Providence is a Forecast and likely conjectures of things to come supposed to be in those Princes that in their Actions proceed slowly and circumspectly it seemeth also a course of Princely Discretion to be retired aud not ordinarily to converse with many Autoritatem absentia tueare Suet. CHAP. XVIII Of Conspiracy and Treason with the Causes and ways of Prevention or Discovery COnspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes Person Treasons are addressed against his Government Authority Country Subjects or Places of Srength These Mischiefs are easily feared but hardly eschewed for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret Foes and consequently not to be avoided Occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est Salust The danger of Conspiracy proceedeth of divers Causes as Avarice Infidelity of Subjects Ambition in Servants and Corruption in Soldiers therefore with great difficulty to be avoided Vitae tuae dominus est quisquis suam contempsit Sen. Notwithstanding it seemeth that either by Inquisition Punishment Innocency or Destiny the evil Affection of Men may be oft-tentimes discovered 1. For whoso will curiously inquire and consider the Actions and ordinary Speechees of Men I mean those that be Persons of Honor and Reputation may oft-tentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the Minds Quoniam rarò nisi male loqunti mali faciunt Lips 2. Punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the Consideration thereof with the hope of Reward doth often discover those dangerous Intentions Cruciatu aut praemio cunct a pervia sunt Tac. But as it is Wisdom in Princes to give ear to Informers so are they not always to be believed for Hope Envy Hate or some other Passion oft-tentimes draws them to speak untruly Quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit Tac. 3. The third and likeliest Defence against Conspiracy is the Princes own Innocency for never having injured any Man it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewd as will endeauor to hurt him Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia Plin. 4. The last and best Bulward to withstand the force of this Mischief we call Destiny which proceeding from the Fountain of Divine Providence may be truly called the Will of God in whose only Power it resteth to protect and defend good Princes Ille erit a latere tuo custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris Salo. Treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous Persons who preferring private Profit before Fame or Fidelity do not fear to enter into any impious Action To this humor ambitious Men dissentious and all such as be desirous of Innovation are inclined Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes Hom. To these Offenders no Punishment is equal to their impious Merit can be devised being Persons odious as well to Friends as Foes Proditores etiam in quos anteponunt invisi sunt Tac. CHAP. XIX Of Publick Hate and Contempt with the Occasions and Means to redress and avoid it HAving briefly touched the Virtues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honor let something be said of the Causes from whence their Ruine doth proceed the chief whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt Hate cometh of Fear which the more Common it is the more Dangerous Nulla vis imperii tanta est quae premente metu possit esse diuturna Cic. The causes of Fear are Punishments Impositions and Rigor and therefore it behoveth a Prince not only to shun them but to eschew those Actions whereby he may reasonable incur their Suspision Sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint non minus opinione fama quam certa aliqua ratione moveri Cic. Yet Punishment Imposition and Censure are in all States necessary although they shew and seem terrible and consequently breed a certain Desperation in Subjects unless they be discreetly and modestly used for extream and frequent Punishments taste of Cruelty great and many Imposts savor of Covetousness Censure of Manners when it exceedeth the quality of Offences doth seem Rigour in these matters therefore it behoveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous chiefly in Capital Punishment which must be confined within the Bounds of Justice Sit apud principem parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis Sen. But if for Security sake the Prince be forced to punish let the same be done with shew of great Sorrow and Lothness Tanquam invitus magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat Sen. Let all Punishments also be slowly executed for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned neither ought any Capital Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale and for Example sake Non tam ut ipsi pareant quam ut alios pereundo deterreant Sen. In punishing also a specil respect must be had that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein Forma rabiei est sanguine vulneribus gaudere Sen. Also in Punishing equality must be observed and the nature of the Punishment according to the Custom Nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur alii ne appellentur quidem Cic. But in punishing publick Offences wherein a Multitude have part the Execution ought to be otherwise and as it were at an instant which may haply seem terrible but in effect is not Frequens vindict a paucorum odium reprimit omnium irritat Sen. Another means to satisfie a People offended is to punish the Ministers of Cruelty and with their Blood to wash away the common hatred Piaculares publici odii victimae Plin. By this King David did appease the Gibeonites The next cause of Discontent cometh of Impositions under which word is comprehended all Levies of Money a matter nothing pleasing to People as that which they esteem equal to their own Lives Pecunia anima sanguis est mortalibus Plaut First to remove Hate conceived of this cause there is nothing better then publick Expostulation of Necessity for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes Nulla quies gentium sine armis nec arma sine stipendiis nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt Tac. The second Remedy against Hate for Impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare For as Tiberius the Emperor was wont to say a Sheep should be fleeced not flead Qui nimis emungit elicit sanguinem Tac. Thirdly also to eschew the Offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant Eye on Informers Promoters and such fiscal Ministers whose Cruelty and covetous Proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great Hate but this mischief may be though hardly encountred either by choosing honest Officers or proving otherwise not only to remain them but to use them as Spunges Exprimendi post quam biberint Suet. In all Impositions or Taxations no Cruelty or Force ought to be used the second cause to kindle Hate and to meet with that mischief nothing is better than to proceed moderately and
State that leaves promises unperformed by reason of unexpected Impediments and for no ill intent ought not to be blamed Neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why Friends should abandon their Confederates Where Magistrates govern justly Subjects obey dutifully where private Persons grow rich and Princes enlarge their Empire there is the Common-wealth blessed and the People fortunate CHAP. XXVI Maxims of State or Prudential Grounds and Polemical Precepts concerning all Estates and Forms of Policy in Times of Peace or War c. confirmed by Select Narrations and Historical Parallels ALL Cities and Towns of State are builded either by People dwelling in or about the Place where they are builded or else they are made by Strangers Of the first are Athens and Venice of the other Alexandria and Florence The Fortune of every City builded and Vertue of the Builder appeareth by Choice of the Place and Quality of Laws For as fertile Places occasion Men to be slothful unless by good laws they be forced to labour so Barrenness compels them to Industry which Reason induceth Wise Men to plant Habitations in either Examples of the first are Ferrara and Rome of the second Ragusa and Genoa All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent Man and at an instant or else they were ordained at sundry Times according to such Accidents as besel Example The Laws of Sparta made at the beginning by Lycurgus the Laws of Rome at sundry Times The Government of every City in Time becomes corrupt Principality changeth into Tyranny The Optimacy is made the Government of the People and the Popular Estate turns to licentious Disorder which Instability or Alteration moved some Law-makers to take Order that in the Government of their City there should be a Mixture of all three and was the Cause that the Policy of Sparta continued 800 Years when the Popular State of Athens endured not one hundred Example The Laws of Sparta made by Lycurgus and the Laws of Athens by Solon Whoso taketh in hand to frame any State or Government ought to presuppose that all Men are Evil and at occasions will shew themselves so to be Example The Envy of the People of Rome to the Nobles and their Insolency towards them appeared not so long as the Kings governed but the Tarquins being Banished Opportunity was thereby offered that the Malice of the one and the other became discovered The divers Honours of the Nobility and People the one desiring to command the other not to obey are the Cause of continual Troubles unless some third Mean there be of more Authority than either to bridle the Force of both Example The Kings in Rome expulsed forth with arose much Mutiny and could not be suppress'd till the Tribum Plebis were created whose Authority wrought the same effect which the Kings had done Some States endeavour to enlarge their Dominions and some others labor only to maintain that Estate they antiently possessed Example of the first was the City of Rome of the second Sparta All States desiring to live at Liberty think fit that every Man should be permitted to accuse any Citizen that offend eth which manner of proceeding works two excellent Effects First That the People should not dare for Fear of accusing to attempt ought against the State or if they do they shall be presently and without Respect punished Secondly by Liberty of accusing every Man hath Means to utter the Offence where with he can charge others which he could not unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary Course and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary particular Revenge or calling in Foreign Forces Example Coriolanus and Appius Claudius at Rome Lucanncve at Chinsi Francisco Valeri in Florence As Accusations are in every State necessary so Slanders are dangerous and worthy of Punishment the Difference betwixt Accusations and Slanders is that the one is publickly performed before Magistrates with good Proofs and Witnesses to maintain the Truth of the Accusation but Slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and Places of Repair without Witness and Justification so as every Man may be slandered but few are orderly accused Example Appius Claudius accused by L. Virginius Furius Camillus slandered by Manlius Capitolinus The only means to suppress Slander is to give Authority to some Persons of Repute to compel every Slanderer to become an Accuser and if the Accusation prove true then to reward the Accuser or at least not to punish him Example Manlius the Slanderer of Camillus for his untrue Information punished A Rule most certain and assured it is That every Kingdom and State at the first well framed or after well informed doth take the Perfection thereof from the Wisdom of some excellent Man who ought not to be blind though in a Matter of great Moment he happily useth some extraordinary Violence or Proceedings for he that employeth Force to mend and not to mar deserves Commendation Example Romulus Lycurgus Cleomenes There lives no Man so simple or wise so wicked or well-disposed but prefers those Persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable Notwithstanding for that well-near all Men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is Good deeming that Honourable which in Truth is otherwise they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a Course which merits rather Infamy than Commendation Example Every Man wisheth himself Timoleon or Agesilaus rather than Dionysius or Phalaris rather a Titus or Trajan than Caligula or Vitellius Who reads Histories treating of great Actions shall perceive that good Princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the Love of the People and Fidelity of Counsellors than were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War Example Of all those Emperours which reigned after Caesar until Maximiinus the greatest number were for their Vices taken and slain only Galba and Pertinax excepted who were good Emperours A Prince of great Knowledge both in Arms and Wisdom so firmly setleth the Foundation of Government as albeit his Successor be of the less Vertue yet may he be maintained even by the Memory of his Predecessor But if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first than the second then all that is past goeth to Ruine Example The Martial Valour of Romulus was the cause that Numa might govern safely in Peace Which Tullus could not have done had he been unlike to Romulus nor should Bajazet Emperour of Turky have enjoyed the State of his Father Mahomet and left the same to his Posterity if Selim his Son had not been more like to his Grand father than to Bajazet his Father The Succession of two excellent Princes chiesly if they be of long life works wondrous Effects The like is seen in Optimacies and Popular States where the Governours successively elected be Men of great Vertue and Understanding Example The first appeared in Philip of Macedon and Alexander his Son the
armed to receive them But the Spaniards being come found no Forces at all to joyn with them and therefore wanting Victual offered Composition The Florentines finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused Peace whereof followed the loss of Prato and many other Inconveniences The like happened to them of Tyre as before The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of Injuries either publick or privately offered is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State for that the Party injured doth oft by indirect means though with hazard of his Country and himself seek satisfaction Example The Complaint which the Galli made against the Fabii who sent Ambassadors in favour of the Tossani not being heard nor any punishment inflicted upon them for Fighting against the Law of Nations was the cause that the Galli were offended with the States whereof followed the sack of Rome and the delay of Justice in Philip of Macedon for not revenging the incestuous oppression of Attalus to Pausanias was the Motive to murther that King Whoso endeavours the alteration of any State must of necessity proceed with all severity and leave some memorable Example to those that shall impugn the Ordinance of Government newly setled Example When Junius Brutus had by his great Valour banish'd the Tarquins and sworn the People that no King should ever reign in Rome within short time after many young Nobles among whom was Brutus's Son impatient of the equality of the new Government conspired to recall the Tarquins but Brutus thereof informed caused his own Son not only to be condemned to death but was himself present at the Execution As Health and soundness of the Hands Legs and other outward Members cannot continue Life unless the Heart and vital Spirits within be strong and firm so Fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed Example When the Emperor came into Italy and had with some difficulty past the confines of the Venetians well near without resistance his Army march'd to Venice and might doubtless have possest the City had it not been defended with Water Likewise the English in their assault of France excepting a few Encounters on the Frontiers found no puissant resistance within the Realm And Anno 1513. they forced all that State and the King himself to tremble as oft before they had done but contrariwise the Romans knowing that Life lay in the Heart ever held the Body of their State strongest For the nearer the Enemy approach'd Rome the better they found the Country armed and defended The desire to command sovereignly is of so great Force as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of Principality but also in them that have no Title at all Example this Appetite moved the Wife of Tarquinius Priscus contrary to all natural Duty to incite her Husband to murder her own Father Servius and possess his Kingdom as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a Queen than to be the Daughter of a King The violation of ancient Laws Orders and Customs under which People have long time lived is the chief and only Cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity Example Albeit the deflowring of Lucrece was the occasion yet was it not the cause that moved the Romans to take Arms against Tarquin for he having before that fact of Sextus his Son governed Tyrannically and taken from the Senate all Authority was become odious both to the Senate Nobility and People who finding themselves well-governed never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration A Prince that desires to live secure from Conspiracy hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great Riches and Honors than those whom he hath greatly injured because they want Means to offend the other have many opportunities to do it Example Perrenius the prime Favorite of Commodus the Emperor conspired his Death Plautianus did the like to Severus and Sejanus to Tiberius for being advanced to so great Honors Riches and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial Title they conspired against the Persons of their Sovereigns in hope of the Dignity but in the end they endured that Punishment which to such Disloyalty and Ingratitude appertaineth An Army which wants Experience albeit the Captain be expert is not greatly to be feared neither ought an Army of well-train'd Soldiers to be much esteemed whose Captain is ignorant Example Caesar going into Africa against Afranius and Petraeus whose Army was full of old Soldiers said he feared them little Quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce Contrariwise when he went to Pharsalia to encounter Pompey he said Ibo ad ducem fine exercitu A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to govern with Curtesie and Mildness than with over-much Austerity and Severity Example Q. and Appius Claudius being Consuls were appointed to govern the War To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully but Appius commanding the other with great Cruelty was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed Nevertheless Tacitus seems of contrary Opinion saying Plus Poena quam obsequium valet Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits I say that a General having power to command Men either they are Confederates or Subjects If Confederates or Voluntaries he may not proceed to extream punishment if Subjects and his power absolute they may be governed otherwise yet with such respect as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him Honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of Victory Every Man knoweth Glory is due to the Victor and we deny not the same Priviledge to the vanquished being able to make proof that the Loss proceeded not from his Default Neither is it dishonourable to violate those Promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth And forced Promises which concern a whole State are not binding and rarely or ever kept nor is the Breaker thereby to receive Disgrace Example Posthumus the Consul having made a dishonourable Peace with the Samnites was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed Being arrived at Rome the Consul informed the People they were not bound to perform the base Conditions he was compelled to yield unto albeit he and those few that promised were bound to perform them The Senate thereupon concluded to send him Prisoner to Samno where he constantly protested the Fault to be only his own wherefore the People by that Peace incurred no Dishonour at all And Fortune so much favoured Posthumus as the Samnites were content presently to return him to Rome where he became more glorious for losing the Victory than was Pontius at Samno for having won the Victory Wise Men have long observed That who so will know what shall be must consider what is past for all worldly Things hold the same course they had at first The Reason is that as long as Men are possest with the
to the other his Greatness cannot long continue for albeit a matter of no difficulty it is to perswade a People yet to make them constant is a work well near impossible Example Theseus Cyrus Romulus The second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by Favor or Corruption or by the Vertue or Greatness of Fortune or Friends A Prince by any or all these means advanced and desirous to hold his Estate must indeavor by his own Vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other which may be done by this means First To assure all Enemies from offending Secondly To win the Love and Friendship of so many Neighbors as possibly he may Thirdly To compass all Designs tending to his Honor or Profit and bring them to pass either by Fraud or Force Fourthly To make himself honored and followed of Captains and Soldiers Fifthly To oppress all those that would or can offend Sixthly To be obsequious and liberal to Friends magnanimous and terrible to Foes Seventhly To cass all old and unfaithful Bands and entertain new Eighthly To hold such Amity with Kings and Princes as they ought reasonably to favor him or else they would offend easily they cannot Example Giovannio Torrigiani Caesar Borgi The third and last means whereby private Persons do aspire to Principalities is not Force and Violence but meer good Will and Favor of Men. The cause or occasion thereof is only Vertue or Fortune or at least a certain Fortunate Craft and Wittiness because he aspireth either by Favor of the People or by Favor of the Nobility for these contrary Humors are in all Common-wealths to be found And the reason thereof is that the great Men do ever endeavor to oppress the People and the People do labor not to be oppressed by them Of these divers Appetites one of these three Effects do proceed viz. Principality Liberty or Licentious Life Principality may come either by love of the Multitude or of the great Men for when any of these Factions do find it self oppressed then do they soon consent to make one a Prince hoping by his Vertue and Valor to be defended Example Francesco Sforza Alessandro de Medici A Prince in this sort aspired to maintain his Estate must first consider well by which of these Factions aforesaid he is advanced for if by Favor of great Men he be aspired then must he meet with many Difficulties for having about him divers Persons of great Quality and such as were but lately his Equals hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth But if the Prince be advanced by the People few or none shall hardly disobey him So it appeareth that a Prince made by the Multitude is much more secure than he whom the Nobility preferreth for common People do not desire to enjoy more than their own and to be defended from Oppression but great Men do study not only to hold their own but also to command and insult upon Inferiors Note that all Monarchies are Principalities But all Principalities are not Monarchies CHAP. VII Of Councils and Counsellors in general A Senate or Council is a certain lawful Assembly of Counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the Commonweale Power Sovereign A Counsellor is called in the Latine Senator which Word signifieth in effect an old Man The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed their Councils of ancient and expert Persons for if they or the greater part of them had been Young Men then might the Council have more properly been called a Juvenate than a Senate The chief and most necessary Note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependence of any other Prince or Commonweale either Oath Homage Natural Obligation Pention or Reward In this Point the Venetians have been ever most precise and for that reason do not admit any Cardinal or other Clergy-man to be either of or at their Councils therefore when the Venetian Senate is Assembled the Usher being ready to shut the Door cryeth aloud Fuora Preti Depart Priest Note also that in every State of what Quality soever a Secret or Cabinet-Council is mainly necessary CHAP. VIII Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties THE King of Spain for the Government of his Dominions hath Seven Councils viz. the Council of the Indies the Council of Spain the Council of Italy and the Low Countries the Council of War the Council of Orders the Council of Inquisition and the Council Royal. In France are Three Councils viz. the Council Privy the Council of Judges which they call Presidents et Conceliers de Parlament and the great Council which they call Assemblies du troys Estates Of Councils in Aristocraties In Venice beside the Senate and great Council are Four Councils viz. the Sages of the Sea the Sages of the Land the Council of Tenn the Three Presidents of Quarantia and the Senate All which Councils do amount to One hundred and twenty Persons with the Magistrates The Great Council of Ragusa consisteth of Sixty Persons and hath another Privy Council of Twelve Of Councils in Democraties Genoua hath Three Councils the Great Council of Two hundred the Senate which consisteth of Sixty and the Privy Council which hath Twenty six Counsellors So it doth appear that in all Commonwealths be they Monarchies Aristocracies or Popular States The Council-Privy is most necessary and often used Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies and the Councils in Aristocracies and States Popular that is to say that all Deliberations fit to be published are in a Monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the Council Privy and after ratified by Common Council But in Optimacies or Popular Government the Custom is contrary Here also is to be noted that albeit the Use and Authority of every Senate a Privy Council is most needful yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Sovereignty resteth For if Counsellors had power to command absolutely then should they be Sovereigns and consequently all Execution at their Pleasure which may not be without detracting from Majesty which is a thing so Sovereign and Sacred as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever may touch or approach thereunto CHAP. IX Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions AN Officer is a Person publick that hath Charge ordinary and limited by Law A Commissioner is also a Person publick but his Charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission Officers are of two sorts and so be Commissioners the one hath power to command and are called Magistrates the other hath Authority to execute so the one and the other are Persons publick yet are not all publick Persons either Officers or Commissioners Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces in War in Justice in disposing the Treasure or some other Function concerning the State but all Commissions do spring and proceed from the Sovereign Magistrates and Commissioners And here is
without Extremity Ne Boves ipsos mox agros postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant Tac. The fourth Remedy is the Princes own Parsimony not giving so largely to private Persons as thereby to be forced to take from the Multitude Magnae opes non tam multa capiendo quam haud multa perdendo quaeruntur Maecaenas The last help against Hate is in Taxation to proceed equally indifferently and without Favor or Respect and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner fort of People Populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet Tac. Touching Censure which we numbred amongst the causes whereof Hate is conceived much needeth not to be spoken because the same is discontinued or rather utterly forgotten yet doth it seem a thing necessary being a certain Observation and Controlement of such evil Manners and Disorders as were not by Law corrigible these Officers were of the Romans called Magistri pudoris modestiae Livi. To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Manners and Excess under Manners I comprehend Wantonness Drunkenness Dicing Brawling Perjury and all such Lewdness as Modesty condemneth These Disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of Censors in all Ages and Sexes to the end that Idleness might be generally avoided Universa plebs habeat negotia sua quibus a malo publico detineatur Salust Excess includeth Riotousness expence of Money Prodigal House-keeping Banquetting and Superfluity in Apparel which things are the Mothers of many Mischiefs It also seemeth in some sort perilous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Covetize or Consuming Nemo nimis excedat five amicorum copia sine opum Arist. The Punishment inflicted upon these sorts of Offenders were either Ignominy or Pecuniary Punishments Censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem Tac. The first and chiefest means to remove these Inconveniences is the Princes own Example whose Life being well censured easily reduceth others to order Vita principis censura perpetua Plin. Secondly Those Disorders may be taken away without danger if the Censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely for the Nature of Man may not suddenly be altered Vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps si eorum sit patiens Sen. These are the chiefest Rules whereby to eschew Hate but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it for being himself good he incurreth the Offence of all bad Folk if he be Evil Good Men will hate him this Danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded because Hate may be gained as well by good as evil Doing Odia qui nimium timet regnare nescit Sen. One other means to remove this Error is to reward the good and well deserving Subjects for no Man can think him Cruel that for love to Vertue useth Austerity which will appear when he bestoweth Bountifully on the Good Praemio poena Respublica continetur Solon The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes we call Contempt being a certain base and vile Conceit which entereth into the Subjects Strangers or Servants of the Prince and his Proceedings for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the Powers of Mans Mind whereunto the Hands the Feet the Eyes do by consent obey Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt Livi. The Causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the Form of Government Fortune or the Prince's Manners the Form of Government becometh Contemptible when the Prince desiring to be thought Merciful ruleth rather Pitifully than Justly which manner of Proceeding taketh away all Reverence in the People and in lieu thereof entereth Liberty or at least a certain Boldness to offend Facult as faciendi quod cuilibet visum non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem Tac. Also to be Mutable Irresolute Light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Honors and Offices of State maketh the Prince Contemptible Qui praesentibus fruitur nec in longius consultat Arist. But if Contempt be caused by Fortune or as may be said more reasonably by Destiny and that those Friends do fail who ought in Duty to defend the Prince and his Authority then is there small hope to eschew Contempt Fato obnoxia virtus Plaut The Prince's Manners do breed Contempt when he yieldeth his Affections to Sensuality and Sloth or if he incur the Suspition of Simplicity Cowardise or any such Vice unworthy the Dignity he beareth Common People do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes as Deformity of Person Sickness or such like Mos vulgi est fortuita externa ad culpam trahere Tac. CHAP. XX. Of Diffidence and Dissimulation in the Management of State Affairs ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy Praise chiefly in private Persons yet because all Men in their Actions do not so proceed it behoveth Wise Men and Princes above others at occasions to Semble and Dissemble for as in all Actions a Prince ought to be Slow and Advised so in Consent and Believing Haste and Facility is most dangerous and though Credulity be rather an Error than a Fault yet for Princes it is both Unfit and Perilous Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this Caution Nihil credendo atque omnia cavendo Cic. Notwithstanding he must not shew himself Diffident or Distrustful utterly but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all Men so ought he not for small causes distrust every Man Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli Sen. Dissimulation is as it were begotten by Diffidence a Quality in Princes of so great Necessity as moved the Emperor Tiberius to say Nescit regnare qui nescit dissimulare The Necessity of Dissimulation is chiefly to be used with Strangers and Enemies it also sheweth a certain Discretion in Magistrates sometimes to disguise with Friends when no Offence doth thereof follow Doli non sunt doli nisi astu colas Plaut This kind of Craft albeit in every Mans Conceit not praisable is nevertheless tolerable and for Princes and Magistrates the same being used to good ends very necessary But those Cunnings which are contrary to Vertue ought not of Honest Men to be used neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption though they be often used in Court and are of some Learned Writers allowed Decipere pro moribus temporum prudentia est Plin. By great Subtilty and Frauds contrary to Vertue and Piety I mean Perjury and Injustice which though all Men in Words detest yet in Deeds are used of many perswading themselves by Cavillations and Sophistications to excuse the Impiety of their False Oaths as it is written of Lysander Pueros talis viros juramentis circumvenire solebat Plut. CHAP. XXI Of War Defensive and Invasive with Instructions touching Laws of Arms Soldiers and Military Discipline THE Art Military is of all other Qualities most necessary for Princes for without it they cannot be defended force of Men only
Perswasion and consequently easily transported by Seditious Leaders Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten Danger and Terror yet unless these Perils by some new Accident be daily revived that Fear by little and little vanisheth and Security recovereth the place Whoso findeth himself contemned or not respected becometh Discontent which Humor in generous Minds breedeth oftentimes Adventerous Imaginations whereof Audacious Attempts have followed chiefly in Persons of Authority and Reputation for he that hopeth no Good feareth no Evil Yet true it is that dangerous Enterprises the more they be thought upon the less Hope they give of good Success for which reason Conspiracies not suddenly executed are for the most part revealed or abandoned All People do naturally imitate the Manners of their Prince and observing his Proceedings resolve to Hate or Love him But if they happen once to Hate the Prince then his Doings Good or Evil are afterwards not Good but if at the beginning he gained the Love of the People then every bad Action is reputed a Vertue as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good Cause or Reason Greatly are Princes deceived if in the Election of Ministers they more respect their own particular Affection than the Sufficiency of the Person elected A Prince having conquered any new Dominion is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened unless the same be after well governed and seldom is it seen that a Principality by ill means gotten hath been long enjoyed As to the Perfection of the whole Body soundness of Head only sufficeth not unless the other Members also do their Office even so it is not enough that a Prince be Faultless but it behoveth also that the Magistrates and Ministers should perform their Duty Great Princes rarely resist their Appetites as for the most part private Men can for they being always honored and obeyed do seldom with Patience indure the want of any thing reasonable as being perswaded that what they desire is Just and that their Commandment hath power to remove all Difficulties All Men are naturally good when no respect of Profit or Pleasure draws them to become Evil. But this Worlds Corruption and our Frailty is such as easily and often for our particular Interest we incline to the worst which was the cause that wise Law-makers found out Reward and Punishment the one to incite Men to Good the other to fear them from being Evil. A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Estate by three means First He practiseth to hold all Subjects in extreme Awe and to be basely minded to the end they should want Courage to take Arms against him Secondly He kindleth Diffidence and Discord among the Great Men thereby to remove occasion of Conspiracy and Combination Lastly He holdeth them Disarmed and Idle so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him To govern is nothing else but to hold Subjects in Love and Obedience for in respect of the end they ought not and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the Governor's Will and their Duty The Laws and Ordinances of a Common-weale made at the beginning thereof when Men were good do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil and therefore new Laws are made according to the Accidents which happen The Discontent and Disorder of People is ever occasioned by the Inequality of their Goods because the Poorer sort would be made equal to the Rich but the Offence that grows among great Men is the desire of Honor for they being equal do endeavor to aspire to equal Authority A Prince that desireth by means of his Ambassador to deceive any other Prince must first abuse his own Ambassador to the end he should do and speak with more Earnestness being indeed perswaded that the Intent and Meaning of his Master is Simple which happily would not were he privy that his Prince's Meaning were to Dissemble This course is also commonly holden by those that by Imployment of a third Person would perswade any thing Feigned or False For the Performance of Conditions of Treaty of Peace or League of Amity the Promises Vows and Oaths of Princes are of great Effect and because Fidelity in a Man is not ever certain and time doth daily offer Occasions of Variation there is no Assurance so Secure and Good as to stand so prepared as the Enemy may want able means how to offend To resolve in Matters Doubtful or answer Requests which we are not willing to grant the least offensive way is not to use direct Denial but by delays prolong the time and so in effect afford good Expectation The old Proverb saith Magistratus virum ostendit which is no less true than Ancient for Men in such Fortune are occasioned not only to make proof of their Sufficiency but also to discover their Affections and the more their Greatness is the less respect they have to contain those Passions which are natural Albeit great Troubles and continual Adversity seem Insupportable yet is there nothing more Dangerous than overmuch Prosperity and being pressed by new Appetites they disturb their own Security In speaking of Occurrents doubtful it is always Wisdom to feign Ignorance or at least alledge that we believe them not for most commonly they are utterly untrue or far other than vulgarly is believed The Actions of Men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good Success attributing that to Council which sometimes is due to Fortune The Multitude of Men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow Resolutions and many times account those Enterprises Generous which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted Great Difference there is between Subjects Desperate and others which are only Discontented for the one desire nothing but present Alteration which they endeavor with all Hazard the other wish for Innovation inciting any Motion or Practice because their Intent is to attend time and that occasion may present it self A Benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured doth not suffice to raze the same out of his Memory chiefly if the Benefit be given at such time as no mere Motion but Necessity may seem the occasion thereof That Peace ought to be desired which removed Suspition which assureth us from Peril which bringeth Quiet certain and acquitteth us of Expences but when it worketh contrary Effects it may be called a dangerous War covered with the name of Deceitful Trust not unlike a perilous Poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome Medicine The Effect of things and not External show or seeming ought to be regarded yet it is credible what great Grace is gained by courteous Speech and Affability the reason whereof is as I suppose that every Man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy and consequently holdeth himself injured whensoever he findeth Men not to afford him like Estimation Men ought in any wise to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend for
with other Princes the one being in Arms against the other if he deny both incurreth Suspicion of both and may be thought to have Secret Intelligences with one or both of them so as either of them shall account him an Enemy and consequently he that proves Victorious will be revenged and the other holding him suspected will not acknowledge his Friendship It is the use of Men to presume much upon their own Merit and seeing the Success of some others to be such as without Cause or Desert are aspired to Dignity thereby encouraged they promised to themselves the like Nevertheless being entred into the course of their Design and finding many Crosses and Impeachments they do not a little repent their Overweening and Presumption but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised Enterprize neither can I think that the Vertue or Sufficiency of any Man without the Favor of the Heavens can advance him for as the Poet saith Nec velle javat potiusve nocet si fata repugnant Whoso serveth a Prince far from his Presence shall with great Difficulty content him For if he commit any Error it shall be aggravated Besides that the Instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived because the State of wordly things doth daily alter Also to serve aloof is a thing full of Danger and far from Reward which Inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Prince's Person Let no Man that cometh to serve in Court assure himself by his Wisdom to be advanced or eschew all Encounters Neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to Fortune but be perswaded that this worldly Life is like to a Voiage by Sea wherein albeit Art with the favor of the Wind may do much yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the Haven appointed for daily Experience doth shew that some strange Ships in the calmest Weather are drowned or impeached by the way when others much weaker and disarmed pass securely Among Men worthy of Commendations those have merited best that first planted true Religion next they that framed Kingdoms and Commonwealths the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their Dominions lastly Learned Men deserve Fame and Memory and as every of these are worthy of Fame and Honor so ought they to be accompted Infamous that introduce Atheism or the Subversion of Kingdoms or are become Enemies to Learning and Virtue Whosoever taketh in hand to govern a Multitude either by way of Liberty or Principality and cannot assure himself of those Persons that are Enimies to that Enterprise doth frame a State of short Perseverance yet true it is that such Princes be infortunate as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary and have the Multitude their Enemy for he that hath few Foes may with small dishonor be assured but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured and the more Cruelty he useth the weaker his Principality proveth In commending another Man great Moderation is to be used for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used so great praise besides that it is uttered with danger to his Judgment that speaketh it the same doth oft-ten-times offend him that heareth it For Self-love which commonly possesseth Men causes the Good or Evil we hear to be measured with our own And consequently every Man that is touched with like deserts and defects doth grow offended that his Commendation is not set forth and feareth lest his Imperfection should be discovered It is often or rather ever seen that the force of Leagues not used in their first heat becomes cold because Suspition soon entereth which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded and may not without long time be rejoined The power of Ambition which possesseth the Minds of Men is such as rarely or never suffereth them to rest The reason thereof is That Nature hath framed in them a certain Disposition to desire all things but not to obtain them so as our Desires being greater than our Power therefore following Discontent and evil Satisfaction Hereof also proceedeth the Variation of Fortune for some Men desiring to get and others fearing to lose that they had gotten do occasion one Man to injure another and consequently Publick Wars do follow by means whereof one Country is ruined and another inlarged Princes of great Power and chiefly those that are Inhabitants of the North having many Children were wont to be much inclined to the Wars as well to win unto themselves Honor as also to get Possessions for their Sons which manner of Proceedings did oft-tentimes remove such Disturbance as the Plurality of Brethren bringeth These and other reasons induced Princes to attempt War against those Kingdoms which in cheir opinion seemed easily conquered or whereunto they can pretend little for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their Proceedings When a Prince deferreth to answer an Ambassador it proceedeth from some of these Respects either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded or that he esteemeth not the Prince that doth demand or that he disdaineth the Person by whom the demand is made or else that he intendeth to hear from his own Ministers to be better resolved Wherefore a discreet Negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these Reasons move the Prince where he is employed to entertain him with delays and make his dispatch accordingly The sufficiency of good Counsellors consistetd in fonr things First They ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their Affairs directing all doings to publick Commodity Secondly To be just in their Proceedings giving to every one that which to him appertaineth Thirdly To be stout and void both of partial respects and fear And lastly To be temperate and moderate in their Desires Whoso desireth to govern well and securely it behoveth him to have a vigilant Eye to the Proceedings of great Princes and to consider seriously of their Designs For it is matter of small difficulty to live in Peace with him who desireth our Amity and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us The Intelligences that Princes study to attain are procured by divers means Some are brought by report some vented by Conversation and Sounding some by means of Espials but the most sure and credibe Occurrents are those which come from Ambassadors chiefly those that either for the Greatness of their Prince or their own Virtue be of most Reputation For those Men conversing daily with great Personages and pondering diligently their Manners Words Wisdom and the order of each Man's Proceedings yea of the Prince himself may with Commodity attain unto matters of great Importance sooner than they that are Writers of Rumors or that take upon them to Conjecture of things to come Whensoever a People is induced to commit so great