Bodies although it appears incomprehensible how could we conceive that the Soul could move the Body The Arm for Instance is only moved by means of the dilatation or contraction of some of the Muscles which compose it And that the Motion which the Soul impresses on the Spirits that are in the Brain may be communicated to those in the Nerves and these to others which are in the Muscles of the Arms it 's requisite that the Determinations of the Soul should be multiplied or changed in proportion to the almost infinite Occurrences or Shocks which would be made by the little Bodies which constitute the Spirits But this cannot be conceived without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Wills at the least Motion of the Body since to move it an infinite number of communications of Motions are necessary For the Soul being but a particular Cause and which cannot exactly know either the greatness or number of an infinite Variety of little Bodies which mutually strike each other when the Spirits are dispersed into the Muscles it could neither establish a general Law for the communication of the Motions of these Spirits nor exactly follow it if it were established So that it is plain the Soul could not move its Arm although it had the power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits These Things are too clear for us to stand any longer upon them It is the same thing with our Faculty of Thinking By inward sensation we know that we would think on something and make some effort to that end and that in the instant of our Desire and Endeavour the Idea of this Thing presents it self to the Mind But we do not discover by inward sensation that our Will or Endeavour produces our Idea nor does Reason tell us it can do it It is through Prejudice that we are perswaded that our Desires cause our Ideas whilst we prove an hundred times a day that the latter follows or attends the former As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them and as we do not feel any thing else but our Desires which precede the presence of our Ideas we think there can be no other Cause of them But if we observe the Matter more closely we shall discover we have no power in our selves to produce them For neither Reason nor the inward sensation we have of our selves give us any information of it I do not think I am obliged to relate all the other Proofs that are made use of by these Defenders of the Efficacy of Second Causes because they appear so weak that it might be imagined I only intended to render them ridiculous and if I should answer them seriously I should become ridiculous my self An Author for Instance asserts very seriously in favour of his Opinion That Created Beings are True Material Formal Final Causes and why then should they not also be Efficient or Efficacious Causes I believe I should not very well satisfie the World if in Answer to the Demand of this Author I should stay to explain so gross an Equivocation and show the difference between an Efficacious Cause and that which some Philosophers have been pleased to call a Material one So that I shall omit some of the like Proofs to come to those they have taken from the Holy Scripture The Seventh Proof Those who maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes commonly bring the following passages to support their Opinion Let the Earth bring forth Grass Gen. 1. Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creatures that hath life and Fowl that may fly c. Therefore the Earth and the Water have from the Word of God received Power to produce Plants and Animals After which God commands the Fowls and the Fish to multiply Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Waters in the Seas and let Fowl multiply in the Earth Therefore he has given them Power to beget their like JESVS CHRIST in the Fourth Chapter of St. Mark sayes That the Seed which falls on good ground shall bring forth an hundred fold and that the Earth bringeth forth fruits of her self first the blade then the ear and afterwards the full corn Lastly it is also written in the Book of Wisdom That the Fire had as it were forgotten the Power it had of burning in favour of the People of God 'T is therefore confirmed by the Old and New Testament that Second Causes have a Power to act ANSWER I Answer That in the Holy Scripture there is also many passages which attribute to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes of which these are some Ego sum Dominus faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram NVLLVS mecum Isa 44.24 Manus tuae fecerunt me plasmaverunt me TOTVM in circuitu Job 10.8 Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed enim Mundi Creator qui hominis formavit nativitatem c. Mac. l. 2. c. 7.22 23. Cum ipse DEVS dat omnibus vitam inspirationem omnia Acts 17.25 Producens foenum jumentis herbam servituti hominum ut educas panem de terrâ Psal 103. 48. There is an infinite number of the like passages but these may suffice When an Author seems to contradict himself and Natural Equity or some stronger Reason obliges us to reconcile him to himself It seems to me that we have an infallible Rule to discover his true Opinion since we need but observe when he speaks according to his own Understanding and when in compliance with the common Opinion When a Man speaks like the rest of the World it is not alwayes a certain sign he is of their Opinion But when he speaks positively contrary to what we are accustomed to say although he should say it but once we have a great deal of Reason to believe 't is what he thinks provided we know he speaks seriously and having first well considered it For instance An Author speaking of the Properties of Animals if he should in an hundred places say that Beasts feel that Dogs know their Master love and fear him and should only in two or three places say Beasts are insensible and Dogs uncapable of knowing loving or fearing any thing How shall we reconcile this Author who appears to contradict himself Must we not collect all the passages for and against it and judge of his Opinion by the greatest number If so I don't believe there is any Man to whom for example we may attribute this Opinion that Animals have no Souls For the Cartesians themselves often say that a Dog feels when he is beaten and 't is very rarely that they deny him feeling And although I have incountered an infinite number of prejudices in this Book we may draw many passages from thence whereby if this Rule I have explained be received we may prove that I have established them all and even that I hold the Opinion of the Efficacy of
Second Causes which I have just now Refuted Or perhaps it might be concluded That The Search after Truth is a Book full of visible and gross Contradictions as some Persons do who it may be have not equity or penetration enough to make them fit Judges of the Works of others The Holy Scripture the Fathers and most good Men oftener speak of sensible Goods Riches and Honours according to the common Opinion than according to the true Ideas they have of them JESVS CHRIST introduces Abraham speaking to the wicked Rich Man Fili recepisti BONA in vita tua Thou hast received thy good things in thy life time that is Riches Honours What we through prejudice call good our good that is our Gold or our Silver is in an hundred places in the Scripture called our Maintenance or our Substance and even our Honesty or that which honours us Pawpertas honestas á Deo sunt But must this manner of speaking used by the Holy Scripture Eccl. 11.14 and most Pious Persons make us think they contradict themselves or that they look upon Riches and Honours as real goods and that therefore we ought to love and seek after them No without doubt because these wayes of speaking complying with prejudices signifie nothing And we see in other places JESVS CHRIST has compared Riches to Thorns has told us we must renounce them because they are deceitful and that whatsoever is great and alluring in this World is an abomination before God We must not therefore collect the passages of Scripture or of the Fathers to judge of their Opinion by the greatest number of them except we would continually attribute the most unreasonable prejudices to them This once supposed Matth. 6.28 29 30. we see that the Holy Scripture positively sayes That 't is God who has Created every thing even the grass of the field That 't is he who cloaths the Lillies with such ornaments as our SAVIOVR prefers before the Glory of Solomon There is not only two or three but an infinite number of passages which ascribe to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes and which destroy the Nature of the Peripatetics Besides we are carried by a kind of Natural Prejudice not to think on God in common Effects and to attribute Power and Efficacy to Natural Causes and seldom any thing but Miracles induce us to think on him as the Author of them And the sensible impression ingages us in favour of Second Causes Philosophers hold this Opinion because say they the Senses convince us of it and this is their strongest Proof Lastly This Opinion is received by all those who follow the Judgments of the Senses Our common Language is formed from this prejudice and we as generally say that Fire has a power to burn as we call Gold and Silver our good Therefore the passages drawn from the Holy Scriptures or the Fathers for the Efficacy of Second Causes prove no more than those that an Ambitious or Covetous Man shall choose to justifie his own Conduct But 't is quite different with those passages we may bring to prove that God does all things For this Opinion being contrary to Prejudice these passages must be understood in their utmost rigour for the same Reason that we ought to believe that 't is the Sentiments of the Cartesians that Beasts are insensible although they have said it but two or three times and continually say to the contrary in all familiar Discourses affirming they feel see and understand In the First Chapter of Genesis God commands the Earth to produce Plants and Animals and likewise the Waters to bring forth Fish And consequently sayes the Peripatetics Water and Earth have received a Power capable of producing these Effects I don't see the certainty of this Conclusion And although we were even obliged to explain this Chapter by it self without having any recourse to other passages of Scripture there would be no necessity to receive this consequence This way of explaining the Creation is accommodated to our conception of things therefore 't is not necessary to take it literally nor ought we to make use of it to maintain Prejudices As Animals and Plants are upon the Earth Fowls live in the Air and Fish in the Water so God to make us apprehend 't is by his Order they are in these places has produced them there 'T is from the Earth that he formed Animals and Plants not that the Earth was capable of generating them or that God to that end gave it a Power or Vertue which it still keeps for we all agree that the Earth does not produce Horses or Oxen but because from the Earth the Bodies of these Animals were formed as is declared in the following Chapter Formatis igitur Dominus Deus de humo cunctis animantibus Terrae Ver. 19. universis volatilibus Coeli Animals were formed out of the Earth formatis de humo and not produced by the Earth Also after Moses has related how Beasts and Fish were produced by vertue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them he adds that 't was God himself who made them that we might not attribute their production to the Earth and Water CREAVIT quae DEVS cete grandia omnem animam viventem atque notabilem quam PRODVXERVNT aquae in species suas omne volatile secundùm genus suum And a little lower after having spoken of the formation of Animals he adds Et FECIT DEVS bestias terrae juxta species suas jumenta omne reptile terrae in genere suo We may observe by the by that where the Vulgar reads it Producant aquae reptile animae viventis volatile super terram the Hebrew has it Volatile VOLITET For as it clearly appears by the passage I related from the Second Chapter this word omitted shows that Fowls were not produced from the Water and that the design of Moses is not here to prove that the Waters had received a true Power to bring forth Fish and Fowl but only to denote the place design'd for each by the Order of God whether to live or be produced in And volatile VOLITET super terram For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants we only design to show that it supplyed them with the Water and Salt which is necessary for their Germination and Growth But I will stay no longer to explain the other passages of Scripture which literally taken favour Second Causes for we are not obliged Besides 't would be very dangerous to understand such expressions literally as are maintained upon common Opinions agreeably to which the Language is formed the Vulgar speaking every thing according to the impression of the Senses and prejudices of Infancy The same Reason which obliges us to take such passages of the Scripture in the Letter as are directly opposite to Prejudices still gives us just cause to believe that the Fathers never
designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are
necessity of sending Dragoons into the Monasteries and Societies and to an infinite number of honest Men to cause them to abjure the Errours of the Cartesian Philosophy So true is it that Devotees do not always see the fatal Consequences of an Advice which impetuous Zeal dictates to those that are in Authority Monsieur Regis well known by the Philosophy he has Published having undertaken to oppose some Sentiments of F. Malebranch this Father neglected at first to Answer his new Adversary but when Monsieur Regis would have drawn an advantage from the silence of a Man who plainly perceived himself unfairly attack'd Father Malbranche published the last Year a short Answer to Monsieur Regis The name of Monsieur Arnaud was made use of in this Contestation which occasioned him to appear again upon the stage In the Journal des Scavans at Paris he Printed two Letters addrest to F. Malebranch who soon answered him and gave two Letters to the Journalist that were also Printed Monsieur Cousin left off his Correspondence with Monsieur Arnaud and refused to put in his Journal other Letters which M. Arnaud had written a little before his Death we shall doubtless see them in his Posthumous works for it is not probable that they will rob the Publick of the Remains of so great a man We shall be gainers thereby two wayes F. Malbranche will break that silence which he seems to have condemned himself to and we shall have new Explanations upon some important Difficult ties which M. Arnaud may have found in the VVorks of so hard an Adversary I have but one thing more to say of F. Malebranch It is that his Heart agrees perfectly with his Vnderstanding There is as much Vprightness in the one as Justness in the other He is a Christian Philosopher who acts as he thinks Never did any Man more perfectly regulate his Manners and Actions upon the Principles of his Philosophy Being perswaded that God is the only cause which acts truly upon our Body and in our Soul F. Malebranch accustoms himself upon every Sensation upon every Perception to elevate himself always towards the Supreme Being to humble himself in his Presence and to praise him continually VVith what assurance does not he as often as it 's possible approach to the Throne of Grace of the Eternal High Priest who continually intercedes for us VVith what fervour does he not beg to be admitted as a Living Stone in the Structure of the Mysterious Temple which this Divine Architect builds up to the Glory of his Father He is in a continual watchfulness and attention over himself to divert the Impressions which sensible Objects may make upon his Body and to stop whatever is capable of exciting the Passions He is the most sober and temperate Man in the World And if F. Malebranch so exactly observes his Duties towards God and himself he is not less regular in those which respect his Neighbour He is tender and compassionate to the unhappy courteous and affable to all the VVorld preventing and sincere in respect of his Friends good and indulgent to all those who injure him Being perswaded that the Love of his Neighbour ought to have for its principal end that Eternal Society to which we are called by the Gospel He endeavours to inspire all those who come near him with Sentiments of Piety and Religion to procure as much as he can their Eternal Happiness which he earnestly desires day and night In a word F. Malebranch has drawn his own Pourtraiture in his Treatise of Morality To compose the greatest part of which he had no need of long and new Reflexions upon the Duties of Man He hath told us without thinking of it what he exactly practiced after he had applied himself to the regulation of his Manners upon the Truths he had so attentively Meditated and so happily Explained A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK V. of the Passions CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Original of the Passions in general THE Mind of Man has two essential or necessary relations which are very different the one to God and the other to its Body as it is a pure Spirit it is essentially united to the Word of God to the Eternal Wisdom and Truth for 't is only by this Union that it is capable of thinking as has been shewn in the 3d Book as an humane Spirit it has an essential relation to its Body and because of this union it is sensible and imagines as has been explained in the First and Second Books I call that sense or imagination of the Mind when the Body is the natural or occasional cause of its thoughts and that understanding when it acts of it self or rather when God acts in it or when his light enlightens it after many different manners independantly of any thing whatever that passes in its Body 'T is the same in respect of the humane Will as a Will it essentially depends upon the Love which God bears to himself upon the Eternal Law in a word upon the Will of God 'T is only because God loves himself that we love any thing and if God did not love himself or if he did not continually imprint upon the Soul of Man a Love like to his I mean that motion of Love which we receive for good in general we should love nothing we should will nothing and consequently we should be without any will since the will is nothing else but the impression of Nature which carries towards good in general as we have often said before Book I. Ch. I. and elsewhere But the Will as it is an humane Will essentially depends upon the Body for 't is only from the motions of the Blood and Spirits that it perceives it self agitated with all sensible Emotions I therefore give the name of Natural Inclinations to all the motions of the Soul which are common to us with pure Intelligences and some of those in which the Body has a great share but whereof it is only indirectly the Cause and the End as I have explained in the preceding Book and here I design by the word Passions all the Emotions which the Soul naturally feels by means of the extraordinary Motions of the Animal Spirits and Blood These are the sensible Emotions which shall be the Subject of this Book Although the Passions are inseparable from the Inclinations and Men were no farther capable of sensible love or hatred than as they are capable of the mental yet I thought it would not be amiss to treat distinctly of 'em to avoid confusion Those that consider the Passions are much more strong and lively than the Natural Inclinations for other Objects and which are always produced from other Causes will acknowledge that 't is not without reason that I have separated things that are inseparable in their nature Men are only capable of Sensations and Imaginations as they are capable of pure Intellections the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind however
Spirits desire as we may think of Devils or some other Spirits who merit this Punishment we cannot say in this case that God communicates his Power to them since they can do nothing that they would do Yet the Wills of these Spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies determine the first Cause to move them So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes Yet if after all these Reasons we will still maintain that the Will of an Angel which moves any body should be a true Cause and not an occasional one it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things For God could as well communicate to him his Prower of Creating and Destroying Bodies as that of moving them if he will'd that things should be created and annihilated In a word If he will'd that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them even as he Wills Bodies should move as the Angel pleases If it be said that an Angel or a Man would be the true movers because God moves Bodies when they wish it it may also be said that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators since God can create Beings when they will it Nay perhaps it might be said that the molt Vile Animals or Matter of it self should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance if we supposed as the Philosophers do that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it In fine Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things we might also say that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Beings as reasonably as to pretend that a Bowl which meets another is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it Because God has determined by his general Will which constituted the Order of Nature that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion There is then but one only true God and he the one only true Cause And we must not imagine that which precedes an Effect to be the true Cause of it God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures if we follow the Light of Reason he cannot make them true Causes because he cannot make them Gods Bodies Spirits pure Intelligences can all do nothing 'T is he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them 'T is he who has created the Heavens and the Earth which regulates the Motions thereof In short 't is the Author of our Being that executes our Wills semel jussit semper paret He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders for he complains by his Prophets that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires All these little Heathen Divinities and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers are only Chymera's that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam which teaches these things 't is that they have received from the Serpent for since the Fall the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish 'T is this Philosophy which joyned to the Errors of the Senses has made them adore the Sun and which is fall at this Day the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind and Corruption of the Heart of Man By their Actions and sometimes by their Words why say they should we not love the Body since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures And why do we laugh at the Israelites which regretted the Loss of the Garlick and Onyons of Egypt since in Effect they were unhappy by being deprived of what in some Measure could make them happy But the new Philosophy which they represent as a dismal thing to affrighten weak Minds that is despised and condemned without being understood The new Philosophy I say since they are pleased to call it so destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles which perfectly agrees with the * Haec est Religio Christiana fratres mei quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimieis ubi vincuntur murmurantibus ubi praevalent saevientibus haec est Religie Christiana ut Colatur unus Deus non Dii qui facit Animam Beatum nisi unus Deus Aug. tr 23. in Joan. first Principle of the Christian Religion that we must love and fear but one God since there is only one God who can make us happy For if Religion teaches us that there is but one true God this Philosophy shews us there is but one true Cause If Religion informs us that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion This Philosophy discovers to us also that all second Causes or all the Divinities of their Philosophy are only Matter and inefficacious Wills In short if Religion teaches us that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods This Philosophy also tells us that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes which are not true Causes That we must neither love nor fear them nor busie our selves about them but think upon God only see him adore him fear and love him in all things But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers They will neither see nor think upon God For since the Fall there is a secret Opposition between God and Man Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands They are like Children who tremble at their Companions after they have daubed their Faces Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison although perhaps it be not so just they resemble those famous Romans who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let loose the Eagle when they deified them CHAP. IV. An Explanation of the Second Part of the general Rule That Philosophers neglect it but Mr. Descartes has very exactly observed it WE have already shewed unto what Errors we are subject when we reason upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses and upon the rambling and indeterminate Idea's of pure Logick We have sufficiently discovered that to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is absolutely necessary exactly to observe the Rule that we have prescribed if our Idea's are clear and distinct and then to reason according to these Idea's In this same general Rule which respects the Subject
only upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses since this Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all just and solid Arguments only breeds Confusion in their Discourses It is not possible to expose the Fantasticalness and Extravagances of the Explanations that Aristotle gives of all sorts of Matters when the Subjects he treats of are simple and easie his Errors are simple and very easily discovered but when he pretends to explain compounded things and such as depend upon many Causes his Errors are at least as compounded as the Subjects he treats on and it is impossible to take them in Pieces so as to discover them all to others This great Genius which they pretend has done so well in his Rules for Definitions did not so much as know what things were necessary to be defined Because putting no Distinction between a clear and distinct knowledge and a Sensible one he imagined he was able to know and explain things to others which he had no distinct Idea of himself Definitions must explain both the Nature of Things and the Terms which compose them and stir up in the Mind distinct and clear Idea's of them But 't is impossible after this manner to define the Sensible Qualities of Heat Cold Colour Taste c. when we confound the Cause with the Effect and the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation which accompanies it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which we know not by clear Idea's but only by an inward Sensation as I have explained in the third Book it is impossible to affix Words to Idea's we have not As we have clear and distinct Idea's of a Circle a Square a Triangle and so distinctly know the Nature of them we may give good Definitions thereof We can even deduce the Idea's we have of these Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by Terms to which these Idea's are affixed but we cannot define either Heat or Cold being only Sensible Qualities for we know them neither distinctly nor by Idea but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation Nor must we define Heat which is external by any Effects For if we substitute in its Place the Definition that we shall give it we shall soon see that this Definition will only deceive us If for instance we define Heat to be what assembles things of the same kind without saying any thing more we may in following this Definition take such things for Heat as have no Relation to it We may say that the Loadstone assembles the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because it is hot that a Pigeon eats Hemp-Seed and leaves other Grain because she is hot That a Covetous Man separates his Gold from his Silver because he is hot In fine there is no Extravagancy that this Definition will not engage us in if we were stupid enough to follow it This Definition then does not explain the Nature of Heat nor can we make use of it to deduce all its Properties since if we keep precisely to its Terms we conclude Impertinences and if we put it in the Place of the thing defined we shall have a strange Piece of Nonsence Yet if we carefully distinguish Heat from the Cause of it although we cannot define it since it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea we may define the Cause of it since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But Care must be had that Heat taken for such a Motion does not always cause the Sensation of Heat in us For Water for instance is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and 't is apparent that Fish feel it warm at least warmer than Ice whose Parts are more in Rest but it is cold in relation to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Bodies For what hath less Motion than another Body is in some manner in rest in respect to that Body So that 't is not in Relation to the Motion of the Fibres of our Bodies that we must define the Cause of Heat or the Motion which excites it We must if we can define this Motion absolutely and in it self and then the Definitions we shall give may serve to discover the Nature and Properties of Heat I do not think my self obliged to examine the Philosophy of Aristotle any further and to unravel the extreamly confused and perplext Errors of this Author It seems to me that I have already shewn that he does not prove his four Elements and that he defines them ill That his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not the Nature of them and that all second Qualities are not compounded of them And lastly although we should grant him that all Bodies were composed of four Elements as second Qualities of the first his whole System would be useless in a Search after Truth since his Idea's are not clear enough always to preserve Evidence in our Ratiotinations If 't is doubted that I have not related the true Opinions of Aristotle it may easily be seen by examining the Books he has writ of the Heavens of Generation and Corruption for 't is from them that I have taken almost all that I have said I had no Design to relate any thing of his Eight Books of Physicks because there is some learned Men who pretend that 't is only a Discourse of Logick And 't is very probable since we find there many indetermined and trifling Words As Atistotle often contradicts himself and as we may maintain almost any manner of Opinion from some Passages taken out of him I doubt not but we may prove by Aristotle even some Opinions contrary to those I have attributed to him but I am not afraid of it it is sufficient that I have the Book by me I cited him from to prove what I have said Nay I shall not give my self any great Trouble to examine whether these Books are Aristotle's or not I take them as for such and as they are commonly received For we ought not to disquiet our selves to know the true Genealogy of things for which we have no Esteem CHAP. VI. Some general Advices which are necessary to conduct us regularly in a Search after Truth and in a Choice of the Sciences THAT it may not be said I only destroy without establishing any thing certain and indisputable in this Work It will be proper to shew in a few Words the Order we ought to keep in our Studies to avoid being deceived and that I even note some most necessary Truths and Sciences in which we may meet with such Evidence as we cannot hinder our selves from consenting to them without suffering the secret Reproaches of our Reason I shall not explain these Truths and Sciences at large because 't is already done I do not pretend to make a new Impression of other Persons Works but content my self with referring to them I will only shew the Order we ought to
merited for us and in another place I call it absolutely the Grace of Jesus Christ it is not that there is no other Grace but that or that there is any which Christ has not purchased for us But I call it the Grace of Jesus Christ to distinguish it from the Grace that God gave to the first Man when he Created him which is commonly call'd the Creator's Grace For the Grace by which Adam might have preserved his Innocence was chiefly a Grace of Light as I have explained in the preceding Remark because that Adam having no concupiscence he stood in need of no Pre-ingaging Pleasures to oppose it But the Grace which we now stand in need of to keep us within the bounds of our Duty and to produce and maintain Charity in us is Pre-ingaging Delectation For as Pleasure produces and maintains the Love of those things which occasion it or seem to occasion it the Pre-ingaging Pleasures we receive in relation to our Bodies produce and maintain Cupidity in us So that being directly contrary to Charity unless God were pleased to produce and maintain Charity in us by Pre-ingaging Delectations it is plain that the Pre-ingaging Pleasures of Concupiscence would weaken it proportionably as Cupidity should be strengthned What I say here supposes that God permits our Concupiscence to Act in us and that he does not weaken it by inspiring us with horror against all sensible Objects which as a result of Sin must needs tempt us I speak of things as they commonly happen But supposing that God diminishes Concupiscence instead of increasing the Delectation of Grace that may produce the same Effects We are sensible that there are two ways of putting Scales in Equilibrio when one of them is over-charged not only in adding Weights to the other side to even it but also in removing some of the other weights which bear it down Neither do I pretend that Men can do no good Actions without Pre-ingaging Delectation I have sufficiently explained my self upon that subject in the 4th Chapter of the 3d Book And it appears so evident to me that a Man who has the Love of God in his Heart may by the force of his Love and without Pre-ingaging Delectation give for Example a Penny to the Poor or bear some small injury with patience that I can not apprehend how any body can question it In my opinion Delectation is only necessary when the Temptation is Strong or Love Weak If however it may be said that it is absolutely necessary to a righteous Man whose Faith I think may be firm enough and his Hopes strong enough to overcome great Temptations The joy or fore-tast of Eternal Happiness being capable to resist the sensible Charms of Transitory Pleasures It is true that Delectation or Actual Grace is necessary for all good Actions if by the Word Delectation or Grace is understood Charity as St. Austin commonly takes it for it is evident that what ever is not done for God is no wise good But removing the Equivocation and taking the Word Delectation in my sense I do not think any body can question what I have said But this is the Case It is supposed that Pleasure and Love are one and the same thing because the one seldom goes without the other and St. Augustin does not always distinguish them And this being supposed Men are in the right in saying what they say We may conclude with St. Austin Quod amplius nos delectat secundum id operemur necesse est for Men certainly Will that which they Love and we may also say that we can do nothing good or meritorious without Delectation or without Charity But I hope to shew in an Explanation I shall give upon the Treatise of the Passions that there is as much difference betwixt Pleasure and Deliberate or Indeliberate Love as there is betwixt our Knowledge and our Love or to express that difference sensibly as there is between the Figure of a Body and its Motion AN EXPLANATION OF What I have said at the beginning of the 10th Chapter of the First Book and in the 6th of the Second Book of Method That it is very difficult to prove that there are Bodies Which must be understood of the the Proofs that are alledged of their Existence IT is very usual among Men to be perfectly ignorant of what they think they understand best and to understand certain things pretty well which they fancy they have not so much as Ideas of When their Senses have some share in their Judgments they yield to what they do not apprehend or to things they have but a very imperfect knowledge of and when their Ideas are purely Intellectual I desire the like Expressions may be allowed me they unwilling receive Indisputable Demonstrations For Example What can the generality of Men think when the major part of Metaphysical Truths are proved to them When the Existence of God is demonstrated to them the Power of his Will the Immutability of his Decrees That there is but one God or one real Cause which does all in all things That there is but one soveraign Reason of which all Intelligences participate That there is but one necessary Love which is the Principle of all Created Wills They think Men speak Words absolutely void of Sense that they have no Ideas of the things they advance and that they would do well to hold their Tongues Metaphysical Truths and Proofs having nothing that is sensible in them Men are not moved and consequently not convinced by them Nevertheless it is most certain that abstracted things are the most distinct and Metaphysical Truths are the clearest and the most evident Men say sometimes that they have no Ideas of God and that they have no knowledge of his Will and moreover think often as they say but 't is only because they fancy they do not know that which perhaps they know best For where is the Man who hesitates to answer when he is ask'd Whether God is Wise Just Powerful whether he is or is not Triangular Divisible Moveable Lyable to any Alteration Nevertheless it is impossible to answer without fear of being deceived whether certain qualifications agree not to a subject if one has no Ideas of that subject So likewise Where is the Man who dares say that God does not Act by the Plainest Means That he is Irregular in his Designs That he makes Monsters by a positive direct and particular Will and not by a kind of necessity In a Word That his Will is or may be contrary to the Order of which there is no Man but has some knowledge But if we had no Idea of the Will of God we might at least question whether he acts according to certain Laws which we clearly conceive he must follow supposing he will Act. Therefore Men have Ideas of things that are purely Intelligible and these Ideas are much clearer than those of sensible Objects Men are more certain of the Existence of
Pain would not differ from Hatred Now it is evident that Pain is different from Hatred since Pain often subsists without Hatred A Man for instance who is hurt without observing it suffers a real and cutting Pain but is free from Hatred for he does not so much as know the Cause of his Pain or Object of his Hatred or rather the Cause of his Pain not being worthy of Hatred it cannot excite it in him Thus he hates not this Cause of his Pain although his Pain inclines him to or disposes him to hate it It is true this Man hates his Pain for Pain deserves Hatred but the hatred of Pain is not Pain but only supposes it The hatred of Pain is not worthy of Hatred as Pain On the contrary 't is very agreeable for we please our selves in hating Pain as we are displeased in suffering it Pain therefore is not Hatred nor is Pleasure which is opposite to Pain Love which is opposite to Hatred Consequently the Pleasure which precedes Reason is not the same thing as Love And I likewise prove that the Joy or Pleasure which follows Reason is also distinct from Love As Joy and Sorrow are directly opposite If Joy was the same thing as Love Sorrow would not differ from Hatred But it is plain that Sorrow is different from Hatred for Sorrow sometimes subsists without Hatred For instance A Man finds himself by chance deprived of such things as he has need of This is enough to cause Sorrow but it cannot excite Hatred in him either because he knows not the Cause which deprived him of these necessaries or else that this Cause not being worthy of his Hatred it could not stir it up in him It is true this Man hates the privation or the good that he loves but it is plain that this kind of Hatred is properly Love For he hates the privation of good only because he loves the good And since to fly the privation of good is to incline towards good it is evident that the motion of this Mans Hatred differs not from that of his Love Thus his Hatred if he 's possest of any not being contrary to his Love and Sorrow being always opposite to Joy it is plain that his Sorrow is not his Hatred consequently Joy differs from Love In fine it is manifest when we are sorrowful 't is because of the presence of something we hate or rather the absence of something we love Thus Sorrow supposes Hatred or rather Love but is very different from both these things I very well know St. Austin affirms that Pain is an a version which the Soul conceives because the Body is not disposed after such a manner as it wishes and that he often confounds Delectation with Charity Pleasure with Joy Pain with Sorrow Pleasure and Joy with Love Pain and Sorrow with Aversion or Hatred But 't is very probable that this Holy Doctor spoke all this according to the general Language amongst the common sort of Men who confound the greatest part of those things which pass within them at the same time Or it may be he had not examined these things after a very exact and Philosophical manner However I believe I may and ought to say that it appear'd requisite to me exactly to distinguish these things if we would clearly and without equivocation explain many Questions which St. Austin has treated on For even those who have contrary Opinions amongst themselves have been accustomed to maintain them from the Authority of this great Man because of the different Sense his Expressions may be taken in which is not alwayes exact enough to reconcile such Persons who perhaps have more mind to dispute than agree A N EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book Concerning the Efficacy attributed to Second Causes EVer since the Fall the Mind of Man is continually imployed upon External Objects he even forgets himself and him who penetrates and inlightens him and suffers himself after such a manner to be seduced by his own and the Bodies about him that he expects in them to find his Perfection and Happiness He who alone is capable of acting in it now hides himself from our Eyes nor are his Operations performed after a sensible manner and although he produces and preserves all Beings the Mind which eagerly seeks the Cause of all things finds much difficulty to discover him although it meets with him every moment Some Philosophers have chose rather to imagine a Nature and certain Faculties as the Causes of those Effects we call Natural than to give God all the Honour which is due to his Power And although they have no Proof nor so much as a clear Idea of this Nature and these Faculties as I hope I have shown they choose rather to speak without knowing what they say and to respect a Power purely imaginary than to make any endeavour to discover the hand of him who performs whatever is done in all things I cannot forbear believing that one of the most deplorable consequences of Original Sin is our having no more gust nor sensation for God or that we perceive him not or meet him but with a kind of horrour and fright We ought to acknowledge God in all things be sensible of his Strength and Power in all Natural Effects admire his Wisdom in the marvellous Order of the Creatures and in a word adore fear and love only him in all his Works But there is now a secret opposition between Man and God Man finding himself a Sinner hides himself flyes the Light is apprehensive of meeting God and chooses rather to imagine in the Bodies which are about him a Power or blind Nature which he can make familiar to himself than to meet there the terrible Power of a Holy and Just God who knows and performs all things I confess there are many persons who by a different Principle than that of the Heathen Philosophers pursue their Opinion about Nature and Second Causes But I hope we shall discover by the consequence of this Discourse that they are of this Opinion only through a received prejudice which it is almost impossible to deliver themselves from without the assistance that may be drawn from the Principles of a Philosophy which has not alwayes been sufficiently known For it is probably this which has hindered them from declaring in favour of an Opinion which I have thought my Duty to maintain There are many Reasons which keep me from ascribing to Second or Natural Causes a strength power or efficacy to produce any thing whatever but the chief is because I cannot even conceive this Opinion What endeavours soever I make to comprehend it I cannot find in my self an Idea which represents to me what this Strength or Power can be which they attribute to Creatures And I believe that I should not make a rash Judgment if I affirm that those who maintain that Creatures have in themselves this Strength and Power
wrote about Idolatry In the Days of Enos Men fell into strange Delusions R. Moses Maimonides and the Wise Men of that Time perfectly lost their Sense and Reason Enos himself was in the Number of those deceived Persons These were their Errours Since God said they has created the Stars and the Heavens to govern the World has placed them on high surrounded them with brightness and glory and employes them to exexecute his Orders it is just that we should honour them and pay reverence and homage to them 'T is the Will of our God that we should honour those whom he has raised and exalted in Glory even as a Prince requires we should honour his Ministers in his presence because the Honour we give to them redounds to himself After they had once received this Notion they began to build Temples in honour of the Stars to offer Sacrifices and Praises to them and even prostrate themselves before them thinking thereby to gain the favour of him who created them And this was the original of Idolatry It is so Natural and Just to have Sentiments of Acknowledgment in proportion to the Benefits we receive See Vossius l. 2. de Idolatria that almost all the World have adored the Sun Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii nullam belluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent consecraverant Cic. l. 1. de Natura Deorum because they all thought he was the cause of the Happiness they injoyed And if the Egyptians have adored not only the Sun the Moon and the River Nilus because its overflowings caused the fruitfulness of their Country but also the vilest Animals 't was as Cicero relates because of some benefit they received from them So that as we cannot and indeed ought not to banish out of Mens Minds the inclination they Naturally have for the true Causes of their Happiness it is evident that there is at least some danger in maintaining the Efficacy of Second Causes although we joyn thereto the necessity of an immediate concourse which has I know not what of incomprehensible in it and which comes in as an after-game to justifie our Prejudices and Aristotles Philosophy But there is no danger in speaking only what we know and atributing Power and Efficacy to God alone since we see nothing but his Wills which have an absolute necessary and indispensable connection with Natural Effects I confess that Men are now knowing enough to avoid the gross Errors of the Heathens and Idolaters But I am not afraid to say that our Mind is disposed or rather that our Heart is often inclined like that of the Heathens and that there will alwayes be some kind of Idolatry in the World until the day that Jesus Christ shall again deliver up his Kingdom to God his Father having first destroyed all Empire Power and Dominion that God may be all in all Quorum Deus venter est Phil. 13.9 Omnis fornicator aut immundus aut avarus quod est idolorum servitus Eph. 5.5 In spiritu veritate oportet adorare John 4.24 For is it not a kind of Idolatry to make a God of our Belly as St. Paul speaks Is it not to idolize the God of Riches continually to labour after Worldly Possessions Is this to render to God the Worship due to him to adore him in Spirit and Truth to have our Hearts filled with some sensible Beauty and our Minds dazled with the brightness of some imaginary Grandeur Men believing they receive from the Bodies which are about them the Pleasures they injoy by their use they unite themselves to them with all the Powers of their Soul And thus the principal of their disorder proceeds from the sensible conviction they have of the Efficacy of Second Causes 'T is Reason only that tells them there is none but God acts in them But besides that Reason speaks so low that they can scarcely hear it and the Senses which oppose it cry so loud that it stupifies them they are still confirmed in their Prejudices by Arguments which are so much the more dangerous as they bear external Characters and sensible Marks of Truth The Philosophers and chiefly the Christian Philophers ought continually to oppose Prejudices or the Judgments of the Senses and especially such dangerous ones as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes And yet I know not from what Principle there are some Persons whom I extreamly honour and that with reason who endeavour to confirm this Prejudice and even to make this Doctrine pass for superstitious and extravagant which is so holy pure and solid and maintains that God alone is the true cause of every thing They will not have us love and fear God in all things but love and fear all things in relation to God We ought say they to love the Creatures because they are good to love and respect our Father render honour to our Prince and Superiour since God commands it I don't deny it but I deny that we must love the Creatures as our goods although they be good or perfect in themselves I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters For we must neither serve our Master obey our Father or Prince with any other design but to serve God and obey him This is what St. Paul sayes who became all things to all Men and complyed in all things for the Salvation of those to whom he Preached Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore tremore in simplicitate cordis vestri SICVT CHRISTO Non ad oculum servientes quasi omnibus placentes sed ut servi Christi facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo cum bona voluntate servientes SICVT DOMINI ET NON HOMINIBVS And in another Epistle Non ad oculum servientes quasi hominibus placentes sed in simplicitate cordis DEVM TIMENTES Quodcumque facitis ex animo operamini SICVT DOMINO ET NON HOMINIBVS We must therefore obey our Father serve our Prince and render honour to our Superiours AS VNTO GOD AND NOT VNTO MAN Sicut Domini non Hominibus This is clear and can never have any bad consequences Superiours would alwayes be more honoured and better served But I believe I may say that a Master who would be honoured and served as having in himself another Power than that of God must be a Devil and that those who served him under that Notion would be Idolaters for I can't but believe that all Honour and Love that tend not towards God are kinds of Idolatry SOLI DEO HONOR ET GLORIA AN EXPLANATION Of what I have said in the Fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method and elsewhere That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most Simple Wayes IT seems to some Persons to be too rash a Conjecture or an abusing of indeterminate and general Terms to say That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most simple wayes in