summam supremam gubernationem potestatem in oâ—nes regni ordines habere Here is no distinction of being superiour singulis but not universis 16. R. 2. cap. 5. The Crowne of England immediately subject to God and to none other If immediately subject to God then will not that distinction salve that the people in universali are above it The iudgement then of Bodin may be well applyed unto this observator They which have written of the duetie of magistrates and other such like books have deceived themselves in mayntayning that the power of the people is greater then the Prince A thing which oft-times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their Soveraigne Prince And ministreth matter of great troubles in Common wealthes of which their opinion there is neither reason nor ground except the King be Captive furious or in his infancy and so needeth to have a protector or Lieutenant appoynted him by the suffrages of the people For otherwise if the King should be subiect unto the assemblyes and decrees of the people he should neither be King nor Soveraigne and the Common wealth neither Realme nor monarchy but a mere Aristocracy of many Lords in power equall where the greater commandeth the lesse in generall and every one in particular and wherein the Edicts and Lawes are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth but in the name and authoritie of the States as in an Aristocraticall Seigniory where he that is cheife hath no power but oweth obeysance unto the Commandements of the Seigniory unto whom yet they all and every one of them feigne themselves to owe their faith and obedience which are all things so absurd as hard it is to say which is farthest from reason Thus he which he doth a little after apply unto the state of England Consider I pray whither it be not true which this author saith that the maintayners of this doctrine doe but feigne themselves to owe faith and obedience unto their Soveraigne They will take the Oath of Allegiance to be every one true and faithfull But then they will tell you that they were particulars onely that tooke the Oath and each in his particular is thereby bound but the people in generall is a certaine universall body in power and nature divided from every man in particular and as an universall body they neither did nor could sweare and consequently are not bound Each particular member to bee admitted into the house of Parliament may sweare that the King is the onely Supreme Governour in all things or causes but being admitted they may altogether deny the King to be supream Governour in any cause or thing Is the King onely supream Governour in disposing of the Militia The making of Laws is a cause or thing and by and under them are all causes things governed yet so far is the King in this thing from being supream Governour that he must be governed and ought to follow the major vote And it were well if he might as a Burgesse intervote or at least as an honest Tradesman might be admitted to vote in election of some Burgesse for so at least by his proxie hee should have some share in the supreame Government though not the only supream Governour But how inconvenient soever this position may be that the people in universali are above the King yet the Observator will prove it true for that the people are the efficient cause and authour of Regall power But we shall first deny that ground And secondly we shall prove that admitting they were the authour of the Regall power yet it doth not follow that therefore they are above it For the first Let us examine whether the people are the authour and efficient cause of conveying Regall power For better understanding whereof it will be requisite first to search out the originall cause and ground of Politicall Government or power to govern in generall and surely wee shall finde that to be no other then the very Law of nature it self The naturall condition of mankind is such as necessarily requires society Naked and impotent weaklings are we when we enter the World and unable without mutuall help and assistance to preserve our selves whence society is absolutely requisite for the preservation of mankind in his infant being as likewise for his future protection from the violence of beasts and brutish men Againe would wee preserve our being without Civill society yet should we be more like beasts then men dumbe and void of all discourse Man therefore naturally needeth Civill society and that society necessarily requires some forme of Civill Government without which it were a confused assembly not a society and such as would ere long become destructive to it self Vbi non est Gubernator corruet populus So then from the Law of nature and necessity is government in generall derived which Law of nature is no other then the Divine Morall Law it self whence I conclude that God is the fountaine efficient cause of all Government or power to governe in the generall So S. Paul Rom. 13. Non est potestas nisi à Deo and again Qui potestati resistit Dei ordinationi resistit True it is although God be the Authour of all politicall power yet doth he not always determine it to this or that particular forme but with the peoples mediate election So that it is lawfull yet not altogether indifferent for a multitude among whom no forme of Government is already established to chuse to themselves either a Democraticall Aristocraticall Monarchicall or mixt Government and to designe the particular person or persons that shall be therewith invested But the power so determined by their vote unto a particular forme and person is from God still not onely as hee is the Authour and universall cause of all things but as from the immediate efficient cause As when anciently Bishops and Presbyters were elected by the people their order or power was not from the people but immediatly from God The people onely nominated or designed the person but neither did nor could confer the power or order of Priesthood Surely the Observator doth not believe that a Horse was the authour of Darius his power and yet was the neighing of his horse the means by which the Kingdome was determined unto him before all the other Persian Lords Neverthelesse he cannot imagine but that this peoples election is the very efficient cause of that Regall power that is elected and setled in some particular person whereas in truth it is but a medium used in the conveyance of it from God the onely authour which instrumentally operates in the conveyance but hath no causall influx at all into the Regall power conveyed whence it is that God challengeth to be acknowledged the authour of Regall power Dan. 2. Hee GOD removeth Kings and setteth up Kings The God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdome power
omnia jura in scrinio pecttoâ—s sui And yet as the government of this Kingdome is now setled the King cannot make void or vertulesse the setled Courts of Justice and thereby draw all things to a determination within his owne breast And if any cause shall come before him as a Judge to determine yet he hath a rule to follow and that 's the Law not his will which Law in respect of the King hath somewhat more then a directive force restrayning him and disabling him to goe against it so that he can doe no wrong The Lawes are made by the Kings power with the peoples or Parliaments assent which is a superiour power or rather the same power in a higher degree or extent to the Regall power alone and withâ—â—â—â— their assent And therefore the Regall power out of Parliament cannot change nor alâ—â—â— the Lawes and Ordinances made in Parliament but is bound by them as being made by a superiour power whence it is that Bracton every where affirmes the Law to be above the King solely And by this superiour power that is by the King with the assent of his people or Parliament were the ordinary Courts of Justice founded and established and their jurisdiction assertained and therefere may not be altered by the Regall power alone and by the same reason the King cannot alter the Constitution of the Court of Parliament but is the Constitution of all Courts alike the ordinary Courts are so constituted as that the Kings speciall Concurrence is not neeessary Arts and Judgements by the ordinary Judges alone are compleat and binding their assembling and departing is setled and doth not depend on the speciall pleasure of the Prince But the Court of Parliament hath another kind of Constitution the Kings speciall concurrence is in that a necessary and essential part Rex est capâ—t principium et finis Parliamenti Their assembling expects his speciall call their continuance depends on his will the Judgemements Arts and Ordinances made in Parliiament and concerning the Kingdome in generall are the Kings onely and without him frustrate and null Consider this good observator and then tel me if you did not endeavor grosly to abuse your reader by telling us that by the same reason the Parliament is not a Court compleâ— without the King the Common-pleas and all other Courts are not I confesse I have wondred to see it of late so often aâ—â—iâ—med That as the King cannot nor ought to declare by prâ—claimation or otherwise his disalowance of the acts judgments of the ordinary Courts so not of the Votes Ordinances of the Lords Commons in Parliament being the highest Court Should the ordinary Courts take upon them to dispose of the Militia by vertue of an Ordinance by them made might not the King by his Proclamation declare the Militia of that Ordinance and forewarne his Subjects not to be abused by it if the Observator can prove that the Lawes and Ordinances made by the now major part of the Lords and Commons are without and against the Kings pleasure of any more validitie that they are in themselves Lawes and Ordinances and not onely so called then I shall admit that the King either by Prociamation or otherwise ought not to declare against them meane while let every man judge how well the observatour hath maintained the power of the Lords and Commons mauger their King to make Lawes and Ordinances that shall bind the people in generall By which Ordinances the Militia the taking of Hull the Navy the Magazine the intercepting all mony and other provision that is but suspected to be passing towards the King the imprisoning all such as appeare dutifull towards his Majesties commands and such like Acts must be justified or acknowledged unjust The Observator finding it more then difficult in a plain field to maintaine his cause endeavours to shelter it under famed pretences of extraordinary danger and necessity in this extremity the King neglecting the helme nay purposely stearing towards rocks and shelves It is the duty of his Parliament in this case to oppose and preserve him and his Kingdome from utter wrecke and ruine He will then acknowledge that in ordinary cases without the King they cannot make a binding Law or Ordinance but in danger that is when they please In the miast of our calamities we are sensible of none thankes be to God but what their Ordinances have occasioned the Parliament seeing they must make use of their legislative power and make Ordinances to secure sâ—me Forts and settle the Militia or else two Kingdomes probably will be lost they doe accordingly the King proclaimes to the contrary in this contrariety consider if the Parliament 〈◊〉 vertually the whole Kingdome if it be not the supreame Judicatory as well in maâ—â—â—â—â— of State as Law if their grounds of jealousie be vaine To what purpose shall we consider of their jealousies if we thinke them to be but pretended by the cunning and practise of some few for accomplishing their designes and plots invented by some of their owne partie to be againe by them discovered yet must King and people submit to their judgement Are not the now major part the supreme Judges of danger to whom King and people are bound to submit If they are is it lesse then a mockery to bid us consider when as after consideration will we nill we we must subjugate our understandings and opinions to whatsoever they already have or hereafter shall declare But yet at your bidding I le consider in this contrariety whether the Parliament pray call them the Lords and Commons now assembled may not make use of their legislaiâ—e power yes if they have any such but I would not have them make use of the King legislative power without him and against him had they beene partners in that power some colour you might have had to have called it theirs but it seemes the power is solely the Kings they are onely to give an assent to the use of it Then you will I consider whether they be not the supreme Judicatory I thinke not the Parliamentiâ— supreame and above them both in matters of State and Law but againe I must consisider you say if the Lords and Cammons be not vertually the whole Kingdome why doe you put in the Lords whom at other times you can be content to spare The Lords Vote in respect of their Barronies derived from the Crowne the Commons Vote in right of their electors whom they represent at least nine parts of the Kingdome neither doe nor may Vote in their election the Clergie in respect of their spirituall livingt may not nor the most substantiall Coppy-holders Farmours nor Lessees for yeers not inheritrixes Jointresses nor reversioners Heirs apparrent and men that live upon Interest are excluded and all that have not 40. s. per annum free hold Land which I imagine cannot be above a tenth part of the Kingdome Tell me good Sir you that
list to unsettle principles power being you say nothing else but that might and vigour which a society of men containes in it selfe why should the might and vigour of these being farre the major part be over mastred and concluded by the Votes of those that are deputed by a miner number of the people or why should halfe the Kingdome in which there are but few Burroughes be equalled and overborne in Voting by two Counties out of which many Burgesses are chosen Old Sarum shal have as many Votes in Parliament as the Citty of London or County of Wiltes By which it seemes the Commons are not sent with equallity from all parts nor sent by all how doe they then represent all what reason is there that all the Kingdome should sit downe with their Votes the truth is the King Lords and Commons in conjunction are vertually the whole Kingdome for that all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination 25 H. 8. 21. your royall Majestie and your Lords and Commons representing the whole Realme in this your most high Court of Parliament have power c. So that in the King principally but yet in conjunction with the Lords and Commons is the vertue and power of the whole Kingdome contained But if we shall admit that the vertue and power of the whole Realme is by representation in the Commons alone or at least in the Lords and Commons what will thence follow the Kingdome you will say are the efficient cause of Kingly power and consequently above it they being above it have power over it may reassume it or dispose of it to such persons as they can confide in and this power the Kingdom may confer upon such as they shall choose for that purpose The Observator hath met with a free Gamster though his principles have beene particularly disproved and are distructive not onely to Monarchy but unto all government yet at present let him take all for granted First that the people have such power and secondly that they may transmit it unto such as they shall choose for that purpose But the question is whether they have done it whether they have chosen the new members for that purpose or for some other The King did not create the Lords I beleeve for that end nor create Borroughes with power to send Burgesses for that end nor command the Counties to elect Knights for that purpose nor did the Borroughes and Counties when they did elect give any such power upon the receipt of the Kings Writ by the Sheriffe and warning or notice given to the Freeholders they meet and cry up some mans name this in it selfe imports nothing but with reference to the Writ so that the people intrust them to doe onely what the Writ requires and thereupon the Sheriffe returnes Elegi feci duos milites who have power from the County ad faciendum what I pray quod breve in se exegit in that they have no avthority without the King to judge of dangers and oblige the King and people to goe their way for repelling the â—ame and yet doth the Writ continue as large as ever it hath been seeing neither the Kings writ nor the peoples election made thereupon doe give it I demand whence have the Lords and Commons excluding the King this soveraign power to judge of dangerâ—â— and thereupon if they so cause to take from the King the power of the Kingdome and according to their pleasures to dispose thereof unto certaine confiding persons unto which disposition the King and people are all required to conform and give consent We have beene often told that it is by the fundamentall Law of the Land a foundation so deepe that like the River Nilus it hides its head from all that seeke it never yet could any the most learned instruct us where to finde out this fundamentall Law which hath layen buried so long that no Law-booke Record or Chronicle makes any the least mention thereof But yet at length a certaine Pamphleter defending the Observatour hath hapt upon it but not amongst the Lawes of this Land he was nessitated to dig a little deep for it but amongst natures principles It is radically couched in nature it selfe and irrepealably enacted in her Magna Charta to which all positive Lawes must in equity vaile that the State may lawfully of its selfe provide for its preservation espectally if the King either see not the danger or seing it will not provide for it in such mâ—nner as may give best security to himselfe and the Common-wealth Certaine it is there is no state but is endued with ability and meanes to preserve it selfe instinct of nature will force all men preserve themselves from present destructior and providence teacheth all to provide against future emergent dangers and this surely the State of England hath done in submitting it selfe to the care and protection of a King on whose good foresight and wisdome next under God the welfare of the whole Realme dependeth he sits as on a watch Tower survaying his owne dominions and by the vigilancy of his Councell at home and Embassadours abroad hath timely intelligence of any approaching evill against which if he shall need any extraordinary advise or aide of his Subjects he hath power by his writ to assemble them in Parliament and with their assent to raise mony and other necessary provision for their defence and safeguard And this I say is that meanes of safety wherewith the State of England hath provided it selfe by putting themselves for better for worse under the protection of a King against all dangers And certainly he that ought to protect them against dangers to him it appertaines to judge of danger and so much was admitted by those who argued for the Subject in case of Ship-mony that the King was sole Judge of the dangers but that he could not therupon tax the Subject but by assent in Parliament But what you will object if the King will not see the danger or seeing it will neverthelesse suffer the Kingdome to fâ—eat at all hazzards or what if being carried away with Malignant Counsell he himselfe shall steere it towards rocks and shelves May not the Kingdome in such case save themselves from ruine and oppose the King There can be no Generalissime so uncircumscribed but that if he shall turne his Cannons upon his owne Souldiers they are ipso facto absolved of all obedience of all Oathes and tyes of Allegiance whatsoever for the time and bound by higher duety to seeke their owne preservation by resistance and defence For my part I cannot but thinke that a state after much sufferance seeing utter destruction to be at hand ready to swallow them up may use any good and lawfull meanes as flight and avoydance to preserve themselves from ruine by the hand of a tyranizing Lord yet I dare not approve of active resistance by taking up armes against a lawful Soveraign Prince though
The King onely cites the Writ the Form whereof is ancient whereby they are summoned to counsell the King de quibusdam arduis not in all things but in some things saith the King Is this to say only in such points as the King shall please to propose Did not His Majesty in expresse words at the beginning of this Parliament leave them to their own method Again Doth the King say If they make any transition they are liable to imprisonment at His pleasure Not His pleasure but the Law is the Rule he tyes Himself unto these then are but false Calumnies Pag. 8. 9. 46. he charges the King with this Position The Lords and Commons in Parliament are meerly to councell the King As if without their consent the King might make a Law That they are limitted by the Writ ad consilium onely That if we make the Lords and Commons to be more then Counsellors we make them commanders and controllers and this is not suitable to royalty From hence the Observator takes occasion to argue very sadly That the Lords and Commons are summoned not onely ad câ—nsilium but ad consensum also in the making and altering Laws And in this though in nothing else he brings authority to back his reasons withall citing the close Roll 7. Ed. 1. Quodomnes tangit ab omnibus approbâ—ri dâ—bet or tratâ—ari He did well to corrupt the Record by putting approbari dâ—bet for tractari otherwise it would not have served his turn But surely the Point needed not proof for never did the King nor any body else deny it the King no where sayes They are called ad consilium onely meerly or that to allow them mere then to counsell were to make them Commanders He saith they are called to counsell that 's true not to command that 's true but he doth not deny them power of consenting which the Observator contradicting himself doth afterwards acknowledge Pag. 16. It is lâ—sâ— unqâ—â—sâ—imed saith he That the legislative power is partly in the King partly in the Kingdome and that the King in ordinary cases cannot make a Law or Ordiaâ—nâ—â— without the Parliament Is it left unquestioned why then would you abuse the people as if the King had claimed a legislative power to himself whereto the consent of the Lords and Commons were not requisite Pag. 7. The King saith he deniâ—s the Lords and Commons if hâ— withdraw himselâ— to have any power of any Court Pag. 10. He cites these as the Kings precise words 'T is improbable and impossible that His Cabinet-Councellors or His Bishops or Souldiers who must have so great a share in the misery should take such pains in the procuring thereof Pag. 25. He tells you That the King saith he cannot without renouncing His own conscience and reason preforce the Parliaments counsell before the Courts All which and many more are falsly imposed upon the King to alienate and corrupt the affections of His Majesties Subjects Pag. 25. He saith The King charges the Parliament with these Doctrines as so offensive 1. That the Parliament hath an absolute indisputablâ— power of dâ—â—laring Law 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents And then the Observator justifies these Doctrines as well as he may for they are most true And had the King denied them as the Observator wou'd have it thought he had indeed destroyed the power of Parliaments But the Doctrines the King chargeth them with are That the then major part of the two Houses had indisputable power of declaring Iaw and were not bound to Presidents Had the Observator taken the Charge aright he would not have answered Statutes are not binding to them why then should Presidents For I hope the now major part of the Houses are bound by Statutes and cannot repeal them though the Parliament may What though his Pamphlet be stuffed with such corruptions yet let me speak one word for him He is no more faulty in this kinde then others You see his iâ—genuity I shall now consider the solidity of his Reasons and the goodly Consequences he draws from them Omitting then those loose extravagant Passages which have no connexion with the Body of his Discourse the sum of that part which seemeth rationall is as followeth Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale The efficient cause is ever superiour unto and more excellent then that which it causeth But the people in whom Power is originall and Majestie underived are the efficient cause conveying Regall Power and Majestie unto Princes not God who is no more the author of Regall then Aristocraticall Power The same people being the efficient cause are also the finall cause for whose good and preservation onely that Power is conveyed and their conveyance is fiduciary upon trust and under such Conditions as they please The people being the efficient cause of Kingly Power he hence infâ—rres They are above the King Rex etsi singâ—lis major universis minor est And from thence to bring it on to his purpose it must needs follow as he thinks the people being above the King The Houses being by vertue of representation the same people must likewise be above the King The Houses then being by vertue of representation the efficient cause conveying Regall Power upon Trust and to no other end but to the good and preservation of the people may when they please to say That it is not disposed of by the King to that end and according to that Trust re-assume that Power and make themselves the disposers thereof from all which Grounds he inferres their power of making Ordinances obliging the People in generall The Ordinance of the Militia to be legall and consequently the Commissions of Array illegall The taking and retaining Hull to be justifiable The taking the Magazine and whatsoever else hath been taken from the King That the King hath in nothing appertaining to His Crown an unconditionable Property That whatsoever Acts he hath passed whatsoever he hath done or can do for His subjects is meer Duty That He ought to acknowledge that he can in nothing merit of the whole State That he ought to assent to all Bills that they approve and adjudge fit to passe That His great Officers be such as they shall allow of That without him they may authoritivè declare the Law and consequently make and repeal Laws and Statutes at their pleasure That when they adjudge the Power intrusted with Him for the Kingdoms safety to be turned against them they and all are ipso facto absolved of all Obedience of all Oaths and Tyes of Allegiance whatsoever to His Majesty and bound to seek their preservation by resistance and defence Desperate Conclusions I shall examine his Grounds ordine retrogradâ— beginning with that immediately antecedent to all his Conclusions Whethâ—r the Parliament so he would have you call the major part of the Lords and Commons remaining are above the King by reason of their representing the whole Kingdom How true it is That the
c. Dan. 4. Cuicunque voluerit det illud Prov. 8. By mee Kings reigne by mee Princes rule By these places it is manifest I thinke that although the peoples election may sometimes operate in the specifying of power and designing the person yet never is it a cause of that power God onely is the authour and efficient cause thereof See Kitchin fol. 10. Le Roy est ordaine de Dieu And therefore was that ever renowned Elizabeth acknowledged by her Parliament to be the lawfull Queen of England Iure Divino so saith Cambden pag. 25. And the Parliament thought it just that King H. 8. Having his Kingly and Regall power given by God saith the Act should in case of necessity that would not abide the calling of a Parliament by his Proclamation or Edicts provide for the safety of the Realme Regall power in specie if it were conveyed or given by the people then must it first have been in the people for Nihil dat quod non habet Now that Regall power could be in the people is impossible for 't is against the nature of Regality to be in more then one Rex unicus esto If the people had Regall power I would know over whom Multitudo Deorum nullitas est Deorum Were supream power radically and originally in the people and by them delegated to some particular person that should governe as a King the King as their instrument would but propound Laws but the people must enact them As in Rome while it was a popular State and that Magistracy was but beneficium populi Leges saith Livy à Magistratu proponuntur tantum sed â populo jubentur But now in the government of this Realme 't is cleere contrary Leges tantum proponuntur à populo jubentur à Rege By which it is manifest that Regall power with us cannot be beneficium populi But again the Observator must not take it for granted that the determination of power to Regall rather then Aristocraticall c. or the placing of it in such particular person was always with the peoples election for surely Regall power and the persons that should governe without any choice of the people hath been determined by God himselfe I shall not insist on the particular institution of Monarchicall Government amongst the Angels good and bad nor on that which Bees and other sensitive Creatures doe observe by that instinct of nature that the Divine Goodnesse hath implanted Nor on that Monarchicall Government amongst the Iews which was often particularly determined by speciall ordinance sent from Heaven by the Ministery of Angels or Prophets though this were sufficient to disprove what the Observator affirmeth That God is no more the Authour of Regall then Aristocraticall power I shall only observe that even in Adam and after among the Patriarchs Noah Abraham Iacob and others the common Fathers of Mankind Regall Government was instituted by GOD himselfe without any Election of the people GOD created Mankinde ex uno ut esset inter homines non Democratia sed Regnum after which the Elders or Fathers of Families successively had by their Eldership not only paternall but Regall power as appears by their making war and execoting sentence of death upon offendors And from these originall Stock-fathers Kingdoms and Monarchies I suppose for the most part have had their beginning without popular Election in their first commencement and therefore I would have our Kings style continued Carolus Dei gratia rather then Carolus electione populi This is excellently declared by Sir Thomas Smith in his Commonwealth lib. 1. cap. 12 to have bin the naturall source or beginning of that Government which is termed legitimum regnum to difference it from Tyranny and absolute Dominion Such as Nimrod and others first gained by usurpation and after held by violence over the people And which is not otherwise from God then as the Divine providence pleaseth to direct it to the punishment of a sinfull people or to such other purpose as to his divine wisdom seems best But with such absolute Dominion England hath nought to dâ—e 't is legitimum regnum that takes place with us where the royall power saith Fortescue is restrained by power politique that the King can neither change the law without the consent of the subjects nor charg them with any strange impositions against their will And hee there cites Aquinas to prove that by this Rule and kind of Regiment should all Mankind have been governed if in Paradise they had not transgressed By which iâ— appears that God in the Law of nature instituted this forme of Government And whether we call it Paternall or Regall it refers to that institution and is from thence derived True it is that violence of war and vulgar Commotions may in most places have interrupted and altered the course of succession according to this Divine institution upon which occasion popular Elections may have interposed But the King once Elected and seated in his Throne is thenceforth dâ—â—mâ—d to reigne by that Paramount right unto which the peoples election is but a restitution or as that learned Historian Kings are made by God and Laws divine and by humane Laws only declared to be Kings and thereupon he observes that David thought himself accountable onely to God Tibi soli peccavi Psal. 51. But againe if it were admitted that the people originally were the Authours of that Regall power by which they are governed I cannot see how it doth necessarily follow that therefore there remayns in them a power above the King I acknowledge that Maxime with its just limitations holds truly in naturall causes Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale but surely it is mightily misapplyed by the Observator who would have us imagine if the people made a King they are themselves more King then he I should rather think if Regall power were originally conveyed from the people they by conveying it over have devested themselves of it If it were conveyed with conditions then under those conditions may it be held against them if absolutely then may it be held absolutely over them It was necessary by the Law of nature that they should convey over a power unto some for will they nill they a people cannot be without a Government Or were their conveyance voluntary have they therefore a power over it at pleasure to revoke it although it were often ratified by Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy Doth not this doctrine destroy not one y Monarchy but all Government whatsoever The people you say are the Authors and efficient cause of that power that the Parliament Members have by Conveyance from them may the people therefore conclude themselves to be above the Parliament and at pleasure revoke and controll their power May Newcastle or any other particular Borough or County disauthorize those they have impowred Or if a particular Borough or County cannot remove their proxies yet the major part of the
Electors throughout the whole Kingdome may according to this doctrine revoke the trust and authority that all the Members have If so how can my obedience be required to their Votes when as it is doubtful whether the major part of the Free-holders do not disavow their proceedings Most certain it is whether the people were the authors of Regall power or not there neither is nor can be any power remayning in the people above that which is in a Monarch or King for if the supream power remayn in the people it must be a popular State such as Rome sometimes was The Lacedemonians had a King in name but their Estate was truly a popular Estate the supream power being in those 5 worthy Members called the Ephori who figuring patronizing the people had power to controll the doings of their King and their custome was as Plutarch relates every ninth yeere upon some cleer night to gaze upon the Firmament and if they observed the Moon to twincle or any Star to sparkle or shoot they thereupon would commit their King to prison who might not thence be delivered untill the Oracle of Apollo had so declared A happy Government I assure you both for King and people But if you will allow of a true King in power as well as in name the sovereigne power next under God must be in him not controllable with the breath of the fickle multitude Princeps Nec ponit aut sumit secures Arbitrio popularis aurae The Roman Emperour was anciently chosen by the Souldiers but did there remayne in them a power over the Emperour so elected T is recorded that the Souldiers having chosen Valentinian the elder would have added ao lleague unto him in the Imperiall government but the Emperour answered them me ad imperium eligere penes vos erat sed cum jam à vobis electus sim consortem imperii quem postulastis non amplius in vectra sed in mea potestate eligere situm est and with this answer were the Souldiers well contented whereby it appeares there remained no superour power in them Did there remaine a superintendent power in the people over the King it would then be lawfull to appeale from the Kâ—ng to the people as to the more supreame power but such appeales were never heard of at least not till of late nor are they consistant with Monarchy or any government but necessarily tend to Anarchy and destruction Omnis honestae rei malus judex est vulgus there is no Common-wealth wherein there are not more evill then good more simple then wise if then the majority of the people shall determine upon the last Appeale what judgement shall we be ruled by You see whereunto the Observators principles do lead and if you desire to know the fountaine from whence he drew these goodly doctrines that little Treatise entituled Puritano-Iesuitismus will point it out unto you I shall forbeare to consider any further by what authority Kings doe reigne And I heartily wish that this Anti-monarchist had spent his time in praising God for giving us that forme of government which experience teacheth and all the learned in the world do acknowledge to be the best and most convenient rather than by presumptuous enquiry after the cause and origen thereof to have endeavoured to shake and unsettle the same As concerning the finall cause of Regall Authority it must be acknowledged the generall end thereof is no other then the conservation and good of the people and true it is that the King is bound not only by his Oath but also by the very end of his Regall Office to protect us and to endeavour our promotion to all kinde of politicall happinesse even as much as he intends his owne honour and right But I cannot swallow that ingratefull inference the Observator makes from thence daring to tell his King That hee cannot merit of the State that whatsoever hee doth for them is meâ—re duty May not the same act be of duty and yet meritorious or deserving Is it not the duty of a Father to take care for his children and yet your selfe acknowledge the Father doth all his offices meritoriously You suppose though falsly Kingly authority commenceth by pact and agreement with the people is not honour and obedience even by that very pact to be paid him as a due reward and doth not reward presuppose desert although after such pact made his care and protection be of duty yet being free to oblige himselfe by that pact to preserve nourish and defend his people was an act meritorious Omnium domos illius vigilia defendit omnium otium illius labor omnium delitias illius industria omnium vacationem illius occupatio For which the Law doth attribute unto him all Honour Dignity and P cheminence and yet you say he deserveth nay he can deserve nothing The word Grace you tell him sounds not well in his mouth yet surely former Kings have used the word without being checkt for it 28. â— 1. cap. 1. The King â—f his speciall grace for redresse of the grievances of his people sustained by his warres and for the amendment of their estate and to the intent that they may be the more ready to doe him service the more willing to assist and â—yde him in time of need grants c. You see that King tearms it of speciall Grace though for amendment of their estate and for those Articles hee granted them hee expected in retribution that his subjects should bee the more willing to assist and ayde him in time of need And so I hope will all good subjects bee at this time the more willing to ayd his Majesty for those many Acts of greater grace he hath pleased to passe unto us You may see sundry other Acts wherein the King himselfe speaking pronounceth them to be of his speciall grace W. 2. cap. 10 cap. 29. 18. E. 1. Stat. de quo warranto c Statutum de gratia regia diâ—itur quando Rex dignatur cedere de jure suo regio pro quiete comodo populi sui Prâ—m Regall the Observator passeth on to consider Parliamentary power pag. 5. Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies if not higher for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments and Parliaments have also the same shall cause as Monarchies Well 't is agreed that the good of the Kingdome is the end whereto Parliamentary power should direct it selfe but then as concerning the power of Parliaments and the efficient cause of that power it will be requisite to consider the parts distinctly and then the power of all together The Parliament is a Body consisting of three distinct Estates the King the Lords and the Commons Unto the Commons considered alone it most properly appertaines to present the grievances of the people and in humble manner to pray such redresse as the King with
their consent and advice of the Lords shall deeme to be just and fit And this power or rather trust they derive from the people their Electors yet not without dependance on the King The Knights are sent by the County but the County had power and command by the Kings Writ to send them And as for the Burgesses their trust or power call it what you will doth more especially referre unto the King as the author thereof for whence had the elected Burgesses their power but from the Borough that sent them whence had the Borough power to send but from the King who by his Letters Patents incorporated them into a Borough and gave them power to send Burgesses to the Parliament which otherwise they had no more right to doe then any other vile whatsoever And this is the ground of that power which the house of Commons have as concerning the generalty of the Kingdome And besides this the house of Commons although a great and honourable Assembly yet of themselves as I think they are no Court either of Record or of ordiâ—ary Iustice unlesse it bee with respect to their owne Members which is rather a necessary priviledge then any power They can neither administer an Oath nor give any judgement twixt party and party nor have they power to controll or reverse a judgement given in the meanest pipowder Court I speak not this with a minde to derogate from the due honour of that Assembly but to occasion some friendly brother if I am in errour to instrâ—ct me how the imposing of the Protestation by order of the Commons only upon all the subjects in generall under a penalty of being branded with malignancy and adjudged unfit to beare any publike office may be defended How that order for levelling Chancels and making other alterations in the Church which issued from the Commons without the King and in opposition to the Lords may be justified either by reason or president How that Remonstrance a chiefe meanes of all our succeding dissentions that was voted with so much opposition in their owne house and was after published I will not say to disaffect the people from his Majesties government may be defended and justified In briefe may I be instructed with some grounds by which these and many other their actions and Votes may be warranted I shall thenceforth acknowledge them whom now perhaps by mistake I think to be no Court at all to be the most supreme Iudicatory both for Law and State In the meane while I am ignorant of any trust they have other then a trust from the people to consult and assent to the King and Lords in the making of Lawes which without the consent of the Lords and his Majesties concurrence is altogether uselesse and of no vertue And in them apart I know no Iurisdiction but with respect to their owne Members and surely that such as it is they have from the Crowne the fountaine of all Iustice and the spring head of all Iurisdiction The house of Peeres considered simply have power by assent or disassent to enable or disable the making or repealing of any Lawes and generall Ordinances but without the concurrence of King and Commons this of it self is of no use They are likewise an high Court of Iudicatory in respect of particular causes orderly brought before them having Iurisdiction in many though not in all Cases In criminall causes concerning life and member I think they have not Iurisdiction without the Kings speciall Commission and therefore they cannot attaint any man for treason murder or felony They are not only a Court of Iustice but of Record they may take a recognizance and by the Kings Writ or Commission may reverse for errour the Iudgements given in any of the ordinary Courts But all these powers as likewise their Baronies by reason of which they have place and vote in Parliament are immediately and meerely derived from the Crowne the fountaine of all honour and jurisdiction and they doe so necessarily depend upon the King in matters of Iudicatory as that in iudgement of law they speak ove bouch le Roy mesme Thus much concerning the Lords and Commons apart from the King The King alone he is Capitalis Angliae Iusticiarius the fountaine of all Iurisdiction and above all other Iurisdictions Britton speaking in the person of King E. 1. nous volousque nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions in nostre royalme By the law of Nations and by the very end of Regall power the King is to iudge the people 1 Sam. cap. 8. Give us a King to judge us vers. 20. We will have a King over us that we also may be as the Nations and that our King may judge us Bracton tels us That the King alone if he could suffice ought to judge the people and that by his Oath he is bound thereunto And as the ordinary iuridicall power is supreme and originally in the King so likewise is the legislative it being a principall end of Regall authority dare jus populo which power was in Kings by the law of nature while they governed the people by naturall Equity long before either municipall lawes or Parliaments had a being Before Moses there were no standing municipall lawes or at least not before Pharoneus long before which there were Kings of Sâ—itâ—â—â— Assyria Egypt c. who according to naturall Equity gave law unto their people Rhemo cum fratre Quirinuâ— jura dabat Hoc Priami gâ—stamen erat â—um jura vocatiâ— Mâ—râ— dâ—ret populâ—â— But their lawes they so gave ought to bee agreeable to naturall Equity aiming no lesse at the good of the people then of themselves Such conditions and limitations as are agreeable to naturall Equity Kings by the divine institution were bound to observe and some by their voluntary Oaths for themselves and their successours many times bound themselves to more strict limits then were absolutely requisite yet being agreeable to Equity and consistent with Royalty ought to be observed And thenâ—e it is according to the severall degrees that the latitude of naturall Equity doth admit in giving lawes that some Kings are more strictly limiâ—ed then others and according to the oaths and promises made by the King of this Realme they can neither give nor repeale any law but â—ith the assent of the Peeres and people The Observaâ—or doth not deny the Legislative power to bee in the King but saith he partly in the King partly in the Kingdom which I shall admit to be true in this sence viz. that the Legislative power is not so in the King onely as that he being sole can either in ordinary or extraordinary cases make or alter any Law for thereunto is necessarily required the assent both of Lords and Commons But yet to speak properly the Legislative power is solely in the King although not in the King being sole Rex solus legislator non si solus the assent of
let but that they may reigne as arbitrary Lords possible I say it is that some Members in a Committee may thus make themselves Lordly Tyrants and theâ— too late will the people wish to have kept under a King though hee should have proved â— Tyrant for so there might have beene some end of their miseries Many Tyrants have againe changed into worthy Kings or if that hope should delude their expectations yet his death would ere long make place for a successor who probably may prove a milder Lord but a tyrannizing community will be an immortall slavery I daâ—e not say this is now aymed at by any yet I could wish men would waâ—ily consider circumstances and well weigh with themselves whether our Observators principles doe not make way for some such end which the wisdome of Parliament cannot but deterre and I hope will ever present Hee gives an absolute arbitrary power to such as shall by what meanes soever make themselves a major part in the Houses neither Statutes nor presidents shall be binding unto them all oaths and tyes of Allegiance unto their King must cease if they Vote their Soveraigne bee their danger and yet forâ—ooth they are obliged by Iustice and honour not to doe wrong to King nor kingdome that is all the security this observator will allow for our Religion lives â—â—â—â—erties and yet what applause and approbation hath his despâ—rate principles received amongst many of us as if they all tended to a glorious freedome O that men would wisely consider what enemies they are unto themselves who blindly hinting after the name of libertie overtorne and destroy their ancient secâ—â—ities T is not prerogative that is now contending with the Subiects libertie but liberâ—ie struggles with Othlocracie the established protestant Religion with scisme and heresie whether learning Law the flower of Nobility the best and choyce of the commonalty may live anâ— not be destroyed is the question An Act of oblivion wherein all unhappy differenceâ— and contentions may lye forever buried hath once and againe bin offered and refused Soâ—â— mens debts and necessities must be satisfied out of the skinns of those they call malignantâ— Are not all such as meddle with the Commission of Array or assist and stand by his Majestie in this opposition declared by those whose well meaning integritie his Majestie supposeth to be abused by some few malignant spirits to be wicked and traiterous enemies to the State Is it not agâ—ine required that all who are or shall be voted Delinquents be delivered up to the Iustice as they call it of Parliament will they be content to be tried oâ— both sides by the kingdome representing it selfe in a second Parliament No saith the Observator that were to exceed in infinitum Will they then allow the King to be an essentiall part of this Parliament or if not will they remove this Parliament to any other placâ— but London that so all the members may freely resort unto it and deliver their conscienceâ— without being posted or prescribed or torne in peeces by a rabble of people that shall requirâ—â— their names They see no reason for that What remaines then but that themselves be justified by themselves and all that dissent from them be at their mercy or destruction And do not three parts of foure of the Nobility dissent from them Are not neer an equall part of the Commons house dis-inclined to these proceedings If you intermingle the Lords and Commons elected are they not opposed with equall number Besides the King and his Royall Line to turne the State survey the kingdome are not the most and most learned of the Divines against them Are not the most and most learned in the professions of Canoâ— and Common law disapproving their proceedings will they in that propertie fals within the cognizance of Iudges as the legalitie or illegalitie of the Commission of Array be directed by the Iudges and Serjeants for such purposes attending in the house of Lords On which side stands the visible major part of those Seminaries of learning the Vniversities and Innes of Court which way are the most of the Gentrie and such of the Commonaltie whose education or nature gives them abilities to discerne further into things then other men Must these be all turned out of the Kings protection to be at pleasure destroyed Must the Militia be delivered up that so the King may be disabled to give them and such as shall hereafter finding themselves abused returne unto their Soveraigne a due and just protection because those that demand the disposall of it have found a meanes to betray a multitude unto their cause amongst whom and on whose side all the Anabaptists Brownists Familists and Non-conformists are to be found even to a man and yet besides them I verily beleeve there are very many able honest and well minded men as likewise many right noble Lords and Members in the House of Commons most heartily desiring the good of their Countrey whose innocence and noble disposition making them unapt to suspect a foule face of treachery to be masked under the pretence of libertie subjects them to the deceipts and hypocrisie of some few furious deformers who as they want not art to abuse the integritie of many good subjects so have they many other meanes and inducements to make their cause suitable with the common sort of men They adorne it with assuming but unjustly the glorious name of Parliament with the very tyâ—le of Reformation they so tickle up the crasie minds of the multitude who ever are in dislike with what is present and beleeve much vertue to be in that which they never tryed that to witnesse their affections and forwardnesse in such a cause they will be content to charge and overcharge themselves and some of them to hazard their owne lives rather then as they are perswaded to live like vassals under a tyrannizing Prince or Popish superstition and these slanders of an intention to bring in Popery and superstition and arbitrary rule with such other falsities are ever made the Triarian Legion in which they put their last and chiefest strength were in soundnesse of reason that did support their cause it would not prevaile chiefely where least abilitie of judgement is But as which the simpler sort ever jealous over the intents and purposes of wiser men imaginary feares and slanders are the aptest meanes to prevaile So in others ambition and selfe conceipt meeting with an unquiet and factious spirit is that which I am perswaded hath given the greatest furtherance unto this unhappie cause Let every man enter into his owne heart and aske himselfe what it is that he particular wants what point of libertie his Ancestors ever had which hee now hath not or may not have granted by the King Let him aske himselfe whether more be not granted then ever our Forefathers had and whether it be not as well Nay better secured unto us then ever any liberty was unto them Why then
when they will and then if the King hath any suit depending in the Common Pleas and finds some of the Iudges inclyning against him they may be held under a fained accusation of Treason till the others have given judgement for the king Surely though the Parliament be a superiour Court yet have the ordinary Courts as firme a foundation as that can have and are more necessary for the people and yet without question upon such pretence no judge may claime a priviledge from arrest in Case of Treason If wee consult with our Law bookes they tell us that the priviledge of Parliament doth not extend to Treason nor yet breach of the peace nor yet as I thinke against the kings debt for the reason and ground of priviledge is because the king hath an Interest in the members to have their advice therefore no subject may arrest them for his debt But that cannot give them priviledge against the king himselfe Vidâ— Dyer 59. 60. Every Burgasse hath priviledge quant larrest nest forsque al suite dun Subject 2 8. 4. 8. b. per Danby Dyer 275. Crompton 8. b. 9. 10. 11 Elsmâ—re Postnati 20. 21. Now whereas the observator saith that this priviledge is Claymed in case of suspition onely and when leave may be had and when competent accusers appeare not This overthrowes the reasons given by the Houses and is not in it selfe satisfactory For thâ—e Attorney Generall in the most competent accuser and the accusation was of downe-right High Treason not onely of suspition and yet upon probable suspition the accused ought to be imprisoned I must therefore intreat the observator in this particular for that it hath beene a cause of so great combustion and taking up of armes within this Kingdome to give me a more full satisfaction There remaines one other scruple wherewith I am perplexed and it ariseth for their voting the Commissions of Array to be illegall whether they deny the power it selfe or onely dislike the â—orme of this present Commision is uncertaine Now as concerning the first it seemes to me that posse regni or the power over the Militia muster array c. is by the fundamentall Law inmovably setled in the Crowne or rather the Crowne setled on it â— being such an individuall right of the Crowne as if a King without it is in truth nothing Opâ—rtet saith Glanvill regiam potestatem armis esse decoratam Jn rege saith Bracto qui recteregit necessaria sunt hac duo arma viz et leges and the Statute maâ—e Elâ—â—ven Henry the Seaventh Cap 1. tells us that by duty of All glance the Subjects are bound to serve their Sovereigne Lord for the time being in his warres fâ—r dâ—fâ—nce of him and the Land against every Robellion power and miget reared agâ—inst â—im And with him to enter and abide in service in battailâ— if the case so require c. And another Statute 4. 5. Phil. Mary Cap 3 Shewes that the Kiâ—gs of his Realm have ever used to muster their Subjects and to Levy a number of them for servâ—ce in waâ—res And so those Reverend Iudges Hutton and Crooke arguing for the Sâ—â—ject in Case of Shipmoney acknowledge the mustering and arraying of the Subjects by Commissions to be undoubted right of the Crowne Hutton fol 39. That there have beene Commissions of Array and provision for Armes and for preparing Armour according to the variety of times for training and disciplining of Souldiers to be prepared for defence c. That this hath beene in use no man can or ever could deny But the armes where-with they were charged were still their owne proper goods And doth not the whole frame of Government of the Realme depend and ever hath done upon Commissions granted by the King to Shereiffs and Iustices of peace whiâ—h are in substance the same with this 12. Hen 7. 17. tels us that at first all administration of Iustice was in the Crowne till people multiplying Shereiffs were deputed under whom are all to be ready for defence of the Realme when enemies come And the Sherifâ—e is to attend the King in time of warre and shall cause the people to goe with the King for the defence of the Realme against enemies and now by all this it appeares that it is the kings right to discipline and array the souldierâ— and to dispose of the strength of the Realme And that this power is inseperable from him even an act of Parliament if it would disable the king tâ— defend the kingdom is voyd being agâ—inst Law and reason Cookâ—s Argument 56. But you saâ— that the Parliâ—ment â—esires no â—em vall of that power which was in the King but that which was in such or such a substituâ—e But whether they desire it or no they have by thâ—i ordinance of Militia taken away that power which was in the King unlesse we shall thinke those to be his substitutes that take it against his wiâ—l and hold it and imploy it against him Againe you tell us it is but for a time disposed of by a tâ—mporary Ordinanc and not absolâ—tely and for ever takâ—n from the King and seeing thâ—y deâ—â—red it not for the present occasion why shâ—uld the King dâ—ny it Should a good fellow desire the observators wiâ—e fâ—r the present occasion I doubt he would not be so kind hearted as to grant it And surely there bee some kinde of things that are not to be departed with though for a day Semiramis desired of her husband king Ninus that he would grant unto her the sovereigne power for five dayes as Diodorus Siculus or as Plutarch reporteth but for one day which being granted her she in that place caused her husband to be slaine and ever after ruled as Queene I hope no body is so wicked as to imagine any such vile intention and yet this story may well shew how a king is no more himselfe iâ— he but for a day depart from his individuall right And such it appeares by his right to the Militia of the Realme and therefore the Commission of Array is in substance undeniably good But then whether the forme of the Commission be legall I can see as little reason to doubt seeing it is for substance and forme both by a very act of Parliament now in force and by his Majesties Ceclararation cleared from all colour of objection So that in mine owne understanding it seemes unquestionable both for matter and forme You will say neverthelesse that I ought to submit my understanding and implicity beleeve it illegall because so voted But this sound somewhat harsh that we should be bound to submit to such votes against an Act of Parliament upon record vnlesse you can assure me that they are proper â—udges against the king and all such as discent from them wheather it be an Act of Parliament or not And if they are yet I pray satisfie mee concerning the manner of their proceedings why was it so hastily determined being a question of that weight and which required a perusall of many ancient Statutes and Records Why were none of the Iudges nor Sarjeants advised within such a quâ—stion of legalitie or illegalitie The Commission is in Latine and old legall Latine are all the members that voted against it able to give the Grammer Construction of it But above all why was it voted without so much as hearing the King or his Counsell to speake in his cause before it were condemned You know what the Poet saith Qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera aequum licet statuerit haud aequus futi I spare to load the Observator with any more doubts concerning their past votes the good Consequences whereof and of other concomitant proceedings I doe much feare If the observator shall give me but probable hope of the good event of things and satisfy my doubt in these perticulars I shall with cheerefulnesse ever after pay an humble obedience unto all such votes and proceedings and shall from thenceforth acknowledge my selfe for his industry in setling and satisfying my yet unsatisfied Conscience to be much indebted unto him Meane while I bid him heartily farewell FINIS Decl of the Lo Com of the 2 of Novemb. Luciâ—â— Sâ—â—mâ— 158. 1. H. 74. 6. Plow Com. 238. 244. Camb. Britan. 163. The King hath Soveraign power hee acknowledgeth no superiour but God alone See Sir Tho. Smith de Rep. Ang. li 2. cap. 4. 5. Rep. so 86. de Iure regis Eccl. siastico Rodin de Rep. cap 8. 7 Rep. 12 13. Câ—lv Case Prov. 11. Livy Gen. 14. â—â—od 32. Sir W. Rawley l. 2. Hist. Mund. Sozomen li 6. Seneca Stamford Preface Cokes Instiâ— 2 part pag. 379. â— H. 7. 20. Stamf. 72. 12 H. 7. 17. Mirror of Iustice Bracton lib. 3. fol. 107. Fortescue cap. â—â— 13. â— Rep. Calâ—ins â—ase 13. Virg Davis rep. Rex Angliae est monarcha Imperator in regno suo Cassaneus in catol. glor. mundi Rex Angliae est absolutus Monarcha in regno suo Vide Crompt Juâ—iâ—d 108. Modiâ— tenendi Parliament Page 1. Page 4. Bodin de Reput l. 2. cap. 5. Vide Cambd. Eliz. pa. 118. accord Page 45. Elsmere postnati 99. 33. H. 8. ca. 1. 28. H. 8. c. 19. Davis Rep. 25. Eccles. 8. vâ— 8. Bracton l. 5 tract. 3. c. 3. li. 1. cap. 8. Wâ—sd 6. pag. 45. Arist. Eth. 18. Cap. 10 Plato in Bolitico His Majesties Answer to the 19. propositions Huttons Argument against Ship mony p. 33 page 34. Deâ—lar Maii 27 concerning the Stat. of E. 1.
are wee not happie and contented as they were Surely wee shall finde no other cause of our present misery but that unquiet spirit within our selves were wee not possessed with this unquiet spirit strong in its illusions vaine and ridiculous feares could not have so far prevailed with us Who to affright the world hath invented day by day those many plotts of Treason which experience hath assured us to bee all but vaine or wickedly invented What is it that carries on with fury and madnesse those disturbers of Church and State the Brownist the Anabaptist and those of the Family Is not this unquiet spirit that rages within their owne breasts This is that spirit with which some seditious preachers being themselves professed labour to infuse the same into their ignorant auditory with this seditious spirit some members finding themselves to have beene hurried on to the hazard of their lives and fortunes indeavour as much as they can to draw others into the same danger hoping thereby to make the multitude of offenders a refuge and safe guard for their owne offences It is the desperate fury of this bloud-thirstie spirit that rejects all tearmes of Accommodation The way of peace it will not know O most unhappie England Thou that for happinesse stoodest so lately in the envie of all Europe shalt now through the raging fury of this infernall spirit lye weltring in thine owne bloud Dead Carcasses shall be strowen up and downe thy streets the Father devided against his owne bowels brother against brother like the Children of Sadmus each slaying and imbruing their hands in the others bloud In this violent storme of intestine Warre who can promise to himselfe security of his fortunes family or life in it selfe Shall not we bee all split upon the rocks of selfe division or overwhelmed with the stormy wind of forraigne invasion unlesse with timely resistance wee either cast out or destroy this unquiet spirit Let us not deludâ— our selves with imaginations that to give way to its fury will be the shortest way to end our misery Consider those that are in opposition to it Consider the justnesse of their cause and you will not exact that they while there runnes but one drop of bloud in their vâ—ines should yeeld themselves to be trampled on by the fury of their insulting adversaries betraying their Religion and Liberty to the destroying Anabaptist or when they shall bee overborne and destroyed doe you that shall survive them expect to enjoy a calme after so bloudy a Tempest will there not arise dissentions amongst your selves You doe not all surely conspire the same end who neverthelesse infected by some few malignant spirits are united in opposition to your Soveraigne of many of you I cannot but say O quam honesta voluntate miseriâ—stis Yet are there not Anabaptists Brownists and other Sectaries abounding amongst you and do not each ayme at the establishing of his owne Sect Against all which you that are truely Protestants must oppose your selves and so must ingage your selves in a second war as bloudy as the former unlesse you will comply and suffâ—r your selves to be carried on beyond your proposed ends of reformation which is an effect that often befalls well-minding reformers when they at empt it by tumultuous force by some furie amongst them to bee forced on beyond their ayme and intended scope These and many other miseries will assuredly encountâ—r with you unlesse God shall please timely to unite the hearts of the King and His Parliament to the confusion of those sâ—ismaticall and seditious spirits who hope by abusing the good intentions of thâ—se â—onourable Houses to establish their designâ—s in the destrâ—ction of the Common-wealth If any harsh expressions have fallen from me in this discourse I desire they may bee applyed against the destroying pests and onely against them If in the matter which the Observator hath given occasion to treate of I have through error too strictly limitted the Royall power or in ought derogated from the right and auâ—hority of the houses of Parliament I shall be most sorry for such my mistake and be ready to retract the same upon the first intimation It was necessary if I would say any thing against the Observator that I should insist upon the actions of the major part of the House in which whatsoever hath beene said is by way of proposall of my doubts rather than dogmatizing any conclusions and that the observator may not from hâ—nce have any occasion further to debate and bandy the principles of Government which ought to remaine sacred and untouched I shall abstract from thence in way of recapitulation such doubts as without examining the cause and origen of Regall and Parliamentary power being well satisfied will much settle my now scrupulous mind and will I thinke goe farre in satisfaction of many others They arise from consideration of the meanes used in composing the House of Commons of the proceedings and Acts of the Houses so composed or from the consequences a and effects that from those acts and proceedings are likely to ensue His Majestie objects that in the determination of elections no other rule was observed then affection to the persons with reverence to their opinions for the abolition and destruction of Ecclesiasticall government c. witnesse the excelling at one clap a great number of persons fairely elected upon pretence of having had their hand in some Monopoly against whom to this day they never have proceeded whereby they might bee restored if innocent or if faultie others might be elected in their roomes to serve for the Counâ—ry And yet they continue among them some that are notoriously knowne to be promoters of Monopolies because their opinions are such as doe well please them This objection and many others in that Declaration concerning the determination of elections doth and will somewhat stagger me untill the observator shall furnish me with a sufficient answer Again I desire to be instructed whether it be but a calumny raised against some worthy Members that by their meanes and countenance terror and force should be used to amate the courage of some members who would not otherwise comply with their opinions whether nippie reprehensions and sometimes imprisonment and other punishments were not rigorously used towards such as did not run with the happie vote of the prime and worthy members whereas others combined for alteration did and might take a libertie to say and propose even what they pleased themselves If there be a truth in these objections it will be to little purpose to dispute what is the power of the Houses of Parliament fairely chosen and freely voâ—ing Concerning their arts and proceedings I am unsatisfied by the Observator whether the Commons alone may make binding Ordinances even out of the case of necessity Jf not how shall I defend their imposing the Protestation upon all the kingdome by a Declaration that what person soever shall not take it is unfit to beare office in