attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction Satisfaction These spiritual pleasures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul but also bring satisfaction Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires but never sil them with satisfaction they may slater and tickle the senses but never quiet the appetite the best they leave behind them is repentance This is wel explicated by Digby of the Soul pag. 460. The violence of fruition in those foul puddles of flesh and bloud presently glutteth with satietie and is attended with annoy and dislike and the often using and repeting it weareth away that edge of pleasure which only maketh it sweet and valuable even to them that set their hearts upon it and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation by a convenient hunger and abstinence Contrary in the Soul the greater and more violent the pleasure is the more intense and vehement the fruition is and the oftener it is repeted so much the greater appetite and desire we have to returne unto the same Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen but fil the Soul and crown its desires with satisfaction Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end where there is no rest there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction and where there is want there can be no rest every want wrings the Soul and keeps it in a restlesse condition So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good Thence Plato Conviv pag. 211. assures us That the contemplation of the first sincere most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction for they who arrive hereto are content to live alone in conversation with this first Beautie c. Of which see Philos General Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect 1. § 2. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodnesse in Conformitie to the Divine Law The measure of moral Goodnesse perfect The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good but the Moral Law Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule The Parts and Causes of moral Bonitie 1 The Mater Things indifferent in genere specie Nothing indifferent in individuo A virtuose Wil the Principe of Moral Good The best End essential to Moral Good The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives Forme How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al Moral Good There is no real moral or natural Good but what is supernatural Moral Good most difficult The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only The distribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice § 1. HAving dispatcht the generic Idea and last End The Moralitie of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics we now passe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts and their Bonitie And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege Volition Consultation and Election But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. § 24. we shal not here undertake the discussion of them As for the Moralitie of human Acts there are great disputes in the Scholes Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consiste Suarez in 1.2 which vulgarly they stile his Ethics Tract 3. Disp 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads 1 He makes the formal denomination or that forme whereby an Act is denominated moral to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed or a figment of mens minds something in or appendent to the things themselves This we grant 2 He thence deduceth That the Esse morale in the act of the Wil besides its Entitie and substance addes a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting and the Wil freely working This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction It 's true the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Wil as the subject of those Acts for al moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being As al moral capacitie is subjected in natural so al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto Thus Cyril Alexandr Compend Dialog de S. Trinit Tom. 5. part 1. pag. 673. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is holy by participation being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie that of it self existes primarily in proper nature namely as Man and Angel or any other rational Creature So Damascene Dialect cap. 59. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is first by nature which is inferred but infers not i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated but if there be human Nature it doth not necessarily follow that there must be Grace Thus the human Understanding and Wil precede Virtue as the subject thereof Yet hence it follows not as Suarez seems to conclude that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil. 3 Hence Suarez concludes that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsecally inherent in the moral act but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Wil and in the very act of the Wil besides its physic emanation from the Wil it speaks denomination from the reason directing and the Wil acting with a plenarie power Though as it has been granted al Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Wil as their main Principles yet it follows not hence that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of emanation May we not as wel argue that al virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts because they flow thence But there lies a mysterie in this Jesuitic Hypothesis which when laid open wil soon evidence its vanitie and falshood The Jesuites and some other Schole-men in imitation yet on mistaken grounds of the ancient Philosophers place the formal reason of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reason Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie formally considered to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil. But the falsitie hereof wil appear by what follows If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right Reason which he seems to make the measure of al Moralitie
〈◊〉 an habitation of a multitude of men using the same commun Decretes or Constitutions Also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a multitude of men which are under the same Law Whence it is added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Virtue of a Citie is the constitution of a right Politie Whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Politician or Statesman is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that understandes the constitution of a Citie or Republic Agreably to those Platonic Philosophemes Aristotle in his Politics 1. 5. makes a Citie to be a kind of animate or animal nature For look as an Animal rightly disposed according to nature is composed of certain proportionate parts mutually ordinate and communicating each to other as also to the whole their exercices and operations so in like manner a Citie when duely disposed and instituted is constituted of such proportionate parts for the mutual aide and assistance each of other And such as the comparation of an Animal and his parts is as to sanitie such is that of a Citie or Republic and its parts as to tranquillitie And what is sanitie according to the Philosophemes of the wisest Physiologistes but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Disposition or right Order of al parts in the Animal whereby they are capacitated perfectly to exert al exercitations and operations convenient to their nature according to which Analogie or proportion the Tranquillitie of a Citie or Republic is nothing else but its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order or right Disposition of al its parts counected together by some commun Law as Marsilius Patavinus that great Politician in his Defensor pacis cap. 2. pag. 6. has wel determined Cicero defines a Republic Rem populi the Affaire of the People and he desines the People a Societie of the multitude Populus coetus multitudinis juris consensu utilitatis communione sociatas Cic. consociated by the consent of Right and communion of Vtilitie i. e. according to our English Phraseologie The people are a Societis consociated by commun consent and according to some Law for public Good This Strabo also lib. 16. makes to be the origine and formal constitution of al ancient politic Societies as we shal shew § 5. on that head of Legislation A People is defined by Augustin de Civ Dei l. 19. c. 24. a Societie of the rational multitude consociated for concordant communion in those things they consent unto Which is by so much the better by how much the more they concord in what is best and by so much the worse by how much the more they concord in things that are worse And as the processe of Nature and Art is always from things lesse perfect to that which is more perfect so it hath been with al Societies which begin at first only with two Man and Woman Gen. 2.18 c. which Plato termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence this imperfect Societie extended it self to more perfect families and then domestic Societie extended it self to Pagus i. e. to the Societie of Villages for anciently Pagani were those in the same Pagus or Village who dranke of the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Dor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Societie of Villages at last extended it self to that of a Citie as this to that of a Republic as Aristot Polit. l. 1. c. 1. A Citie was at first instituted for the securitie preservation and wel-being of the whole Hence a Citie is defined by Augustin de Civit. lib. 15. cap. 8. A multitude of men collected together by some commun bond of Societie So also de Civit. Dei l. 1. c. 15. he saith A Citie is nothing else but a concord multitude of men Thence Grotius de Jure belli pag. 6. defines a Citie a companie of men consâ—ciated together for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie Wherein note 1 The generic Idea of a Citie which is a Companie or Communitie i. e. perfect for it is essential to a Citie both as to Mater and Forme that it be perfect It is perfect as to Mater in that it is composed of al manner of Artificers and Occupations necessary for the subsistence and welfare of a Communitie It is also perfect as to Forme as it has a perfect Order and Regiment for the conservation and gubernation thereof 2 Whence follows the formal constitution of a Citie which consistes in its regular consociation of which before 3 Thence also its End is for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie of which also in what precedes Touching a Citie its constitution and perfection see more fully that pious and great Reformer not only of Religion but also of Philosophie Savonarola Epit. Ethicae l. 10. § 5. Legislation its Origine Having hitherto discussed and explicated the essential Constitution of a Politie and politic Bodie we now passe on to the Empire thereof which consistes in Legislation and Administration or Jurisdiction That al politic Bodies are bounded and governed by Laws has been already proved § 2. And we find a clear account hereof in Strabo Geogr. l. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Men that are politic or civil do lead their lives after one commun Law appointing them what to do for otherwise that a multitude should without harmonie among themselves concur in the doing of one thing it is impossible Of what great use Laws are for the right ordering and governing Republics and al politic Bodies is wel laid down by Plato Protag pag. 326. where speaking of the Education of Youth he saith That after they depart from under their Preceptors the Republic compels them to learne the Laws and to live according thereunto a certain Formule being framed that so none act rashly according to their own wils but as Writing-masters prescribe such as begin to write certain half-letters and strokes of the pen thereby to forme their hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. So the Republic having framed a Formule of Laws invented by good and ancient Legislators according to their prescript compels both those that governe and those that are governed to act but if any transgresse their bounds him they punish which kind of punishment they cal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Correction 1. The necessitie of Laws Touching the Necessitie of Laws we have an excellent Disscourse in Plato Leg. 9 p. 874 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that Laws be framed for men that so they may live according to Laws for if they should live without these they would in nothing differ from the savage bestes The cause whereof is this because no mans ingenie is so framed by nature as that he should certainly know what conduceth to the commun utilitie of human life or if he should know what is best yet he is not always able or willing to act the same This grand reason of State inducing a necessitie of Laws he explicates in the
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
of what he has Man is then said to live when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought which sin deprives him of in that it makes him use things that are to be enjoyed and enjoy things that are to be used Thus it invertes the order of things Hence it was a commun Saying with Socrates as also the Stoics That al Vice is against Nature because human Nature as such was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End which state man by sin doth relinquish and so by consequence lose the right use of his Being Life Reason Wil Affections and al human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to human Nature 2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature Sins repugnant each to other but to themselves This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin for al moral Libertie implies Order Harmonie and Vniformitie which ariseth from Virtue but Lusts are extreme jarring dissonant and opposite each to other Oh! what strange discords confusions and seditions are there among lusts in the heart How is the heart distracted and as it were torne in pieces by them Lusts are extreme mutinous and lawlesse they keep no order Thence in sacred Philosophie it is said The corrupt mind cannot subject it self to the law of God Rom. 8.7 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 8.7 cannot keep the place order and ranke the Law of God has put the Soul into It alludes to Military order for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers Yea it 's added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither indeed can be namely because the Law is the rule of order but Lusts are al for disorder they disagree among themselves as wel as from the Law of God Lusts have no end bounds measure what is sin but a confused Chaos of al manner of disorders How do sensual passions fight not only against Gods Law but against each other And oh what a slavery ariseth herefrom Thence sinners are described Tit. 3.6 Tit. 3.6 Serving lusts and diverse pleasures These sinful pleasures are not only diverse as to Number but also as to Qualitie as different and opposite each to other Thence Jam. 4.1 Lusts are said to maintain an intestine war in mens Souls whence al externe wars and contests arise Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sedition of the Soul or Insurrection So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pag. 214. he makes al virtrose persons to be like each other and friends but as for profligate wicked men they differ as wel from themselves as each from other And in his Phaedo pag. 92. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al sin is ful of discord but virtue is harmonious The reason of this Discord and Repugnance among lusts is this Al concord and agreament in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God who is the first Unitie so far as men depart from this prime Unitie so far they fal under confusion Nulla major poena nequitiae est quà m quod sibi suis displicet Sen. Epist difformitie and disorder And what greater punishment of sin is there than this that it is displeasing yea repugnant to it self How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for and then reassume what they relinquished What a conflict is there between avaricious and prodigal lusts But of this more in what follows 3. Sin most impotent and infirme Sin is the Disease of the Soul ful of impotence and infirmitie Al moral Libertie implies health vigor force and strength and wherein consistes the vigor and strength of any thing but in adherence to its first Principes The more any thing departes from Vnitie the more Division Contrarietie Dissolution and Infirmitie And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul Doth it not by departing from him depart from its first Unitie and strength O! then how impotent and infirme is sin This is every where intimated in sacred Philosophie Ezech. 16.30 So Ezech. 16.30 How weak is thy heart i.e. how sick faint and impotent by reason of lust Yet it follows Seing thou doest al these things the workes of an imperiose whorish woman She had potent imperiose lusts but a weak heart to resist tentations Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root which sheds its maligne influences on al our Affections and Actions Deut. 29.18 Thus Deut. 29.18 Apostasie is said to be a root bearing gal and bitternesse The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rendred Gal signifies a poisonous herbe and so it must be rendred here a root whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter Thence the LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 springing up in gal or poison and bitternesse For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both gal and poison answerable to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gal Act. 8.23 Peter alludes hereto Act. 8.23 where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature So Heb. 12.15 Heb. 12.15 Root of bitternesse i.e. poisonous root of sin Nothing so poisonous and killing as sin Whence sinners are said to be Jer. 17.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick even unto death So Esa 24.4 languisheth as a feeble crazy consumtive bodie as v. 5. Basil in Psal saith That men are rendred by Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without wound and blemish whence they become 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexpugnable and free as before Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul that which renders it most impotent and servile That sin is ful of impotence and infirmitie Plato once and again inculcates So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith An intemperate man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 weaker than himself whereas a temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more potent than himself i.e. than his sensual appetite Thus in his Timaeus pag. 86 87. he proves That the irregularitie of our affections is the worst disease So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he informes us That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things but good conserves and relieves And thence he concludes That a servile Sinner hath nothing sound Lastly Repub. 1. he saith Vnrighteousnesse is the disease of the Soul 4. Sin is the spot stain and defilement of the Soul Sin the defilement of the Soul and therefore the greatest servitude Virtue gives a Nitor Lustre Splendor Beautie and Glorie to the Soul but Sin is the Blot and blemish of human Nature indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin and sinful Idols Hence we find mention Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gillulim filthy Idols The word signifies both filth and Idols or sordid dunghil
that there is a God but yet he doth not regard human affaires or 2 if he doth regard them yet that he is easily reconciled by the prayers and sacrifices of men there have been some though not many who have been infected with these blasphemous sentiments of the Deitie Plato here as before in the beginning of this Dialogue pag. 885. mentions three sorts of Atheists which in his days diffused their venimous blasphemies against the Deitie 1 Such as denied the Existence of God 2 Such as held there was a God but yet denied his Providence and Governement of human affaires 3 Such as held Gods providence and observation of mens good and evil acts but yet withal denied the Justice of God in punishing sin affirming that God was easily reconciled by Prayers and Sacrifices Now Plato sets himself to refute each of these of which hereafter The last of these three kinds takes in practic Atheisme which is indeed of al the most pestiferous and diffusive For when men believe there is a God and that the World is governed by him yet then to thinke that he wil be pacified by their hypocritic and imperfect prayers and services is in Plato's estime an high piece of Blasphemie and practic Atheisme and therefore he spends much force of Argument to prove That the righteous God cannot be pacified by the services of the wicked Of which we shal discourse more fully in the Justice of God Plato Repub. 10. pag. 886. tels us That those who truely believe the Existence of God wil not indulge themselves in sin Whence the Stoics following Socrates held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every wicked man was an Atheist For they held there were two forts of Atheists 1 Such as were contrary to God 2 Such as despised God by disobeying his Laws c. And it was a great Saying of Picus Earle of Mirandula That there was but one thing in the World worse than a speculative Atheist and that was a practic Atheist The roots of practic Atheisme lie low as an insensible Spring and Principle which moves and workes al and yet is not discerned Some of the greatest Professors of a Deitie may be the greatest practic Atheists 3. In what follows Plato manifests a warme zele and passion against these Atheists and their Atheistic infusions as the peste of Families Republics yea of human Nature Thus Leg. 10. p. 890. having mentioned the opinion of some Atheists affirming The monstrose nature and pestiserous influences of Atheisme That the assertion of a Deitie was not from Nature but the politic constitution of Statesmen to keep men in awe he replies What a monstrose thing O my Hoste doest thou relate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and how great a peste which invades the minds of young men to the ruine and subversion of Republics and private Families Whereby he demonstrates that this prodigiose peste of Atheisme tends to the subversion of States Families Persons yea human Nature And we have a good observation to this purpose in Campanella Polit. cap. 8. When Sects of Philosophers or others shal turne to Atheisme the top of divine wrath and ruines of people are near for when th y are come to denie the Providence of God or the Immortalitie of the Soul things necessarily suffer a mutation or reformation because the bridle is taken off from mens consciences and they also are destroyed by impious Princes Yea formal Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature not only morally but physically as hereafter O! what a servile base thing is Atheisme How doth it bow down the Soul to the basest of conditions Doth it not expose a man to a miserable venture of al future miseries but strip him naked of al hopes of future happinesse Is not every Atheist divided against himself Do not those remains of light in Conscience and those secret fears of a Deitie war against his corrupt atheistic Ratiocinations Have not his irregular passions ful libertie to captivate him and tyrannise over him without check Yea doth he not bid farwel to his best being his first cause and last end Would it not be thought unnatural for the Plant to bid adieu unto its Mother-earth which bred and nursed it up or should the branch renounce and bid defiance to its root would not al condemne it of unnatural madnesse and ingratitude Did the Earth ever disclaim its dependence on the Sun for warme influences light and heat Was the stream ever so foolish as to bid farwel to its Fountain And yet is not this the case of every Atheist Doth he not disclaim his original Fountain Root Sun Parent and first Cause Alas how much doth he depose and forfeit his Reason yea human Nature What are al his atheistic Reasonments but assaults against himself endeavors to banish himself from himself O! what venimous poison doth Atheisme drop on human Nature It doth indeed commit a rape on humanitie and plunder it of its native glorie beautie dignitie and perfection it doth unhinge and separate man from his most laudable noble and best self it makes him a slave and vassal to Mater and Motion it robs not only his Creator of the workes of his hands but himself of human felicitie and tranquillitie yea it placeth man many degrees below the Brute animal which enjoys some happinesse in this present state whereas the Atheist can enjoy neither present contentment nor yet hopes of future blisse So repugnant is Atheisme to human Nature 4. The punishment of Atheisme Thence Plato procedes Leg. 10. pag. 890. to shew what should be the punishment of such Atheists He saith It belongs to the Magistrate to endeavor their conviction by reason and if they obstinately persevere to punish them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some by death others by stripes others by bonds others by infamie others by banishment others by miserable povertie And in the conclusion of this Discourse pag. 907. he sums up al thus We affirme therefore that those three things that were proposed by us namely that there is a God and that he takes care of althings and that he is not inclined by mens services beyond what is just and equal have been abundantly demonstrated And then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But for the contentions of wicked Atheistic men we have discoursed more vehemently and warmely of this mater Namely for this reason O Clinias we have used greater vehemence lest peradventure these profligate Atheists should by their disputations conceit themselves to have the better of us and thence to act althings according to the dictates of their lusts and belch forth their blasphemous atheistic opinions of God Wherefore to silence the madnesse of those Atheists we have used the greater vehemence And after al he establisheth this Law That if any speak or act any thing atheistically and impiously against God he be punished by the Magistrate If Plato were so zelose and warme against the Pagan semi-Atheists of his Age what vehemence and zele
Nature and not from free election there could nothing be contingent as Suarez and others prove But here occurs a knotty objection What indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God which is thus urged How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election when as they are the same with the Divine Essence and so attended with the same natural necessitie This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus That between the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination not of time but of nature But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates in what sense it may be said that God could before nil what he now wils It is manifest saith he that God could not either in regard of Time or Eternitie before nil privatively or positively what he now wils but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe not that it is really a power in God So Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis and at last concludes That the Wil of God as the first Cause of things may be said to be both necessary and contingent necessary as the same with the divine Essence and yet contingent as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. Disp 7. pag. 114. saith That we may conceive signum rationis a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future And Disput 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative Negative Indifference he makes to be that which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that or to act than not to act and in this regard addes he the divine Wil was before it determined to create the world in that signo rationis moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God Al these solutions are much of the same import and may be resolved into this That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence and so they are necessary or as they terminate on the Creatures and are the cause both of their futurition and existence and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason nature or causalitie in which they might not have been And this we stile Antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil but only a prioritie of Causalitie which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie 9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible Gods Wil irresistible This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philosophie So Esa 46.10 My counsel shal stand Esa 46.10 and I wil do al my pleasure The like we find in Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled Thus also Rom. 9.19 Who hath resisted his Wil By which the Apostle excludes al manner of resistence not only actual but also possible That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated 1 from Gods prime universal Causalitie God according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most soverain Cause and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of al second Causes which are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ministerial instrumental Causes of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who gives essence to althings Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing Now how is God the first universal cause of althings Is it not by his Divine Wil We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil he effectes and operates immediately by his wil without any distinct executive power as we shal prove anon 2 From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us Psal 115.3 Psal 115.3 and 135.5 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth So Psal 135.5 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human men wil what they can do but God can do what he wil because his wil is omnipotent If Gods wil were not Omnipotent he could not do whatever is possible for he workes althings by his wil neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed Omnipotent or Almighty but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect because its volition is its operation it s fiat is its factum esse its word its deed Thence that of Augustin Gods wil is most certain because most potent Of which see more fully Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 46 47. and Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. I wil not saith he have him for my God who is not Omnipotent in Acting who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do what he wils who hath not a wil universally efficacious infrustrable indefectible and necessary in causing yea whose wil is not to me necessitie 3 From the Beatitude of God Aristotle as reason assures us that al men do what they wil if they can because herein their Beatitude seems to consist So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And if he could and would he hath also done it for al when they can and wil act for there is no impediment Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition therefore what men desire they do if they can as Aristotle subnectes Hence the Divine wil if it could not do what it would it should not be blessed because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition So Bradwardine l. 2. c. 27. Yea I constantly and freely avouch I wil not have him for my God whose most blessed wil poor miserable sinful I can when I please pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie and subjugate c. 4 From the Infinitude of
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
Law of their natures apt to obey the first independent Cause namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect that implies not a contradiction albeit it may excede the natural capacitie force or efficace of their Beings So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God of which more anon Hence 4 every dependent Being is contingent For whatever has any passive or obediential power is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause to which it owes absolute obedience even to annihilation Hence 5 every dependent Being is defectible For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible The supreme God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-being and self-sufficient a pure simple Act without the least mater or passive power it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing but every Creature being Ens or Being by participation and so composed of Something and Nothing or of Act and Pfassive Power it cannot be but that it should be Defectible or apt to fail which is the root of its Dependence as it wil appear by the next Proposition § 4. The Origine of Dependence 1. Passive Power The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power which every Creature is invested with For the explication whereof we are to consider that all Creatures being educed by God out of Nothing stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being whose name is Exod. 3.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who is or according to Plato's Phraseologie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being yea more of Nothing than of Being which makes it obnoxious to Limitation Contingence Mutabilitie Defectibilitie and Dependence Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it Now al limits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence resulting therefrom whence Damascene addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Deitie only is impassible namely because exemt from Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic Natural or Obediential whereby it is limited and confined to such or such a degree of Entitie Existence and Operation For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind there is ever coarctation and confinement Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act who is void of al power and composition and therefore of al finitude and limitation But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing i.e. of Act and Power it 's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or Nothing and most of Entitie and Actualitie and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing and Passive Obediential power therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement So for al other Creatures which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie Passive Power and limitation of the Creature Hence 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings For al Creatures having been educed 2. The Dominion of God by the Omnipotent Power of God out of Nothing and invested only with a finite limited Being composed of Something and Nothing or Act and Passive Power hence it necessarily follows that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator and impedible according to his pleasure Where ever there is passive Power there is impedibilitie There is nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible but God who is Pure Act and Lord of all God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature for al uses that implie not a contradiction This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie as the first Cause of althings For no Dominion is complete and perfect unlesse it include a Power for al possible use May we estime that a perfect Dominion which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature Are not these two correlates And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God speak its absolute dependence on God Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exemted from his Absolute Dominion And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature but also al its operations for otherwise the Creature were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence as § 11 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God both as to its Essence Existence Activitie and Operation God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth yea reduce it to its first Nothing Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature as in what follows § 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause Every Creature Dependent For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hypothesis which I conceive al wil grant That it is impossible the same thing should be and not be This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus 1 Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion
Logic regardes Propositions or Judgements as it answers to the Second Operation of the Mind which consistes in a judgement of things by Affirming or denying the same For albeit the Mind may have a simple Idea or Notion of a thing by simple Apprehension yet it cannot make a Judgement thereof without Affirmation or Negation So that the proper object of this second part of Logic is to use Aristotles stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Complexe orations Notions or Ideas such as carrie with them an Affirmation or Negation Propositions in regard of their Species and Affections admit of various distributions 1 In regard of their Species or Kinds Propositions are distributed 1 into Simple and Composite A Simple Proposition is that which cannot be resolved into other Propositions The Simplicitie of a Proposition is taken from the Unitie of its Subject Predicate and Verbal Copule As A man is Rational A Composite Proposition is that which is composed of other Propositions conjoined The Principal of Composite Propositions are Hypothetic and Disjunctive The parts of an Hypothetic Proposition are copulated by the conditional particle If as If he be a man he is rational The first part is called the Antecedent the later the Consequent The Veritie of an Hypothetic Proposition consistes not in the truth of the Parts but in their Connexion If the condition be impossible an affirmative Hypothetic is equipollent to a simple Categoric Negative A Disjunctive Proposition is that which hath parts conjoined by a Disjunctive particle as Every Animal is either a Man or a Brute 2 Proposition as to its kind is divided into Pure and Modal 2 The Affections of Propositions are either Absolute or Relate Absolute Affections are Quantitie and Qualitie 1 A Proposition in regard of its Quantitie is either Vniversal Particular or Singular The notes of Quantitie regard the subject of Propositions which is either Vniversal or Singular If the subject be Universal and taken Universally i. e. in its utmost Latitude and Extension expressed by the note Al or No then the Proposition is Vniversal as Al men are rational If the subject be Universal but limited and confined by some note of Particularitie then the Proposition is Particular as Some men are learned If the subject be Singular then the Proposition is such as Plato was a Philosopher The Aristoteleans adde though without reason a fourth sort of Propositions which they cal Indefinite consisting of an Universal Subject without any note of Quantitie As Man is learned Virtue is beautiful But their mistake herein is obvious for if an Universal subject be found without restriction and limitation it must be taken Universally Whence the first Proposition Man is learned is false because al men are not so but the second Virtue is beautiful is true yet not indefinite but Universal because al Virtue is so 2 In regard of Qualitie a Proposition is Affirmative or Negative True or False A Proposition is true when it conjoins things to be conjoined or divides things to be divided A Proposition is false when it conjoins things to be divided or divides things to be conjoined The Relate Affections of a Proposition are Conversion Equipollence Subalternation and Opposition 3. Syllogisme and Discourse The third part of Logic is of Syllogismes answerable to the third operation of the Mind which is Ratiocination or Discourse That which induceth a Necessitie of Ratiocination and Argumentation is the Composition and Limitation of the human Intellect which cannot judge of the Veritie or Falsitie of a Proposition by the sole consideration of its Termes without assuming a middle Terme or Argument for the demonstration thereof A Syllogisme may be considered either in regard of its Composition and Constitution or in regard of its Division and Species In the Composition and Corstitution of a Syllogisme we may consider both its Mater and Forme 1. The Mater of a Syllogisme is either remote or proxime The Mater of a Syllogisme 1 The Remote mater of a Syllogisme is its three Terme two whereof are Extreme the other Middle The Predicate of the Question is always the Major Extreme because it is ever more Universal and Extensive than or equal to the Subject Hence the Subject of the Question is ever the Minor Extreme because lesse or not more extensive than the Predicate The Middle Terme is assumed as an Argument to prove the Question and is collated and compared both with the subject or minor extreme as also with the predicate and major extreme either separately as in simple Syllogismes or conjunctly as in composite This middle Terme is so termed not in regard of its Site but Office yet in the first Figure it is middle as wel in regard of Site as Office 2 The Proxime mater of a Syllogisme is its Propositions which in a simple perfect Syllogisme are three Major Minor and Conclusion The two first are usually termed the Premisses the last the Conclusion which is the same with the Question or Thesis to be demonstrated 2. The Forme of a Syllogisme The Forme of a Syllogisme consistes in the apt disposition of the Premisses so as the Conclusion may thence necessarily follow And because al kinds of Conclusions cannot be deduced from al kinds of Premisses hence Logicians prescribe certain general Rules for the regular deduction of Conclusions from their Premisses These Rules they bottome on certain Axiomes General Axiomes and Rules such as these 1 Particular Propositions are contained in the general of the same kind 2 A Proposition becomes Particular or Vniversal from the Particularitie or Vniversalitie of its Subject 3 The Predicate of an Affirmative Proposition having not greater Extension than its Subject is alwaies considered as taken Particularly because it is by accident that it is sometimes taken Vniversally 4 The Predicate of a negative Proposition is alwaies taken Vniversally From these Principes the following general Rules for the right constitution of simple Syllogismes as to their forme are deduced 1 From two particular Propositions nothing regularly can be concluded 2 From two Negatives nothing duely follows For two negative Propositions separate both Predicate and Subject from the middle terme 3 The middle terme must once at least either in the Major or Minor be taken Vniversally For if it may be taken twice Particularly it may be taken for diverse parts of the same whole whence the termes of the Conclusion can neither be rightly conjoined nor separated As Some Animal is a Man Some Animal is a Beste Therefore some Beste is a Man 4 The Conclusion ever follows the weaker Part. i. e. If any one Proposition be Particular or Negative the Conclusion also is Particular or Negative The reason is because the Premisses are the cause of the Conclusion now we al know that what infirmitie is in the cause follows also in the effect 5 The termes of a Conclusion may not be taken more Vniversally in the Conclusion than in the Premisses and the reason is manifest because
8. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 5. L. 3. c. 4. BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie Preface THE first Reformers of Philosophie Wiclef Wesselus Savonarola Picus Mirandula Lud. Vives Melanchton Stapulensis and Ramus 1. The Right Vse and Abuse of Platonic Philosophie 4. The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie 6. A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophie Philosophie Considered 1. Generally 1 in its Historie 2 In its generic Nature Cognition Which includes nine Intellectile Habits 3 In its Ends Adjuncts Differences Right Vse Abuse Parts and Characters c. 1. 2. Particularly 1. As Notional or Logic. Wherein consider 1 Its End the Refinement of the Intellect 3. 2 Its Parts touching 1 Simple Ideas or Notions both Objective and Subjective and these both first and second 4 5. 2 Propositions and Judgements 6. 3 Syllogisme and Discourse its Mater and Forme Figures and Modes 8 9. 4 Method which regardes the former three Parts 12. 2. Real Philosophie 13. 1 Natural Physiclogic and Mathematic Ib. 2 Moral Ethic or Private Oeconomic and Politic. Ib. 3 Metaphysic or Prime 14. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation MOral Philosophie its Genus Prudence 2 Prudence its Nature and Object Ib Its Offices and Parts 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4. The Subject of Prudence Conscience 5. The Law of Conscience Ib. Synteresis and Syneidfies what 6. The Rule of Purdence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 7. 1 Subjective right Reason Ib. 2 Objective right Reason 8. The Last End its influence in Morals 9 The last End as extensive as the First Principe and but one 10. The last End desired infinitely 11. God the Last End of al. 12. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie the Last End of Man 13 To adhere to God as our Last End speakes Perfection 14. The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib. 1 It 's the Idea of al Good 15. 2 It 's the Preme Beautle Ib. The Nature of Beaurie Explicated 16. The Soverain Beautie of God 17. 3 The chiefest good most proper 18. Vse and its Regulation Ib. What Temperance is 19. The Vtilitie of things in reference to their Last End 20. Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself 22. Intention of God as the Last End how it must be ever actual 23. Fruition its Difference from Vse 25. Al Fruition importes 1 Love 26. 2 Vnion and Possession 28. 3 Communion with the best Good 29. By Contemplation and Love 30. 4 Delectation and Joy 31. Which requires 1 a sweet Good 32. 2 Possession thereof 33. 3 Action thereon 34. Adjuncts of Delectation 1 Realitie 35. 2 Connaturalitie and Agreament 36. 3 Vniformitie and Harmonie 37. 4 Puritie 5 Force 39. 6 Infinitude without excesse 40. The Effects of Delectation 1 Amplitude Ib. 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 41. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie THE Moralitie of human Acts. 42. Moral Bonitie in Conformitie to the Divine Law 46. The measure of Moral Good Perfect 48. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Ib. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good 50. No human Law a perfect Rule Ib. The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good 51. Right Reason Objective Light 52. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule 54. The Parts and Causes of Moral Good 55. The Mater of Moral Good 56. Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie 57. No Action Indifferent in Individuo 58. A Virtuose Wil the Effective Principe of Moral Good 60. The best End Essential to Moral Good 62. The Forme of Moral Good in Conformitie to the Moral Law 63. How the Forme of Good Consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wel-doing Ib. How far Circumstances Moralise 64. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of Good 68. Al Good and Virtue Supernatural 69. The Difficultie of Moral Good 70. The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins 71. The Distribution of Virtue into Pietie and Justice 72. CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection 74. Moral Libertie as to State in Virtuose Habits 76. Virtue gives 1 Dominion 78. 2 Life Health Vigor and Force 79. 3 Amplitude and Enlargement 80. 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 82. 5 Beautie and Glorie 84. Moral Libertie as to Exercice 85. 1 Contemplation of God 86. 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 87. 3 Dependence on the first Cause 90. 4 Conformitie 1 To Gods Precept 93. 2 To his Providential Wil. 95. 5 The reference of althings unto God as the Last End 96. Moral Libertle of Exercice the highest demonstrated 1 From its Order 98. 2 From its Spontaneitie and Suavitie 99. 3 From its Vitalitie 101. 4 From its Amplitude 103. 5 From its Purgation of Sin Ib. 6 From its Stabilitie 104. 7 From its Improving Virtue 105. 8 From its Formal Beatitude 106. CHAP. IV. Of Sin and Moral Servitude SIN a Transgression of the Law 108. Sin as to its formal Reason Privative 110. The Causes of Sin 1 Mans Defectibilitie 111. 2 The Vitiositie of human nature 112. The Nature and Influence of Original Sin 114. 3 Practic Error 115. 4 Self-love 119. Sins of Ignorance Passion Wilful 121. The Moral Servitude of Sin 122. 1 Sin repugnant to human Nature 123. 1 As a Falling from God Ib. 2 As it strips of the Image of God 124. 3 As Enmitie against God 125. 4 As it divestes men of Humanitie 126. 2 Sins repugnant each to other 127. 3 Sin most Impotent 128. 4 Sin the defilement of the Soul 129. 5 Sin ful of Shame and Reproche 130. 6 Sin the Tyrannie of the Soul 132. 7 Sin ful of Penurie and Want 133. 8 Sin the Fetters of the Soul 134. 9 Sin Folie and Madnesse 135. 10 Sin makes Men Bestes 136. The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude 137. The Servitude of Sin 1 Voluntary Ib. 2 Necessary the Degrees and Kinds of this sinful Necessitie 138. 3 Infinite as to Number and Magnitude 141. 4 Penal with the Nature of Punishment 142. 5 Sin in it self the greatest Punishment 144. 6 Other Punishments of Sin 145. 1 Sin breeds Fear and Shame Ib. 2 Sin ful of Instabilitie 146. 3 Sin ful of Anxietie and Torment Ib. 4 Eternal Punishment of Sin 147. Sinners Dead in Sin 148. 1 The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyperbolic but Real 149. 2 No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Corrupt Nature 150. 3 The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Vniversal and Total 152. 4 Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue 153. 5 No Freewil in Nature to Moral Good 155. CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie its Essential Constitution and Administration POlitic Philosophie what 158. Politie its Forme in Order 159. The Object of Politie the Multitude or Communitie 161. God the Founder of al Polities 162. Man's
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
is not the last end the rule and measure of al order Is not every thing then rightly disposed when it is conveniently brought into a subordination to its last end Wherefore the contemplation of the last end is of greatest moment in Moral Philosophie And they say that Plato was the first that used the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this philosophic and strict Notion for Homer and other of the Ancients used the word to expresse an Effect in its accomplishment and perfection but Plato restrained it so as to signifie thereby a final Cause or that which is last in the series of things desired yet first in intention This Cicero interprets extreme last chiefest What force efficace and influence the last end has in Morals Plato frequently inculcates So in his Theaetetus he assures us That al Science is inutile yea noxious without the notice of the best End This last End he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal End of althings which Proclus cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the End of Ends. And for the more ful and clear explication of this last End its universal influence and excellence the following Propositions are diligently to be considered 1. Prop. It is necessarie that we constitute some last End as wel posititively as negatively in every Series of Actions This Hypothesis is wel argued by Suarez Metaph. Disput 24. Sect. 1. And the reason is most evident for look as in Descent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means we must necessarily at last stop in some one or more means which are first in execution though last in intention so in Ascent from the means to the end it is as necessary that we at last stop in some last end which is first in intention and last in execution Again as there is a subordination of second Causes to the first Cause so in like manner of inferior Ends to the last End For in Ends and those things that conduce thereto there cannot be a progresse into infinite but as there is a first means from whence the motion begins so there must be a last end in which it terminates In Ends there is a twofold order 1 of Intention 2 of Execution and in both orders there must be a first and a last That which is first in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe which moves the appetite and gives bounds to it and therefore can be no other than the last End that which is first in the order of Execution is the first means conducing to the last End So that a progresse into infinite is on neither part possible if there were not a last end nothing could be desired no action of the appetite could be terminated neither would the intention of the Agent ever cease if there were not a first means from whence the execution should begin no Agent could begin to worke c. 2. Prop. The last End of althings must be as extensive and ample as the first Principe or Cause Thus Plato de Leg. 4 p. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God as the old Tradition testifies having in himself the Principe and End and Medium of althings In which he plainly indigitates That God is the first Cause and last End of althings That the last End is as large as the first Principe is evident because the order of Ends must correspond and answer to the order of Agents as they who are under God ought not morally neither can they physically move but as dependent on the motion and concurse of God the first Cause so neither ought they to desire any thing under God but what may conduce to God as their last End Such as the Universalitie of the first Cause is in giving Being or Welbeing such is the Universalitie of the last End in requiring and calling for the emprovement of al. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his first Cause farther than his regresse thereto answers his progresse therefrom God as the first Principe gives Being and as the last End terminates and sixeth the Being conferred Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the first Cause must tend to him as his last End 3. Prop. The last End of althings can be but one This Hypothesis both Plato and Aristotle concord in And the reason is most apparent because althings desire their utmost perfection which consistes in their tendence to the most perfect Being Now the most perfect Being can be but one For if there should be more than one most perfect then the one would have somewhat which the other hath not and so neither would be most perfect Every good by the addition of some other good is made better and more perfect except the most simple and perfect Good by the participation whereof al other goods are made better Hence 4. Prop. Every man in every human Act virtually if not actually intends some last End This is manifest because in every human Act something is desired for it self which cannot be referred to any other thing and what is this but some last end Again man naturally desireth the complement of al good and albeit there may not be an actual elicite intention in every man as to his last end yet there is a natural propension thereto whence procede al Acts about particular goods 5. Prop. The last End is desired infinitely without end or termes Thence Aristotle following Plato herein in his Magn. Moral lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the last End thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The perfect End is that which being obtained we neither desire nor need any thing beyond it So the Stoics who were akin to the Platonists define the last End 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That for the sake of which al offices are performed but it for nothing else So that the last End gives termes and bounds to althings but admits no termes or measure As to take away the first Cause of our Being supposeth us not to be so to take away the last End supposeth a confused infinitie as to acting Therefore something must be simply desirable for it self and for no other For that which a man desireth in order to a further end the same he desireth in such a measure as is most conducible to that end but what he desireth for it self towards that his desire is infinite for the better it is the more desirable therefore if infinitely good infinitely desirable without termes or bounds The only measure of loving our last End is to love it without measure for the last End being the terme of the appetite it may not receive termes or limits from any other thing but by how much the more it is loved by so much the better is the love In althings appetible the last End gives measure but receives none because the proper reason of althings we desire is taken from the End Hence 6. Prop. The last End is the terme and measure of althings What
4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right
Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie Thus Seneca would needs persuade us That we have this merit of Nature that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al yea those that wil not follow yet see it And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them as the Rule of Moralitie The Schole-men also in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses I no way dout but hereafter to demonstrate Indeed al our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne dreaming tenebrous knowlege as Plato stiles it 2 That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonitie No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good is also evident because al human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to al the Causes and Principes of moral Goodnesse how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good What Restrictions Emendations and Alterations do they need What an infinite number of particular cases are there which no human Law can reach Wel therefore doth Androcles in Aristotle Reth l. 2. c. 25. informe us That al human Laws need another Law to correct them as fishes need salt to preserve them from putrefaction This corrective Law they terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equitie which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature as hereafter cap. 5. § 5. 4. The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law This Hypothesis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonstration 1 The Divine Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first essentially just and holy Being and therefore the first essential rule or measure of al Justice and Sanctitie 2 But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature he hath therefore given us a divine Law as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us 3 This Divine Law given us as the Rule of moral Bonitie was concreate and connatural as to Adam it being impressed and engraven on his nature and so needed not any further promulgation 4 Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam in his innocent state one and the same he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Dutie of man and so became a Law unto himself 5 But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature as to supernaturals and very far as to naturals and civils retaining only some fragments or broken notices our most benigne Lord out of his great clemence and pitie to lapsed man gave a new Edition of that natural Law and therein fresh notices of his soverain wil and pleasure touching mans dutie So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature albeit the subjective was lost in Adam Yea some Divines of great note conceive that those very commun natural Notions communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ Thus they interpret Joh. 1.9 of Christ's illightening every man Joh. 1.9 i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation And the reason seems demonstrative because our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation by which the whole World stands So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature by virtue of the first Covenant as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ The objective Light or Law of Nature is stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and its Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the knowen Duties i.e. by nature to which they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine namely Institutes or positive Commands of God For Jus naturale the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural but to positive Laws as Grotius hath wel observed Right Reason the objective Law of Nature 6 This objective Law of Nature in its second Edition as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen and that Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason was but an Imitamen hereof we now undertake to demonstrate He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is Right is the Royal Law 1 That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to me unquestionable and I think it wil clearly appear so to others by what follows 2 He saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law as Jam. 2.8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jam. 2.8 And why doth he terme it the Royal Law but because it was the supreme Law of God the King of Kings Thence Socrates addes We therefore rightly granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that this Law was the invention of Being it self or of the first independent Being For this generally he understands by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an operation against right Reason i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art 6. pag. 76. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And truly this to act according to right Reason is commun to al and let it be fixed as a Canon So again Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so as right Reason shal prescribe This right Reason he elsewhere termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal commun Law which al by nature are subject to So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art 3. pag. 69. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I say Law is either proper or commun proper or private Law is that written Law which belongs to particular Nations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature for there is a certain commun Just and unjust which al consent unto albeit there should be no societie or confederation of men This commun Law of Nature is the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
movetur It 's a great Saying of the Platonists That one free is moved from infinite to infinite upon infinite i.e. a virtuose man in al exercices of Virtue is moved 1 From God as the first Cause and original Spring 2 To God as the last End and infinite Good 3 Vpon or according to the infinite Wil and Law of God as the measure and rule of al his virtuose exercices Whence also they tel us That the motion of a free Soul is circular from God as the first Cause to God as the last End and by God and his divine Wil as the measure Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue So that it fals under no coarctation or confinement either in regard of Principe or End or Rule but partakes in its measure of that Amplitude which its Principe End and Rule rejoiceth in For such as a mans first Principe last End and Exemplar is such is he as to libertie or servitude Quantò finis altior tantò actus volunâ—â— est libeâ—â— By how much the more ample and sublime the end is by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement Whereas sin being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End puts fetters chains limits and confinement on the Soul 5. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations Affections and Motions Plato in his Timaeus 〈…〉 persuades us That the culture and cure of every thing consistes in giving it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 its proper diet and exercices and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies than to give it its proper virtuose exercices When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful than when it is most in virtuose exercitations Althings are purified by perfective fermentation and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections Thus Rom. 12.11 Rom. 12.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fermenting or boiling in spirit Syr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is spoken of boiling waters Job 41.22 So Job 30.27 LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 My bowels fermented or boiled The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices the more free they are to serve God and lesse obnoxious to the service of sin By how much the lesse we serve sin by so much the more free we are And who serve sin lesse than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices Plato Tim. pag. 89. tels us That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercice And doth not this hold true as to the Soul Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul What makes the fire to conserve it self in its puritie but its grand and perpetual activitie Doth not also the running stream keep it self pure whiles the standing Pool gathers mud Are althings in Nature purified by motion Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in aliquid tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium Aquin. and shal we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercices It 's true virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force as Physic purgeth out il humors but by the divine promisse concurrence and benediction By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto 6. Virtuose Exercices most stable and permanent Virtuose Exercices are most stable firme and permanent Therefore most free Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes much in the firmitude stabilitie and permanence of such exercices Whence Plato in his Cratylus pag. 415. derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is always in fluxe or motion whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facile and expedite progresse For saith he it always flows in an equal stable manner The Soul according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ever-moving Principe and therefore it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be always in action Now it is most certain that no acts of the Soul are more stable firme and permanent than virtuose acts Thus Arist Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtuose exercices are most permanent And he gives this reason of it Because blessed Souls live and dwel always in such Acts without tediousnesse or oblivion And Plato in his Cratylus tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul which obstructs al virtuose exercices The firmitie and stabilitie of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End and by how much the more the Soul departes from these by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God under al the vicissitudes and various changes of this World argues great moral libertie as to exercice and wherein consistes the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End if not in virtuose exercices 7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue Virtuose Exercices improve Virtue and so by consequence moral Libertie Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. assures us That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy they are rendred more infirme and impotent but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals as wel as Naturals Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous than virtuose exercices So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by labors and exercices And are not virtuose labors of al most nourishing and corroborative Thence saith Seneca Labor nourisheth generose minds O! Generosos animos labor nutrit Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse or twofold motion of the heart so is Virtue by its exercices It 's a trite Saying in the Scholes Cessation from acts diminish habits but continuance therein emproves the same It 's true there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits and virtuose which come by infusion because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts but given in by God of mere Grace God rewards virtuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue or Grace and that of mere Grace So Mat. 13.12 Mat. 13.12 For whosoever hath to him shal be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent but the employing using or occupying the same for it is a good Rule among Grammarians That Verbes which primarily signifie to have or possesse oft denote the using of what we have So here Hath notes to use occupie or traffic with what we have To such it shal be given and he shal have more abundance i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent be it natural or supernatural with much more in the same kind If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations he shal receive more in that kind if true moral supernatural Virtues his stock shal encrease in its kind Whence it follows But whosoever hath not i. e. employes not by exercice from him shal be taken away even that he hath i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither Yea virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper Heb. 12.11 12. Thus Heb. 12.11 Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous but grievous but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exercised as in the Gymnade whence it follows v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension firmitude strength It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor whereof the hand is the instrument Thence he addes and the feeble knees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the paralytic knees such as are as it were struck with a Palsie and therefore unapt for motion This later clause seems to refer to the Race which required the exercice of the knees as labor that of the hands 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in virtuose exercices because herein consistes formal Beatitude Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations Thus Plato in his Conviv pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consiste in contemplating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the most sincere uniforme divine Beautie c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus pag. 250. So Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude the exercice of the rational Soul according to the best and most perfect Virtue in the most perfect life And Cap. 8. he addes That to act wel and live wel makes man happy And the demonstration hereof is most evident For 1 Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes and therefore their perfection for every Forme Power or Habit is ordained to its act as to its perfection Whence Basil termes Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 completive or perfective of Nature Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues that formal Beatitude cannot consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in use and exercice For a man may possesse the chiefest good and have habitual likenesse thereto and yet not formally happy as virtuose men asleep 2 The more Virtue is in exercice the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act without the least habit or passive power either physic or metaphysic and therefore the more actuose Virtue is the more like it is to God 3 Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul as before Chap. 1. § 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie Yea we are herein assured that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude even in this life This seems the import of that Exhortation 1 Tim. 6.12 1 Tim. 6.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exercise thy self in that famose contest of Faith Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games specially that of the Race wherein they contended for a Crown Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lay hold of eternal life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 9.24 Phil. 3.12 in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race who when they came to the end thereof laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal Thus Christians by virtuose exercices lay hold on eternal life as the Crown at the end of their Race Thus he speaks of himself 2 Tim. 4.7 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 4.7 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest The double Article addes a great Emphase and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude Sin a Transgression of the Law Sin as to its formal reason privative The causes of Sin 1 Mans defectibilitie 2 The Vitiositie of human Nature 3 Practic Error 4 Self-love Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful The moral Servitude of Sin as 1 Repugnant to human Nature 2 Repugnant each to other 3 The Disease of the Soul 4 Defilement 5 Shame and Reproche 6 Tyrannie 7 Penurie 8 Captivitie 9 Folie and Madnesse 10 It makes men Brutes The Adjuncts of this Servitude It is 1 Voluntary 2 Necessary 3 Infinite 4 Most penal Sin the worst punishment Other punishments of Sin It brings 1 Fear and shame 2 Instabilitie 3 Anxietie 4 Eternal punishment Al naturally Slaves of Sin No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature Natural impotence to what is good No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie § 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good Virtue and Libertie we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil and that Servitude which attends it It 's a good Notion of Aristotle Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parallel opposites illustrate each other So in his Ethics l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary Which holds true here in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law Doth al moral Good consiste in conformitie to the moral divine Law What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law as 1 Joh. 3.4 That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie Thence Definit Platon pag. 416. 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
〈◊〉 that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome Hence it comes to passe that whiles we know nothing we thinke we know althings And are not those greatly to be pitied who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant Is any thing more worthy of compassion than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World And whence comes this proud affected ignorance but from mens not knowing God and themselves Is it not a strange thing that the Soul which knows althings else should be so ignorant of it self and of its Maker Thence Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 144. saith It is no wonder that they who are ignorant of God should account that which is worst best Whence he concludes That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil And as to the ignorance of our selves he openly affirmes Theaecet pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not i. e. ignorant by how much the lesse they thinke they are so And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and our selves is the root of al sin he further demonstrates Alcibiad 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance whereby a man thinkes he knows what indeed he is ignorant of And he subjoins the reason Those are left under error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who knowing nothing thinke they know every thing Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance Whence he concludes pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins and most opprobriose Lastly Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant we grossely erre Such a venimous maligne efficacious influence has proud conceited practic Error on al sin Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance practic Errors foment and maintain lusts The mind like a silk-worme lies intangled in those errors that came out of its own bowels when lust hath put out Reason it soon takes the Chair men of corrupt minds are men of sinful lives Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other whiles lust bribes conscience out of office it cooperates with sin Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors thereby to create its own chains and fetters a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie surely there is no dutie done by that man whose conscience doth not its dutie for there is nothing in man active for God when conscience is not first active It 's evident then that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin And as Plato so Aristotle his Scholar hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance and ignorant Sins A drunken man that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain and by this they are made unjust and wicked And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds 1 There is saith he an ignorance the cause of which is in our selves As when drunken men sin ignorantly which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse 2 There is an Ignorance of Right or Law when men are ignorant of their dutie which they ought to know 3 There is an ignorance from our own neglect which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided 4 There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sinning We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege the one universal the other particular a defect in either of these causeth sin Whence it follows that a man may have an universal knowlege that this or that is sinful in general and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege But now sithat universal knowlege though most certain is not so influential on our actions as particular because actions are about singulars hence it follows that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin than universal knowlege has to prevent it This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent or that which is consequent to the act Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil may be looked on as voluntary For what is involuntary if it arise from some precedent voluntary act it may be judged voluntary according to moral estimation As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard whose ignorance is voluntary because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle That those Acts whose Principe is in us may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us Lastly we may with Aristotle distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin and such as are cum ignorantia i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance but the later not because the ignorance is voluntary Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do as wil to do what they know Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto as oft as sensual passions prejudice or affected ignorance prevail So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin either because men do not practically consider al circumstances or if they do consider them yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion That this or that sinful Act is sweet or profitable A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises and yet dissent from the conclusion yea consent to a bad conclusion Lusts pervert Conscience and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts nor yet its lusts molest it There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart It 's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse to believe as
it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
5. They know not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This notes their ignorance of Right or Law Neither wil they understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this notes their oscitance and negligence in examining Causes and maters of Fact They walke in darkenesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This some understand of being blinded by private Affections and Bribes so that they cannot see what is just and equal according to Exod. 23.8 And thou shalt take no gift for the gift blindeth the wise and perverteth the words of the just Now by reason of these things he saith Al the foundations of the earth i. e. the Judaic State are out of course Which shews that injustice destroyes the very foundations of a Nation Thus Job 15.34 And fire shal consume the tabernacles of Briberie How much Justice is necessary to preserve States and commanded by God appears Deut. 16.18 And they shal judge the people with judgement of justice Deut. 16.18 i. e. with an equalitie towards al parties and in al maters So v. 20. Justice justice shalt thou follow i. e. al manner of justice v. 20. nothing but justice exactly diligently continually 2 The Office of a Magistrate must be administred with Temperance Temperance Thus Plato Repub. 3. pag. 403. We have said that the Keepers of the Laws or Magistrates be commanded that they altogether abhor Drunkennesse for it is lawful for any man to be drunke rather than for a Keeper And he gives this reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it is ridiculous that a Keeper should want a Keeper Meaning that a Drunkard wants a Keeper himself and therefore is not fit to be the Keeper of others Thus Solomons Mother Prov. 31.4 Prov. 31.4 It is not for Kings to drinke wine Hebr. it is not convenient for Kings to drinke wine i. e. a large quantitie of it which the Grecians terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a drinker of wine or one given to wine Whence Plato addes pag. 404. That the diet of the Magistrate ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simple not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with varietie of dainties which is most destructive to sanitie 3 Magistrates must administer their Office with moderation as to passions 3. Moderation and freedome from discords Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 378. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magistrates of the Citie ought to be possessed with this sentiment that it is the basest thing for them to contend by mutual discords How much irregular passions are unbecoming a Civil Magistrate is wel expressed by Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1. art 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is not lawful to pervert a Judge by provoking him to anger or to envie or to compassion for this is al one as if one about to use a rule should pervert the same 4 Clemence also ought to be illustrious in magistratic Administrations 4. Clemence Thence Plato Politicus pag. 274. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We said that a King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of Mankind and in this regard a God for mortal man Wherein he makes a Magistrate to be Gods Vicegerent and a Pastor of mankind which denotes his clemence Thence that of Seneca to Nero The clemence of a Magistrate workes a shame of sin in the Subjects that is the greatest punishment which comes from the mildest Magistrate c. 5 Magistrates ought to exercice their Office with Self-denial 5. Fidelitie c. Diligence Courage and Fidelitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 374. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ex quo se Caesar orbi terrarum dedicavit sibi cripuit Seneca By how much the greater the Office of Magistrates is doth it not require by so much the greater vacation and thence the greatest art and diligence How much sloth and negligence is unworthy of a Civil Magistrate we are assured by Homer Iliad 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It becomes not a Magistrate to sleep swectly the whole night to whom the people and so great cares are committed Again Plato Leg. 6. requires that a Judge be indued not only with judgement and prudence for the understanding of maters but also with fidelitie in and for the determination of them § 8. Having explicated the essential Constitution and Administration of Politie we now procede to the Vtilitie thereof The effects of Politie both good and bad as also to what is Conservative and Destructive thereto As for the Vtilitie of a good Politie we have it wel laid down by Plato in his Menexenus pag. 238. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Politie is the Nurse of men good truely of good men but bad of bad men And we are now to explicate that our Ancestors were educated in an excellent forme of Politie by the benefit whereof both those that now live have become good as also they which made a good end of their days He being about to describe the Politie of the Athenian Republic begins with a Preface touching the efficacious influence of good Politie to make men good as also of bad to render men bad Touching those things that are Preservative or Destructive of politic Bodies Plato has given us many Philosophemes Things destructive to Republics As for the Preservatives of a politic Bodie they are sufficiently evident in what precedes touching politic Constitution and Administration and they wil farther appear by shewing what things are destructive thereto 1. 1. Atheisme and carnal Politie As Religion is the main Foundation and Pillar of politic Societie so Atheisme and carnal Politie in subjecting Religion to private interest is that which brings ruine to the same What influence Atheisme has on the ruine of Republics Plato frequently inculcates particularly in his Leg. lib. 10. and elsewhere as hereafter when we come to discourse professedly of Atheisme B. 2. C. 1. S. 2. As more open Atheisme so carnal Politie in prostituting and subjecting Religion to private interest either of State or single persons is a great cause of ruine unto States This was that which brought ruine to the ten Tribes who after their revolt from Rehoboam and Judah being afraid lest that if the people should go up to worship God at Jerusalem they would again be thereby induced to returne to their old Allegeance they upon corrupt reasons of State erected Calves at Dan and Bethel hoping thereby to keep the people in obedience to Jeroboam who had usurped the Governement Now this their politic contrivement in making Religion to subserve their State-interest whereby they hoped to preserve their usurped Politie proved indeed the main cause of their destruction So sotish is the solie of those who endeavor by subjecting Religion to State-interest to secure themselves which is indeed the most compendiose way to State-ruine 2. 2. Luxurie and Idlenesse Another great cause of Ruine to politic Bodies is Luxurie Sensualitie and Idlenesse Plato assures us That Polities are composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of the manners of
has had no smal influence on Atheisme in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature or to the various modifications of mater or to some mundane Spirit exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece Democritus Epicurus c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie 3 Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme as Plato Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate telling us That young men by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other at last come to disbelieve every thing For Scepticisme naturally tends to Atheisme he that disputes every thing at length comes to believe nothing even in things divine 4 But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome when it became the Seat of State-policie For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only but also diffused it self throughout the European World Hence Machiavel that great secular Politician of Florence layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us some are so bold and daring as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it others by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives could with as much facilitie turne Atheists It is natural to carnal reason and policie to step up into the Throne of God and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4.30 Dan. 4.30 Is not this great Babylon that I have built i. e. by my wisdome and power c. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind Pride c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man This Plato has wel observed in the place fore-cited de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Atheists who opposed the existence and providence of God as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophistic spurious Philosophers Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist but a great deal cures him of Atheisme And indeed to speak the truth it is not Philosophie simply in it self but the infidelitie carnal reason and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists Psal 10.4 This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie as Psal 10.4 The wicked through the pride of his countenance The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through is causal denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme The countenance here is brought in not as the formal subject or proper seat but as the Index of his pride that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self though the proper subject of it be the heart Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the pride of his spirit Thence it follows wil not seek after God This notes his practic Atheisme founded in speculative Whence it follows al his thoughts are that there is no God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies mischievous thoughts politic designing imaginations The wicked through the pride of his heart is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God Thus Psal 14.1 Psal 14.1 The fool hath said in his heart there is no God The fool here is not such an one as wants reason but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme This I am bold to assert that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme which covers the face of this politic World is the carnal Reason Infidelitie and spiritual Pride of mens hearts not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith This is very clear because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way as any other of the simplest of men Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined Certainly this so great credulitie in things natural or politic is a sufficient demonstration that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith that makes men Atheists as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons which they idolise It is a thing most prodigiose that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations to believe yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheisme Threesorts of Atheisme but also of its kinds Thus de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age under the Symbol of a young man in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. My Son thou art yet young neither do I dout but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion Expect therefore I beseech thee that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment is indeed a point of the highest consequence namely that any one thinking rightly of God lives wel or il But first touching this mater I wil signifie to thee one great thing lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater and it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Not thou alone nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this Atheistic sentiment of God but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease And I wil tel thee what has happened to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 namely no one of them who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not hath persevered therein even unto old age We find a great instance hereof in Bion mentioned by Laertius in his Life who in his health said The Gods were nothing but being worne out by a long disease and fearing death he acknowleged their existence c. Plato addes As for the two other opinions about God namely 1
would he expresse against the bold daring Atheists of this Age O! what an ignoble base degenerate uncomfortable thing is Atheisme how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature Ought not the Atheist sooner to dout of his own being than God's For if he be God who made him must needs be Thence Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician composed a Treatise That Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature and is not to be found therein but that they who acknowlege not the true Deitie must necessarily feigne to themselves some false ones as it is mentioned in his Life pag. 71. In sum Atheisme is a proposition so disnatural monstrose and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man that notwithstanding the insolence vanitie and pride of Atheists who endeavor by violence to rase out al notices of a Deitie in their Conscience yet stil they give us some evidences of their fears that there is a Deitie by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities § 2. 1. Vniversal consent for the Existence of God Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheisme having been discussed we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God First That there is a God he demonstrates from the universal consent of al Times and Nations Thus Leg. 10. pag. 887. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But now giving credit to those Traditions which together with their milke they sucked in and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurses who made it their businesse to implant these sentiments on their minds c. Wherein he shews how those that denie the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradition which they sucked in with their mothers milke and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings as hereafter Yea he makes this Hypothesis That there is a God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-evidencing first Principe which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof because Nature it self instructes us therein it being that which the most prostigate men cannot rase out of their Souls Thence Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith That it never came into Controversie among the most of Grecians that there was a God And he gives this reason for it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The knowlege or notion of Gods Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us or engraven on our Natures We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument in Plato's own dialect thus Have not al mankind in al times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deitie Doth not al the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimonie for the existence of a Deitie What made the Egyptians Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multiplied Deities but a notion engraven on their Beings fomented by universal Tradition that there was some supreme Being they owed Hommage unto It 's true their Hommage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object but doth not the act sufficiently argue that they owned a Deitie albeit not the true God Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deitie Was there ever any Nation so barbarous as not to pay Hommage to some supreme Being Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World where professed Atheisme gained place or habitation Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men that God made the World and governes the same Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run not only through al Times Ages and Nations but even through the Principes of human Nature yea in the venes and bloud of men Wel then might Plato say That men sucked it in with their mothers milke So much for inartificial Argument 2. 2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie rationally from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause Thus in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever is produced it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause for it cannot be that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause Then in what follows 〈◊〉 proves the World was made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The World was made because it is seen and touched and has a bodie But it is clear that such things are produced c. Whence he concludes that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe Plato bottomes his demonstration on these two Hypotheses 1 That the World was made 2 That it was made by some precedent Cause 1 That the World was made and not eternal was an Hypothesis generally maintained by al the Philosophers before Aristotle who asserted That the first Mater was eternal and that on a mistaken Principe That nothing could be produced out of nothing But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal because it is sensible and corporeous and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause And his argument may in his own interrogatorie mode be thus improved If the World be eternal must it not also be immutable and invariable Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal For where there are generations and corruptions there must be causes and effects which implie prioritie and posterioritie for the cause naturally precedes the effect but can there be any prioritie and posterioritie in what is eternal If the World was from al eternitie must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been and eternally not have been Must not the present way of Generation and Corruption correspond with the World's Eternitie Doth not our reason yea commun sense assure us that the Worlds present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternitie Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive that one man should beget another successively from al Eternitie Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternitie implie a flat contradiction Moreover doth not generation and corruption suppose an inequal succession of ascent and descent and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being Again if there were an infinite succession of generations and corruptions how is it possible there should be any effect or issue for can there be an end where there is no beginning Against the Eternitie of the World see more largely Derodone L'Atheisme convaincu pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World the Sun Moon c. that it could not be eternal and thence makes good his Hypothesis that it was created by God See also Sr. Charles Wolseley's Vnreasonablenesse of Atheisme Edit 3. pag. 47-64 177. 2 Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause The World made by some prime Cause is That the World was made by some precedent Cause For saith he whatever is produced is produced by some Cause We see nothing but what is produced by somewhat else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels
us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
of our Understanding is mutable because dependent on externe objects and Mediums but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable and therefore the measure of al Truth as Aquinas wel notes This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God saith he by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings and al particles of time as they are most truely in himself for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant according to the manner of our human infirmitie but he understandes althings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Wil which represences althings uniformely and invariably As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens which should see by extramission and actively as God seeth it would then always see uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round and the same part now in the East and anon in the South and then in the West Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time with their distinct vicissitudes and successions without the least variation or succession because he sees althings not passively by species and impressions received from the things themselves but actively in his own Essence and Wil the active Principe of al. We poor mortals by reason of our infirmitie cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time always fluent and succeding each other and therefore we take the present instant which of al time is most actual and best known to us and make it the measure of past present and future time whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable but God who knows althings in his own Eternitie is not liable to such succession and mutation his Science being a pure necessary Act must needs be immutable and invariable albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods knowlege the primary object is the divine Essence which is immutable and therefore the divine Science such also Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known then it would be mutable as they are but not otherwise God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential wherefore 1 he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of 2 He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows 3 He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows 4 He cannot begin to know what he before knew not or not to know what before he knew because nothing begins to be future This immutabilitie of the divine Science as to things future arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil and not from any thing in the object is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates That the Causes Origines and Reasons of althings future though in themselves never so instable are most stable immutable necessary yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil whence also the Divine Science is most certain necessary and immutable This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future as before That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary so Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 39. pag. 130 140. Hence 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible 4. Divine Science most certain Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive and be deceived or to be ignorant of supreme Beings much lesse God The Science of God being necessary ad immutable it cannot but be most certain and infallible To know things certainly is to know them in their causes now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings he thence knows them perfectly Gods Science is as certain as the future events for where there is a determinate effect there must be a determinate cause and where the cause is determinate there the science also may be determinate The knowlege of things future in God is as certain as the knowlege of things present for every future compared to God the first Cause and his Science is necessary and necessarily future albeit as compared to the second causes some effects may be contingent or contingently future The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect namely the divine Essence it cannot but be most certain and infallible if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science how much more in divine Science which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light and most simple intuition contemplating every Being and Truth as it is in it self in the glasse of the divine Essence The divine Intellect sees althings as existent in themselves by the infinite light of the divine Essence and therefore most certainly and infallibly as Esa 40.13 14. Hence 5. The Dâ—â—â—â—e Science is absolute and independent not conditionate and dependent on any create Object Thus Plato 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-subsistent and independent as to al externe objects and condition For otherwise saith he God should not have a certain knowlege of and soverain dominion over human affaires It 's impossible that any effect should be or be understood as future in any case but dependently on its efficient cause Now what is the first and universal Essicient of al effects but the Decree of the divine Wil on which every effect dependes more than on its proxime cause Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects placed in such circumstances For al futures whether absolute or conditionate are known by God not from the determination of second causes but from the determinatin of the divine Wil which is the first Cause For whence springs the futurition of things but from the determination of the divine Wil And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the second CAuse And if so may we not then hence conclude that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the existence of or any conditions that belong to future objects If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent must not the divine Science which is identified therewith be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object can it be any other than conjectural Where any science dependes on its
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
God An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would nor forced to do what he would not a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent unless it has at least equal power How then is it possible that a poor infirme impotent Creature should resist the Divine Wil Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing being not to be hindred or frustrated any manner of way For who knows not that it altogether follows if God can do any thing and wil do it he doth it c. But of this more when we come to the Causalitie of God C 7. § 4. Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil Gods Wil 1. Decernent or preceptive we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Wil as has been demonstrated we may distribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehensions 1. into Decernent or Decretive and Legislative or Preceptive Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is usually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti and his Legislative Preceptive Wil Voluntas Signi This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophie for God is oft said in Scripture to wil things that are never offected as the salvation of Reprobates or the like which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Wil but may very wel of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this distinction we are to consider 1 That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly said to be his Wil but his voluntas signi or preceptive Wil is only equivocally or analogically and figuratively such Gods decretive Wil is the Divine essence decreeing althings and so properly and univocally stiled his Wil but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil 1 Metaphorically as Princes signifie their interne wil by their externe commands which are thence termed their Wil. 2 Metonymically as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleasure Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the wil of God as Sanderson De Obligat Conscient p. 132. Davenant against Hoard p. 392. and Ruiz prove Hence 2 Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are disparate or diverse but not opposite The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other but the wil decreeing and the wil commanding do not oppose each other because they are not ad idem the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law or the measure of his operation and permission but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law or the Rule of our operation and offices The Decree of God determines what he wil do or not do the Precept what we ought to do or not to do Gods Decernent Wil or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of al his actings towards the Creature but his Reveled Wil is the sole Rule Reason and Measure of al the Creatures actings towards him 3 The Decretive Wil of God is ever Absolute efficacious and particular but the preceptive wil of God is sometimes absolute sometimes conditionate sometimes universal sometimes particular sometimes efficacious and sometimes not 4 Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent called in Scripture his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good pleasure which is the measure of his own Affects and Effects But Gods preceptive wil is externe and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects but only of our Dutie 2. Gods secret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29 Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled which is much the same with the precedent mentioned Deut. 29.29 The secret things belong unto the Lord our God but things which are reveled unto us i. e. Gods secret Wil is the measure of his operation but his reveled wil of ours So Prov. 25.2 It 's the Glorie of God to concele a thing Gods wil is stiled secret 1 as the things he wils are unknown to us 2 as the causes and reasons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us 3 as it is as it were the Law Rule or measure of his Divine operations Gods reveled wil is so termed because it is his pleasure reveled either in his Word or Workes every act of Gods Providence shews somewhat of his Wil as wel as his Word 1 Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promissive or preceptive Reveled promisses are the measure of Gods Benefices towards us Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God 2 Gods reveled providential Wil is either directive or afflictive There is a conformitie which the rational Creature owes to each of these reveled wils of God To the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due to the promissive reveled wil there is an obedience of faith due to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission Resignation and Dependence due Lastly this reveled wil of God is never opposite to albeit it be oft diverse from his secret wil and the reason is because they are not about the same object Gods secret wil regards the events of things his reveled wil the duty of man either active or passive 3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Wil into Complacential Gods Wil Complacential Providential and Beneplacite Providential and Beneplacite 1 Gods Complacential Wil is his simple complacence in al the good Actions Habits and Events of men yea it extendes not only to moral but to natural goods as Gen. 1.31 There is a perpetual necessary volition in God which taketh pleasure in al good whether create or increate Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good This they cal Gods Love of simple complacence of which see Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 6. § 2. p. 38. and Disp 19. p. 214. 2 Gods Providential Wil is that whereby he is said to wil and intend an end when he in his providence either graciose or commun affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it As where God sends his Gospel he may be said really to intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent albeit they are not al saved because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same were they but really embraced and improved In this regard Davenant and others affirme that Christs death is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an universal remedie applicable to al and that God by his Voluntas Providentiae as Aquinas stiles it intended it as such This intention or wil of God
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the progenie of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
other executive power to execute its commands unlesse it be in such things as it cannot by it self reach but the Divine Omnipotent Wil reacheth althings therefore it can execute its own commands without the mediation of any executive power 2 The Efficacious Wil of God touching A. gives existence to A. otherwise the Efficacious Wil of God were impedible and so some one might resist his Wil. 3 Our Wil can by its mere volition produce some effects namely Habits it can also move other Powers by its Empire Therefore the Divine Wil can by its sole volition produce al effects Thus Augustin on Psal 144. With God to Wil in to do because althings receive Being from his Wil. The like Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings that the Lord hath willed he hath done and no man hath resisted his Wil he willed that althings were made and they were made and he wils that the world consistes and it consistes and al that he wils he can do and they are done From this Active Creation of the Divine Wil God is said by some to be a Creator from al Eternitie Thus Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. dist 28. q. 3. fol. 122. This denomination is not extrinsec but intrinsec to the Divine Essence and Wil. Hence Plato stiled the World in regard of this active Creation Eternal as it lay from al Eternitie in the Divine Wil and Ideas For the Active Efficience of the Divine Wil is every way sufficient to denominate the Passive Power of the World as creable 5. Passive Creation is something in the thing created not really Passive Creation a Mode of the thing Created but mentally or modally only distinct from it For the explication of this Proposition we are to note 1 That Passive Creation doth not so much regard God as the thing Created God in Creating the World was not reduced from Power to Act as al Creatures are when they act for Gods Active Efficience was as has been demonstrated from al Eternitie and no other than his Divine Wil neither was there at the passive Creation of the World any new act in God which was not before in him but there was an accession of an act or existence to the things Created which was not before whence by an extrinsec denomination God is said to be Creator at the passive Creation of things as by an intrinsec denomination he was Creator from al Eternitie in regard of his Active Efficience or Decree 2 Albeit we conceive and expresse Passive Creation under the notion of a mutation yet it is not properly such because al proper mutation implies a succession of one thing after another which Creation admits not being momentaneous and al at once without any terme from which or fluxe which al mutation includes 3 Some and those not vulgar Scholastics hold That passive Creation is no way really but only mentally distinct from the Creature So the Passive Creation of a Man is really and essentially the same with a Man Thus Ocham in Sent. 2. q. 9. and Greg. Ariminensis in Sent. 2. dist 1. q. 4 5. with the Nominals generally who presume that Action is not a middle thing between the Cause and Effect And their Arguments in this Case are not to be contemned for they prove it 1 From the special Reason of Creation which is not an Accident but the very substance or Essence of the thing Created for if it were some middle thing between God and the Creature distinct from both it must be a Creature and so the terme of some other Creation and this of some other which would open a door for a progresse into Infinite 2 From the Essential Reason of a Creature for Dependence on the first Cause is of the Essence of the Creature therefore it is in the Creature and not really distinct from it Now the prime and essential dependence of the Creature on the first Cause is Creation wherefore it can be no more distinguished from the Creature than the Essence of a thing is distinguished from it self That the Dependence of a Creature on its Creator is not distinct from its Essence they prove by many and strong Arguments of which hereafter C. 11. § 6. 4 Suarez Metaphys Disput 20. S. 5. p. 529. with others assert That Creation is somewhat in the thing Create not really distinct as a proper entitie yet ex natura rei as a mode thereof But this Controversie is not material neither doth it want an easie way of reconcilement for Suarez's modal distinction in effect as he limits it amounts to little more than a mental distinction at least that which they stile rationis ratiocinatae which has some foundation in the things distinguished However they both agree in this that Passive Creation is in the thing Created Hence it follows 6. That the Relation of the Creator to the Creature doth not-suppose any mutation in God For Creation may be considered either actively or passively if we consider it actively so it is attributed to God by an interne denomination it being the same with the Wil of God if we consider it passively so it is the same with or not really distinct from the Creature and ascribed or attributed to God only by an extrinsec denomination and relation which speaketh no mutation in God See what precedes of Gods Immutabilitie C. 4. § 1. § 2. The Providence of God demonstrated From the Creation of God we passe unto his Providence whereof we find Illustrious Ideas and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching the Divine Providence we shal give the mention thereof in the particular Ideas of Providence we shal here begin with Plato's demonstration of Gods Providence which he gives us largely De Leg. 10. p. 900 c. where he proposeth the blasphemous Antithesis of an Atheistic Spirit denying the Providence of God in this manner But thou indeed being carried away with a certain blind and rash madnesse because thou canst not belch forth thine Indignation against God himself neither can the venome of thine enraged Mind reach him therefore thou fallest into this Affection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That albeit thou grantest there is a God yet thou deniest that he takes care of Human Affaires This Antithesis which Epicurus afterward espoused Plato greatly opposeth as that which is most unworthy of the Divine Infinitely wise Bountiful and Soverain Being In the general he affirmes That it is not difficult to demonstrate this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Gods Providence is as wel occupied about the least as about the greatest and most excellent things But p. 901. he descendes to particular Arguments 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore whether it be God or whether it be Man that neglectes any affair is it not for one of those two causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Either because he conceives it no way refers to the whole if smal things are
which being cast out of the neast by their Parents and very much affected with hunger slie up and down the Air making loud cries Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41 Thus Aristotle and Elian tel us that the young Ravens are expelled from their neast by the old ones To this sense Vossius Mcy and others incline The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin as also by Bochart de Animal Tom. 2. p. 203 c. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions Job 39.39 Psal 34.10 and 104.21 both of which by reason of their vehement appetite and unskilfulnesse to acquire food suffer great hunger and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God 6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production as they refer both to God differ only mentally Conservation continued Creation Creation gives Being and Existence unto things Conservation Continuation in Being Something 's are conserved immediately by God becuase subject only to him as Spirits That the conservation of such differs only mentally from their Creation is evident Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means yet so as that God conserves them immediately in and by those means Now that the conservation of such things also as to Gods immediate conservative influxe differs not really but only mentally from thier first production is manifest because conservation as to God whether it be by means or without means is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Production not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation which is no other than his most simple volition but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold That Conservation is a continued Creation Which must not be understood of proper continuation but according to our manner of understanding or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible but Creation and Conservation are one indivisible act without any successive duration or real continuation as to God but only a most simple indivisible permanence as Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates Hence we may easily understand how Creation or the first production of things and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception and expression Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production nor to be Created in regard of their subsequent continuation For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced Creation includes a Novitie of Essence which conservation excludes and conservation includes precedent Existence which Creation excludes Nehem. 9.6 Thus Conservation is continued Creation as Nehem. 9.6 where God is said to preserve althings made by one and the same Act. John 5.17 So John 5.17 My Father hitherto worketh and I worke i. e. for the Conservation as wel as the first production of things neither are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God for the production and conservation of things 7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is various The Object of Divine Conservation Albeit the Conservation of God be in it self one simple Act not different from the first production of things save by some connotation only yet it admits various Objects and Effects 1 God conserves Individuals some to al Eternitie without the least corruption or alteration as Angels and Human Souls Other Individuals shal be conserved for ever yet not without some alteration and resinement as the celestial Bodies c. 2 Pet. 3.10 12. 2 Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserves in their Species and in the whole for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitution and Continuation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the whole Vniverse unto which there is more regard to be had than to any part albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species when they decay as to their individual Natures 3 God conserves also the vigor virtue and efficacitie of al second causes together with their Operations so long as they are existent CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin God the Supreme Gubernator The end of Divine Gubernation It s Order most perfect and immobile It hath the force of a Law Its use of means It s extent to althings Gods Gubernation as to Men particularly as to Sinners and Sin The Origine of Sin and its causes God not the Author of Sin How God is the cause of the material act of Sin How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permissive not merely Negative but Ordinative Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin § 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God Divine Gubernation we now descend to his Gubernation whereof we find illustrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great as it may appear in the particulars thereof I shal at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it Thus Plato Phileb p. 28. What O Protarchus may we determine that althings and this which is called the Vniverse are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason as Fortune wil Or rather on the contrary should we not affirme with our Ancestors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the eternal Mind and a certain admirable Wisdome ordering al in the most accurate manner doth governe He saith that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wisest manner and with the best order Thus also Iamblichus saith That the Egyptians when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship thereby signifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move governe and direct the Ship so doth God the world We find the same similitude used by Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 as before Hence this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence whereby he directes governes and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends in the most orderly manner This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be resolved into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator God the Supreme Gubernator Eccles 8.4 Soverain Gubernator and absolute
Divine Gubernation Doth not every one keep its ranke and slation performe its office and move most regularly according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it Thence it follows And calleth them al by name i. e. has an accurate knowlege of and command over al as a wise General that can cal al his Souldiers by name whose beck and nod every one obeys Such is the admirable Dexteritie and Domination of Divine Gubernation But whence springs al this that follows By the greatnesse of his might The magnitude of Divine Power is the cause of his admirable fixed Gubernation because he is omnipotent therefore it is impossible that he should fail in his Gubernation Thus it follows For that he is strong in power not one faileth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 faileth or is deprived i. e. of that fixed order and station which Divine Gubernation has allotted to it there is not one that detractes its office but al subserve the Divine order Thus Plato in his Phado p. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is the eternal Mind that disposeth althings in the best order and is the cause of al And thus I determined with my self if it be so that this gubernative dispositive Mind doth thus dispose althings then althings are placed in that station and ranke where they may be most rightly constituted The Stoics also as Laertius in Zeno assures us held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence which disposeth althings in the best manner This gubernative Providence as it includes a fixed order and series of causes and effects they called Fate which they made to be a connexe series of things or reason whereby the world was governed So Chrysippus said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of althings mutually following each other from al eternitie by an immutable and inviolable complication Whereby indeed they seem to understand no other than the series and order of Divine Gubernation decreed by God from al eternitie So Stobaeus in his Physics explicates their mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The reason of those things which are governed in the world by Providence And that this was the original import of the Stoic Fate we are assured by Seneca Minutins Faelix Lud. Vives and others Thus Robert Grosseteste that great Philosopher as wel as Divine in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie We must know saith he that Fate may be taken for Providence according to Boetius Lib. Consol Philos 4. who saith that Fate is the same with Providence yet they may admit different considerations because Providence is that Divine Reason in the Soverain of althings which disposeth althings but Fate is the disposition inherent in things mobile by which Providence knits them together in their proper orders In what follows he proves out of Cicero Boetius and others that Fate is really the same with Providence of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. § 5. Hence 4. None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernation Prop. No second cause can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation And the reason is evident because this Gubernation of God intrinsecally includes not only a prudent provision of the best means but an efficacious execution of them so as they shal infallibly reach their end It 's true wicked men oft do substract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of Gods preceptive Gubernation but yet they cannot totally withdraw themselves from the order of Gods providential Gubernation whiles they violate the moral and sacred order of Divine precepts do they not fal into the penal order of Divine punishments Yea oft do not those very means which they use to violate the Divine order Gen. 11.4 promove the same Thus Gen. 11.4 And they said Go to let us build us a citie and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven and let us make us a name lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth You see their designe in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God or to secure themselves against a dispersion and scattering and yet lo the wise Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel v. 8. which they intended as a means to prevent their dispersion the cause thereof as v. 8. So the Lord scattered them abroad c. And yet out of this very dispersion which they feared and felt Divine Gubernation brought another sacred order even for the peopling the whole Earth Thus the most unnatural confusions are ordered by Divine Gubernation the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may seem to obstruct or pul it down whiles men endeavor to escape one order of Divine Gubernation they fal into another 5. The Order of Gods Gubernation a Law Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation whereby althings are appointed and reduced to their end has the force and efficace of a Law Thence Plato termes this Order of Divine Gubernation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Adrastie i. e. Gods fixed Order So Pindar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Regal Law of althings i. e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has constituted for the Gubernation of althings This Law whereby Divine Gubernation orders and disposeth things as it refers to things inanimate and Brutes comprehendes in it al those Natural Instinctes Instigations Inclinations and Propensions whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and usages Do not things Natural which are not invested with rational notices or spontaneitie certainly observe some Laws and Dictates of Nature which you may assoon banish them from their Natures as divest them of Are not the several kinds of their Operations constantly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end albeit they know not what they do nor why Doth not the silly Bird curiosely frame its neast and the simple Bee its cel always after the same forme and figure and so in al other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes what a fixed Order is there agreable to the Law of their Beings And whence comes al this but from the infinite Wisdome and Gubernation of the Divine Mind who conductes things most irrational in the most intelligent prudent manner to their ends May we not then conclude that the Natural Generations and Operations of althings procede from that Universal Law engraven on their Beings whereby they are by the wise Conduct of Divine Gubernation directed to their respective Ends In sum this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation consistes 1 In the Natural Principes of things 2 In their Natural Inclinations 3 In al Natural Instinctes and Impulses of Nature 4 In their Obediential Capacities or Powers whereby they are ready to receive any
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
Human Wil as chap. 5. § 3. 3 Again if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurse of God it could also intend the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence 4 The Understanding cannot produce its act without Gods illumination therefore neither can the Wil its without Gods concurse See this more fully in Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. § 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes in this Part 4. C. 7. 9. § 12. Lastly Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural Creatural Dependence as to its parts is either Natural or Moral and Supernatural Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence conservation and operation Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals We find both these dependences conjoined in Man for he having a double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitude to God 1 as a Creature and 2 as a Rational Creature he hath also a double dependence on God Supernatural Dependence on Christ 1 Natural of which in what precedes 2 Moral and Supernatural And as in Naturals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting can do nothing without much lesse contrary to the efficace and concurse of their Superiors so also in Morals and Supernaturals Supernatural Elevation is the total next and formal Reason of acting supernaturally and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God its supernatural influencing cause by so much the more it partakes of his influence as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression God doth most potently and yet most sweetly influence the Affect Act and Effect of the virtuose Soul Phil. 2.13 Al effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infusions of God Yea the natural Wil by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence is elevated to act above Nature This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ as Mediator and Spring of al Grace is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 87.7 As wel the singers Psal 87.7 as players on instruments shal be there Al my springs are in thee Glassius renders the words thus And they shal sing as those that lead the Dances Al my springs are in thee The Psalmist having given us in the foregoing Verses a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reigne of the Messias on Mount Zion or in Evangelic Churches and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there he concludes with this as the burden of their Song Al my springs are in thee i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee O great Mediator Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence The New Creatures dependence on Christ for supernatural Grace is Vniversal Total Absolute and Immediate and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace For Habitual Grace 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace So John 1.16 And of his fulnesse have we al received Joh. 1.16 and Grace for Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies either the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon and then the sense is Grace upon Grace i. e. abundant Grace and that freely or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Christ and Nature received from Adam and then the meaning is this Grace for Grace i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust for there was no lust in his heart but what was communicated to his Posteritie so the Children of Christ the second Adam receive from him Grace for Grace i. e. al manner of habitual Graces answerable to those in his Human Nature This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also wel expressed by the Disciples Luk. 17.5 Luk. 17.5 And the Apostles said unto the Lord Encrease our Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adde Faith to us i. e. some additional degrees of Faith The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelitie and therefore now having by their frequent relapses gained some sense of their own insufficience they depend wholly on him for supplies their own impotence engageth them to depend on his Omnipotence Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invisible Root in Heaven and by Juices derived from a Principe above it self As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto and did not depend on his Creator so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it so long as it dependes on Christ 2. The New Creature has an Universal For Actual Grace Psal 141.8 Absolute Total and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Thus Psal 141.8 But mine eyes are unto thee O God the Lord in thee is my trust leave not my soul destitute Hebr. make not my soul naked or emty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to evacuate or make naked So the Targum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It notes his total dependence on god We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described Cant. 8.5 Who is this that cometh up from the Wildernesse leaning upon her Beloved Who is this i. e. this Woman or Church that cometh up out of the Wildernesse This shews her abandoning her own forces and strength Leaning or Cleaving to The Original word is no where else found in the Old Testament The LXX render it by a word that signifies confirming her self which denotes her dee sense of her own insufficience with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Christians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ and not on habitual Grace received from him Members and Branches live on life but the life of their Head and Root So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ as Paul Gal. 2.20 When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received than in dependence on Christ they soon fal into sin This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is wel illustrated Phil. 2.12 13. Phil. 2.12 Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling This fear and trembling doth not implie douting as the Papists would needs persuade us but a modest humble self-abasing sense of our own insufficience with an absolute dependence on Gos Al-sufficient Grace Thence it follows v. 13. For it 's God that worketh in you to wil and to do of his good pleasure This is a strong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine
ful and convictive demonstration and explication of the Necessitie and Nature of creatural Dependence we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Every Being dependent or independent Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent That this distribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commensurate is generally confessed by such as discourse of Metaphysics And for the demonstration and explication hereof we are to consider That a dependent Being and that on which it dependes do really differ in number And the reasons are demonstrative 1 Because nothing as such can be said to depend to itself 2 The dependent is in order of Nature at least posterior and inferior to that on which it dependes 3 Dependence importes subordination to that on which the dependence is Hence Divines say that the Son of God albeit he be as to Origine from the Father yet in as much as he partakes of the same Essence with the Father he cannot be said to be dependent on him For he being in the forme or Essence of God thought it not robberie to be equal with God Phil. 2.6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 2.6 here is generally rendred by al Rapine or Robberie and we may take it properly and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he did not unjustly assume or arrogate to himself this title and character of being equal with God For that is accounted Rapine or Robberie in a proper sense when any injuriosely assumes or takes to him that which belonges to another Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robberie against God by endeavoring or affecting an equalitie with God Thus also should a Creature affect or arrogate an independence either in Essence or Operation it may justly fal under the imputation of Robberie against God because it thereby equaliseth itself to God But our Lord Christ accounted it not robberie to be equal with God i. e. independent as God is For one person in the Trinitie is not essentially divided from the other but the Son is so generated by the Father as that he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another essence or thing albeit he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another person The Son has the same numeric independent Essence with the Father and the Spirit So that although one person be really distinct from the other yet this distinction being involved in one most simple Divine Essence it implies a contradiction to say one person dependes on the other which was the great error of Origene imbibed from Platonic Philosophie as before Ch. 6. § 4. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 8 9. § 2. One prime independent Being An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being essentially precedent to itself as the cause of its Being and Operation This Proposition may be demonstrated and explicated by its parts thus 1 There is one prime independent Being This is evident from the series of causes in which we find that althings obey the superior Power from which they derived their origine whence it necessarily follows that to prevent a progresse into infinite we stop in one prime supreme infinite Power which received no this Being from any other but is truely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being and Self-sufficient or Independent Again that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifest because where-ever there is Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence there must needs be Dependence But now al Beings except the first Cause admit Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence as to their Essence and therefore none but the first Being can be independent Hence it follows 2 That the first independent Being admits not any precedent Being as the cause of its Being For whatever presupposeth the efficience of some precedent cause supposeth also Participation Posterioritie and Inferioritie which the prime independent Being excludeth Whence also it follows 3 That the prime independent Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being or from himself When we say the prime independent Being is from himself it must not be understood positively as if he did effectively produce himself for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and impossible but negatively that he receives not his Being from any other Hence we conclude 4 That Independence is as essential to the first Being and Cause as Dependence is to second Beings and Causes As it is essential to the Creature to be defective indigent limited receptive and dependent so it is as essential to the Creator to be infinite alsufficient and without al deficience indigence and dependence either actual or possible Hence § 3. Dependent Being by participation c. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation finite potential contingent and defectible 1 Every dependent is Ens by participation For whatever is not Being by Essence and independently must necessarily be such by participation where there is not self-Being there must be a reception of Being from some other which connotes participation 2 Whatever is dependent is also finite and limited both in Being Virtue and Operation 1 Whatever is dependent is finite in Being because its Being is by participation and according to communication of the superior Cause 2 Every dependent is also finite in virtue and efficace For whatever is limited in its essence must necessarily also be limited in its virtue and efficace Hence 3 every dependent is also finite in its Operation For the sphere of Activitie cannot be larger than the sphere of Essence if the principe be limited the operation cannot but be limited 3 Whatever is dependent is also potential To explicate and demonstrate this Attribute of a dependent Being we must consider 1 that nothing is pure Act but the first most simple independent Being no Creature is pure Actualitie where there is dependence there is somewhat of Potentialitie or passive Power either physic or metaphysic Al mater hath a physic passive power or natural possibilitie of being corrupted Spirits have not a physic passive power or natural principe of corruption yet they have a met a physic passive power of being annihilated or cast back into their primitive nothing 2 Besides the natural power which a dependent Being has there is an obediential power appendent to its nature For the explication of which we are to know that it is essential to a create Being to be subject and subordinate to the first increate and independent Being so far as to obey it in receiving al impressions and acting under it whatsoever implies not a contradiction Hence the Scholes distribute the power of the second cause or dependent Beings into natural and obediential their natural power of receiving influences from the superior cause or acting is that which is appendent to their natures and whereby they naturally receive or act and produce effects proportionate to their natures But the obediential power of dependent Being is that whereby they are according to the
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause