Guision Faction and the other Nobility 19. To stir up the people if they grow secure and neglâ—gent of Aâ—mour and other provision for the Common-wealth by some rumour or fear of danger at home to make more ready when occasion requireth But this seldom to be used least it be supposed a false Alarm when there is need indeed 20. To have special care that his children especially the heir apparent have such bringing up as is meet for a King viz. in learning specially of matters pertaining to State and in Martial exercise contrary to the practise of many Princes who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure and to spend their time in hunting c. which by reason of their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State II. Kingdoms new gotten or purchased by force are preserved by these means 1. FIrst if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours or have the same tongue manners or fashions as have his own Countrey it is an easâ—â— matter to retain such Countries within their obedience in case the Princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct For men of the same quality tongue and condiâ—ion do easily shole and combine themsâ—lves together so much the rather if the people of that countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their own Libâ—râ—y wherein specially is to be observed that the laws and customs oâ— that purchased Countrey be not altered nor innovated or at least it be done by little and little So the â—urgundians and Acquitains were annexed to France The reason because partly they have been accustomed to serve and partly for that thâ—y will not â—asily agree about any other to be their Prince if the Bloud Royall be once extinguished As for the invasion of a forreign Coutrey whereunto the Prince hath no right or whereof the right heir is living It is not the part of a just Civil Prince much less a Prince Christian to enforce such a countrey and therefore the Machiavilian practises in this case to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the Bloud Royal is lewd and imperâ—inent The like is to be said of murthering the Natives or the greatest part of them to the end he may hold the rest in sure posession A thing not onely against Christian Religion but it is inhumane injustice cruel and barbarous 2. The safest way is supposing a right that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some other place and our Colonies consisting of so many as shall be thought meet be planted there in some part of the Province Castles Forts and Havens seized upon and more provided in fit places as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch which Transplanted 10. Iews And of the Romans in France Tribes of the Germany Brâ—tany and other places The reason 1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot are to be maintained within the Province which cannot be done without great charge 2. For that the whole Province is â—roubled and grieved with removing and supplying the Army with victuals carriages c. 3. For that Colonies are more sure and faithâ—ul than the rest As for the Natives that are removed from their former â—ears they have no means to hurt and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly are content to be quiet The Turks practise in Asia where the chief grounds and dwellings are posessed by the Souldiers whom they call Timariotae That the Prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase especially for a time till things be well setled especially if the Province be great and large as the Turks in Greece The reason 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order and get the good will of his new Subjects 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes presence if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants and inferiour Governours Where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression 3. Because being present he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted and so may quickly give remedy to it which being absent he cannot do or not do in time 4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside then to take heed that the charge of Governing or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men and of other meet quality that depend wholly upon the Princes favour and not to Natives or other of their own Subjects that are gracious â—or their Nobilâ—â—y or Virtue especially if the Province be great and somewhat far distant which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects As for such Governours as depend wholly upon the Princes favour being not born but created Noble they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty and in case they would revolt yet they are not able to make any great strength for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers to keep them in Subjection and not for any ill will 4. To have the children of the châ—eâ— Noble men and of greatest Authority Hostages with them in safe keeping the more the better For that no bound is stronger than that of nature to contain the Parents and Alies in obedience and they the rest 5. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present Governâ—ment 6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may be that they may seem by being conquered to have gotten a protectour rather than a Tyrant For the Common-People if they enjoy peace and â—e not distracted nor drawn from their business nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily conâ—ained under obedience Yet notwithstanding they are to be disâ—used from the practise of Arms and other Exercises which increase courage and â—e weakened of Armour that they have neither spiâ—it â—or will to rebel 7. If theâ—e be any â—action in the Countrey to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part and to combine with it â—as Caesar in Fraâ—â—e 8. To look well to the Borders and confining Provinces and if any rule there of great or equal power to himâ—elf to joyn league with some other Borderers though of less strength to hinder the attempts if any should be by such neighbour Prince For it happeneth often thaâ— a Countrey inâ—eâ—ted by one neighbour Pâ—ince â—calleth in another of as great oâ— greater power to assist and rescue it from the other that invadeth it So the Romans were called into Greece by the AEtolians the Saxons by the Britains the Danes by the Saxons 9. To leave their Tiâ—les and dignities to the Natives but the command and Authority wholly to his own 10. Not to put much trust nor to
discovered and put to flight if the multitude affect their Prince But the Common people being once offended hath cause to fear every moving both at home and abroad This may be effected by the Prince if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people and avoid those things that breed hatred contempt viz. if he seem as a Tutor or a Father to love the people and to protect them if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom For that nothing is more popular nor more pleasing to the people than is peace 4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously yet with State and Majesty to his people and receive complaints of his suppliants and such like 5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts and place of Iusticâ— that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which he maketh the seat of his Empire and so make it sure and faithfull unto him which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom as the hearâ— in the middle of the body or the Sun in the middle of Heaven both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions and least the furthest partsâ— at one end move whilest the Prince is in the other Iâ— he go in progress many times to see his Provinces especially those that are remote 6. If he gratifie his Courtiers and Attâ—nâ—ants in that â—ort and by such means as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people as with Monopolies and such like 7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy or seem grievous to his Ministers but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himself as the French Kings who for thâ—t purpose as may seem have erected their Court at Paris which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and â—nvy both with the Nobles and the Pâ—ople 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people though he have no need and pay the same justly without defalcaâ—ion of any part by his Exchequer or other Officer 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed â—atred or contempt of his person which may be done if he shew himself not too light inconstant hard cruel â—sfeminate fearfull and dastardly c. But contrarywise Religious Grave Iust Valiant c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience than love and reverence of the people towards the Prince 10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision which is to be rumoured and made known abroad if it be known that he is reverenced and obeyed by his peoples at home 11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion which if it happen he is to joyn speedily with other Princes which are in like danger to abate that greatness and to strengthen himself and the rest against it An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain 12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward or other means to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince with whom he hath differences if any thing be intended against his State Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes Court under colour of Embassage or some other pâ—etence which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn 13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey and not to encounter them with his Prâ—rogative nor to use it at all where there is a Law for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts especially if it tender to take from them â—â—â—ir commodities and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers 14. To provide especially That that part which favoureth the State as it standeth be more potent than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change 15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates especially of such as assist the Prince in his Counsels and Policies and not to lean over much to his own advise contrarie to the rule of Machiavil who teacheth That a Prince can have no good counsel except it be in himself his reason because if he use the counsel of some one he is in danger to be over-wrought and supplanted by him if he counsel with more Then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions As if a Prince of great or mean wisdom could not take the Iudgement of all his Counsellorurs in any point of Policie or of so many as the himself thinketh good and to take it either by word or in writing and himself then in private peruse them all and so after good and mature deliberation make choice of the best without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one For the Proverb is true that two eyes see more than one and therefore the advises and Consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a Feast or dinner where many contribute towards the shot by which means they have more variety of dishes and so better fare and yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best â—or his health and appetiâ—e 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten as in the example of Solomon which may seem the reason why our Kings of England had their Kings Bench in place of publick Justice after the manner of the ancient Kings that â—ate in the Gate where for better performing of this Princely duty some special causes may be selected which may throughly be debaâ—ed and considered upon by the Prince in private with the help and advise of his learned Councel and so be decided publickly as before is said by the Prince himself At least the Prince is to â—ake accompâ— of every Minister of publick Justice that it may be known that he hath a care of Justice and doing right to his people which makes the Justicâ—rs also to â—e more â—â—reful in performing of their duties 17. To be moderate in his Taxes and impositions and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse â—o do it by Parliaments and with their consents making the cause apparent unto them and shewing his unwillingness in charging them Finally so to use it that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects than an exaction by him 18. To stop small beginnings unto â—his end to compound the dissentions â—hat arise amongst the Nobles with caution that such as are free be not drawn into parts whereby many times the Prince is endangered and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion as in the example of the Barons Wars and the late Wars of France which grew from a quarrel betwixt the
seem a benenefactour and have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey or doing some good for it 6. To forbid feastings and other meetings which increase love and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters under pretence of sparing cost for better uses To that end the Curfieu Bell was first ordained by William theâ— Conquerour to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour 7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great but rather many equally great that they may envy and contend one with another and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort to do it warily and by degrees If quite to wreck him and to have his life yet to give him a lawfull tryal after the manner of his Countrey And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation as to do him contumely or disgrace not to suffer him to escape because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto Honour which great spirits do most desire and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace than to any thankfulness or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismistion True in Atheists but not in true Christian Nobilitie 8. To unarm his people and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe and having them ready when service requireth and then to arm with them such and so many as he shall think meet and to commit them to such as are sure men 9. To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility and betwixt the Nobility and the people and to set one Rich man against another that they combine noâ— together and that himself by hearing the grieff and complaints may know the secrets of both parts and so have matter aâ—ainst them both when it listeth him to call them to an account 10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong specially about womens matâ—ers by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters which hath been he ruin of many Tyrants and conversion of their States As of â—arquinius by Brutus Appius by Virginius Pisistratus by Harmodius Alexander Medices Duke of Florence Aloisus of Placentia Rodericus King of Spain c. 11. To that end to be moderate in his pleasures or to use them closely that he be not seen For that men sober or watchfull or such as seem so are not lightly subject to contempt or conspiracies of their own 12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize or do any special action â—or the Common-wealth in that manner as it may seem they could not be better regarded in case they lived in a Free-state 13. All rewards and things gratefull to come from himself but all punishments exactions and things ungratefull to come from his Officers publick Ministers And when he hath effected what he would by them if he see his people discontented withall to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects 14. To pretend great care of Religion and of serving God which hath been the manner of the wickedest Tyrants for that people do less fear any hurt from those whom they think Virtuous and Religious nor attempt likely to do them hurt for that they think that God protects them 15. To have a strong sure Guard of forreign Souldiers and to bind them by good turns that they having at least profit may depend upon him and the present State As Câ—ligula the German Guard where the Nobility are many and mighty The like is practised by Lawfull Kings as by the French King 16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault or case with them that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT for their own safetie 17. To take part and to joyn himself with the stronger part if the Common people and mean degree be the stronger to joyn with them if the Rich and Noble to joyn with them For so that part with his own strength will be ever able to overmatch the other 18. So to frame his manners whole behaviour as that he may seem if not perfectly good yet tolerably evil or somewhat good somewhat bad These Rules of Hypocritical Tyrants are to bee known that they may be avoyded and met withall and not drawn into imimitation Preservation of an Aristocracie RUles to preserve a Senatory State are partly taken from the common Axioms and partly from those that preserve a Kingdom Preservation of an Oligarchie by Sophisms Rules 1. IN Consultations and Assemblies about publick affairs to order the matter that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies and Councels But to impose a Fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty On the other side to pardon the people if they absent themselves and to bear with them under pretence that they may the better intend their Occupations and not be hindered in their Trades and earnings 2. In Election of Magistrates and Officers To suffer the poorer sort to vow and abjure the bearing of Office under colour of sparing them or to enjoyn some great charge as incident to the Office which the poor cannot bear But to impose some great Fine upon those that be Rich if they refuse to bear Office being Elect unto it 3. In judicial matters In like manner to order that the people may be absent from publick Trials under pretence of following their business But the Richer to be present and to compel them by Fines to frequent the Court 4. In Warlike exercise and Arms That the poor be not forced to have Armour Horse c. under pretence of sparing their cost nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exercises but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor Horse c. by excessive Fines and to exercise themselves in War-like matters c. 5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts Policie and Warlike exercise and to observe good order and discipline For as Popular States are preserved by the frequencie and Liberty of the People so this Government of the Richer is preserved by discipline and good oâ—der of Governours 6. To provide good store of War-like furniture especially of Horse and Horse-men and of Armed men viz. Pike c. which are proper to the gentry as shot and light furniture are for a Popular Companie 7. To put in practise some points of a Popular state viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment To make yearly or half years Magistrates c. For that the People are pleased with such things and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one And if any grow to too much greatness to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this State 8. To commit the Offices and Magistracies to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters which both tendeth to the conservation of this State and pleaseth the people for that they reap some relief and benefit by it
Olygarchies or the other degrees conspire together and make quarrel against the Chief as in Kingdoms The examples of Wat Tyler Iack Straw c. 2. In the Chief Injury when great Spirits and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured or take themselves so to be as Coriolanus Cyrus minor Earl of Warwick In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong 3. Preferment or want of preferment wherein some have over-much and so wax proud and aspire higher or have more or less than they deserve as they suppose so in envy and disdaâ— seek Innovation by open faction so Caesar c. 4. Some great necâ—ssity or calamity So Xerxes after the â—oil of his great Army And Senaâ—harib after the loss of 185. in one night 2. Particular 1. ENvie when the chief exceed the mediocriâ—y before mentioned and so provoketh the Nobility and other degrees to conspire against him as Brutus Cassius c. against Caesar 2. Fear viz. Of danger when one or more dispatch the Prince by secret practice or force to prevent his own danger as Artabâ—nus did Xerxes 3. Lust or Lecherie as Tarquinius Superbus by Brutus Pisistratindae by Armodius Appius by Virginius 4. Contempt For vile quality base behaviour as Sardanapalus by Arbaces Dionysius the younger by Dion 5. Contumely When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation as Caligula by Chaereas 6. Hope of Advancement or some great profit as Mituridates Anobarsanes Chief Other dâ—grâ—es Other degrees Alteration without violence CAuses of alteration without violence are 1. Excess of the State when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was or should have been setled and exceedeth in power riches and absoluteness in his kind by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes and impositions c. applying all to his own benefiâ— without respect of other degrees and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government as a Kingdom into a Tyranny an Oligarchâ—â— into an Aristocraciâ— 2. Excess of some one or more in the Common-wealth viz. When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest either in honour wealth or virtuâ— and so by permission and popular favour are advanced to the Sovereignty By which means popular States grow into Oligaâ—chies and Oligarchiâ—s and Aristocracies into Monarchiâ—s For which cause the Athenians and some other free States made their Laws of Ostrocismos to banish any for a time that should excel though it were in virtue to prevent the alteration of their State which because it is an unjust Law 't is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means that none should grow to that heigth and excellency than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy FINIS A METHOD how to make use of the Book before in the reading of the Story DAVID being seventie years of age was of wisdom Memorie c. sufficient to gouern his Kingdom 1. Reg. Cap. 1. Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government DAvid being of great years and so having a cold drie and impotent bodiâ— married with Abishag a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole Realm to revive his bodie and prolong his life 1. Reg. Chap. 1. verse 3. Example of the like practise in Charles the fifth DAvid being old and impotent of boâ—tâ— by the advise of hâ—s Nobles and Pâ—isitians marriâ—d a young maid callâ—d Abishag to warm and presâ—rve his old bodiâ— Observation VVHâ—ther David did well in mâ—â—rying a maid and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marrie a young woman or on the other side for an old worn and decrepite woman to marrie a young and lustie man For the affirmative ARG. The end of marriage is Societie and mutual comfort bâ—â— thâ—râ— may be Sociâ—tie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old and young partie Ergo 't is Lawful Answ. Societie and comfort is a cause effect of marriage but none of the principal ends of marriage which are 1. Prâ—creation of children and so the continuance oâ— mankind 2. The avâ—iding of Fornication As for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man woman and woman where no marriage is and therefore no proper ends of marriâ—ge The Negative ARG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends for which marriage was â—rdained by God is no lawfull marriage But the conjunction betwixt an old imâ—otent and young partie hath no respect tâ— thâ—â—â—ght end for which marriage was ordainâ—d by God Thereâ—ore it is no lawful marriage 2. No contract wherein the partâ—e contâ—acting bindeth himself to an impossible condition or to do that which he cannot do is good or lawfull But the contract oâ— marriage by an impotenâ— person witâ— a young partie bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot dâ— viz. to perfoâ—m the duties of Marriage Therefore it is unlawfull For the same cause the civil Law determineth a nullity in these mâ—râ—iages except the woman know before the infiâ—mitie of the man in which case she caâ— have no wrong being a thing done with her own knowledge and consâ—nt because Volenti non fit injuria In legem Julian de adulteriis leg. Si uxor c. It provideth further â—or the more certaintie of the infirmitiâ— That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage because that men that have been infirm at the first by reason of sickness or some other accident afterwards proved to be sufficient De repudiis leg. in causis Defence for David in marrying Abishag IT was rather a Medicine than a marriage without any evil or disordered affâ—ction 2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles and Phisitiâ—ns 3. It was for the publick good to prolong the life of a worthie Prince 4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmitie and to what end she was married unto him who if she did it for the common good and for duties sake having withall the gift of continencie she is to be commended if for ambition or some vain respect it is â—er own and not Davids fault Political Nobilitie Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom FIrst took the advantage of Davids affection and kindness towards him and made him secure of any ill dealing Secondly of his age and infirmities disabling his Father as unfit for Government Thirdly blazed his title and Right to the Crown Fourthly got him Chariots Horsemen and Footmen and a guard to make shew of State Fifthly being a comly and goodly Person made a popular shew of himself and his qualities Sixtly joyned to himself in Faction Joab the General of the Armie who was in displeasure for murthering of Abner and Amaza and feared that David would supplie Benajah in his