necessitate pensata Upon the word Concessa I would gladly be satisfy'd when or by whom that Power was ever granted to the King where shall we find that Grant It is clear that whoever hath the entire Power of making a Law may justly dispense with that Law. And therefore Almighty God being the sole and supream Law-giver might dispense even with the Moral Law as he did with the sixth Commandment when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac and with the eighth Commandment when he commanded the Israelites to borrow the Jewels of the Aegyptians and to go away without restoring of them But it stands not with reason that he who hath but a share with others in the making of a Law as the King hath no more should have the power by himself alone to dispense with the Law unless that power were expresly intrusted with him by the rest of the Law-makers as sometimes hath been done Sir Edward Coke in his seventh Report in the Case of Paenal Statates fol. 36. towards the lower end does affirm that this Dispensing Power is committed to the King By All his Subiects So that it is not claimed Jure Divino but by Grant from the People But where to find any such Grant we know not I have as I conceive made it appear in my larger Argument p. 14. that the first Invention of Dispensations with Laws began by the Pope about the time of Innocent the Third and by our King Henry the Third in imitation and by encouragement from the Pope so that it was not by the Grant of the People but ever exclaimed against by all good men and generally by all the people and ever fenced against by a multitude of Acts of Parliament It is true the Dispensing with Laws hath ever since been practised and they began at first here in England to be used only in Cases where the King alone was concern'd in Statutes made for his own profit wherein he might have done what he pleas'd But it is but of latter times that they have been stretched to Cases that concern the whole Realm See my Argument fol. 13. Hence it evidently appears it cannot be a legal Prerogative in the King for that must ever be by Prescription and restrain'd to those Cases that have been used time immemorial and must not be extended to new Cases Now there hath been no such usage as will warrant the Dispensing with such an Act of Parliament as is now before us that of 25 Car. 2. c. 2. The Chief Justice Herbert from the Definition before recited and those two Authorities of Sir Edward Coke in his Case of Monopolies and that other of Penal Statutes frames an Argument to prove that the Dispensation granted to Sir Edward Hales was good in Law. Because a Dispensation is properly and only in case of a Malum Prohibitum he thence insers that the King can dispense in all Cases of Mala Prohibita Which is a wrong Inference and that which Logicians call Fallacia à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter Because he can dispense with some that therefore he can dispense with all is no good Consequence It appears by the late Chief Justice Vaughan's Reports in the Case of Thomas and Sorrel so often cited by the Chief Justice Vaughan's Rep. fol. 333. the fourth Paragraph that his Opinion is That the King cannot dispense with every Malum Prohibitum and he gives many Instances of such Mala Prohibita that are not dispensable fol. 342 and 334. parag 4. Therefore the Lord Chief Justice Herbert should as I conceive regularly first have given us the distinction of Mala Prohibita into such as are dispensable and such as are not dispensable and then have shewn that the Dispensation granted to Sir Edward Hales fell under the first part but that learned Reporter the chief Justice Vaughan so often cited by our now Lord Chief Justice in the aforesaid Case of Thomas and Sorrell fol. 332. the last Paragraph save one quarrels with the very distinction of Malum Prohibitum and Malum in se and says it is confounding From whence I would observe and from the whole Report in Thomas and and Sorrell's Case that the Notion of Dispensation is as yet but crude and undigested and not fully shaped and formed by the Judges The Pope was the Inventer of it Our Kings have borrowed it from them And the Judges from time to time have nursed and dressed it up and given it countenance And it is still upon the growth and encroaching till it hath almost subverted all Law and made the Regal Power Absolute if not Dissolute I must agree that our Books of late have run much upon a Distinction viz. Where the breach of a Penal Statute is to the particular damage of any person for which such person may have his Action against the Breaker of that Law there tho' it be but Malum Prohibitum yet the King cannot dispense with that Penal Law according to the Rule in Bracton Rex non potest gratiam facere cum injuriâ damno alterius As for instance There are several Statutes that prohibit one man from maintaining another's Suit though in a just Cause See Poulton de pace Regis Regni in his Chapt. of Maintenance fol. 55. Now it is held that the King cannot dispense with those Laws because it would be to the prejudice and damage of that particular person against whom the Suit is so maintain'd by another for there can be no maintenance but it is to the wrong of a particular person So of carrying a Distress out of the Hundred But there are many other Penal Laws where by the transgressing of them no Subject can have any particular damage and therefore no particular Action for the breach of them As upon the Statute that prohibits the Transportation of Wool under a Penalty By the breach of this Law that is by the Exportation of Wool no one particular man hath any damage more than every other man hath but it is only against the Publick Good. And the breach of such a Penal Law is punishable only at the King's Suit by Indictment or Presentment And the like where such a Penal Statute gives an Action Popular to him that will sue for the Penalty who hath no right to it more than any other till his Suit be commenced In these Cases it is commonly held that the King may dispense with such Penal Statutes as to some particular persons and for some limitted time whereof they make the King the sole Judge because as the reason is given in the Chief Justice Vaughan's Reports fol. 344. parag 2. Such offence wrongs none but the King. This is now the common receiv'd Opinion and Distinction And the breach of such kind of Penal Statutes are said to be only the King's damage in his publick capacity as Supream Governour and wronging none but himself Lord Vaugh. Rep. 342. parag 3. But if we will narrowly search into this
1 Hen. 4. num 91. that Judgment against Sir Thomas Haxey was revers'd As for the distinction pag. 30. of a Disability actually incuri'd before the medling in an Office and where the Disability is prevented by the coming of a Dispensation I answer That its being so prevented is but Peticio Principii and a begging of the Question And to this Distinction I have I think fully spoken in the foregoing Argument fol. 40. The late Parliament in making this Act of 25 Car. 2. had no doubt a prospect that probably the Crown would discend upon a Popish Successor and they levelled this Act against the Dangers that might then befal our Religion and Liberties and they thought it a good Security But it is all vanished and come to nothing by occasion of this Judgment in the Case of Sir Edward Hales And that must be justified by a Fiat Justitia As to the Objection that the Chief Justice fancies might have been made against him or advice given him that he should rather have parted with his place than to have given a Judgment so prejudicial to the Religion he professes pag. 33. This I say that for my part I should never have advis'd him to have parted with his Place much less to have given a Judgment against his own Opinion But let his Opinion be what it was yet seeing the clear intention of the Makers of the Law contrary to that his Opinion and knowing the desperate effects and consequences that would follow upon dispensing with that Act for we were upon the brink of destruction by it and taking notice as this Chief Justice and the rest of the Judges needs must that the King had first endeavour'd to have gain'd a Dispensing Power in thismatter from both Houses which was the fair and legal course and that yet that very Parliament which out of too great a compliance with those times had over-look'd so many Grievances and conniv'd at the King 's taking and collecting of the Customs though in truth the Collectors and all that had any hand in the receiving of them incurr'd a Praemunire by it not to mention the ill Artifice used in gaining the Excise yet that Parliament of the King 's boggled at the Dispensing with the Act of 25 Car 2. knowing the mighty Importance of it And though they could not but take notice that so many Judges at once had been remov'd because they could not swallow this Bitter Pill and others brought into their places as might be justly suspected to serve a Turn and the King 's Learned Councel could not at first find out this Prerogative to do his work with till so many ways had been attempted and all proved ineffectual sure in such circumstances it had been Prudence nay the Duty of the Judges to have referr'd the determination of it to a Parliament and the rather because it was to expound a Law newly made and the consequences so dreadful and the intent of the Law-makers so evident And this hath been frequently practis'd by Judges in Cases of far less difficulty and concernment This I have also enlarged upon in my Argument page 26. Object But it might have been a long time before any Parliament had been called Answ. We ought to have Parliaments once a year and oftner if need be and eadem praesumitur esse mens Regis quae Legis and we then stood in great need of a Parliament even for the sake of this very Case And these hasty Judgments are one ill Cause why Parliaments meet no oftner the Work of Parliaments is taking out of their hands by the Judges And it is the Interest of some great Officers that Parliaments should not be called or else be hastily prorogu'd or adjourn'd As to the point of the feigned Action which the Lord Chief Justice seems to justifie I conceive he mistakes the force of the Objection Feigned Actions may be useful but this Action against Sir Edward Hales is suspected not only to have been feigned and brought by Covin between him and his Servant and Friend but it was feignedly and faintly prosecuted and not heartily and stoutly defended Like the practice of common Fencers who play for a Prize they seem to be in good earnest and look very fierce but agree before-hand not to hurt one another Qui cum ita pugnabat tanquam se vincere Nollet Aegre est devictus proditione suâ This solemn Resolution was given upon a few short Arguments at the Bar and without any at the Bench and upon other Reasons as I have heard which were then made use of are now given by the Chief Justice but the Times will not now bear them After all I intend not by this to do the Office of an Accuser nor to charge it as a Crime But as I think my self bound in Duty on the behalf of the whole Nation of my self though a small part and member of it and of my Friends I humbly propose That the Judgment given in Sir Edward Hales his Case may after a due Examination if there be found cause be legally Revers'd by the House of Lords and that Reversal approv'd of and confirm'd by a special Act of Parliament FINIS Declaration Plea. Order The Act of 25 Car. 2. Of the Law in general Of a Dispensation Of this particular Act of 25 Car. 2. Dangers from Papists to the Protestants The Test. Judgment given by Parliament The Pishop of Winchester's Collections Of Law in general Laws made by consent of the People * Grotius de Jure Bell. pacis f. 151. †King James the Firstin his Speech to the Lords and Commons at White-hall 1609. f. 531. 25 H. 8. c. 21. ‖ Leges nulla alia causa nos tenent quam quod judicio populi receptae sunt Ulpian de Lege 32. Tum Demum Leges humanae habent vim suam cum fuerint non modo institutae sed etiam firmatae approbatione Communitatis Sir Wal. Ral. in his Hist. of the World 245. * Fol. 531. Mr. Hooker Fol. 17. Non eget Mauri jaculis nec Arcu The original of Dispensation Instances of Dispensation The Definition of a Dispensation The Original of Dispensation * Marsilius Patavinus in the 14 Cent. of Padua in his Defensor pacis It s Antiquity ‖ Dr. Barrow of the Pope's Supremacy 316. See there the unreasonableness of Dispensations †Anno 1215. Pag. 646 647. Mat. Paris p. 677. * Sir Cotton's Abridgment of the Records of the Tower amongst the Petitions of the Commons 51 E. 3. Numb 62. Dispensations from Rome are said to be the chief Grief Prinn's Second Tome Fol. 504. Ibidem 760. Innocent 4th * Dr. Barrotti in the Pope's Supremacy 31. L. 3. c. 3. sect 10. Fol. 39. * Sir Ed. Coke 2 Inst. 27. No Law or Custom of England can be annul'd but by Act of Parliament Selden's Dissertatio ad Fletam 539. Fol. 775. The King and Parlialiament have the Power of Dispensing The Statute of Dispensation The Preamble No Prescription The time of Limitation in a Writ of Right is limited to the time of R. I. Where the true Power of Dispensing resides 15 R. 2. nu 8. 2 H. 4. nu 26. R. 2. nu 22 17 R. 2. 34. 2 H. 4. nu 63. * Hob. 157. at the lower end It is the Office of Judges to advance Laws made for Religion according to their end tho' the words be short and imperfect †Sir Ro. Cott. Abridg. 1 R. 2. nu 95. 2. Inst. 408. * 39 E. 3. 21. 40 E. 3. 34. Objection * 12 H. 7. 19. Plowden 319 322. * Sir Moor's Reports 239. Warram's Case A Prerogative that tends to the great prejudice of the Subject is not allowable Croke Jac. 385. The same Case * 14 E. 3. c. 7. That by their trusting to tarry in their Office by procurement they are encouraged to do many Oppressions to the People 28 E. 3. c. 7. 42 E. 3. c. 9. 1 R. 2. c. 11 †Sir Cotton's Abr. 18 E. 3. nu 54. Objection Answer * 1 H. 4. c. 6. †11 E. 3. c. 1. 13 H. 7. 8. by Daver 's Letter B. Answer * See 13 H. 7. 8. by Daver's Letter B. Election of Sheriffs by the County Fol. 174 175. 28 E. 1. c. 8. chap. 13. See the Reports of E. 2. in t ' Memoranda Scac ' fo 28. * Sir Rob. Cot. Abr. 18 E. 3. nu 54. See the Stat. of 6 H. 8. c. 18. in the Statutes at large concerning the Under-Sheriff of Bristol 9 H. 5 c. 5. * Palmer's Rep. 451. Dr. Burnet's Hist. of the Rights of Princes 239. K. James in his Promonition to all Christian Monarchs 298. Objection Answer Objection Answer 8 R. 20. Answer Argument Answer Or Tributary L. 1. C. 5. †K. James 1. in his Speech to both Houses 1609 in his Works fol. 533 says the King with his Parliament are absolute in making or forming of any sort of Laws Sir Rawleigh's Hist. of the World fol. 245. ‖ Archbishop Laud too did the like Seld. Dissert 539. Seld. Dissertat ad fletam fol. 537. Pryn's Second Tome fol. 290 292 299. 301 302. 46 E. 3. Rot. Parl. nu 7. 8. Object Estoppel Answ. Object 2. Here is no Estoppel Answ. A Stranger may take the advantage of this Estopp 7 E. 4. 1. Br. Estoppel 163. Knoil Heymor's third Kebk 528. by Chief Justice Hale That a Stranger cannot falsifie a Verdict Rol. Abr. first part 362. Dr. and Stud. 68. à ad fin b. Object 2. Answ. A dependant Action An Action dependant or collateral * Jaques versus Caesar. And Dr. Drury's Ca. 8 R. 142. And Mackaelly's Ca. 9 R. 68. 1 H. 4. c. 6. Pag. 10.
no respect of persons and as before I observ'd from Aristotle is a Mind without Affection Now the nature of a Dispensation is to favour some to set some at liberty from the obligation of the Law and is a kind of praeterition of others leaving them still under the tye and obligation and obnoxious to the Penalty if they transgress Whereas in a well govern'd Kingdom there ought to be Unum pondus and Una Mensura in distributive as well as commutative Justice It was part of the Oath that was taken by King William the First who is commonly stiled the Conquerour that he would Aequo jure Anglos Francos tractare Which Oath favours nothing of a Conquest nor does it run in the stile of a Conquerour And it is the Oath of a Judge at this day That he shall truly serve the King and his People c. That he shall do Right to every Person notwithstanding the King's Letters that is notwithstanding any Non Obstante It is a Maxim in Law Quo modo aliquid Ligatur eo modo dissolvitur Now a Law being made by Consent of all should not be Dissolv'd again but by the like Consent that is by Authority of the King and Parliament who have the Legislature Dr. Willet in his Synopsis Papismi makes a Difference between a Toleration and a Dispensation That of Moses in case of Divorces was a Tolleration A Dispensation says he must be of as high a Nature as the Institution None but the Law-Maker can Dispence with the Law not he that hath but a share in the Legislature And from hence I shall take occasion to assert and shall endeavour to make good my Assertion by Law that the Lawful Power of Dispensing with an Act of Parliament that concerns the Publick is only in the hands of those that have the Legislative Power I confine my self to such Acts only as concern the Publick as the present Act we have now to do with does in a very high degree And therefore I hold that none can Dispence with such a Law but the King and Parliament and such as they entrust with it I shall begin to prove this by an Act of Parliament which is the highest Resolve and Authority in our Law It is in the Preamble of the Act of 25 Hen. 8. c. 21. the Statute of Dispensations and the Preamble of a Statute is Law as well as the enacting part or body of the Law. It is in effect a Declaration of what was Law before at least it shews the Opinion and Judgment of the Law-Makers which is of high Authority It first utterly disowns and renounces the Pope's long usurped Claim and Pretence of Dispensing with any Person within this Realm even in Matters Spiritual tho' by him practis'd for many Years I desire to observe upon this that long usage by an Usurpation gives no lawful Right But I would further observe too that where it hath been long admitted and used it is in such Case reasonable for none but the Supream Court to undertake it and declare against it In the next place this Act of Parliament does affirm That this Realm of England is subject to no Laws but such as have been made and taken by sufferance of the King and his Progenitors and the People of this Realm at their free Liberty by their own Consent to be used amongst them and have bound themselves by long Use and Custom to the observance of them as to the customed and ancient Laws of this Realm Originally establish'd as Laws of the same by the said Sufferance Consents and Customs And none otherwise This shews the Original of our Common Law. This likewise clearly proves that whatever is imposed upon the People without their Consent hath not the Authority of a Law And it cannot be shewn that ever the People did consent to this Power or Practice of Granting Dispensations But it plainly appears that our Acts of Parliament are so far from approving or countenancing of it that they have often fenced against it altho' in vain hitherto And tho' the Usage have been very Ancient as I have shewn yet that gives it no lawful Authority for this Preamble declares those only are Laws binding to the People that have been Originally establish'd as Laws The Word Originally refers no doubt to our very Primitive Institution which is Common Law or at least to a time so ancient as that the Original cannot be traced out nor shewn and then it shall be presum'd to be the Common Law. Now I have I hope clearly evinced that the very first invention and practice of Dispensations by the Bishop of Rome is not time out of mind nor can the Usage of it here by imitation of the Pope reach up to a Prescription in the judgment of our Law nor by the Rules of it For Sir Edward Cook in his first Instit. Fol. 115. treating of a Prescription and the nature of it says That if there be any sufficient proof of Record or Writing to the contrary albeit it exceed the Memory of any Man living yet it is within the Memory of Man in a legal sence it had its Original since the beginning of the Reign of our King Richard the First that is in the time of King John and King Henry the Third But that which makes it much the stronger is that this Declaration of the King and Parliament against such Dispensations and Laws introduc'd without the King and Peoples Consent does conclude with Negative Words viz. and not otherwise and is exclusive of all other that is that nothing is Law without their Consent And this Statute of Dispensations proceeds further to shew where the true and lawful Power of Granting Dispensations is vested in these words viz. It stands with natural Equity and good Reason that in all Laws humane within this Realm the King and both Houses representing the whole State of the Realm have full Power to Dispense and to Authorize some Person to Dispense with those and all other humane Laws of this Realm and the same Laws to abrogate annull amplifie and diminish as it shall be seen unto the King the Nobles and the Commons of the Realm present in Parliament meet and convenient for the Wealth of the Realm and then it does dispose of the Power of Dispensation in Matters Ecclesiastical to the Archbishop of Canterbury some whereof are to be confirm'd by the King and others that may be good without the King 's confirming And altho' the body or enacting part of this Statute extend only to Causes Ecclesiastical yet the Preamble does reach expresly to all humane Laws This Statute of 25th of Henry the Eighth was made in the time of such a King as we all know by reading our Histories stood highly upon his Prerogative and would never have consented to such a Declaration concerning the Power of Dispensing if it had been a special Prerogative in the Crown and had there
So also as the Commons may disagree thereunto at the next Parliament with this Protestation too that this their Assent being indeed a Novelty these are the very words be taken for no example This is granted with abundance of caution and jealousie and proves it is not ancient The Commons do agree to the Power granted to the King for the Moderation of the Statutes touching Provisors in the last Parliament beseeching the King that the same may not license any Cardinal or Stranger to enjoy any Benefice within the Realm It was enacted by the Lords and Commons that Tydeman late Abbot of Beaulew and Elect of Landaf by the Pope's provision should enjoy the same Bishoprick notwithstanding any Act so always as this be taken for no example That the sale of Tin may be at Lostwithiel in Cornwal and shall not continue at Calais Notwithstanding the Council may grant License to Merchants to carry the same Tin to what parts they will as to them shall seem good Here the Power of Dispensing is delegated to the Council Upon the request of the Commons the King promiseth that he will not from thenceforth dispence with the Statute of Provisions to Benefices This implies that the King had practis'd it and we know who began the practice and who taught it to others and this Record shews it was without consent and was a cause of complaint and the King promises to reform it for the future But what signifies a Promise where a Law and an Oath is too weak to secure it this Promise doth not confer a new Right but is to reform an unjust Practice I shall use one Argument more against this exercise of the Power of Dispensing with Acts of Parliament as it hath of late been practis'd and that Argument shall be rais'd from the great Inconvenience and Mischief that will ensue upon it to the Kingdom it may occasion the infrequency of Parliaments by taking much of their power out of their hands Laws are many times made but probationers and temporary to the end that if upon experience of them they be found to be too severe or strict and to sit hard upon any persons that the Parliament at their next meeting may moderate or relax the severity or inconvenience that may arise by them But if there be another way allowed for the doing of this Work there will be the less need of a Parliament and so other Work that requires also their meeting may remain unremedied If we consider how frequently the Parliament ought to meet and and how often they did anciently meet we shall easily be convinc'd that the relaxing of a Law or giving remedy where the Law was upon experience found inconvenient was a work properly belonging unto them and there was no need of resorting to any other help for who should cure or reform a Law if any thing were amiss in it but the Law-makers See the Statute of 6 H. 8. c. 18. the Book of Statutes at large concerning Bristol Our Saxon King Alfred and his Wise Men that is the great Council of the Kingdom ordained that a Parliament twice a Year and oftner in time of Peace should meet in London Thus says that ancient Book stiled The Mirrour of Justices c. 1. sect 3. pag. 10. by 4 E. 3. c. 14. It is accorded that a Parliament shall be holden every Year once or more often if need be this does not abrogate not alter King Alfred's Law. By 36 E. 3. c. 10. many Laws had passed in that Parliament of 36 E. 3. which are there called Articles as anciently our Statutes were drawn into certain Articles and so passed as being Articles of Agreement betwixt the King and his Subjects as I had occasion to observe in the beginning of my Discourse and this Statute of 36 E. 3. provides that for maintenance of the said Articles and Statutes and redress of divers Mischiefs and Grievances which daily happen a Parliament shall be holden every Year as another time was ordained by a Statute referring to the Statute of the Fourth of this King. The Act of 16 Car. 2. c. 1. for repeal of the Triennial Act made 16 Car. 1. in the last Paragraph recites that by the ancient Laws and Statutes of this Realm made in the Reign of King Edward the Third Parliaments are to be held very often and this Act of 16 Car. 2. makes a new provision to the end as the words are there may be a frequent calling assembling and holding of Parliaments once in three Years at the least Now let us enquire what the proper Work of a Parliament is which the said Statute of 36 E. 3. mentions in part viz. for maintenance of the Articles and Statutes and redress of Mischiefs and Grievances that daily happen as that Statute recites Sir Tho. Smith who was principal Secretary of State in his Treatise de Republica Administratione Anglorum L. 2. c. 2. fol. 50 51. says this of the Parliament In Comitiis Parliamentariis posita est omnis augustae Absolutaeque potestat is vis veteres leges jubent esse irritas novas inducunt praesentibus modum constituunt There is the true dispensing power Incerti juris controversias Dirimunt Bracton writes of this High Court Habet Rex Curiam suam in concilio suo in Parliamentis suis ubi terminatoe sunt dubitationes Judiciorum novis injuriis emersis nova constituuntur remedia The Mirrour of Justices c. 1. pag. 9. says that Parliaments were instituted to hear and determine the Complaints of the wrongful Acts of those against whom the Subject otherwise could not have common Justice that is against great and powerful Delinquents Nihil prodest says Bracton Jura concedere nisi sit qui Jura tueatur So that there is need of a frequent resort to be had to the Law-mamakers not only to resolve difficulties of Judgments but to keep the power of Interpretation within its due bounds and the Law hath taken care for frequency of Parliaments Sir Francis Bacon in his Advancement of Learning gives this excellent Advice to Law-makers and to those to whom it belongs to defend the Laws Let not says he Praetorian Courts speaking of Courts of Equity have power to decree against express Statutes under pretence of Equity for says he if this should be permitted a Law interpreter that is a Judge would become a Law-maker and all Matters should depend upon Arbitrament that is upon an Arbitrary Power And Arbitrament would encroach upon and at last swallow up Law. The power of extending or supplying or moderating Laws little differs says he from the power of making them Courts of Equity sometimes under the pretence of mitigating the Rigor of the Laws and such is the Power of Dispensing relax the Strength and Sinews of Laws by drawing all to Arbitraments he was well able to judge of this having been Lord Chancelor And it is his 46th Aphorism That is the best Law which gives the least
now mentioned It is but an Opinion against a Solemn Resolution of all the twelve Judges I find that some who had transgress'd that Act of 23 H. 6. and had continued above one Year in that Office of Sheriff soon after the making of that Act did not think themselves secure against the Penalty of that Act by any Non obstante from the King but procur'd an Act of Parliament to indempnifie them for what they had done for by another Act made the 28th of the same King Henry the Sixth it is ordain'd that the Sheriffs for the Year then last past should be quit and discharged against the King and his People of the Penalties of the 200 l. which they incurr'd by the Statute of 23 H. 6. by Exercising the Office of Sheriff longer than a Year from the day next after the day of all All-Souls on which day by the Statute a new Election was to have been made I have one great Authority more and that is of an Act of Parliament too which in my judgment clearly proves against this Resolution of the twelve Judges in the time of 2 H. 7. that the King had no such Prerogative to dispence with the Sheriff's continuing in his Office longer then a Year But that the only dispensing Power was in the King and Parliament as I have affirm'd and in the King when any Special Act of Parliament shall for a time limitted enable him so to dispence And it is an Act in the time of a wise and powerful King who would not lose his Prerogative where he had right to it It is the Statute of 9 H. 5. c. 5. in the Statutes at large this Statute recites the Statute of 14 E. 3. whereby it was ordain'd that no Sheriff should continue in his Office above a Year And it recites further that whereas at the making of that Statute there were divers valiant and sufficient persons I suppose it is ill translated valiant and it should have been men of value in every County of England to exercise the said Office well towards the King and his People But by reason of divers Pestilences within the Realm and Wars without the Realm there was not now such sufficiency of such persons It is therefore ordained that the King by Authority of this Parliament of 9 H. 5. may make the Sheriffs through the Realm at his will until the end of four Years notwithstanding the said Statute made 14 E. 3. or any other Statute or Ordinance made to the contrary Here the King is entrusted with the Power and that but for a short time in the very Case of continuing Sheriffs in their Offices longer than a Year and that in a case of great and absolute necessity and this by a Special Act of Parliament which plainly shews he could not do it by any Prerogative he had of dispensing for then he would never have taken it under an Act of Parliament What ground therefore the Judges had in the second Year of Henry the Seventh to adjudge it to be a Prerogative in that King I cannot see and that Resolution is the leading Case to all the Opinions that have been delivered in the Point since that time and the Opinions still justifie themselves by that one first Resolve and cite that for their great Authority That Opinion seems to be delivered upon a sudden Question put to the Judges by the King's Council not argued nor deliberated on nor upon any Case that came Judicially before them and the Judges there take notice only of two ancient Statutes viz. 28 E. 3. c. 7. 42 E. 3. c. 9. both which barely forbid the Sheriffs to continue longer than a Year in their Office but no Penalty is imposed and the Earl of Northumberland's Case had a Non Obstante in it only to these two Statutes as appears by the Abridgement of that Case by Patent's Case 109. So that they did but ad pauca respicere de facili pronunciare But they do not take the least notice of the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. which makes the disability nor do the Judges in that Case give that reason for their Judgment as Sir E. C. hath since found out to justifie it viz. His Prerogative inseparable c. Something may be observed from the time when that strange Resolution pass'd Judicis Officium est ut res ita tempora rerum querere It was in 2 Henry the Seventh in the beginning of the Reign of that King who stood high upon his Title and Power if we may believe a late Historian Mr. Buck. in his History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third who in his Second Book fol. 54. discourses likewise of King Henry the Seventh and his Title to the Crown says of him That he seemed to wave all other Titles and stuck to that of his Sword and Conquest and at his Coronation he caused Proclamation to be made with these Titles Henricus Rex Anglioe Jure divino Jure humano June belli c. Which yet the Barons could not agree to tho' the King peremptorily avowed he might justly assume it having as a Conquerour entred the Land fought for the Crown and won it The Barons answered says the Historian as peremptorily That he was beholding to them both for his Landing and Victory But the more they opposed it the more he insisted upon it Now that King that made his Title by Conquest might carve out to himself what Prerogatives he pleased And who durst dispute it with him And this probably might have some influence upon that Resolution of the Judges being so early after his Claim viz. 2 H. 7. But I find Sir E Coke a Chief Justice of great Learning and of as great Integrity taking up the same Opinion It is in the Reports that go by the Name of Sir Coke's 12 Rep. fol. 18. No Act says he can bind the King from any Prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his Person but that he may dispense with it by a Non Obstante as a Soveraign Power to Command any of his Subjects to serve him for the Publick-weal and he instances in that of a Sheriff and quotes the Resolution of the Judges of 2 H. 7. and urges that of Judges of Assize that they may go Judges of Assize in the Counties where they were born or did inhabit if the King dispense with it by a special Non Obstante But he gives another instance which I presume none in these days will subscribe to and if he mistook himself in this instance he may be supposed to mistake and err in all the rest Purveyance says he for the King and his Houshold is incident solely and inseparably to the Person of the King And for this Cause the Act of Parliament of Henry the Third de tallagio non concedendo which barrs the King wholly of Purveyance is says he void If this be Law what a Case are the Subjects in that have given a
Recompence by a Revenue of Inheritance in part of the Excise to the King in lieu of Purveyances It is sober Advice given by Learned Grotius in his Book De Jure Belli pacis 82. Let us not says he approve of all things tho' delivered by Authors of greatest Name for they often serve the Times or their Affections and bend the Rules as occasion requires This Resolution of all the Judges in the Second of Henry the Seventh is again cited in Calvin's Case in Sir Coke's Seventh Report and there a Reason is given to justifie that Resolution which is not so much as touch'd upon in the Report itself of 2 H. 7. but it has been studied and found out since that Resolution viz. That an Act cannot barr the King of such Service of his Subject which the Law of Nature did give him And this is the main Reason insisted on in the late Judgment given in Sir Hales's Case as I am informed which is the only Case that I find which came to be argued upon the very point yet it was but lightly spoken to for that of 2 H. 7. which is the first of the kind was not upon a Case that came Judicially before the Judges but was upon a Consultation only with the Judges and without Argument Nor in any other Authorities that I have cited grounded upon that Resolution of 2 H. 7. did the Point directly come in question Judicially And Calvin's Case is the first that I find which offers this special Reason viz. That no Act of Parliament can restrain the King from commanding the Service of his Subject but it is an inseparable Prerogative in the King and as Sir E. C. speaks in his 12 Rep. Tho' an Act makes the King's Patent void and tho' the King be restrained to grant a Non Obstante by the express words of the Act and tho' the Grantee is disabled by the Act to take the Office yet the King says Sir Edward Coke may by his Royal Soveraign Power of Commanding command a man by his Patent to serve him and the Weal-Publick in the Office of Sheriff for Years or for Life And this the King may do for such Causes as he in his Wisdom shall think meet and profitable for himself and the Common-weal of which he himself is solely Judge says Sir E. C. So tho' the King and Parliament have adjudged and declared by a Law such a person or such a sort of persons to be altogether unfit for such a Service or Office. As for Example They have adjudged Papists who own a Forreign Authority and Jurisdiction and who hold Doctrines destructive and contrary to the Religion Established in this Kingdom to be very unfit and uncapable of being entrusted with the maintaining of the Government and the Religion Established by Law in this Kingdom Yet according to late Opinions and Resolutions tho' the King himself by the Advice of his Great Council have so adjudged and declared yet he may do otherwise and he may employ a Papist to defend the Protestant Religion and he is the sole Judge of the fitness of Persons for his Service This is the Discourse this is the Argument and Reason used Will this Reason be allowed of shall the King be the sole Judge of the Persons fit to serve him in all Cases and is it an inseparable Power and Prerogative in the Person of the King I shall put a Case wherein the Judges depart from this Opinion and appear to be of another mind In the Lord Anderson's Reports the 2d Part 118. It is there said If an Office in the King's-Bench or Common-Pleas be void and the placing of the Officer belongs to the King if the King grant it to a person not able to execute it the Grant is void as 't is there held by many of the Justices And there a Case is cited out of 5 E. 4. rot 66. where one Tho. Wynter was placed by the King in the Office of Clerk of the Crown in the King's-Bench The Judges before the King himself did declare him to be Inhabilem ad Officium illud pro commodo Regis populi sui Exercendum and he was laid by and one Roger West at the commendation of the Judges was put in Will any man presume to say the person is unfit when the King who is the sole Judge of the fitness of persons to serve him hath adjudg'd him fit yes the Judges in a Case that concerns the Courts where they sit it seems will controul the King 's own judgment and judge the person inhabilis and hold the Grant void in such case To compare our present Case with this The King and Parliament by a Law have adjudged the Papists unfit to be entrusted with the Government and with the preserving of the Reform'd Religion but says the Judges if the King without the Parliament judge otherwise his judgment shall prevail why not as well in the case of an Office in the Courts at Westminster which does belong to the King to dispose of as in an Office that immediately concerns the Safety of the King and Kingdom and the great concernment of Religion So here is one Command of the Kings set up in opposition to another Command of the King. A Command of the King upon private advice or it may be possible gained from him by surprize by an importunity or an undue solicitation against a serious solemn deliberate Command of the King upon advice with his great Council and with the Consent of the whole Kingdom this is the very Case before us This is against all reason and against the Examples of the greatest wisest and most absolute of Kings and Princes who commanded their Judges to have no regard to any Commands of theirs that were contrary to Law. Vinius the Civilian in his Commentary on the Imperial Institutes fol. 16. gives this Rule Rescripta Principum contra Jus vel utilitatem publicam Elicita à Judicibus improbari etiam ipsorum Imperatorum constitutionibus jubentur Princeps non creditur says he aliquid velle contra utilitatem publicam concedere 21 H. 8. c. 13. sect 10 11 27. Dispensations for Pluralities contrary to Act are declared to be void Hob. 82 149 146 155. The King is never by Law supposed ill affected but abused and deceived for Eadem praesumitur mens Regis quae est Juris Grotius de Jure belli pacis 112 113. Amongst the Persians the King was Supreme yet he took an Oath at his entrance and it was not lawful for him to change certain Laws made after a particular form If the King Establish the Decree and Sign the Writing it may not be changed according to the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not as we read in the Book of Daniel 6 Dan. 8. 12 15. By the Act of 2 E. 3. c. 8. it is accorded and established that it shall not be commanded by the Great Seal nor the little Seal to disturb or
in Hill. 11 Jac. B. R. Dominus Rex and Allen against Tooly in the Second Part of Bulstrode's Reports 186 to 191. in an Information brought upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. for using the Trade of an Upholsterer in which he had not served as an Apprentice Seven Years The Defendant pleaded That he was a Freeman of London and that by the Custom of London a Freeman might use any Trade and he alledged that the Custom was confirmed per Regem in Parliamento It was holden first that there can be no good Act of Parliament without the three Consents viz. Of the King Lords and Commons 2. That tho' divers Acts of Parliament do not specifie these Three Assents but only mention the King as Dominus Rex Statuit and as it is in the Prince's Case Dominus Rex de Communi Concilio Statuit and the like Yet when the Party will Plead he ought to Plead it according to Law and to set forth all the Assents that is of the King Lords and Commons and this was the Opinion of the whole Court. Now Pleading is an exact setting forth of the Truth We are not to raise Arguments from Forms of Speaking but rather from exact Pleading and the Resolutions of Judges And tho' Magna Charta in the stile seems to be spoken by K. H. 3. as by the word concessimus yet the Act of 15 E. 3. c. 1. recites that it was made a Law by the King Lords and Commons and that what is said to be granted was but their former Right Lambert's Archion 267 c. I hear that in speaking to the Case of Sir Edward Hales it was observed that by this Act of 25 Car. 2. there is no incapacity or disability at the first and upon the admission to the Office put upon any Person from taking of an Office but that he is well admitted to it and the Grant is good and that time is given to take the Tests and if by the times given he fail to take them then he is to be disabled and the Grants are to become void but not before Like a Condition subsequent that defeats the Estate which yet was well vested and then before the Grant is defeated and the Party become disabled the King's Dispensation steps in and prevents the Penalty and Disability And herein it was said it differs from the Case of Symony and buying of Offices where the Interest never vested but the Person was first disabled There is indeed a difference but none that is material for it is all one whether the Party be disabled to take or whether having well taken and been well admitted he is afterward disabled to hold and retain by not performing the Condition For when he is first admitted it is sub modo and under a Condition that if he fail to perform what the Law requires his Office shall be void Another Argument as I hear it reported was rais'd from the King 's being a Soveraign Prince and from thence it was inferred that he might dispense with Laws that are Poenal upon necessity whereof he is the sole Judge The ground of this Argument namely That the King is a Soveraign Prince if it serve for the Point in question it may also extend a great way further then to this question we have before us it is hard to limit the extent of it it seems to speak that we must obey without Reserve The word Soveraign is French and in Latin is Supremus id est qui in alios potestatem habet The Correlate whereof is Subditus or a Subject and is attributed frequently to some sorts of Subjects especially to the Heads or Superiours of Religious Orders But among us tho' now frequently used in our humble Addresses to the King or in our reverend mention of him yet we find it very rarely if ever used in our ancient Acts of Parliament or in our Law Books I find no mention of the very word among the many Attributes and Titles ascribed to Kings and Princes in Mr. Selden's Titles of Honour He hath that which is Synonimous as Supream Monarch as it signifies in opposition or in distinction to Princes that are subordinate and feudatory such as Tacitus speaks of that the Romans when their Government was Popular had instrumenta servitutis Reges But properly he is a King that is a Soveraign and hath no Superiour upon Earth According to Martial Rex est qui Regem Maxime non habeat And such we freely and cheerfully acknowledge the King to be and the best and most of his Subjects do swear that he is the only Supream Governour of this Realm and of all other his Dominions as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical as Temporal Causes and that no Foreign Prince hath any Power within this Realm And I wish that all the rest of his Subjects would heartily take this Oath but this among others is that which Sir Hales's Dispensation extends to Yet how from hence it can be argued that the King can dispense with his Laws I do not see I mean Laws of the same nature as that we have now before us Therefore those that used this Argument surely meant the word of Soveraign in another sence viz. Absolute Solutus a legibus It they mean by Soveraign a Prince that is absolute and solutus a legibus and they must understand it so or else I do not see how it is pertinent to the present Argument this is of a mighty Consequence and ought to have been well considered before it had been used I find the word in this sence as I take it propounded in an addition or saving to the Petition of Right 3 Car. 1. viz. Not to infringe Soveraign Power But it was not liked and upon Reasons given at a Conserence those that did propound it were satisfied to lay it aside It may be read in the Memorials of the English Affairs fol. 10. If the word Soveraign be meant in this sence it is oppos'd by all our ancient Authors Judges and others by plain and express Language whose very Writings I have before cited and I will but only touch upon them again Fleta says Superiorem non habet Rex in Regno nisi Deum Legem per Legem factus est Rex This fully expounds the word Sovereign Both Fleta and Bract. and Sir Gilbert Thornton who was Chief Justice in Edw. the First 's time take notice of that Jus Caesareum or Lex Regia as it is called by the Civilians Nec obstat quod dicitur quod Principi placet Legis habet vigorem For it never was received in England but in a restrained sence And with this agrees the ancient Coronation Oath That the King shall hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm which the People have chosen But King H. 8. with his own hand corrected the old Oath to the effect following viz. That he shall hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm not prejudicial
and where it is a collateral Suit not depending upon that Record An Action against the Sheriff for an Escape of one taken in Execution this is a dependant Action and is grounded upon the Record of the Judgment given against the Party that escap'd The Sheriff cannot aver any thing against that Record and examine it over again nor can he take any advantage of Error or erroneous proceeding in obtaining that Judgment Saunders Rep. 2 part 101. So in an Action of Debt grounded upon a Judgment or in an Audita quaerela to be reliev'd upon a Judgment And so in our Case this Action of Debt for the 500 l. is grounded upon the Conviction which must stand for truth as long as it remains in force not avoided by Error or Attaint A Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment is a dependant Action In error the Plaintiff may not averr any thing against the Record Mullens versus Weldy Siderfin's 1st part 94. Error was sued in the Kings-Bench to reverse a Judgment given in the Palace-Court And the Plaintiff in Error assign'd for Error that the Duke of Ormond who is principal Judge of that Court by Patent was not there It was agreed by the Court that it might not be assign'd for Error for it was contrary to the Record But per Cur. in an Action of Trespass or false Imprisonment which says that Report are collateral Actions he may falsifie and assign that if he be taken upon such Judgment So if a man be indicted and convict of an Assault and Battery and afterwards the person so assaulted brings his Action for the Battery this hath no dependance upon the Indictment or Conviction for it may be sued though there were no Indictment but is a distinct and collateral Suit. The Indictment and Verdict is no Estoppel nor can so much as be given in Evidence as is held by the whole Court in the Case of Sampson versus Yardley and Tothill 19 Car. 2. B. R. Kebles's 2 part 384. The like in an Appeal of Murder Kebele's 2 part 223. Another Penalty upon the Offender against this Statute of 25 Car. 2. is That he shall be disabled to sue in any Action Now suppose a person convict at the Assizes sues an Action may not the Defendant in that Action take the advantage of that Disability and plead the Conviction As in Case of an Outlawry pleaded in Disability there need not be set forth all the proceedings in that Suit wherein the Plaintiff was outlawed but he may plead the Record of the Outlawry and rely upon it and it shall not be examin'd whether there was any just cause to sue him to the Outlawry or not The Indictment the Defendant's Plea to it and the Verdict upon it have determin'd the matter of Fact that the Defendant is guilty of the Offence against this Act of Parliament The Act it self hath pronounc'd the Judgment which consists of many particulars one whereof is That the Defendant shall forfest 500 l. to him that will sue for it And the Action of Debt for the 500 l. brought by the Plaintiff grounded upon all these is in the nature of an Execution And all these put together are not several and distinct Suits but in effect all but one Suit and Process one depending upon the other The second Point is Whether the Dispensation pleaded by the Defendant be a good Bar to the Action of Debt And this is properly called The Matter in Law and the great Point of the Case for which I refer the Reader to my Argument at large POSTSCRIPT BEING SOME Animadversions UPON A Book writ by Sir EDW. HERBERT Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas ENTITULED A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Hales's Case SINCE the finishing of my Argument about the Power of Dispensing with Paenal Statutes a Book came to my hands touching the same subject entituled A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Edward Hales his Case written by Sir Edward Herbert Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in vindication of himself And although I am of opinion that the substance of all the Arguments contained in the said Book are fully answered in my aforesaid Discourse yet I hold it necessary to make some Animadversions upon the said Book and to point out readily to the Reader the several Pages of my Discourse wherein the Arguments of the Chief Justice are more directly and particularly treated of and answered And there being great Reverence justly due to a Person that bears so high a Character as also to a Judgment given in that Superiour Court of the King's Bench and by advice of all but two of the rest of the Judges as I now hear some short Apology had need be used for that freedom I have taken to animadvert upon it being as I am but in a private station In short therefore I have not undertaken it out of any vain conceit of my own Abilities but out of a sincere desire to inform such as in the approaching Parliament are like to have this great Case in Judgment before them and some may possibly not be at leisure as I have been to study the Case the matter being of a mighty importance Nor have I entred the Lists upon any contentious humour or taking any advantage of the late Happy Change of publick Affairs I am I thank God more inclin'd to commiserate the Distress that may befal any persons by the change of the times it having been my own case so lately although they differ from me in Judgment or Interest I am very far from insulting over any whatever hard usage I my self have met with Nemo confidat nimiûm secundis Nemo desperet meliora lapsus My Apology is this 1. I was engaged in the Argument before the coming forth of this Book and it happening into my hands before my publishing of my Discourse I could not decline the observing something upon it without being suspected to have given up the Cause 2. The Lord Chief Justice himself hath by his Book given fresh occasion fairly to discuss the point again by declaring that he expects as we all do that it will receive a disquisition in Parliament 3. And as the Chief Justice hath endeavour'd with as much as can be said to give the World satisfaction in the justice and right of the Case to maintain the Judgment given so he is well known to be of that ingenuity and good temper and candour as willing to receive a satisfaction if any further Argument to the contrary may be so happy as to convince him The Chief Justice Herbert pag. 6. gives us the Definition of a Dispensation out of Sir Coke's 11th Report fol. 88. viz. Dispensatio mali prohibiti est de jure Domino Regi concessa propter impossibilitatem praevidendi de omnibus particularibus And again Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxacio utilitate ceu