argument of true absolute Soveraignty But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty There is Onus aswell as honos that is a great burden charg and care aswell as honour and renowne thâ—…t is inseperably incident to this great function and therefore he that gaines the one be it by discent conquest or otherwise must discharge the other The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor The author tels us that This inference is most weake and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded pray heare his reason The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it followes â—…e which 〈◊〉 their power I may adde his owne perticular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The Authors argument to destroy the Observators inference is but this that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away therefore it must needs follow that the King is greater then the people I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it for if it can be proved on that hangs the strength of his argument that the people have not divested themselves of all power oâ—…t of his premisses the consequence is just that the universe is greater then the King Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Soveâ—…ty as I have shewed before it must follow that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be in effâ—…ct 〈◊〉 which hath been denied even by the King himself who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust and if so as no doubt pâ—…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent for no inferiour power can doe it so that by this time I hope the Author is satisfied that the Obseâ—…ors inference is just and his reason weake and defective But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses for saith he If the people be the true â—…ent cause of poweâ—… it is a rule in naâ—…ure quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Sâ—…ange sayes the Author that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast off Monarchy It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason should make theâ—…selves so palpably ignorant can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatioâ—… from an extreame extirpation or eradication if my reason faile me not it is he that indeavoureth what ever he pretend the casting off of Monarchy for as Monarchy is never so secure as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments it submits to their determinations so it is never so much in danger as when it exalts it selfe above and against them and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of why it is this he hath given you a rule that is regularly not generally true that will maintaine the case in question not all others for instance he tels the Observator That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule and why for that saith he he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich aâ—…d 〈◊〉 richer for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale I this is thaâ—… â—…hat hath made this great combustion maâ—…r of â—…ight and estate could you perswade us out of our reason you would quickly seize upon these but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that which God dispenced unto our Ancestors and they through his mercy â—…queathed unto us If I should tell you that God made man therefore God is greater than man or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets is greater than those rivolets and so conclude that therefore quicquid efficit tale est magis talâ—… you would presently say that this were no infallible way of reasoning why for you to conclude that it doth not hold in some cases therefore not in the case in question is not this the same fallacy but as befor s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds for he saith it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is â—…erent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation dâ—…st themselves of power or wealth That power was origiâ—…lly inherent in the people that I thinke will not be questioned That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power is cleared thus as I have shewn before that power that is fiduciary and upon condition must needs bee subject to a power more supream to see the due discharge of this trust and condition or othâ—…rwise it would in effect prove absolute but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition therefore it must be subâ—…ect to a power more suâ—…e wâ—…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament Besides what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think that a people in whom all power did origâ—…y reside should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one which being abused must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction I but saith the Author If the King be universis minor then the people have pâ—…ced a King not over but 〈◊〉 them and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 when they might command they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject The King is universis minor lesse than the Publike but he is singulis major over and above all individuals and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe for that undutifull and â—…urable passage of commanding of his Majestie and of making him our subject I wish withall my soule that the Author of this booke and his associates were not more guilty of this then his Parliament could ever Parliament or â—…ple with more
Soveraignty as â—…hey please T is strange that our Author will passe his judgement especially so severe an one upon any thing that he doth not understand because happily it may conclude thus much that his sacred person and his actions ought to be directed and ruled by his great councell the Parâ—… 〈◊〉 it therefore thence be deduced that they may dispose of his Soveraignty at pleasure this is the Authors meaning not ours If the King 〈◊〉 such high 〈◊〉 as subjects it were not lawfull or naturall for him to expoâ—…e his 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is it 〈◊〉 for subjects then to doe so What a strange 〈◊〉 is this is it not lawfull for a man by the hazzard of his person to defenâ—… his properâ—…y which cannot be maintained without the defense of his Countrey But this doth no way prove that if the Kings right were as absolute as the subjects that he might expose hâ—…s life and forâ—…une for their defence for no doubt hee that looseth his life when he might have saved it is a man slayer and if the people had beene made for the King not the King for the people what Law could have warranted the hazzarding of his person â—…or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But to disprove this conclusion he saith That the people have as great 〈◊〉 gâ—…eater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…or the King and this he makes good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 that I become your Leâ—…ge of life 〈◊〉 gâ—…ds c. as 〈◊〉 by â—…he Proâ—…station and 〈◊〉 of Ligeance which are to the same effect He is no true subject that will not expose 〈◊〉 and all that he hath for the preservation of his King anâ—… Soveraâ—…e we shall ever acknowledge that strong tie and obligation that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us to doe it But yet we must 〈◊〉 that the Kings oath and the Law of the Land which engage the King to protect and defend his Kingdome and people are equalâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Observator had shewen the efficâ—…ent cause of Parliament to wit the people anâ—… he finall cause safety and libertie he descends to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 are aimed at in Parliaments not to be attained to by oâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 est of the people might be satisfied â—…nd Kings better counselled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 certainly many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high deâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 Monarchs who knew no Parliaments Thâ—…s possibly may be 〈◊〉 but I â—…ope it shall not 〈◊〉 into the hearts of English Subjects any whit the greater affection to that kind of 〈◊〉 I believe indeede that this is that the Author would faine perswade us to These are the maine grounds of the sad division our Religion and our Parliaments God enable us to maintaiâ—… both for if wee part with either we shake hands and bid adue to all happinesse The Author saith that two â—…her 〈◊〉 might have beene named as assentiall as the former which are to supply his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Subsidies and assent to the abrogation of old Lawes and enacting new The latter I 〈◊〉 agree to be so but I never heard before that the supplying of his Majesties wants by Subsidies was one of the essentiall ends of the calling of Parliament It was accounted formerly the maiâ—… end of calling of a Parliament the ease or Releife of the subject and the granting of Subsidies was then esteemed but as a congratulation or thankfull acknowledgment of the Kings grace and favour towards them in that Parliament and is it now become one of the maine ends I suppose the Author speakes out of a late experience 'T was never happy with England since this Law was broached And wheresoever Kings advance their owne profit or but make it â—…quall with that of the publique the people will never enjoy true happinesse In the Summes of Edward 1. â—…laus 7. in 3. dors We see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writt that whatsoeveâ—… affaire is 〈◊〉 publique concernment ought to receive publique approbation Quod ownes tangit 〈◊〉 omnibus appâ—…obari debet tractari The Author tells us that this must be understood with due caution lest wee reduce our selves to our primirive estate by dissolving the bonds of Government and therefore saith he the policie of all estâ—…tes for the avoydiâ—…g of all confusion hath been to leave the transaction of publique affaires to some certaine number and their suffrages doe in Law binde the rest So saith he in absolute Monarchies what Princes doe is legally the act of all and hee makes the result of all to be this Those things which the Law doth require shall be transacted onely by Parliament the people doe handle and approve of by their Knights and â—…rgesses those things which the law hath intrusted the King with many of which concerne the good of the whoâ—… what bee doth is their act I shall not with our Author dare to confine Parliaments whose power is vaste and incognit as my Lord Cooke speakes And yet I shall not ascribe so unlimited a power unto them as to give them juâ—…isdiction in all cases They themselves who best know their power have in their late Declaration protested against it for they say they have power of jurisdiction of declaring the law in perticular cases before them then not in all cases But who shall bee Judge of those cafes by which they are intituled to jurisdiction can therâ—… be any one a Competent Judge of this but themselves and they having past their judgement who ought or dare to contradict it no reversing of their judgement but by the judgement of a subsequent Parliament why then since none can know their power or if they could they are not competent Judges of it how dare any one goe about to dispute their power or call in question their judgement The desire of the Commons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. was that they might not advise in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance the matter in debate then concerning the setling of intestine commotions guarding the Marches in Scotland and the Seas concludes no more than this that they thought themselves not competent Counsellours in thiâ—… case happily by reason of their unskilfulnesse in that way or for that the King had then more able Counsellors to advise with in that matter which under favour is no renouncing of jurisdiction But to give a more full and satisfactory answer at that time the King complyed with his Parliament and would not be advised by others and then there being no breach of trust there 〈◊〉 the lesse reason for the Parliament to advise or intermeddle with affaires of that nature But if the King had then deserted the Counsell of his Parliament and cleaved to the advise of his young men like Rehoboam certainely then they would not have deserted their power in danger of the Common-wâ—…alth which by their
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended
future thus abuse his judgement and discretion Lâ—…t me give him this caution when his heart shall suggest any ill of so great and reverend a counsell whose actions ought to awe him to a good conceipt of them to consider well the grounds and reasons of his mistrust and when he hath done this ponder on the great disproportion and inequality that there is betwixt so great a power and himself and this will either ingage him to a better beleife or force him to silence And let thâ—… people take this Caveat that the subtile prâ—…ssing and urging of the ill examples of other men ought not though it be most maliciously indeavoured to perswade us to a beleife of the like corruptions in the Parliament The things taken from the King at Hull were armes which are of more danger than other kind of Chattells By the same law all that part of the Kingdome which is not confided in may be disarmed Good reason too if in a publique 〈◊〉 they shall appeare in opposition to them who indeavour nothing but the publique fafety and preservation Nay why may not their money be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it If that probability can be evidenced by a sufficient proofe I see no reason any man should be permitted to buy a sword to helpe to cut his owne throat nay more to hasten the ruine of the Common-Wealth The Subjâ—…ct is in a miserable condition that is liable to be undone as often as they please to be fearefull Wee should be in a farre worse condition if we should not feare when we have just cause and prevent the losing of the whole by a wise parting with some small and inconsiderate portion Let Brainford evidence this truth I but he saith it is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize whatever else belongs unto his Majesty It doth much extenuate the fact to seize those things which would be more immediate Agents or instruments in his Majesties and the publique ruine I but then againe hee sayes that the law of the land hath onely intrusted the Prince with armes so that the Subject ought not to he arrayed trayned and mustered but by his Commission He sayes very much and of great consequence had it beene at another time But as circumstances may vary a case so I hope the Author will learne to distinguish betwixt a case in neceâ—…ity and one out of necessity Betweene the Kings adhering to the advise of his great Counsell the Parliament and his deserting of them and betweene the due execution of his trust and the breach of it These layed together will much vary the case and justifie the Parliament in their arraying trayning and mustering without his Majesties Commission But some determination must be supreame and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the directions of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meere direction No necessity of either for in cases of this nature which is confessed to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary law Our Author doubâ—…lesse hath a strong Minerva that could make so subtile a decision of a matter of so great controveâ—…sie But I beleive this concept was as soone penned as it was thought on For what is this but in plaine termes to tell the Parliament hat they might aswell have saved their labour And that if a King seduced by evill counsell shall indeavour the destruction of the publique yet it lyes not in the power of the Parliament any way to oppose or prevent it A sad conclusion if it would hold But then his Majesty maintaining of his negative power puts this case whether if the Papists in Ireland in truth were or by act or accident had made themselves the Major part of both Houses of Parliament there and had pretended the trust which the Parliament here doth from the Kingdome of Ireland thereupon had voted their Religion and liberty to â—…e in danger of extirpation from a Malignant party of Protestants and Puritanes and therefore that they should put themselves into a possure of defence that the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of that Kingdome were to be put into the hands of such persons as they could confide in c. Wheâ—…her he were bound to consent to all such alterations as these men should propose to him and resolve to be for the publique good I shall not need to prove the unlikely hood of their accomplishing their desired ends nor go about maintaine with the Observator that there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland as betwixt England and Wales Neither do I thinke if it were so that the two Parliaments would joynâ—… for transacting and concluding upon matters for both states But to the question I shall give this short answere that I do not conceive the King in such case bound to consent to their proposalls For I never did nor shall allow where their conclusions and requâ—…sts are evidently against lâ—…w reason or Religion if that may bâ—… presumed of a Parliament that in such case the Kiâ—…g is bound to yeâ—…ld to their Votes No farre be it from any one thus to judge for that were to make him a â—…yrant though against his will and to be ingaged in his peoples ruine against his conscience But now what use or advantage can be made of this against the casâ—… in question â—…he Parliaments proposalls being not apparently either against law reason or Religion doâ—…h nonplus my understanding to imagine A faction is said to have prevailed upon a Major part by cunning â—…orce absence or accident The Observator argues thus aginst it If by cunning we must suppose the Kings party in Parliament hath lost all their law policy and 〈◊〉 The reason why they are overborne may be this not because they have lesse law but more hoâ—…sty which will not permit them to maintaine a good cause by ill meanes No the reason is evidently this that they have liâ—…le law and 〈◊〉 Honesty which wiâ—…hholds them from promoting the publique safâ—…ty I but how falls it out that after so many reiterated scandalls of pretences and deceivings of the people the Author should now confesse that the cause is good only he adds that there is an ill prosecuting of it which he ought to prove if he expects we should beleive him Certainely he did not read what he had writâ—…en or not understand it or there is some hope now at the last after the venting of his spleâ—…ne that he will prove a convert But I dispaire of convincing him by better reason for he is here in his very next words fallen into a contradiction where he saâ—…es that wee all know in how great stead these Piae
〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 it and are to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 as the whole body of the 〈◊〉 To 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reason be d si ed. is not to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but then by the rule of contraries to dissent 〈◊〉 he hath granted whatever might in reason be 〈◊〉 is a 〈◊〉 of the Houses and this you do 〈◊〉 allow Why now the onely judge in this case of reasonable or 〈◊〉 demands is the Parliament and they have adjudged their request 〈◊〉 wherefore it is your duty and mine 〈◊〉 wee will oppose our judgements to theirs which will be extreame arrogancy to believe they are so however what their awefull authority will not do their reason ought But he sayes upon pretence of distresse to takâ—… illegall courses is as if thâ—…y should perswade us we are not in 〈◊〉 and therefore they must break 〈◊〉 beads to forward our recovery Right but in case of apparent and imminent danger as now if the great Physitian of the common-wealth shall neglect his patient it may by all lawfâ—…ll and legall courses as it doth now indeavour its owne preservation Thâ—…y represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State Very true if the King do not desert them but if he do then they represent the whole State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions onely and when leave cannot sâ—…asonably be â—…ad and when Competent accuse appeare not â—…n the impeachment If by suspitions be meant onely a bare not confiding in this injustce cannot be sufficient ground No nor if by suspitions is meant a labouring for an Arbitrary power for which there is no ground and of which the whole Parliament must needs be equally guilty this is as insufficient â—… cause of impeachment as the other But upon Articles drawne and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused parties are at liberty they may be meddled with True if competent 〈◊〉 appeare in the impeachment then they may be arrested and deteined to appeare before the Parliament but there ought to be no other prosâ—…cution in any other Court or way than in Parliament whereby they may be deprived of a member without their consent I but sayes hee if the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence shoâ—…ld not be willing hath not the law provided in such a case for tryall of treason For the first no doubt where they are not able to give consent there they have not power to dissent And for the latter if upon hearing of the cause the accusers appeare to be competent and the cause of impeachment legall and just t were to much presumption and confidence in us for to believe them so confident as not to be willing to give way for a legall tryall 5. That the Soveâ—…aigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no Negative voyce This power is not claymed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdome from ruine in case where the King is so seduced and that he preserres dangerous men and prosecuâ—…s his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be Kings as long as they please and when they are weary of 〈◊〉 the kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe The Author might have spoken truth in better and more honourable language both to King and Parliament if he had pleased That is they will as of right they ought represent the whole State the King deserting of them so that they may be enabled to preserve the kingdome from ruine and when that shall be out of danger then shall his Majestie freely enjoy his negative according to law and right To save it from ruine the law hath better provided for the peoples safety by prohibitâ—…ng all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever 〈◊〉 As illegall executions of power such as the Commission of Array are not to be justified So legall such as the Militia are not to be condenmed And in case where the King is seduced that is when â—…e is not so wise as he should be because he doth not thinke as they do and refuses to satisfie the humors and interests of some I dare not say that the King is not so wise as he should be No such irreverend dialects I leave to the Author But this I may say had not his Majesty waived the faâ—…full advise of his Parliament who seek nothing but the peace and happinesse of him and his people and satisfied the humours and interests of others who ayme at nothing more than the ruine of both these sâ—…d disasters had not fallen upon us And preferres this seemes to be the cause of all preferments do noâ—… goe the right way true for none but Commissioners of Array do now happe preferments dangerous men that is such as desire he should governe according to the known lawes of the land were we before the Parliament governed according to the known lawes of the land they are the same men that still labour to defend the same rule and power And prosecuâ—…es his loyallâ—… Subjects that is is driven from London to Yorke where be long time patiently expected the undeceiving of the people No he paâ—…ed from London or if you please that I may speake truth was seduced by malignant Counsell to make so unhappy a change And I wish from my very soule that his sacred person were not more deceived by such than his people are by the Parliament 6. That leavying of forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not levying war against the King but war against his authority though not person is war against the King If this were noâ—… so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdome could not save both but must stand and looke on It is against common sense to sancy a King ruining himselfe and kingdome he can neither be willing not able T is not to be presumed that a King rightly informed will but a King seduced may and uponRep. â—…reacherous and unworthy advise for raigne aid will not be wanting to do that which domâ—…stick cannot 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament 〈◊〉 elected This is mâ—…st 〈◊〉 but takes not off those words upon which this proposition is grounded But it doth with any faire and candid reading and interpretation For when the Parliament saith that all Presidents ought not to be rules for them to be regulated by this position must necessarily intend those of deposing Kings for that the presidents of forced Parliaments ought not to be followed These might well have beene omitted as being more fully handled in the booke But least hee should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer FINIS Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 1 King 12. Verse 8. Verse 7. Verse 8. 9. Verse 10. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 Râ—…p Obser. Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. â—…ep Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Ans. Rep. Rom. 13 â—… Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Râ—…p Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. 〈◊〉 Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5 〈◊〉 14. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obser. Aâ—…s Râ—… Obser. Ans. Rep. That was a Pâ—…pular 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Dr. Ferne Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Rep. Obsâ—…r Ans. Mâ—…t 27. 19 Rep. 〈◊〉 18. Obsor Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Obs. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obâ—… Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Oâ—… Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep Oâ—…s Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Oâ—…s Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obseâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. 〈◊〉 Obs Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Obs. Ans. Rep.