shall come saith the Lord that I will make a new Covenant with the House of Israel and with the House of Judah not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers in the Day that I took them by the Hand to bring them out of the Land of Egypt which my Covenant they brake c. But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the House of Israel after those Days saith the Lord I will put my Law in their inward Parts and write it in their Hearts and will be their God and they shall be my People But not to insist longer on this let us only observe That tho from what hath been said we may conclude that to speak properly There is no Law of Nations and consequently no Right of Nations because there never hath been any Covenant or Agreement between all Nations nevertheless we may say that this common Precept Thou shalt not do to another what thou wilt not that another should do to thee ought to be esteemed as the first
attends those who do not greatly seek it and as often flies from those who eagerly pursue and hunt after it So true is it saith he further That there is some secret hidden Power that over-rules human Affairs and seems to delight and sport it self with over-turning Crowns and Dignities and trampling 'em under Feet Vsque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam Obterit pulchros fasces saevasque secures Proculcare ludibrio sibi habere videtur Of Destiny AS to what concerns Destiny Homer speaks more plainly of it than of Fortune for he makes Hector say That if the Destinies don't appoint nor order it nothing is able to take away his Life beside but no Man can avoid his Destiny Nam nisi Fata vocent nemo me mittat ad Orcum At Fatum vitat nemo mihi crede virorum Now tho' Cicero fancies that Fate and Destiny is but a foolish idle and superstitious Name Anilis plenum superstitionis fati nomen and Epicurus That 't is only a fantastical Name and that nothing is done by Destiny Nevertheless as there have always been Maintainers of Destiny some taking it in one sense others in another we must here endeavour to understand the several Opinions into which they have been divided Among these Opinions there are two Principal for some will have Destiny to be Divine others a meer Natural thing The First were the Disciples of Plato and the Stoicks according to whose Opinion Plutarch Chalcidius and some others look upon Destiny or Fate in two manners First As a Substance which they took for God himself or for that eternal Reason which from all Eternity hath ordered all things and hath so joined all Causes both Superior and Inferior together that all that happens either Good or Evil happens persuant to these Causes They bestowed several Names upon this Divine Substance or Reason for sometimes they termed it as Plato The Soul of the World The Reason and the eternal Law of the Nature of the Vniverse And sometimes as Zeno and Chrysippus The moving Virtue of Matter a spiritual Virtue and the Reason of the Order that Governs and Rules all Things Sometimes God Jupiter Understanding or Intellect as Aristotle and Seneca And sometimes with Heraclitus The Reason that penetrates into all Things And sometimes as Pythagoras The governing and ruling Cause of all Things both Vniversal and Particular Secondly As an Act namely in part for the Decree it self or for the Command by which God hath established and ordained all things and partly for the Order it self that Consequence and Concatenation of Causes at first appointed in which it pursues its course without varying in the least from the Rules and Methods at first prescribed For thus they spoke of it when they called Destiny The Law of Nature The Companion of the Whole The Daughter of Necessity The Order that includes and comprehends all other Orders Or as Chrysippus saith A certain eternal and immutable sequel of Things c. Sempiterna quaedam indeclinabilis series rerum catena volvens semetipsa sese implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines in quibus apta connexaque est To which Lucan seems to allude in these two Verses At simul à prima descendit origine Mundi Causarum series atque omnia Fata laborant And Hesiod when he speaks distinctly of the three Parcae which Spin the Life of Man the first is named Atropos because the Time past is irrecoverable which is as the Thread spun and wound in the Spindle The second is called Clotho because of the Time present that runs which is as the Thread in the hand of her who Spins The third is Lachesis because of the Time to come or the hazard which is as the Wool or Flax that is not yet twisted Lachesis in Plato is said to govern the Time past Clotho the present Atropos the future That which is added of Lachesis that she receives the celestial Actions of the two other Sisters that she joyns them together and that she distributes them here below upon the Earth shews the Opinion of the Astrologers who bind the Fate of Mankind to the Stars and make it to depend upon them and come from them according to Manilius Fata quoque vitas hominum suspendit ab Astris An Opinion among the Astrologers more certain than that of the Sybils and the Oracles which were said to utter forth the Destinies For to hear them speak they seem to be no less acquainted with the Designs and Decrees of Heaven than the Oaks which Plato tells us came forth from Voices of the Enchantresses as Virgil observes Quam comitabantur fatalia carmina quercus Moreover as the Disciples of Plato the Stoicks and the other Patrons of Destiny seem consequently to defend Necessity which Seneca stiles a Necessity of all Things and of every Action which no Violence can break or alter For the Destinies saith he exercise their Right and their absolute and uncontrolable Power without favouring any and without being moved either with Prayers or Compassion they observe their fatal course appointed and irrevocable like as the swift and furious downfal of the Waters from some steep Places which neither go back nor stop for those Waters which follow but continually thrust down the first thus the constant sequel of Destiny makes the order of Things under this first and eternal Law to submit to the irrevocable Decree As therefore they seem to maintain I say a Necessity which altogether destroys the Liberty of human Actions and leaves nothing in our Free-will for that reason these Objections are opposed proceeding from the Inconveniences that will ensue The Chief of these Inconveniences is That if our Souls as they are placed and ranked in the sequel of Things be governed by the Destinies and being deprived of all Libery they act always out of an immutable and unavoidable Necessity the Liberty and ordinary Conduct of the Affairs of human Life fails and all Consultations are useless for whatever you resolve upon there shall nothing happen but what hath been decreed by the Destinies Thus Prudence will become idle and needless the study of Wisdom frivolous Legislators and Tyrants will be equally ridiculous because they command things that we must unavoidably do or what we can by no means perform So that there will be neither Vice nor Virtue nor any thing that will deserve either Praise or Blame seeing that they alone are reputed worthy of Praise who might do ill but behave themselves well and those worthy of Blame who might do well but behave themselves ill In this case no body will deserve Reward for any good Deeds as no body will deserve Punishment for any bad because the first cannot but act well and the latter hath not the Power to forbear and abstain from what is ill Finally if all things proceeded from an unavoidable Necessity in vain should we offer up our Prayers our Vows and Sacrifices c. 'T is
out the strangest means to deliver our selves from it and to procure our Death Et saepe usque adeo mortis formidine vitae Percipit ingratos odium lucisque videnda Vt sibi conciscant moerenti pectore lethum But this extraordinary Fear causeth by degrees a certain kind of Melancholy which depresseth the Heart enfeebles the Spirits and obstructs all the operations of Life It stops Digestion and draws upon us many Diseases that are the immediate Causes of Death However the Opinion of the Stoicks is not only contrary to the Sacred Precepts of our Religion but is also contrary to Nature and right Reason We must except some certain Persons who being directed by a Particular and Divine Instinct have been instrumental in procuring their own Deaths as Samson and others in the Old-Testament and Sophronia and Pelagia since the New for Nature furnishes all sorts of Animals with a Natural love of Life and there is none besides Man let them be tormented with never so grievous pain but labours to preserve Life as much as they can and to avoid Death This is a sign that none but Man doth by his mistaken Opinions corrupt the Institution of Nature when he refuseth the benefit of Life and advanceth his Death he acts then by a wickedness peculiar to himself for the true state of Nature is to be consider'd in the general body of the Creatures and not in some few individuals of one single Species that hasten their own destruction and cast away themselves before the time appointed by Nature From hence we may conclude that such are injurious to God and Nature who being design'd and order'd to perform a certain Race stop in the middle of their Course of their own accord and who being appointed to watch forsake and abandon their Post without waiting for Orders from their Superiors Besides Reason forbids us to be Cruel against the Innocent who never did us any harm and by consequence it don't allow that we should act inhumanly upon our selves from whom we never experienced any Hatred but rather too much Love Moreover upon what occasion can our Vertue appear more conspicuous than in suffering Courageously the Evils that our hard Fortune imposes upon us To die saith Aristotle because of our Poverty or for Love or for some other mischievous accident is not the act of a Man of Spirit and Courage but of a mean and timorous Soul for it is the part of a weak Mind to shun and flye from things hard to be endured Stout Men saith Curtius are wont to despise Death rather than to hate Life 'T is the trouble and impatience of Suffering that carries the Cowards to base Actions that makes them despised and scorned Vertue leaves nothing unattempted and Death is the last thing with which we must Encounter but not as timerous lazy and unwilling Souls I shall not here stay to examin the Opinion of those who imagining saith Lactantius that the Souls are Eternal have therefore kill'd themselves as Cleanthes Chrysippus and Zeno expecting to be transported at the same time to Heaven or as Empedocles who cast himself in the Night into the Flames of Mount-Aetna that by disappearing so suddenly the World might think that he was gone to the Gods or as Cato who was during his Life-time a Follower of the vanity of the Stoicks who before he kill'd himself as it is Reported had read Plato 's Book of the Eternity of the Soul or finally as Cleombrotus who after he had read the same Book cast himself down a Precipice This is a Cursed and Abominable Doctrin that drives Men out of their Lives Neither shall I trouble my self with that Cyrenaick of Hegesius who Disputed so Elegantly concerning the Miseries of Life and the Blessed Place of the Souls after Death that King Ptolomy was forced to forbid him to speak in Publick because so many of his Disciples after they had heard him destroyed themselves as Cicero Reports and some others For the Evils that we indure in this Life may happen to be so great and increase in such a manner that when the time of Death is come the loss of Life may not be unpleasant and that in such a Case Death may be esteem'd as the Haven that shelters us from the Miseries and Torments of Life But to aggravate our Afflictions so far as to beget in us a scorn and hatred of Life is to be injurious and unthankful to Nature as if the Gift of Life that hath been bestowed upon us for our use were to be rashly cast away or as if we were not to accept of it any longer nor honestly and quietly to enjoy it as long as is possible 'T is true what Theognis said formerly That it were much better for Men not to be Born or to Die as soon as they are Born is a Celebrated Saying Non nasci res est mortalibus optima longe Nec Solis radiis acre videre Jubar Aut natum Ditis quamprimum lumen adire This is confirmed by the Example of Cleobis of Biton of Agamedes of Pindarus and of some others who having Petitioned the Gods to grant to them the thing which was best and most desirable were admitted to this great favour To die in a short time Answerable to this is the Custom of the Thracians who wept at the Birth of their Children but Congratulated the Happiness of such as Died. Not to mention Menander who wish'd a young Man dead because he was well beloved by the Gods Quem diligunt Dii Juvenis ipse interit Nor to say any thing of that Famous Sentence Vitam nemo acciperet si daretur scientibus That no body would accept of Life willingly if it were given to them that knew what it were But pray who will believe that Theognis and the rest have spoken seriously and without any Restriction I say without any Restriction for if they would have it that it is better for such only who are to be miserable all their Lives that they had not been Born or to have Died at the very moment of their Birth the Saying might be tolerable and allowable but to speak this in relation to all Men is to affront Nature the Mistriss both of our Life and Death that hath ordered and appointed our Birth and our Dissolution as she hath all other things for the preservation of the Universe It were to expose our selves to be contradicted if not by all yet by the most part of Men who are not weary of Life but seek to preserve it as carefully as they can For Life as we have already observed hath something in it very pleasing and lovely therefore he that speaks in this manner shall feel himself bound and held fast and I am apt to believe that he may be like the Old Man in Aesop who sent Death back again tho' he had often called for it before or like another who refused to make use of the Dagger that he had desired to be
hurts wilfully that is to say knowing to whom in what manner and how he injures From whence it follows that because 't is one thing to suffer an unjust Act or to receive Damage and another to suffer an injury a Man may willingly suffer an unjust Act but not suffer an injury For that Reason Aristotle observes that we define a Man who doth an injury He who hurts knowing to whom in what manner and how he hurts yet that is not sufficient but we must add this particular Against the Will of him whom he hurts This being supposed in the first place 't is impossible that we should do injury to our selves or that a Man should receive an injury from himself for a Man may do a damage to himself and act against his own advantage but not do an injury because the same Person is both Agent and Patient he acts and suffers willingly But we must nevertheless remember what we have already said and shall have occasion to mention again hereafter That he who wishes Evil to himself as he who desires his own death or kills himself wishes for it not as an Evil he desires not death as it is the destruction of Life but as it is some Advantage that is to say as 't is the end of the Evils from which he desires to be delivered and so he looks upon it as a considerable Benefit It is likewise certain according to that kind of Maxim Volenti non fit injuria that no injury can be done to him who consents and approves of it For as we have already said no man can suffer an injury but against his Will because as the injury is in it self an Evil it cannot be look'd upon as Good or the cause of any Good 'T is true it may be a Crime in him who takes the Goods of another though this other by mistake may seem to be consenting to it as for Example If he be frightned into a Consent under some pretence if he be deluded into it by fair Promises if he be flatter'd into it by Craft if he works upon his Weakness or the easiness of his Temper or if he conceals from him the true Value of the thing without afterward informing him of his Error and so of the rest but as for him who knowingly and willingly gives away his Goods consents that they may be taken this Man cannot be judged to receive an injury but a damage But since both doing and suffering injury is an Evil if you inquire which of the two is the worst Aristotle will readily resolve you that it is in doing an injury for that cannot be done without Injustice Therefore Plato gives us this Advice That we should be more careful to avoid doing an injury than suffering it Besides tho' he who receives any damage tho' he receives it not against his Will he who doth the mischief or wrong if he designs to do an injury is not in such a case excusable because it was not for want of his Will that the damage did not prove an injury Seneca explains this matter very well It may happen saith he that a Man may offer me an injury and that I may not receive it as if any one should put into my House what he had taken out of my Farm he had been guilty of a Theft and yet I may have lost nothing thereby If any one lies with his own Wife and believes her to be the Wife of another he is an Adulterer though the Woman be not Some body hath given me Poison but as it happens to be mixed with other Ingredients it hath lost its Operation he who hath administred the Poison is a Murderer though no mischief is done by it All designed Crimes are in respect of the Sin done and effected before the act is accomplished CHAP. IX Of the Virtues which accompany Justice namely of Religion of Piety of Observance Love Bounty Liberality Gratitude And first of Religion THere are two main Causes or Reasons why God ought to be Worship'd and Ador'd the First is the supreme excellency of his Nature the Second his Bounty to us First they who stile him most Good and most Great Optimum Maximum had doubtless these two Reasons in view because as he is most Good he is the most liberal and sovereign Benefactor and as he is most Great he is supremly Excellent So that we may very well approve of Epicurus's Maxim and say That God ought to be Honoured purely for himself without any further Expectation but only because of his supreme Majesty and of his sovereign Nature for that that is most Excellent deserves to be Reverenced and Honoured But yet with him to acknowledge no other Cause and notwithstanding to disown his Bounty is what cannot be too much blamed for as Seneca tells him very well Thou dost not acknowledge the Favours and Blessings of God but supposest that as it were at a far Distance and out of the noise of the Affairs of the World he enjoys a profound Rest and interrupted Felicity without being concerned for the good Deeds of Men any more than for the evil He who teacheth this Doctrin does not consider the Sighs and ardent Desires of those who pray from all parts of the World and with Hands lifted up towards Heaven make Vows either publick or private which certainly would not easily be nor is it easily to be suppos'd that the generality of Mankind would of their own accord fall into such a stupid Madness as to address themselves to deaf and senseless Divinities to no purpose They ought to have understood that the Gods sometimes deny and sometimes grant our Requests out of their bountiful Goodness and that often they assist us so powerfully and so seasonably that they divert the great Mischiefs and Calamities that threatned us Where is that Man so miserable so forsaken and under such unhappy Circumstances who hath not at some time experienced this great Bounty and Liberality of the Gods If you look upon them who lament and grieve for their ill Fortune and tire themselves in complaining you will meet with none but Heaven hath bestowed upon him some Favours some Drops of that large Fountain of Goodness have fallen upon him Ay but God saith he does us no Good From whence then comes all those things that thou possessest that thou bestowest that thou refusest that thou keepest and that thou receivest From whence proceed that vast number of grateful Objects that delight thine Eyes thine Ears and thy Mind He hath not only provided things needful his Love hath proceeded farther to furnish us with things Pleasant and Delightful with many pleasant Fruits wholesome Herbs and nourishing Meats for Food which succeed one another according to their Seasons The most careless ever and anon stumble upon some of 'em without labour or toil 'T is God who hath created for us all the several sorts of Creatures either upon the Earth or in the Waters or in the Air that
and Love and for the same Ends. 'T is Nature hath established what is right just and equitable to its Law 'T is a greater Evil to be the cause of Wrong than to suffer it Nature commands that our Hands should be always ready to afford assistance Let this be always in our Heart and at our Lips Homo sum humani nihil à me alienum puto I am a Man and think my self obliged to all the Duties of Humanity THE Third BOOK OF Liberty Fortune Destiny and Divination CHAP. I. What Liberty or Free-Will is AFter we have examined the moral Virtues we must speak something of Destiny Fortune and of Free-will which some esteem to be Causes others to be Modes or manner how certain Causes act and others to be nothing but empty Names vain and imaginary Notions we must I say speak something and the rather because according as they are received or rejected Virtues and Vices will be allowed or not allowed and consequently our Actions may deserve praise or blame rewards or punishments for 't is most certain that there is nothing either commendable or blame-worthy but what is done freely and with deliberation and that what ever is done by Chance or out of Necessity is neither to be commended nor condemned This being unquestionable the first thing that we have to do is to examin wherein Liberty or Free-will consists what is Fortune and Destiny that so we may the better understand how Fortune and Liberty either contradict or may agree with Destiny To begin therefore with Liberty And here 't is to be understood that we mean not precisely such a Liberty as is taken in opposition to Slavery that which relates properly to the Body and is described a power of living as we please but we mean that which the Greeks were wont to name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id quod in nobis seu penes nos nostrove in arbitrio potestateque situm est that which is in us within our Power or Free-will namely something which is in the Soul and is not under Bondage to any external Master or if I may make use of the words of Epictetus That which cannot by any means be hindered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if we should say A full and entire Power or Liberty to do any thing The Latins and chiefly the Divines call it commonly liberum aribitrium Free-will and sometimes liberale arbitrium Upon which we must observe First That this is given to Reason or which is the same thing to the Understanding because Reason is look'd upon as an Arbitrator between Parties or as a Judge to examin to consult and deliberate and at last to decide as the Judgment is sway'd upon what we ought or ought not to do in a doubtful Case Secondly That as soon as the Consultation and Deliberation are concluded Reason hath indeed elected and chosen one thing preferrable before another which she hath conceived or believed to be the best the Appetite or the Function of the Appetite will immediatly follow Thirdly That by this word Appetite I understand the reasonable Appetite and that which is peculiar and proper to Man alone as Reason is because we shall hereafter indifferently make use of these Terms Will and Appetite meaning the reasonable Appetite Fourthly That because the Action of the moving Faculty which is properly the pursuit of that which is good follows the Appetite or as we commonly speak the Will the Faculty being taken for the Action that Action of the moving Faculty is for that reason termed Voluntary as if one should say willingly undertaken that is with Deliberation and Consultation Fifthly That Reason or Free-will is supposed in Man to be so free that of the several things which come under his Deliberation there is nothing he chuseth but he hath at the same time an equal liberty of refusing it and making choice of something else Truly we usually ascribe this Liberty to the Will or to the reasonable Appetite which signifies the same thing for we all agree that the Original of Liberty is in Reason which we commonly call Understanding that is to say in the intellective Power for we usually hold that the Will is a Faculty or Power of it self blind which cannot incline to any thing till the Understanding goes before and holds forth if I may so say a Light before it So that 't is the Property of the Understanding to precede and enlighten and of the Will to follow So that it cannot easily be turned out of the Path it hath taken until the Understanding first turns the Light which directs it that way Liberty therefore seems by consequence to be first and primarily in the Understanding and secundarily or dependantly in the Will To open the Matter a little more clearly The Nature of Liberty seems first to consist in an indifferency by which the Faculty which is named Free may incline or not incline to any thing and this is called Liberty of Contradiction or incline in such a manner to any thing as it may equally incline it self to the contrary and this is called Liberty of Contrariety And in truth as we cannot imagin any Liberty without a Faculty free to chuse 't is certain that there neither is nor can be any Choice but where there is an indifferency because where there is but one thing proposed or where the Faculty is resolved and determinated to act or to pursue any certain thing there can be no Choice nor Election which supposeth at least two things whereof the one is to be preferr'd before the other I know some are of Opinion that the Will is then principally and altogether free when it is so fixed and resolved on any certain thing suppose for Example the sovereign or chief Good and Happiness that it cannot be bent or diverted to any other thing that is to say to Evil because say they the actual love the pursuance the enjoyment of this Good or Happiness is altogether Voluntary and by consequence altogether Free But I know not whether they take notice enough that there is this difference between a willing Action and a free Action for a willing or spontaneous Action is nothing else but a certain propensity or impulse of Nature which impulse may be effected without any Reasoning whereas the free Action supposeth and depends upon some Reasoning Examination Judgment or Choice preceding And to prove that a spontaneous Action is a certain impulse or propensity of Nature they instance in Children and Brutes unto whom they never attribute the use of Reason or Liberty yet they perform many things sponte and this is said also of things inanimate as of a Stone that it falls down sponte of its own accord or of Fire that it ascends sponte so that fiery sponte and fieri natura seem to be the same thing Thus as the Appetite inclines of its own Nature to Good 't is no wonder that we should say that 't is carried sponte of
THREE DISCOURSES OF HAPPINESS VIRTUE AND LIBERTY Collected from the WORKS of the Learn'd GASSENDI By Monsieur Bernier Translated out of French LONDON Printed for Awnsham and John Churchil at the Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row MDCXCIX THE PREFACE THE Epicurean Philosophers placing the Happiness of Man in the Satisfaction of the Mind and Health of the Body assure us that those two are no otherwise to be procured than by a constant Practice of Virtue And because they have had the hard Fate to be misrepresented by most of the other Sects as well Ancient as Modern and their Principles traduced as favouring the most brutal Sensuality the Learned Gassendi who had either examined their Doctrin with more Diligence or interpreted their Sentiments with more Candour and Justice thought he could not employ his Time better than to vindicate the Morals of Epicurus and his Followers from the Slanders of Mistake and Malice and to shew that their principal Design was to lead Men by smooth and easie Paths to a just sober wise and virtuous Behaviour as the only way to true Happiness This he proved at large and illustrated with the Sentiments of many great and excellent Men among the Greeks and Romans But because these Things were diffused through the voluminous Works of that Great Man Monsieur Bernier whose Name is a sufficient Commendation in the Common-wealth of Learning took the Pains to put them together and to form them into several intire Discourses which on account of their great importance to Mankind are here presented to the Publick OF Moral Philosophy IN GENERAL MAnkind having a natural Inclination to be happy the main bent and design of all his Actions and Endeavours tend chiefly that way It is therefore an undeniable Truth that Happiness or a Life free from Pain and Misery are such things as influence and direct all our Actions and Purposes to the obtaining of them And tho' several Persons who neither want the Necessities nor Conveniences of Life possessing great Riches promoted to Dignites and Honours blessed with a beautiful and hopeful Off-spring in a word who want nothing that may seem requisite to compleat their present Happiness tho' I say we find many who have all these Advantages yet they lead an anxious and uneasy Life disquieted with Cares Troubles and perpetual Disturbances From whence the wiser sort of Mankind have concluded That the Source of this Evil proceeds from the Ignorance of the Cause wherein our true Happiness consists and of the last end which every one should propose to himself in all his Actions which being neglected we are led blind-fold by our Passions and forsake Honesty Vertue and good Manners without which it is impossible to live happily For this Reason they have therefore undertaken to instruct us wherein true Happiness consists and to propose such useful Precepts for the due regulation of our Passions whereby our Minds may be less liable to be disturb'd This Collection of Precepts Reflections and Reasonings they name The Art of Living or The Art of leading an happy Life And which they commonly call Moral Philosophy because it comprehends such Doctrins as relate to the Manners of Men that is to say the accustomed and habitual Actions of Life From hence we may understand That this part of Philosophy is not only speculative and rests in the bare Contemplation of its Object but proceeds to Action and that it is as we usually say active and practical for it directs and governs our Manners rendring them regular and agreeable with the Rules of Justice and Honesty So that in this respect it may be said to be The Science or if this Term be scrupled at we may call it The Art of doing well I only make this Supposition for let it be stiled Art or Science 't is a difference only in Name which depends upon the manner of understanding those two Words and therefore requires no further Scrutiny into the matter We will rather take notice that Democritus Epicurus and divers others of no small Eminency have had so high an esteem for Moral Philosophy that they have judged the Natural to be no further regarded than only as it was found useful in freeing us from certain Errors and Mistakes in our Understanding which might disturb the Repose and Tranquility of our Life and wherein it might be serviceable to Moral Philosophy or to the better obtaining of that Knowledge which teaches us to live happily and comfortably I shall not mention the Followers of Socrates Aristippius Anthistenes with the Cyrenaicks and Cynicks who altogether neglecting the Natural gave themselves entirely over to the study of Moral Philosophy considering with Socrates what might make for the Good or Ill of Families and what might contribute to the Grief and Disturbance of Man's Life Quid siet in domibus fortasse malumve bonumve We may also here observe That tho' Socrates is supposed to be the Inventer of Moral Philosophy this is only to be understood so far as he did cultivate and improve a new and considerable part not that he laid the first and Original Precepts of it for it is certain that before him Pythagoras had much improved this sort of Knowledge And 't is well known that he commonly asserted That the Discourser of a Philosopher that cures not the Mind of some Passion is vain and useless as the Physick that drives not away the Distemper from the Body is insignificant It is likewise very certain That the wise Men of Greece who lived a little before Pythagoras were named wise only because they addicted themselves to the Study of Moral Wisdom Therefore at this present time their famous Sentences that relate to Mens Manners are generally known all over the World We might add if we would make farther search into the Antiquity of the Heroes that we shall find Orpheus by this same Study of Moral Philosophy drawing the Men of his time off from their barbarous and savage way of Living which gave occasion of that Saying of him That he tamed the Tygers and the Lions as Horace describes Orpheus inspir'd by more than human Power Did not as Poets feign tame savage Beasts But Men as lawless and as wild as they And first disswaded them from Rage and Blood Thus when Amphion built the Theban Wall They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute In a word it was Morality that first set a Mark of Distinction between publick and private Good setled our Rights and Authority and gave Laws and Rules for regulating Societies as the same Poet expresses When Man yet new No Rule but uncorrupted Reason knew And with a native bent did Good pursue Vnforc'd by Punishment unaw'd by Fear His Words were simple and his Soul sincere No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd No Court erected yet no Cause was heard But all was safe for Conscience was their Guard However we must acknowledge our selves much indebted to Socrates as to Moral Philosophy since by his applying himself
can this shorten the long state of Death For tho' thy Life shall numerous Ages fill The State of Death shall be Eternal still And he that dies to day shall be no more As long as those who perish'd long before If Nature saith he again should in anger speak to us in this manner What Cause hast thou O Mortal to Weep and to Complain of Death If thy former Life hath been easie and pleasant and if thou hast known how to make use of the good things and delights that I have afforded thee why dost thou not as a Guest depart when thou art full and satisfied with Life and why dost thou not accept fond Creature of the agreeable Repose that is offered thee But if otherwise thy Life hath been to thee a burthen and if thou hast suffered my Bounties to perish why desirst thou more to mispend them after the same manner for I can give thee no new thing And if thou shouldst live thousands of years thou wilt but still see the same things repeated over again If Nature should speak to us in this Language should we not have reason to approve of this Discourse and own that it hath cause to Reproach us in this manner Fond Mortal what 's the matter thou dost sigh Why all these Tears because thou once must die And once submit to strong Necessity For if the Race thou hast already run Was pleasant if with joy thou saws't the Sun If all thy Pleasures did not pass thy Mind As thro' a Sieve but left some Sweets behind Why dost thou not then like a thankful Guest Rise cheerfully from Life's abundant Feast And with a quiet Mind go take thy Rest But if all those Delights are lost and gone Spent idly all and Life a burthen grown Then why fond Mortal dost thou ask for more Why still desire t' increase thy wretched store And wish for what must wast like those before Not rather free thy self from Pains and Fear And end thy Life and necessary care My Pleasures always in a Circle run The same returning with the yearly Sun And thus tho' thou dost still enjoy thy Prime And tho' thy Limbs feel not the rage of Time Yet I can find no new no fresh Delight The same dull Joys must vex thy Appetite Altho' thou coud'st prolong thy wretched Breath For numerous Years much more if free from Death At least we must acknowledge that a Wise Man who hath lived long enough to consider the World ought of his own accord to submit himself to the Course of Nature when he perceives that his time is come and cannot but suppose that his Race is Run and that the Circle that he hath finish'd is compleat and if this Circle is not to be compared to Eternity it is however with the continuance of the World As to what relates to the whole Prospect of Nature he hath often beheld the Heavens the Earth and other things included in the World He hath often seen the rising and the setting of the Coelestial Bodies He hath taken notice of several Eclipses and many other Phaenomenas or unusual Appearances in the Skye the constant succession of the Seasons and in a word many particular Generations many Corruptions and Transmutations And as to those things which relate to Mankind he hath seen or at least hath heard and understood from History the Transactions that have happen'd from the beginning of Peace and of War of Faith kept and violated of a Polite Life and of a rude and barbarous Behaviour of Laws Establish'd and Abolish'd of Kingdoms and Commonwealths in their first Birth and Declension and generally all other things that he hath any knowledge of or which have been told him and with which he is in any wise acquainted as if he had been present when they first happen'd So that he ought to consider that all the time that is gone before him relates to him as if his Life were begun with the things themselves And because we must judge of the future by the time past he ought also to think that all the subsequent time relates to him in the same manner and that there shall be nothing hereafter but what hath been already that there is nothing but the Circumstances of things that alter and that all things in general steer the same common Course and make the like appearances so that Holy Writ hath reason to say The thing that hath been it is that which shall be and that which is done is that which shall be done again and there is no new thing under the Sun Is there any thing whereof it may be said see this is new From whence we may conclude that a Wise Man ought not to fancy his Life short for by casting his eye upon the time past and foreseeing the time to come he may extend it to as great a length as the duration of the Universe Moreover tho' Epicurus had cause to say That it is ridiculous to assert that there is no evil in Death when it is present and yet to dread it and be troubled when it must come as if there were any reason to be disturbed for that which is absent which when present never gives us the least sorrow Nevertheless because other Considerations represent Death dreadful as the Evils and Pains that Usher it and those that we think will be its necessary Attendants Seneca therefore makes it his business to recommend divers Considerations wherein he shews that tho' Death in it self is no Evil yet it appears so much in that Notion that it ought not to be lookt upon as an indifferent thing for as he expresseth himself Death is not indifferent in the same manner as it is indifferent whether the Hairs of my head be of one length or not for Death is to be reckon'd amongst those things which tho' they be no real Evils yet they appear to be so for we love our selves and naturally desire to subsist and preserve our selves and we have an innate aversion from a dissolution because it seems to deprive us of many advantages and draws us away from that plenty of Enjoyments unto which we are accustomed There is yet one thing more which causeth us to dread Death We know the things present but we are altogether Strangers to those unto which we are a going and therefore we fear that which is unknown Besides we have a natural dread of Darkness into which we imagin that Death is leading us So that tho' Death is indifferent yet it is not of the number of those things that are easily to be despised we ought to inure and harden our Minds by a long accustomed Habit to enable us the more willingly to undergo and encounter with the dismal approaches of Death The Third Particular relates to the abominable Opinion of the Stoicks who were perswaded that in some Cases Men had the liberty to kill themselves for thus you see Seneca represents them arguing It is certainly a great
lest by shunning of these they might fall into greater From hence we may learn that Debauchery is not to be shunn'd for its own sake nor Sobriety to be desired because it declines some Pleasures but because it procureth greater and more substantial ones We shall find the same Arguments for Fortitude for it is neither Labour nor Pain nor Patience nor Constancy nor Industry nor Courage nor Watchfulness that draw us of themselves but we are perswaded by these actions that we may live without Trouble or Fear and that we might free our selves as much as is possible from that which incommodes either the Mind or the Body for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is disturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death and it is a miserable thing to be oppress'd with Pain and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage insomuch that by this weakness of Spirit many have lost their Parents many their Friends and many their Native Country nay have altogether lost themselves But a generous stout and couragious Spirit is free from such Cares and Troubles because it despiseth Death and is so provided to receive Grief and Pain that it knows the greatest are cur'd by Death and the least have divers intervals of Rest and that as for moderate Griefs we are Masters of them Besides a noble Spirit considers that if the Pains be not extraordinary they are easily suffered but if they be very grievous we shall then willingly surrender and quit our Life which in such a case becomes unpleasant to us so that we leave it in the same manner as we go off a Theatre From hence we may conclude that Fear and Cowardise are not in themselves blame-worthy neither do Courage and Patience of themselves merit Praise But the first are slighted because they increase Pain and Sorrow and the other are desired because they procure real Pleasure There remains nothing else to be examin'd but Justice of which we may almost say the same For as I have already demonstrated that Wisdom Temperance and Fortitude are so joyned with Pleasure that they cannot be separated from it we ought to say the same of Justice which is not only inoffensive to all Men but does also constantly bring with it such advantages as by the strength of its own nature does quiet and settle the Thoughts by affording continual hopes of never wanting those things which an honest Mind may desire And as Timerousness Covetousness and Cowardise do perpetually torment the Mind and are continually vexing and disturbing its quiet So where Injustice bears sway in the Soul it begets much Trouble and Vexation and if it hath committed any evil action tho' never so secretly yet it can never be assured that it shall always remain undiscover'd Jealousy and fear of being found out do commonly attend evil Actions and we suppose every one to be our Accuser and ready to Inform against us Nay some out of fear of being Discovered have been their own Accusers If some think their Riches a sufficient shelter and capable of quieting their Conscience yet they have such a dread of the Justice of God in punishing their Crimes that upon a due resentment of this their Thoughts labour under a perpetual Agony and Disturbance Now their wicked Actions can never be able so much to lessen the anxiety of their Life as the gripings of a Wounded Conscience or the Laws of the Country and the hatred of their Acquaintance have to increase it Nevertheless such is the unsatiable desire of some Men after Riches Luxury Honour Dominion c. that in the obtaining of them they will stick at no indirect Means so that nothing but a severe Punishment inflicted on them by the Laws is able to stop their Career True Reason therefore directs all Men of sound Judgment to observe the Rules of Justice Equity and Fidelity which are the best means to procure to our selves the good Esteem and Love of others and which is absolutely necessary to render our Lives Pleasant and Sedate And the rather because hereby we have no temptation to do what is ill because that the desires which proceed from Nature may easily be appeased without doing wrong to any Person and as for other vain Desires we are not to regard them for they prompt us to nothing that is really worthy seeking after and Injustice it self brings a greater damage to us than the recompence it can be able to make us by the seeming good things it brings along with it Therefore we cannot say That Justice is of it self desirable but only because it is attended with a great deal of Pleasure and Content for we are not a little pleased with the esteem and good will of others which renders our Life Comfortable and Pleasant Thus we don't believe that we ought to shun Vice only because of the inconveniencies that fall upon the Wicked but chiefly because it never suffers the Mind to be at rest where it hath once taken possession I might here mention the Objections that are brought against this Opinion but they relate to nothing but sensual and dishonest Pleasures which Epicurus abhors in express words I will only take notice that the Pleasure that is here understood is such true real and natural Pleasure in which our Happiness consists We therefore say That Vertue is inseparably accompanied with it being the real and genuine cause of it for where that is supposed Happiness immediately attends and when that is removed Pleasure it self must needs decay In the same manner as the Sun is said to be inseparable from the Day because it alone is the true and necessary cause thereof for as soon as the Sun appears over our Horizon the Day must needs be and when it withdraws the Day dis-appears Now the reason why Epicurus supposes Vertue to be the efficient cause of Happiness is because he thinks that Prudence doth as it were contain all other Vertues for all the rest proceed from this and have in a great measure a dependence upon her CHAP. III. Wherein an Happy Life doth consist WHat we have already discours'd of tends to little else than to make a plain discovery of Epicurus's Opinion But now we must come closer to the Matter and strictly examin whether he had sufficient ground to say That Pleasure is the main End Here we must weigh two of his chief Maxims First That all Pleasure is of it self and of its own nature a real Good and on the contrary That all Grief and Pain is an Evil. The Second is That notwithstanding sometimes we must prefer some sort of Pains before some sort of Pleasures Whether all Pleasure be good of it self IN respect of the first Maxim It is not without ground that Epicurus asserts That all Pleasure is of it self good tho' by accident it happens sometimes otherwise for all Creatures are of themselves so inclinable to Pleasure and Delight that it is the first and chief thing that they naturally covet nor
means to be made strait But Aristotle answers That it is not convenient to entertain them with these kind of Discourses because when it concerns us as in the case of the Passions and Actions we give not so much credit to the Words as to the Thing it self From whence it happens that when the Words agree not with what the Senses apprehend they are despised and tho' they comprehend something that is good yet they are thereby baffled Therefore Aristotle seems to intimate That it is more reasonable not to place the Pleasures amongst the Evils seeing the Senses are of a contrary persuasion and when they are barely look'd upon as Pleasures they approve of them and judge them good but it is more reasonable to discover and lay open the Evils that frequently accompany such Pleasures which cause a prudent and considering Man to abstain from them lest he being tempted thereby should be drawn into so great Mischiefs If these Answers of Aristotle will not satisfie nothing can hinder us from exclaiming against Pleasure it self supposing those to be Pleasures which cause much more Evil than they procure Good For when it concerns us to persuade it is the same thing to say That Pleasure or the Action that accompanies the Pleasure is Wicked to conclude that we are therefore to shun it by reason of the Evils which infallibly attend and proceed from both Whether the Opinion of the Stoicks in respect of Good and Evil be Justifiable WE might here enter into a large Field of Dispute with the Stoicks who pretend That there is nothing Good but that which is Honest and nothing Evil but that which is Dishonest But hereby we should only trifle away our time in unnecessary Disputes for in short it is manifest that they have rais'd a Dispute about the bare Name when at the same time they have limited and confined the thing it self viz. the Notion of Good according to their own Fancy which all Mankind besides take in a large Sense For whereas other Men place several things besides Vertues in the number of good things as Health Pleasure Glory Riches Friends c. And besides Vices they reckon several other things amongst Evils as Sickness Pain Shame Poverty Enemies c. The Stoicks have rather named these things Indifferent or neither Good nor Evil. But this seems very absurd and contradictory to take Health and Sickness Pleasure and Pain for the same things c. They have endeavoured to feign new Words and call Health Pleasure Glory and other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Promota Assistants As if they should say that they were not really Good but such things as did approach the nearest to Vertue and lead us to that which is the chief and only Good The same Fancy they have had of Diseases and Pain they have named them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abducta remota As if they should say that they were things less Noble and separated from Vertue for when it concerns us to make a Choice those are preferred and these are forsaken This is their way of Discourse which I think not worth Answering any otherwise than as Cicero doth when he cries out O the great strength of Mind and the brave Subject to raise a new Doctrin O magnam vim ingenii causamque justam cur nova existeret disciplina The Stoicks argue and with their weak Reasonings would maintain That Pain is no Evil Concludunt ratiunculis Stoici cur dolor non sit malum c. As if Men were only troubled about the Word and not the Thing Wherefore must you Zeno deceive me with your subtil Niceties and new coin'd Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when you tell me that what looks grievous is no Evil you put me at a stand I would desire to know how that which seems to me most prejudicial and hurtful is no Evil in it self Nothing is Evil as you pretend but that which is Dishonest and Vicious These are but Words neither can you hereby remove the difficulty I understand very well that Pain and Grief are not criminal Evils You need not trouble your self to tell me that but shew me whether it be an indifferent thing to suffer Pain or to be free from it You say That it is indifferent as to the Happiness of Life seeing that consists in Vertue alone But in the mean while what you call Pain is to be reckoned amongst those things that you are to avoid and by consequence is an Evil. When you pretend that Pain is no real Evil but only something uneasie to be suffered c. It is to speak at large what all the World besides name in one word Evil. And when you say That there is nothing Good but what is Honest and nothing Evil but what is Dishonest it is to vanquish in Words but not in Sense it is to express Desires and prove Nothing Doubtless this is an undeniable Truth All that Nature hates ought to be esteem'd in the number of Evils and all that is grateful to it is to be reckoned on the contrary Whether at any time Pain ought to be preferr'd before Pleasure THE Second thing to be Examin'd before we conclude about Epicurus's Opinion is Whether we should sometimes avoid Pleasure to embrace Pain This Question depends very much upon the former for if any Pleasure offers it self of that sort which Plato calls Pure and disengaged from any mixture of Grief and Trouble that is to say such as is never to be succeeded by any future Pain neither in this Life nor in that which is to come or if any Pain offers it self such as may be stiled Pure and free from any Pleasure that is such as can never be supposed to yield any Satisfaction No Man can give any reason why such a Pleasure ought not to be accepted and such a Pain avoided But if any Pleasure offer it self which might hinder us from obtaining a greater or which will be attended by a Pain that may cause us to repent the suffering our selves to be drawn away to it or if a Pain offers it self which may turn away a greater or which may be followed by a Pleasure very great there is no Reason can persuade us the shunning such a Pleasure and embracing such a Pain Therefore Aristotle observes That Pleasure and Pain are the Criteria or distinguishing Marks by which we ought to judge whether any thing is to be accepted or avoided Now any Wise Man will decline Pleasure and embrace Pain if he sees that Repentance will follow or that by admitting a little Pain he may avoid a greater But Torquatus plainly clears the Doubt And to the end we may easily see from whence the Mistake arises among those who accuse Pleasure and approve of Pain I will briefly tell you how it is and expound unto you what that Author of Truth and Encourager of an happy Life hath said No Man despises hates or shuns Pleasure because it is
judgeth aright and without mistake There is no need of Reasoning and Disputing in these Cases or to seek for Causes why Pleasure is desirable and Pain to be avoided we our selves can as easily judge of this matter as of the Fire that it is Hot the Snow White and the Hony Sweet Maximus of Tyre teacheth the same Doctrin Pleasure says he more ancient than Reason or Art goes before Experience and stays not for Time But that violent desire we have for it and which is coaeval with our Bodies is as the foundation of the Creature 's well-being so that if we renounce it all that shall be born must immediately Perish Man after he comes to years may by Experience and Industry arrive to a competent degree of Knowledge Reason and Vnderstanding which is so much Extoll'd naturally and of his own accord but from his Infancy he loves Pleasure and avoids Pain without any help or Instruction for it is Pleasure that delighst him and Pain that annoys him If Pleasure were a thing of no value we should not bring it so early into the World with us nor would it be the first thing necessary for our Preservation But it is not necessary from what we have here said that you should conclude That Pleasure is Man's chief Good or Happiness for as Eudoxius says in Aristotle As in all things that which is desired is Good so that which is chiefly desired ought to be the chief Good or that which every thing desires is chiefly desirable therefore what every thing desires must be the chief Good but that is Pleasure therefore Pleasure is that chief Good Let us here now admire the Wisdom and Fore-sight of the Great Creator and Author of Nature That in regard all our Actions and Operations are of themselves painful and troublesom and these also as Aristotle terms them being Natural as Seeing Hearing c. He hath caused them all to be sweetned with Pleasure and the more necessary these Operations are for the preservation of our Species the greater Pleasure Nature hath allotted them otherwise all Creatures would neglect or forget not only the act of Generation but even Eating and Drinking it self if there were not certain natural Instigations that stir and move us and by causing some kind of Pain and Uneasiness minds us of the Action which the Pleasure that ought to appease this Pain and Uneasiness doth promote and encourage which is a manifest Proof that these sorts of Pleasures are not of themselves Evil tho' Men abuse them afterwards by Intemperance contrary to other Animals Neither is it requisite here to hint again that by the name of Pleasure we don't mean those gross sensual Pleasures of Luxury Effeminacy delicious Meats Revellings and the Debauchery of Women In short such as the Sages as Maximus observes exclaimed against styling them Sardanapali scilicet Luxus Medica mollities Ionicae deliciae Siculae mensae Sybariticae saltationes Corinthiae meretrices c. but generally all that we can call and is generally stiled by the name of Joy Pleasure Contentment Satisfaction Delight Sweetness Pleasantness a peacable State Quietude of Thought secure Tranquility c. which are nothing else but synonymous Names for Pleasure We must only here remember That what we have already observed is one of Aristotle's Principles That whatsoever we make choice of is always accompanied whith Pleasure And seeing there are three sorts of things named Good according to Vulgar Distinction the Honest the Useful and the Pleasant The latter is common to the rest for the Honest and the Useful seem to be also Pleasant and Grateful From hence therefore we may infer that Good and Pleasant are but different Names for the same thing and that Good is Good and described to be what all Creatures desire only because it is grateful and pleasing and by consequence that that Good which is pleasing is desired for the Pleasure it affords It remains that we next prove That the good things which are Honest and Useful are also desired for the Pleasure they yield That things Profitable and Vseful are sought after for the sake of Pleasure NOw there is no difficulty to prove that things Profitable and Useful relate to what is grateful or to the Pleasure which we receive from them For it is manifest That things Useful are not desired meerly because they are Useful but for something else which is either Pleasure it self or which relates to Pleasure As first in respect to Eating or Drinking soft Musick or sweet Perfumes and the like it is plain that we value them in respect of the Pleasure that attends them which may likewise be understood of divers Arts and Sciences as of Cookery Hunting Painting Physick Chirurgery c. which tend to free us from several Distempers from which to be delivered is very pleasing The same thing may be said of Navigation of Merchandise of War all which center in the getting of Mony or something like whereby we may attain to some Pleasure that we promise to our selves So when any one by hard Labour has acquired sufficient to purchase an Habitation Cloaths Medicines Books and the like Conveniences does not he promise to himself the Pleasure he shall enjoy when he shall have obtain'd these things and shall be able to subsist in Ease and Quiet for the future without any further Pains or Trouble to eat when he shall be an Hungred and drink when he is Thirsty or warm himself when Cold to be at leisure and satisfie his Curiosity when he shall desire it in short when he shall be in a condition to spend his days Comfortably Securely Honestly Honourably This is generally the aim of all the World of the Husband-man of the cheating Tradesman as Horace stiles him of the Soldier Merchant and Seaman The Soldier Fights the busy Tradesman Cheats And finds a thousand Tricks and choice Deceits The heavy Plough contents the labouring Hind The Merchant strives with ev'ry Tide and Wind And all this Toil to get vast heaps of Gold That they may live at Ease when they are Old This is the design of the Courtiers and of such as busy themselves in obtaining great Employments and high Offices they undergo many Labours make great Courtships suffer many Hardships and all for no other purpose but that they might at last as they pretend retreat in Peace and spend the remainder of their Lives to their own Content quietly and peaceably The most sordid and most covetous Misers propose to themselves the pleasure to look upon their Coffers full of Gold and Silver A sordid Churl the Jest of all the Place Thus comforted himself for his Disgrace The Lowsy Rabble Hiss me at the Play And Grin and make the greatest Farce of me But what care I when I can hug at home My strutting Bags and give my self an Humm Not to mention those who not understanding That Nature is satisfied with a little delight in Debauchery and Excess who by Rapine and
right Judgment we ought to have used the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which imports Commanding Of the Dispositions or Qualities needful for performing the Duties of Prudence THE Duties or the Acts of Prudence being such as we have already mentioned it is certain that some Dispositions Qualities or Faculties are requisite in the Soul for their due Execution These are properly the Faculties which are called Partes Integrantes and which are commonly comprehended under these general Terms of the recollecting of Things past the right understanding of Things present and the foresight or providing against Things to come For first it is plain that Prudence makes it absolutely necessary to call to Mind Things past for in the sequel of Affairs the Things that ought to be done hereafter have such a relation with what hath been already done that if we forget that which hath been done in the manner as it hath been done that accordingly we may effect what remains to be done it often happens either that that which is already done comes to nothing or that which is to be performed rarely succeeds but crosses our Expectation Besides our Judgments are to reason and judge according to our Knowledge neither can they conclude upon more certain Grounds than this That from like Causes probably may follow like Effects Now it is certain that to be able to make this Comparison of one Cause with another it is absolutely necessary to remember Things past Besides as it seldom or never happens that one thing is intirely like to another in all Circumstances we ought to have in our Mind and Memory several Occurrences which are truly alike in most Things and yet may be different as to other Circumstances that so in our Resolution we may have a regard to those Circumstances This caused Aristotle to say That young Men may propably attain the Art of Geometry and become Masters of such like Sciences but they cannot so easily attain to Prudence because this respects particular Things whereof the Knowledge is obtained only by Experience and Observation Wherefore Afranius says of Wisdom that Use had begotten her and Memory was her Mother Vsus me genuit Mater peperit Memoria 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant me Graij vos Sapientiam But this may properly be understood of Prudence as Ovid seems to imitate in these Verses where he brings in Pallas in the Habit of a grave Matron saying That Youth and even riper Years are ignorant of most Things which we ought to avoid and that a good and judicious Choice is not to be made but by a long tried and well season'd Experience non omnia grandior aetas Quae fugiamus habet seris venit usus ab annis It is likewise manifest that the understanding and knowledge of present Things is absolutely requisite and that to act prudently we must very well understand the nature the qualities and circumstances of our present Affairs For if it happens that for Example any be obliged to take a Resolution as we say upon a sudden How can that well be done if he knows not perfectly all the Circumstances of the Business so that he may run them over in a moment in his Thoughts if he sees not the Correspondency and Opposition that this Business hath with others and if he knows not what will follow from this rather than from that Suppose that he hath time to consider yet if he understands not the Nature the State and Circumstances of the thing he is considering of the Will or Ability of those who may be Assisting or Prejudicial to the executing of it what dependence it may have with Matters that may either retard or hinder it or if he knows not his own Strength or what he is able or not able to perform what good can such a one do and which way will he propose to succeed Let us therefore take it for granted that a Man is so much the more Prudent and more able to deliberate to judge well and execute accordingly the greater and more exact his Memory is of the time past for by that the greater and more exact will likewise his Knowledge be of things present Lastly All the World will acknowledge that the Fore-sight of things to come as far as we can search into and apprehend 'em is very requisite that if any Evil is impendent we may endeavour to avoid it and if any Good we may the better secure it and may so adapt the means to its proper end that all things may succeed well I say as far as Men are able to fore-see and apprehend for sometimes things so fall out that all human Art and Contrivance can no wise fore-see so that all our Imaginations have been deceiv'd and impos'd things falling out quite otherwise than we have supposed or our Reason could fore-see From hence we may conclude that our Prudence depends much upon Conjectures and admonishes us at the same time to remember our natural Weakness and to acknowledge that God only knows certainly what is to happen And here by the way we ought to take heed of being impos'd upon by Juglers and Fortune-tellers who take upon 'em to predict things to come Yet notwithstanding Prudence hath these three considerable Advantages First That tho' sometimes it is mistaken as namely when an Accident intervenes which it was not possible to fore-see yet it often attains its End whereas Imprudence is often deceiv'd and seldom or very rarely compasses its End except by Accident Secondly That a prudent Man considering the uncertainty of all things he proposes nothing so certain to himself as if it ought infallibly to fall out so that hereby he prepares against all Casualties that may happen contrary to his Expectation and by this means fore-sees as it were the Event by being fore-warned Thirdly Tho' Matters succeed to him contrary to his Contrivance and Fore-sight yet he never has just Cause to repent because he squares his Actions by the Rules of right Reason and therefore without some Casualty intervening which is out of the reach of human Fore-sight to prevent he could not rationally expect to be disappointed But on the other hand an imprudent Man is always wrack'd with Repentance because he finds that he hath neither foreseen nor prevented what he might have done but suffered such things to befall him which a cautious and timely Fore-sight in all likelihood might have prevented CHAP. III. Of private Prudence NOW to descend to the several Species or distinct Parts of Prudence we have already mentioned the ordinary Division of the Schoolmen who name five the Private which they also call Monastic or Solitary by which every one Governs and Rules his own proper Manners the Oeconomic by which every one Governs his Family the Politic which they ascribe to Subjects when they behave themselves conformable to the Laws of the Society the Military by which an Army is Governed the Regal by which a whole Nation is ruled But Aristotle whose
not how more Praised and Extolled than others Nevertheless he proves at large by many Examples and without forgetting his own That though Men put a higher esteem upon military Actions than upon Civil yet we must except against this Opinion for if we will Judge according to Truth there are many civil Actions far greater and nobler than the Military From whence we may conclude that tho those who behave themselves with Courage in War may be esteemed Brave and Excellent yet this Virtue of Fortitude resides not in them alone nor do they only deserve the Titles of Brave and Stout Now to treat of Fortitude contained within its just Limits two Things seem generally requisit The First That it be an invincible strength of Mind against all Things that may be difficult that is to say against such Evils as are difficult either to overcome or to undergo The Second That it be not rash or unadvised that it tends to a good End namely to the support of Honesty and Equity In relation to the First when I say that Fortitude is a certain strength of Mind doubtless we ought not hereby to understand that this Virtue consists as some vulgar People may imagine in the meer Strength and Vigour of Body for a Man of a weak and infirm Body may deserve the name of Brave if he designs the Justice of the Cause he undertakes and continues resolute and unshaken in his purpose not knowing how to yield nay tho he meet with ill Fortune if his Courage never fails but he proceeds on with the same Bravery and Resolution of Thought Much less do we suppose it consistent with a boasting and vain-glorious Humour too much incident to some Persons for if you remove this Ostentation which puts them in pursuit after a dim Light of Glory you will find them Mean Contemptible Cowards nay when it most concerns them to encounter with real Dangers they 'l draw back their Courage failing 'em and very often seek to save themselves by a shameful Flight Again when I say that it is a firm inflexible resolution of Mind I hereby observe that it ought to be such a firmness as ought never to yield but to continue so not only in respect of the greatness of the Labour and Danger but also in respect of its long continuance and repeated Endeavours I say that this strength or firmness of Mind is to encounter all Evils because this Virtue of its own Nature is as a Bulwark against all that is or appears to be Evil in our Life and that it properly hath no other Post assign'd but this I say moreover That the Evils that Fortitude designs to overcome are to be difficult for tho this Virtue may extend to light easy and common Ills yet it is very profitable to accustom our selves to encounter 'em and support our selves under 'em that we may thereby also the better begin to form an Habit for just as the Virtue of Temperance is not required that one should abstain from doating on an old wither'd Hag as it was objected to Crysippus so Fortitude appears not in little Evils but only in great and difficult such as is Death Pain Ignominy the loss of Friends or of Children Poverty Imprisonment Banishment and others that are able to terrify us at a distance or ready to overwhelm us when they draw near As to the Second thing requisite Fortitude would not be a Virtue if it were foolish and unconsiderate but it would be Rashness and as Aristotle terms it a certain Brutality or a brutish Effort opposite to this Virtue which is call'd Heroick and Divine which is nothing else but a kind of noble Courage and Bravery which gave the very Name to Heroes and caused their Deeds to be stiled Heroick Such therefore ought not to be esteemed Brave or Courageous who being carried by a blind Fury and trusting chiefly to their bodily Strength run headâ—ong upon any Undertaking and as if they had bid defiance to Dangers seem to fear nothing so much as to appear fearful of any thing But those are truly Brave who understanding Dangers neither loving them nor provoking them Indiscreetly behave themselves nevertheless with Courage as often as they ought and in that manner that they ought for Aristotle makes this Remark That a stout and brave Man is not he who fears nothing or is resolved to bear all Things or to undertake all Things but he who acts thus where he ought for the end and purpose that he ought when he ought and in that manner that he ought Qui quod oportet cujus causa quando quo modo oportet As therefore on the one Hand he opposeth to a brave Spirit the timerous Soul who for Fear undertakes not the thing that he should so on the other the Audacious and Rash for want of Fear or out of too much Confidence in himself undertakes what he ought not Not to say that according to his Opinion such may be termed Fools and mad Men who fear nothing neither Earthquakes nor Storms such as the Celtae were For there are some Things that are truly to be feared as Shame and Infamy which attends it for as he saith 't is Impudence not to fear them because Shame is an Evil. And as Seneca observes Fortitude is no inconsiderate Rashness nor a Love of Dangers but it is the knowledge how to distinguish what is or what is not Evil. It is always Watchful Constant Patient c. Neither would it be a Virtue as it is manifest if it did not propose Honesty and Justice for its End For that cause Aristotle will have a brave Man to be undaunted but still with an honest Intent And for the same Reason after he hath condemned those for Cowards and far from Brave who destroy themselves for fear of Poverty or for Love or Grief and after he hath declared that those may be esteemed Brave who being tempted by Rewards or frighted by Torments yet behave themselves resolutely which in some respect may be said of Soldiers who are reduced to the necessity of Fighting he saith That he who is truly Brave ought not to be obliged by Necessity but moved by Honesty We add particularly this word Equity because those who are commonly reputed Brave often abuse their Strength against the dictates of Justice and speak according this barbarous Dialect Power is above all Things the Right is in the Conqueror Hence it is that Plato judges Fortitude to be a kind of a Flux or Torrent against the endeavours of Unjustice and therefore blames Protagoras who esteemed those Men brave who were most Profane most Unjust most Intemperate and the greatest Fools because saith he we are not to judge of Fortitude by the Strength of the Body but by the Constancy of the Mind and by an end that is Honest and Praise-worthy in which Justice and Equity principally appear 'T is also to be observed That the Heroes have always been the Protectors of
that which provokes Appetite and makes it become greater than it would be naturally Therefore wise Men have fancied that it makes for our Health to give a check to our Appetite and stop betime And because some might object that other Animals that follow Nature and consequently never do ought in prejudice of their Health Eat and Drink till they be fully satisfied They answer That the Animals live upon Food purely natural and which never stirs up Hunger nor Thirst as that doth which Men make use of This is plain in Drink the most natural which is Water and that we drink with great Pleasure but as soon as the Thirst is allayed we have no more Inclination to it However 't is certain that no Person repents to have risen from Table without being fully satisfied but we have often been sorry to have filled our Stomachs so full that we were able to eat no more And doubtless it is not without Cause that Diogenes wonders that Men will eat for Pleasure and that they will not forbear Eating for the same Reason seeing there is so much Pleasure in being Healthy and free from Diseases and by this means will be ready the sooner to repeat the same Pleasure with the more delight and Satisfaction In relation to the Quality it seems also that then we have a regard to our Health when we shall nourish our selves with plain Food easy to be digested and which we know to be proper and convenient For this reason we see some Country-people who live upon nothing but Bread Fruits and Water and yet enjoy a perfect Health without any need of a Physitian Whereas those who feed at plentiful Tables have but a weak Body and are often forced to seek the assistance of the Physitian Therefore there have always been some Sects of wise Men such as Pythagoras who abstained from Eating the Flesh of living Creatures and contented themselves with the plain Products of Nature and have spent their Life in Health and Pleasure I shall not here repeat what we have said elsewhere that Flesh seems to be no natural Food for Mankind but as Custom hath made it so we should consider at least that the use of Flesh is so much the more Healthy the more plainly 't is prepared And that the Arts of Cooks of Confectioners and others who by their different Mixtures and Sauces do as it were change our very Food seem to have been intended for the destruction of the Health of Mankind Therefore we cannot but wonder why we should with so much earnestness prosecute such as Poison and yet hire and entertain the Contrivers of our dainty Dishes who by a deceitful Art destroy no less their Life and Health But how few are there that are not carried away by the deceitful Charms of a liquorish Tast and being bewitched with the present Pleasure never take heed nor apprehend the Mischiefs that follow What great Reason had Democritus to Laugh at those who make Vows to the Gods for their Health and yet by their debaucht and disorderly living undertake to ruin it daily 'T is a wonderful thing saith Diogenes That Men have so much care to cause their Bodies to be Embalmed after their Death and yet all their endeavours during Life is to become rotten Of Chastity in particular FInally in relation to Chastity I will only observe that whereas this Virtue is to struggle with the most violent of all the Passions unto which there is scarce any Body but submits I shall here mention Two or Three principal means that may serve as Bulworks to defend us from danger The First is a great Sobriety for it will be in vain to attempt to give a check to this unruly and imperious Appetite unless you carefully cherish this Virtue which tho encourged it you will still have great difficulty to overcome this Lust Long before Terence was heard of it hath been said That without Wine and good Cheer Love grows Cold. Which is easily to be made out for that which encourages Love and stirs up Lust is the increase of natural Seed which swells and moves in the Vessels excites Nature and obliges it to free it self from that which is troublesome to it Now as this increase proceeds from the quantity or quality of the Food if any Person be very temperate in his living and if he takes care to use no Meats that are too hot or fit to augment the Seed he will take away the Fewel and the Oil as I may so say which serves to increase and add Flame to this Fire Therefore those who profess a chast and continent Life ought not fully to satisfy themselves but as we have said before retain always a Stomach for more Citra satietatem vesci Their Virtue will not want a sufficient Reward for they will become stronger and more lusty because the ejection of the Seed diminishes the Strength and Spirits which is the cause why other Animals and even the very Trees the more fruitful they are the sooner they grow Old The Second Means is some honest Employ which may entertain and spend some of the Spirits that make the Seed to boil up and so give a diversion to the Thoughts For the Imagination which fixes upon the beloved Object and is not otherwise diverted is easily heated and from a little Spark kindles and becomes a great Flame Therefore we ought to take a strong Resolution to resist all base and dishonest Thoughts to avoid all occasions which might cause them to rise whether by the Sight or too intimate and private Discourses or by Reading or Touching or otherwise and if casually any doth arise not to give it time to take any deep root but to banish it at first and in so doing we discover our Manhood for the more you give way the greater will be the difficulty to stop your self in so slippery a Path So that there is nothing can be a greater Truth than what is commonly said That it is a kind of Combat where the Victory is not to be obtained but by flying away The Third is the custom of resisting and overcoming for as we become so much the more inclinable to Love the more easy and the more often we yield and submit to it so we become so much the more Continent the more courageously we resist and the less we are overcome by it I confess the violence of this Passion is great but it often happens that the weakness of our Spirit is such that at the first Assault we suffer our selves to be overcome You yield upon the first Assault without making any effort or exercising your Resolution in trying whether you might not have Strength enough to withstand the Temptation and so no wonder that the Passion triumphs and gets the Victory over your Reason But perhaps you will say I have already contracted an Habit. Well Why don't you endeavour by forbearance to destroy this Habit and to bring in a contrary For the thing
is not impossible if you will strive with all your Courage Learn by degrees to be Continent and if you cannot abstain one Day of two at least abstain one in a Week for by this means it will happen that in a little while you will attain three Days of Abstinence afterwards Six and after that you will be Conqueror during whole Weeks and Months But above all things remember that as it is almost impossible but that many things must intervene which may divert you from your Design so you ought to keep steady and fixt to your Resolution You must break through all Obstacles You must proceed still on and be continually going forward You must consider with your self that it is a great weakness to express so early a Repentance and being a Man as you are to shew nothing less than your Manhood Consider what a satisfaction you will have when the Fatigue will be over and that you shall find that you have got the Victory whereas if you suffer your self to be meanly overcome a troublesome and uneasy Repentance will attend you but otherwise you will applaud and approve of your Happiness when you shall have bravely obtained the Conquest You will also from thence receive new Strength to help you to overcome again in a like Temptation and if you continue you will find that by degrees you will alter the evil Habit that you will draw your self out of a cruel Bondage deliver your self from a base Tyranny and instead of a dark and clouded Spirit it will become clear and Serene instead of a feeble and diseased Body it will become strong and vigorous and instead of a languishing and short Life it will become healthy and long Not to mention here the loss of Reputation and Goods neither shall I instance in those other odious Mischiefs which are known to all the World I shall not here trouble my self to inform you That it is usual to subdivide these two kinds of Temperance each into two Parts so that they assign four parts commonly subject to Temperance whereof Two of them relate to the Tast namely Abstinence and Sobriety the First concerns our Eating the Second our Drinking and the other Two relate to Venery namely Chastity and Modesty The First concerns the Act it self and the Latter some Circumstances such as are Kisses Approaches Embraces Looks and Discourses c. I shall not insist here to prove that Modesty is either Chastity it self and principally that of Virginity which being once lost as the Poet saith can never be retrieved Nulla reparabilis arte Laesa Pudicitia est deperit illa semel Or if it be understood for that Virtue that gives a check to the Circumstances that we have named it ought not to be esteemed so much a part subject to Prudence as a potential part of Chastity I will only observe in relation to Modesty which is so called from the word Modest being a kind of a Guard to Chastity that tho Nature produces nothing whereof we ought to be ashamed as an obscene Thing and therefore among Nations who own no Obscenity neither in the Members of the Body nor in the Language or Names that are given to them for as to this we are to refer our selves to common Usage nevertheless among those People who do own any such thing we are to refrain from them and we are not to banish Modesty which obligeth us to forbear them for let it be either Nature or Law or Custom which makes things to be esteemed Brave Good or Honest 't is always Nature that commands them to be observed which is to be obeyed for the common Good in which the Happiness and Welfare of every private Person as due to him of common right is comprised Therefore Cicero discourses excellently well upon this Point We are not to hearken to the Cynicks who Laugh at us because we esteem things to be filthy and undecent in Words which are not really so indeed and on the contrary Things that are really Wicked and Dishonest we don't stick to mention by their proper Names As to Steal to Cheat to commit Whoredom which indeed is Vnjust and Dishonest and yet is spoken without any Obscenity To beget Children is an honest Act but yet to use the proper Term is Obscene and Immodest For our part let us follow the dictates of Nature and let us abstain from all that our Eyes or Ears cannot honestly endure let our Carriage our Gate our Sitting our Lying down our Countenance our Eyes and our Hands observe the Rules of Modesty And hear what he says in another Place After he had shewn that there is nothing more indecent and unbecoming than in serious and weighty Matters to mix loose and light Expressions Says he Thus Pericles treated the Poet Sophocles very wisely who while sitting upon the Bench with him in open Court espied a beautiful young Damsel pass by and not being able to contain himself cried out What a Beauty is there before us Pericles answered O Sophocles 't is becoming a Judge upon the Bench to be Modest and Grave not only in respect to his Hands but in respect to his Eyes also Of Mildness and Gentleness WE shall now speak something as to the other parts of Temperance which some name Subject Parts others Potential But Mildness seems truly to belong rather to Fortitude than to Temperance in that it relates to Truth which ariseth because of Pain and because it resides in that part of the Appetite which derives its name from Wrath namely in the irascible part therefore it seems to deserve to be plac'd under Fortitude Nevertheless as it is the property of Fortitude to raise and encourage and of Temperance to check and depress and that in respect of Wrath the Mind hath not so much need to be incited and stir'd up as to be curb'd and kept in for this reason it is commonly placed under Temperance However Aristotle teacheth That Mildness or Gentleness ought to be reckoned among the Virtues because 't is a Mediocrity or a Medium between two Extremes the one a Temper inclinable to Wrath as when a Man is either sooner or in a higher degree enraged than he ought against one who deserves it not or for some frivolous Causes The other a simple Meekness or want of Anger as when a Man is not angry when and against whom and for such Reasons as he ought to be angry for he declares that under certain Circumstances 't is not only lawful but also requisite and needful to be so and that because Nature it seems hath not only given Man an Inclination to Anger but also because that this Passion is as a Spur that stirs us up and encourages us to repel not only private Injuries but likewise puts us upon securing our selves against such publick Dangers and Calamities as may affect our Country Parents Relations c. and all good Men. By this means our private and publick Welfare is secured and maintained and
but be driven from what he is driven So that there remains nothing else for him to desire but that the Shapes of Things might come to him such as they ought to make them appear as really they are and that the Evil might not impose upon him under the disguise of Good nor the Good under that of Evil. He fancies further that certain Things seem truly to be in our Power seeing that we try that we advise and consult and that we freely chuse without constraint one thing before another But nevertheless that is nothing in reality because the occasion of the Consultation or the representation of several Things which make us almost equal and keep the Ballance steddy holding our Spirit in suspence cannot but be made to us because of the sequel of Things which proceeds from a higher Principle the Mind remaining in an uncertainty until the usefulness of the one appears to exceed that of the other and then the first usefulness draws and fixes it As if election were no other thing but a pursuance of what is best or of that which seems best and which is done without Constraint or without Aversion because we naturally love Good of our own accord and willingly seek after it So that in his Opinion Liberty is nothing else but Libentia Moreover he holds as all others do who are Defenders of this Doctrin of Fatality and namely Manilius viz. That to treat now of Fate or Destiny and to examine its Laws and Nature as we here at present do that this is according to the Laws and Course of Destiny Hoc quoque fatorum est legem perdiscere fati Hoc quoque fatale est sic ipsum expendere fatum Because if you suppose any kind of human Action he will have its nearest cause to have been so moved by some other going before and this by another and that other by one preceeding that and so on to Infinity that such a Series of Causes hath been appointed and that such and such Actions could not but follow Such as is saith Cicero the Desire of Ennius Would to God that never any Ax had out down those unhappy Trees of Pelion He might have taken his Rise a little higher in this manner Would to God that never any Trees had grown upon Mount Pelion nay further yet Would to God that Mount Pelion had never been and so by ascending still higher to wish That the Ship had never been made and that Medea had never departed from her own House Among those who have truly allowed of a natural Necessity but nevertheless not absolute and unavoidable the chief are Aristotle and Epicurus In respect of Aristotle he will have Destiny or fatal Necessity to be nothing else but Nature it self or if you please every Cause as it acts according to Nature or according to its natural Course As for Epicurus he was of the same Opinion as Aristotle and accordingly he took away the absolute and unavoidable necessity of Things but he hath this Conceit particularly to himself that he hath invented for that purpose another Hypothesis and hath fancied this long series of Causes or this mixture of Atoms mentioned before that there might be something to break off the necessity of Destiny and might preserve the liberty of the Will which he saith is free and not subject to the Fates Et fatis avolsa voluntas That is to say out of that sequel or series of Movements which according to Democritus follow one another by an absolute everlasting and unavoidable Necessity as if Experience and Reason had drawn this Truth from the Mouth of Epicurus contrary to his own Principles Besides did all Things move in a direct Line Did still one Motion to another joyn In certain order and no Seeds decline And make a Motion fit to dissipate The well-wrought Chain of Causes and strong Fate Whence comes that perfect freedom of the Mind Whence comes the Will so free so unconfin'd Above the power of Fate by which we go When ere we please and what we will we do But Democritus as Cicero hath afterwards done would but make a Jest of that Hypothesis or Supposition not only because 't is a meer Imagination but also because 't is of no use to Epicurus nor to his design for saith he This declining Motion of Atoms being as natural as the perpendicular all Things will be done always in the same manner as by Destiny seeing that which will happen will happen always by the same necessity according to the difference and diversity of the Causes of these Motions which follow one another as in a kind of Chain by a certain continued Series because he supposing the Spirit of Man to be corporeal or composed of Atoms as other Things are he draws it not out of that everlasting Chain of Motions which are of themselves natural and necessary as he makes all the Atoms generally to be It can never be saith Democritus to Epicurus That the Mind of Man can shew or exercise this Liberty by which he desires as suppose for instance an Apple He ought first to have the Idea or visible Shape of the Apple in his Imagination which Idea passing through his Eyes moves his Understanding to know the Apple And that the Apple may be able to transmit that Idea to the Eye it ought to be put into such a place by one who hath gathered it from the Tree or that he hath had elsewhere Now the Tree besides the Sun-beams the Moisture and the Earth which have made it grow ought to have had a Grain of Seed from whence it had its beginning This Grain must have proceeded from another Apple that Apple from another Tree which Tree was set in that place and in that time and not in another and thus going back to the very beginning of the World in which time the Earth and all Earthly Seeds were generated as he says from a general Meeting or Concourse of these Atoms which that they might be able to meet or gather together in such a place and in that manner ought to come from thence and not from any other place from that World and not from another and so of all the foregoing Eternity Besides if as he pretends the Spirit is made up of Atoms these Atoms ought to have been continued in the Seed of the Parents they ought to gather there together from certain Food from a certain Air from a certain Sun Such and such Food ought to have been taken and no other their Causes and all other Causes ought to have been so and to proceed from such Causes and from no other and so from all Eternity So that these Causes have from all Eternity been so bound to the other Causes that when these last have met together the Mind could not but desire and wish for this Apple This is what Cicero seems to have in his Fancy when he laughs at this Declension of Atoms as a thing altogether whymsical and
how two contrary Propositions which regard a future Contingency the one could be certainly true and the other infallibly false and that notwithstanding Man could continue his Free-will and be at liberty to make his Choice and of two Things proposed to do one or t' other tho' there could be but one determined to be done he therefore was of Opinion that there could be no Divination or certain Prediction in relation to things to come which were of themselves contingent And that therefore there was no Art to Divine nor any true Divination and if there were the things that were foretold and should come to pass would not be in our Power For if what were predicted were absolutely true and unquestionable it could not be otherwise but it must happen accordingly and consequently the contrary could not So that there would be a necessity for the doing one and no liberty left for the other But we have already proved that the Fore-knowledge and Fore-sight of God may very well agree with the Free-will of Man and therefore the Truth of the things which have been foretold by the Prophets inspired from above and contained in the Holy Scriptures remains entire Therefore we shall only mention that Divination which was so famous among the ancient Heathens Cicero saith that of all the Philosophers there is none that hath more despised and ridicul'd it than Epicurus Nihil tam ridet Epicurus quam praedictiones rerum futurarum And when he speaks of the Stoicks who were addicted to and protectors of this Opinion he says that he was sorry that those who were of his Sect had given occasion to the Epicureans to laugh at them Doleo Stoicos nostros Epicureis deridendi sui facultatem dedisse non enim ignoraes quam ista derideant And elsewhere he saith if we should give heed to those Discourses we should commit an Act of Superstition we should adore all those Sooth-sayers and Fortune-tellers Tanta imbueremur superstitione ut Haruspices Augures Harioli Conjectores nobis essent colendi Epicurus saith he again delivered us from all those Fears and set us at Liberty His terroribus ab Epicuro soluti fuerimus in libertatem vindicati c. Epicurus gave no Credit to Dreams as Eumolpus saith in Petronius This gives us to understand saith he that Epicurus was an excellent Man for he ridiculed all those sorts of Fooleries And Tertullian Vana in totum somnia Epicurus judicavit Cicero Insolenter credo ab Epicureo aliquo inductus disputat somniis credi non oportere He laughs in Lucretius for the Interpretation that was made of those Prodigies But not by reading Tuscan Books enquire The Gods Design by this celestial Fire He had no greater Opinion of the Oracles if we may credit Origen and Eusebius who inform us that Epicurus and all his Disciples laughed at ' em And Plutarch brings in a certain Boethian an Epicurean who found fault with the Verses of the Sybils as weak simple and senseless without quantity or measure and as having nothing Divine in them Tanquam principio truncos medio elumbes fine claudicantes c. and that the Style was so flat that there was no Poet that would offer to imitate them Besides the same Plutarch observes that Colotes suspected the Oracle of Apollo concerning Socrates And Lucretius commends Empedocles and other Philosophers for having given Answers savouring more of Sanctity and Certainty than those of the Delphick Oracle For some rare Inventions justly fam'd Which they have left as Oracles more sure Than from the Tripod spoke and less obscure Than those the Ancients from the Pythia heard And because Epicurus saw that commonly Men suffered themselves to be carried away with a persuasion that this kind of Divination was effected by the means of the Gods or of the Demons and that those who made Profession of this Art were as it were inspir'd with a Divine Fury when they were ready to prophecy or foretel future Events as may appear by these Verses Now to the Mouth they come Aloud she cries This is the time enquire your Destinies He comes behold the God! Greater than Human Kind she seem'd to look And with an Accent more than Mortal spoke When all the Gods came rushing on her Soul c. And as may be seen in that Passage of Apuleius where one may see the Relation of all those Fopperies of Antiquity which the common People received for Truths and the wiser for Cheats Among the Demons every one hath his distinct Office some have the care to adjust and interpret Dreams others to make certain Remarks on the Bowels of Beasts others to govern the flying of Birds and to teach them the augurial Notes or Chirpings others to inspire their Prophets others to manage the Thunderbolts and cause the Lightning to burst out of the Clouds and thus of other Circumstances by which we understand the things to come which depend only upon the Will and Power of the Celestial Divinities but are discovered to us by the Means Mediation and care of the Demons Thus by a Dream Hannibal was advertised of the loss of an Eye The Soothsayers were Impowered to foretel Flaminius the danger he was in of losing a Battle Accius might by a Miracle cut asunder a Whetstone with a Raizor that there might appear the signs of the alteration in the Royalty that an Eagle should continue over the Head of Tarquin to shadow him and that the Countenance of Servius Tullius should look as if inraged In a Word that all the Predictions of the Soothsayers the appearances of Lightnings and the Verses of the Sybils c. Because I say Epicurus saw that Men suffered themselves to be commonly imposed upon by these things which he look'd upon as childish and as most unreasonable he therefore denied the being of Spirits and fancied that all those Events were to be ascribed rather to Fortune or Chance than to any unknown Cause and the rather because if we should agree that there were any Demons we ought not therefore to believe that their Understanding is so large as to penetrate into things to come or to foresee and foretel the certainty of future Events By the same Reason he denied that Divination which they commonly proved by the things that these Spirits foretold when they appeared to Men for after that Brutus had discerned that famous Apparition of his Genius or Ghost to Cassius a Disciple of Epicurus answered him plainly You are deceived 't is not to be believed that there are any Spirits and if there were they cannot have any human Shape or Voice nor any thing answerable to our Senses Yet I would to God that these things were true that so we might not only rely upon our Arms our Troops and our strong Fleets at Sea but also upon the Succours and Supports of these Demons and Spirits we who are the Generals of so Holy and Religious a Party Now this Opinion of Epicurus ought not to
Matters and is if we may so say altogether in its own Power which happens as they say chiefly in Dreams or when we are ready to die and when it begins to free it self from the Clog of the Body for these be the very Words of Plato cited by Cicero Plato therefore appoints us to prepare and dispose in such a manner our Bodies for sleep that there may be nothing to cause a mistake or disturbance for this cause the Disciples of Pythagoras were forbidden to eat Beans because this Food causeth the the Stomach to swell and begets Wind and Vapors that disturb the Tranquility of the Mind when therefore in our sleep the Spirit is disengaged from these hindrances of the Body it calls to Mind the time past sees the present and foresees the time to come for the Body of a sleeping Person is like that of a dead Man but his Spirit is living and in its full Vigour But not to stay here to refute this Persuasion because 't is a meer Fable to say that our Souls are the Particles of the Divine Substance and that there are some who can Prophecy in their Madness in their Melancholy or in their Sleep Let us only conclude with Cicero's Words That 't is very absurd to believe that God sends Dreams for that they are incident not only to Men of Sense and Honour and Wisdom but even to Men of meanest and lowest Degree Of the Oracles LAstly for the Oracles and those Predictions that are ascribed to the Sybils and to the Prophets when they were possess'd with a divine Fury that disturb'd them caused their Colour and Countenance to change their Head and Breast to swell in such a manner that they were quite out of breath and as it were ready to expire as Virgil excellently represents it Thus while she laid And shivering at the sacred Entrance staid Her Colour chang'd her Face was not the same And hollow Groans from her deep Spirit came Her Hair stood up convulsive Rage possess'd Her trembling Limbs and heav'd her labouring Breast Greater than Human Kind she seem'd to look And with an Accent more than Mortal spoke Her staring Eyes with sparkling Fury roul When all the Gods came rushing on her Soul I shall not say that this kind of Fury seems not becoming the Divine Majesty and therefore Cicero hath great cause to speak of it in these words What Reason or Authority can you produce for this Divine Fury Can it be suppos'd that what a wise Man cannot foresee a Fool or a Man depriv'd of his Senses should be able to discover I shall only observe some Particulars that will discover to us the Vanity and Folly of the thing The first is the affectation of delivering their Oracles in Verse and not in Prose We have already observed that the Disciples of Epicurus made but a sport of those Verses as being ridiculous and unworthy of the Divinity In this manner Cicero speaks of them These Verses which they say the Sybil in her fury made and pronouc'd savour more of Cunning and Subtilty than of Transport and Disturbance of Mind for the Author who compos'd them hath artificially contrived that whatsoever happen'd it will seem to be thereby foretold for they express nothing precisely nor plainly neither of Men nor Times but have designedly made them obscure that they might seem at another time to be fit for other purposes all which does not denote a Person in furious Transports but one who is sensible and cautious of what he doth or saith The Second particular is this Amphibologia or manner of delivering these Oracles with a double Signification which Savours of a Subtilty that is no greater than what belongs to Man Besides among many of those who are most Famous there are several that are forged and invented meerly for Pleasure For Example in relation to these Craesus the Halys passing shall destroy A mighty Mass of Wealth Pyrrhus thy Force the Romans shall destroy Cicero informs us that the First was never given to Croesus and that Herodotus may have invented it of his own Head as Ennius contrived the latter And especially as to the latter for that it was certainly forged at pleasure and that it was never delivered to Pyrrhus because Apollo never spoke in Latin and that in the Days of Pyrrhus Apollo had left off making Verses The third particular is the Juggling or Forgeries related at large by Eusebius which prove that the Oracles were never delivered by the Gods or by the Demons but that they were contrived by cunning Knaves Cheats and Impostors as Lucian very well observed when he tells us by what means he himself discovered all the Subtilty by which the false Prophet Alexander had made himself so famous in the Oracle He saith moreover that this false Prophet hated very much the Christians and the Epicureans because they maintained that the Oracles were nothing but meer Lies In this manner Eusebius speaks of them They have among them Promoters and Ministers of their Cheats and Tricks who walk up and down and round about to inquire diligently and ask those who came for what purpose and upon what occasion every one comes to consult the Oracle They have in their Temples a great many dark Corners and Places to retreat and hide where the People are not to enter and where they place themselves to hear what is spoken without being seen So that the Darkness of the place the Precaution the Superstition of those that come and the Authority of the Ancients who have believed in these Oracles are of great use to 'em We might add also the Folly and Stupidity of the People who never try nor examin things and the Dexterity the Cunning and Subtilty of those who manage the Business and who promise to every one pleasing Things and entertain all the World with fair Hopes c. He relates afterwards their ambiguous manner of speaking their unusual and barbarous Words and the affected composure of their Expressions how often the Oracles have been proved guilty of Falshood and how often those who by their Advice have undertaken Wars and have met with very ill Success how many Persons they have deluded unto whom they promised Health and Prosperity And after his Conclusion from hence that they were no Gods but Impostors who uttered these Oracles he continues and goes on thus But why do you think it is that they thus court Strangers and give them such great Encouragments more than the Inhabitants of the Place who are their Friends or Fellow-Citizens unto whom they should consequently endeavour to render the Gods more Propitious than to others who are no ways related to them The Reason is plain for it is much more easy to deceive Strangers who understand not their Jugglings than Neighbours who are acquainted with all their slights and cunning This shews sufficiently that there is nothing here Divine nothing that is above the Reach and Contrivance of Man Afterwards he reckons
' em What Pleasure can there be in Life when Friendship is banished and what Friendship can there be among the Ungrateful This being granted we must consequently suppose Gratitude to be our chief Duty For tho he who gives pretends to nothing else than giving nevertheless he seems to expect that he who is thereby obliged should acknowledge the Favour and if he don't he will be unjust In Truth tho the Donor expects no reward yet he who receives the Kindness is not therefore free from the Ingagement that lies upon him to recompense his Benefactor by all good Offices Certainly if Hesiod will have us return as we say with Usury the Things that have only been lent us for a time With how much greater Reason saith Cicero ought we to be thankful when we have received more signal Obligations Ought we not to imitate those fruitful Fields that return much more than they receive And if we are Officious to them from whom we expect good Deeds how much more ought we to be to them who have already been kind to us and obliged us There are two sorts of Liberality the one is to give the other to restore 't is in our Power to give or not to give but not to restore is a thing not to be allowed of in an honest Man But suppose a Person is incapable you 'l say Seneca answers That he who is willing to return a good Deed does in effect do it for his good Will is a sufficient discharge of his Obligation He saith moreover That they who are obliged may not only equal but also surpass in good Will and Generosity those who give we may reward also the greatest Princes Lords and Kings either by affording to them faithful Counsel or by a constant attendance and by a pleasing Converse free from Flattery and yet delightful or by a serious Attention to what they propose when they consult about difficult Affairs or by a constant Fidelity when they intrust any Secret Propose the richest and the happiest Man in the World I will tell you what he wants viz. a cordial Friend to whom he may impart his most secret Thoughts Don't you perceive how great Men by confining the liberty of those who attend 'em and limiting their Trust to certain slavish Offices lose and cast themselves away because no Body about 'em dares freely impart their Thoughts either to incline them to what is for their advantage or to persuade them from what tends to their hurt There is no Mischief nor Calamity but they are liable to from the very Moment that they are barr'd from hearing the Truth You may ask What good you can do to a prosperous Person Persuade him not to trust to his Prosperity Will it not be a good Office that you do him when you shall cause him to quit this foolish Confidence and let him see that this Power that he has may not always continue the same And that the Things that Fortune bestows are flitting and inconstant oftner flying away faster than they come You don't understand the value and true worth of Friendship if you don't perceive that in bestowing a Friend you bestow the most excellent Gift the World can afford and who is never more useful and necessary than where all Things are in great plenty and abundance But not to insist longer upon this Aristotle offers two or three Questions upon this Point First Whether Beneficence is to be esteemed or valued according to the advantage of him who receives or according to the Liberality of him who bestows it He Answers That in the Kindnesses that are done for advantage and which are grounded upon Profit these are to be valued by the advantage of him who receives 'em because he is in want and he who does them performs 'em but upon Condition to have the same returned But in Friendships and Kindnesses that are established upon Virtue we must measure or compute the good Deed by the good Will of the Donor because where Virtue is concerned the intention is chiefly to be considered therefore whether any gives much or little the Gift or Kindness is to be esteem'd great for the great Affection or extraordinary good Will of the Party giving The Second Question Why those who give have a greater affection for the Party they give to than the other hath for the giver To this he Answers That the cause is not as some suppose for that the Donor is as the Creditor and the other as the Debtor and because the Debtor wishes for the Death of the Creditor but the Creditor the Life and Health of the Debtor but because the Benefactor is as the Artificer who loves more his own Works than they should be otherwise beloved again if they were alive which is to be seen among Poets who love the Offspring of their Brain as tenderly as the Offspring of their Body And they who receive a good Deed are as it were the handy Work of him who gives The Third Why there is no Law to indite an ungrateful Person This Crime says he which is universal is truly punished by none tho disapproved by all But as the valuation of an uncertain Thing would be very difficult we have only condemned it to an universal dislike and hatred leaving it among those Things which we have referred to the Justice and Vengeance of the Gods Besides 't is not convenient that all ungrateful Persons should be known lest the vast number of those who are stained with this Vice should lessen the Shame of the Crime and lastly 't is no small Punishment that an ungrateful Person dares not desire a good turn from another whom he has disobliged and that he is taken notice of and condemn'd by all the World As to what remains to be treated of here concerning Affability sweetness of Temper Civility and such like Virtues they may be sufficiently understood by what hath been mentioned already about Gentleness and Mildness We shall finish this Treatise with a Passage out of Seneca which contains the Sum of all moral Duties What do we do saith he what Precepts do we enjoyn What a small matter is this not to hurt him whom we ought to serve This is a worthy business indeed for a Man to be kind and loving to his Fellow-Creature Shall we make Laws for a Man to hold out his helping Hand to one Shipwreckt and ready to sink or to direct him that is wandring and hath lost his Way or to divide our Bread to him that perisheth for Hunger To what purpose is it to reckon at large what is to be done seeing I can comprehend the whole Duties of Mankind in few Words This great All which thou seest and which contains all Things divine and human is but One we are the Members of this great Body Nature hath made us all Related and a Kin by bringing us forth from the same Principles and of the same Elements 'T is Nature hath given us a mutual Affection