only by the potential being of a thing which in proper speech is nothing but requires an actual or formal being to its production Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them Yet because that when I am careless and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding I do not so easily call to mind the reasons why the Idea of a being more perfect then my self should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect It will be requisite to enquire further whether I who have this Idea can possibly be unless such a being did exist To which end let me aske from whence should I be From my self or from my Parents or from any other thing less perfect then God for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect or equally perfect with God But first If I were from my self I should neither doubt nor desire nor want any thing for I should have given my self all those perfections of which I have any Idea and consequently I my self should be God and I cannot think that those things I want are to be acquired with greater difficulty then those things I have but on the contrary tis manifiest that it were much more difficult that I that is a substance that thinks should arise out of nothing then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant which is only the accident of that substance And certainly If I had that greater thing viz being from my self I should not have denyed my self not only those things which may be easier acquired but also All those things which I perceived are contain'd in the Idea of a God and the reason is for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done and certainly if they were Really more difficult they would seem more difficult to me if whatever I have I have from my self for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to have alwaies Been what now I am and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being For the Durance or Continuation of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts Therefore it will not follow that because a while ago I was I must of necessity now Be. I say this will not follow Unless I suppose some Cause to Create me as it were anew for this Moment that is Conserve me For 't is evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew if it did not exist So that 't is one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione as the Philosophers term it from the Act of Creation Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question whether I who now Am have any Power to Cause my self to Be hereafter for had I any such power I should certainly know of it seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me which is a Thing that Thinks to which I answer that I can discover no such Power in Me And consequently I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from my self But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God but that I am produced either by my Parents or some other Causes less perfect then God In answer to which let me consider as I have said before that 't is manifest that whatever is in the effect so much at least ought to be in the cause and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks and have in me an Idea of God it will confessedly follow that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being it also must be a Thinking Thing and must have an Idea of all those Perfections which I attribute to God Of which Cause it may be again Asked whether it be from it self or from any other Cause If from it self 't is evident from what has been said that it must be God For seeing it has the Power of Existing of it self without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in it self that is all those Perfections which I conceive in God But if it Be from an other Cause it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of it self or from an other Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All Which will Be God For 't is evident that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me But chiefly of that which conserves me in this Instant time Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me and that I received the Idea of one of Gods perfections from One of them and from an other of them the Idea of an other and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World but not all of them Ioyn'd in any one which may Be God For on the contrary Vnity Simplicity or the inseparability of All Gods Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him and certainly the Idea of the Vnity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause then by That from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections For 't is Impossible to make me conceive these perfections conjunct and inseparable unless he should also make me know what perfections these are Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour'd of Them were True yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks for they have onely predisposed that material Thing wherein I that is my mind which only at present I take for my self Inhabits Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them But I must of necessity conclude that because I am and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect that is of God it evidently follows that there is a God * Now it only remains for me to examine how I have received this Idea of God For I have neither received it by means of my Senses neither comes it to me without my Forethought as the Ideas of sensible things use to do when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense or at least seem so to work Neither is this Idea framed by my self for I can neither detract from nor add any thing thereto Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is
as now it is the more or the less I consider the Composition of the Wax In the interim I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre for though I revolve these things with my self silently and without speaking yet am I intangled in meer words and am almsot deceived by the usual way of expression for we commonly say that we see the Wax it self if it be present and not that we judge it present by its colour or shape from whence I should immediately thus conclude therefore the Wax is known by the sight of the eye and not by the inspection of the mind only Thus I should have concluded had not I by chance look'd out of my window and seen men Passing by in the Street which men I as usually say that I see as I do now that I see this Wax and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments which perhaps may cover only artifical Machines and movements but I judge them to be men so that what I though I only saw with my eyes I comprehend by my Iudicative Faculty which is my Soul But it becomes not one who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar to draw matter of doubt from those ways of expression which the Vulgar have invented Wherefore let us proceed and consider whether I perceived more perfectly and evidently what the Wax was when I first look'd on 't and believed that I knew it by my outward senses or at least by my common sense as they call it that is to say by my imagination or whether at presâ—nt I better understand it after I have more diligently enquired both what it is and how it may be known Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true What was there in my first perception that was distinct What was there that seem'd not incident to every other Animal But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents and consider it as if it were naked with it's coverings pull'd off then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind though yet perhaps my judgment may erre But what shall I now say as to my mind or my self for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but a mind Why shall I say should not I who seem to perceive this Wax so distinctly know my self not only more truly and more certainly but more distinctly and evidently For if I judge that this Wax exists because I see thâ—s Wax surely it will be much more evident that I my self exist because I see this Wax for it may be that this that I see is not really Wax also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any thing but it cannot be when I see or which is the same thing when I think that I see that I who think should not exist The same thing will follow if I judge that this Wax exists because I touch or imagine it c. And what has been said of Wax may be apply'd to all other outward things Moreover if the notion of Wax seems more distinct after it is made known to me not only by my sight or touch but by more and other causes How much the more distinctly must I confess my self known unto my self seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in the peroeption of Wax or any other Body does also encrease the proofs of the nature of my Mind But there are so many more things in the very Mind it self by which the notion of it may be made more distinct that those things which drawn from Body conduce to its knowledge are scarce to be mention'd And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in for seeing I have now discover'd that Bodies themselves are not properly perceived by our senses or imagination but only by our understanding and are not therefore perceived because they are felt or seen but because they are understood it plainly appears to me that nothing can possibly be perceived by me easier or more evidently than my Mind But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion I am willing to stop here that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon MEDITAT III. Of GOD and that there is a God NOw will I shut my eyes I will stop my ears and withdraw all my senses I will blot out the Images of corporeal things clearly from my mind or because that can scarce be accomplish'd I will give no heed to them as being vain and false and by discoursing with my self and prying more rightly into my own Nature will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self I am a Thinking Thing that is to say doubting affirming denying understanding few things ignorant of many things willing nilling imagining also and sensitive For as before I have noted though perhaps whatever I imagine or am sensible of as without me Is not yet that manner of thinking which I call sense and imagination as they are only certain Modes of Thinking I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention'd whatever I know or at least Whatever as yet I perceive my self to know Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me of Which I have not yet taken Notice I am sure That I am a Thinking Thing and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make me certain of any Thing I Answer that in this My first knowledge 't is Nothing but a clear and distinct perception of What I affirm Which would not be sufficient to make me certain of the Truth of a Thing if it were Possible that any thing that I so clearly and distinctly Perceive should be false Wherefore I may lay this Down as a Principle Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very Certain and manifest Which I afterwards found to be doubtful Therefore What sort of Things were they Viz. Heaven Earth Stars and all other things which I perceived by my Senses But What did I Perceive of These Clearly Viz. That I had the Ideas or Thoughts of these things in my mind and at Present I cannot deny that I have these Ideas in Mee But there was some other thing Which I affirm'd and Which by Reason of the common Way of Belief I thought that I Clearly Perceived Which nevertheless I did not really Perceive And that was that there were Certain Things Without Me from whence these Ideas Proceeded and to which they were exactly like And this it was Wherein I was either Deceived or if by Chance I Judged truly yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my Perception But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry as that
him and I not comprehend Why or How they are done for seeing I now know that my Nature is very Weak and Finite and that the Nature of God is Immense Incomprehensible Infinite from hence I must fully understand that he can do numberless things the Causes whereof lie hidden to Me. Upon which account Only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End viz. Final Causes as of no use in Natural Philosophy for I cannot without Rashness Think my self able to Discover Gods Designes I perceive this also that whenever we endeavour to know whether the Work 's of God are perfect we must not Respect any one kind of Creature singly but the Whole Vniverse of Beings for perhaps what if considered alone may Deservedly seem Imperfect yet as it is a part of the World is most perfect and tho since I have doubted of all things I have discover'd nothing certainly to Exist but my self and God yet since I have Consider'd the Omnipotency of God I cannot deny but that many other things are made or at least may be made by him so that I my self may be a part of this Vniverse Furthermore coming nigher to my self and enquiring what these Errors of mine are which are the Only Arguments of my Imperfection * I find them to depend on two concurring Causes on my faculty of Knowing and on my faculty of Choosing or Freedome of my Will that is to say from my Vnderstanding and my Will together For by my Vnderstanding alone I only perceive Ideas whereon I make Iudgments wherein precisely so taken there can be no Error properly so called for tho perhaps there may be numberless things whose Ideas I have not in Me yet I am not properly to be said Deprived of them but only negatively wanting them and I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of Knowing And tho I understand him to be a skilful Workman yet I cannot Think that he ought to have put all those perfections in each Work of his singly with which he might have endowed some of them Neither can I complain that God has not given me a Will or Freedom of Choise large and perfect enough for I have experienced that 't is Circumscribed by no Bounds And 't is worth our taking notice that I have no other thing in me so perfect and so Great but I Understand that there may be Perfecter and Greater for if for Example I consider the Faculty of Vnderstanding I presently preceive that in me 't is very small and Finite and also at the same time I form to my self an Idea of an other Vnderstanding not only much Greater but the Greatest and Infinite which I perceive to belong to God In the same manner if enquire into memory or imagination or any other faculties I find them in my self Weak and Circumscribed but in God I Understand them to be Infinite there is therefore only my Will or Freedome of Choice which I find to be so Great that I cannot frame to my self an Idea of One Greater so that 't is by this chiefly by which I Understand my self to Bear the likeness and Image of God For tho the Will in God be without comparison Greater then Mine both as to the Knowledge and Power which are Ioyn'd therewith which make it more strong and Effective and also as to the Object thereof for God can apply himself to more things then I can Yet being taken Formally and Precisely Gods Will seems no greater then Mine For the Freedome of Will consists only in this that we can Do or not Do such a Thing that is affirm or deny prosecute or avoid or rather in this Only that we are so carried to a Thing which is proposed by Our Intellect to Affirm or Deny Prosecute or Shun that we are sensible that we are not Determinâ—d to the Choice or Aversion thereof by any outward Force Neither is it Requisite to make one Free that he should have an Inclination to both sides For on the contrary by how much the more strongly I am inclined to one side whether it be that I evidently perceive therein Good or Evil or Whether it be that God has so disposed my Inward Thoughts By so much the more Free am I in my Choice Neither truly do Gods Grace or Natural Knowledge take away from my Liberty but rather encrease and strengthen it For that indifference which I find in my self when no Reason inclines me more to one side then to the other is the meanest sort of Liberty and is so far from being a sign of perfection that it only argues a defect or negation of Knowledge for if I should always Clearly see what were True and Good I should never deliberate in my Iudgement or Choice and Consequently tho I were perfectly Free yet I should never be Indifferent From all which I perceive that neither the Power of Willing precisely so taken which I have from God is the Cause of my Errors it being most full and perfect in its kind Neither also the Power of Vnderstanding for whatever I Understand since 't is from God that I Vnderstand it I understand aright nor can I be therein Deceived From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors To which I answer that they proceed from hence only that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Vnderstanding I keep it not within the same bounds with my Vnderstanding but often extend it to those things which I Vnderstand not to which things it being Indifferent it easily Declines from what is True and Good and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin * Thus for example when lately I set my self to enquire Whether any thing doth Exist and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing it evidently follows that I my self Exist I could not but Iudge what I so clearly Vnderstood to be true not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Vnderstanding so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly by how much the less indifferent I was thereto But now I understand not only that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature and it so happens that I doubt whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature or Whether they are both the same but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either or to Iudge nothing of either But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side yet the Knowing that they are only
like that sun which is without me and my reason perswades me that that Idea is most unlike the Sun which seems to proceed Immediately from it self All which things sufficiently prove that I have hitherto not from a true judgement but from a blind impulse beleived that there are certain things different from my self and which have sent their Ideas or Images into me by the Organs of my senses or some other way But I have yet an other Way of inquiring whether any of those Things whose Ideas I have within Me are Really Existent without Me And that is Thus As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking I acknowledge no Inequality between them and they all proceed from me in the same Manner But as one Represents one thing an other an other Thing 't is Evident there is a Great difference between them * For without doubt Those of them which Represent Substances are something More or as I may say have More of Objective Reallity in them then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents and again That by Which I understand a Mighty God Eternal Infinite Omniscient Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself has certainly in it more Objective Reallity then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited But Now it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause as there is in the Effect of that Cause For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity but from the Cause and how can the Cause give it that Reallity unless it self have it And from hence it follows that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing Neither a Thing which is more Perfect that is Which has in it self more Reallity proceed from That Which is Less Perfect And this is Clearly True not only in those Effects whose Actual or Formal Reallity is Consider'd But in Those Ideas also Whose Objective Reallity is only Respected That is to say for Example of Illustration it is not only impossible that a stone Which was not should now begin to Be unless it were produced by something in Which Whatever goes to the Making a Stone is either Formally or Virtually neither can heat he Produced in any Thing which before was not hot but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a degree of Perfection as heat is But also 't is Impossible that I should have an Idea of Heat or of a Stone unless it were put into me by some Cause in which there is at Least as much Reallity as I Conceive there is in Heat or a Stone For tho that Cause transfers none of its own Actual or Formal Reality into my Idea I must not from thence conclude that 't is less real but I may think that the nature of the Idea it self is such that of it self it requires no other formal reality but what it has from my thought of which 't is a mode But that this Idea has this or that objective reallity rather then any other proceeds clearly from some cause in which there ought to be at least as much formal reallity as there is of objective reallity in the Idea it self For if we suppose any thing in the Idea which was not in its cause it must of necessity have this from nothing but tho it be a most Imperfect manner of existing by which the thing is objectively in the Intellect by an Idea yet it is not altogether nothing and therefore cannot proceed from nothing Neither ought I to doubt seeing the reallity which I perceive in my Ideas is only an objective reallity that therefore it must of necessity follow that the same reallity should be in the causes of these Ideas formally But I may conclude that 't is sufficient that this reallity be in the very causes only objectively For as that objective manner of being appertains to the very nature of an Idea so that formal manner of being appertains to the very nature of a cause of Ideas at least to the first and chiefest causes of them For tho perhaps one Idea may receive its birth from an other yet we cannot proceed in Infinitum but at last we must arrive at some first Idea whose cause is as it were an Original copy in which all the objective reallity of the Idea is formally contain'd So that I plainly discover by the light of nature that the Ideas which are in me are as it were Pictures which may easily come short of the perfection of those things from whence they are taken but cannot contain any thing greater or more perfect then them And the longer and more diligently I pry into these things so much the more clearly and distinctly do I discover them to be true But what shall I conclude from hence Thus that if the objective reallity of any of my Ideas be such that it cannot be in me either formarlly or eminently and that therefore I cannot be the cause of that Idea from hence it necessarily Follows that I alone do not only exist but that some other thing which is the cause of that Idea does exist also But if I can find no such Idea in me I have no argument to perswade me of the existence of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired and hitherto I could discover no other perswasive Some of these Ideas there are besides that which represents my self to my self of which in this place I cannot doubt which represent to me one of them a God others of them Corporeal and Inanimate things some of them Angels others Animals and lastly some of them which exhibite to me men like my self As touching those that represent Men or Angels or Animals I easily understand that they may be made up of those Ideas which I have of my self of Corporeal things and of God tho there were neither man but my self nor Angel nor Animal in being And as to the Ideas of Corporeal things I find nothing in them of that perfection but it may proceed from my self for if I look into them more narrowly and examine them more particularly as yesterday in the second Medit. I did the Idea of Wax I find there are but few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them viz. Magnitude or extension in Longitude Latitude and Profundity the Figure or shape which arises from the termination of that Extension the Position or place which divers Figured Bodies have in respect of each other their motion or change of place to which may be added their substance continuance and number as to the other such as are Light Colours Sounds Smels Tasts Heat and Cold with the other tactile qualities I have but very obscure and confused thoughts of them so that I know not whether they are true or false that is to say whether the Ideas I have of them are the Ideas of things which really are or are not For altho falshood formally and properly so called consists only in
Appetites and Affections in It and for Iâ— and lastly I perceived pleasure and Pain in its Parts and not in any other Without it But why from the sense of Pain a certain Grief and from the sense of pleaâ—ure a certain Ioy of the Mind should arise or Why that Gnawing of the stomach Which I call Hunger should put me in mind of Eating or the driness of my Throat of Drinking I can give no other Reason but that I am taught so by Nature For to my thinking there is no Aâ—â—inity or â—ikeness between that Gnawing of the Stomach and the desire of Eaâ—ing or between the sense of Pain and the sorrowful thought from thence arising But in this as in all other judgments that I made of sensible objects I seem'd to be taught by Nature for I first perswaded my self that things were so or so before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it But afterwards I discover'd many experiments The Reasons why I doubt my senses wherein my senses so grosly deceived me that I would never trust them again for Towers which seem'd Round a far off nigh at hand appear'd square and large Statueâ— on their tops seem'd small to those that stood on the ground and in numberless other things I perceived the judgements of my outward senses were deceived and not of my outward only but of my inward senses also for what is more intimate or inward than Pain And yet I have heard from those whose Arm or Leg was cut off that they have felt pain in that part which they wanted and therefore I am not absolutely certain that any part of me is affected with pain tho I feel pain therein To these I have lately added two very general Reasons of doubt Medit. 1. The first was that while I was awake I could not believe my self to perceive any thing which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive tho I were a sleep And seeing I cannot believe that what I seem to perceive in my sleep proceeds from outward Objects what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am awake The other Cause of Doubt was that seeing I know not the Author of my Being or at least I then supposed my self not to know him what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by Nature as to be deceived even in those things which appear'd to me most true And as to the Reasons which induced me to give credit to sensible Things 't was easie to return an answer thereto for finding by experience that I was impelled by Nature to many Things which Reason disswaded me from I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by Nature And tho the perceptions of my senses depended not on my Will I thought I should not therefore conclude that they proceeded from Objects different from my self for perhaps there may be some other Faculty in me tho as yet unknown to me which might frame those perceptions But now that I begin better to know my self and the Author of my Original How far the senses are now to be trusted I do not think that all things which I seem to have from my senses are rashly to be admitted neither are all things so had to be doubted And first because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive may be so made by God as I perceive them the Power of understanding clearly and distinctly one Thing without the other is sufficient to make Me certain that One Thing is different from the Other because it may at least be placed apart by God and that it may be esteem'd different it matters not by what Power it may be so sever'd And therefore from the knowledge I have that I my self exist and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my Nature or Essence but that I am a thinking Being I rightly conclude that my Essence consists in this alone that I am a thinking Thing And tho perhaps or as I shall shew presently 't is certain I have a Body which is very nighly conjoyned to me yet because on this side I have a clear and distinct Idea of my self as I am only a thinking Thing not extended and on the other side because I have a distinct Idea of my Body as it is onely an extended thing not thinking 't is from hence certain that I am really distinct from my Body and that I can exist without it Moreover I find in my self some Facultâ—es endow'd with certain peculiar waies of thinking such as the Faculty of Imagination the Faculty of Perception or sense without which I can conceive my whole self clearly and distinctly but changing the phrase I cannot conceive those Faculties without conceiving My self that is an understanding substance in which they are for none of them in their formal Conception includes understanding from whence I perceive they are as different from me as the modus or manner of a Thing is different from the Thing it self I acknowledge also that I have several other Faculties such as changing of place putting on various shapes c. Which can no more be understood without a substance in which they are then the foremention'd Faculties and consequently they can no more be understood to Exist without that substance But yet 't is Manifest that this sort of Faculties to the End they may exist ought to be in a Corporeal Extended and not in a Vnderstanding substance because Extension and not Intellection or Vnderstanding is included in the Clear and Distinct conception of them But there is also in me a certain Passive Faculty of sense or of Receiving and Knowing the Ideas of sensible Things of which Faculty I can make no use unless there were in my self or in something else a certain Active Faculty of Producing and Effecting those Ideas But this cannot be in my self for it Pre-supposes no Vnderstanding and those Ideas are Produced in me tho I help not and often against my Will There remains therefore no Place for this Active Faculty but that it should be in some substance different from me In which because all the Reallity which is contain'd Objectively in the Ideas Produced by that Faculty ought to be contain'd Formally or Eminently as I have Formerly taken notice this substance must be either a Body in which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain'd Formally or it Must Be God or some Creature more excellent then a Body In which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain'd Eminently But seeing that God is not a Deceivour 't is altogether Manifest that he does not Place these Ideas in me either Immediately from himself or Mediately from any other Creature wherein their Objective Reallity is not * contain'd Formally but only Eminently And seeing God has given me no Faculty to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from Corporeal or Incorporeal Beings but rather a strong Inclination to believe that
violently and more than ordinarily moved that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain there it signifies to the mind that something or other is to be felt and what is this but Pain as if it were in the Foot by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause as being hurtful to the Foot But the Nature of Man might have been so order'd by God that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing viz. either it self as 't is in the Brain or it self as it is in the Foot or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts or lastly any other thing whatsoever but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body In the like manner when we want drink from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat which moves the Nerves thereof and by their means the inward parts of the Brain and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health So of the Rest. From all which 't is manifest that notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God 't is impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable For if any cause should excite not in the Foot but in the Brain it self or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain that self same motion which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled the Pain would be felt as in the Foot and the sense would be naturally deceived for 't is consonant to Reason seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense and it oftner proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot than from any other I say 't is reasonable that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot rather than of any other part And so if a dryness of Throat arises not as 't is used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body but from an unusual Cause as it happens in a Dropsie 't is far better that it should then deceive us then that it should alwayes deceive us when the Body is in Health and so of the Rest. And this consideration helps me very much not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject but also to correct and avoid them For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsly than truely in those things which conduce to the Bodies advantage and seeing I can use almost alwayes more of them than one to Examine the same thing as also I can use memory which joyns present and past things together and my understanding also which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors I ought no longer to fear that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false But especially those â—xtravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turn'd off as ridiculous and perticularly the chief of them viz. That * of not distinguiâ—hing Sleep from Waking for now I plainly discover a great difference between them for my Dreams are never conjoyned by my memory with the other actions of my life as whatever happens to me awake is and certainly if while I were awake any person should suddenly appear to me and presently disappear as in Dreams so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went I should rather esteem it a Spâ—ctre or Apparition feign'd in my Brain then a true Man but when such things occur as I distinctly know from whence where and when they come and I conjoyn the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth if after I have called up all my senses memory and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them that clashes with other truths For God not being a Deceiver it follows that In such things I am not deceived But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not alwayes allow time for such an accurate examination I must confess that Mans life is subject to many Errors about perticulars so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us. FINIS ADVRTISEMENET CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS AMong seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy as being Penn'd by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury a Man famously known to the World abroad but especially to his own the English Nation and therefore 't is likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen then what proceeds from a Stranger and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violenâ— Opposition of so Potent an Enemy And yet it must be Confess'd that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehendâ—d by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs's Philosophy especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English and therefore not Impertinently refer'd to Here in a Discâ—urse to English Readers And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly VVho certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon VVhat Foundations it was Built OBJECTIONS Made against the Foregoing MEDITATIONS BY THE FAMOUS THOMAS HOBBS Of MALMESBURY WITH DES-CARTES'S ANSWERS OBJECT I. Against the First Meditation Of things Doubtful 'T IS evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation that there is no sign by Which we may Distinguish our Dreams from True 〈…〉 Phantasmes which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground we may well doubt whether any Thing Be or Not We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation But Because Plato and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same incertainty in sensible Things and because 't is commonly Observed by the Vulgar that 't is hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions ANSWER Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as true were proposed by Me only as Probable and I made use of them not that I may vend them as new but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my
Man knowing that there must be some Cause of his Imaginations or Ideas as also an other cause before That and so onwards he is brought at last to an End or to a supposal of some Eternal Cause Which because it never began to Be cannot have any other Cause before it and thence he Concludes that 't is necessary that some Eternal Thing Exist and yet he has no Idea which He can call the Idea of this Eternal Thing but he names this Thing which he believes and acknowledges by the Name God But now Des-Cartes proceeds from this Position That we have an Idea of God in our Mind to prove this Theoreme That God that is an Almighty Wise Creatour of the World Exists whereas he ought to have explain'd this Idea of God better and he should have thence deduced not only his Existence but also the Creation of the World ANSWER Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Phantasie by which Position he may Easily Prove that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God whereas I declare every Where but especially in this Place that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind so that when I Will or Fear because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear this very Will or Fear are reckon'd by me among the number of Ideas And I have purposely made use of that Word because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in God and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by And I think I have sufficiently explain'd the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them Lastly what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand OBJECT VI. * BVt 〈◊〉 arâ— Other Thoughts That have Superadded Forms to them as when I Will when I Fear when I Affirm when I Deny I know I have alwayes whenever I think some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections and others of them Iudgemeâ—ts When any one Fears or Wills he has certainly the Image of the Thing Fear'd or Action Will'd but what more a Willing or Fearing Man has in his Thoughts is not explain'd and tho Fear be a Thought yet I see not how it can be any other then the Thought of the Thing Fear'd For what is the Fear of a Lion rushing on me but the Idea of a Lion Rushing on me aâ—d the Effect which that Idea produces in the Heart whereby the Man Fearing is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight but now this Motion of Flying is not Thought it remains therefore that in Fear there is no other Thought but that which consists in the likeness of the thing And the same may be said of Will Moreover Affirmation and Negation are not without a voice and words and hence 't is that Brutes can neither affirme or deny not so much as in their Thought and consequently neither can they judge But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man for when we affirme that a Man runs we have not a thought different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running Affirmation therefore or Negation superadds nothing to meer thoughts unless perhaps it adds this thought that the names of which an Affirmation consists are to the Person affirming the Names of the same thing and this is not to comprehend in the thought more then the likeness of the thing but it is only comprehending the same likeness twice ANSWER T is self evident That 't is one thing to see a Lion and at the same time to fear him and an other thing only to see him So t is one thing to see a Man Running and an other thing to Affirme within my self which may be done without a voice That I see him But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer OBJECT VII * NOw it remains for me to examine how I have received this Idea of God for I have neither received it by means of my senses neither comes it to me without my forethought as the Ideas of sensible things use to do when those things work on the Organs of my sense or at least seem so to work Neither is this Idea framed by my self for I can neither add to nor detract from it Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is innate even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self If there be no Idea of God as it seems there is not and here 't is not proved that there is this whole discourse falls to the ground And as to the Idea of my self if I respect the Body it proceeds from Sight but if the Soul there is no Idea of a Soul but we collect by Ratiocination that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body that imparts to it Animal Motion by which it perceives and moves and this whatever it be without any Idea we call a Soul ANSWER If there be an Idea of God as 't is manifest that there is this whole Objection falls to the ground and then he subjoyns That we have no Idea of the Soul but collect it by Ratiocination 'T is the same as if he should say that there is no Image thereof represented in the Phantasie but yet that there is such a Thing as I call an Idea OBJECT VIII * AN other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomors that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions At the same time we can certainly have but one Idea of the Sun whether it belook'd at by our eyes or collected by Ratiocination to be much bigger than it seems for this last is not an Idea of the Sun but a proof by Arguments that the Idea of the Sun would be much larger if it were look'd at nigher But at different or several times the Ideas of the Sun may be diverse as if at one time we look at it with our bare eye at an other time through a Teloscope but Astronomical arguments do not make the Idea of the Sun greater or less but they rather tell us that the sensible Idea thereof is false ANSWER Here also as before what he says is not the Idea of the Sun and yet is described is that very thing which I call the Idea OBJECT IX * FOr without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something more or as I may say have more of objective Reality in them then those
our selves a Faculty of producing them OBJECT * THe whole stress of which Argument lyes thus because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am viz having the Idea of a God in me unless really there were a God A God I say that very same God whose Idea I have in my mind Wherefore seeing t is not demonstrated that we have an Idea of God and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that God is Inconceivable that is as I suppose that we cannot have an Idea of Him it follows that the Existence of God is not demonstrated much less the Creation ANSWER When God is said to be Inconceiveable t is understood of an Adequate full conception But I am ' een tired with often repeating how notwithstanding we may have an Idea of God So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my demonstration OBJECT XII Against the Fourth Meditation Of Truth and Falshood * BY Which I understand that Error as it is Error is not a Real Being Dependent on God but is only a Defect and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God 'T is Certain that Ignorance is only a Defect and that there is no Occasion of any Positive Faculty to make us Ignorant But this position is not so clear in Relation to Error for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot Err for this Reason only because they have not the Faculties of Reasoning or Imagination from whence 't is Natural for us to Conclude That to Err there is requisite a Faculty of Iudging or at least of Imagining both which Faculties are Positive and given to all Creatures subject to Error and to Them only Moreover Des-Cartes says thus I find my Errors to Depend on two concurring Causes viz. on my Faculty of Knowing and on my Faculty of Choosing or Freedom of my Will Which seems Contradictious to what he said before And here also we may note that Freedom of Will is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists ANSWER Tho to make us Err there is requisite a Faculty of Reasoning or rather of Iudging that is of Affirming and Denying because Error is the Defect thereof yet it doesnot follow from thence that this Defect is any thing Real for neither is Blindness a Real Thing tho stones cannot be said to be Blind for this Reason only That they are incapable of sight And I much wonder that in all these Objections I have not found one Right Inference I have not here assumed any thing concerning the Freedom of Mans Will unless what all Men do Experience in themselves and is most evident by the Light of Nature Neither see I any Reason Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position Perhaps there may be Many who respecting Gods predisposal of Things cannot Comprehend How their Freedom of Will Consists there-with but yet there is no Man who respecting himself only does not find by Experience That 't is one and the same Thing to be Willing and to be Free But 't is no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter OBJECT XIII * AS for Example When lately I set my self to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist and found that from my setting my self to examine such a Thing it evidently follows That I my self Exist I could not but Iudge what I so clearly understood to be true not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Vnderstanding so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto This expression Great Light in the Vnderstanding is Metaphorical and therefore not to be used in Argumentation And every one that Doubts not of his Opinion Pretends such a Light and has no less a Propension in his Will to Affirm what he doubts not than He that really and truely knows a Thing Wherefore this Light may be the cause of Defending and Holding an Opinion Obstinately but never of knowing an Opinion Truly Moreover not only the Knowledge of Truth but Blief or Giving Assent are not the Acts of the Will for Whatever is proved by strong Arguments or Credibly told we Believe whether we will or no. 'T is True To Affirm or Deny Propositions to Defend or Oppose Propositions are the Acts of the Will but it does not from thence Follow that the Internal Assent depends on the Will Wherefore the following Conclusion so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error is not fully Demonstrated ANSWER 'T is not much matter Whether this expression Great Light be Argumentative or not so it be explicative as really it is For all men know that by light in the understanding is meant clearness of knowledge which every one has not that thinks he has and this hinders not but this light in the Vnderstanding may be very different from an obstinate Opinion taken up without clear perception But when 't is here said That we asseâ—t to things clearly perceived whether we will of no 't is the same as if it were said that willing or nilling we desire Good clearly known whereas the word Nilling finds no room in such Expressions for it implies that we will and nill the same thing OBJECT XIV Against the Fifth Meditation Of the Essence of material things * AS when for Example I imagine a Triangle thy perhaps 〈◊〉 a Figure exists no where 〈◊〉 of my thoughts nor ever will exist 〈◊〉 Nature thereof is determinate and its Essence or 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 immutable and eternal which is 〈◊〉 made by 〈◊〉 noâ— depends oâ— my mind as appears from this that 〈…〉 be demonstrated of this Triangle If a Triangle be 〈◊〉 where I understand not how it can 〈◊〉 any Nature for what is no where is 〈◊〉 and therefore has not a Being 〈◊〉 any Nature A Triangle on the Mind 〈◊〉 from â— Triangle seen oâ— from one made up of what has been seen but when once we have given the name of a Triangle to a thing from which we think the Idea of a Triangle arises tho the Triangle it self perish yet the name continues In the like manner when we have once conceived in our thought That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones and when we have given this other name viz. Having its three Angles equal to two right ones to a Triangle tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World yet the Name would still continue and this Proposition A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones would be eternally true But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy'd This Proposition likewise A Man is an Animal will be true to Eternity because the Word Animal will eternally
Innate even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self And truly 't is not to be Admired that God in Creating me should Imprint this Idea in me that it may there remain as a stamp impressed by the Workman God on me his Work neither is it requisite that this stamp should be a Thing different from the Work it self but 't is very Credible from hence only that God Created me that I am made as it were according to his likeness and Image and that the same likeness in which the Idea of God is contain'd is perceived by Me with the same faculty with which I perceive my Self That is to say whilst I reflect upon my self I do not only perceive that I am an Imperfect thing having my dependance upon some other thing and that I am a Thing that Desires more and better things Indefinitely But also at the same time I understand that He on whom I depend contains in him all those wish'd for things not only Indefinitely and Potentially but Really Infinitely and that therefore he is God The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am Viz Having the Idea of a God in me unless really there were a God a God I say that very same God whose Idea I have in my Mind that is Having all those perfections which I cannot comprehend â—ut can as it were think upon them and who is not subject to any Defects By which 't is evident that God is no Deceiver for 't is manifest by the Light of Nature that all fraud and deceit depends on some defect But before I prosecute this any farther or pry into other Truthes which may be deduced from this I am willing here to stop and dwell upon the Contemplation of this God to Consider with my self His Divine Attributes to behold admire and adore the Loveliness of this Immense light as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my dark Understanding For as by Faith we believe that the greatest happiness of the next Life consists alone in the Contemplation of the Divine Majesty so we find by Experience that now we receive from thence the greatest pleasure whereof we are capable in this Life Tho it be much more Imperfect then that in the Next MEDITAT IV. Of Truth and Falshood OF late it has been so common with me to withdraw my Mind from my sences and I have so throughly consider'd how few things there are appertaining to Bodies that are truly perceived and that there are more Things touching Mans mind and yet more concerning God which are well known that now without any difficulty I can turn my Thoughts from things sensible to those which are only Intelligible and Abstracted from Matter And truely I have a much more distinct Idea of a Mans mind as it is a Thinking Thing having no Corporeal Dimensions of Length Breadth and Thickness nor having any other Corporeal Quality then the Idea of any Corporeal Thing can be And when I reflect upon my self and consider how that I doubt that is am an imperfect dependent Being I from hence Collect such a clear and distinct Idea of an Independent perfect Being which is God and from hence only that I have such an Idea that is because I that have this Idea do my self Exist I do so clearly conclude that God also Exists and that on him my Being depends each Minute That I am Consident nothing can be known more Evidently and Certainly by Humane Vnderstanding And now I seem to perceive a Method by which from this Contemplation of the true God in whom the Treasures of Knowledge and Wisdome are Hidden I may attain the Knowledg of other Things And first I know 't is impossible that this God should deceive me For in all cheating and deceipt there is something of imperfection and tho to be able to deceive may seem to be an Argument of ingenuity and power yet without doubt to have the Will of deceiving is a sign of Malice and Weakness and therefore is not Incident to God I have also found in my self a Iudicative faculty which certainly as all other things I possess I have received from God and seeing he will not deceive me he has surely given me such a Iudgement that I can never Err whilst I make a Right Vse of it Of which truth I can make no doubt unless it seems that From hence it will follow That therefore I can never Err for if whatever I have I have from God and if he gave me no Faculty of Erring I may seem not to be able to Err. And truly so it is whilst I think upon God and wholly convert my self to the consideration of him I find no occasion of Error or Deceit but yet when I return to the Contemplation of my self I find my self liable to Innumerable Errors Enquiring into the cause of which I find in my self an Idea not only a real and positive one of a God that is of a Being infinitely perfect but also as I may so speak a Negative Idea of Nothing that is to say I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect Being and No-being that as I am Created by the Highest Being I have nothing in Me by which I may be deceived or drawn into Error but as I pertake in a manner of Nothing or of a No-Being that is as I my self am not the Highest Being and as I want many perfections 't is no Wonder that I should be Deceived By which I understand that Error * as it is Error is not any real Being dependant on God but it is only a Defect And that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a faculty of Erring given me by God but only it so happens that I Err meerly because the Iudicative faculty which he has given me is not Infinite But yet this Account is not fully satisfactory for Error is not only a meer Negation but 't is a Privation or a want of a certain Knowledge which ought as it were to be in me And when I consider the Nature of God it seems impossible that he should give me any faculty which is not perfect in its kind or which should want any of its due perfections for if by how much the more skilful the Workman is by so much the Perfecter Works proceed from him What can be made by the Great Maker of all things which is not fully perfect For I cannot Doubt but God may Create me so that I may never be deceived neither can I doubt but that he Wills whatever is Best Is it therefore better for me to be deceived or not to be deceived These things when I Consider more heedfully it comes into my Mind First that 't is no cause of Admiration that God should do Things whereof I can give no account nor must I therefore doubt his Being because there are many things done by
very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome that we should call by different names those substances which we perceive are the subjects of very different Acts or Accidents and that afterwards we should examine whether those different names signifie different or one and the same thing Now there are some Acts which we call corporeal as magnitude figure motion and what ever else cannot be thought on without local extension and the substance wherein these reside we call Body neither can it be imagin'd that 't is one substance which is the subject of Figure and another substance which is the subject of local motion c. Because all these Acts agree under one common notion of Extension Besides there are other Acts which we call cogitative or thinking as understanding will imagination sense c. All which agree under the common notion of thought perception or Conscience And the substance wherein they are we â—ay is a thinking thing or mind or call it by whatever other name we please so we do not confound it with corporeal substance because cogitative Acts no have affinity with corporeal Acts and thought which is the common Ratio of those is wholly diffrrent from Extension which is the common Ratio of These But after we have formed two distinct conceptions of these two substances from what is said in the sixth Meditation 't is easie to know whether they be one and the same or different OBJECT III. * WHich of them is it that is distinct from my thought which of them is it that can be separated from me Some perhaps will answer this Question thus I my self who think am distinct from my thought and my thought is different from me thoâ—not seperated as dancing is distinguished from the Dancer as before is noted But if Des Cartes will prove that he who understands is the same with his understanding we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions the understanding understands the sight 〈◊〉 the Will wills and then by an exact anâ—logy the Walking or at least the Faculty of walking shall walk All which are obscure improper and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble Des Cartes ANSWER I do not deny that I who think am distinct from my thought as a thing is distinguish'd from its modus or manner But when I ask which of them is it that is distinct from my thought this I understand of those various modes of thought there mention'd and not of my substance and when I subjoyn which of them is it that can be separated from me I only signifie that all those modes or manners of thinking reside in me neither do I herein perâ—eive what occasion of doubt or obscurity can be imagined OBJECT IV. * IT remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is but that I conceive in my mind What it is There is a great Difference between Imagination that is having an Idea of a Thing and the Conception of the Mind that is a Concluding from Reasoning that a thing Is or Exists But Des-Cartes has not Declared to us in what they Differ Besides the Antient Aristotelians have clearly deliver'd as a Doctrine that substance is not perceived by sense but is Collected by Ratiocination But what shall we now say if perhaps Ratiocination be nothing Else but a Copulation or Concatenation of Names or Appellations by this Word Is From whence 't will follow that we Collect by Râ—asoning nothing of or concerning the Nature of Things but of the names of Things that is to say we only discover whether or no we joyn the Names of Things according to the Agreements which at Pleasure we have made concerning their significations if it be so as so it may be Ratiocination will depend on Words Words on Imagination and perhaps Imagination as also Sense on the Motion of Corporeal Parts and so the Mind shall be nothing but Motions in some Parts of an Organical Body ANSWER I have here Explain'd the Difference between Imagination and the Meer Conception of the Mind by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax what it is therein which we Imagine and what it is that we conceive in our Mind only but besides this I have explained in an other Place How we understand one way and Imagine an other way One and the same Thing suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure There is in Ratiocination a Conjunction not of Words but of Things signified by Words And I much admire that the Contrary could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts For Who ever doubted but that a Frenchman and a German may argue about the same Things tho they use very Differing Words and does not the Philosopher Disprove himself when he speaks of the Agreements which at pleasure we have made about the significations of Words for if he grants that something is Signified by Words Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this something then about Words only and by the same Right that he concludes the Mind to be a Motion he may Conclude Also that the Earth is Heaven or What else he Pleases OBJECT V. Against the Third Meditation of God * SOme of These viz. Humane Thoughts are as it were the Images of Things and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea as when I Think on a Man a Chimera Heaven an Angel or God When I Think on a Man I perceive an Idea made up of Figure and Colour whereof I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of a Man or not and so when I think on Heaven But when I think on a Chimera I perceive an Image or Idea of which I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of any Animal not only at present Existing but possible to Exist or that ever will Exist hereafter or not But thinking on an Angel there is offer'd to my Mind sometimes the Image of a Flame sometimes the Image of a Pretty Little Boy with Wings which I am certain has no Likeness to an Angel and therefore that it is not the Idea of an Angel But beleiving that there are some Creatures Who do as it were wait upon God and are Invisible and Immaterial upon the Thing Believed or supposed we Impose the Name of Angel Whereas the Idea under which I Imagine an Angel is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things In the like manner at the Venerable Name of God we have no Image or Idea of God and therefore we are forbidden to Worship God under any Image least we should seem to Conceive Him that is inconceivable Whereby it appears that we have no Idea of God but like one born blind who being brought to the Fire and perceiving himself to be Warmed knows there is something by which he is warmed and Hearing it called Fire he Concludes that Fire Exists but yet knows not of what shape or Colour the Fire is neither has he any Image or Idea thereof in his Mind So