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A45610 Aphorisms political by James Harrington. Harrington, James, 1611-1677. 1659 (1659) Wing H805; ESTC R335 8,287 21

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but tendeth as we have seen both in Holland and Switz towards Division In the third way the Commonwealth uniting other Commonwealths retaineth unto her self the leading of the whole League leaving unto each of the rest her own Laws and her own Liberty XLVIII Till a Commonwealth be first framed how such a Commonwealth should make an effectual Union with another Nation is not possible to be seen XLIX The new unpractised and heretofore unheard-of Union as it is vulgarly spoken with Scotland by uniting Deputies of divers Nations not in a Council apart or by way of States General as in the United Provinces but in the standding Councils of some one Commonwealth in the League is destructive to Liberty both in England and in Scotland L. If the Commonwealth of England receive Deputies from Scotland in a greater number then that of her own she receiveth Law from a forraign Interest and so loseth her own Liberty LI. If Scotland be received in an equal number it obstructeth the freedom of both or occasioneth War or Dissention LII If Scotland be received in an inferiour number she receiveth Law from England and so loseth her Liberty The like is understood of Ireland LIII Whereas a well-ordered Commonwealth should give the Balance to her Confederates and not receive it from them The Councils in which divers others are thus united though in a far inferiour number of Deputies yet if these lie in wait or lay their heads together may be over-ruled obstructed or over-balanced by forraign interests LIV. VVhere Countries are divers in their Laws and yet are to receive Laws one from the other neither the Common-wealth giving Law knoweth what to give nor the Common-wealth receiving Law understandeth what she receiveth in which case the Union returneth unto Force or Confufion LV The best way of holding a Nation different or not different in Laws is the Roman that is by way of Province LVI A Province especially if she have strong holds may by defraying of a small guard be kept unto a just League and for the rest enjoy her own Laws her own Governmeut and her perfect Liberty other wayes of Union will be found more chargeable and less effectual on both sides for if England have no Army in Scotland Scotland will receive no Law from England and if England have an Army there her hold consisteth not in the Union but in the Force The like is to be understood of Ireland LVII If a Country be very small and not able to subsist of it self as Wales it may be safely united and held but the advantage that Wales hath in participation of all Magistracies and Offices is not that which England is able to afford unto such a Country as Scotland without subjecting her neck unto the yoke LVIII The order of a Commonwealth requireth that it consist first of a Civil secondly of a Religious thirdly of a Military and fourthly of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations appertaineth unto the last part and in the formation of a Commonwealth to begin with that first which is naturally last is to invert the order and by Consequence the Commonwealth which indeed is nothing but order LIX Where there can be any other Government there can be no Commonwealth LX Where there can be a Commonwealth what tumults soever there happen and which soever prevail there can be no other Government that is to say without forraign invasion which throughout I must be understood to except LXI If Sir George Booth had prevailed he must either have introduced a Commonwealth or have restored a King LXII If a King were restored he must either govern by an Army or by Parliaments LXIII A King governing now in England by an Army would for the same Causes finde the same effects with the late Protector LXIV A King governing now in England by Parliaments would finde the Nobility of no effect at all LXV A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all is a meer popular Council LXVI A meer popular Council will never receive Law from a King LXVII A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King becometh thereby a Democracy or equal Commonwealth or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form LXVIII A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form must consist especially of such an Assembly the result whereof can go upon no interest whatsoever but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people LXIX An Assembly consisting of a few may go upon the interest of one man as a King or upon the interest of one party as that of Divines Lawyers and the like or the interest of themselves and the perpetuation of their Government LXX The popular Assembly in a Commonwealth may consist of too few but can never consist of too many LXXI In every Commonwealth there hath been a popular Assembly This in Israel at the least consisted of twenty four thousand upon a monthly Rotation In Athens Lacedemon Rome it consisted of the whole Citizens that is of all such as had right in the Commonwealth whether they inhabited in City or Country In Venice it consisteth of about two thousand In the Province of Holland onely which containeth eighteen or nineteen Soveraignties the Popular or resolving Assemblies consist at the least of five hundred Persons these in the whole Union may amount unto five or six thousand in Switz I believe they come unto a greater number And the most of these Assemblies have been perpetually extant LXXII If the popular Assembly consist of so few and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth LXXIII If the popular Assembly consist of so many and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate there must be a Senate to help this defect LXXIV The Reason of the Senate is that a popular Assembly rightly constituted is not capable of any prudent debate LXXV The Reason of the popular Assembly is that a Senate rightly constituted for debate must consist of so few and eminent persons that if they have the result too they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people but according to the interest of themselves LXXVI A popular Assembly without a Senate cannot be wise LXXVII A Senate without a popular Assembly will not be honest LXXVIII The Senate and the popular Assembly being once rightly constituted the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self LXXIX The Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati in that they were prayed to go apart and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth to propose as they thought good unto the great Council and from thence first arose the Senate of Venice to this day called the Pregati