Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n
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A87129
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Aphorisms political. By James Harrington.
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Harrington, James, 1611-1677.
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1659
(1659)
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Wing H804; Thomason E995_8; ESTC R202590
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4,480
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11
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Law from England and if England have an Army there her hold consisteth not in the Union but in the force XLVIII If a Country be very small and not able to subsist of it self as Wales it may be safely united and held but the advantage that Wales hath in participation of all Magistracies and Offices is not that which England is able to afford unto such a Country as Scotland without subjecting her neck under the yoak XLIX The order of a Commonwealth requireth that it consist first of a Civil secondly of a Religious thirdly of a Military and fourthly of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations appertaineth unto the last part and in the formation of a Commonwealth to begin with that first which is naturally last is to invert the order and by Consequence the Commonwealth which indeed is nothing but order L. Where there can be any other Government there can be no Commonwealth LI. Where there can be a Commonwealth what tumults soever there happen and which soever prevail there can be no other Government that is to say without forraign invasion which throughout I must be understood to except LXII If Sir George Booth had prevailed he must either have introduced a Commonwealth or have restored a King LIII If a King were restored he must either govern by an Army or by Parliaments LIV. A King governing now in England by an Army would for the same Causes finde the same effects with the late Protector LV. A King governing now in England by Parliaments would finde the Nobility of no effect at all LVI A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all is a meer popular Council LVII A meer popular Council will never receive Law from a King XVIII A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King becometh thereby a Democracy or equal Commonwealth or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form LIX A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form must consist especially of such an Assembly the result whereof can go upon no interest whatsoever but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people LX. An Assembly consisting of a few may go upon the interest of one man as a King or upon the interest of one party as that of Divines Lawyers and the like or the interest of themselves and the perpetuation of their Government LXI The popular Assembly in a Commonwealth may consist of too few but can never consist of too many LXII If the popular Assembly consist of so few and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth LXIII If the popular Assembly consist of so many and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate there must be a Senate to help this defect LXIV The Reason of the Senate is that a popular Assembly rightly constituted is not capable of any prudent debate LXV The Reason of the popular Assembly is that a Senate rightly constituted for debate must consist of so few and eminent persons that if they have the result too they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people but according to the interest of themselves LXVI The Senate and the popular Assembly being once rightly constituted the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self LXVII The Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati in that they were prayed to go apart and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth to propose as they thought good unto the great Council and from thence first arose the Senate of Venice to this day called the Pregati and the Great Council that is the Senate and the popular Assembly of Venice and from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Com-wealth LXVIII The popular Assembly of Venice at this day consisteth of about two thousand the popular Assemblies in the Province onely of Holland consist of about five hundred by which I guess that in all the united Provinces they may amount unto about three thousand in Switz they come unto a far greater number and all or the most of these are perpetually extant LXIX If a popular Assembly consisting of eleven hundred or a thousand may be so framed in England as to be sufficient to preserve the interest of the people such an Assembly of so few in a Territory of so large an extent will be altogether new in the world and without any example LXX That a people of themselves should have such understanding as when they of Venice did institute their Pregati or Senate is rare LXXI That a Senate or Council of Governours having supreme power should institute a popular Assembly and propose to it though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable is that wich is rarer LXXII Where such Elections are proposed unto the people as being made accordingly must needs produce a well-ordered Commonwealth and the people who never stick at such work elect accordingly there not the Proposers of any power in them but the people by their peculiar and natural right and power do institute and ordain their whole Common-wealth LXXIII An Assembly of men being all Assemblies are naturally void of invention is not capable of inventing any perfect Model or Method of Government LXXIV The wisest Assemblies through this necessity have in the Formation or Reformation of their Governments still pitched upon some one man LXXV It is not below the dignity of any Assembly but according unto the practice of a good Commonwealth to admit of any man that is able to propose to them LXXVI One mans reason is as another mans judgment yet is it in Art to say things which will do themselves at least it is lawful for any man to appeal unto Event and so do I in these Aphorisms Aug. 25. 1659. FINIS