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A45610 Aphorisms political by James Harrington. Harrington, James, 1611-1677. 1659 (1659) Wing H805; ESTC R335 8,287 21

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but tendeth as we have seen both in Holland and Switz towards Division In the third way the Commonwealth uniting other Commonwealths retaineth unto her self the leading of the whole League leaving unto each of the rest her own Laws and her own Liberty XLVIII Till a Commonwealth be first framed how such a Commonwealth should make an effectual Union with another Nation is not possible to be seen XLIX The new unpractised and heretofore unheard-of Union as it is vulgarly spoken with Scotland by uniting Deputies of divers Nations not in a Council apart or by way of States General as in the United Provinces but in the standding Councils of some one Commonwealth in the League is destructive to Liberty both in England and in Scotland L. If the Commonwealth of England receive Deputies from Scotland in a greater number then that of her own she receiveth Law from a forraign Interest and so loseth her own Liberty LI. If Scotland be received in an equal number it obstructeth the freedom of both or occasioneth War or Dissention LII If Scotland be received in an inferiour number she receiveth Law from England and so loseth her Liberty The like is understood of Ireland LIII Whereas a well-ordered Commonwealth should give the Balance to her Confederates and not receive it from them The Councils in which divers others are thus united though in a far inferiour number of Deputies yet if these lie in wait or lay their heads together may be over-ruled obstructed or over-balanced by forraign interests LIV. VVhere Countries are divers in their Laws and yet are to receive Laws one from the other neither the Common-wealth giving Law knoweth what to give nor the Common-wealth receiving Law understandeth what she receiveth in which case the Union returneth unto Force or Confufion LV The best way of holding a Nation different or not different in Laws is the Roman that is by way of Province LVI A Province especially if she have strong holds may by defraying of a small guard be kept unto a just League and for the rest enjoy her own Laws her own Governmeut and her perfect Liberty other wayes of Union will be found more chargeable and less effectual on both sides for if England have no Army in Scotland Scotland will receive no Law from England and if England have an Army there her hold consisteth not in the Union but in the Force The like is to be understood of Ireland LVII If a Country be very small and not able to subsist of it self as Wales it may be safely united and held but the advantage that Wales hath in participation of all Magistracies and Offices is not that which England is able to afford unto such a Country as Scotland without subjecting her neck unto the yoke LVIII The order of a Commonwealth requireth that it consist first of a Civil secondly of a Religious thirdly of a Military and fourthly of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations appertaineth unto the last part and in the formation of a Commonwealth to begin with that first which is naturally last is to invert the order and by Consequence the Commonwealth which indeed is nothing but order LIX Where there can be any other Government there can be no Commonwealth LX Where there can be a Commonwealth what tumults soever there happen and which soever prevail there can be no other Government that is to say without forraign invasion which throughout I must be understood to except LXI If Sir George Booth had prevailed he must either have introduced a Commonwealth or have restored a King LXII If a King were restored he must either govern by an Army or by Parliaments LXIII A King governing now in England by an Army would for the same Causes finde the same effects with the late Protector LXIV A King governing now in England by Parliaments would finde the Nobility of no effect at all LXV A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all is a meer popular Council LXVI A meer popular Council will never receive Law from a King LXVII A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King becometh thereby a Democracy or equal Commonwealth or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form LXVIII A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form must consist especially of such an Assembly the result whereof can go upon no interest whatsoever but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people LXIX An Assembly consisting of a few may go upon the interest of one man as a King or upon the interest of one party as that of Divines Lawyers and the like or the interest of themselves and the perpetuation of their Government LXX The popular Assembly in a Commonwealth may consist of too few but can never consist of too many LXXI In every Commonwealth there hath been a popular Assembly This in Israel at the least consisted of twenty four thousand upon a monthly Rotation In Athens Lacedemon Rome it consisted of the whole Citizens that is of all such as had right in the Commonwealth whether they inhabited in City or Country In Venice it consisteth of about two thousand In the Province of Holland onely which containeth eighteen or nineteen Soveraignties the Popular or resolving Assemblies consist at the least of five hundred Persons these in the whole Union may amount unto five or six thousand in Switz I believe they come unto a greater number And the most of these Assemblies have been perpetually extant LXXII If the popular Assembly consist of so few and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth LXXIII If the popular Assembly consist of so many and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate there must be a Senate to help this defect LXXIV The Reason of the Senate is that a popular Assembly rightly constituted is not capable of any prudent debate LXXV The Reason of the popular Assembly is that a Senate rightly constituted for debate must consist of so few and eminent persons that if they have the result too they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people but according to the interest of themselves LXXVI A popular Assembly without a Senate cannot be wise LXXVII A Senate without a popular Assembly will not be honest LXXVIII The Senate and the popular Assembly being once rightly constituted the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self LXXIX The Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati in that they were prayed to go apart and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth to propose as they thought good unto the great Council and from thence first arose the Senate of Venice to this day called the Pregati
and the Great Council that is the Senate and the popular Assembly of Venice and from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Comwealth LXXX That a people of themselves should have such understaning as when they of Venice did institute their Pregati or Senate is rare LXXXI That a Senate or Council of Governours having supreme power should institute a popular Assembly and propose to it though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable is that which is rarer LXXXII The diffusive body of the People is not in a natural capacity of judging for which cause the whole judgement and power of the diffusive body of the People must be intirely and absolutely in their collective Bodies Assemblies or Representatives or there can be no Commonwealth LXXXIII To declare that the Assemblies or Representatives of the People have power in some things and in others not is to make the diffusive Body which is in a natural incapacity of judging to be in a political capacity of judging LXXXIV To bring a natural incapacity of judging unto a political capacity of judging is to introduce Government To bring a natural incapacity of judging to such a collective or political capacity of judging as yet necessarily must retain the interest of the diffusive Body is to introduce the best kind of Government But to lay any appeal whatsoever from a political capacity of judging to a natural incapacity of judging is to frustrate all Government and to introduce Anarchy Nor is Anarchy whether imposed or obtruded by the Legislator first or by the People or their Demagogues or Incendiaries afterwards of any other kinde whatsoever then of this onely LXXXV To make Principles or Fundamentals belongeth not unto Men unto Nations nor unto humane Laws To build upon such Principles or Fundamentals as are apparently laid by GOD in the inevitable necessity or Law of Nature is that which truly appertaineth unto Men unto Nations and unto humane Laws To make any other Fundamentals and then build upon them is to build Castles in the Air LXXXVI Whatever is violent is not secure nor durable whatever is secure or durable is natural LXXXVII Government in the whole People though the Major part were disaffected must be secure and durable because it waveth Force to found it self upon Nature LXXXVIII Government in a Party though all of these were well-affected must be in-secure and transitory because it waveth Nature to found it self upon Force LXXXIX Commonwealths of all other Governments are more especially for the preservation not for the destruction of Mankinde XC Commonwealths that have been given to cut off their diseased Limbs as Florence have brought themselves unto impotence and ruine Commonwealths that have been given unto healing their diseased Limbs as Venice have been healthful and flourishing XCI Athens under the Oligarchy of four hundred was in finitely more afflicted and torn with Distraction Blood and Animositie of Parties then is England yet by introduction of a Senate of four hundred and a popular Assembly of five thousand did thereupon so suddenly as if it had been a Charm recover Might and Glory See the eighth Book of Thucydides A Story in these Times most necessary to be considered XCII To leave our selves and Posterity to a farther Purchase in Blood or Sweat of that which we may presently possess enjoy and hereafter bequeath unto Posterity in Peace and Glory is inhumane and impious XCIII As certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispelleth the Peevishness and Peril of Sickness doth a good state of Government the Animosity and Danger of Parties XCIV The Frame of a Commonwealth having first been proposed and considered Expedients in case such should be found necessary for the safe effectual and perfect introduction of the same may with some aim be applied or fitted as to an House when the Model is resolved upon we fit Scaffolds in building But first to resolve upon Expedients and then to fit unto them the Frame of a Commonwealth is as if one should set up Props and then build a House to lean upon them XCV As the chief Expedients in the building of an House are Axes and Hammers so the chief Expedient in the building of a Government is a standing Army XCVI As the House which being built will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of Axes Hammers is imperfect so the Government which being formed cannot support it self without the perpetual use of a standing Army XCVII While the Civil and Religious Parts of a Commonwealth are in forming there is a necessity that she should be supported by an Army but when the Military and Provincial Parts are rightly formed she can have no farther use of any other Army Wherefore at this point and not till then her Armies are by the practise of Commonwealths upon slighter occasions to have half pay for life and to be disbanded XCVIII Where there is a standing Army and not a formed Government there the Army of necessity will have Dictatorian power XCIX Where an Army subsisteth upon the Pay or Riches of a Single Person or of a Nobility that Army is alwayes Monarchical Where an Army subsisteth not by the Riches of a Single Person nor of a Nobility that Army is alwayes Popular C. The English Armies are popular Armies CI. Where Armies are popular and exercise Dictatorian power in deposing Single Persons and Monarchical Assemblies there can be no greater nor needs any other Expedient for the introduction of a Commonwealth Nevertheless unto this may be added some such moderate Qualifications as may prune the Commonwealth not lop off her Branches Whom these will not satisfie it is not a Commonwealth but a Party that can CII If the late King had freely permitted unto the People the exercise of the power inevitably devolved upon them by the change of the Balance he had not been destroyed If either of the late Single Persons had brought the People into an orderly exercise of the power devolved upon them he had been great VVhat Party soever shall hinder the People from the exercise of the power devolved upon them shall be certainly ruined who or what party soever shall introduce the People into the due and orderly exercise of the power devolved upon them shall be forthwith secure and famous for ever CIII A man useth nourisheth and cherisheth his Body without understanding it But he that made the Body understood it CIV. The reason why the Nations that have Commonwealths use them so well and cherish them so much and yet that so few Nations have Commonwealths is That in using a Commonwealth it is not necessary it should be understood but in making a Commonwealth that it be understood is of of absolute necessity Caput Reipublicae est nosse Rempub. Cicero CV As the natural Body of a Christian or Saint can be no other for the frame then such as hath been the natural Body of an Israelite or of an Heathen so the political Bodies or civil Governments of Christians or Saints can be no other for the frame then such as have been the political Bodies or civil Governments of the Israelites or of the Heathens CVI. It shall be as foon found when and where the soul of a Man was in the Body of a Beast as when or where the Soul or Freedom natural unto Democracie was in any other Form then that onely of a Senate and an Assembly of the People CVII In those things wherein and so far as Art is directed or limitted by the nature of her Materials it is in Art as in Nature CVIII That Democracie or equal Government by the People consist of an Assembly of the People and a Senate is that whereby Art is altogether directed limited and necessitated by the nature of her Materials CIX As the Soul of Man can never be in the Body of a Beast unless GOD make a new Creation so neither the Soul or Freedom natural unto Democracie in any other Form whatsoever then that onely of a Senate and a popular Assembly CX The right Constitution coherence and proper Symmetry of a Form of Government goeth for the greater part upon Invention CXI Reason is of two Parts Invention and Judgement CXII Judgement is most perfect in an Assembly CXIII Invention is most perfect in one Man CXIV In one Man Judgement wanteth the strength which is in a multitude of Counsellours CXV In a multitude of Counsellours Invention is none at all XCVI Through the defect of Invention the wisest Assemblies in the Formation or Reformation of Government have pitched upon a sole Legislator XCVII It is not below the Dignity of the greatest Assembly but according unto the practice of the best Commonwealths to admit of any man that is able to propose to them for the good of his Country CXVIII Unto the making of a well-ordered Commonwealth there goeth little more of pains or charge or work without doors then the Establishment of an equal or apt Division of the Territory and the proposing of such Election unto the Divisions so made as from an equal Foundation may raise equal Superstructures the rest being but paper-work is as soon done as said or voted CXIX VVhere such Elections are proposed as being mad by the People must needs produce a well-ordered Senate and Popular Assembly and the People who as we have already found by experience stick not at like work elect accordingly there not the Proposers of any power in themselves but the whole People by their peculiar and natural Right and power do institute and ordain their whole Commonwealth CXX The highest earthly Felicity that a People can ask or GOD can give is an equal and well-ordered Common-wealth Such an one among the Israelites was the Reign of GOD and such an one for the same Reason may be among Christians the Reign of CHRIST though not every one in the Christian Commonwealth should be any more a Christian indeed then every one in the Israelitish Common-wealth was an Israelite indeed Septem. 12. 1659. FINIS ERRATA Aphor. 47. line 1. for their wayes read three wayes