of Prevention or Discovery COnspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes Person Treasons are addressed against his Government Authority Country Subjects or Places of Srength These Mischiefs are easily feared but hardly eschewed for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret Foes and consequently not to be avoided Occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est Salust The danger of Conspiracy proceedeth of divers Causes as Avarice Infidelity of Subjects Ambition in Servants and Corruption in Soldiers therefore with great difficulty to be avoided Vitae tuae dominus est quisquis suam contempsit Sen. Notwithstanding it seemeth that either by Inquisition Punishment Innocency or Destiny the evil Affection of Men may be oft-tentimes discovered 1. For whoso will curiously inquire and consider the Actions and ordinary Speechees of Men I mean those that be Persons of Honor and Reputation may oft-tentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the Minds Quoniam rarò nisi male loqunti mali faciunt Lips 2. Punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the Consideration thereof with the hope of Reward doth often discover those dangerous Intentions Cruciatu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt Tac. But as it is Wisdom in Princes to give ear to Informers so are they not always to be believed for Hope Envy Hate or some other Passion oft-tentimes draws them to speak untruly Quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit Tac. 3. The third and likeliest Desence against Conspiracy is the Princes own Innocency sor never having injured any Man it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewd as will endeauor to hurt him Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia Plin. 4. The last and best Bulward to withstand the force of this Mischief we call Destiny which proceeding from the Fountain of Divine Providence may be truly called the Will of God in whose only Power it resteth to protect and defend good Princes Ille erit a latere tuo custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris Salo. Treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous Persons who preferring private Prosit before Fame or Fidelity do not fear to enter into any impious Action To this humor ambitious Men dissentious and all such as be desirous of Innovation are inclined Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes Hom. To these Offenders no Punishment is equal to their impious Merit can be devised being Persons odious as well to Friends as Foes Proditores etiam in quos anteponunt invisi sunt Tac. CHAP. XIX Of Publick Hate and Contempt with the Occasions and Means to redress and avoid it HAving briefly touched the Virtues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honor let something be said of the Causes from whence their Ruine doth proceed the chief whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt Hate cometh of Fear which the more Common it is the more Dangerous Nulla vis imperii tanta est quae premente metu possit esse diuturna Cic. The causes of Fear are Punishments Impositions and Rigor and therefore it behoveth a Prince not only to shun them but to eschew those Actions whereby he may reasonable incur their Suspision Sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint non minus opinione fama quam certa aliqua ratione moveri Cic. Yet Punishment Imposition and Censure are in all States necessary although they shew and seem terrible and consequently breed a certain Desperation in Subjects unless they be discreetly and modesty used for extream and frequent Punishments taste of Cruelty great and many Imposts favor of Covetousness Censure of Manners when it exceedeth the quality of Offences doth seem Rigour in these matters therefore it behoveth the Prince to be moderate and 〈◊〉 chiefly in Capital Punishment which must be confined within the Bounds of Justice Sit apud 〈◊〉 parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis Sen. But if for Security sake the Prince be forced to 〈◊〉 let the same be done with shew of great Sorrow and Lothness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nocum tormento ad castigandum veniat Sen. Let all Punishments also be slowly executed for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned neither ought any Capital Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale and for Example sake Non tam ut ipsi pareant quam ut alios pereundo deterreant Sen. In punishing also a specil respect must be had that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein Forma rabiei est sanguine vulneribus gaudere Sen. Also in Punishing equality must be observed and the nature of the Punishment according to the Custom Nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur alii ne appellentur quidem Cic. But in punishing publick Offences wherein a Multitude have part the Execution ought to be otherwise and as it were at an instant which may haply seem terrible but in effect is not Frequens vindicta paucorum odium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at Sen. Another means to satisfie a People offended is to punish the Ministers of Cruelty and with their Blood to wash away the common hatred Piaculares publici odii victimae Plin. By this King David did appease the Gibeonites The next cause of Discontent cometh of Impositions under which word is comprehended all Levies of Money a matter nothing pleasing to People as that which they esteem equal to their own Lives Pecunia anima sanguis est mortalibus Plaut First to remove Hate conceived of this cause there is nothing better then publick Expostulation of Necessity for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes Nulla quies gentium sine armis nec arma sine stipendiis nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt Tac. The second Remedy against Hate for Impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare For as Tiberius the Emperor was wont to say a Sheep should be sleeced not slead Qui nimis emungit elicit 〈◊〉 Tac. Thirdly also to eschew the Offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant Eye on Informers Promoters and such fiscal Ministers whose Cruelty and covetous Proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great Hate but this mischief may be though hardly encountred either by choosing honest Officers or proving otherwise not only to remain them but to use them as Spunges Exprimendi post quam biberint Suet. In all Impositions or Taxations no Cruelty or Force ought to be used the second cause to kindle Hate and to meet with that mischief nothing is better than to proceed moderately and without Extremity Ne Boves ipsos mox agros postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant Tac. The fourth Remedy is the Princes own Parsimony not giving so largely to private Persons as thereby to be forced to take from the Multitude Magnae opes non tam multa capiendo quam haud multa perdendo quaeruntur Maecaenas The last help against Hate
concerning all Estates and Forms of Policy in Times of Peace or War c. confirmed by Select Narrations and Historical Parallels ALL Cities and Towns of State are builded either by People dwelling in or about the Place where they are builded or else they are made by Strangers Of the first are Athens and Venice of the other Alexandria and Florence The Fortune of every City builded and Vertue of the Builder appeareth by Choice of the Place and Quality of Laws For as fertile Places occasion Men to be slothful unless by good Laws they be forced to labour so Barrenness compels them to Industry which Reason induceth Wise Men to plant Habitations in either Examples of the first are Ferrara and Rome of the second Ragusa and Genoa All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent Man and at an instant or else they were ordained at sundry Times according to such Accidents as befel Example The Laws of Sparta made at the beginnig by Lycurgus the Laws of Rome at sundry Times The Government of every City in Time becomes corrupt Principality changeth into Tyranny The Optimacy is made the Government of the People and the Popular Estate turns to licentious Disorder which Instability or Alteration moved some Law-makers to take Order that in the Government of their City there should be a Mixture of all three and was the Cause that the Policy of Sparta continued 800 Years when the Popular State of Athens endured not one hundred Example The Laws of Sparta made by Lycurgus and the Laws of Athens by Solon Whoso taketh in hand to frame any State or Government ought to presuppose that all Men are Evil and at occasions will shew themselves so to be Example The Envy of the People of Rome to the Nobles and their Insolency towards them appeared not so long as the Kings governed but the Tarquins being Banished Opportunity was thereby offered that the Malice of the one and the other became discovered The divers Honours of the Nobility and People the one desiring to command the other not to obey are the Cause of continual Troubles unless some third Mean there be of more Authority than either to bridle the Force of both Example The Kings in Rome expulsed forthwith arose much Mutiny and could not be suppress'd till the Tribum Plebis were created whose Authority wrought the same effect which the Kings had done Some States endeavour to enlarge their Dominions and some others labor only to maintain that Estate they antiently possessed Example of the first was the City of Rome of the second Sparta All States desiring to live at Liberty think fit that every Man should be permitted to accuse any Citizen that offendeth which manner of proceeding works two excellent Effects First That the People should not dare for Fear of accusing to attempt ought against the State or if they do they shall be presently and without Respect punished Secondly by Liberty of accusing every Man hath Means to utter the Offence wherewith he can charge others which he could not unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary Course and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary particular Revenge or calling in Foreign Forces Example Coriolanus and Appius Claudius at Rome Lucanncve at Chinsi Francisco Valeri in Florence As Accusations are in every State necessary so Slanders are dangerous and worthy of Punishment the Difference betwixt Accusations and Slanders is that the one is publickly performed before Magistrates with good Proofs and Witnesles to maintain the Truth of the Accusation but Slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and Places of Repair without Witness and Justification so as every Man may be slandered but few are orderly accused Example Appius Claudius accused by L. Virginius Furius Camillus slandered by Manlius Capitolinus The only means to suppress Slander is to give Authority to some Persons of Repute to compel every Slanderer to become an Accuser and if the Accusation prove true then to reward the Accuser or at least not to punish him Example Manlius the Slanderer of Camillus for his untrue Information punished A Rule most certain and assured it is That every Kingdom and State at the first well framed or after well informed doth take the Perfection thereof from the Wisdom of some excellent Man who ought not to be blind though in a Matter of great Moment he happily useth some extraordinary Violence or Proceedings for he that employeth Force to mend and not to mar deserves Commendation Example Romulus Lycurgus Cleomenes There lives no Man so simple or wise so wicked or well-disposed but prefers those Persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable Not withstanding for that well-near all Men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is Good deeming that Honourable which in Truth is otherwise they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a Course which merits rather Infamy than Commendation Example Every Man wisheth himself Timoleon or Agesilaus rather than Dionysius or Phalaris rather a Titus or Trajan than Caligula or Vitellius Who reads Histories treating of great Actions shall perceive that good Princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the Love of the People and Fidelity of Counsellors than were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War Example Of all those Emperours which reigned after Caesar until Maximiinus the greatest number were for their Vices taken and slain only Galba and Pertinax excepted who were good Emperours A Prince of great Knowledge both in Arms and Wisdom so firmly setleth the Foundation of Government as albeit his Successor be of the less Vertue yet may he be maintained even by the Memory of his Predecessor But if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first than the second then all that is past goeth to Ruine Example The Martial Valour of Romulus was the cause that Numa might govern safely in Peace Which Tullus could not have done had he been unlike to Romulus nor should Bajazet Emperour of Turky have enjoyed the State of his Father Mahomet and left the same to his Posterity if Selim his Son had not been more like to his Grand father than to Bajazet his Father The Succession of two excellent Princes chiefly if they be of long life works wondrous Effects The like is seen in Optimacies and Popular States where the Governours successively elected be Men of great Vertue and Understanding Example The first appeared in Philip of Macedon and Alexander his Son the second in the Consuls of Rome In every State where Soldiers are not the Fault thereof proceeds from the Governours Wise Princes were therefore wont even in Times of Peace to cause Warlike Exercises to be used for without them the most Warlike Nations become not only Ignorant in Martial Knowledge but also effeminate Example Pelopidas Epaminondas in Thebes and King Tullus in Rome as well in Peaceable as Troublesome Times used the exercise of
other State for that the Party injured doth oft by indirect means though with hazard of his Country and himself seek satisfaction Example The Complaint which the Galli made against the Fabii who sent Ambassadors in favour of the Tossani not being heard nor any punishment inflicted upon them for Fighting against the Law of Nations was the cause that the Galli were offended with the States whereof followed the sack of Rome and the delay of Justice in Philip of Macedon for not revenging the incestuous oppression of Attalus to Pausanias was the Motive to murther that King Whoso endeavours the alteration of any State must of necessity proceed with all severity and leave some memorable Example to those that shall impugn the Ordinance of Government newly setled Example When Junius Brutus had by his great Valour banish'd the Traquins and sworn the People that no King should ever reign in Rome within short time after many young Nobles among whom was Brutus's Son impatient of the equality of the new Government conspired to recall the Tarquins but Brutus thereof informed caused his own Son not only to be condemned to death but was himself present at the Execution As Health and soundness of the Hands Legs and other outward Members cannot continue Life unless the Heart and vital Spirits within be strong and sirm so Fortifications and Frontier-desences do not prevail unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed Example When the Emperor came into Italy and had with some difficulty past the confines of the Venetians well near without resistance his Army march'd to Venice and might doubtless have possest the City had it not been defended with Water Likewise the English in their assault of France excepting a few Encounters on the Frontiers found no puissant resistance within the Realm And Anno 1513. they forced all that State and the King himself to tremble as ost before they had done but contrariwise the Romans knowing that Life lay in the Heart ever held the Body of their State strongest For the nearer the Enemy approach'd Rome the better they found the Country armed and defended The desire to command sovereignly is of so great Force as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of Principality but also in them that have no Title at all Example this Appetite moved the Wife of Tarquinius Priscus contrary to all natural Duty to incite her Husband to murder her own Father Servius and possess his Kingdom as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a Queen than to be the Daughter of a King The violation of ancient Laws Orders and Customs under which People have long time lived is the chief and only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity Example Albeit the deflowring of Lucrece was the occasion yet was it not the cause that moved the Romans to take Arms against Tarquin for he having before that fact of Sextus his Son governed Tyrannically and taken from the Senate all Authority was become odious both to the Senate Nobility and People who finding themselves well-governed never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration A Prince that desires to live secure from Conspiracy hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great Riches and Honors than those whom he hath greatly injured because they want Means to offend the other have many opportunities to do it Example Perrenius the prime Favorite of Commodus the Emperor conspired his Death Plautianus did the like to Severus and Sejanus to Tiberius for being advanced to so great Honors Riches and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial Title they conspired against the Persons of their Sovereigns in hope of the Dignity but in the end they endured that Punishment which to such Disloyalty and Ingratitude appertaineth An Army which wants Experience albeit the Captain be expert is not greatly to be feared neither ought an Army of well-train'd Soldiers to be much esteemed whose Captain is ignorant Example Caesar going into Africa against Afranius and Petraeus whose Army was full of old Soldiers said he feared them little Quia 〈◊〉 ad exercitum sine duce Contrariwise when he went to Pharsalia to encounter Pompey he said Ibo ad ducem sine exercitu A Captain General commanding an Army ought rather to govern with Curtesie and Mildness than with over-much Austerity and Severity Example Q. and Appius Claudius being Consuls were appointed to govern the War To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully but Appius commanding the other with great Cruelty was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed Nevertheless Tacitus seems of contrary Opinion saying Plus Poena quam obsequium valet Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits I say that a General having power to command Men either they are Confederates or Subjects If Confederates or Voluntaries he may not proceed to extream punishment if Subjects and his power absolute they may be governed otherwise yet with such respect as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him Honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of Victory Every Man knoweth Glory is due to the Victor and we deny not the same Priviledge to the vanquished being able to make proof that the Loss proceeded not from his Default Neither is it dishonourable to violate those Promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth And forced Promises which concern a whole State are not binding and rarely or ever kept nor is the Breaker thereby to receive Disgrace Example Posthumus the Consul having made a dishonourable Peace with the Samnites was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed Being arrived at Rome the Consul informed the People they were not bound to perform the base Conditions he was compelled to yield unto albeit he and those few that promised were bound to perform them The Senate thereupon concluded to send him Prisoner to Samno where he constantly protested the Fault to be only his own wherefore the People by that Peace incurred no Dishonour at all And Fortune so much favoured Posthumus as the Samnites were content presently to return him to Rome where he became more glorious for losing the Victory than was Pontius at Samno for having won the Victory Wise Men have long observed That who so will know what shall be must consider what is past for all worldly Things hold the same course they had at first The Reason is that as long as Men are possest with the same Passions with former Ages consequently of these doings the same effects ensue Example The Almains and French have ever been noted for their Avarice Pride Fury and Infidelity and so in divers Ages experience hath proved even to this present For perfidious Dealing the French have given sufficient proof not only in ancient times but also in the time of Charles VIII who promised to render to the Florentines the Forts of Pisa but having divers times
THE Secrets of Government AND Misteries of State Plainly laid open in all the several Forms of Government IN THE CHRISTIAN WORLD Published by JOHN MILTON Esq Printed in the Year 1697. TO THE READER HAving had the Manuscript of this Treatise Written by Sir Walter Raleigh many Years in my Hands and finding it lately by chance among other Books and Papers upon reading thereof I thought it a kind of Injury to withhold longer the Work of so Eminent an Author from the Publick it being both answerable in 〈◊〉 to other Works of his already Extant as far as the Subject would permit and given me for a true Copy by a Learned Man at his Death who had Collected several such Pieces John Milton THE Principal Contents CHAP. I. THE Desinition and Division of Publick Weales and Sovereign States according to their several Species or Kinds Page 1 Chap. 2. Of Sovereign or Monarchick Government with its Essential Marks and Specifical Differences P. 3 Chap. 3. Of Monarchies Seignioril exemplisied in the Turkish and West-Indian Empire P. 6 Chap. 4. Of Monarchies Royal with the Means to maintain them P. 8 Chap. 5. Of Monarchies Tyrannical P. 11 Chap. 6. Of New-found Monarchies and Principalities with the Means to 〈◊〉 them P. 12 Chap. 7. Of Councils and Counsellors in general P. 17 Chap. 8. Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties P. 18 Chap. 9. Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions P. 21 Chap. 10. Of Magistrates their Qualifications and Elections P. 22 Chap. 11. Observations intrinsically concerning every Publick State in Points of Justice Treasure and War P. 24 Chap. 12. Extrinsick Observations shewing how to deal with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively how to prevent their Designs and decypher their Intendments P. 30 Chap. 13. Observations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities Charactering an Excellent Prince or Governor P. 35 Chap. 14. Of the Princes intimate Counsellors and Ministers of State with their several Requisites P. 41 Chap. 15. The Art of Ruling or Mystery of Regiment P. 48 Chap. 16 Of Princely Authority wherein it consists and how far to be extended and delegated P. 51 Chap. 17. Of Power and Force and how to be raised and maintained P. 53 Chap. 18. Of Conspiracy and Treason with the Causes and ways of Prevention or Discovery P. 55 Chap. 19. Of Publick Hate and Contempt with the Occasions and Means to redress and avoid it P. 58 Chap. 20. Of Diffidence and Dissimulation in the Management of State Affairs P. 67 Chap. 21. Of War Defensive and Invasive with Iustructions touching Laws of Arms Soldiers and Military Discipline P. 70 Chap. 22. Of Generals and Commanders and their requisite Abilities in Martial Enterprises and Expeditions P. 83 Chap. 23. Of Councils in War and Directions Tactick and Stratagematick with Advice how to make an honorable Peace P. 87 Chap. 24. Of Civil War with the Causes and Remedies thereof P. 97 Chap. 25. A Collection of Political Observations confirmed by Reason and Experience advertising Princes Statesmen and Private Persons how to demean themselves in all Fortunes and Events P. 107 Chap. 26. Maxims of State or Prudential Grounds and Polemical Precepts concerning all Estates and Forms of Policy in times of Peace or War c. confirmed by Select Narrations and Historical Parallels P. 184 ADVERTISEMENT THE Excellent Woman described by her True Characters and their Opposites Printed for J. Watts The Secrets of Government AND Misteries of State Plainly laid open CHAP. I. The Definition and Division of Publick Weales and Sovereign States according to their several Species or Kinds A Common-wealth is a certain Sovereign Govornment of many Families with those things that are common among them All Common-wealths are either Monarchies Aristocraties or Democraties A Monarchy is that State where the Sovereignty resteth in the Person of one only Prince An Aristocraty is where some small part of the People have in them as a Body corporate the Sovereignty and Supreme Power of the whole State A Democraty is where all the People have Power and Authority Sovereign So doth it appear that the Place and Person where the Sovereignty resteth doth cause the State to be either a Monarchy an Aristocraty or Popular Government CHAP. II. Of Sovereign of Monarchick Government with its Essential Marks and Specifical Differences SOvereignty is an absolute and perpetual Power in every publick State and he is properly and only a Sovereign that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal nor holdeth of any other Prince Person or Power but God and his own Sword The first Mark of Sovereignty is absolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general and every of them in particular without consent of any other Person or Persons either greater or inferior to himself The second Mark of Majesty is Authority to make War and conclude Peace at his pleasure The third is Power to beslow all Honors and chief Offices at his pleasure The Fourth Mark of Sovereignty is Appellation The Fifth Mark and last is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwise condemned in Life Lands Goods or Honors These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer Deputy or other Magistrate but in the Prince's absence and for some urgent occasion Monarchies are of three Sorts Signioril Royal and Tyrannical The Diversity of Monarchies doth not proceed from the Nature of the State but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that govern for great difference there may be between the nature of the Commonwealth and the Government thereof That Prince that giveth the Magistracies Honors and Offices without respect of Nobility Riches or Vertue may be said to govern popularly And that Monarchy may be said to be governed Aristocratically when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich Men only The same difference there is to be sound in States Aristocratical and Popular for the one and the other may be both Signioril or Tyrannical A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War is made Owner of Mens Bodies and Goods and governeth them as a Master of a Family governeth base Servants and Slaves A Monarch Royal is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws of God and Nature suffering every Subject to enjoy Liberty natural with Property in Lands and Goods governing as a Father governeth his Children A Monarch Tyrannical is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature commandeth Free-men as Slaves and useth their Lands and Goods as his own CHAP. III. of Monarchy Signioril Exemplisied in the Turkisn and West-Indian Empire ALL People subject to Princes are governed as Free-men by their Prince and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties who not by the Princes Commission but by Ancient 〈◊〉 or Custom have Inheritance and Tenements or else they are by one Prince and his Ministers commanded which Ministers have not by Law or Ordinance any Authority or Interest of
the Vertue or Greatness of Fortune or Friends A Prince by any or all these means advanced and desirous to hold his Estate must indeavor by his own Vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other which may be done by this means First To assure all Enemies from offending Secondly To win the Love and Friendship of so many Neighbors as possibly he may Thirdly To compass all Designs tending to his Honor or Profit and bring them to pass either by Fraud or Force Fourthly To make himself honored and followed of Captains and Soldiers Fifthly To oppress all those that would or can offend Sixthly To be obsequious and liberal to Friends magnanimous and terrible to Foes Seventhly To cass all old and unfaithful Bands and entertain new Eighthly To hold such Amity with Kings and Princes as they ought reasonably to favor him or else they would offend easily they cannot Example Giovannio Torrigiani Caesar Borgi The third and last means whereby private Persons do aspire to Principalities is not Force and Violence but meer good Will and Favor of Men. The cause or occasion thereof is only Vertue or Fortune or at least a certain Fortunate Craft and Wittiness because he aspireth either by Favor of the People or by Favor of the Nobility for these contrary Humors are in all Common-wealths to be found And the reason thereof is that the great Men do ever endeavor to oppress the People and the People do labor not to be oppressed by them Of these divers Appetites one of these three Effects do proceed viz. Principality Liberty or Licentious Life Principality may come either by love of the Multitude or of the great Men for when any of these Factions do find it self oppressed then do they soon consent to make one a Prince hoping by his Vertue and Valor to be defended Example Francesco Sforza Alessandro de Medici A Prince in this sort aspired to maintain his Estate must first consider well by which of these Factions aforesaid he is advanced for if by Favor of great Men he be aspired then must he meet with many Difficulties for having about him divers Persons of great Quality and such as were but lately his Equals hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth But if the Prince be advanced by the People few or none shall hardly disobey him So it appeareth that a Prince made by the Multitude is much more secure than he whom the Nobility preferreth for common People do not desire to enjoy more than their own and to be defended from Oppression but great Men do study not only to hold their own but also to command and insult upon Inferiors Note that all Monarchies are Principalities But all Principalities are not Monarchies CHAP. VII Of Councils and Counsellors in general A Senate or Council is a certain lawful Assembly of Counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the Commonweale Power Sovereign A Counsellor is called in the Latine Senator which Word signifieth in effect an old Man The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed their Councils of ancient and expert Persons for if they or the greater part of them had been Young Men then might the Council have more properly been called a Juvenate than a Senate The chief and most necessary Note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependence of any other Prince or Commonweale either Oath Homage Natural Obligation Pention or Reward In this Point the Venetians have been ever most precise and for that reason do not admit any Cardinal or other Clergy-man to be either of or at their Councils therefore when the Venetian Senate is Assembled the Usher being ready to shut the Door cryeth aloud Fuora Preti Depart Priest Note also that in every State of what Quality soever a Secret or Cabinet-Council is mainly necessary CHAP. VIII Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties THE King of Spain for the Government of his Dominions hath Seven Councils viz. the Council of the Indies the Council of Spain the Council of Italy and the Low Countries the Council of War the Council of Orders the Council of Inquisition and the Council Royal. In France are Three Councils viz. the Council srivy the Council of Judges which they call Presidents et Conceliers de Parlament and the great Council which they call Assemblies du troys Estates Of Councils in Aristocraties In Venice beside the Senate and great Council are Four Councils viz. the Sages of the Sea the Sages of the Land the Council of Tenn the Three Presidents of Quarantia and the Senate All which Councils do amount to One hundred and twenty Persons with the Magistrates The Great Council of Ragusa consisteth of Sixty Persons and hath another Privy Council of Twelve Of Councils in Democraties Genoua hath Three Councils the Great Council of Two hundred the Senate which consisteth of Sixty and the Privy Council which hath Twenty six Counsellors So it doth appear that in all Commonwealths be they Monarchies Aristocracies or Popular States The Council-Privy is most necessary and often used Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies and the Councils in Aristocracies and States Popular that is to say that all Deliberations fit to be published are in a Monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the Council Privy and after ratified by Common Council But in Optimacies or Popular Government the Custom is contrary Here also is to be noted that albeit the Use and Authority of every Senate a Privy Council is most needful yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Sovereignty resteth For if Counsellors had power to command absolutely then should they be Sovereigns and consequently all Execution at their Pleasure which may not be without detracting from Majesty which is a thing so Sovereign and Sacred as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever may touch or approach thereunto CHAP. IX Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions AN Officer is a Person publick that hath Charge ordinary and limited by Law A Commissioner is also a Person publick but his Charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission Officers are of two sorts and so be Commissioners the one hath power to command and are called Magistrates the other hath Authority to execute so the one and the other are Persons publick yet are not all publick Persons either Officers or Commissioners Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces in War in Justice in disposing the Treasure or some other Function concerning the State but all Commissions do spring and proceed from the Sovereign Magistrates and Commissioners And here is to be noted that every Commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye or revoke it or if the Commissioners during his Commission shall aspire to Office and Authority equal to his that made it CHAP. X. Of Magistrates their Qualifications and Elections A Magistrate is an Officer having
is in Taxation to proceed equally indifferently and without Favor or Respect and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of People Populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet Tac. Touching Censure which we numbred amongst the causes whereof Hate is conceived much needeth not to be spoken because the same is discontinued or rather utterly forgotten yet doth it seem a thing necessary being a certain Observation and Controlement of such evil Manners and Disorders as were not by Law corrigible these Officers were of the Romans called Magistri pudoris modestiae Livi. To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Manners and Excess under Manners I comprehend Wantonness Drunkenness Dicing Brawling Perjury and all such Lawdness as Modesty condemneth These Disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of Censors in all Ages and Sexes to the end that Idleness might be generally avoided Universa plebs habeat negotia sua quibus a malo publico detineatur Salust Excess includeth Riotousness expence of Money Prodigal House-keeping Banquetting and Superfluity in Apparel which things are the Mothers of many Mischiefs It also seemeth in some sort perilous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Covetize or Consuming Nemo nimis excedat sive amicorum copia sine opum Arist. The Punishment inflicted upon these sorts of Offenders were either 〈◊〉 or Pecuniary Punishments Censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem Tac. The first and chiefest means to remove these Inconveniences is the Princes own Example whose Life being well censured easily reduceth others to order Vit 〈◊〉 principis censura perpetua Plin. Secondly Those Disorders may be taken away without danger if the Censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely for the Nature of Man may not suddenly be altered Vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps si eorum sit patiens Sen. These are the chiefest Rules whereby to esehew Hate but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it for being himself good he incurreth the Offence of all bad Folk if he be Evil Good Men will hate him this Danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded because Hate may be gained as well by good as evil Doing Odia qui nimium timet regnare nescit Sen. One other means to remove this Error is to reward the good and well deserving Subjects for no Man can think him Cruel that for love to Vertue useth Austerity which will appear when he bestoweth Bountifully on the Good Praemio poena Respublica continetur Solon The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes we call Contempt being a certain base and vile Conceit which entereth into the Subjects Strangers or Servants of the Prince and his Proccedings for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the Powers of Mans Mind whereunto the Pland the Feet the Eyes do by 〈◊〉 obey Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt Livi. The Causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the Form of Government Fortune or the Prince's Manners the Form of Government becometh Contemptible when the Prince desiring to be thought Merciful ruleth rather Pitifully than Justly which manner of Proceeding taketh away all Reverence in the People and in lieu thereof entereth Liberty or at least a certain Boldness to offend Facultas faciendi quod euilibet visum non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem Tac. Also to be Mutable Irresolute Light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Honors and Offices of State maketh the Prince Contemptible Qui praesentibus fruitur nec in longius consultat Arist. But if Contempt be caused by Fortune or as may be said more reasonably by Destiny and that those Friends do fail who ought in Duty to defend the Prince and his Authority then is there small hope to esehew Contempt Fato obnoxia virius Plaut The Prince's Manners do breed Contempt when he yieldeth his Affections to Sensuality and Sloth or if he incur the Suspition of Simplicity Cowardise or any such Vice unworthy the Dignity he beareth Common People do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes as Deformity of Person Sickness or such like Mos vulgi est fortuita externa ad culpam trahere Tac. CHAP. XX. Of Dissidence and Dissimulation in the Management of State Assairs ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy Praise chiesly in private Persons yet because all Men in their Actions do not so proceed it behoveth Wise Men and Princes above others at occasions to Semble and Dissemble for as in all Actions a Prince ought to be Slow and Advised so in Consent and Believing Haste and Facility is most dangerous and though Credulity be rather an Error than a Fault yet for Princes it is both Unfit and Perilous Wherefore it importeth them to be desended with this Caution Nihil credendo atque omnia cavendo Cic. Notwithstanding he must not shew himself Diffident or Distrustful utterly but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all Men so ought he not for small causes distrust every Man Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli Sen. Dissimulation is as it were begotten by Dissidence a Quality in Princes of so great Necessity as moved the Emperor Tiberius to say Nescit regnare qui nescit dissimulare The Necessity of Dissimulation is chiefly to be used with Strangers and Enemies it also sheweth a certain Discretion in Magistrates sometimes to disguise with Friends when no Offence doth thereof follow Doli non sunt doli nisi astu colas Plaut This kind of Craft albeit in every Mans Conceit not praisable is nevertheless tolerable and for Princes and Maglstrates the same being used to good ends very necessary But those Cunnings which are contrary to Vertue ought not of Honest Men to be used neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption though they be often used in Court and are of some Learned Writers allowed Decipere pro moribus temporum prudentia est Plin. By great Subtilty and Frauds contrary to Vertue and Piety I mean Perjury and Injustice which though all Men in Words detest yet in Deeds are used of many perswading themselves by Cavillations and Sophistications to excuse the Impiety of their False Oaths as it is written of Lysander 〈◊〉 talis viros jurament is circumvenire 〈◊〉 Plut. CHAP. XXI Of War Defensive and Invasive with Instructions touching Laws of Arms Soldiers and Military Discipline THE Art Military is of all other Qualities most necessary for Princes for without it they cannot be defended force of Men only sufficeth not unless the same be governed by Council and Martial Wisdom Duo sunt quibus resp servatur in hostes sortitudo domi 〈◊〉 Tac. Military knowledge concerneth War and every War is either Forreign or Domestical Touching Forreign it must be considered when it must be begun how to continue it and when to be ended to begin War a Prince is to take
because divers Remedies may be hoped as well by time as other accidents The offensive Words or Answers of Indignation proceeding from great Princes ought never to admit displeasure into the Minds of them against whom they are spoken For having by Speech uttered a great part of Choler the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer and more easily appeased Such is the condition of noble and generous Spirits To judge right of other Mens merit seems of great difficulty for time and tryal is thereto required Also it is not easie to answer the expectation of Men but ost-times inconsiderate and not measured in due proportion It is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of Affairs and Vacations For as it sitteth well a Prince or Person of Dignity in times of Audience and Judgment to be grave heedsul and austere So those Offices performed all shew of Authority and sad looks ought to be set apart for by that means neither courteous Behaviour shall detract from the Reverence due to his place nor severity diminish the Love which to his Behaviour appertaineth Magistrates must look into all things but not exact all things to rigor Light Faults may be pardoned but great Offences severely 〈◊〉 yet not always proceeding to punishing but ost contented with Repentance To be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a Magistrate shewing himself sowre to the bad and sweet to the good framing both Countenance and Condition according to the Merit of Men and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend than to hate Soldiers must be encouraged in all Fortunes to stand resolved and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage ever attending a Time and Opportunity of Revenge which commonly cometh to pass where Mens Minds are united For common Danger must be repelled with Union and Concord Among other Reasons wherewith Soldiers are encouraged Necessity and Distress doth oft inforce them For as Men of Vertue perform the Actions of Arms for Honour so the Coward must do them for his Security All Enterprises attempted by Arms are Honourable but those that are done in Countries remote are more praiseable For the less they be in Knowledge the greater is the Glory to Atchieve them To be truly and faithfully loved is a thing greatly to be desired for Terror and Fear are weak Works of Affection For they being taken away he that ceaseth to fear will soon begin to hate and as they that by Force are kept under obey with ill Will so they that govern without Line justly rule against Right Some Men either deserving to be accounted of excellent Wisdom or singular in that Skill whereof they make Profession do ordinarily love the Proceedings of others taking that Advantage of their ill Success Yet sure it is that Disaster and unhappy Event of some Actions proceed not of Disorder for Human Imperfection but from a certain Fatal Fury which neither Counsel nor Constancy of Men can withstand It is a matter of much difficulty or rather impossible for any Prince to maintain the Law Civil or Military without Severity For where Men hope to be easily pardoned there are they apt to offend Contrarily where Mens Actions are precisely sitted there do they live in over-great Aw and Hatred doth always accompany such Severity The best course therefore is to punish Offences severely and reward vertuous Merits liberally so shall Fear be converted to reverend Respect and none have cause to complain For as it lies in each Man's Power to shun offending so is it in their Power also to deserve well and merit Reward Whosoever aster mature deliberation hath resolved what Course to hold in the Action he hath in hand must not after repent or fear any Difficulty For such Thoughts would break the Vigour of the Mind and impeach the Proceedings of that which was resolved And albeit some Differences do happily arise yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater Impediments Young Men for the warmness of their Blood and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune more willingly enterprise Actions rather honourable than severe But Old Men as well for that their Heat is cooled as also for having attempted many things in vain make choice of Enterprises severe rather than those that are followed with Fame and Glory The greatness of one Prince is nothing else but the Ruin and Distress of another Likewise his Strength is the Weakness and Oppression of others Some Conquests are of such Quality as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honour yet a modest resusal becomes his greater Glory The Dignity of Magistrates is not assured without Arms for when Obedience faileth no other means is left to continue a People united As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Prince's Strength so is the same their own Security For as by the Princes Authority the People are governed so by their Consent he is maintained Three things Men covet with immoderate Desire Lands Riches and Honours but as seldom they compass their full Content so are they for the most part to endure a Destiny far other than they wished Strange it is yet by Experience proved true That in Time of Danger Fortune or rather Destiny so much amazeth the Judgment of Wise Men as seldom they conceive what Resolution is best to be taken No great Free-City can long continue quiet unless the same be used to foreign Assaults For wanting Foes without some inward Enmity will arise not unlike to strange Bodies of Men which being secure from external Injury are nevertheless by their own Poise oppressed As every Pilot of ordinary Skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the Course of his Ship so every Governor of Capacity doth understand how the Affairs of State are in peaceable Times to be handled But when Tempests are and Subjects bent to Sedition the one requires an excellent Sailer the other the Aid of some excellent Wisdom It oft happens that Publick Duty is opposite to private Friendship so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Country or draw our dearest Friends into Danger In which case we are to prefer publick Respect before particular Obligation The nature of base People is such as either they obey slavishly or command insolently For Liberty being the Mark whereat they aim is by them of that Quality neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued and always there are some seditious Leaders to be found who of Disorder are inclined to kindle the Ire and Offence of Ignorant People Dux rebus motis facile invenitur Salust Experience hath oft proved That Men in best Fortune and such as esteem themselves most secure even then fall soonest into Disadventure because those Dangers unfeared be as it were contemned and not regarded To enter needless Dangers was ever accounted Madness yet in Times of extream Peril and apparent Distress Bold and Hazardous Attempts are greatest Security The divers Adventures which happen