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A51655 Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.; Recherche de la vérité. English Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715. 1694 (1694) Wing M315; ESTC R4432 349,306 512

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to speak meerly for Talkings sake like many that speak boldly of every thing that comes next 'em they are therefore concern'd to find out Words proper to express as they ought to do their thoughts which are not common Though we have a great Veneration for Persons of Piety Divines Old Men and generally for all those who have justly acquir'd great Authority over other Men nevertheless we thought our selves oblig'd to say this of 'em it often happens that they believe themselves infallible because all other Men hearken to 'em with Respect because they make little use of their Reason in the discovery of Speculative Truths and for that they condemn with too much freedom whatever they dislike before they have seriously consider'd it Not that they are to be blam'd for not applying themselves to many Sciences of little use for they are allow'd both to let 'em alone and to despise them if they think convenient but they are not to judge of 'em rashly as their fancies lead 'em nor upon ill grounded suspitions For they are to consider that the Gravity of their Delivery the Authority which they have acquir'd over the Minds of Men and their common custom of confirming what they say by some Passage of the Holy Scripture will infallibly lead into Error all those that listen to 'em out of Respect and who being incapable throughly to examine things suffer themselves to be surpriz'd by Manners and Appearances When Error hath the appearance of Truth it is oftimes more respected than Truth it self and this false Respect is attended with dangerous Inconveniencies Pessima res est errorum Apotheosis pro peste intellectus habenda est si vanis accedat veneratio Thus when certain Persons either out of false Zeal or out of a Love for their own thoughts have made use of Scripture to establish false Principles of Natural Philosophy or any other Science they have oft been listen'd to as Oracles by Men that have believ'd 'em upon their Words because of that Veneration which they owe to Sacred Authority but it has likewise happen'd so that Vicious and Corrupted Minds have hence taken an occasion to despise Religion So that by a strange Inversion the Holy Scripture has been the Cause of Error to some and Truth has been the Motive and Original of Impiety to others We ought therefore to be careful as the Author above cited well observes how we seek for dead things among the living and never to pretend by the strength of our own Wits to discover in Sacred Scripture what the Holy Ghost hath not thought fit to reveal Ex divinorum humanorum malesana admixtione continues he non solum educitur Philosophia Phantastica sed etiam Religio Haretica Itaque salutare admodum est si mente sol●ia fidei cantum deatur quae fidel sunt All Persons then who have Authority over others ought to be so much the more cautions in their Decisions by how much they find 'em to be most adher'd to Divines especially ought to take care how they being Religion into contempt through their false Zeal out of vain glory either to exalt themselves or disseminate their Opinions But because it is not for me to tell 'em their Duty let 'em bear St. Thomas Opuse 9. who being interrogated by his General what he thought of some Articles answered him out of St. Austin in the following manner Multum autem nocet alia que ad pietatis Doctrinam non speclant vel asscrere vel negate quasi p●●tinentia ad sacram doctrinam Dicit enim in 5. Conf●ss cum audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi le cae●● aut stellis de Solis Lunae motibus dixerunt nescientem aliud pro alio sentientem patienter intucor opinantem hominem nec illi obesse video cum de te Domine Creator omnium nostrorum non credat indigna si forte sitûs habitûs Creaturae Corporalis ignoret Obest autem si haec ad ipsam doctrinam Pietatis pertinere arbitretur pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat Quod autem obsit manifestat August in 1. super Genesin ad Litteram Turpe est inquit nimis perniciosum ac maxime cavendum ut Christianum de his rebus veluti secundum Christianas literas loquentem ita delicare quilibet Infidelis audeat ut quemadmodum dicitur toto Coelo errare conspiciens risum tenere vix possit Et non tamen Molestum est quod errans homo videatur Sed quod Auditores nostri ab eis qui foris sunt talia sensisse creduntur cum magno eorum Exitio de quorum salute satagimus tanquam indocti reprehenduntur respumtur Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse ut haec que communes Philosophi senserunt nostrae Fidei non repugnant neque esse sic asserenda ut dogmata Fidei licet aliquando sub nomine Philosophorum introducantur neque sic esse neganda tanquam Fidei contraria ne Sapientibus hujus Mundi contemnendi Doctrinam Fidei occasio praebeatur It 's very dangerous to speak decisively upon Matters which do not belong to Faith as if they did St. Austin tells us in his 5th Book of Confessions When I see says he a Christian that is not acquainted with the Opinions of Philosophers concerning the Heavens the Stars and the Motions of the Sun and Moon and would take one thing for an other I let 'em alone in these Opinions and Doubts For I don't see that Ignorance in the situation of Bodies the different ordering of Matter can injure 'em provided he has not unworthy Sentiments of thee our Lord who art the Creator of us all But it does him an Injury if he is persuaded that these things concern Religion and if he is so bold as obstinately to affirm what he knows not The same Saint explains his Thoughts yet more clearly upon this Subject in the first Book of the Literal Explication of Genesis in these Terms A Christian must take a great deal of Care that he does not speak of these Things as if they were Holy Scripture for an Infidel who should hear him speak Extravigances that should have no appearances of Truth could not forbear laughing at him so the Christian is only Confounded and the Infidel would be very little Edified Yet what is more mischievous in these Encounters than a Man's being deceiv'd is that these Infidels that we endeavour to Convert imagine falsely and to their inevitable ruine that our Authors have very extravigant Sentiments so that they condemn and despise 'em as ignorant Men it is therefore in my Opinion more proper not to affirm the common receiv'd Opinions of Philosophers as Matters of Faith which are not contrary to our Faith although we may sometimes make use of the Authority of Philosophers to make 'em be receiv'd We must not also reject these Opinions as contrary to our Faith that we may give no occasion
great Images upon the bottom of the Eye as those Faces which are nearer as the Senses only Perceive but never Judge to speak properly 'T is certain that this Judgment is nothing but a compounded Sensation which consequently may be sometimes false However V. That these Judgments deceive us in some particular Occurrences that which is nothing else but Sensation in us may be consider'd in respect of the Author of Nature who excites it in us as a kind of Judgment I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgments because this way of speaking serves to give a reason of Things as may be seen here in the Ninth Chapter towards the end and in many other places Altho' these Judgments which I have spoke of are useful to correct our Senses very many ways and that without them we should very frequently be deceiv'd yet they are also occasions of Error For Instance If it happens that we see the top of a high Steeple behind a great Wall or a Mountain it will appear very near to us and very little but if afterwards we should see it at the same distance yet with many Fields and Houses betwixt it would doubtless appear the greater and at a farther distance altho' in each Station the Projection of the Rays of the Spire or its Image which is Painted at the bottom of our Eyes would be altogether the same Now it may be said that we see it greater because of a Judgment that we Naturally make viz. that since there is so much Land betwixt us and the Steeple it must be further and consequently greater But on the contrary if we saw no Fields betwixt us and the Steeple altho' we even knew there were many and that it was a great way off which is very remarkable it would always appear very near and very little as I have said And it may also be suppos'd that this is done by a Natural Judgment of our Soul which thus sees this Spire because it Judges it about five or six hundred paces distant for commonly our Imagination does not represent a greater distance between Objects and us if it be not assisted by a Sensible view of other interjacent Objects beyond which it can yet imagine farther 'T is for this cause See the 9th Chapter towards the end that when the Moon Rises or Sets we see it greater than when it is elevated above the Horizon for when it is very high we see no Objects betwixt it and us whose greatness we know to Judge of that of the Moon by comparing them together but when it is near Setting we see betwixt it and us many Fields whose breadth we know very near and so we Judge it at a greater distance because we see it at a greater It 's observable that when the Moon is Risen above our Heads altho' our reason assures us that it is at a very great distance yet it seems to us to be very little and very near for indeed these Natural Judgments of Sight are only built upon the Perceptions of the same Sight and Reason cannot correct them So that they very often deceive us in causing us to form free Judgments which perfectly agree with them for when we Judge by our Senses we are always deceiv'd but we are never deceiv'd when we conceive for a Body only Instructs as a Body but God always teaches us Truth as I shall show hereafter These false Judgments deceive us not only as to the distance and bigness of Bodies but also in making us see their Figure other than it is We see for Example the Sun and Moon and other Spherical Bodies very distant as if they were Plains and Circles because at this great distance we cannot distinguish whether the opposite part is nearer to us than the others and because of this we Judge it at an equal distance 'T is for the same reason we Judge that all the Stars and the blue which appears in the Heaven are at the same distance and as it were a perfectly Convex Vault because our Mind supposes an Equality where it sees no Inequality altho' it ought not positively to conclude but where it sees evidently I shall not tarry here to Explain at large the Errors of the Sight as to the Figures of Bodies because any Book of Optics will save me that Labour This Science indeed does only show how the Eyes are deceiv'd and all its direction consists but in helping us to make those Natural Judgments we have spoke of at such time as we ought not to make them and this may be done after so many ways that there is not one Figure in the World which may not be Painted after a thousand different manners so as that the Sight will Infallibly be deceiv'd thereby But this is not a place to Explain these things thorowly what has been said is sufficient to show that we must not trust to our Eyes when they represent the Figure of Bodies to us altho' we are not so subject to be deceiv'd by Figures as other things CHAP. VIII I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That duration which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is is unknown III. Examples of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest WE have discover'd the principal and most general Errors of the Sight about the Extension of Figures we must now correct those in which it deceives us about the Motion of Matter and this will not be a very difficult performance after what we have said about Extension for there is so great a relation betwixt these two things that if we are deceiv'd about the bigness of Bodies we must unavoidably be deceiv'd in their Motion But to offer nothing except what is clear and distinct we must first take away the Equivocation of the word Motion for this Term commonly signifies two things the first is a certain power that is imagin'd in a mov'd Body which is the Cause of its Motion the second is a continual removal of a Body that is departing from or approaching to another that is consider'd as in a State of Rest When we say for Instance that a Bowle hath communicated its Motion to another the word Motion is here taken in the first signification but if it be said simply that a Boul is in Motion it is taken in the second Sense And indeed this term Motion signifies both the Cause and Effect together which yet are in themselves two different things They seem to me to be in the grossest and most dangerous Error concerning force who attribute to it Motion and the transportation of Bodies these fine terms of Nature and impressed Qualities seem to me to be only a proper Subterfuge for the Ignorance of the falsly Learn'd See the 3d Chapter of the Second Part 6. l. and impious Libertines as may be very easily proved but this is not a fit place to
Of the Imagination of Men in the prime of their yea● is from Thirty to fifty years At that Age the Fibres of the Brain have generally acquir'd a moderate consistence The Pleasures and Pains of the Senses for the most part make no farther Impression upon 'em so that they need no more then to defend themselves from violent Passions which rarely happen and this they may do provided they carefully avoid all occasions that excite 'em so that the Soul being no longer distracted with such kind of Interruptions may with more ease apply it self to the Contemplation of Truth A Man in such an Estate and who has quitted the prejudices of his Infancy who from his Youth has acquir'd a Promptness to Meditation who not only retains a clear and distinct Notions of the Mind and carefully rejects all the confus'd Idea's of the Senses and who has both leisure and a Wit to meditate such a Man will hardly fall into Errors But 't is not of such a Man that we are now to Discourse 't is of the common sort of Men who for the most part are of another Constitution The Consistence then which we meet with at the years of Discretion in the Fibres of Mens Brains is the cause if it may be so said of the Solidity and Consistence of their Errors 'T is the Seal that Seals their Prejudices and all their false Opinions and shelters 'em from the strength of Reason In a word the more Advantageous this Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is to Persons well Educated the more Disadvantageous it is to the greatest part of Men since it confirms both the one and the other in their Present Thoughts and Opinions But Men are not only confirm'd in their Errors when they are arriv'd at the Age of Forty or Fifty years they are also more subject to fall into new ones because that believing themselves at that time able to judge of every thing as indeed it would become 'em to be so they decide with presumption and only consult their own Prepossessions for Men never argue upon things but in some relation to those Idea's which are most familiar to ' em When a Chymist would Argue about some Natural Body presently his Three Principles come into his Mind A Peripatic immediately thinks of the four Elements and the four first Qualities another Philosopher refers every thing to other Principles So that nothing can enter into the Mind of Man which is not immediately infected with the Errors to which it is subject or which does not augment the number of its Errors This Consistence of the Fibres of the Brain produces another very bad Effect especially in Persons more advanced in years which is to make 'em uncapable of Meditation They cannot set themselves to the Consideration of those Things which they desire to know and so they can never penetrate into those Truths which are but a little conceal'd They cannot relish the most Rational Sentiments when they are supported by Principles which appear new to them though they are otherwise very intelligent in things of which their years have given 'em great Experience But all that I have here said extends no farther than only to such as have spent their Youth without making use of their Wit or applying themselves to Study To clear these things 't is requisite to know that we cannot learn any thing whatever it be without giving our minds to it and that we cannot be attentive upon any thing if we do not imagine and admit a lively representation of it into the Brains Now that we may imagine Objects 't is necessary that some some part of the Brain give way or that there should be imprinted on it some other Motion that so it may be able to form the Traces which are affix'd to the Idea's that represent those Objects to us so that if the Fibres of the Brain are but a little harden'd they will admit no Inclinations or Motions but what they were formerly accustom'd to Whence it comes to pass that the Soul can never imagin nor consequently be attentive upon what it desires but only upon things that are familiar to it From hence we must conclude that it is of great advantage for a Man to Exercise himself in me●it ●ting upon all sorts of Subjects that so he may be able to acquire a Readiness to think upon what he pleases For as we acquire an extraordinary facility to stir our Fingers after various manners and with a swiftness even to wonder by frequent use in playing upon Instruments so the Parts of the Brain the Motion o● which is requisite to imagine what we desire do by use and custom acquire a certain easiness and slexibility which is the reason that Things are imagin'd more easily more readily and more distinctly Now the best way to acquire this Habitude which makes the chief distinction betwixt a Wise Man and another Person is to accustom our selves in our youth to search after the truth of such things as are very difficult because at that Age the Fibres are more pliable and apt to give way Nevertheless I do not pretend that this Facility is to be acquir'd by those who are call'd Men of Study yet make it their business only to read without meditating and without searching of themselves the Decision of a Question before they read it in an Author For 't is visible that by that means only a Man acquires a facility to remember things that he has read 'T is every day observable that they who read much can never apply their Minds to new things that are told 'em and that the vanity of their Learning hurrying 'em to judge of those things before they have conceiv'd 'em in their Minds throws 'em into those Errors which other Men avoid But though the want of Application be the principal Cause of their Errors there is one that is peculiar to ' em That in regard they always carry in their Memories an infinite number of confus'd Species they presently choose out some one which they look upon to be the Subject of the Dispute and because the Things that are told 'em do not agree therewith they judge ridiculously that their Opponent is deceiv'd If you make it out to 'em that they themselves are deceiv'd and that they do not so much as understand the State of the Question then they are mad and not able to apprehend what is said to 'em and they still keep stedfast to the first false Species which their Memory presented to ' em If you shew 'em their Mistake too apparently they will start a Second and a Third which they will defend sometimes against all Appearance of Truth nay even against their own Consciences because they have no respect or love for Truth and because they are asham'd to acknowledge that there are some things which others know better than themselves What ever has been said concerning Persons of Forty or Fifty years of Age III.
their Masters For as those Persons do as much as in 'em lies never permit any but such as are devoted to their Interests or such as they are no way afraid of to speak to their Masters so the Prejudices of these Men will not permit the Mind to behold with a fixed Eye the Idea's of Objects that are wholly pure and unmix'd but they disguise 'em they cover 'em with their Liveries and present 'em in that manner all masqu'd so that 't is a difficult thing for 'em to undeceive themselves and acknowledge their Errors CHAP. IX I. Of Effeminate Wits II. Of Superficial Wits III. Of Persons of Authority IV. Of those that make Experiments WHat we have said is sufficient in my Opinion to set forth in general what are the Defects of the Imagination in Studious Persons and the Errors to which they are most subject Now in regard there are none but these Persons who trouble themselves with Searching after Truth and because all the rest of Mankind depends upon them for it it might be thought that we should here conclude this Second Part. Nevertheless 't is convenient to say something more concerning the Errors of other Men because it will not be amiss to know what they are Of the Effemina●e Wits Whatever flatters the Senses extreamly affects us and to whatever affects us we apply our selves proportionably to the pleasure we take in it Thus they who give themselves up to all manner of the most sensible and pleasing Divertisements are incapable of penetrating Truths that include any considerable difficulty because the Receptacle of the Mind which is not infinite is wholly taken up with their Pleasures or at least they have a very great share therein The generality of Great Men Courtiers Rich Men young People and they that are call'd by the name of fine Wits being taken up with continual Pastimes and only Studying the Art of flattering their Concupiscence and Voluptuous Appetites by degrees acquire such a Delicacy of Skill in these things or rather such a Softness that they may be often said to be rather Effeminate than fine Wits as they pretend to be For there is a great difference between Fineness and Softness of Wit though they are generally confounded one with another Fine Wits are they who discern by the Conduct of Reason the most minute differences of things who foresee the uncommon and almost imperceptible Effects that depend upon Hidden Causes In short these are they who penetrate into the Subjects which they consider But soft Wits have nothing but a false Delicacy they are neither lively nor pierceing they discern not the Effects from the Causes even of the most gross palpable thing Lastly they neither apprehend nor penetrate into any thing but are extreamly nice as to Manners A Clownish Word the Accent of a particular County a little Grimace provokes 'em more than a torrent of confus'd and frivolous Arguments they cannot know the Defect of Reasoning but are immediately very sensible of a false Measure or an irregular Gesture In short they understand sensible things perfectly because they keep their Senses in continual Exercise but they want the true understanding of things that depend upon Reason because they seldom or never make use of their own Nevertheless these are the Persons who are most esteemed in the World and easily acquire the Reputation of Curious Wits For when a Man speaks with a free and disengag'd Air when his Expressions are pure and well chosen when he makes use of Simile's that flatter the Senses and move the Affections after an imperceptible manner though he utter nothing but trivial things though there be nothing found nothing true in all his fine Words He according to the Common Opinion shall be cried up for a Curious Wit a Refin'd Wit a Polish'd Wit They never perceive that he is only a Soft Effeminate Wit and shines only by false Lights that never enlighten the Mind and that his persuasions prevail only because we have Eyes but not because we have Reason Lastly We do not deny but that all Men are in some measure guilty of this weakness which we have observ'd in some There is not any Man whose Mind is not touch'd by the Impressions of his Senses and Affections and who by consequence is not a little sway'd by outward Formalities and Language As to this all Men differ but in the more or the less But the reason why this defect is attributed to some particularly is this because there are some who acknowledge it to be a fault and strive to reform it Whereas they who have been mentioned by us look upon it as a very advantageous Accomplishment Far from acknowledging this same false Delicacy to be the Effect of an Effeminate Softness and the Original of an Infinite number of the Diseases of the Mind they imagine it to be an Effect and Mark of the Beauty of their Genius To these of whom we have spoken Of Superficial Wits we may join a very great number of Superficial Wits who never dive into any thing and who never apprehend unless it be confusedly the differences of things Not through their own fault as in those before mentioned for their Minds are neither fill'd up nor contracted by their Divertisements only they have naturally Slender Wits However this same Slenderness of Wit proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul as may be well imagin'd but it is caus'd sometimes by the great scarcity or the more than ordinary slowness of the Animal Spirits sometimes through the Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain sometimes also through an immoderate abundance of Spirits and Blood or for some other Reason which it is not worth while to examine There are then two sorts of Wits Some readily observe the difference of things and these are True Wits Others imagine and suppose a Resemblance between 'em and these are Superficial Wits The first have a Brain proper to receive clean and distinct Traces of the Objects which they consider and because they are very attentive to the Idea's of the Traces they see those Objects as it were near at hand and nothing escapes ' em But Superficial Wits receive none but feeble or confus'd Traces of their Objects They see 'em only as it were cursorily at a distance and very confusedly so that they seem alike to 'em like the Faces of those which we see afar off because the Mind supposes always Likeness and Equality for the Reasons which I shall give in the Third Book The greatest part of those that speak in Publick all those that are call'd great Talkers and many of those who are fluent of Speech though they speak but little are of this sort For they who meditate seriously and accurately are very rarely known to have a Copious Utterance of their own Meditations Usually they hesitate when they begin to speak because they are somewhat cautious of making use of Terms that excite in others a false Idea being asham'd
among Men not only in what concerns the Nature of the Mind but in every thing else For since there is an Essential Difference between Knowing and Doubting if the Academics speak what they think when they assure us they know nothing we may justly say they are the most ignorant of all Men. Nor are they only the most ignorant of all Men but they are also the most obstinate Assertors of the most Irrational Opinions For they not only reject whatever is most certain and most universally received that they may be accounted great Wits but by the same violence of the Imagination they please themselves with talking after a decisive manner of the most uncertain and improbable things Montagne apparently labours under this Distemper and therefore of necessity we must conclude that he was not only ignorant of the Nature of Mans Mind but also that he was intangled in many gross Errors in reference to that Subject granting that he spoke what he thought as it became him to do For what may we say of a Man who confounds Mind and Matter together who recites the most extravagant Opinions of the Philosophers upon the anture of the Soul yet so far from condemning 'em that he rather approves 'em though most repugnant to Reason who sees not the Necessity of the Immortality of our Souls who believes that Human Reason is not capable of understanding it ● 2. c. 12. and looks upon all the Prooss that are brought to confirm it as so many ' Dreams which the desire of Immortality produces in us Somnia non decentis sed optantis who is angry with Men because they separate themselves from the Croud of other Creatures and distinguish themselves from Beasts which he calls our Fellow Brethren and our Companions and which as he believes discourse together understand one another and laugh at us as we speak understand each other and deride them who believes there is a greater difference between a Man and a Man than between a Man and a Beast and who attributes even to Spiders Deliberation Thought and Conclusion and who after he has asserted that the Frame of Mans Body has no advantage over that of Beasts willingly embraces the following Sentiment That it is not Reason nor Ratiocination nor the Soul that renders M●n more Excellent than Beasts but our Beauty our Complexion and the Structure of our Limbs above which Prerogatives we ought not to prefer our Vnderstanding our Prudence and other Vertues c. Can a Man who relying upon these Whimsical Opinions conclude That 't is not for his Ratiocination but his Pride and Obstinacy that Man Extolls himself above Beasts Can such a Man I say have an exact knowledge of the Mind of Man or is it to be thought that he can persuade others he has it But we must do Justice to all the World and give a faithful Character of Montegne's Parts He had a bad Memory and a worse Judgment 't is true but those two Qualities together do not compose that which usually the World calls the Beauty of the Mind 'T is the Elegancy the Vivacity the Extention of the Imagination that procures a Man the Reputation of being a good Wit The Common sort of People admire that which glitters not that which is solid because they have a greater value for that which affects their Senses than for that which informs their Reason And therefore mistaking Elegancy of Imagination for Elegancy of Wit it may be said that Montagne had an Elegant and Extraordinary Wit His Idea's are false but splendid his Expressions irregular or bold but pleasant his Discourses ill supported by Reason but well imagin'd There is throughout his Book a Character of an Original which pleases infinitely Though he be an Usurper of others Mens Draughts it may be said that his Bold and Strong Imagination gives the Turn of an Original to every thing he Copies Lastly he has all those things ready at hand which are necessary to please and allure nor have I obscurely demonstrated as I am apt to believe that he has acquir'd Admiration among so many Men not by convincing their Reason by Evident Arguments but by subduing their Minds by the Commanding and Victorious power of his Imagination CHAP. VI. I. Of Imaginary Wizards and Lycanthropi or Wolf-Men II. A Conclusion of the Two First Books THere is nothing wherein the force of the Imagination more prodigiously shews it self than in the hideous number of Goblines Apparitions Witchcrafts Characters Inchantments Charms and generally of all those things which are thought to depend upon the Power of the Devil There is nothing more terrible or formidable to the Mind or which produces in the Brain deeper Traces than the Idea of an Invisible Power which we are not able to resist and which meditates nothing but to do us Mischief All Discourses which revive that Idea are listen'd to with Fear and Curiosity Men adhering to every thing that is extraordinary take a Phantastic delight to tell surprizing and prodigious Stories of the Power and Malice of Wizards as well to frighten others as to terrifie themselves So that 't is no wonder that Wizards are so common in some Countreys where the Belief of those Nocturnal Meetings of Wizards called Sabbaths has too much prevail'd where all the most extravagant Tales of Witchcrafts are heard as so many Authentic Histories and where real Madmen and Visionaries whose Imagination was at first disordered as well by the rehearsal of such Tales as by the Corruption of their own Hearts are burnt for Wizards I know that many People will blame me for attributing the greatest part of Witchcrafts to the force of Imagination because there are some Men who delight in terrifying things and are angry with those that go about to disabuse 'em and who are like those that are sick through the power of Imagination who listen most awfully to their Physicians that foretell some dismal thing that is to befall 'em and obey their Prescriptions exactly Superstition is not easily destroy'd and when ever it is attacqued it finds a great number of Champions and this same proneness to believe all the Dotages of Daemonographers is produc'd and cherish'd by the same cause that renders the Superstitious obstinate as may be easily prov'd However it will not be amiss to set down in few Words how in my Judgment such Opinions as these came to get footing in the World A Shepherd in his Cottage after Supper tells his Wife and Children what was done at the Convention of Wizards called the Sabbat Now when his Imagination comes to be heated by the Vapours of the Wine and that he begins to believe himself to have been present at that Imaginary Assembly he fails not to speak of it after a strong and vigorous manner His Natural Eloquence together with the Proneness of his Family to give Ear to so new and terrible a Story could not but produce strange Traces in their weak Imaginations Nor is it otherwise
's easie to conclude that we must not at first apply our selves to an Enquiry into hidden Truths whose knowledge depends upon too many things and whereof some are not familiar enough to us For we ought to Study methodically and make use of what we know distinctly to apprehend what we know not or what we know but confusedly However the greatest part of those who Study do not take this Course they make no Essay upon their own Strength they consult not themselves to know what they are capable of 'T is a secret Vanity and an irregular desire of knowing and not Reason which rules their Studies They begin inconsiderately to enquire into the most secret and impenetrable Truths and to resolve Questions which depend upon so great number of Relations that the most quick and penetrating Mind cannot discover them with any absolute certainty but after many Ages and almost an infinity of Experiments There are a great number of Questions of this Nature in Physicks and Morality All Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities as of Animals Plants Metals and of their respective Qualities are Sciences which can never be sufficiently evident nor certain especially if they be not manag'd after another Method than heretofore or if we begin not by the most Simple and least compounded Sciences upon which they depend But studious Persons will not give themselves the trouble of Philosophizing in Order they do not agree upon the Certainty of Physical Principles they know not the Nature of Bodies in General nor their Qualities but confess it themselves However they imagin they can give a reason why for Example the Hairs of Old Men wax White and yet their Teeth grow Black which depends upon so many Causes that it 's impossible to give any certain reason for it To know this it 's necessary to understand in what consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular the Humours with which they are nourished the Philtres through which these Humours pass the Conformation and the Root of the Hairs or the Skin through which they pass and the difference of all these things in a Young and an Old Man which it 's absolutely impossible or at least very difficult to know Aristotle II. An example of want of Order in Aristotle for example hath pretended to know the Cause of this Whiteness which happens to Old Mens Hairs he hath given many reasons in different places of his Books But because he is the Genius of Nature he stays not there he enquires deeper He hath discover'd that the Cause which makes Old Mens Hairs White was the same which made some Persons and some Horses have one Eye Blew and the other of another Colour These are his words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is sufficiently Surprising Book V. De Gener. Anim. C. 1. but there is nothing hid from this great Man and he gives reasons of so great a Number of things in almost all places of his Physicks which the sharpest Persons of this Age believe Impenetrable that it was deservedly said of him That God gave him to us that we might be Ignorant of nothing that was to be known Aristotelis Doctrina est Summa Veritas quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis Humani Intellectus Quare bene dicitur de illo quod ipse fuit creatus datus nobis Divina Providentia ut non ignoremus possibilia Sciri Averroes ought to have added That Divine Providence gave us Aristotle to teach us what was impossible to be known For it 's true that this Philosopher does not only teach us things which may be known but if since he must be believ'd upon his word his Doctrine be the Soveraign Truth Summa Veritas he also teaches us those things which are impossible to be known Certainly one must have much Faith thus to believe Aristotle when he gives us only Logical Reasons and only explains the Effects of Nature by the Confus'd Notions of the Senses especially since he boldly decides Questions which will never be resolv'd by other Men. Thus Aristotle takes a particular Care to inform us that we must believe him upon his word for 't is an incontestable Axiom with this Author that the Disciple must believe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is true that Disciples are sometimes oblig'd to believe their Master but their Faith ought to be extended only to Experiments and Matter of Fact for if they intend to become true Philosophers they must examine the Reasons of their Masters and then receive them only when they discover the Evidence of them by their own Judgment But to be a Peripatetick it is absolutely necessary to believe and to retain and the same Disposition of Mind ought to be had at the reading of that Philosophy as at the reading of an History for if any one takes the Liberty of making use of his Judgment and Reason he must not expect ever to be a great Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the reason why Aristetle and many other Philosophers have pretended to know what can never be known is That they have never known the difference betwixt Knowing and Knowing betwixt having a certain and evident Knowledge and having but a probable one And the reason why they never understood this difference is That the Subjects to which they applied themselves being beyond the perfect reach of their Mind they saw but a part of them without being able to comprehend them all together which indeed is enough to discover many Probabilities but not to discover Truth evidently Besides they seeking after Science meerly out of Vanity and probabilities being more apt to gain the Esteem of Men than Truth it self because they are more proportionated to the common reach of the Mind they have neglected to seek after necessary Means to increase the Capacity of the Mind and to give it more Extension than it has so that they have not been able to penetrate the bottom of Truths that are but a little hidden Geometricians have well known how little Extension the Mind has Geometricians behave themselves well in their Search after Truth at least they behaved themselves in their Studies after such way as shews they know it perfectly especially those that have made use of Algebra which Vieta and Descartes have renewed and improv'd in this Age. What I say appears from this That those Persons have not undertaken the Resolution of very compound Difficulties before they knew clearly the more Simple on which they depend They did not apply themselves to the Consideration of Lines as Conick Sections until they were Masters of common Geometry But that which is particular to Algebraists IV. Their Method inlarges the Capacity of the Mind that of Aristotle contractsit is That they see their Mind cannot be at the same time applied to many Figures they cannot imagine Solicts that have more than three Dimensions although it 's often necessary to conceive they may have more they make use of Common and very
of Well-being Now the Love of Well-being is so Powerful that it sometimes proves Stronger than the Love of Being and Self-Love makes us sometimes desire not to be because we have not a Well-being This is the Case of all the Damned who according to the Word of Jesus Christ had better not to be than to be so Unhappy as they are because these Wretches being declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodness Centers and who is the Sole Cause of Pleasure and of Pain which we are capable of it is impossible they should enjoy any Satisfaction they are and will be Eternally Unhappy because their Will will ever remain in the same Disposition and in the same Irregularity So that Self-Love includes two Loves the Love of Greatness of Power of Independence and generality of all things which seem to be proper for the Preservation of our Being and the Love of Pleasure and of all things that are necessary for our Well-being that is To be Happy and Satisfied Those two Loves may be divided several ways Whether because we are composed of two different parts of Soul and Body according to which they may be divided or because they may be distinguish'd or specified by the different Objects that are useful for our Preservation However we will not inlarge upon that because as we do not design to make a Treatise of Morality it is not necessary to make an Inquiry into and an exact Division of all the things we look upon as our Felicities It was only necessary to make this Division to relate the cause of our Errors in some order Therefore we shall first speak of those Errors which are caused by our Inclination for Greatness and for all those things that makes our Being Independant of others And afterwards we shall treat of those which proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleasure and for all those things which render our Being the best it can be for us or that contents us most CHAP. VI. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect as Science and Virtue I. Of the Inclination we have for all that raises us above other Persons or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful as Dignities and Riches seem in some measure to make us Independent All those that are beneath us have a Respect for us and fear us they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preservation and they dare neither Prejudice us nor oppose our Desires Therefore Men constantly endeavour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others For they never consider that both their Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God above and not on Men and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy does not consist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men as Weak and as Miserable as themselves but in an humble Submission to the Will of God who being Just will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Vertue Dignities and Riches they also use their utmost Efforts in order to persuade others that they do really possess them And if it may be said that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so it may also be said that they often take less care to be Virtuous than to appear so For as the Author of the Book Entituled Reflectiones Morales fays agreeably Virtue would not go far unless it were accompanied with Vanity The Reputation of being Rich Learned and Virtuous produces in the Imagination of those that are about us or that are more nearly related to us very convenient Dispositions for us It makes them fall at our Feet it makes them act in our Favour it Inspires them with all the Motions that tend to the Preservation of our Being and to the Increase of our Grandeur Thus Men preserve their Reputation as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue Learning Dignities and Riches and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages We will now endeavour to show by some Examples how those Inclinations may engage them into Error Let us begin by the Inclination that Men have for Virtue or for the Appearance of Virtue Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous commonly imploy their Mind and Time to understand Religion and to exercise themselves in good Works They only desire with St. Paul to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly and to know their Duty after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness And therefore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation No Fault can be found with that Conduct it is Infinitely to be valued II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly and they often repent their not having followed it more But this is unapprovable that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane very Certain and Useful which disingage the Mind from Sensible Things and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel some Pious Persons without having examin'd them condemn them too freely either as being Useless or Uncertain It is true that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless Men are partly in the right to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use No body is oblig'd to study them and it is better to despise them than to suffer ones self to be deceiv'd or blinded by them Nevertheless we may affirm That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths The Universal Knowledge or the Existence of a God is absolutely necessary since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God It is necessary to know that it is his Will which makes and which regulates Nature That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will In a word That all things whatever depend on God It is also necessary to know what Truth is the means to distinguish it from Error the Distinction between the Mind and Body the Consequences that may be drawn from it as the Immortality of the Soul and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty The Knowledge of Man or of ones self is a Science that cannot be reasonably despis'd it contains a World of