I hope we are now come safe to this passe that the Parliament may and ought in our case to defend the people or kingdoms rights use the peoples power which is the supreame as others have proved to cleare passionate men rather then to satisfie any judicious man who will not require proofs in a point plain enough of it self ever resident in the people and so in the Parliament though dormient till it be by the Parliament thought fit to be wakened which should it not now be done such a seeming-secure and supine sleep might have proved a mortall lethargy But here these Sophisters think to enter upon us and to take the benefit of their own wrong for seeing they have brought the Kingdom to this passe that unlesse the Parliament take the power of the kingdom into the kingdoms or its own hands it cannot defend it self or the kingdoms rights or rather rescue them they would cunningly prepare those whom they intend to make slaves by first making them such fools as to beleeve that the Parliament intends a change of the Monarchicall form of government and to oppresse King and people by I know not what new kind of Arbitrarie tyrannicall government I beleeve the King and Parliament will soon be attoned if any can shew the Parliament by what other way it can discharge its trust and dutie in this constitution of the times without the power it hath assumed But what if it shall appear I should make scruple to use the word shall as if it did not appear alreadie without these weak offers had we not to do with such as seem to have found our some new kind of reason or having antiquated the old which differenced man from irrationall creatures to have substituted passion or idle phantasie in the roome of it the best method indeed for them afterward on as good or the same proportion of reason to advance the power of the King into the place of the power of the whole people or Kingdom it is their own manner of speech and practise as sound and good as their own Method to make such distinction and difference betwixt King and kingdom what if it shall appear time bringing every day truth to light and perhaps even to these men some allucida inter valla that there is not the least probabilitie that the Parliament can have such a thought of usurpation as these men would impose or seem to suppose much lesse was it ever heard that any free Parliament actually made any the least attempt to that effect so far is it that ever it effected it Whereas on the other side ill Counsell about Princes have attempted oft and de facto sometimes performed the turning of a well poysed or tempered Monarchy into an arbitrarie tyrannicall power and publique oppression by which change such ill instruments appear the onely gainers and the malignant spleen swels in a miserable consumed bodie the head not exempt and yet the very swelling a dangerous disease even to the spleen it self at last Unlesse such monstrous times did priviledge it were high presumption to think it were not all-sufficient to stop such mouthes to say it is a Parliament and it were dishonourable for it to do as they calumniate and therefore not to be imagined This maxime on ground being no more to be denied or questioned in this Monarchy then that the earth is round in naturall Philosophy as neer as morrall Philosophy may attive at naturall in point of certitude though should we grant them that a Parliament may erre nay do wrong to Prince people or particulars yet that would not follow upon this which they would maliciously inferre and ayme at for none but it self or another Parliament were to correct or rectifie what a Parliament should have done amisse and not the King or any other persons any way whatsoever much lesse by force or warre for he that is allowed to judge or correct is allowed thereby at least an equall if equality for such an intent can be conceived sufficient possibly but such equality of power in two distinct Magistrates for so we must distinguish King and Parliament here of different natures and touching one and the same point or matter in controversie cannot be in one and the same state then such a corrector must be allowed superiour and the corrected subordinate but such the King cannot be in our case as above is partly shewed and shall be further afterwards How then can lorce or warre on his side for this cause be rationall and just nay though it should be but defensive much lesse if offensive or inferred Since even bate resisting the ordinances of the Parliament is or presupposes an assuming of the supreme power to judge and condemne such resistance being the execution of the sentence But we shall not carry it away so easily that the Parliament will not be unjust to any holding such power strong temptations of profit corrupt too oft where one or a few are ordinary Judges as a little water standing sooner is putrified but multitude of these Judges are like the Sea incorruptible But moneys received profits and emoluments accrewing it were a shame not without a certain mixture of presumption to insist on such base imputations here had not frontlesse and monstrous malice been so incredibly audacious as actually to raise them may make a dividend sufficient to draw to some uniust act each man or the maior part of such a multitude very likely and to draw the more matter of profit we see how by frequent orders they invite private causes and do they give any publique account of the moneys they receive from the people more then the Malignants could have done for Ship money But we erre they give publique account but it is to get credit onely with the people that they may be in their sinister practises and machinations the lesse suspected and better served But stay how can they have ill ends at all on foot or in agitation since of all their particular actions and proceedings of most moment from time to time they by their Declarations or the like give no lesse then of the moneys an account to the world except they be evident of themselves Should they do that they cannot give reason for but such malicious vigilance as we deal with when it might in particulars charge them and article against them upon truths would never be driven to the base and miserable shifts of these generals and the like most ridiculous impudent transparent calumnies for want of matter to work on and did not the people see clearly they have reason and that their ends are meerly the publique good it would desert them loosing patience upon the sence of the present evils which like the sicknesse which even the best phisick before it can induce a finall setled state of health works in a patient chiefly if disorders during the cure also foment the peccant humours through the malignant traverses of our Calumniators both people
their Herculesses honest men and men of honour ready to die for their Countrey if need require judging such a death infinitely to be preferred before the lives of the chiefest of these should they obtaine what they seeke But let us end this patheticall flying out though it be hard for the inferiour faculties sometimes not to stirre when the understanding somewhat inlightened hath inflamed the will On the other side so divine a gift as this Parliament thankfully recognized and made use of duely and the just power and dignitie of the Parliament and therein all our happinesse wisely and manfully now once asserted moderation and mediocritie induced the Monarchy duely tempered may be in humaine probabilitie perpetuall and all the surfet become Physicke And this violent Feaver of the State having amazed and drawne to an head all the malignant humours before dispersed all over the body and lying dangerously hidden and set on fire consumed and expelled them like the filth of an house swept into an heape and burnt the whole body may be much clearer sounder and better disposed then had not such a distemper ever beene I hope it appeares already were there no more then these presented weake reasons to an ordinary rationall man if far better from others be too meane for his Majestie what way he is to take that all may be well and seeing but one side can be trusted with the power of the Kingdome which of them is most unlikely to tyrannize or reduce all to arbitrary government or which will most probably use it to the publique good onely or whether in such extraordinary times it doe not most safely repose where it is originally naturally inherent viz. in the peoples owne hands and so in the Parliaments Nay were the case hitherto dubious yet since libertie first made appointed limitted prerogative for they confine together as the people in whom is the radicall primary supreame power and who made Kings not Kings people thought best when it first made choice of or instituted this one forme of government among divers others which we call Monarchy and whereof there are sundry degrees in sundry States some more some lesse trusted or limited as the first founders pleased els why are they not all equall since free and voluntary agents worke or doe onely so much or so far as they please and the various subordinate degrees or kinds of the creatures prove the divine Majestie to be agens liberrimum els the creatures would be all equall an involuntary or naturall agent as Philosophy termes it ever working as much as it can or to the utmost extent or sphere of its power and activitie and so an equalitie in the effects since I say libertie or the people first created as I may say Prerogative and that so tempered modified or graduated as it thought most conducible to its owne happinesse for the supreame power ever worketh for it selfe rather then for the subordinate or inferiour as being the end the efficient and finall causes being here co-incidents it is just that this namely libertie judge and give law to that and that this if an unnaturall jarre fall out gaine and prosper rather then the other and since the people reserved ever in its owne hands and saved to it selfe upon the trust to the Monarchy what priviledges right of Parliament or liberties c. parcell 〈◊〉 the originall power naturally in the people and which may draw backe to the fountaine the derivative power as the bloud and spirits to the heart when there is cause it thought best surely it must doe this with purpose to see them conserved as safely as may be and upon occasion to make use of them and enjoy them which could not be surely done without a power reserved to judge of the state of them and when they were to be used and the like for if the Prince be trusted touching the keeping himselfe within his limits he may even as well be trusted absolutely without limits nor such power to judge of them is to any purpose as above-said without power to execute what is judged hereupon fit So the Parliament judgeth in this case as the first authour and superintendent of the intent and is not as a partie to be judged Further were the matter yet dubious yet seeing the Protestant Religion the power being in the Parliaments hand is far more out of the reach of danger then the other way even without calling his Majesties good meaning into question therein as I hope anon will appeare it ought to put it out of all question how wee are to range our selves in these times The Parliament having our case so standing such power as is deduced whatsoever would seeme to oppose that power and stand in their way as they defend and assert the publique good so invaded must be voidable and usuall ordinary known lawes or customes made or in use supposing or whilest the Prince kept duely within his bounds which the King speakes so much of saying that he will ever governe by them and hold all to them but ever intending the publique good are no way to bound or tye up the transcendent power of the Parliament when it shall encounter new and never before heard of exorbitances or invasions of the publique good which the times that made those knowne Lawes never heard of so never provided against But by proportion of reason this Parliament may and ought as well provide by new Ordinances or orders for such new evills as they encounter as the former did for what they then met with for they had their originall also ex malis moribus bonae leges and had those times had such causes offered as these have they would have provided remedies of a nature like those this Parliament hath done the power and generall intentions of all times or the universall ground being still the same that is to defend and vindicate or procure the publique good and to tye them to the knowne or old Lawes in this case where the letter might kill were irrationall for so the first breaker of the Lawes might take the priviledge of the Lawes and advantage of his owne wrong and under the colours of the Lawes fight against and overthrow them or the rule reason or intention that caused them at first If it be said nothing was done by the King of publique consequence but by advice of the Judges it may be answered that the Parliament is the onely competent Counsell Judge in cases neerely concerning the publique and people in generall which the King is entrusted upon such occasions to call that the whole people may not but upon extraordinary causes be troubled to elect for Parliaments and attend that service But in such a case as ours by virtue of the legislative power residing in the Parliament it may make new Ordinances at least for the time as it sees occasion and judges to be in order to that supreame and immutable Law or Law of Lawes and end of them
conscience and the people without humane remedy if he exorbitate for they ought not to presume but to prove strongly if they could this which were for the disadvantage of the people so mainely for whose good all was intended at the first institution of the Monarchy and the peoples happines ought to be rather favoured and preferred in the interpretation of a doubtfull matter were this such as assuredly according with the first institutors intention and I thinke it is not so apparent if it be apparent at all that the King is so left to God onely as it is that the safetie and happines of the people is Lex suprema and the end of all which is out of doubt and therefore by this tye of an oath and all other fitting ties power and meanes also intended to be procured and secured and all oft little enough though such power is unlesse upon necessitie not onely not to be exercised but also to be kept as secret as may be that the Princes authoritie in as much as it may make for the good of the people may be kept up And perhaps the oath the people hath taken to the King especially as the people is represented in Parliament may respecting at this time this reason onely inferre as well on the peoples side that it is left to God onely thereupon and so supreame in point of judgement and power but allowing or rather understanding truly such power to be in the people and from it in the Parliament as hereafter may further appeare wee are to doe is not this way the peoples libertie rights happines safer and better assured together with the Kings just power or prerogative since the Parliament is not capable could it be willing to usurpe upon either as after may be shewed then imagining such supreame power to be invested in the King either the peoples right or the Kings just power it selfe can be seeing no man will deny but Kings are subjects capable of arbitrary or tyrannicall power oft times willing and giving the attempt and sometimes actually prevailing So if the framers of this Monarchy had intended such paramount power should be still in the King and that in such extraordinary emergents as now appeare in England they had been more solicitous of and provided better far for one meanes of diverse ordeined to an end then for the very end it selfe the peoples happines which they had left still depending dangerously on one mans conscience or will as it should at any time happen to change when so sure and safe a provision offered it selfe else-where as before is partly touched and had preferred the meanes before the end and so doe all the desperate malignants and the disorderers of our times State which is retrograde to reason others may better ensorce this point touching the intent of the first institution and adde expresse authorities perhaps out of the Lawes to this end or the practise of Parliaments in such times if such have ever before been or otherwise proceed by analogie and good consequences of reason If it be said that by such a provision of remedie for the people in danger as abovesaid a dangerous president of disobeying and weakning the Kings authority is introduced which may worke even danger of dissolution of the Monarchy Admitting but not granting that upon such a president once made upon an extraordinarie cause and that by an orderly way and which once done may well prevent all suture need of making any more such presidents admit such a danger even to the Monarchy followed thereupon which yet will not be made good in our present case as after will appear then here now is the point Among divers forms of government whereby a people may be governed that it may be happie which is the end and ayme of every such form this Nation chose one particular one which it judged fittest to compasse that end as indeed Monarchy duely tempered is the best but distempered by tyranny the worst the advantage of union or unitive power which it hath above other forms strengthening to evill when it degenerates as it did to good whilest it stood incorrupt but if this objection were of weight it would follow that it were more rationall that the peoples felicity which is the supreme end to which all good forms of government are ordained and tend should rather suffer then a particular form or fashion of government of which there are choice and any of which are but one meanes or way to compasse that end if it continue incorrupt but if corrupted to destroy the end and so one meanes to the end nay in our case a meanes if not rectified wholly to frustrate the end should be preferred before the end it self which it ought onely to serve nor can it be said the remedie were worse then the disease for what remedie can be so ill as that disease a free a glorious a noble Nation to fall to servitude spirituall and temporall from a long enjoyed Liberty in both kinds and our selves the instruments though to go on in such a case the remedie might not prove so ill or difficult if men would pay obedience duely there where reason tells them they owe it And should there be no such remedie for the people or for conservation of the frame of the government the constitution of this Monarchy which the King declareth he admireth so much were most deficient in the most principall point of all namely the defending and preserving it selfe the very foundation and ground-work as the end of all otherwise provisions orders Laws without which what were they but folly and phantasie Nay were not the folly of the first institution rather to be as much admited as raising an instrument utterly unfit for the purpose it was meant for had it left the maine end of all that is the peoples safetie libertie happinesse in such a case as ours without all possible nay without any provision expresse or imployed by common intendment or analogie of reason or rule of Law though the true the naturall the best or the onely provision or remedie to keep Prince and people in their due temper were so at hand so facile so offering it self and if not before usuall yet used possibly at the very time of such an institution and for that very purpole namely a Parliament or other meeting of the like nature without provision I say against the greatest publick mischief of all that ultimum malum Reipublicae as divine Plato termes it arbitrary power or tyranny and that a mischief so likely to happen more so oft attempted nay actually happening But he that implores force not now to speak of what is pretended herein by words and that though but to resist the orders of that power whose part alone it is to remedie the people in our case doth in fact deny that this Monarchy hath made such provision or hath that power so necessary to help and desend it self or that the people in
hath appeared and further hereafter may do cannot be Admit this Trojan horse into your walls allow this all of them may easily resolve into nothing Consider well what Judgement hath been made of the Laws the libertie the property of the Subject before this Parliament whilest a future Parliament was doubted and feared and therefore kept off as long as these Malignants could but their fear and hate shews what we ought ardently to desire and love whilest so many Monopolies Loane Conduct Coat Ship-money and the like grievances were brought upon us our persons not going Scotfree as consisting well and compatible with our laws liberties properties and adjudged lawfull which yet what did they or ere long going on at least would they have wanted of making them all meerly at discretion pleasure and will the meer names of such things remaining and used indeed as Trophees of their Conquest and monuments of our quondam felicity and at leasure to be lamented folly and eternall shame The danger of our Religion is not forgotten because not ranked in mention with the rest it shall have a better place by it self as a Queen sitting alone The Judgement made of priviledges of Parliament during this Parliament seem to have come little short of the Judgements made of our liberties properties c. and if it be duely weighed First that they will have the King to be judge of them then what Judgement hath been lately made both in fact and in words or Declarations of them a man meanly penetrant will find them resolved by the positions of these Malignants into next to nothing and all this while the Parliament was and is in vigour vindicates and asserts them and likely to call these men to account what will they make of them should they through the authority and reputation of this Parliament which is the essence of it peirce at once the heart of all future for a Parliament not free were no Parliament and if the King be allowed judge of priviledges of Parliament where any new case happens which may touch the very essence of it if it be any thing else then the priviledges will it not come to this that the Judges he appoints or rather such instruments as the Malignants about him please to set over us shall upon the matter judge the Parliament which is to Judge their Judges making it and the Laws what they please and to restrain the power and freedome of it as of the Laws as they think fit whereupon would follow even the same inconveniences which were before mentioned supposing the King the supreame Judge of the Laws namely that the Parliament should be disenabled to defend the people or indeed it self if incroached on or oppressed upon the same reasons in that place expressed But it seems more rationall that since the Parliament is to be Judge of the Laws as is above shewed nay even may make them at least in some cases it may judge as well of its own priviledges neither appears it in the Kings power to make them what he pleases save onely thus if he doth not exorbitate nor innovate any thing against them neither can the Parliament desire any alteration of them in any point betwixt it and the King concerning them But in case of extraordinarie emergents of never-before-heard of attempts on his part whither by any verball declaration or by fact whereby the priviledges authority or very being for it may trouble a good School-man to distinguish clearly betwixt these three it self of the Parliament is indangered it is reason that the priviledges now become any thing that the Parliament judges fit for the conservation of it self For the maine end and intent of the first ancient ordinary and usuall priviledges of Parliament being to enabie and qualifie it for the due attending defending or advancing the publique good for which purpose they were judged sufficient by the first Institutors not suspecting such new invasions or attempts on them or on Parliaments as since have happened in more corrupted times but thinking them rather secure as pait of the Laws or customes which Kings are bound to keep inviolate why should not the same end and intent which ever remains in equall force immortall and immovable work and move as well to the instituting even of new ones if new causes happen and without such new ones the Parliament shall remain disenabled to procure the publique good for which it was ordained and if the Parliament may in extraordinarie rimes as now make new Ordinances for the conservation of the people it may make if need require new Ordinances or Priviledges which are but the private Laws of or concerning the Parliament for its own conservation without which they cannot desend or conserve the people and in vain had it power to make new Ordinances upon new occasions for the publique good if it have no inherent power to make new priviledges or ordinances upon new emergent dangers to save it self Posse naturally and necessarily presupposing Esse as grounded on it Qui dat finem dat necessaria ad finem the priviledges being to defend and maintain the Parliament as the Laws the people and as Salus populi is lex suprema as before so it may as well be said Salus Parliamenti supremum privilegium If it may work new it may much more interpret declare and judge of the old on occasion and are no more to be held to the old usuall known priviledges when new extraordinarie attempts or affronts happen then to the old known Laws onely in the case above spoken of and upon the same ground and analogy of reason And here we are fallen unawares on the old Lord Treasurer Burleigh who we need not say was a great Statesman who was wont to say He knew not what a Parliament might not do not much unlike the Archbishop Bancrost a great Statesman who would tremble as is said at the mention of a Parliament as knowing or rather not knowing the power of it and had not they both taken the word Parliament in our acception they had told us no news It is one effect of ill Counsell about a Prince in the consequence somtimes better then in their intentiō to minister occasions to the people by invasion of their rights to look narrowly into the nature of the Princes prerogative when by the power of truth it ost looseth of the former reputation which liberty gains a more dubious light setting it of better and ignorance begetting here devotion and admiration of what is unknown hence it is perhaps that in these times as more polite and penetrant then many former ages Prerogative is said generally to loose in Christendome the better thus fortified against the so great and growing danger from the Common enemy the Turke and other great Mahometan Princes the great bulwark of Christendome Germany now so torne the more requiring it by so maine a disparity in matter of liberty the Mahometans using their Subjects as their
the world and so complaint be made to the Parliament thereof if it were to any end to complaine there of that which hath already passed without punishment But seeing the Parliament hath power the case standing as before hath been shewed to doe in all things as they see cause by good consequence their speeches necessarily preparing discussing agitating concluding what is so to be done cannot be subject to any limitting questioning or accompt abroad nor in reason therefore are to be divulged in that sence this being incompatible with such power But then these haters of our Law-makers and Lawes say Many of both Houses are away and so the acts lesse valid but be the number remaining little yet the acts of the Major part of that number are still good For neither the King that calied them away or countenanceth them that desert their stations may alledge this nor the Members that voluntarily not upon trust in those that remaine or leave obtained abandon their places there and duties are to take the benefit either of their owne wrong whether negligence in such Members or worse perhaps nor of their owne unworthinesse as Cowardise to oppose what they liked not which feare admitting such could be argues still that they that feared were the lesser number though what needed they feare to speake freely a dissenting lesser number being ordinary and sometimes a very few perhaps scarce enough to make a number dissenting openly from the rest of the whole House without any inconvenience It being allowed for any to speake their minds whilst a matter is in agitation before it be settled If they say they goe away that they may not seeme to allow what would passe though they were present then the Major part concurres to what is done by their owne confession els why stay they not to oppose it If they say so many are gone without leave of the Houses as put together would make the Major part supposing this were true either such a Major part went away at once in a body and then it was their fault not to stay for then they being the Major part had prevailed or they went by little and little and then still it was a Major part of the remainder that concurred to what was done els it had not passed and so the acts still good If they fly to say that they who thus deserted the House out of feare did it not as fearing the Parliament but the people granting these men this which is not their due that such had cause to feare the people and that such base feare when as they pretend they were to stand for the King Countrey Lawes Liberties Religion and did not render them utterly unworthy their places it may be answered briefly they that remained and carried matters might feare the King as much or more but their cause was noble and good but these or the like Cavils will no more hoodwinke the people their onely course were to produce some publique act of Parliament that might certifie the world that the King and both houses have long since unanimously concurred to dissolve this Parliament else Sophistry will not carry it against the manifest truth By the premisses or rather by diverse excellent Tractates published by others to the same or the like effect I hope it is even as cleare that the Parliament is and ought to be the supreame Judge in publique matters now in question in England as what it is it hath judged and ordered touching these things by so many publique orders declarations and the like and consequently that reason wills that they be sacred in our esteeme and punctually obeyed and executed and so no need of warre and whosoever goeth against reason and truth goeth against God himselfe who is Prima summa pura ratie and it will concerne him nearely to looke to it whether he be stronger then God goeth against himselfe if he be a man and shall first finde a civill warre in himselfe before he can cause it in his Countrey upon such grounds and for his Majestie he cannot as he is a King but judge that that man thinks dishonourably of him who goeth about to perswade him that that can be for his good that is not for the good of his Kingdome and so sever what is so excellently joyned or that the great Counsell of the Kingdome is not the onely at least the very best and the onely sure and securing way without all doubt for that Prince to follow that intends the publique good and which will ever assuredly concurre with him to that end nor in opposing an arbitrary power which ill men about him for their owne private and wicked ends would induce Doth the Parliament any thing but disenable a Prince or rather those about him from doing ill or more properly from usurping such power which to what end is it in a good Prince which he will or can never reduce to act or use but the false or pretended Mother of the childe who would have it divided whom the wisdome of the King may discerne will whisper there is no thankes or glory to doe good unlesse he might have done evill and so did good freely since free will onely merits I beleeve they hold merits it seemes these malignants setched not this Doctrine from heaven for there we may finde that confirmation in grace in the Angels and blessed spirits of just men whereby compleat free will or the remaines of it which free will argues but imperfection and mutabilitie power to sinne being but impotency and the King of Kings God himselfe who is perfection it selfe being above and without all power or possibilitie of doing any evill yet rather therefore I should say omnipotent in or for good that confirmation in grace I say by which free will is transfigured and sublimed into a state divine and Posse non peccare into non posse peccare is a transcendent blessing if not the very essence of celestiall beatitude where these suggest such a condition is to be declined though with ruine of all But howsoever the Divines of our times may not allow the explication or application of this point we may hope his Majestie out of his Princely care of the good of his people though both himselfe and it may beleeve well of his good intents to that purpose will be far from judging such a puntiglio of arbitrary power for however it may fill and tickle the phantasie yet deeply and duely penetrated into by judgement it appeares to resolve even into no more if a puntiglio be any thing or least it might possibly be thought he would or might have done evill had he not been restreined from it when he cannot violate such just restrictions without first doing the greatest evill of all to the publique from judging I say such a puntiglio a just and sufficient cause to destroy the people by a civill warre when were this power indeed justly belonging to him yet true love to his people might judge
all Salus populi suprema lex and that power even of making new Lawes is ever upon the matter in both Houses of Parliament and that even when the King keepes himselfe within his due bounds and is assistant in Parliament how much more then as before is shewed if he shall by exorbitating dangerously bring himselfe within the compasse of our case and that the Kings consent to what the Parliament propounds to him to be enacted for Law ought not to be denyed may appeare by comparing this following part of the Oath which the Kings of England at their Coronation take or ought to take cited in the Remonstrance of the 26th of May in haec verba Concedis justas leges confuetudines esse tenendas permittis per te eas esse protegendas ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas vulgus elegerit secundum vires tuas Respondebit Rex Permitto concedo Comparing this part of the Oath with the clause of the preamble of a Statute there also cited intimating that the King is bound by his oath to remedy by Law such inconveniences as the Kingdome may suffer in the future as well as to keepe and protect Lawes already in being for then either those Latine words here cited or some part of them and that the latter namely Quas vulgus elegerit are to be understood of Lawes futurely to be made or else it cannot be shewed by what part of the Oath as the said preamble affirmes the King is bound by Law to remedy the mischiefs that happen from time to time to his Realme Nor will the Lawes of Grammer or use of speech or custome of phrase tolerate that Elegerit without the conjunction Si or the like preceding or regulating it though we passe not by unconsidered the rude speaking of those times can ever be taken for Elegit the preter-perfect tense but as it stands in the fore-cited place must of necessitie participate a future nature and signifie precisely shall have chosen that is that the King assumeth to confirme such Lawes as the people shall have chosen it being to be conceived that the people or Parliament first amongst themselves must have debated of chosen and agreed upon them before they present them to the King to be confirmed Besides if those cited words Et permittis per te esse protegendas ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas populus elegerit should not referre to future elections but to past onely they were superfluous and vaine the words precedent Concedis justas leges consuâ—tudines esse tenendas which presuppose necessarily and cannot be understood without a precedent election and consent of the people to them expressing sufficiently Lawes and customes elected already confirmed and in use And the Kings answer to these cited words being bimembris or two-fold Concedo permitto all the other answers of the King to the other Questions in the Oath cited in the said Remonstrance because the questions are meerely simple and single conteined in one word only as to one question onely Servabo to another onely faciam being also single and in one word argues the question to be double as is said And that the King is not bound onely in generall thus to remedy the particular wayes or meanes left to his choice see the said Remonstrance folio 8. which ought to have it selfe sufficed without such poore gleanings as these or the like If then by these and other better reasons which others have presented the Parliament hath such a legislative power even where the King dischargeth his office as upon the matter to make such Lawes as it judgeth best for the publique good where through the prevalence of ill men about him it is not done but the contrary and so the danger is from him shall not power be in them to make new Ordinances or provisionall Lawes for the timely remedying such publique mischiefs at least for the time and to suspend some of those in being if they judge fit How much more then to judge of declare or interpret those that seeme dubious ranging and making all to be subservient to the supreame Law Salus populi the rule and reason of all Lawes as was ever intended at the making of all particular Lawes Hath not even the Lord Chancellour a little touch of such a power upon the Common Law What then may we thinke a Parliament hath and that when the very publique is in danger And if the whole people unanimously consenting upon a Princes not performing what he is bound unto may possibly change the very forme of that limitted government which it first instituted how much more may it conserve or defend that temper or kinde of government which it hath erected by regulating the enormities of the Prince by maintaining and holding what they have reserved out of that which was all theirs at the first or their owne rights How many degrees then are they off from being bound to become themselves the instruments to overthrow them how strongly are they bound to the contrary And indeed were not the Parliament the supreame Judge in all the said questions or of like nature if we may call it a Parliament at all not having this power it could not possibly save the people when ill men prevailing upon the King would oppresse it for while they carry on by degrees and mature by little and little such their mysticall and pernicious designes which must be met with betimes in such tender and jealous matters before they advance and grow strong when caution comes too late and opposition out of season doth but exasperate and increase the evill they will cause the King by fit instruments for the purpose to pronounce judge or interpret each such degree or gaining a new and further point still lawfull and not subject to question however dangerous to the people in it self and of worse consequence till the mysterie at last unmask and all be desperate It may be superadded that should the Parliament be more jealous of the Prince then there were reason which yet as I hope hath appeared is not to be imagined of the wisdom and Justice of the Parliament yet it were the farre lesse evill that the Prince being but for the people should somewhat suffer by such the Parliaments jealousie which were but peccare in meliorem securiorem partem then that by the Parliaments too much security and beleeving in the Prince the people or whole kingdome should be endangered or oppressed for whose good they both are ordeined as means for the end Besides that the authority and politique infallibilitie of the Parliament must be by all that love their Countrey not blemished but held sacred and inviolate as supreame The King indeed saith he will defend and maintain the Laws Liberties properties of Subjects just priviledges of Parliament but even in saying this he seems to violate them if he thereby assume the supreame Judgement of them to himself which as already partly