Democraty the chief and Soveraign power consisteth in many Magistraâ—es yearly chosen by popular Suffrages or by certain other Intervalls of time and this heretofore was the state of the people of Rome when they were governed by Consulls Praetors Tribunes of the people Aedils and other yearly Magistrates and from hence proceed those Expressions which oftentimes we find in Tully Populi Romani Majestas laesa populi Majestas Visum est Senatui populoque Romano The Majesty of the Romane people The injured Majesty of the people it seemed good to the Senate and the people of Rome c. In a state Aristocratical the same Majesty resideth amongst some of the Lords and Nobles whom in some places they call Illustrissimoes in others the Peers of the Land and in other places again they receive other titles and appellations according to the custom of the Nation Amongst whom although peradventure but one as in the Common-wealth of Venice or more of them may have a preheminence of place and dignity above the rest being as it were a certain Primacy of Order which heretofore was the Honour of the Bishops of Rome and some Patriarchs in their Councils yet no man was so superiour above the rest in power that by his own authority he could judge any one of them neither could he himself be judged unlesse it were by all of them altogether Some form of this Government is still retained by our Mayors and Aldermen in our Cities and by the Heads and Fellows of Colleges in our Universities and although as it were but in a shadow yet in some manner they do represent it to us But in a Monarchial Government as the Name it self implies the chief Power is resident in the Person of the King alone whereupon St. Peter a most excellent Interpreter of St. Paul doth admonish the Christian People to obey the King as their superior that no man might any more doubt of whom St. Paul speaketh when he maketh mention of the higher Powers Ro. 1. 3. 1. Samuel also the Prophet of God doth so propound unto the people the fulness of the Kingly Power to be considered of by them 1 Sam. 8. That if a King the supreme in his Kingdom should act all those things which in that Chapter it is manifest that it is lawful for him to do upon no just Cause but upon the meer desire of Domination and to show himself a Tyrant and not a King although he wanted not Sin before God yet he ought not to have any force to be put upon him by the People nevertheless he may justly be said to have abused his Power but his own Power Amongst us English what more certainly or more cleerly can appear unless at noon we choose rather to be blind than open our eyes than that the supreme Power of the three Kingdoms doth intirely appertain to the Kings most excellent Majesty whom we are accustomed to render more remarkable by the title of Majesty not only according to the common use of speaking but in our solemn Ordinances and in all our forms actions of Law in the taking of an oath laying our hands upon the Gospel of the eternal God we acknowledg him the supreme yea the only supreme Governour of all persons and Causes in his Kingdoms VIII In the fourth place we are to understand That when we say the Power of making Lawes is in the King alone It is not so to be understood as if we meant that whatsoever the King is pleased to command shall immediatly obtain the force of a Law for by and by I will show unto you that some Consent of the People themselves and many other things are required to the Constitution of Law but this is that which I would hold forth unto you that the Counsels of the People Senate and other Demands of the Peers People or any whomsoever doe not oblige the Subjects nor do carry with them the Power of a Law unlesse they are strengthened and established by the Authority of the King to which being maturely and duely prepared as soon as the Consent of the King accedeth they immediatly receive the Name the Form and Authority of a Law and forthwith begin as soon as they are published to oblige the Subjects Therefore seeing that only is to be esteemed to be the Principal and the efficient Cause of any thing which by it self and immediatly produceth and into a prepared matter introduceth that Form which giveth to that Thing both the Name and the Being although other things ought to concurre to the production of that Effect or to go before it as so many praevious dispositions that so the matter may be rendred more apt to receive the Form intended by the Agent It is most manifest whatsoever those things are which antecedently are required to the Constitution of a Law yet the will of the Prince from whose Arbitration and Command alone all Rogations of Lawes are either established or made void is the only adaequate and efficient Cause of Publick Laws IX These things being premised The Position is confirmed by many Arguments And first by the Testimony of Holy Scripture First Gen. 49. 10. in that remarkable Testament of the Patriarch Jacob being about to dye The Scepter shall not be taken away from Judah nor a Law-giver from his Thigh is a Prophecy of the future Royal Dignity of that Tribe which the holy old man doth periphrastically describe and to the Confirmation of it he mentioned the Scepter the most remarkable witnesse of Kingly Authority and the Legislative Power the chiefest Perogative of it Secondly Deut. 33. 4 5. Moses was said to be a King in Israel because having gathered together all the Tribes of the People he gave them a Law to observe Thirdly Psal 60. 7. Judah is my Law-giver that is King And the vulgar Interpretation reads it Judah is my King In the Text now in hand Prov. 8. 15. By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things where which is usual with Solomon in the whole Book of the Proverbs that the latter part of the verse doth contain an Amplification or Antithesis the very same Persons who in the beginning of the verse are called Kings in the latter part by way of Amplification are called Makers of Lawes Fiftly In the new Testament St. James also maketh mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Royal Law X. Secondly It is confirmed by the Testimonies of Philosophers and Historians and by the Authority of the Civil Laws and the municipal Laws of our Nation The thing being so manifest we shall be content to give you but few Examples Aristotle Plutarch and almost an infinit Number of other Authors of great Estimation do all affirm that we must have a Law and the Law of the Prince But that of Ulpian is very remarkable which he hath in his Book of the Roman Laws Quod principi placuit Legis vigorem habet What pleaseth the Prince hath the
in a threefold consideration And first of all the worship of God properly so called and the chiefest is that inward wordship of the mind which consisteth in the exercise of inward Vertues as of Faith Hope Love Invocation Confidence c. Secondly those outward Acts by which that inward worship of the mind is partly expressed and partly helped and fostered such as are publick Prayers Singing of Psalms the Hearing of the word and the participation of the Sacraments c. may reducibly and lesse properly be called and oftentimes are called the worship of God as they are the outward Testimonies and Helps of that worship which so properly is called Thirdly Seeing it is impossible that any outward action especially if it be a solemn one should be performed without some Circumstances either more or lesse of Time Place and Gesture from whence it comes to passe that the very same Circumstances which if established by Laws or Customes are called also Rites do sometimes receive the appellation of worship although very improperly and only for that Concomitancy which they have to that outward worship which it self also is improperly called a worship It is therefore to be affirmed That the inward primary worship properly so called doth only so acknowledge God to be the only Author of it that it is not lawful for any man either to institute a new worship or being instituted by God to exhibit it to any other besides God himself We are to affirm also That the outward worship according to its substantials is instituted only by God but there is a far different account to be made of the circumstances which are accessary to this outward worship and those which do accompany it If there be any who will Honor them also with the Name of worship For seeing that the outward worship of God cannot be performed without Circumstances and God in the Gospel hath not given any certain particular Circumstances perpetually to be observed in sacred Assemblyes but only hath lay'd down some Generals as may conduce to Order Honesty and Edification it must necessarily follow that the Determination of the said Circumstances which are but Accidental to the worship it self and mutable according to the respect of Times Places and Occasions must pertain unto those who under Christ have a Right and Power of Governing the Churches which that they may be imposed by those who in the several Churches are invested with publick Authority and being imposed may Religiously be observed by all the Members of the said Churches the nature of Holy worship doth not forbid but Solemnity rather Decency doth require We observe also that even those Men themselves who so Lordly bitterly do inveigh against the Canons and Ecclesiastical Constitutions yet as often as they please do use those Rites in the outward worship of God no where prescribed by Christ or his Apostles as the lifting up of their hands in the taking of an Oath the uncovering of the Head in the Holy Conventions and many other things which because we dayly observe to be done it is unnecessary to rehearse them XXX In the fourth place they object that Moses the pattern of the old that is of the Jewish Church who was given by God to the people of the Jews to be their Lawgiver did not only by his Law define the Substantials of the Jewish worship but according to that fidelity which was in him he omitted not the least Circumstances and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a Type of the Christian Church he most compleatly and perfectly finished all things according to the Idaea of the Example which was propounded to him in the Mount And now if Christ the-Lawgiver of the new Testament should not have prescribed all things and every thing even to the least Circumstances which are to be performed in the Ecclesiastical worship it may justly be believed to suspect which is near to Blasphemy that he was lesse faithful in the House of God than Moses and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and contumely done unto Christ if any new Rites never instituted by him should by humane Authority be brought into the Church or be received by the Christian common people But they who do object these things ought in the first place to have considered that by this Argument all humane political Laws are no lesse everted than Eclesiastical for Moses by the commandement of God did give unto the people of Israel a certain and a defined Law not only of those Rites which belonged to the worship of God but also of those Decrees and Judgments which belonged to the Administration of Civil Government XXXI In the second place it is a wonder moreover that they observed not that by this comparison of that fidelity which was in both Law-givers Moses and Christ that they could not more importunately have alleged any thing that could bring a greater dammage to their own Cause or more strongly have confirmed ours For as from that that Moses both in rituals and judicials did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews we do truly collect it was the will of God that the people of the Jews should be so restrained in their duties under that paedagogy and Mosaick Discipline as under a Yoak of servitude so that very few things should be free unto them so from that also that Christ the most faithful Interpreter of his Fathers Will did give unto the Christian Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies we do truly collect that it is the will of God that the Magistrates and Christian people should be permitted in those things to their own Liberty so that it is now free for any private Man of his own accord no command or prohibition of a superior intervening to do as shall seem in his own Judgement to be most expedient and to the several Churches and their Governors to prescribe those things which according to the condition of the time and place shall seem to them to be most subservient to Order Honesty Edification and Peace XXXII Moreover Those who do make use of this Argument ought in the third place to have considered that under that Paedagogy of Moses the Jews themselves had not all the Liberty of Rites in things pertaining to the worship of God so take away that it was not lawful for them by their own Authority to observe and to institute those things which it is manifest were never commanded either by God himself or by Moses his Servant Of many take these few instances First the solemn feast of the Passover which by the Law of Moses was commanded should be observed but seaven dayes was by a special Law of Hezekias who received a singular testimony of his piety from God himself and by the consent of the people continued seaven dayes longer The History is extant 2. Chron. 30. Secondly Esther and Mordecay did institute that the seast of Purim should be yearly celebrated in memory of
that Deliverance which God vouchsafed to the Nation of the Jewes under Ahasuerus King of the Persians Esther 9. Thirdly when Moses commanded but one day only in the year to be observed in the seaventh month for a solemn Fast the Kings and Magistrates of that people for what causes it is not known but likely in the remembrance of some remarkable Judgements of God did by their own Authority institute annual solemn Fasts insomuch that in the dayes of the last of â—he Prophets there were four solemn Fasts kept every year viz three others besides that of the seventh month in the fourth fifth and tenth month of all which mention is made Zach. 8. 19. Fourthly the Feast of the Dedication of the Altar called Encoenia was instituted by the Asamonians without any command of God The History is to be read Maccab. 4. 59. And by the Judgement of the most and best Interpreters Christ himself is thought not only to have approved of it but to have honoured it with his presence Joh. 10. 20. Fifthly we find it no where to be enjoyned by any Commandment of God that in solemn Fasts and penitential mourning they should put on Sack-cloth and strew Ashes on their hair but amongst the Jews for some Ages past the long custom was so received and so obtained the force of a Law that Christ himself did use that manner of Speech as from the custom of that Nation and showed not the least dislike of it Mat. 11. 21. Sixthly it is manifest by the writings of the Rabbins that it was the manner also of the Jews before the supper of the Passeover that the Master of the Family should stoop solow as to wash the feet of those of his own houshold which although commanded by no Law of God we find it to be observed by Christ as it is manifest in the History of the Gospel John 13. Why shall I here number up the Synagogues every where builded in so many Cities and Towns for the Conveniency of sacred Conventions and many other things a long Catalogue whereof the Jewish Commentaries doe afford us From all which this may be concluded If so many things pertaining to the worship of God were lawful for the Jews to alter under that yoak of Severer Discipline there can no probable Argument be derived from their Example to overthrow the force of Ecclesiastical Humane Laws THE SEVENTH LECTURE Concerning the obligation of humane Laws in relation to the Efficient Cause thereof PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things IN the last Term we did treat of the obligation of humane Laws both in the Generality of them to wit that Laws rightly constituted do oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to obedience so also in the Species as to those doubts which seemed properly to pertain to the material cause to wit how humane Laws do oblige them First we treated of things impossible Secondly of things possible but very burthensome Thirdly of things necessary Fourthly of things unlawfull and dishonest Fifthly of Evils to be permitted Sixthly of Things of a middle Nature indifferent in general Seventhly of Ecclesiastical Rites in Special of all these things which have been spoken that I may not appear too tedious in repetition the Sum is this That Subjects are obliged to obey just Laws but they are not obliged to obey Laws that are unjust And so Solomon in this Text requireth of the makers of Laws that they do decree nothing but what is just I must now proceed to prosecute those things which are yet remaining to be spoken of In the handling of which I will use as much brevity as the subject will permit that so in its due time I may finish the whole work or at least so much of it as pertaineth to the obligation of Laws II. In the order of Causes according to the method which I have elsewhere observed the Efficient Cause doth follow next to the Material And the Formal next to that the Final Cause is the last of all and doth both head the Rear and shuts it up Concerning the Efficient Cause of Laws I have already sufficiently shewed in the third Conclusion of the fifth Lecture That humane Lawes do not oblige unless they are made by a person invested with a legitimate Authority This in the first place is now remaining to be considered of In whom is the just and lawful power of making of Laws or who are those makers of Laws to whom according to the mind of Solomon The Right of discerning righteous things belongeth To give a full Answer to this first doubt which is the chiefest of all by farr in this kind of Cause two things are to be supposed In the first place I suppose the legislative power to be the power of a Superior as to give a Command in which appellation I do also comprehend a Prohibition which is a proper Act of the Law to be the Act of a Superior You are to observe that in this consideration there is not a little difference betwixt these three A Promise A Petition and a Command Without the least distinction it is common to all Superiors Inferiors and Equals to promise For a Father may promise something to his Son and the Son to the Father and the Brother or a Neighbour to his Brother or to his Neighbour But to Crave or to Petition belongeth properly to Inferiors and sometimes in some respect to Equals As the Son beseecheth his Father or the Neighbour his Neighbour to excuse him or to receive the acknowledgment of his thankfulnesse but this belongeth not unto Superiors unlesse it be very improperly and by discending to a lower degree than their condition is But it is so peculiar to Superiors and of Men placed in a preheminence of Dignity to Command that he would be altogether ridiculous whosoever he is whether an Equal or an Inferior that seriously should command his Superior or Equal to the performance of any thing For every Act doth require a Beginning proportionated to it And an Equal hath no Command on an Equal III. Now as to an obligation concerning these three it is thus to be Stated He who craveth one thing of another man obligeth by that petition neither himself nor the party of whom he craveth it for it is a petition and a petition is an Act of Indigence and not of power whose effect because it depends on another and proceeds not from the Agent it self cannot induce any obligation But he who promiseth something to another man doth by his promise oblige himself but he obligeth not him to whom the promise is made for a promise being the Act of a free will every man as he is a free Agent and hath a power over his own will as the Apostle speaketh 1 Cor. 7. 37. can exercise on himself that Right and Power which he hath over his own will but
force and Vigor of a Law which lest it may seem to make a way for tyrannical Domination being ill understood hath heretofore been thus expounded by our Country-man Bracton What pleaseth the Prince that is not every thing which headily and out of the heat of his troubled mind is suddenly conceived and resolved upon but that which by the Counsel of his Peers his Royal Assent giving Authority unto it and deliberation and a debate being had thereon shall maturely and rightly be defined Cui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 legibus ipsis legum vim imponendi potestatem Deus dedit Finch Nomotech in Epist dedic And in our Laws In the dayly proceedings in our Courts of Pleas the Laws according to the solemn Form of Appellation are called the Kings Lawes for no other Cause as our Lawyers have informed us but because the Kings of England are the Fountains of Justice and Laws and the Laws themselves in the reading of them professing it because from Almighty God they have granted to them an autocratical or a self-Ruling Power of giving force unto the Laws themselves that they may passe for and be esteemed as Laws This is so plain that we need not take any further pains in producing more witnesses XI And indeed this were enough and might give abundant satisfaction were it not for the impudence of an idle person that conceals his own Name who by a ruinous and a nasty fiction and which was never heard off in the world before these unhappy times hath endeavoured to cast a mist over so clear a light by raising an Invention of I know not what coordinate Power And to flatter the nefarious Counsels and Endeavours of some Neotericks in these dayes which being destitute of all defence of Right were nevertheless for the time to be supported by some specious pretence although never so weak and slender he doth in a Book published for that purpose earnestly labour to make the people sensible of that wild Philosophy which hither to had been imposed on them by way of contradiction viz. That the King being supreme and having no equal is notwithstanding at the same time not supreme and hath an equal yet is it not so much to be admired as lamented that there were found some who greedily snatched at and imbraced this ridiculous Invention as slid down from heaven and indeed because it concerned their Interest that the people should be seduced into such a false Belief they therefore suffered themselvs to be so insnared by this grosse Sophism as to become guilty of the foulest Perjury For what can deserve to be called Perjury if this be not Perjury in the highest Nature As to acknowledge and constitute a Power equal to him in his Kingdom whom in expresse words you have sworn to be the only and the supreme Power in the Kingdom Away then with this our so absurd Coordinator and with all his portentuous Jugglings and having so cleanly rid our hands of him let us proceed XII The said position or Conclusion is thirdly proved by reason the chiefest Act of Governing doth require the chiefest Power for every Act being the exercise of some Power doth presuppose in the Agent a Power proportionate to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the making of Laws is the supreme chief Act of Governing It cannot therfore be excercised unless by a person who is invested himself or who by his virtue and authority doth derive unto another the supreme power and jurisdiction over the Commonalty subjected to him For seeing there are two most noble parts and Species of jurisdiction and publick power and remarkable above the rest viz. the Legislative power and the power Judicial both of which consist in jure dicundo that is in pronouncing the Law from whence the name of jurisdiction doth proceed but with this difference that the jurisdiction of the Judge is the speaking of a Law only as it is already given or exhibited but the Jurisdiction of the Lawgiver is the speaking of a Law that is as yet unmade and remaineth still to be exhibited it followeth that the power of the Judge is far more narrow and not of such a noble extension as that of the Law-giver It is the office of the Judge to speak and give Laws unto the people by a Law already made but it is the office of the Law-giver to give Laws unto the Judge himself and to ordain a new Law which may be a Rule unto him in his seat of Judicature the Judge is obliged to pronounce according to the prescript of the Law constituted The Law-giver out of the plenitude of his power doth prescribe and constitute the Law which the inferiour Judge is no lesse bound for the future to observe than the people themselves It is therefore no wayes inexpedient that the judicial power being a power of an inferiour nature be ordinarily exercised by an inferiour person but it is as necessary as expedient that the supreme architectonical power of making Laws should be excercised by none but only by that person who hath in his hands the supreme power and so much of the first Doubt XIII The second demand or Quaere is Whether the consent of the people be required to the obligation of the Law For by what hath been already spoken a man may peradventure conceive that the power of making Laws doth pertain unto a Prince by so absolute and full a power that the Subjects have no part in this great affair and in whatsoever he determineth there remaineth nothing for the people to do but to perform his commands and to humble their necks under the yoak of his obedience And indeed according to the lusts of those who heretofore bore sway it may appear by their sic volo sic jubeo that this excesse of command did take such place amongst the Kings of former ages when the meer arbitrations of Princes stood for Laws that the name of a Tyrant of an innocent at the first and of an honest signification did grow at the last into a great ignominy by the foul abuse of so saving a power and even in our days it doth convey somthing that is horrid into our ears as often as we hear it spoken But that some consent of the people is at least required I have both heretofore manifested and it is granted by all of the most approved Authors that I have read Insomuch much that the Jesuits themselves the most stout Defenders of the Popes oecumenical omnipotence and which by them is by no limits to be included do yet hold that many in Germany and other places are to be excused for the non-observing of the Laws of the Council of Trent and the Bulls of the Sea of Rome only upon this Account that those Laws were never received into use amongst those Nations I affirm therefore and it is the common received opinion that the Laws propounded and instituted by a Prince or the Head of a Commonalty do not
oblige the Subjects nor have the Power of a Law unless they be received by the Commonalty themselves and are allowed by the Customs and Suffrages of those that use them According to Demosthenes the Law is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Common Ingagement of a City and if peradventure his authority be of lesse value because he lived in the popular Common wealth of the Athenians will you be pleased to hear the great Lawyer Julian who lived when the Roman Emperours had the fulness of command his words in his two and thirtieth Book de legib are these Ipsae Leges nulla alia ex causa nos tenent quam quod judicio populi receptae sunt The Laws do oblige us for no other cause than that they are received by the judgement of the people XIV But though all acknowledge the necessity of that reception or consent yet all men do not derive it from the same Fountain There are some who think that the consent of the People is therefore required in the making of Laws because that Princes have all their power flowing to them from the people which if they do abuse as they are to be esteemed to abuse it if they shall extend it further or longer than it shall please the people the people by their own right may again re-assume that power which before they had granted to them This is a most erronious and a dangerous position and which all those who are not enemies to mankind and the publick peace ought deservedly to abhominate All their reason relyeth on a double foundation but both of them very weak and abhorring to sober sence The first is that Princes do owe unto the people for all their power the other that whosoever he is who granteth power to another it lyeth in his power to revoke that power when he pleaseth O most egregious Sophistry if this were so Were Samuel more to be condemned for his Oratory who the more to affright the people being weary of their Theocracy or Government immediately from God and to deterre them from their perverse affectation of innovation had enough to do to lay before their eyes the vast extent of the power of Kings Or were the people of Israel more to be condemned for their folly who ignorant of their own right would suffer themselves to be circumvented and baffled by so gross a pretence and return nothing back unto the Prophet no not so much as a word Were they all so dumb and stupid and void of resolution as well as understanding that not one in so great a multitude could be found as had either so much acuteness or confidence as readily to make answer to these objections of Samuel it being so easy for them to give such a sudden check unto them Tell Boys these tales who have the leisure to hear them and not the wit to understand them We if our King shall thus begin to domineer will use our own privileges and presently take away that right from him which we have given to him In how few words had they done the whole work and stopped for ever the mouth of the Prophet if these fictions of new Magistrates had been so much believed in former ages as they now are confidently suggested to new Disciples and willingly entertained by the unadvised multitude XV. But to be in earnest and to draw more near unto the thing it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer in hymn I say in the first place That the power of Governing in a Common-wealth by what means soever men arrive unto it proceedeth only and immediately from God himself The Testimonies of holy Scripture to prove this are most manifest b Non alio animo populus rectorem suum intuetur quà m si Dii immortales potestatem visendi sui faciant Seneo 1. de clemâ—â— 19. By me Kings reign Prov. 8. That is by my authority alone and not by any authority of men The Powers ordained are ordained by God and not by the people Rom. 13. 1. The Magistrates themselves which are set over the people are the Ministers of God Rom. 13. 4 6. And therefore they are called Gods Psal 82. 6. because they are his Vice-gerents on Earth God himself and not the suffrages of any people conferring this honour on them I have said you are Gods Can any people constitute Gods unto themselves without the filthy Crime of Idolatry Seeing it belongs to men by their own authority to make choice of their own Vice-gerents and to intrust them with places and power according to their own and not anothers arbitration Will any mortal man be so bold as to arrogate that right unto himself as to affirm that the Minister of God on Earth and as it were a Vice-God is made so by his authority and by a power which his wretchedness hath conferred on him although peradventure there may be some references or parts of the people concerning the person of the King as he is the Subject of Power as by and by you shall see just so as in the Generation of natural things there are some praevious alterations which may prepare and dispose of the matter to receive the Form to be introduced yet the conferring of the Kingly Power and the application of it to the Person is not the work of the People but immediatly of God himself as the Production of a Form into the matter subjected is the immediate work of the Agent or Person generating Lib. 5. contra haeres cap. 20. That is elegantly spoken of Irenaeus Cujus jussu homines nascuntur hujus jussu et Reges constituuntur By whose Command men are born by his Command Kings are also constituted XVI I say in the second place to point directly to the Fountains Head that political Domination at the beginning was only the off-spring of paternal power Those who have the leisure to look more diligently after the beginning of things will find that the Nations did not grow up into Kingdoms and Commonwealths by the mutual consent of the people but that all Empire amongst the posterity of Noah did for a while consist within the bounds of paternal Authority At that time there were neither Kings nor petty Kings much lesse Monarchs of vast Continents nor so much as the least signes of any Aristocratical Government or popular State a word not heard of throughout all the world in those antient times and first of all brought into Greece a moving Nation and desirous of novelty by the ambition or fury of some who industriously affected new things All Domination at that time consisted in the power of Heads of Familyes amongst which he who was the first born of every Family 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 7. Eudem 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. 1. Polit. â— without any suffrages or election was by a certain Right and privilege of Nature the Governour of all things both Holy and Civil and as it were the Prince of all that alliance who
propounded and he doth not violate the Law unless he doth neglect them both XXIV This which was to be spoken of the obligation of a Law purely penal being as I conceive sufficiently unfolded let us now passe to the consideration of a penal Law mixed Concerning which I make this my third conclusion A penal Law mixed to wit which openly commandeth something to be observed and that it more diligently may be performed which is commanded doth appoint a penalty to the transgressors doth oblige both to the fault and to the punishment insomuch that he neither satisfies the Law nor his Conscience who undergoes the punishment unless he doth perform that also which is commanded by the Law There is none can doubt that such a Law doth oblige to the punishment for otherwise of what use would the punishment be that is added to it And it is manifest that it obligeth to the fault because it containeth a manifest command And every command obligeth to the fault For a Fault or a Sin is nothing else but the transgression of some precept 1 Joh. 3. Neither can that be probably spoken which is said to be the opinion of Navarr that the Law-maker by inserting the punishment doth signify that he hath no intention of obliging but only to that punishment which is annexed Observe I pray you how perverse it is so to interpret the appointing of a punishment which it is certain is for that end annexed to the precept that the said precept by the fear of punishment might more diligently and more accurately be observed as to make weak and take-away the obligation of the said precept Numberlesse are the Laws which throughout the world are made against Thieves Murderers perjured Persons and other wicked and nefarious people God also gave a Law to our first Parents by which he forbad them to eat of the fruit of the Tree which was in the midst of Paradise having annexed to the prohibition the punishment of death if they should eat thereof Gen. 2. Can any man be found so dâ—stitute of reason as to think that Adam was obliged by this Divine Law and that others are obliged by Humane Laws to the punishment only and not unto the fault Who will affirm to omit humane Laws that Adam was not obliged in Conscience by that Divine Law to abstain from the forbidden fruit but to this only that if he did eat thereof he should be ready to undergoe the setence of death The opinion therefore of Navarre being exploded as dangerous and by all men confuted if indeed the opinion was his which I shall hardly believe he being a man of so reverend a fame we are to affirm that a penal Law mixed being both penal and preceptive doth oblige both to the punishment and to the Fault to the punishment as it is penal and to the Fault as it is preceptive XXV The third Doubt remaineth How and how far the transgressor of a penal Law is bound to undergoe the punishment in the fact it self that is appointed by the Law I must make haste I will therefore be as short as I can I say therefore in the first place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that it imposeth not any thing upon the transgressor to be either done or suffered by him but consisteth rather in an inability to do something which was commodious for him to do or in an incapacity of receiving somthing which would be profitable for him he is guilty of the Law so violated and is bound ipso facto to undergo the punishment There are many Laws which do forbid transgressors to do this or that as the Civil Laws for certain causes do forbid translationem Dominii the alteration of power or free-holds There are also many Laws which for such a certain time do make Delinquents incapable of such a place or dignity As if a Disturber of the peace by a statute of the University be prohibited to have his Grace propounded in the Congregation House for the space of two years after the fault committed In such the like cases where the punishment consisteth only in the Inability or the Inâ—â—pacity because to undergoe this punishment there is no Cooperation required of the person to be punished but rather a certain Cessation of operating He who hath violated the Law is obliged willingly to suffer the punishment although he be not required I say in the second place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that a cooperation of the person offending be necessarily required to the Execution of the Law that is that he who is to be punished is to act something himself in his own punishment he is not obliged ordinarily to undergoe the said punishment ipso facto before the Judge hath pronounced the sentence or which is the same before the punishment be exacted of him by a person to that purpose invested with lawful Authority The guilty person is bound indeed to suffer the punishment but if he called to it otherwise he is not bound I say in the third place that a guilty man after the sentence pronounced by the Judge or after he is required to it by a person invested with lawful Authority is obliged to a willing undergoing of the punishment yea and with some Cooperation of his own if this Cooperation be not against the Laws of humanity though otherwise very grievous and extremely painful For examples sake If an offendor be commanded to pay a great sum of money under the name of penalty or to depart the Kingdome he is bound by the power of the Law to the performance of it but if the punishment imposed be not only grievous but something also that is inhumane as if a malefactor be commanded to scourge himself to cut off his own hand to drinke poyson or the like in these cases the guilty person is obliged to undergoe the punishment passively but he is not obliged actively to cooperate in it w ch he knows to be ordained by the Law and which by his default he hath deserved And let this suffice to be spoken of the necessity of the Promulgation of Laws and of the Obligation of those penal Laws which may seem to have any reference with the Formal Cause of Laws THE NINTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in respect of the Final Cause thereof 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and Honesty IN our former Lectures we have treated of the Obligation of Humane Laws as to their Material Efficient and formal Causes in some places peradventure more largely and in others again peradventure more concisely than was requisite It remaineth that we should proceed to the explication of those things which do pertain to the final Cause of Laws But before we do come to dissolve these doubts we are first to premise and pronounce as an undoubted Truth That the ultimate end
rashly and how dangerously also this so vast a power is attributed to the people Nevertheless there be other considerable reasons to be alleged which vehemently may perswade us that the peoples consent and approbation is to be had in the making of Laws First because the Law ought to be as a mind void of any extravagancy of desire but the Laws of Princes rashly sent forth to the unwary Subjects Aristot 3. Polit. in the favour and on the behalf of Courtiers and Flatterers are oftentimes corrupted with the depraved desires of impotent affections Secondly because those Laws which are not allowed when propounded to the Subjects to speak morally are presumed to be either unjust in themselves or too burdensome to the Subjects or at least unprofitable to the publick And therefore it is expedient that they should not be enacted it being very incommodious to the Common-wealth that Laws should be multiplyed without a necessity Thirdly because it is manifest that Laws rightly constituted may be so abrogated by a Contrary Custome that they cease any longer to oblige which Custome is nothing else than a conjoyned consent of the people neglecting to observe that Law as being unprofitable together with the consent of the Prince not exacting an observation of it Therefore it being in the same power to destroy as it is to make the force of the Laws do seem not a little to depend on the approbation and consent of the people Fourthly and cheifly because the consent of the people in the making of Laws and their concurrence with the power of the Prince doth so much conduce both to the publick peace of the whole Kingdome and the safety and security of the people that there can be nothing more For most likely it is that all Subjects will not grievously but readily and cheerfully obey both those Kings who desire their consent and those Laws to which they themselves shall give their consent Neither is it to be feared that the Supreme and Legislative power of the King shall by this means suffer any diminution which is the only argument that the adverse party do object against it for that these two I say the consent of the people and the supreme power of the Prince in making Laws may friendly and at once consist together besides that there seems to be no repugnancy in the things themselves may appear by this that our Kings of England whose supreme power the Inhabitants of this Kingdom before these late unhappy times have most fully always and most freely acknowledged did notwithstanding never so exercise their Legislative power as to impose any Laws on their Subjects without their own consent XXIII We conceive it therefore to be granted that at the least some consent of the people is to be required in the making of those Laws which in Conscience may oblige the Subjects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But it may be here doubted Aristot 1. Polit 6. and that not unjustly I shall therefore make this the third Doubt or Demand how great and how much of the consent of the people may be required to this that the placit of the Prince may have the vigour of a Law I answer in this consent of the people of which we now treat two things are to be considered viz. the time and manner of consenting And both these do fall again under a twofold consideration For either the Law is consented to as to the time that is before the promulgation of it or after or as to the manner that is with an expresse consent or suffrages or with a tacit consent or customes From the complexion of these there do proceed four sorts or degrees of popular consent XXIV The first and the lowest and least degree of all is the tacit or silent consent before the publication or asking of the Law which is when a people have so put themselves and all that they have in the power of the Conquerour or by a long custome of obedience have so entirely submitted themselves to the will of the Prince that whatsoever he determineth they do yield unto it And this may come to passe both ways for by the Law of Nations that power of the Prince is just which is either obtained by a just War or confirmed by a continued succession as by a right of praescription And this degree indeed although not very profitable to the people if the Prince be pleased to turn his power into tyranny yet it will so far suffice that the people cannot complain of any injury done unto them if it should so fall out that the Prince should determine any thing too severely against them which peradventure is not unjust but such a thing as they would not willingly have to be done As amongst us many of the Presbyterians do importunatly as their Custom is and unjustly complain that the election of Parochial Pastors is unlawfully taken away from the People when those who ought to be chosen to that Office by the Parishoners are presented by some private person or by some College under the name of a Patron without their Consent not dreaming all the while that the right of Electing if the People heretofore had any which is very uncertain and if denyed can never be proved for some certain Cause from the beginning but by the long prescription of Time now unknown was long agoe conveyed unto those whom they call the Patrons of Benefices and so in the election made by the Patrons the Consent of the People is virtually involved and contained which answer if it be of no force amongst men that are obstinate in their own opinions yet of this at least they are to be advertised which may be enough to satisfie the most importunate Adversary which is that the Rights of Patronships and the Advowzons or Advocations of Churches were long agoe established by Authority of Parliament that is by the common and full Consent of the whole People And therefore what is done in this Case by a legitimate Patron the People have already consented that it is lawful for him to do it XXV The second Degree is the silent Consent of the People to such a Law after the promulgation of it that is when the People do not contradict the Law made and published by the King but rather do approve it by their Deeds by conforming themselves to the will of the Prince and by observing that which is commanded by the Law for if he who but holds his peace doth seem to consent much more is he presumed to consent Leges constituuntur cum promulgantur firmantur cum moribus utentium approbantur Distinct 4. Sect. in istis who expresseth an actual obedience Of this degree of Consent thus speaketh Julian again in the place above cited Quid interest suffragio Populus voluntatem suam declaret an rebus et facto What difference is it if the People do declare their Consent by suffrages or by deeds and Acts XXVI The third
intention but unprofitable to the publick nay in some sence obnoxious yet the Subject is bound to obey it provided it be made by just Authority and the matter of the Law or the thing commanded be such that it may be done without Sin The reason is because every man ought to be careful and diligent in the performance of that which belongs to his own part Gal. 6. 5. and not too scrupulous of what concerns another For every man shall bear his own Burthen If a Law-giver shall be wanting in his Duty what is that to you Do you perform your Office howsoever As for his intentions whether they be right or not let himself look to it for he must give to God an account of all his actions and intentions And do you look to your self for if you shall refuse to obey him you shall give to the same God an account of your disobedience XII The fourth Dout of the Changing of Laws if they seem to be unprofitable or obnoxious to the Common-wealth whether and how far the Change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be required and urged by the People The reason of the Doubt in one respect is because in a body Civil as in a body natural every change especially if it be sudden and great is dangerous and on the other side because it concerns the Common-wealth that the Laws be accommodated to the Times and Customes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 4. Phys text 128. and if the one doth change that the other be changed with them For answer to this I say in the first place it is certain that the Laws may be changed yea and sometimes that they ought to be changed for they have heretofore been changed with great profit to the Common-wealth therefore they may now be changed again and may be so in all future times if occasion shall require it shall be found profitable to the Commonwealth And why may not that be lawful to be done again which hath been lawful heretofore There are every day new emergencies new inconveniencies new evils and if there are not new Laws made to redresse them there will be no remedy Arist 2. And all men saith Aristotle seek not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 8. And if heretofore it were expedient that a Law should be made because it was profitable to the Commonwealth it being found afterwards by the change of the conditions of Times and manners to become unprofitable why is it not expedient that it should be taken away again XIII I say in the second place That the change of particular Laws is not without danger and therefore not to be attempted unlesse it be upon some great and urgent necessity Aristotle acutely and briefly as his custom is produceth divers reasons 2. Poli. 8. These three are the chiefest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These often changes do very much derogate from the authority of the Law and the Law-giver As we conceive that person to be of a very slender and weak judgement who for no sound or evident reason is easily enduced to change his Opinion Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It maketh the people wanton and petulant This is true enough we not long since have had the experience of it and apt to fly at any thing if they shall find their Law-giver easy on this account and departing from his own right to humour the Votes and unsatisfied desires of the people Therefore the chief Philosopher most gravely and deservedly doth reprove the Law of Hippodamus a Law-maker of Miletum viz. That whosoever had discovered or found out something profitable to the City should be recompenced for his good service with a publick reward This Law was specious enough at the first sight and plausible to the people but look throughly into it and you will find nothing in it either of prudence or safety or Advantage For what could be found more dangerous to disturb the publick Peace than that factious men and of a turbulent and cunning Spirit under the shaddow of a publick good should not only occasion the subversion of the Laws but also call in question the Form of the whole Civil Government and obtrude unto the State a new Idaea of Government according to the humour of their own Invention Do you hear I beseech you a Philosopher famous in his times or rather a Prophet and a foreteller of the manners and the times in which now we live Gravâ—ora inserre vulnera dum minoâ—â—bus medeâ—i defidâ— amus Ambros 2. Oâ—sic 2. Thirdly the Innovation of Laws being ordained for the removing of some present Inconvenience and being it may come to passe and oftentimes it doth so come to passe that from this suddain Immutation many and more grievous Inconveniencies may arise though not peradventure at the first discovered the most grave Philosopher did judge it to be far safer to tolerate endure some Inconveniencies and those not slight ones neither in a Common wealth which may be avouched of the Church also which is a kind of a Common-wealth than in pretence of Reformation either Ecclesiastical or Political to cancel old Laws Statutes turn all things upside down Of a far different judgment to those of our times were the wise men of former Ages whose Rules Principles were as are here these folowing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Malum benè positum non est movendum Imperiti medici est pejus malo remedium adhibere an Evil well placed is not to be removed It is the part of an unskilful Physician to apply a Remedy worse than the disease XIV I say in the third place That although the changing of Laws may seem to be necessary by reason of some great and evident Cause yet it is not to be attempted by the people without the consent of the Prince but modestly they are to crave and patiently to expect it of him and this may aptly be collected from the Analogy of the Head and the Members for how like a monster were it and destructive to the whole body if the Arms the Breast or the Feet should assume unto themselves the office of the Head This is abundantly enough demonstrated in those things which not long since we declared to you when we spake of the efficient Cause of Laws viz. That the principal Act of Jurisdiction cannot be exercised but by him only who is the Head and chief of the whole Commonalty Therefore the Constitution the abrogation and any Immutation of Laws whatsoever which are all of them the principal Acts of the chiefest Jurisdiction cannot pertain unto the people unless where the people are Prince as in a State Democratical but to him only who doth exercise a Soveraignty of Dominion over the whole Commonalty in a State Monarchical and who hath the undoubted power of a transcendent Command by himself In a businesse of so great an importance the duties of the people are these
to all Laws Kings Ordinances and Customs whatsoever VI. From so loose and dangerous an Interpretation of this vulgar Axiom not only a window but a spacious door being opened to seditious tumults and all manner of popular licence It is manifest that they who defend their horrible wickednesse with this forbidden buckler do not entertain the pure and genuine construction of that Axiom but do feign another to themselves which by an inforced Interpretation may give some shew of Patronage to their depraved Counsails and their Cause For as often as any man to serve his Avarice Ambition Hatred or Anger shall attempt new designs and fill all things with Rapine Blood and Plunder he incontinently may pretend the Safety of the People for his nefarious Villanie Examine I pray you the Annals and Chronicles of all times throughout the world both sacred prophane antient modern exotick or our own you shall every where find that the Catilines and Cethegi of all times and places did constantly practise these things under the pretence of liberty and popular safety so that he may seem to have a Melonin stead of a Heart they are Tertullians own words that will suffer himself to be thus Circumvented and deluded But whether unwarily hath this Tempest hurried me whiles I let loose the reigns to my just Indignation I therefore do contain my self and that I may appear a Disputant and not an Orator I return to the matter in hand VII Where in the first place this is to be considered what in that vulgar Axiom is meant by the word Safety For it any man finds his dignity or liberty affronted or injured in some small thing nay and if it be a great one he is not presently to complain that he hath endangered or lost his Safety For every Hurt or Blemish is not directly opposed to the Safety of any thing or person but the Ruine or Destruction of it It is altogether the same thing a due Analogy being reserved in a body Politick and Republick as it is in a humane body and a single person By reason of the jarring of the contrary qualities in a mans body because of the defect or excesse of inward Heat and Cold and a various Immutation of extrinsecal Accidents it may so come to passe that a man may hardly enjoy his health but very often in one part or other of his body he may endure that either within or without which may be very troublesome to him it may also come to passe that by the Stone the Tooth-ach or the Gou◠or by some other disease in some other part he may feel an extreme pain or be so sick in every part that he may lye down yet in the mean time it may be neither necessary nor seasonable to have recourse unto extraordinary Remedies as if he were in apparent danger of his life and safety So in a Common-wealth we must not presently attempt against the Laws and Ordinances We must not gather together a rabble of the vulgar and raise tumults we must not presently cry out Arms Arms for the safety of the people as soon as any popular Souldier or bold Babler shall complain unto the people and accuse the Prince the Peers the Magistrates and Judges or their Ministers or any one of them of violating the Laws doing Injurie or neglecting their duties although peradventure they have deserved it There ever were and will be under the best Kings and the best govern'd Common-wealths some oppressions of the meaner Citizens proceeding from the abuse of Power and many other grievances for the preventing or redressing of which no care or industry of the Governours no severity of the Laws could prevail for if it shall be lawful for the factious Citizens as soon as ever they see one or another example of this nature to despise all Laws and Ordinances and under the pretence of the publick safety to revenge themselves upon the oppressors by force of Arms Kingdoms and Common-wealths will never be free from troubles and tumults Our Saviour saith Luke 17. 1. It cannot be avoyded but that offences will come and we must go out of the world as the Apostle saith 1 Cor. 5. 10. or seek some Eutopia or Platonick Common-wealth to preserve us if we shall make such an Interpretation of the safety of the people that unless every one of the lowest degree of Citizens be altogether secure from all unjust force and unrighteous Domination of some Superiour or other there shall be no publick peace at all The safety of the Common-wealth is then indeed in danger when by the incursions of Exotick Enemies or by the depraedations of wicked Citizens the affairs are brought into so manifest a danger that unless some timely help be provided the City and Country undoubtedly will be destroyed VIII We have seen what our Innovators do mean by the word Safety In the next place we are to observe how rightly that word People is interpreted by them The People as St. Augustine defines them from the lost books of Cicero in his Repub. is Coetus multitudinis Hominum juris consensu utilitatis Communione Sociatus * De 〈…〉 A multitude of men associated by the consent of Law and Right and the Communion of profit 〈◊〉 in this appellation of people all the Roman Citizens of every Order and Condition were contained For besides Kings in their first times and Emperors in their last the Romans had a threefold degree of distinction Patricians Knights and the Common people But in what a latitude this word is to be received amongst the Latine writers wheresoever it is found the Reader may collect by the adjoyned circumstances which for the most part for a most sure argument for this purpose may best be done by those words which are annexed viz. the opposite Terms The word People is taken three wayes by the Roman Writers First and of all the most unusual it is taken for the Common People alone which was the lowest order of the People of Rom◠as in that of Martial Dat populus dat gratus eques dat thura Senatus Where the word People being opposed to the Senate and the Knights can signifie nothing but the Common-People Secondly for both the inferior orders of People viz. the Common People and the Knights together the Supreme or Patrician order being excluded For in the beginning of the constitution of that Common-wealth the Kings being expelled the Fathers thought good to retain among themselves a kind of Prerogative of Honour and Dignity above other Citizens and for the signification of it to separate themselves by that name from the rest of the Turba of the People From whence came those solemn Forms The Senate and the People of Rome It seemed good to the Senate and the People of Rome In which the name of People doth comprehend all the other Citizens both Knights and Common-People the Senate excepted Thirdly it is taken for all the Citizens of all degrees without difference both
Fathers Knights and Common-People for of these three orders after that Kings desisted and there were as yet no Emperors the whole City did consist And in this sence for in the whole duration of that Common-wealth the State was popular the Roman writers are to be understood as often as they make mention of the preserving of the Safety Dignity and Majesty of the people IX I have the more diligently expounded these things not only because the proper significations of many words of this kind do depend on the use of that people from whom the words themselves are derived to us but for another two fold Cause The one that we suffer not our selves to be deceived and circumvented by a lesse proper interpretation of a doubtful word The other that in the bare appellation of the word people there may be no force to the prejudice of him who is Prince of the Commonalty and the head of the people Either of which of what moment they are to our present purpose you shall presently understand by those things which I am to prefer unto you X. I say therefore that this word people as many other words signifying an aggregate multitude may be taken two wayes Either collectively as it signifieth the whole Commonalty of the Republick that is the Prince and Subjects together or discretively and precisely as it signifieth the Subjects only and severed from the King In the very same manner as the Body either implyes the rest of the Members with the Head or the rest of the Members without the Head And the appellation of a Family doth sometimes comprehend all who are within one House Wife Children Servants and the Master of the Family himself who is over them all and sometimes again those only who are under his command and of whom he hath care And in the name of an Army sometimes the General is comperhended with the Souldiers sometimes he is not comprehended And the like is to be observed in the words of Parliament or Kingdom and other words of the same kind which signifie indeed a collection of many but with order and reference to one as their principal or their Head Therefore if not with a malignant intent yet certainly by a most dangerous Error it comes to passe that that which is spoken of the people collectively in the former sense inclusively to comprehend the whole Commonalty that is the Prince with the Subjects should be so wrested that it should be applyed to the people in the latter sense that is to the Subjects alone the King excluded XI But you will say how may it appear to us that the Appellation of people in the first sence may in that Axiom be understood collectively for the King and people and not discretively in the later sence for the common people alone I answer that most manifestly it doth appear by the common use of speaking and the Analogy of other words of the same signification In which the most certain rule of Interpretation is that words collective are alwayes to be taken collectively unlesse the Adjunct which is opposite to it doth require it For examples sake where it is said 1 Col. 1. 18. Christ is the Head of the Body of the Church It is manifest by the Adjunct opposite to it to wit the mention of the Head to which the Body is there relatively opposed that the word Body is there taken discretively for the other Members of the body precisely severed from the Head So if any man should say that the General had advanced with his Army into the Fields or had sent them to their winter quarters or that the Master of a Family had forbad any belonging to him to go out of his doors at twelve of the Clock at night Or what is written of David That whatsoever the King did was acceptable to the people It is manifest by the Adjunct every where opposed that in the word General master and King those collective words of Army Family and Subjects are not to be understood collectively but discretively and exclusively that is by the appellation of the Army the Souldiers are only comprehended and not the General and by the appellation of Family the Servants or Children are comprehended and not the Master himself and by the appellation of people the Subjects are only comprehended and not the King The reason is because the Opposite which is one of the correlatives being adjoyned doth necessarily imply the word collective answering on the other side and relatively opposite unto it to contain precisely its correlative that is the multitude only annexed and conjoyned to the Head and chief and not the whole Commonalty aggregated as it were from both the Terms correlative XII But when an Opposite is not added which may necessarily carry its signification to the other part of the Relation only it were incongruous to sence and reason to take the word collective otherwise than collectively and in its just latitude so that â—t may thereby comprehend both the Terms of the Relations especially when the speech is concerning safety profit or any other good or advantage which is or mat be common to them both for examples sake if it were commanded that tomorrow the camp should march because the Army should not be invironed by the Enemy or that Corn should be bought for the present use of a Family Orectes himself would swear that the man was not of a sober understanding who should apprehend that what was spoken either of the Army or the Family had relation only to the good of the Souldiers and the Servants no account or care being had of the General who commanded the Army nor of the Master who governed the Family which is all one as if a sick man being admonished by the Physician to have a greater care of his body for the future should with a great diligence begin to keep warm his Breast and his Thighs and other members beneath his neck but take no care at all to provide for his head because the Physicitian did only put him in mind of his body but not of his head XIII But I come yet nearer to the point in hand if Peradventure a whole company of common Souldiers should affirm that the safety of the Army was the supreme Law military but they had a General who did put them upon such hard service by his unsufferable commands that unlesse they timely should shake off the yoak of obedience to him the whole liberty of the Army would be in great danger to be lost and thereupon from this Principle of asserting their own liberties by force of Arms they should consult and agree amongst themselves no longer to obey his commands but to take away the life of their General Or if household Servants whom the Apostle 1 Peter 2. 18. would have obedient not only to those who are good and favourable to them but to those also who are rough and rigorous should combine amongst themselves to refuse his commands