alterd any condition or quality which I beleeve arises first from the causes which wee have long since run over that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune ruines as her wheele turnes I beleeve also that he proves the fortunate man whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the times and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ for we see that men in the things that induce them to the end which every one propounds to himselfe as glory and riches proceed therein diversly some with respects others more bold and rashly one with violence and th' other with cunning the one with patience th' other with its contrary and every one by severall ways may attaine thereto We see also two very respective â—nd wary men the one come to his purpose and th' other not and in like manner two equally prosper taking divers courses th' one being wary th' other headstrong which proceeds from nothing else but from the quality of the times which agree or not with their proceedings From hence arises that which I said that two working diversly produce the same effect and two equally working th' one attaines his end th' other not Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience times and affaires turne so favourably that the carriage of his businesse prove well hee prospers but if the times and affaires change he is ruind because he changes not his manner of proceeding nor is there any man so wise that can frame himselfe hereunto as well because he cannot go out of the way from that whereunto Nature inclines him as also for that one having alwayes prosperd walking such a way cannot be perswaded to leave it and therefore the respective and wary man when it is fit time for him to use violence and force knows not how to put it in practise whereupon hee is ruind but if he could change his disposition with the times and the affaires he should not change his fortune Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe Consider the first exploit he did at Bolonia even while John Bentivolio liv'd the Venetians were not well contented therewith the King of Spaine likewise with the French had treated of that enterprise and notwithstanding all this hee stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse personally undertook that expedition which action of his put in suspence and stopt Spaine and the Venitians those for feare and th 'others for desire to recover the Kingdome of Naples and on th' other part drew after him the King of France for that King seeing him already in motion and desiring to hold him his friend whereby to humble the Venetians thought he could no way deny him his souldiers without doing him an open injury Julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion which no other Pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done for if hee had expected to part from Rome with his conclusions settled and all his affaires ordered before hand as any other Pope would have done hee had never brought it to passe For the King of France would have devisd a thousand excuses and others would have put him in as many feares I will let passe his other actions for all of them were alike and all of them prov'd lucky to him and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary for had he litt upon such times afterwards that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects there had been his utter ruine for hee would never have left those wayes to which he had been naturally inclind I conclude then fortune varying and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes prove happy while these accord together and as they disagree prove unhappy and I think it true that it is better to be heady than wary because Fortune is a mistresse and it is necessary to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her and we see that she suffers her selfe rather to be masterd by those than by others that proceed coldly And therefore as a mistresse shee is a friend to young men because they are lesse respective more rough and command her with more boldnesse I have considered the 25 Chapter as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things The life of man is like a game at Tables skill availes much I grant but that 's not all play thy game well but that will not winne the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play Examine this play never so surely play never so probably unlesse the chance thou castest lead thee forward to advantage all hazards are losses and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap. 9. v. 11. The race is not to the swift nor the battell to the strong neither yet bread to the wise nor yet riches to men of understanding nor yet favour to men of skill but time and chance happeneth to them all Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivers in his books could not fence against the despight of Fortune as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke Nor that great example of policy Duke Valentine whom our Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master could so ruffle or forcc his mistresse Fortune that he could keep her in obedience Man can contribute no more to his actions than vertue and wisdome but the successe depends upon a power above Surely there is the finger of God or as Prov. the 16. v. 33. The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was not Josephs wisdom made all things thrive under his hand but because the Lord was with him and that which he did the Lord made it to prosper Gen. 39. Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes as that their effects prove answerable and sometimes that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes the successe returnes with such a supereminency of worth that it farr exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes CHAP XXVI An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians HAving then weigh'd all things above discoursd and devising with my selfe whether at this present in Italy the times might serve to honour a new Prince and whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valourous Prince to introduce such a forme that might doe honour to him and good to the whole generalty of the people in the countrey me thinks so many things concurre in favour of a new Prince that I know not
Francis Sforce or aâ— as members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the Prince thaâ— gaines it as the kingdome of Naples is to the King of Spain Thesâ— Dominions so gotten are accustomed either to live under â— Prince or to enjoy their liberty and are made conquest of eitheâ— with others forces or ones owne either by fortune or by valour CHAP. II. Of Hereditary Principalities I Will not here discourse of Republiques because I have otherâ— where treated of them at large I will apply my selfe only to a Principality and proceed whilâ— I weave this web by arguing thereupon how these Principalities can be governed and maintained I say then that in State of inheritance and accustomed to the bloud of their Princes there â—re far fewer difficulties to keep â—â—em than in the new for it sufâ—â—ces only not to transgresse the â—ourse his Ancestors took and so â—fterwards to temporize with â—hose accidents that can happen â—hat if such a Prince be but of orâ—inary industry he shall alwayes â—e able to maintain himselfe in â—is State unlesse by some extraordinary or excessive power he be â—eprived thereof and when he hath lost it upon the least sinister chance that befals the usurper he â—â—covers it again We have in Itaâ—â— the Duke of Ferrara for example thereof who was of ability to resist the Venetians in the yeer 84 â—nd to withstand Pope Julius in â—he tenth for no other reason than because he had of old continued in that rule for the natuâ—â—ll Prince hath fewer occasions and lesse heed to give offence whereupon of necessity he must â—e more beloved and unlesse it â—e that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred itâ— agreeable to reason that naturaâ—ly he should be well beloved bâ— his own subjects and in the antâ—quity and continuation of thâ— Dominion the remembrancâ— and occasions of innovations aâ— quite extinguished for evermoâ— one change leaves a kinde oâ— breach or dent to fasten the building of another CHAP. III. Of mixt Principalities BUt the difficulties consist iâ— the new Principality anâ— first if it be not all new but as member so that it may be termâ— altogether as mixt and the vâ—riations thereof proceed in thâ— first place from a naturall diffâ—culty which we commonly findâ— in all new Principalities for meâ— do willingly change their Lorâ— beleeving to better their conditâ—on and this beliefe causes theâ— to take armes against him thâ—â— rules over them whereby they deâ—â—ive themselves because they â—â—nde after by experience they â—ave made it worse which deâ—ends upon another naturall and â—rdinary necessity forcing him â—wayes to offend those whose â—rince he newly becomes as well â—y his souldiers he is put to enterâ—â—in upon them as by many other â—â—juries which a new conquest â—aws along with it in such manâ—er as thou findest all those thine â—â—emies whom thou hast endamâ—aged in the seizing of that Prinâ—â—pality and afterwards canst â—ot keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it for not being able to satisfie them accordâ—â—g to their expectations nor put 〈◊〉 practise strong remedies against â—â—em being obliged to them For â—â—wever one bee very well proâ—â—ded with strong armies yet hath 〈◊〉 alwayes need of the favour of â—e inhabitants in the countrey 〈◊〉 enter thereinto For these reaâ—â—ns Lewis the twelth King of France suddenly tooke Milan and as soone lost it and the firsâ— time Lodwick his owne forces served well enough to wrest it out oâ— his hands for those people thaâ— had opened him the gates finding themselves deceived of theiâ— opinion and of that future gooâ— which they had promised themselves could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them True it is that countreyes thaâ— have rebelled again the seconâ— time being recovered are hardâ— lost for their Lord taking occasion from their rebellion is lessâ— respective of persons but carâ— only to secure himselfe by punishing delinquents to clear all suspicions and to provide for himselfâ— where he thinks he is weakest sâ— that if to make France lose Milan the first time it was enougâ— for Duke Lodwick to make somâ— small stir only upon the confines yet afterwards before they coulâ— make him lose it the second timâ— they had neede of the whoâ—â— world together against him and â—â—at al his armies should be wasted â—nd driven out of Italy which â—roceeded from the forenamed â—auses however though both â—he first and second time it was â—aken from him The generall â—auses of the first we have treated â—f it remaines now that we see â—hose of the second and set down â—he remedies that he had or any â—ne else can have that should â—hance to be in those tearmes he was whereby he might be able â—o maintaine himselfe better in his conquest than the King of France did I say therefore that these States which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their Conquerour are either of the â—â—me Province and the same language or otherwise and when â—hey are it is very easie to hold â—hem especially when they are â—ot used to live free and to enjoy â—hem securely it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them For in other matters allowing them their ancient conditions and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them men ordinarily live quiet enough as we have seene that Burgundy did Britany Gascony and Normandy which so long time continued with France for however there be some difference of language betweene them yet can they easily comport one with another and whosoever makes the conquest of them meaning to hold them must have two regards the first that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished the other that he change nothing neither in their lawes nor taxes so that in a very short tâ—me they become one entire body with their ancient Principality But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language manners and orders here are the difficulties and here is there need of good fortune and great industry to maintain them and it would be one of the best â—nd liveliest remedies for the Conquerour to goe in person and dwell there this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable as the Turke hath done in Greece who among al the other courses taken by him for to hold that State had he not gone thither himselfe in person to dwell it had never beene possible for him to have kept it for abiâ—ing there he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings and â—orthwith can remedy them whereas being not there present â—hey are heard of when they are growne to some height and then â—s there no help for them Moreover the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thiâ—her the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince neere at hand whereupon have they more reason to love him if they meane to be good â—nd intending to doe otherwise â—o feare him and forrein Princes will be well
the Pope the Venetians the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and the Florentines These potentates took two things principally to their care the one that no forreiner should invade Italy the other that no one of them should inlarge their State They against whom this care was most taken were the Pope and the Venetians and to restraine the Venetians there needed the union of all the rest as it was in the defence of Ferrara and to keep the Pope low they servd themselves of the Barons of Rome who being devided into two factions the Orsini and Colonnesi there was alwayes occasion of offence between them who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope held the Popedome weak and feeble and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope as was Sextus yet either his fortune or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof for in ten yeers which time one with another the Popes ordinarily liv'd with much adoe could they bring low one of the factions And if as as wee may say one had near put out the Colonnesi there arose another enemy to the Orsini who made them grow againe so that there was never time quite to root them out This then was the cause why the Popes temporall power was of small esteeme in Italy There arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt who of all the Popes that ever were shewd what a Pope was able to doe with money and forces and hee effected by meanes of his instrument Duke Valentins and by the occasion of the French mens passage all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions but to make the Duke great yet what hee did turnd to the Churches advantage which after his death when the Duke was taken away was the heire of all his paines Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius and found the Church great having all Romania and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out and by Alexanders persecutions all their factions worne down hee found also the way open for the heaping up of monyes never practis'd before Alexanders time which things Julius not only follow'd but augmented and thought to make himselfe master of Bolonia and extinguish the Venetians and chase the French men out of Italy and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church and in no private regard hee kept also the factions of the Orsini and Colonnesi in the same State hee found them and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration yet two things have held them quiet the one the power of the Church which somewhat affrights them the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them nor shall these parties ever bee at rest while they have Cardinals because they nourish the factions both in Rome and abroad and and the Barons then are forc'd to undertake the defence of them and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons And now hath Pope Leo his Holinesse found the Popedome exceeding puissant of whome it is hop'd that if they amplifi'd it by armes hee by his goodnesse and infinite other vertues will much more advantage and dignifie it CHAP. XII How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercenary souldiers HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being and shewed the wayes whereby many have sought to gaine and hold them it remaines now that I speak in generall of the offences and defences that may chance in each of the forenamed We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid otherwise it must needs bee that hee goe to wrack The principall foundations that all States have as well new as old or mixt are good lawes and good armes and because there cannot bee good lawes where there are not good armes and where there are good armes there must needs be good lawes I will omit to discourse of the lawes and speak of armes I say then that the armes wherewithall a Prince defends his State either are his own or mercenary or auxiliary or mixt Those that are mercenary and auxiliary are unprofitable and dangerous and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes hee shall never be quiet nor secure because they are never well united ambitious and without discipline treacherous among their friends stout among their enemies cowardly they have no feare of God nor keep any faith with men and so long only deferre they the doing of mischiefe till the enemy comes to assayle thee and in time of peace thou art dispoyld by them in warre by thy â—lemies the reason hereof is beâ—ause they have no other love â—or other cause to keep them in â—he feild but only a smal stipend â—hich is not of force to make â—â—em willing to hazard their lives â—or thee they are willing indeed â—â—be thy souldiers til thou goest to â—â—ght but then they flye or run â—way which thing would cost â—ee but small paines to perswade â—r the ruine of Italy hath not had â—ny other cause now adayes than â—or that it hath these many yeers â—ely'd upon mercenary armes â—hich a good while since perhaps â—ay have done some man some â—â—rvice and among themselves â—â—ey may have been thought vaâ—â—ant but so soone as any forrein â—nemy appeard they quickly â—â—ewd what they were Whereâ—pon Charles the King of France â—ithout opposition made himself â—aster of all Italy and he that â—â—id that the cause thereof were â—ur faults said true but these were not those they beleevd but whaâ— I have told and because they were the Princes faults they alsâ— have suffered the punishment I will fuller shew the infelicity oâ— these armes The mercenary Captaines are either very able men or not if they bee thou canst noâ— repose any trust in them for they will alwayes aspire unto theiâ— owne proper advancements eitheir by suppressing of thee thaâ— art their Lord or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose but if the Captaine beâ— not valourous hee ordinarily ruines thee and in case it be answerd that whoever shall have armes in his hands whether mercenary or not will doe so I woulâ— reply that armes are to bee imployd either by a Prince or common-wealth The Prince oughâ— to goe in person and performâ— the office of a commander thâ— Republick is to send forth hâ— Citizens and when shee send forth one that proves not of abilities shee ought to change him â—hen and when hee does prove â—alourous to bridle him so
Bentivolii grand-father of this Anniball who now lives that was Prince in Bolonia being slaine by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him none of his race being left but this John who was then in swadling clouts presenty the people rose upon this murder and slew all the Canneschâ— which proceeded from the popular affection which the family of the Bentivolii held then in Bolonia which was so great that being there remain'd not any now Anniball was dead that was able to manage the State and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him and gave the government of their City to him which was rul'd by him untill John was of fit yeares to governe I conclude then that a Prince ought to make smal account of treasons whiles he hath the people to friend but if they be his enemies and hate him he may well feare every thing and every one And well orderd States and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence not to cause their great men to fall into desperation and to content the the people and so to maintaine them for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes is that of France and therein are found exceeding many good orders whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends of which the chiefe is the Parliament and the authority thereof for hee that founded that Kingdome knowing the great mens ambition and insolence and judgeing it necessary there should bee a bridle to curbe them and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones grounded upon feare intending to secure them would not lay this care wholly upon the King but take this trouble from him which hee might have with the great men in case hee favourd the Commonalty or with the Commonalty in case hee favourd the great men and thereupon set up a third judge which was that to the end it should keep under the great ones and favour the meaner sort without any imputation to the King It was not possible to take a better nor wiser course than this nor a surer way to secure the King and the Kingdome From whence we may drawe another conclusion worthie of note that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour Here againe I conclude that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility but not thereby to incurre the Commons hatred It would seem perhaps to many considering the life and death of many Romane Emperours that they were examples contrary to my opinion finding that some have liv'd worthily and shewd many rare vertues of the minde and yet have lost the Empire and been put to death by their owne subjects conspiring against them Intending then to answer these objections I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours declaring the occasions of their ruine not disagreeing from that which I have alleagd and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times and it shall suffice mee to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus who were Marcus and Commodus his sonne Pertinax Julian Severus Antonius Caracalla his sonne Macrinus Heliogabalus Alexander and Maximin And first it is to be noted that were in the other Principalities they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles and the insolence of the people the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers which was so hard a thing that it causd the ruine of many being hard to satisfy the souldiers and the people for the people love their quiet and therefore affect modest Princes and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage that is insolent cruell and plucking from every one which things they would have them exercise upon the people whereby they might bee able to double their stipends and satisfie their avarice and cruelty whence it proceeded that those Emperours who either by Nature or by Art had not such a reputation as therewith they could curbe the one and the other were alwayes ruind and the most of them specially those who as new men came to the principality finding the difficulty of those two different humours applyd themselves to content the souldiers making small account of wronging the people which was a course then necessary for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality and when they cannot attaine therunto they are to provide with all industry to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty And therefore those Emperours who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire had need of extraordinary favours more willingâ—y stuck to the souldiers than to the people which neverthelesse turnd to their advantage or otherwise according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them From these causes aforesayd proceeded it that Marcus Pertinax and Alexander though all living modestly being lovers of justice and enemies of cruelty courteous and bountifull had all from Marcus onward miserable ends Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured for hee came to the Empire by inheritance and was not to acknowledge it neither from the souldiers nor from the people afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues which made him venerable hee held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits and was never either hated or contemnd But Pertinax was created Emperour against the souldiers wills who being accustomd to live licentiously under Commodus could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to Whereupon having gotten himself hatred and to this hatred added contempt in that hee was old was ruind in the very beginning of his government Whence it ought to be observed that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad and therefore as I formerly said when a Prince would maintaine the State hee is often forcd not to be good for when that generalty whether it be the people or souldiers or Nobility whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee is corrupted it behooves thâ—e to follow their humour and content them and then all good deeds are thy adversaries But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodnesse that among the prayses given him had this for one that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire he never put any man to death but by course of justice nevertâ—elesse being held effeminate and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruld by his mother and thereupon fallen into contempt the
with the governments of the provinces as were the armies of the Romane Empire And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the souldiers than the people it was because the souldiers were more powerfull than the people now is it more necessary for all Princes except the Turk and the Souldan to satisfie their people than their souldiers because the people are more mighty than they wherein I except the Turk he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot and 15000 horse upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people hee maintaine these his friends The Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto which being wholly in the souldiers power hee must also without respect of his people keep them his friends And you are to consider that this State of the Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities for it is very like the Papacy which cannot be termd a hereditary Principality nor a new Principality for the sonns of the deceasd Prince are not heires and Lords thereof but hee that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them And this order being of antiquity cannot be termd a new Principality because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones for though the Prince be new yet are the orders of that State ancient and ordaind to receive him as if hee were their hereditary Prince But let us returne to our matter whosoever shall consider our discourse before shall perceive that either hatred or contempt have causd the ruine of the afore-namd Emperours and shall know also from it came that part of them proceeding one way and part a contrary yet in any of them the one had a happy successe and the others unhappy for it was of no availe but rather hurtfull for Pertinax and Alexander because they were new Princes to desire to imitate Marcus who by inheritance came to the Principality and in like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla Commodus and Maximinus to imitate Severus because none of them were endued with so great valour as to follow his stepps therein Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions nor yet is it necessary to follow those of Severus but he ought make choyce of those parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State and to take from Marcus those that are fitt and glorious to preserve a State which is already establishd and setled CHAP. XX. Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of are profitable or dammageable SOme Princes whereby they might safely keep their State have disarmd their subjects some others have held the townes under their dominion devided into factions others have maintain'd enmities against themselves others have apply'd themselves to gaine them where they have suspected at their entrance into the government others have built Fortresses and others again have ruind and demolishd them and however that upon all these things a man cannot well passe a determinate sentence unlesse one comes to the particulars of these States where some such like determinations were to be taken yet shall I speake of them in so large a manner as the matter of it selfe will beare It was never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects but rather when hee hath found them disarmd hee hath alwayes armd them For being belov'd those armes become thine those become faithfull which thou hadst in suspicion and those which were faithfull are maitaind so and thy subjects are made thy partisans and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes when thou bestowst favours on those thou armest with the others thou canst deale more for thy safety and that difference of proceeding which they know among them obliges them to thee those others excuse thee judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more who have undergon more danger and so have greater obligation but when thou disarmst them thou beginst to offend them that thou distrusts them either for cowardise or small faith and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee and because thou canst not stand disarmd thou must then turne thy selfe to mercenary Souldiery whereof wee have formerly spoken what it is and when it is good it can never bee so much as to defend thee from powerfull enemies and suspected subjects therefore as I have said a new Prince in a new Principality hath always ordaind them armes Of examples to this purpose Histories are full But when a Prince gaines a new State which as a member hee addes to his ancient dominions then it is necessary to disarme that State unlesse it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof and these also in time and upon occasions it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate and so order them that all the armes of thy State be in the hands of thy own Souldiers who live in thy ancient State neare unto thee Our ancestors and they that were accounted sages were wont to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoya in factions and Pisa with Fortresses and for this cause maintaind some towne subject to them in differences whereby to hold it more easily This at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a certaine manner might be well done but me thinks it cannot now adayes bee well given for a precept for I do not beleeve that divisions made can do any good rather it must needs bee that when the enemy approaches them Cities divided are presently lost for alwayes the weaker part will cleave to the forreine power and the other not be able to subsist The Venetians as I think mov'd by the aforesaid reasons maintaind the factions of the Guelfes and Gibellius in their townes and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood yet they nourishd these differences among them to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels should not plot any thing against them which as it prov'd never serv'd them to any great purpose for being defeated at Vayla presently one of those two factions tooke courage and seizd upon their whole State Therefore such like wayes argue the Princes weakenesse for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace being they are able by meanes thereof more easily to manage their subjects but war comming such like orders discover their fallacy Without doubt Princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great who hath more need to gaine reputation than a hereditary Prince causes enemies to rise against him and him to undertake against them to the end he may have occasion to master them and know that ladder which his enemies have