history and Laws of his Country but very well knows and that this opinion of Englands being a limited Monarchy is no new one but owned to be so by our Kings themselves We may appeal to the last words of Magna Charta it self Concessimus etiam eisdem pro nobis et haeredibus nostris quod nec nos nec haeredes nostri aliquid perquiremus per quod libertates in hac Charta contentae infringantur vel infirmentur Et si ab aliquo contra hoc aliquid perquisitum fuerit nihil valeat et pro nullo habeatur And this his late Majesty of blessed memory who best knew the extent of his own power says in his Declaration from New-market Martij 9. 1641. That the Law to be the measure of his power and if the Laws are the measure of it then his power is limited for what is a Measure but the bounds or limits of the thing measured So likewise in his Answer to both Houses concerning the Militia speaking of the men named by him If more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them than by Law is in the Crown it self His Majesty holds it reasonable that the same be by Law first vested in him with power to transfer it to those persons In which passage his Majesty plainly grants that the power of the Crown is limited by Law and that the King hath no other Prerogatives then are vested in him thereby Nor was this any new Doctrine or indicted by persons disaffected to Monarchy and which had but newly come off from the Parliament side by the apparent Justice of his late Majesties Cause as Mr. Hobs in his little Dialogue of the civil wars of England doth insinuate but was the opinion of the ancient Lawyers many hundred years ago Bracton who lived in the time of H. 2. writes thus Li. I. Cap. 8. Ipse autem Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et Lege quia Lex facit Regem Attribuit igitur Rex Legi quod Lex attribuit Ei viz. dominationem et potentiam Non est enim Rex ubi dominatur voluntas et non Lex And Li. III Cap. 9. Rex est ubi bene Regit Tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit dominatione quod hoc sanxit lex humana quod leges ligent suum Laterem if this be law we have a Tyrant as well described as by any difinition in Aristotle Also that the King alone cannot make a Law Li. I. Cap. 1. So likewise the Lord Chancellour Fortescue in his excellent treatise de laudibus Legum Angliae dedicated to Prince Edward only Son to Henry the VI. and certainly writing to him whom it most concerned to know those Prerogatives he might one day enjoy he would not make them less than really they were Cap. 9. He instructs the Prince thus non potest Rex Angliae ad libitum suum mutare Leges Regni sui Principatu namque nedum regali sed et politico ipse suo Populo dominatur Populus enim iis Legibus gubernatur quas ipse fert cum Legis vigorem habeat quicquid de consilio et de consensu Magnatum et Reipublicae communi sponsione authoritate Regis sive Principis praecedente juste fuerit difinitum et approbatum And the Parliament Rol. 18. E. 1. num 41. quoted in Lord Cook 's Inst 4. pt acknowledges the same Homines de Cheshire qui onerati sunt de servientibns Pacis sustentandis petunt exonerari de oneribus Statuti Winton ' c. The Kings Answer was Rex non habet consilium mutandi consuetudines nec statuta revocandi So likewise Cap. 18. speaking of the Laws of England non enim emanant illa à Principis solùm voluntate ut Leges in Regnis quae tantum regaliter gubernantur ubi quandoque statuta ita constituentis procurant commoditatem singularem quod in ejus subditorâ—m ipsum redundant dispendium et jaciuram sed concito reformari possunt dum non sine Communitatis et Procerum regni illius assensu primitus emanarunt so Cap. 13. Et ut non potest caput corperis Physici nervos suos commutare neque membris suis proprias vires et propria sanguinis alimenta denegare nec Rex qui caput est corporis Politici mutare potest Leges corporis illius nec ejusdem Populi substantias proprias substrabere reclamantibus iis an invitis And concludes thus habes jam Princeps institutionis politici Regni formam quam Rex ejus in Leges ipsius aut subditos valeat exercere ad rutelam namque legis subditorum ac eorum corporum et bonorum Rex hujusmodi erectus est et ad hanc potestatem a Populo effluxam ipse habet quo ei non liceat potestate alia suo Populo dominari I had not been so large on a Subject which is so known and evident and which no sober man will deny were it not for two reasons the first is to satisfy Divines and men of other professions who have not leasure to read old Law Books and perhaps may lye under some doubts what the true form of Government of this Kingdom hath ever been and in the next place to confute the Author's Cavil and other mens of his way to the contrary Authority being the best Judge in this Case as Diogenes confuted Zenos's Arguments against motion not by disputeing but walking So now whether the Treatise this Author writes against be but a Platonick Monarchy or a better piece of Poetry than Policy I will not dispute but this much I think I may safely affirm that the Government he describes is not a Creature to be found God be thanked on English ground and for those that so much admire it let them go find it by the banks of Nilus or Ganges where the Sun that late Emblem of universal Monarchy is so indulgent to the Creatures he produces that those which he cannot make grow here beyond an Eut or Adder are there made Crocodiles and Serpents that devour a man at a bit So that if you should stile them the representatives of the Monarchs of those Climates Travellers will say you do not wrong them I shall now proceed to answer the most material Objection of this Authors and not imitate him who in this Treatise passes by all the Arguments which Mr. H. brings to prove that this is no absolute despotick but at least a limited Monarchy as silently as Commentators do hard places that puzle them Let us therefore look back to his Patriarcha where he gives us a distinction of the School-men ' whereby they subject Kings to the directive but not to the coactive power of Laws and is a confession that Kings are not bound by the positive Laws of any Nation Since the compulsory power of Laws of that which properly makes Laws to be Laws by binding men by rewards and punishments to obedience whereas the direction of the Law
and he shall find them managed much after the same rate Nor hath these differences onely divided these Monarchies where the Succession was never well settled at first but even those that have been better constituted and where one would belieev the Discent of the Crown had been sufficiently settled by a long Discent of Kings for many hundreds of years And of this Scotland hath been a famous Example where after the death of King Alexander III and his Grandaughter Margaret of Norway two or three several Competitors claimed a Right to succeed But omitting others it was agreed that it lay between John Baylliol and Robert Bruce Earl of Carick both of them drawing their Discent from David Earl of Huntingdon Great Uncle to the last King in whom they all agreed the Right to the Crown would have been had he survived Baylliol claimed as eldest Son to Dornagilla Grandaughter to Margaret the eldest Daughter of the said Earl David Robert Bruce claimed as eldest Son of Isabel the second Daughter of the said David So that if Baylliol alledged his Discent from the eldest Daughter Bruce was not behind-hand but pleaded though it was true he was descended but from the second Daughter yet he being a Grandson and a degree neerer ought to succeed whereas Baylliol was but great Grandson to Earl David And though Dornagilla Baylliol's Mother was in the same degree with himself yet he being a man ought to be preferred before a woman in the same Line and that if the Laws of Scotland would have given it to Dornagilla if it had been an ordinary Inheritance yet Discent of the Crown was not to be ruled by the Common Laws of other Inheritances In short this Dispute did so divide the Nobility into Factions and puzzle the Estates of the Kingdom that not being able to decide it they and all the Competitors agreed to refer the Controversie to Edward I. King of England one of the wisest and most powerful Princes of his time who upon long advice and debate with twelve of the learnedest men of both Kingdoms at last adjudged the Crown to Baylliol or as the Scotch Historians relate because he would do him Homage for it which Bruce being of a higher spirit refused Yet this did not put an end to this great Controversie for though Baylliol was thereupon admitted King yet falling out not long after with King Edward to whom he owed all his greatness and having the worst of it the Nobility and States of Scotland revived Bruce's Title and declared him King who after a long War with England enjoy'd the Crown quietly at last and left it to his Issue whose Posterity in our present King enjoy it to this day To this I shall adde one Example more from Portugal within these hundred years King Henry called the Cardinal dying without Issue there was a great Controversie who should succeed for he died suddenly just as the States of the Kingdom were assembled to settle the Succession for he declared himself unable to decide it So that he onely left by his Will twelve Governours of the Kingdom who should govern during the interregnum but that the Crown should descend to him that should appear to them to have the best Title Four eminent Competitors put in their claims 1. Antonio called the Bastard who nevertheless pretended that he was lawful Son to Don Lewis second Brother to Henry the last King So that he had no more to do but to prove himself Legitimate 2. Alexander Duke of Parma who claimed as Grandson to Mary eldest Daughter to Don Duarte youngest Brother to the last King Henry and Son to King Emanuel 3. The Duke of Braganza who claimed as Son to Katherine second Daughter of the said Don Duarte yet alledged his Title to be best because he was the next of the Bloud-Royal who was a Native of Portugal as the Heir of the Crown as he pretended ought to be by a Fundamental Law of that Kingdom yet it seems that Law was not then so well known or otherwise there was no reason why these Governors should not have admitted him King as soon as ever they met 4. Philip the second King of Spain who claimed as Son to Isabella Daughter of Emanuel King of Portugal and so a degree nearer than the rest to Henry the last King The States and Governours differing the States were dissolved and during their recess the Governours not agreeing among themselves the King of Spain raised an Army and entering Portugal seiz'd the City of Lisbon and consequently all the rest of the Kingdom submitted to him and so made himself King by force And yet we have seen in his Grandson's time the Estates of Portugal declare this Title void and the Crown setled in the Posterity of the Duke of Braganza who still enjoy it by vertue of this Fundamental Law And that this Fundamental Law could not be altered but by the consent of the Cortes or States appears by the late Alteration of this Constitution upon the Treaty of Marriage of the present Prince Regents Daughter with the Duke of Savoy And how much even Kings themselves have attributed to the Authority of their Estates appears by the League made between Philip the Long King of France and David King of Scots wherein this Condition was exprest That if there should happen any difference about the Succession in either of these Realms he of the two Kings which remained alive should not suffer any to place himself on the Throne but him who should have the Judgment of the Estates of his side and then he should with all his power oppose him who would after this contest for the Crown So that our Author without cause lays the fault upon the wilful ignorance of the People in not remembring or acknowledging the right Heir of the Crown when the ablest and wisest men of the Age they lived in could not by the meer Laws of Nature and Reason determine which was he And our Author should have done well to have set down some certain Rules how the People might be assured without a positive Law before made that they acknowledge the right Heir and not an Usurper to his prejudice CHAP. II. Observations on the Directions for Obedience in doubtful times and other places of his Patriarcha and other Treatises BUT since this Author rather than the disposal of a Crown shall fall to the decision of the People or States of the Kingdom will give an Usurper a good Right to it against all persons but him that hath the Right we will now examine how much of that is true which he lays down in his Directions for Obedience to Governours in doubtful times and how far men are bound in Conscience to obey an Usurper whilst he that hath Right is kept out by him First he takes it for granted that all those that so eagerly strive for an original Power to be in the People do with one accord acknowledge that originally the Supream Power was
difficult Cases by way of Appeal in time of peace But that the Government was purely Aristocratical this Author himself confesses even when he denies it He tells us p. 50. at the time when Scripture saith There was no King in Israel but that every man did that which was right in his own eyes even then the Israelites were under the Kingly Government of the Fathers of particular Families for i◠the consultation for providing Wives for the Benjamites we find the Elders of the Congregation bare the onely sway Judg. 21.16 Now what is an Aristocracy if this be not viz. an Assembly of the Elders or chief of the Fathers that is the best men meeting consulting and resolving of publick business What power these Fathers of Families had at home is not declared whether it was independant or else did submit to the government of its own Tribe But that it was Aristocratical is apparent if Josephus understood any thing o◠the History or Antiquities of his own Country which he undertook expresly to write of For Antiq. lib. 4. cap. he brings in Samuel speaking to this effect to the People desiring a King An Aristocracy is the best Government neither should you require any other sort of Government But as for the Kings which God gave them afterwards there is nothing to be drawn from thence for this Authors advantage for he himself tells us there is no use to be made of it Vid. His Observations upon Milton p. 20. For speaking against Milton's sence of the words in Deut. 17.14 he says Can the foretelling or the forewarning the Israelites of a wanton wicked desire of theirs i. e. of a King which God himself condemned be an Argument that God gave or granted them a Right to do such a wicked thing Or can the narration and reproving of a future Fact be a donation and approving of a present Right or the permission of a sin be made a commission for the doing of it So that it seems sometimes when it makes against the Author's sence God is so far from approving Kingly Government that it is a sin for the People so much as to desire it But it is likewise as great a Question whether after Kingly Government was established it was likewise absolute so that the King might put any body to death right or wrong For we find 1 Sam. 14.45 the People rescued Jonathan out of the hands of his Father Saul and would not permit him to be put to death for his breach of the rash Vow which Saul had made nor is it imputed to the People that is the Army for a sin Neither could Ahab take away Naboth's Vineyard and his Life together but by colour of Law and a legal Tryal Neither could King Zedekiah save Jeremy the Prophet from the power of the Princes who cast him into the Dungeon for Jer. 38. v. 5. Zedekiah said Behold he is in your hand for the King is not he that can do any thing against you His fourth reason is that God in Scripture mentions not nor takes notice of any other Government than Monarchical This is but a Negative Argument at best the Scriptures not being written to teach us Politicks but to declare God's Will and to shew us his merciful and gracious dealing with the Jews notwithstanding all their backslidings and rebellions against his Commandments His fifth reason is that Aristotle saith in his Ethicks chap. 11. That Monarchy is the best form of Government and a Popular Estate the worst The words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which though true does not enforce any Obligation to the one more than the other for though a man be obliged to his own preservation yet he himself is the onely Judge of the means and if he erre and use the worst means for the best they are not in fault if they acted as well as they could and to the best of their knowledge for that end Neither does it follow that there are no more sorts of Government than these two to be chosen Nor is it any better Argument that the world for a long time knew no other sort of Government but onely Monarchy and that the Platforms of Commonwealths were hatched amongst a few Cities in Greece and that they were first governed by Kings until the wantonness ambition or faction of the People made them attempt news kinds of Regiment But let any one read the Greek Histories and he will find the cruelty and tyranny of Kings did more frequently give occasion to the People to run into Commonwealths than either the ambition or faction of the People And as for the antiquity of Monarchy the alteration of it rather makes against him since the whole Body of a People seldom alter a Government unless they find themselves hurt by it and that it proved inconvenient for them I shall not dispute which is the better Government Monarchy or Commonwealth since in my own judgment I incline to the former where the Monarch is good And though I will not affirm as the Author does Directions for Obedience p. 71. That even the Power which God himself exerciseth over mankinde is by the Right of Fatherhood as he is both King and Father of us all Since besides his absolute power and his being the sole cause of our production he is also endued with that infinite Wisdom and Goodness that he still orders all things for the good of his Subjects and so hath besides his Power the highest Right to govern as the best and most perfect being So likewise Monarchs as far as they imitate the divine Wisdom and Beneficence have the like Right to be called Gods Lieutenants Nor shall I trouble my self as the Author does p. 67. and so on to 73. to compare the Mischiess and Inconveniencies that have been found in absolute Monarchical and Popular Government there being various Examples both of Cruelty and Injustice in both and I think they are both the aptest of any sorts of Governments to run into Extreams and I know not whether there have not been found out a Regal Government mixt with somewhat of an Aristocracy or Democracy which if truely observed were freest from the inconveniencies of either But this Author is so full of the mischiefs of Commonwealths that he sometimes mistakes in History and makes those Disorders to arise from the faults and licentiousness of the People which proceeded indeed from the Usurpation of their Power Thus he makes it the height of the Roman Liberty that its Subjects might be killed by those that would and sets forth the Tyranny of Sylla as an effect of the Roman Freedom when indeed it was rather an effect of the absolute Monarchy usurped by Sylla during his Dictatorship So that Dionysius Halicarnasseus gives us his judgment of those actions of Sylla in these words Lib. V. circa finem I would onely shew that for these wickednesses the name of Dictator became hateful for all things seem good and profitable onely
no more to be said And as for the places out of St. Paul and Peter it not being my designe to write Divinity-Lectures I shall refer the Reader to the learned Commentators onely I shall take notice that his Assertion That these Apostles wrote their Epistles when the name of the Authority and People of Rome was still in being though the Emperours had usurped a Military Power and yet though the Government was for a long time in most things in the Senate and People of Rome yet for all this neither of the two Apostles take notice of any such Popular Government and our Saviour himself divides all between God and Caesar and â—llows nothing to the People All which though but a Negative Argument against Popular Government and â—o not conclusive yet the foundation of it is not true For though in Rome there remained a shadow of the Power in the Senate yet it was onely in such cases as â—he then Emperours committed to their judgment as â—he Kings of France do now make use of the Parliament of Paris onely to ease themselves of divers troublesome Causes or to take off the odium from themselves as in the condemnation of Sejanus and divers other Conspirators against them and yet they reserved the last Appeal to themselves in Cases both Civil and Capital as may be observed in St. Paul's appeal to Caesar and it is certain that the Roman Emperours in those times put men to death as often as they had a mind to it by their own power made what Edicts they pleased and appointed Proconsuls and Governours of Provinces as often as they saw it convenient and had all Money coined with their Image or Superscription and received and disposed of all Tributes publick Taxes And yet this Author doubts whether Tiberius Claudius or Nero were absolute Monarchs when they had all the Prerogatives that a Monarch could have I come now to the Author's Observations on Aristotle's Politicks It will be easie to prove that he makes use of him in all places that make for his Hypothesis but takes no notice of those that make against it a usual course among Writers especially in Politicks or Divinity Nor does he onely do this but likewise oftentimes perverts Aristotle's sence to make it subservient to his own of which I shall produce these instances In his first Quotation p. 3. he renders these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the eldest in every house is King Whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not here signifie to be an absolute Monarch but to govern as a Master of a Family or chief Ruler a power faâ— short of that of an absolute Monarch And so Lambinus hath rendered it in his Version So likewise he hath misplaced these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and makes them to come in as a reason of what he says before concerning a perfect Monarchy whereas this sentence precedes the former and there are three or four sentences between them and therefore it cannot serve for a Consequent where it is really an Antecedent Nor is this sentence truely rendered by the Author For a King according to Law makes no kind of Government whereas he should have said No distinct species of Government for so are these last words to be rendered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or else he would make Aristotle contradict himself if after he had spoke so much in other * Vid. 3 Pol. c. 14. Speaking of the ancient Heroical Kingdoms places of a King according to Law he should make it no kind of Government at all So likewise p. 4. he misrenders these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That of all Governments Monarchy is the best and a Popular State the worst Whereas any one but meanly skill'd in Greek knows that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not signifie Monarchy but Kingship and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not a Popular Estate but an Aristocratical Commonwealth and in the same Chapter put in opposition to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I shall not trouble my self to inquire whether Aristotle distinguishes well between an Aristocracy and an Oligarchy or between an Oligarchy and a Democracy or whether he do well to exclude Artificers from any Vote in the Government These I shall leave to be defended by those that are greater admirers of him than my self onely I will see that if I can he have fair play and not that sence put upon him that he never meant And therefore I shall turn over to p. 12. where he quotes another place out of Aristotle's fourth Book cap. 13. That the first Commonwealth among the Grecians after Kingdoms was made of those that waged War From whence he would infer That the Grecians after they left off to be governed by Kings fell to be governed by an Army So that any Nation or Kingdom that is not charged with the keeping of a King must perpetually be at the charge of paying and keeping of an Army Which though it happened true during the corrupt Oligarchy of the Rump which was â—ut an armed Faction contrary to the sense of this Nation yet is not a necessary Consequent of all Commonwealths Neither is it the Author's sence in this place as may appear by what he says before and what â—ollows these words That he meant no such thing a standing Army in constant Pay being a thing unknown among the Greek Commonwealths where every Freeman served in person as a Horseman or on foot according to his ability as any that reads those Histories may easily observe and a Guard of Strangers or a constant standing Army was ever held the Body of Tyranny as it still continues in all absolute Monarâ—hies from France to China But to return to Aristle in the place before cited by the Author where speaking just before of the Government of the Maleans and other Greek Commonwealths he says That their Government consisted not onely of those Footmen that bore Arms but of those that had served in the Army And then follows these words quoted by the Author 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not well rendered by those that waged War since they should rather be rendered by those that went to the Wars this Force not being to defend them from their own Citizens but Neighbours with whom they were still at Wars for it appears that not onely those had a share in the Government who were actually in Arms but those also that had served in the Army for Aristotle says immediately after That their Strength consisted chiefly at first of Horsemen and that as the Common-wealths increased in the strength and number of them that were of ability or substance to bear Arms the Administration of the Commonwealth was communicated to more From whence it appears that as also at first among the Romans they onely had a Voice in their Councils or Assemblies who were able to maintain themselves in the Wars at their own charge As amongst us none have a
rate his power now encreases but that he may be so he threaten to cut their Banks and let in the Sea to drown them and their Country if they will not yeild it up to him may they not if they find they cannot resist him submit themselves to him and make the best terms they can for themselves and are they not then obliged by the Authors own Principles to continue his Subjects and yet here is no actual War or inundation but threats only to force them to this submission So that the Authors Supposition is false that no case can happen but an actual War only which can reduce a People to such terms of extremity as to compell them to an absolute abnunciation of all Soveraignity and so likewise is this consequence also which he assumes from thence then war which causeth that necessity is the prime means of extorting such Soveraignity and not the free gift of the People who cannot otherwise chuse but give away that Power which they cannot keep for they might either leave their Country or bury themselves in it But it seems the Author had forgot his Logick or else he would have remembred to distinguish between Causa sine qua non and Causa efficiens a cause which does not properly give being to a thing and yet without which it could not have been produced Thus a Slave at Argiers though it is the occasion of his servitude his being taken Prisoner yet the true Cause of his becoming a lawful Servant to his taker does not proceed from his conquering him but from his coming to Terms with him that he shall be dismist of his Fetters or Imprisonment upon Condition he will serve faithfully and not run away and all Moralists consider those actions they call mixt as when a Merchant flings his goods over into the Sea to avoid being cast away among the number of the Voluntary ones though they commenced from some kind of force since in this case the Merchant might if he pleased keep his goods if he would venture his life So in many cases may a Conquered People if they have never neither by themselves or their representatives owned the Conquerer But as much as the Author quarrells at the word usufructuary Right in Grotius as too base to express the Right of Kings and as derogatory to the dignity of Supreme Majesty yet the the French are not so scruplous but in the absolutest Monarchy of Europe plainly declare that their King hath but an usufructuary right to his Kingdom and the Territories belonging thereunto or that he can any way charge them with his debts or alienate or dispose of them without the consent of the States of France See Mezeray in the reign of this King 1527. and was so solâ—mnly declared by that great Assemby des notables called by K. Francis the First to give their Judgment of the Articles of Peace lately made with the Emperour Charles V. at Madrid their sense was that Burgundy which by those Articles was to be delivered up was an inseparable Member of the Crown of which he was but the usufructuary and so could not dispose of the one any more than of the other nor was this any new opinion but as old as St. Lewis who being desired by the Emperour Frederic III. to restore the King of England his just Rights To which the said King replyed whose words I will faithfully translate as they are in Matthew Paris p. 765. Anno Dom. 1249. By the holy Cross with which I am signed I would willingly do it if my Counsel i. e. the Estates would permit it because I love the King of England as my Cosen but it were hard at this very instant of my Pilgrimage viz. for the holy land to disturb the whole body of my Kingdom by contradicting the Counsels of my Mother and all my Nobles although the Intercessors are very dear to me neither is this to make a Kingdom all one with a Ferm as the Author words it since in the civil Law it signifies not only one that barely receives the rents or profits but likewise enjoys all other Prerogatives and advantages that may accrew to him as the true owner though he have not power to sell or give it away Nor I suppose will any French or English Subject unless such bigotted ones as the Author acknowledge any Forraign Prince or other Person can obtain an absolute Dominion over them by Conquest I am sure they were not of that opinion between two hundred and three hundred years agoe when the King of England brought a plausible Title into France and had it backt by almost an entire Conquest of the whole Kingdom and a formal setlement and acknowledgment from Charles VI. then King and the greatest part of the Nobility and Clergy of France at Paris and yet after all this the French had so little Conscience as to proclame Charles the Dauphin King of France and to drive the English out of the Country and renounce their allegiance which they had sworn to our Kings Henry V. and VI. and yet the Author will have it to be but a naked presumption in Grotius to suppose The Primary will of the People to have been ever necessary P. 69. to bestow Supreme power in succession But if the Author will not be content that Kings shall have any less than absolute Propriety in the Crown let us see the consequences of this Doctrine For the Crown must be of England in the nature of an absolute Fee Simple and is consequently chargeable by any act or alienable by the Testament of the King in being So that then King John had Power to make this Kingdom feudatary and tributory to the Pope and so the Pope hath still a good Title to it And since Religion with these Gentlemen diminishes nothing from the right and absoluteness of Monarchy the same King might have made over his Kingdom to the Emperor of Moroco as the Historians of those times relate he would and so the Sarracen Prince might have entred upon the non-performance of the Conditions and have turned out his Vassal and been King here himself which opinion how contrary it was to the notions which Kings themselves had of the right to dispose of their Kingdoms let any man consult Matthew Paris and he will see there what Phillip Agustus amongst other things tells Wallo the Popes Legate Anno 1216. P. 280. that no King could give away his Kingdom without the consent of his Barons who are obliged to defend it and all the Nobility there present began to cry out at once that they would assert this Priviledge till death That no King or Brince could by his sole Will give away his Kingdom or make it tributary by which the Nobles of the Kingdom might become Slaves Nor did the English Nobility think otherwise since this was one of the causes of their taking Arms against King John Matt. Paris 1245. p. 659. 666. and afterwards in his
in the Assembly of Estates To which the answer is obvious that though it is true the Monarchs passing of Laws whether in the great Council or in his privy Council be but a matter of form if the Legislative power remain wholly in himself yet since even the forms and Circumstances in doing things are such essential things without which business cannot be done If therefore the people made it part of their original Contract with their Prince at first that he should make no laws but what should be of their proposing and drawing up and that he might refuse if he pleased the whole but should not alter any part of it This though in its self a matter of form yet being at first so agreed is indeed an original and fundamental constitution of the Government Therefore the Author is as much mistaken in his Divinity as his Law when Patriarcha P. 97. Resolves the question in the affirmative Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he command any thing contrary to his Laws That the Subject ought to break the laws if his King command him Where as as the Author hath put it nothing is more contrary to Law and Reason for so it would be no sin for Souldiers or others to give and take away mens Goods by force or turn them out of their houses if they could produce the Kings Commission for it and consequently it was no sin in those Irish Rebells that acted by a counterfeit Commission under Sr. Philim O Neal for though it was forged yet the forgery being known but to very few it was in respect of those who acted by vertue thereof all one as if it had been true and according to this Authors Divinity Part 1. Page 98. They were obliged to rise and cut the throats of all the English Protestants since the King by his Commission commanding a man to serve him in the Wars he may not examine whether the War be just or unjust but must obey since he hath no authority to judge of the causes of War which if spoken of such Wars as a King hath a right to make is true but of all warin general nothing is more false as appears by the instance before given nor are the examples the Author there brings at all satisfactory as that not only in humane Laws but also in Divine a thing may be commanded contrary to law and yet obedience to such commands is necessary the sanctifying the Sabbath is a Divine law yet if a Master command his Servant not to go to Church upon a Sabbath day the best Divines teach us that the Servant must obey this Command though it may be sinful and unlawful in the Master because the Servant hath no authority or liberty to examine or judge whether his Master sin or no in so commanding Where if the Author suppose as I do not that the Sunday which he improperly calls the Sabbath cannot be sanctified without going to Church or that going to Church on that day is an indispensible duty the Master commanding the contrary ought no more to be obeyed than if he should command his Servant to rob or steal for him but if going to Church be a thing indifferent or dispensible at some times then the Author puts a Fallacy upon his Readers arguing from the non-performance of a thing which is doubtful or only necessary secundum quid in which case the Subject or Servant is bound to obey Authority to a thing of another kind which is absolutely unlawful Since it is sinful for any Subjects to obey the King 's private or personal Commands in things unlawful and contrary to known positive laws The laws only seting the bounds of Property in all Commonwealths so that though it be no sin in Turky or Muscovy for an Officer to go and setch any mans head by vertue of the Grand Seigniors Commission without any trial or accusation I suppose any man that valued his life would say it were murder for any person to do the same by the Kings bare Commission in England and yet there is nothing but the Laws and Customs of each Government that creates the difference Not that I do affirm it were a sin in all Cases for a Subject to obey the King though contrary to Law since there are some Laws which the King hath power to dispence with and others which he hath not and others which he may dispence with but yet only for the publick good in cases of extreme necessity But to affirm as the Author does without any qualification or restriction that it is a sin to disobey the Kings personal Commands in all cases however issued out favours of Mr. Hobs Divinity as well as Law nor does the Author himself when he hath thought better on 't Patriark P. 99. assert the Kings Prerogative to be above all laws but for the good of his Subjects that are under the laws and to defend the peoples rights as was acknowledged by his late Majesty in his speceh upon his answer to the Petition of right So it is true the King hath a power to pardon all Felonies and Manslaughters and perhaps Murders too yet supposing this power should be exerted but for one year towards all Malefactors whatsoever any man may easily imagin what such a Prerogative would produce So that the publick good of the Kingdom ought to be the rule of all such Commands and where that fails the right of commanding ceases Ib. 99. As for the instance of the Court of Chancery it is not a breach of the Kings Preogative but part of the Common Law of this Kingdom so no man that understands any thing of Law or Reason will affirm that it is a Court of that exorbitant power that it is limited by no rules or bounds either of Common or Statute Law or of the Laws of aequum and bonum or that every thing that a Chancellour who is keeper of the Kings Conscience decrees must be well and truly decreed since this were to set up an absolute Tyrany But I shall now proceed to examine the rest of the reasons the Author gives either in this Treatise or his Patriarcha against the possibility of a limited Monarchy He finds fault with Mr. H. P. 281. ' For asserting that a Monarch can have any limitation ab Externo and that the sole means of Soveraignty is consent and fundamental contract which consent puts them in their power which can be no more nor other than is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection upon which our Author inquires thus if the sole means of a limited Monarchy be the consent and fundamental contract of a Nation how is it that he saith a Monarch may be limited by after condescent is an after condescent all one with a fundamentnl contract or with an original and radical constitution why yet he tells us it is a secundary original constitution A secundary original that is a second first
and if that condescent be an act of Grace doth not this condesent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will if he either formally or virtually as the Author supposeth desert his absolute or Arbitrary power which he hath by conquest or other right Which last words of Mr. H. though I confess they are ill exprest yet I see no down right contradiction in the sence Mr. H. meant them if any man please to consult him he there says That a Monarch may either be limited by original constitution or an after condescent therefore these words the sole means of Soveraignty is the consent and fundamental contract is not meant of a limited Monarchy any more than of another but of any Soveraignty whatever So likewife though these words a secundary original constitution may seem to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to destroy each other yet as the Author explains himself you will find they do not in sense for he only supposes that a Prince who hath an absolute Arbitrary power either by succession or election finding it not so safe and easie as he conceives it would be for him if he came to new terms with his people would desert some of that despotick power and govern by let rules or Laws which he obliges himself and his Successors by Oath or some other conditions never to make or alter without the consent of his Subjects I see not why this may not in one sense be called a second original constitution for he was at first an absolute King by which was the original constitution and his coming to new Terms with them may be termed in respect of this a secundary original constitution or agreement of the government though founded upon the former old right which the Monarch had to govern as for a King by Conquest it cannot indeed in respect of him be properly called a secundary constitution since the Conquerour had no right to clame an absolute subjection from the Subjects until they submitted to him so as that they might not drive him out again if they were able until he came to some Terms with them Thus I think no sober man but will maintain that the people of England might lawfully have driven out William I. called the Conquerour supposing he had claimed by no other title but Conquest alone which when he had sworn to observe and maintain all the Laws and liberties of the people of England and had been thereupon Crown'd and received as King and had quitted his pretensions by Conquest or force and had taken the Oaths and homage of the Clergy Nobility and People they could not then without Rebellion endeavour to do And certainly had he not thought his title by Conquest not so good as the other of King Edward's Testament he would never have quitted the former and sworn to observe the Laws of his Predecessor so likewise Henry I. Mat. Paris from whom all the Kings and Queens of England have since claim'd upon his Election and Coronation for other title he had none granted a Charter whereby he renounced divers illegal practices which Flatterers may call Prerogatives which his Father and brother had exercised contrary to King Edward's Laws and their own Coronation Oaths so that here is an Example of one of the Authors absolute Monarchs who by a right of Conquest might pretend to the exercise of an arbitrary power yet renounced it and only retained so much as might serve for the well governing of his Subjects and his own security It is not therefore true which this Author affirms that this accepted of so much power as the people pleased to give him since they neither desired nor did he grant them any more but those just rights they had long before enjoyed under their former Kings before his Father's coming into England However I conceive this wise Prince was of the opinion of Theopompus King of Lacedemon Plut. in Lycurgo who when his wife upbraided him that he would leave the royal dignity to his Sons less than he found it no rather replyed he greater as more durable and therefore Plutarch in the same place ascribes the long continuance of the Lacedemonian Kingdom to the limited power of their Kings in these words ' and indeed when Envy is removed from Kings together with excess of power it followed that they had no cause to fear that which happened to the Kings of the Massenians and Argives from their Subjects But because this Author tells Mr. H. that if we should ask what proofs or examples he hath to justify his Doctrine of a limited Monarchy in the Constitution he would be as mute as a fish we will shew two or three examples of the antiquity of such limited Monarchies though they were not of the same model with those that are at this day found among the Germanes and other northern Nations descended from thence In Macedon the Kings descended of Caranus as Callisthenes says in Arrian did obtain an Empire over the Macedonians not by force but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Law So Curtius Lib. IV. The Macedonians were used to Kingly Government but in a greater appearance of liberty than other Nations For it is certain the lives of their Subjects were not at their disposal as appears from the same Author Lib. VI. The Army by an antient custom of the Macedonians did judg of Capital causes i. e. in time of War but in peace it belonged to the People the power of their Kings signified litle unless his Authority was before of some force And this was by original constitution for we do not find that ever the Kings of Macedon altered any thing in their original constitution yet they had the Soveraignty in most things and their persons were sacred So likewise among the antient Romans where Romulus from a Captain of Volunteers became a King Dyonisius Halicar Lib. II. Tells us that after Romulus had made a speech to his Souldiers and followers to this effect that he left it to them to consider what Government they would chuse for whatsoever they pitcht upon he should submit to it and though he did think himself unworthy the Principality yet he should not refuse to obey their Commands concluding that he thought it an Honour for him to have been declared the Leader of so great a Colony and to have a City called by his name Whereupon the people after some deliberation among themselves chose him their King or limited Monarch since both the Senate and people had from the very beginning their particular shares in the Government the Senates making this great Counsel which yet were for the greater part of them chosen out of the Patricians by the Tribes Dyon Hal. Lib. 11. and Curiae with these he consulted and referred all business of lesser moment which he did not care to dispatch himself for be reserved to himself the last Appeal in causes and to be Pontifex Maximus or Cheif Priest and Preserver
is but like the advice and direction which the Kings Councel gives the King which no man says is a Law to the King Igrant this distinction provided the Author will likewise admit another that though the King is not obliged by Laws or to any Judges of them as to Superiors or as to the compulsory Power of them Yet in respect of God and his own Conscience he is still obliged to observe them and not to dispence with them in those cases which the Law does not give him a power so to do and since it is true that it is the rewards and punishments annext that give laws their Sanction therefore there are certain rewards which will naturally bless Princes that keep their Laws such as peace of Conscience Security the affections of their People c. and if I call the contrary effects to these natural punishments that are commonly the consequences of the breach of them I think I should not speak absurdly since the Author himself tells us P. 93. Albeit Kings who make the Laws are as King James there teacheth us above Laws yet will they rule their Subjects by the Law and a King governing in a setled Kingdom leaves to be a King degenerates into a Tyrant so soon as he seems to rule it is there printed in the Copy according which is nonsence contrary to his Laws and certainly a Tyrant can never promise himself security either from his own Conscience or from Men but whereas he says the direction of the Law is only like the advice which the Kings Councel gives him which no man says is a Law to him is false for the Kings Councel should never advise him to do that which he cannot whith a safe Conscience perform but the Kings Conscience can never advise him to break those Laws that are the boundaries between his Prerogatives and the Peoples just Rights and therefore though it is true in some cases where the King sees the Law rigorous or doubtful he may mitigate or interpret the Execution thereof by his Judges to whom he hath made over that power in the intervalls of Parliament and though perhaps some particular Statutes may be his Authority be suspended for causes best known to himself and Council Yet this does not extend to Laws of publick concernment and for that I will appeal to the Conscience of any true Son of the Church of England whether he thinks for Example that the Proclamation for indulgence contrary to the Statute made against Conventicles were binding or no Neither is this that follows consistent with what the Author hath said before That although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws yet he is not bound thereto but at his good will and for good Example or so far forth as the general Law of the safety of the Commonwealth doth naturally bind him For in such sort only positive Laws may may be said to bind the King not by being positive but as they are naturally the best and only means for the preservation of the Common-wealth So that if a King thinks any the firmest and most indispensible Laws that have been made suppose Magna Charta or the Statute de Tallagio non concedendo for example not to be for the safety of the Commonweal it is but his declaring that he will have them no longer observed and the work is done nor will this that follows help it though true that all Kings even Tyrants and Conquerors are bound to preserve the Lands Goods Liberties and lives of all their Subjects not by any Municipal Laws so much as the natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore-Fathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick Good of the Subjects All which is very well but if this Monarch thus succeeding in the place of the natural Father is the sole Judge of what things are necessary for the common good what if he have a mind to keep these Children for Children and subjects slaves are all one with this Authour as some unnatural Fathers do as cheap as they can or to make the most of them will let them enjoy no more but the scanty necessaries of life and will think fair water brown bread and wooden shooes sufficient for a Farmer and 300 l. or 400 l. per annum enough in Conscience for a Country Gentleman or desiring to be absolute and therefore to have a constant standing Army to raise mony with as some Monarchs do and being resolved that for the future all the just rights and priviledges of his Clergy Nobility and People shall signifie nothing will take all the over-plus of his Childrens Estates eaving them no more then a poor and miserable subsistence he may lawfully do what he will with his own and it is all his upon the first intimation of his pleasure by Edict or Proclamation But perhaps some honest Divine may start up and tell him he will be damned for thus abusing his power or breaking his Coronation Oath what What if this Father of his people shall laugh at him for a fool and think himself too cunning to believe any such thing or what if his Son or Successor be resolved not to run his head any more into the snare of a Coronation Oath but finding himself invested in all the absolute power of his Predecessour without any unjust act of his own since we know Princes seldome loose any thing they have once got will exercise it as he pleases for his own humour or glory and thinks himself not obliged in Conscience to restore any of those rights his Predecessor hath ursuped upon his People I know not what benefit this may be to the Prince but this I am sure of it would very little mend the Subjects condition to be told their former Monarch was damned or that this may follow him when they are now slaves nor is this a mere Chimera since a Neighbouring people over against us lost their liberties by much such a kind of proceeding And therefore this Authour hath found out a very fit interpretation of the Kings Coronation Oath Vide Iuramenta Regis quando coronatur old Stat. ed 1556. for whereas he used to Swear that he will cause equal and upright justice to be administred in all his judgments and to use discretion with mercy and truth according to his power and that the just Laws and customes quas vulgus elegerit I will not translate it shall chuse to be observed to the honour of God Yet our Author will have the King obliged to keep no laws but what he in his discretion Judges to be upright which is to make the Oath signifie just nothing as I have proved already wherein he abominably perverts the sense of this Oath for that which he puts first is really last And the words by which he Swears to observe the Laws and customes granted by King Edward and other his Predecessors are absolute and without
although it look fine yet examined to the bottom signifies little for it is not true that every the least transgression of the bounds of Law is a subversion of the Government it self since if done perhaps only to one or a few persons it does not follow that therefore it must be a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick Liberty in all cases Neither does the Subjects bearing with it not contribute otherwise then accidentally to this breach of Liberty Since he is obliged to bear it not because it is just but because he either may hope to have redress by the ordinary course of Law or else by petitioning the Assembly of Estates when they meet who are partly ordained on purpose to remonstrate the Grievances of Subjects to their Prince and thereupon to have them redressed Nor is this limited Monarch as the Author would infer less obliged to govern according to Law in smaller or private matters then in great and publick ones Only in many smaller matters Princes or their Officers may through ignorance or inadvertency sometimes transgress the true bounds of Law which they would not do perhaps if they were better informed And so likewise if the Subject bear it it is not from the Legality of the Act but from this great Maxime in Law and Reason that a mischief to some private men is better than an inconvenience in giving every private person power that thinks himself injured by the Prince or his Officers to be his own Judg and right himself by force since that were contrary to the great duty of every good Subject of endeavouring to preserve the common peace and happiness of his Country which ought to be preferred before any private mans Interest So on the other side if the oppression or breach of Laws be general and extend to all the People alike if the reason of the case alter why may not the practicedo so too ' But Mr. H. gives us another remedy in this case that if the Monarchs Act of Exorbitancy or Transgression be mortal and such as suffered dissolves the Frame of the Government and publick Liberty then the illegality is to be laid open and redressment sought by Petition Which is true for an Appeal to the Law from the violence of subordinate Ministers is really a Petition for Justice to the King himself who is by the Law supposed present in the persons of his Judges that represent him and this the Author himself in a better humour does confess in his Patriarcha P. 93. The people have the Law as a familiar interpreter of the Kings pleasure which being published throughout the Kingdom doth represent the presence and Majesty of the King also the Judges and Magistrates are restrained by the common Rules of Law from using their own Liberty to the injury of others since they are to judg according to the Laws and not to follow their own Opinions And because it might so happen that the King may be sometimes surprised or importuned to write Orders or Letters to the Judges to direct them to act contrary to the Law The King himself in Parliament hath declared See the Oath of the Justices 18. E. 3. what Oath these Justices shall take when they are admitted into their Office where among other things they swear thus And that ye deny no man common right by the Kings Letters nor none other mans nor for none other cause and in case such Letters do come to you contrary to the Law that ye do nothing by such Letters but certifie the King thereof and proceed to execute the Law notwithstanding the same Letters and concludes thus And in case ye be from henceforth found in default in any of the points aforesaid ye shall be at the Kings will of Body Lands or Goods thereof to be done as shall please him as God help you c. And the Lord Chief-Justice Anderson and his Fellow-Justices in the Common-Pleas who upon so great a point as Cavendishes Case was 35 El. having consulted with all the Judges of England delivered their Opinions solemnly in writing that the Queen was obliged by her Coronation-Oath to keep the Laws and if they should not likewise observe them they were forsworne Anderson p. 154 155. Which Will of the Kings is supposed to be as well declared by the House of Peers his supreme Court of Justice as by any other way See the Judgment upon Tresillian and the rest of his Brethren 21 Rich. 2. and the Impeachment of the House of Commons against the Judges that gave their Opinions contrary to Law in the case of Ship-money Vide the subsequent Act of Parliament 17 Car. 1. Chap. 14. declaring that upon the Tax called Shipmoney and the Judgment Entr. 1. H. 7. 4. b. the judicial opinions of the said Justices and Barons were and are contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm and the Liberty of the Subjects c. which if it be truely observed there can never be any fear of a Civil War or popular Commotion since our Law supposes the King can do no wrong that is in his own person And therefore Sir John Markham when Chief Justice told King Edward the 4th That the King cannot arrest any Man himself for suspition of Treason or Fellony as other of his Lieges may for if it be a wrong to the party grieved he has no remedy Therefore if any Act or thing be done to the Subject contrary to the Law the Judges and Ministers of Justice are to be questioned and punished if the Laws are violated and no reflection made upon the King who is still supposed to do his Subjects Right Si factam fuerit injustum says Bracton per inde non fuerit factum Regis And thus much will serve for a further Answer to the Authors Query before mentioned Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he command any thing contrary to his Laws since all the Subjects both great and small are supposed to know what the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject are as well as what are the Prerogatives of the Crown nor are these reserved Cases so many or so difficult as the Anthor would make us believe but that they may be easily understood without Appealing to any other Judg then the Conscience of every honest man And though the King may for our common defence in time of War make Bulwarks upon another mans Land or command a House to be pull'd down if the next be on Fire or the Suburbs of a City to be demolished in time of War to make it serviceable though men may justify their obedience in such Cases yet it were folly and madness from thence to argue that the King were as much to be obeyed if he commanded us to pull down a whole Town for his Diversion or to take away all mens Lands or Goods at his Pleasure Since if he should be so weak as to command it it were his unhappiness
pleases because I have obliged my self to it by compact and I am obliged to follow this Mans will because he can enjoyn me thus by his supreme Authority But supreme and absolute are not one and the same thing for that denotes the absense of a Superiour or an Equal in the same order or degree but this a faculty of exerciseing any right by a Man 's own Judgment and Will but what if there be added a Commissary clause that if he shall do otherwise he shall forfeit his Kingdom as the Arogonians of Old after the King had sworn to their Priviledges did promise him Obedience in this manner Vid Hotomani Frarcogallia C. 12. We who are of as great Power as thou do Create thee our King and Lord on this condition that thou observe our Laws and Priviledges if otherwise not Here it is certain that an absolute King cannot be He to whom the Kingdom is thus committed under a Commissary Clause or Condition but that this King may have for all this a regal Power though limited I see no reason to the contrary for although we grant a Temporary Authority cannot be acknowledged for Supreme because it depends upon a potestative condition and which can never be in the Princes power Yet a King of this sort above-mention'd is not therefore subject to the power of the People with whom the cognizance is whether he keep his Oath or not for besides that such a Commissary Clause is wont to comprehend only such plain things which are evident to any Mans sences and so are not liable to dispute So that this power of taking cognizance does not at all suppose any Jurisdiction by which the Actions of the King as a Subject may be judged but is nothing else than a bare Declaration whereby any Man takes notice that his manifest right is violated by another See Grotius Lib. 1. Cap. 3. § 16. And Baecler upon him who are both of the same Opinion Grotius indeed in the same place speaks more obscurely when he says That the Obligation arising from the promises of Kings does either fall upon the exercise of the act or also directly upon the very power of it if he act contrary to promises of the former sort the act may be called unjust and yet be valid if against those of the latter it is also void as if he should have said Sometimes a King promises not to use part of his Supreme Authority but after acertain manner and sometimes he plainly renounces some part thereof concerning which there are two things to be observed first that also some acts may be void which are performed contrary to an Obligation of the former sorts as for example if a King swear not to impose any Taxes without the consent of the Estates I suppose that such Taxes which the King shall Levy by his own will alone to bevoid Secondly That in the latter form the parts of the supreme power are divided But that the Nature of limited Kingdoms may more thoroughly be understood it is to be observed that the affairs which occur in Governning a Common-wealth are of two kinds for of some of them it may be agreed beforehand because whenever they happen they are still but of the same Nature but of others a certain Judgment cannot be made but at the time present whether they are beneficial to the Publick or not for that those circumstances which accompany them cannot be forseen Yet concerning both that People may provide that he to whom they have commited this limited Kingdom should not depart from the Common good in the former whilst it prescribes perpetual Laws or Conditions which the King should be obliged to observe in the latter whilst he is obliged to consult the assembly of his People or Nobility Thus the People being satisfied of the truth of their Religion and what sort of Ecclesiastical Government or Ceremonies do best suit their Genius so it is in Sweden may condition with the King upon his Inauguration that he shall not change any thing in Religious matters by his sole Authority So every Body being sensible how often Justice would be injured if Sentence should always be given by the sole Judgment of the Prince ex aequo hono without any written or known Laws and that Passion VI. Tacit An. L. 13. 4. 2. Interest or unskilfulness would have too great a sway for avoiding this inconvenience the people may oblige their King that either he shall compose a Body of just Laws or observe those that are already extant and also that Judgment be given according to those Laws in certain Courts or Colledges of Justice and that none but the most weighty Causes should come before the King by way of Appeal This is likewise the Law of Sweden So likewise since it is well known how easily Riches obtained by the Labour of others may be squandered away by Luxury or Ambition therefore the Subjects Goods should not lie at their Princes mercy to sustain their Lusts Some Nations have wisely assigned a certain Revenue to their Prince such as they supposed necessary for the constant Charges of the Common-wealth but if greater expences were necessary they would have those referred to the Assembly of Estates And since also some Kings are more desirous than they ought to be of Military Glory and running themselves into unnecessary Wars may put themselves and their Kingdoms in hazard therefore some of them have been so cautious that in the conferring the regal Dignity they have imposed this necessity upon their Kings that if they would make offensive Wars upon their Neighbours they should first advise with their great Council and so likewise it might be ordained concerning other matters which the People judged necessary for the Common-wealth lest that if an absolute power of ordering those things were left to the Prince the common good of the People would perhaps be less considered And since the people would not leave to this limited King an absolute power in those Acts which are thus excepted but that an Assembly either of the whole people or of those that represent them divided into their several Orders it is further to be observed that the power of this Council or Assembly is not alike every where For in some places the King himself though every where absolute may have appointed a Council or Senate without whose approbation he will not have his decrees to be valid Which Senate without doubt will only have the Authority of Councellors and though they may question the Kings Grants or Decrees and reject those which they judg inconvenient for the Common-wealth yet they do not this by any inherent Right but by a power granted them from the King himself Who would this way prevent his decreeing any thing through hast imprudence or the perswasion of Flatterers that might prove hurtful to his State to which may be referred what Plutarch mentions in his Apothegms ' That the Aegyptian Kings