to great Cities will succeed the better in their Learning both upon that account and by their being instructed by abler Masters Having thus provided against this Evil which is much greater than it seems to be we must also provide against another into which France would infallibly fall if all the Colledges that are establish'd were in one Hand The Universities pretend that a great deal of wrong is done them in not leaving them exclusively from all others the faculty of Teaching Youth The Jesuits on the other hand would not be displeas'd perhaps of being the only Persons imploy'd in that Function Reason which ought to decide all sorts of Differences does not permit the frustrating of an ancient Possessor of what he possesses with a just Title And Publick Interest cannot suffer a Society not only recommendable by their Piety but famous for their Learning as the Jesuits are to be depriv'd of a Function which they are able to perform with great Advantage for the Publick If the Universities should teach alone there would be cause to fear they would in time resume their former Pride which might prove as prejudicial for the future as it has been heretofore If on the other hand the Jesuits had no Companions in the instructing of Youth besides that the like Inconvenience might be fear'd there would be moreover a just subject to fear many others A Society which is govern'd more than any ever was by the Laws of Prudence and which devoting it self to God without depriving themselves of the knowledge of the things of this World lives in so perfect a Correspondence that the same Spirit seems to animate the whole Body A Society which by a blind Vow of Obedience is submitted to a perpetual Chief cannot according to the Laws of Sound Policy be much Authoriz'd in a State in which a powerful Community must be formidable If it be true as it is most certain that Men have a natural Inclination to advance those they have receiv'd their first Instructions from and that Parents have always a particular Affection for those who have educated their Children It is also true that the absolute Education of Youth cannot be committed to the Jesuits without being expos'd to give them a Power which would be the more obnoxius to States in that all the Places and Honours which give the management thereof would be fill'd by their Disciples and that those who take an Ascendant early over the Mind sometimes retain it during their whole Life If we add that the Administration of the Sacrament of Penance gives that Society a second Authority over all sorts of Persons which is of no less weight than the first If we consider that by those two ways they penetrate into the most secret Motions of Hearts and Families it will be impossible not to conclude that it is not fit to leave them the said Ministry alone without Competitors Those Reasons have been so powerful in all States that we have no Example of any hitherto who have been willing to yield the Empire of Letters and the absolute Education of their Youth to that Society alone If that Society good and harmless in it self created so much Jealousie in the Arch Duke Albert one of the most pious Princes of the House of Austria who only acted according to the Motions of the Council of Spain that he thought fit to exclude them out of certain Universities in which they were actually settled and to oppose the new Settlements they design'd in Flanders If they have behav'd themselves so as to induce some Republicks to remove them absolutely out of their Dominions tho' with too much Rigour it is the least that can be done in this Kingdom to give them some Check seeing not only that they are submitted to a Foreign and Perpetual Chief but moreover subject and at the Devotion of Princes who seem to desire nothing more than to humble and ruine this Crown As in point of Faith all the Catholick States of the World have but one Doctrine in that which does not relate to it there are many who differ from whence the Source of their Fundamental Maxims is often deriv'd for which reason standing in need of some Theologians who may on certain occasions couragiously defend the Opinions which have been always receiv'd there and preserv'd by an uninterrupted Transmission they require some free from any Ingagement with any suspected Powers having no dependance to deprive them of Liberty in things in which Faith allows it to all the World History informs us that the Order of St. Benedict was formerly so absolutely Master of the Schools that no body was taught in any other places and that it decay'd so absolutely in point of Science and of Piety together in the Tenth Century of the Church that it was call'd Unhappy upon that account It also informs us that the Dominioans have afterwards enjoy'd the same Advantages which those good Fathers were first possess'd of and that Time has depriv'd them of it like the others to the great prejudice of the Church which happen'd to be infected at that time with many Heresies It also informs us by the same means that Letters are like passing Birds which do not always remain in the same Country And therefore Policy requires the preventing of the said Inconvenience which being come to pass twice is with Reason to be fear'd a third time and which probably will not happen if that Society has Companions in the Possession of Letters All Parties are dangerous in point of Doctrine and nothing can be more easie than to form one under pretence of Piety when a Society thinks it self oblig'd to it by the Interest of their Subsistance The History of Pope Benedict the 11th against whom the Cordeliers nettled upon the account of the Perfection of Poverty viz. of the Revenue of St. Francis were animated to that degree that they did not only declare open War against him by their Books but moreover by the Emperour's Arms by favour of which an Anti-pope arose to the great prejudice of the Church is too great an Example to require any thing more to be said upon that subject The more Societies adhere to their Chief or Superiour the more they are to be fear'd particularly by those to whom they are not favourable Since then Prudence obliges not only to oppose whatever may be prejudicial to the State but also to prevent whatever might contribute thereunto since the Power of so doing often creates a Desire so to do Since also the Weakness of Humane Nature requires a Counterpoise in all things and that it is the Foundation of Justice it is more reasonable that the Universities and the Jesuits should Teach in Emulation of one another to the end that the said Emulation may whet their Vertue and that Sciences may the better flourish and be certain in the State in that being deposited into the Hands of Two Guardians if the one should chance to lose this sacred Pledge
which is seldom repair'd afterwards The wisest Princes have avoided those divers kinds of Evils in making Reason the guide of all their Affections Many have cur'd themselves of them after having found to their Cost that unless they did it their Ruin was Inevitable To return precisely to the Point of the Question proposed in this Chapter the scope of which is to show how Important it is to discern those who are the fittest for Employments I will conclude it saying That since Interest is that which makes Men guilty of Male-adminnistration in the Places that are committed to them Ecclesiasticks are often to be preferr'd to many others in what relates to Places of great Trust Not that they are less subject to their own Interest but because they have a great deal less self Interest than other Men since that having neither Wives nor Children they are free from the Bonds which ingage Men most CHAP. VIII Of the Evil which Flatterers Detractors and Intriguers commonly occasion in States and how necessary it is to remove them from Kings and to banish them from their Courts THere is no Plague so capable to ruine a State as Flatterers Detractors and certain Men who apply themselves wholly to form Cabals and Intrigues in their Courts They are so industrious to spread their Venom by divers imperceptible ways that it is difficult to scape it without abundance of care As they are neither of a Quality nor Merit to have a share in the Management of Affairs nor good enough to be concern'd for the Publick Good their only aim is to disturb both and expecting great advantages from Confusion they omit no means to overthrow by their Flatteries by their Crafts and by their Detractions the Order and Rule which deprives them absolutely of all hopes of Fortune since it is impossible to build any in a well disciplin'd State unless it be upon Merit which they are wholly destitute of Besides that as it is a common thing for those who have no share in Affairs to endeavour to ruine them those sort of Men are capable of doing all manner of Evils and therefore it behoves Princes to take all the precautions imaginable against the malice which disguises it self in so many different dresses that it is often difficult to ward it There are some who notwithstanding they have neither Courage nor Wit have nevertheless so much of both as to feign as much steadiness as a profound and severe Wisdom and to set off themselves in finding fault with every body's Actions even when they are most to be commended and that it is Impossible to do better in respect of the thing in question Nothing is so easy as to find apparent Reasons to Condemn what cannot be better done and what has been undertaken upon such Solid Foundations that one could not have done otherwise without committing a notable fault Others having neither Mouths nor Spurs dislike by their Gestures by shaking of their Heads and by aserious Grimace what they dare not Condemn with Words and cannot be blam'd with Reason Not to flatter in what Relates to such Men It is not enough for the Prince to refuse them his Ear he must also banish them from the Cabinet and Court together because that as their facility is sometimes so great that to speak to them and to persuade them is the same thing even when they cannot be persuaded there still remains some Impression which has its Effect another Time when the same Artifice is renew'd And indeed the Little Application they have to Affairs induces them often to Judge the Cause rather by the number of Witnesses than by the Weight of the accusations I could hardly relate all the Evils those Evil Councelors have been the Authors of during your Majestie 's Reign But I have so lively a Resentment of it for the Interest of the State that it forces me to say That there can be no room for mercy for such Men in order to prevent the mischiefs that have been done in my Time Tho a Prince be never so Firm and Constant he cannot without great Imprudence and without exposing himself to Ruin keep ill Men about him who may surprise him unexpectedly as during a Contagion a Malignant Vapor siezes in an Instant the Heart and Brains of the strongest Men when they think themselves soundest Those Public Plagues must be remov'd never to return unless they have cast all their Venom which happens so seldom that the care we ought to have of repose obliges more to the Continuation of their Removal than Charity can Invite to recall them I boldly advance this proposition because I have never seen any of those Lovers of Factions bred in the Intrigues of the Court lose their Ill habit and change their Nature unless for want of Power which properly speaking do's not Change them since the will of doing Ill remains in them when the Power has left them I am sensible that some of those Men may be sincerely converted but experience teaching me that for one who persists in his repentance twenty return to their old Vomit I decide boldly That it is better to use Rigor against one Person who deserves favour than to expose a State to some prejudice by being too Indulgent either towards those who keep their malice in their Heart only acknowledging their fault in Letters or towards those whose levity may give a reason to dread a relapse worse than their former Evil. 'T is no wonder that Angels should never do any Evil since they are confirm'd in Grace but that those who are obstinate in that kind of Malice should do any good when they may do harm is a kind of Miracle which must be wrought by the immediate Powerful hand of God and it is certain that a Man of great Probity will find much more difficulty to subsist in an Age corrupted by such Men than one whose Vertue they will not stand in dread of this Reputation not being so Intire Some are of Opinion that it suits with the goodness of Kings to Tolerate things which seem to be of small Consequence in the beginning but I say That they can never be too careful to discover and to extinguish the least Intrigues of their Cabinets and of their Courts in their Birth Great Conflagrations being occasion'd by small sparks who ever puts out one do's not know what mischief he has prevented but to discover it if he leaves any one unextinguish'd tho the same Causes do not always produce the same Effect he will perhaps find himself reduc'd to such an Extremity that it will no longer be in his Power to remedy the same Whether it be true or no that a little Poyson stops a great Vessel the Course of which it cannot advance of one Moment it is easy to conceive by what Naturalists relate to us of that Poyson that it is absolutely necessary to purge a State of that which may put a stop to the Course of Affairs tho it
Charging the Provinces with the Raising and maintaining of Souldiers Soveraigns ought to take the Care of it and that they may make them subsist with order if they will use proper means to that end according to the following order All Souldiers must be Listed their Names place of Birth and of abode Enter'd that in case they should run away from their Colours they may be the sooner found again The Register of every Place must be charg'd with the number of those that shall be rais'd within his Precinct and the Judges oblig'd to use their endeavours for the apprehending and punishing according to the Ordinances all those who shall come back from the Armys without leave on pain of the said Judges being turn'd out of their Offices upon proof of their having receiv'd Information of the return of your Souldiers without having prosecuted them for the same For the Listing of Souldiers every one must be oblig'd to serve three Years without demanding to be dismiss'd unless in the Case of an Evident Ilness on condition that the said Term being expir'd it shall not be lawful to refuse it them when demanded This condition is very necessary by reason that when the French think themselves constrain'd and kept against their Will they commonly think of nothing but running away tho they were to lose a thousand Lives if they had so many whereas when they are at Liberty to retire it is likely they will freely remain in the Armies Nature commonly inclining Men to have a less desire for what they are allow'd to do than to do that which is forbidden them Whatever Souldier shall obtain his dismission shall be oblig'd to enter the same into the Register of the Jurisdiction in which he was rais'd The Chiefs and Officers of a Regiment shall not be allow'd on any pretence whatever to receive Souldiers of another on pain of being degraded of Arms nay more of their Gentility if they are Gentlemen And the Souldiers who shall abandon their Captains without leave shall be sent to the Galleys without Mercy at whatever time they are taken neither shall any change of Place or of condition exempt them from the same No Furlow or Dismission shall be allow'd of unless sign'd by the Colonel or Commander in Chieâ— in his Absence and seal'd with the Seal of the Regiment Every Regiment shall have a Provost a Commissary a Comptroller and a Pay Master who shall all be obliged to follow the Regiment on pain not only of being cashier'd but also of Exemplary Punishment In case any disorders happen and the Provost do's not Punish the offenders according to the Laws of Arms he shall be punished himself as soon as the said Complaint is brought to your Majesty or to the Generals In case the Regiment is not Compleat and the Comptroller or Commissary do not give Notice thereof they shall be answerable for it themselves and be severely punished If the Men are unpay'd by the Pay-Master's fault either by his imbezeling the King's Money by bare put offs or delays or other failures he shall be liable to pay the quadruple and to be exemplarily punish'd The said Officers shall only be imploy'd by way of Commission Experience having shewn that nothing spoils the King's Officers more particularly in Military Affairs than to give them Places for Life which properly speaking is nothing but a Title to steal with Impunity Those who command the Forces shall be oblig'd to put them in Battalia whenever it shall be requir'd by the Commissaries To the end that those who shall have such Commissions may perform them faithfully the Commissary shall have 200 Livers a month the Comptroller 150 Livers the Provost 100 Livers his Clerk 50 Livers and every one of his Men 30 Livers And whereas it would be to no purpose to regulate the Souldiers and inferiour Officers without prescribing the Order which must be observ'd by the principal Officers The Colonels Captains Serjeants Major Lieutenants and Ensigns shall not be allow'd to quit their Posts without leave from their Generals and Commanders of the Forces or from your Majesty and in case any shall infringe the said Regulation they shall be Cashier'd Degraded of their Gentility and Arms if they are Gentlemen or barely Cashier'd if they are not without any prejudice to greater punishments It will be fit for Your Majesty to impose this Law upon Your Self never to grant them any such leave in time of War without a Lawful Cause but when they are in Garison Your Majesty may be so kind as to grant furlows to a third part of the Officers for four months to the end that in a years time they may have it all in their turn If with this good Rule which cannot be thought too Austere even by those who may suffer by it particular care be taken of the Souldiers If Bread be given them all the year round six Musters and a Suit of Cloathes If the Military Missions be continued which were practis'd in 1639. to prevent their falling sick If when they are ill Hospitals be provided to follow the Army in all places as it was done in the said year and a livelyhood secur'd for those who shall be maim'd in the King's Service in the Commandery of St. Lewis design'd to that end I dare answer that the Infantry of this Kingdom will be well Disciplin'd for the future * Cavalry It will be the same with the Horse if raising them with the same Order which I do not repeat to avoid a tedious Narration every Trooper be obliged to keep two Horses for Service and a Sumpter If they are made to observe the Ordinances rigorously which oblige them never to be without Arms and if in time of Peace they are put in Garison in close places to prevent the disorders which it is impossible to secure the People against when Souldiers are Quarter'd in the open Countrey They have behav'd themselves so ill in these last Wars that in case they should remain in the same condition they would be no longer fit for any Service The true cause of their decay is the vast number that has been rais'd in these latter times to oppose the Cavalry of Foreigners who make all sorts of Men Troopers indifferently For which reason it has been impossible to raise them among the Gentrey of Courage and Activity as formerly and the Officers have been oblig'd to take not only old Souldiers but also raw young Men of all conditions whose Courage or Strength had never been Try'd If in imitating Strangers who receive all sorts of Men in their Cavalry ours had learnt also to support Fatigues as well as theirs tho' they had lost part of their ancient Valour which made them recommendable we should have some reason to comfort our selves but the Inconstancy and love of ease which reigns almost among all conditions in our Nation having quite alter'd them they have lost the best qualification they had without acquiring that which they had
Prudence That Punishment also shew'd that your Servants preferr'd Publick Good before Private Interest since on that occasion they resisted the Sollicitations of several Persons whom it behov'd them to have a great deal of Consideration for as well as the Threatnings of Monsieur which Puy-Laurens carry'd to that degree as to declare That in case Montmorency were put to Death Monsieur would find a time to make them suffer the same Fate The Patience wherewith you have born the new Conspiracies which Puy-Laurens form'd in Flanders in Monsieur's Name who retir'd thither for the third time is altogether like that which induces a Father to excuse the Behaviour which one of his Children is inspir'd with after having laid aside his Obedience That which has induc'd you to bear as long as the Good of the State and your own Conscience would permit you the Malice and Levity which have often induc'd the Duke of Lorrain to Arm against you is a Virtue which has but few Examples in History The Goodness which has prevail'd with you to be contented for the Reparation of his second Faults with the Deposition of some Places capable to keep him within the Bounds of his Duty had not his Folly equall'd his Breach of Faith will be found perhaps the more singular in that there are few Princes who lose the opportunity of making themselves Masters of a Neighbouring State when they have a lawful Subject and Power at once so to do After so many Relapses committed by the Duke your Vassal after he had snatch'd away from you contrary to his Faith against Divine and Humane Right a Pledge almost as precious as your State the Prudence wherewith you divested him when his Malice and Inconstancy could receive no other Remedies but the utmost Extremities is the more to be commended because that had you done it sooner your Justice might have been call'd in question Neither could you tarry longer without shewing your self insensible and without committing by Omission a Fault equal unto that which a Prince should commit in divesting another without a Cause What ought we not to say of the good Nature which has enclin'd you to procure Monsieur's Return into France for the third time when there seemed no longer to be any reason to trust his Faith after the divers Relapses and extraordinary Infidelities of his Followers Many thought with Reason that he could never come back again without exposing your most Faithful Servants and yet they were the only Persons who did sollicit your Majesty to draw him out of the Peril into which he had expos'd himself That Action will meet but few Examples in Antiquity if we consider the Circumstances of it and perhaps but little Imitation of it for the future As no body could without a great deal of Boldness advise your Majesty to grant Monsieur contrary to your own Sentiments a notable Augmentation of Power the Government of a Province and a strong Place in order to recall him out of Lorrain the first time he went out of the Kingdom so it requir'd a great deal of Firmness to resist the Instances he made for a whole Year together to have one given him upon the Frontier where he design'd to retire in quitting Flanders It was no small Happiness that those two Counsels succeeded so well that the Concession of the first place occasion'd his first Return and yet prov'd so innocent a Cause that being useful on that occasion they could not make an ill use of it since when his Adherents endeavour'd it And that the Refusal of the Second was so far from hindring him to return to his Duty and into his Native Country the only place of his Safety that on the contrary it induc'd him to return back again with as good an Intention as he and his have confess'd since it was bad when under Pretence of the Safety of his Person he defir'd a Retreat to disturb the growing Peace of France anew The extraordinary Favours your Majesty granted to Puy-Laurens to induce him to inspire a good Conduct to his Master are so worthy of remembrance that they must not be forgotten in this place The Punishment he receiv'd when you discover'd that he continu'd to abuse your Favours was too just and too necessary not to insert it afterwards I am persuaded that Posterity will observe three things which are very considerable on that Subject An entire Resignation of all Interests but such as related to the Publick Good in your Creatures who having receiv'd him by your express Command into their Alliance nevertheless advis'd you to secure him because the Good of the State requir'd it A great Prudence in performing that Action in the Presence of Monsieur who could not near hand disapprove a Council which he would have dreaded for himself at a distance had not Experience made him sensible that he was not aim'd at A great Boldness in allowing him as much Liberty as he enjoy'd before grounded barely upon this That as ill Counsels only had seduc'd him the Effect would cease with the Cause and that he would be no sooner destitute of them but he would follow by his own Sentiments a Method quite different from that he had been put upon This Action and many others transacted during your Majesty's Reign will I am sure make this pass for a certain Maxim That it is necessary on certain occasions in which the Welfare of the State is concern'd to assume a Male Virtue sometimes to exceed the Bounds of Common Prudence and that it is sometimes impossible to avoid certain Evils unless something be given to Fortune or rather to Divine Providence which seldom refuses its Assistance when our exhausted Wisdom can no longer furnish us with any Moreover your Conduct will be acknowledged the more just in that those who will read the History of your Life will find that your Majesty never punishes any body without having first endeavour'd by some extraordinary Favours to retain him within the Bounds of his Duty The Marshal d' Ornano was made Marshal to that end The Grand Prior was certain of the Command of the Sea when he perverted his Brother's Mind and both gave you Cause to deprive them of their Liberty The Marshal de Bassompierre only subsisted by your Favours when his way of speaking and of behaving himself at Court oblig'd you to confine him to the Bastille The Lord Keeper Marillac was the more oblig'd to perform his Duty because the height to which his good Fortune had elevated him left him no room to desire any thing tho' never so ambitious The Marshal his Brother settled in Verdun and elevated to an Office of the Crown had all the reason imaginable to avoid the Fate he deserved by his Ingratitude and by his evil Behaviour The several Commands the Duke de Montmorency had had in your Armies tho' he was as yet very young to deserve them the Office of Marshal of France the free Access your Majesty gave him to your
lasted Five Years no ill Accident ever befell you but what seem'd only to be permitted for your Glory In 1635. the Army your Majesty sent into the Low Countries as soon as they came there won a famous Battel before their being join'd with that of the States General And if the Prince of Orange commanding both had no Success suitable to those great Forces and to what was expected from a Captain of his Reputation the fault of it cannot be imputed to you Having submitted your Arms to the Command of that Prince it was his part to pursue the Point of an Army he receiv'd Victorious But the Slowness of a heavy Nation could not improve the Eagerness of yours which requires Execution rather than Counsel and which by dallying loses the Advantage which their Fiery Nature gives them over others That very Year the Forces of the Empire having pass'd the Rhine at Brisac came so near your Frontiers that tho' you could not free them from Fear yet you freed them from the Losses your Enemies sustain'd One of the finest Armies the Emperour had put on foot for a long while perish'd in Lorrain and their Loss prov'd the more considerable in that the bare Patience of those who commanded your Forces in those parts occasion'd it At the same time the Duke of Rohan favour'd by the principal Heads of the Grisons who desir'd their Liberty enter'd happily into their Country with open force seiz'd the most considerable Passes and Posts and fortify'd them notwithstanding the Opposition which the Neighbourhood of the Milaneze enabled the Spaniards to make conveniently The Dukes of Savoy and of Crequi who did command your Armies in Italy took a Fort in the Milaneze and built another upon the Po which prov'd a dangerous Thorn to your Enemies In 1636. the Cowardise of three Governours of your Frontier Towns having given the Spaniards a Footing into this Kingdom and cheaply enabled them to acquire considerable Advantages Without being discourag'd when all seem'd to be lost in Six Weeks time you rais'd so powerful an Army that it might have been able totally to destroy your Enemies had those to whom you entrusted the Command of it employ'd it as they should have done Their Failures oblig'd you to put your self at the Head of it and God assisted you to that degree that that very Year in the sight of those who had only taken those Places because you were distant from them you retook the only one which was of Importance to your State You overcame many Difficulties in that Expedition which were created by your own Men who being prejudic'd by Ignorance or Malice highly disapprov'd so great a Design If you did not succeed in the Siege of Dole the reason which obliges every one to run to that which is most pressing was the only Cause of it Your Majesty remov'd your Forces from thence with great Prudence since it concern'd you more to retake Corbie than to take Dole At that time Galas entring this Kingdom with the main Forces of the Empire to which the Duke of Lorrain join'd himself with his They were both driven out of Burgundy with the shame of Raising the Siege of St. John de Laune a weak Place and the loss of part of their Cannon and of so great a number of Men that out of 30000 wherewith they entred this Kingdom they did not march out Ten. The River Tosino was Witness that very Year of an Action no less fortunate in Italy where your Forces gain'd a famous and bloody Combat And you had Advantages in Valtelina which were the more considerable by reason that your Enemies having often taken the Resolution to engage your Forces in order to drive them out of it by Force they never attempted to put their Design in Execution but fighting and being beaten prov'd one and the same thing to them In 1637. you took two Places from your Enemies in Flanders and retook one of those which had been deliver'd up to them the Year before by the Cowardise of the Governours A Third being besieg'd in the Country of Luxemburg was taken soon after and your Enemy suffer'd as much Damage by the entrance of your Armies in their Country as they design'd to make you suffer the same way If the Panick Fear of him who commanded your Forces in Valtelina and the Infidelity of some of those for whose Liberty you had sent them thither made you lose through Cowardise and Treachery together the Advantages you had acquir'd there by Force and Reason That Year was happily Crown'd by the retaking of the Isles of St. Margaret and of St. Honorat and by the Relief of Lucare besieg'd by the Spaniards By the first of those two Actions Two Thousand Five Hundred French landed at Noon-day in an Island kept by as many Spaniards and Italians an Island fortify'd by Five Regular Forts joyn'd to one another by Lines of Communication which enclos'd it almost entirely by a good Parapet Your Men fought at their Landing and beat your Enemies which oppos'd them and after having forc'd the major part of them to retire into their Ramparts they forc'd them out of them in Six Weeks time Foot after Foot by as many Sieges as there were Forts tho' one of them was compos'd of Five Bastions Royal so well provided with Cannon and with Men and all other Necessaries that it seem'd a Rashness to attack it By the Second a potent Army so well retrench'd that there was but one Head of a Thousand Fathom by which it could be attack'd a Head so well fortify'd that at every Distance of Two Hundred Paces there were Forts and Redoubts garnish'd with Cannon and lin'd with Infantry was attack'd in the Night and forc'd by an Army which tho' inferiour in number did nevertheless defeat it wholly after several Combats Those two Actions are so extraordinary that one cannot say they are signal Effects of the Courage of Men without adding that they were seconded by the Providence and Hand of God who visibly fights for us In 1638. tho' the beginning of the Year prov'd unfortunate to you in Italy at St. Omer and at Fontarabia by the ill Fate of Arms and by the Imprudence Cowardise or Malice of some of those who commanded yours the End Crown'd the Work by the taking of Brisac after a long Siege two Battels and divers Combats attempted to relieve it Moreover as soon as you had notice of the ill Event of the Siege of St. Omers your Majesty repair'd in Person to the Place where there was reason to expect some dangerous Events You put a stop to the course of the Misfortunes of your Arms by taking and demolishing Renty which greatly incommoded the Frontier After which le Castelet the only Place of yours then remaining in your Enemies Hands was taken by Force in sight of them without their daring to oppose the Effects of your Arms. The Naval Engagement in which 14 Gallies and 4 Ships of Dunkirk all retir'd into
the Priestly Office and without a manifest Abuse do that which only belongs to those that are particularly consecrated to GOD And when they do so before the last Sentence of the Church is given their attempt is not only void of Justice but even of all appearance of Justice The Endeavours of the Parliaments also to translate all the Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction to the Tribunal of Princes under pretence of Temporal Justice is no less void of Ground and of Appearance And yet there is no Presidial or Judge Royal but will ordain the time of Processions the Hour of High Masses and many other Ceremonies under colour of publick Convenience thus the Accessary becomes the Principal And whereas the Service of God should preceed all things and be the Rule of Civil Actions it will no longer be in force than while the Temporal Officers of Princes will be pleas'd to allow it I am very sensible that sometimes the Male-Administration of Justice of those who exert the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and the Tediousness of the Formalities prescrib'd by the Canons give a specious Pretence to the Incroachments of the King's Officers but it cannot be with Reason since one Inconvenience does not establish another but obliges to correct both which is what I design to shew hereafter I would willingly pass under silence the Pretension which the Parliaments have to render every thing abusive which is Judg'd against their Decrees to which by that means they would give the force of Ordinances if I were not oblig'd to shew that this Abuse is the less supportable in that they endeavour by that Encroachment to equal their Authority to that of their Master and of their King The Detriment the Church receives by such Encroachments is the more insupportable in that it hinders the Prelates absolutely from performing their Office When a Bishop designs to punish an Ecclesiastick he strait removes from under his Jurisdiction by an Appeal if in making his Visitation he makes any Ordinance the effect of it is immediately stopt by reason that tho' in matters of Discipline Appeals are only by way of Devolution yet the Parliaments make them suspensive against all manner of Reason In fine we may affirm with Truth that the Church is fetter'd and that if her Ministers are not blind yet their Hands are tied insomuch that tho' they know the Evil it is not in their Power to redress it That which comforts me in this Extremity is that what is impossible to the Church on this Subject will be very easie to your Majesty on whose bare Will the remedy such Disorders depends The first thing that is to be done in order thereunto is to prohibit those Appeals for the future unless in the Case of a visible attempt upon the Royal Jurisdiction and of an evident Transgression of the Ordinances which only relate to the Temporal Authority of Kings and not to the Spiritual Authority of the Church This Ordinance being suppos'd if in order to have it regularly observ'd your Majesty will be pleas'd to make a Regulation containing Six Heads You will at once put a stop to the Incroachments of the Church and of the Parliaments The First Head of that Regulation must order all Appeals of this kind to be seal'd with the Great Seal for the Parliament of Paris and that in all others which the Distance of your Court obliges to make use of the Privy Seal they may not be seal'd before three ancient Advocates have affirm'd under their Hands that there is cause of Abuse submitting to a Fine in case it be found otherwise The Second must declare that all Appeals made in point of Discipline shall be only by way of * The like Remedy was practis'd 15 Years after the Pragmatical Sanction to stop the course of the Secular Judges Vsurpations over the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction it was ordain'd That those who had a mind to get Letters out of the Chancery to oppose the Rescripts and Letters of the Popes should be oblig'd to quote evidently the means by which they did pretend to justifie that the Pragmatical Sanction was infring'd Devolution and not of Suspension The Third must order the Abuse complain'd of to be specify'd both in the Appeal and in the Sentence that shall be given upon the same which is the more necessary in that it often comes to pass that tho' there is only an Errour in point of Formality or in some particular Head of the Sentence which contains many when the Parliament declares that there is an Error or Abuse the Sentence is held void in all things tho' it ought only to be so in one of its Circumstances which commonly is not very material The Fourth must oblige the Parliaments to enter the Causes of the said Appeals upon the Rolls before any others and to call and judge them preferrably to all others without referring the same to avoid the Delays which are often desir'd by those who only aiming to elude the Punishment of their Crimes endeavour to tire out their ordinary Judges from whom they Appeal and because it is not reasonable to deprive the Publick of the Administration of Ecclesiastical Justice by making those who are the principal Officers of it bare Sollicitors before a Tribunal which is inferiour to theirs The Fifth must impose a Necessity on the Parliaments to Fine and to Condemn those to pay the Costs who shall appeal without a Legal Cause without the Power of remitting the same on any account or upon any pretence whatever and to send them back again before the same Judges from whom they have appeal'd without a Cause which is the more necessary because that without this Remedy all Criminals would be at liberty to free themselves of the common Jurisdiction by Appealing without a Cause The best Ordinances and the justest Regulations being often despis'd by those who ought to observe them most Religiously and the Licentiousness of Soveraign Courts often proceeding to that degree as to violate or reform your Orders according to their pleasure the best way to render your Will effectual and to make your self to be obey'd in a point of such Consequence is to add a Sixth Head to the Five foregoing which will be as effectual a Remedy to oblige your Officers to perform their Duty on that subject as that of Appeals is excellent to hinder the Ecclesiastical Judges from being wanting in theirs in the Exercise of their Jurisdiction This Remedy requires nothing but to grant the humble Petition of your Clergy that your Majesty would be pleas'd to allow them to Appeal from you to your self by applying themselves to your Council whenever your Parliaments shall be wanting in the Observation of your Orders and Regulations This is the more reasonable in that whereas in order to suppress the Incroachments of the Church by appealing to your Judges Application is made to a Tribunal of an Order different and inferiour by its Nature and that in having recourse to your
to be dissatisfied since they will be employ'd in others which will prove better but such great difficulties will be met with in the Practice of such an Order that it will be impossible to overcome them A Man may be fit to Govern in Piccardy by reason of his being born there who will not be fit to be employ'd in Brittany where he has no Acquaintance and where the Place which will be given him will hardly be able to maintain him The Governments of France are for the most part of so little Profit that unless they are given to Persons who are more desirous of them upon the account of Honour and for the Convenience of their Neighbourhood than out of any other Consideration there are few who are able to bear the Expence of them Besides there are not Men enough in the Provinces for the Alterations which must needs be made if Employments are made Triennial Those Mutations are not only practicable but absolutely necessary in the great Employments of Spain as those of the Viceroys of Naples of Sicily of Sardinia the Government of Miâ—an and other Employments of the like Consequence And all of them are so profitable to those that possess them that in quitting the Abundance of the one they enter into the Wealth of the other Places which are distant from the abode of Princes require a Change of Governours in Places of the Consequence of those I have mention'd by reason that a longer Residence than that of Three Years might enable them to form Projects to settle themselves there for ever seeing particularly that the Ambition of Men is so prevailing that they are easily inclin'd to change the Condition of Subject into that of Master But the case is different in France where the Governments are not so distant from the abode of the Kings as to fear such Inconveniences nor the said Employments so great as to give the Possessors a sufficient Authority to make themselves Masters of the same Therefore provided your Majesty and your Successors keep the Power of Changing the Governments as you shall think fit upon real Cause given so to do which you may always do with Justice provided they are given gratis and not sold I dare be bold to say That it is better in that point to follow the ancient Custom of France than to imitate that of Spain which is nevertheless so politick and so reasonable considering the extent of its Dominion that though it cannot be usefully practic'd in this Kingdom yet it will be proper in my Opinion to make use of it in those Places of which France will preserve the Possession in Lorrain and in Italy SECT III. Which condemns Survivorships THe Survivorships in question in this Place are granted either against the Will of the Possessors of Places or by their Consent All Men are sensible that it is very unjust to nominate the Successors of a Man while he is alive against his Will since it exposes his Life to the Artifices of the Person that is to profit by his Death and that the Dread which may justly seize his Mind is a kind of Death to him That Practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this Kingdom is at present banish'd from thence It is so dangerous that the Councils and the best Constitutions of Temporal Princes do condemn it as well as Reason Neither can the Consent of the Possessors any ways justifie that Proceeding since that whatever Confidence they may repose in those who are appointed to succeed them they are often mistaken Though it is impossible to satisfie every body in a State by Grants yet it is necessary at least to afford hopes to those to whom nothing better can be given Which can never be done if Places Offices and Benefices are given to Children who in the height of their Merit and of their Age would perhaps hardly dare to expect those Honours and Dignities which are granted them in the Cradle Such Favours in which the State is greatly concern'd hardly oblige any body A Man does not think that that is given him which his Father or another Relation is in possession of he looks upon the Survivorship of it as a Right of Inheritance rather than as an effect of the Prince's Goodness Notwithstanding that the Good of the State requires that in the Promotion of Offices Merit should be preferr'd to all other things in what relates to Survivorship a greater regard is had to the Service of him who demands a Successor than to the persons that is to succeedhim can do The Favour of the one on such occasions often serves in lieu of Merit in the others who have nothing but their Importunity to recommend them Therefore I conclude that the less Favours of that kind are granted is certainly the best and that it would be better yet never to grant any seeing that whatever particular Considerations can be alledg'd the Consequence of them is dangerous in States where Examples have often more Force than Reason If any one observes that I condemn a thing in this Article the practice whereof I have suffer'd even in respect to my own Relations * When the Command of the Sea was given to the Cardinal Trade was almost totally ruin'd and the King had not one Ship I am sure that he will remain very well satisfied if he considers that while a Disorder is in vogue without any possibility of a Remedy Reason requires that Order should be extracted out of it Which was my Intention in preserving Places which had been establish'd by my Cares to Persons whom I could more strictly oblige to follow my Intentions and my Steps If it had been possible during the Troubles of a Reign agitated by divers Storms to settle the Regulation I propose I would have been a very Religious Observer of it CHAP. VI. Which represents to the King what Men think he ought to consider in relation to his Person GOD being the Principle of all Things the Soveraign Master of Kings and He who makes them Reign prosperously if your Majesty's Devotion were not known by all the World I would begin this Chapter which relates to your Person in representing to you That unless you follow the Will of your Creator and submit to his Laws you must not expect to have yours observ'd and to find your Subjects obedient to your Orders But it would be superfluous to exhort your Majesty to Devotion you are so naturally inclin'd to it and so much confirm'd in it by the Habit of your Vertue that there is no reason to fear that you will ever deviate from it Therefore instead of representing to you what Advantages Religious Princes have above others I will content my self with saying That the Devotion which is necessary in Kings must be free from Scruples I say it Sir because the Niceness of your Majesty's Conscience often makes you dread to offend GOD in doing things which certainly you cannot abstain from without Sin I
they observe the same Rule towards themselves That is in being true to their word and faithful to their Promises conditions which are so absolutely necessary for the reputation of a Prince that as he who is destitute of them can never be esteem'd by any body so it is impossible for him who does possess them not to be reverenc'd and credited by all the World I could instance many Examples of this Truth but as I do not design this Work for a Common Place easy to be perform'd by all sorts of Men who will extract good Books I will only instance such as are so certain and so clear that all sensible Persons will find the Proof of them in their own Reason SECTION III. The Prince must be Powerful by the force of his Frontiers NONE but such as are depriv'd of common sence can be unsensible how necessary it is for great States to have their Frontiers well Fortify'd It is a thing the more necessary in this Kingdom in that that tho the Levity of our Nation should make it incapable of making great Conquests their Valour would render them Invincible in their defence having considerable Places so well fortify'd and so well provided with all things that they may be able to show their Courage without being exposed to suffer great hard-ships which are the only Enemies they have to overcome A Frontier well fortify'd is capable either to discourage Enemies from the designs they might have against a State or at least to stop the Course of the same and their Impetuosity if they dare venture to do it by open force The subtil motions of our Nation stand in need of being secured against the Terrour they might receive in an unexpected attack if they did not know that the entrance into the Kingdom has such strong Ramparts that no foreign Impetuosity can be capable to take them by Storm and that it is impossible to overcome them without a considerable Time The new method of some of the Enemies of this State being more to starve the Places they besiege than to take them by force of Arms and to ruin the Country they invade by a great number of horse than to advance by degrees into it with a considerable body of Foot as was done antiently it is clear that Frontier Places are not only useful to resist such Efforts but also to secure States in the Bowels of which it is impossible for Enemies to make any great Progress if they leave Places behind them to cut off the communication of their Countrys and their Convoys together These considerations oblige me to represent that it is not sufficient to fortify Places and to put such Provisions and Ammunitions into 〈◊〉 as may serve to resist brisk attacks but also to â—â—â—â—ish them with all things necessary for a year at least which is a sufficient time to relieve them conveniently I am â—â—nsible that it is almost impossible for great Kings to provide many Citadels thus but it is not to with great Towns in whichi the Society of Men produces a great store of many things which a particular Governor cannot make a sufficient provision of and it is easie to oblige the Inhabitants to provide Provisions for a Year which will always suffice for six Months and more if they turn out useless Mouths as reason requires I am so far from pretending that this Order should exempt Princes from having publick Magazins that on the contrary I am of opinion that they can never have too many and that after having provided them they must establish such good Orders to preserve them that the Governors to whom the disposition of the same belongs may not have the Liberty to dissipate them in vain either out of negligence or a desire to convert them to their own Uses I do not particularly specify the Number of Cannons To omit nothing I will observe in this Place that it is better to have Magazins of Salt Petre of Brimstone and of Coals than of Powder ready made by reason that it spoils in time by keeping and that an Accident of Fire is the more to be fear'd of Powder and of Bullets and of all other Warlike Ammunitions which are to be put in every place because it is to be different according to their different Largeness But I will say that Provisions for the Mouth are not more necessary than those of War and that it would be to no purpose for a Town to be well stor'd with Victuals if they wanted what is absolutely necessary both to defend themselves and to annoy their Enemies seeing particularly that Experience showeth us that those whoshoot most commonly kill most when a Place iâ—â—â—sieg'd one might better spare Bread than Powder The Antients having observ'd very well that the real Strength of Towns consists in the number of Men I cannot forbear adding that all Fortifications are useless unless the Governor and the Officers who command in a place have a Courage equal to the Strength of the Walls and Ramparts and unless the Number of Men is proportion'd to the Largeness of the place and the quantity of the Posts that are to be defended Experience has show'd us in divers occasions that the least Holds are impregnable by the steadiness of the courage of those who defend them and that the best Citadels make no great resistance when those that are in them have not a Courage suitable to their Force Therefore Princes can never be too careful in choosing those to whom they intrust Frontiers since the Welfare and repose of the State depends chiefly on their Fidelity and Vigilancy their Courage and Experience and that often the lack of one of these Qualifications costs millions to States if it does not prove the absolute cause of their Ruin SECTION IV. Of the Power a State ought to have by its Land-Forces This Section has several Subdivisions upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains which will be specify'd in the Margin THE most potent State in the World cannot boast of injoying a certain Peace unless it be in a condition to secure it self at all times against an unexpected Invasion or Surprise In order thereunto it is necessary that so great a Kingdom as this is should always keep a sufficient Army on Foot to prevent the designs which hatred and envy might form against its Prosperity and Grandeur when 't is look'd upon to be in a secure Repose or at least to stifle them in their Birth Who has Force has commonly Reason on his side and he that is Weak is commonly thought in the wrong in the Judgment of most Men. As a Souldier who do's not always wear his Sword is lyable to many inconveniences that Kingdom which do's not always stand on its Guard and keep it self in a condtion to prevent a sudden surprise is in great danger Public Interest obliges those who have the management of States to Govern them so as not only to secure them against all
produce apearent arguments to Condemn the same tho never so necessary Men must lay aside all Passions to be able to Judge and to decide what is reasonable on such occasions and there is no small difficulty to find the dertain point of a just Proportion The Expences which are absolutely necessary for the subsistance of the State being fix'd the less a Prince can raise among the People is the best In order not to be forc'd to raise great summs it is necessary to spend little and the best way to make moderate expences is to banish all Profusion and to Condemn whatever may tend to that end France would be too Rich and the People too abounding if it did not suffer the dissipation of the public Revenue which other States spend with rule They lose more in my opinion than some Kingdoms who pretend some Equality with us Commonly spend A Venetian Ambassador told me one day wittily upon this Subject speaking of the Wealth of France that in order to make us perfectly happy he only wish'd we knew as well how to spend that well which we dissipate without reason as the Republic knew how to lay out every Quatrain without waste and without overmuch husbandry If it were possible to regulate the appetite of the French I would think that the best way to manage the King's purse were to have recourse to that expedient but as it is impossible to prescribe bounds to the greediness of our Nation the only way to contain them is to use them as Physicians do famish'd Pationts whom they constrain to use abstinence by keeping all manner of Victuals from them To that end it is necessary to reform the Finances by the suppression of the chief means by which Men get money unlawfully out of the King's Coffers Among them all none are so dangerous as that of the * Persons imploy'd to pay private services Comptans the abuse of which is grown to that heigth that not to remedy it and to ruin the State is one and the same thing Tho it is useful to use them on some occasions and that it seems necessary in others nevertheless the great inconveniences and the abuses which arrise by it do so far surpass their usefulness that it is absolutely necessary to abolish them Whole Millions will be sav'd by this means and a thousand conceal'd profusions will be redress'd which it is impossible to discover as long as the secret ways of spending the public Treasure will be in use I am sensible that some will urge that there are some foreign expences which by their Nature must be kept secret and which the State may receive considerable advantages by which it will be depriv'd of whenever those in favour of whom they may be made will think they can get no more Money out of them But so many robberys are committed under that Pretence that I am of opinion upon mature deliberation that it is better to lose some advantages which may accrue by it than to be thereby exposed to all the abuses which may be daily committed to the ruin of the State However not to Obstruct the means of making some secret Expences to the advantage of the State a million of Gold may be allowed for the said private expences on condition that the laying of it out shall be sign'd by the King himself and that those who shall have a share in it shall give acquittances for the same If any one urges that these Comptans are necessary for the remitments which are in use I say that it is one of the reasons for which it is fit to remove them Since Men have liv'd in former ages without the aforesaid Comptans the same may be done again and if in laying aside the use of them the use of Farming were also abrogated instead of doing any harm it will do a great deal of good Some perhaps may wonder why since I know the use of the * Persons imploy'd to pay private services Comptans to be of ill consequence I did not retrench it in my time The great Henry was sensible of the evil establish'd in his Predecessor's time and could not remove it The Troubles and Intestine broils the foreign Wars and consequently the great Expences and the extraordinary Farms the King has been oblig'd to make and to let out to raise Money have not permitted the thinking on the Execution of so good an advice The ruining the Huguenot Party abating the Pride of the Grandees maintaining a great War against Powerful Enemys in order to secure the future Tranquillity of the State by a good Peace are all means which have been used to reach the ends proposed since that is the way to remove the Causes of the Toleration of those abuses The Subject of the Comptains having given me an occasion to speak of the letting out of extraordinary Farms I cannot forbear saying that the great augmentations of the revenue which may be made that way are so far from being advantageous to the State that on the Contrary they are very prejudicial and Inpoverish it instead of Inriching it Perhaps this proposition may be looked upon at first as a Paradox but it is impossible to examin it carefully without discovering the Justice and Truth thereof The King's Revenue can only be increas'd by the augmentation of the Impositions which are laid on all sorts of Commoditys and therefore it is evident that increasing the revenue that way Expences are increased at the same time since those things must be bought dearer which were bought cheaper before If Mear grows dearer if the Price of Stufs and of other things rises the Souldiers will not be able to maintain themselves and consequently it will be necessary to augment their Pay and the salary of all Workmen will be greater than it was before which will make the increase of the Expence answerable to the augmentation of the Revenue and tho it will be a great grievance to the People the Prince will be but very little the better for it Poor Gentlemen whose Estates consist in Land will not improve their Revenue by such Impositions the Fruits of the Earth will hardly rise in Price at least for their advantage and if the Times make them dear the less of them will be sold so that at the Year's end the poor Gentry will find no augmentation in their Revenue tho a very considerable one in their Expences by reason that the new subsidys will raise the Price of all those things which are necessary for the maintenance of their Families which they will make shift to maintain at home tho' poorly but they will be no longer able to send their Children into the Armies to serve their King and Country according to the obligation of their Birth If it be true as it is most certain that the sale of those Commodities which your Subjects deal in diminishes according to the increase of Impositions it may happen that such augmentations will lessen your
manner they will receive no prejudice and the King will not make use of the common advantage he has with private persons who have the liberty to free themselves of the said Debts when they are able to pay them at the rate they are commonly sold at This medium which is the only one that can be us'd may produce its effect divers ways either in many years time by the bare management of the injoyment of the said Charges or in one only by an immense sum of Money which must be had ready by the supply of an extraordinary Fund The natural Impatience of our Nation not allowing us to hope that we will be able to persevere 15 or 20 years in the same resolution The first way which requires so much time is nowise receivable The great Fund which is necessary to reimburse all at once such immense Charges as those of the State would make this second proposition as ridiculous as impossible and so the third only remains practicable In order to make use of it with so much Justice that no body may have cause to complain it is necessary to consider the charges which it will be necessary to suppress in three different manners according to the divers rates at which they are sold * The Major part of the Rents constituted upon the Taille since 1612 are still in the hands of the Grand-Farmers of their Heirs or of those to whom they have made them over and they have purchas'd them at so low a Rate that they dayly expect the retrenchment of them which would be a far greater greivance to them than the Reimbursement of the same at the common Price The new Rents established upon the Aids are only sold at seven years Purchase and they amount to two Millions The new Rents upon the Gabelles are sold at seven years and a half Purchase and they amount to five millions 260 thousand Livers The first Rents constituted upon the Taille which are commonly sold at five years purchace ought only to be consider'd and reimburs'd at that rate according to which their Injoyment of the same makes the Reimbursement of them in seven years and a half The other Rents constituted upon the Taille since the late King's Death which are paid either in the Elections or in the General Receipts must be reimbursed at the rate of six years purchace which they are sold at the Injoyment of which will only reimburse them in eight years and a half The Offices of Elections with salaries Taxations of Offices and other Rights which they injoy must be reimbursed at the rate of eight years Purchace which is the common Price of such Places Reason requires the taking of the same method for the Reimbursement of the charges constituted upon the Aids upon all the Gabelles upon the five great Farms upon the Foreign Farm of Languedoc and of Provence upon the Customs of Lyons upon the Convoy of Bourdeaux the Custom of Bayone the Farm of Brouage and such Reimbursements can only be made by the bare Injoyment in eleven years time I am sensible that Rents of that kind are daily sold for less than eight years Purchace but I propose the Reimbursement of them at this Rate for the satisfaction of the partys concern'd being sensible that if in an affair of that importance there must be a loss it is better it should fall upon the King than upon them The Rate of all the Reimbursements which can be made being justly establish'd it is necessary to consider that there are some Charges so necessary in this Kingdom or ingaged at so high a Rate that I do not place them among those of which the Reimbusement is to be thought on by the way I am proposing Those are the salarys of the Parliaments and other sovereign Courts of the Presidials and royal Courts of the King's Secretarys of the Treasurers of France and receivers General Not that I think that no suppression ought to be made in those kind of Offices that 's far from my thoughts But to proceed with order towards the diminution of the Charges of the Kingdom Reason requires that one should begin by the Reimbursement of those which are sold at lower rates and which are inconvenient to the Public For that reason I prefer the suppression of the Rents establish'd upon the Tailles and that of many Places of assessors to all others That of those sorts of Rents by reason of the lowness of their Price and that of the assessors because those offices are the true source of the People's Misery both upon the account of their Number which is so Excessive that it amounts to upwards of four Millions in Exemptions as also of their Male-administrations which are so Common that there is hardly any one Assessor who do's not discharge his own Parish that many draw considerably out of those they have nothing to do with and that some of them are such abandon'd wretches that they are not affraid of loading themselves with crimes by adding Impossitions on the People which they convert to their own use That very consideration is the only one which hinders me at present from speaking of the suppressions of many Offices of judicature the Multitude of which is useless their Price being as extraordinary as their salarys are Inconsiderable it would be an ill piece of husbandry to meddle with them upon the account of the present necessity When it will be thought fit to lessen the Number of them the best way in order thereunto will be to make so good a Regulation of the * The Annual Duty the said Officers pay to the King Paullette that the said Offices being reduc'd to a moderate Price the King may be able when they become vacant to Reimburse them to the owners and suppress them at once Neither do I as yet include in the number of the suppressions the Colleges of the King's Secretarys the Offices of the Treasurers of France and the Receivers General not upon the account of the smalness of their Profit which is pretty considerable but upon the account of the summs they have paid for the same which are not small Neither do I put in the old Rents which have been created in the time of your Majesty's Predecessors which are paid in the Office of the City of Paris both by reason that the actual summs disburs'd by the Purchacers are greater than that of all the rest and because it is fit that the interest of Subjects should in some manner be mix'd with those of their Soveraigns as also because they are devolv'd to several Religious Houses Hospitals and Communitys towards the maintenance of which they are necessary and that having been often divided in Familys they seem to be settled there in such a manner that it would be difficult to remove them without disturbing their settlements Nevertheless in order not to omitt any husbandry that may be made with reason to the advantage of the State I must observe two
speedy Peace and to preserve you for this Kingdom with your Servants of which I esteem my self one of the meanest instead of leaving this Advice by Testament I hope to accomplish it my self SECTION VIII Which shews in few words that the utmost point of the Power of Princes must consist in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts THe Finances being manag'd as above written the People will be absolutely eas'd and the King will be Powerful by the Possession of his Subjects Hearts who considering his care of their Estates will be inclin'd to love him out of Interest * Philip de Valois Formerly the Kings thought themselves so happy in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts that some were of opinion that it was better by this means to be King of the French than of France And indeed this Nation had formerly such a Passion for their Princes that some Authors praise * Ammian Marcellin Lib. 16 and 17. them for being always ready to spill their Blood and to spend their Estates for the Service and Glory of the State * That Policy was grounded upon the saying of a great Prince who tho' depriv'd of the Light which consists in Faith nevertheless was so clear sighted by Reason that he thought he could never want Money in his necessities since he was belov'd by his People who had enough for him Cyrus and Xenophon Book the 5th of his Institution Under the Kings of the first second and third Race until Philip le Bell the Treasure of Hearts was the only publick Wealth that was preserv'd in this Kingdom I am sensible that former times have no relation nor proportion to the present that what was good in one Age is often not permitted in another But tho' it is certain that the Treasure of Hearts cannot suffice at present it is also very certain that the Treasure of Gold and Silver is almost useless without the first both are necessary and whoever shall want either of them will be necessitous in Wealth CHAP. X. Which concludes this Work in showing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove ineffectual unless the Princes and their Ministers are so mindful of the Government of the State as to omitt nothing which their Trust obliges them to and not to abuse their Power IN order to conclude this Work happily I am now to represent to your Majesty that Kings being oblig'd to do many things more as Soveraigns than as private Men they can never swerve so little from their Duty without committing more faults of omission than a private person can do of commission It is the same with those upon whom Soveraigns discharge themselves of part of the burthen of their Empire since that Honour makes them liable to the same obligations which lie on Soveraigns Both of them being consider'd as private persons are liable to the same faults as other Men but if we regard the Conduct of the publick which they are intrusted with they will be found liable to many more since in that sence they cannot omit without sin any thing they are oblig'd to by their Ministry In that consideration a Man may be good and virtuous as a private person and yet an ill Magistrate and an ill Soveraign by his want of care to discharge the obligation of his Trust In a word unless Princes use their utmost endeavours to regulate the divers orders of their State If they are negligent in their choice of a good Council if they despise their wholsom Advice Unless they take a particular care to become such that their Example may prove a speaking voice If they are negligent in establishing the reign of God that of Reason and that of Justice together If they fail to protect Innocence to recompence signal Services to the Publick and to punish disobedience and the Crimes which trouble the order of the Discipline and Safety of States Unless they apply themselves to foresee and to prevent the evils that may happen and to divert by careful Negotiations the Storms which Clouds easily drive before them from a greater distance than is thought If Favour hinders them from making a good choice of those they honour with great Imployments and with the principal Offices of the Kingdom Unless they are very careful to settle the State in the Power it ought to have If on all occasions they do not preferr Publick Interest to Private Advantages tho' otherwise never so good livers they will be found more guilty than those who actually transgress the Commands and Laws of God it being certain that to omit what we are oblig'd to do and to commit what we ought not to do is the same thing I must moreover represent to your Majesty that if Princes and those who are imploy'd under them in the first Dignities of the Kingdom have great advantages over private Men they injoy that benefit upon hard conditions since they are not only liable by omission to the faults I have already observ'd but also that there are many others of commission which are peculiar to them If they make use of their Power to commit any injustice or violence which they cannot do as private persons they are guilty of a sin of Prince or Magistrate by commission which their sole Authority is the source of and for which the King of Kings will call them to a very strict account on the day of Judgment Those two different kind of faults peculiar to Princes and to Magistrates must needs make them sensible that they are of a far greater weight than those of private persons by reason that as universal Causes they influence their disorders to all those who being submitted to them receive the impression of their movements Many would be sav'd as private persons who damn themselves as publick persons One of the greatest of our Neighbouring Kings being sensible of this Truth at his Death cry'd out that he did not stand in so much dread of the sins of Philip as he was apprehensive of the King 's His thought was truly Pious but it would have been much better for himself and for his Subjects to have had it before his Eyes in the heighth of his Grandeur and of his Administration than when in discovering the importance of it he could no longer make that use of it which was necessary for his Conduct tho' he might for his Salvation I humbly crave your Majesty would be pleas'd to reflect this very moment on that which that great Prince perhaps only thought on a few hours before his death and to invite you to it by Example as much as by Reason I promise you that I will spend no day of my life without endeavouring to introduce that into my Mind which ought to be there at the hour of my Death in what relates to those Publick Affairs which you are pleas'd to intrust me with THE END Historical Observations ON THE Political Testament OF Cardinal de Richelieu Book 1. Chap 1. Page 4â— of the
Minister presented to him after an apparent reconciliation with a haughty Air and not without some Coldness In 1630 notwithstanding the Cardinal de la Valette his Son had had so great a share as I have said in the day of the * Cullys Duppes and that in his particular he had received some considerable disgust the preceeding day from the Queen Mother he went to Versailles to see the King upon this great alteration and could never be persuaded by his Friends to step into the next Room where all the Court repair'd in a through to pay new homages to the restor'd Minister he contented himvelf with seeing him two or three days after it as if nothing extraordinary had happen'd to him In 1631 the Cardinal seem'd to have a mind to reconcile himself to that Family for he prevailed for the Duke de la Valette who was only a Duke by Breef to be receiv'd into the Parliament in that Quality the same day with him which the Court looked upon as a great Caress But the following year 1632 gave him a new and very considerable cause of displeasure from the old Duke He caus'd him to be sounded by the superintendant de Bullion to try whether he would yield his Government of Mets and of the three Bishopricks to him in exchange upon very advantageous Conditions to which the Duke express'd a great repugnancy Those whose Conjectures always go too far or who reckon upon the easiness of Human minds to pass from desire to desire and from one ambition to another fancy'd that the Cardinal had a mind to make a great and lasting Settlement in that Country to secure himself against all Revolutions for the future to obtain next to that Government the Bishoprick of Metâ— and the great Abbys of the said City or adjacent Parts In the next place to get that from the King's favour which the Duke had refused from Henry the 3 d's To add to the three Bishopricks first in the King's Name and next in his own Dun Stenai Jamets and some other Places of Lorrain Sedan which might be got out of the House of Bouillon Chateaurenaud Charleville and mount Olimpus and finally to compose a little Kingdom of Austrasia capable to maintain it self against all the Neighbouring Powers under a Soveraign of his capacity If this was his design which I would neither affirm ner reject that Instance would discover as much as any thing the Character of his mind more us'd to give than to receive a Law For it is certain that tho he passionately desired the success of Bullion's negotiation he broke it first because the Duke without explaining himself clearly and without accepting or refusing talk'd of adding to the proposed exchange a Marshal's Staf for the Duke of Candale his Son a Man who indeed deserved that honour being famous throughout Europe for his foreign expeditions but to whom the Cardinal was unwilling to give such a reward for the jests he had made on him Shall I say moreover what others have written and published before me which perhaps will seem frivolous The said Negotiation was set on foot in 1632 in the journey of Toulouse which ended by the Execution of the Duke de Montmorrency They pretend that on their return two things which in appearence seem'd to be inconsiderable nevertheless sensibly mov'd the mind of that Minister The first as it is reported is that he thought himself neglected by the old Duke who was too busy in receiving the Queen Ann of Austria in his House of Cadillac upon the road to Bourdeaux The Queen was coming back that way to see Rochel and the Cardinal to see Brouage where he had never been since he had made great expences there The Coaches which the Duke had order'd to receive him at his coming out of the Boat were taken up by the numerous Train of the Queen and could not come back soon enough to prevent the Cardinal's arrival who was not expected so soon The Duke after having conducted the Queen to her appartment brought them back to him himself with a thousand excuses that his orders had not been well executed but he could never persuade him to use them and the Cardinal chose rather to walk the remainder of the way a foot notwithstanding he was fatigu'd and incommoded with a distemper which had like to have kill'd him some days after They add in the second place that it prov'd a great deal worse yet at Bourdeaux where his distemper which was nothing but a suppression of Urine oblig'd him to tarry after the Queen The Duke out of respect to that Princess and to keep no mark of Command in her presence had order'd his Guards to put of their Coats and Muskets he ordered them to take them again as soon as ever she was gone and went to visit the Cardinal with his usual pomp of Governor and a large attendence of Gentlemen belonging to him or of the Province who did always accompany him It is thought that the Arch-bishop of Bourdeaux and some others who were the Duke's Enemys and were with the Cardinal at that time persuaded him that it was not only done to brave him but perhaps to quarrel him in case of need and to attempt upon his Person so that he excus'd himself from seeing him as being too Ill and almost thought he had scaped a Peril when he found himself in a Condition to leave Bourdeaux The Duke having accompanyed him at his departure with the same train as it were to honour him That which is certain is that the Duke was inform'd some time after it by the Cardinal de la Valette his Son that some had endeavour'd at least to give the Minister those impressions That he took it very Ill from the Arch-bishop of Bourdeaux and made War against him more than ever Their quarels proceeded so far that the Duke having employ'd ways of fact as it were to maintain his Authority of Governor in the Metropolitan City induc'd the Archbishop to excommunicate him The Clergy of France being inspir'd by the Cardinal who put himself at their head declar'd for the abus'd Prelate and demanded reparation for the Injury It was in that great Storm the Cardinal de la Valette his Son and some of his Friends propos'd as a last remedy of reunion the Marriage of Mademoiselle de Pontchateau with the Duke de la Valette for Gabrielle de Bourbon one of the most lovely Princesses of her time beautiful and wise very witty and so mild that she was never known to be angry dy'd six or seven years before a forthnight after her being deliver'd of a Son who dyed Duke of Candale in the year 1658. As soon as the Conditions of this new Marriage were resolv'd upon and accepted all the Affairs with the Archbishop of Bourdeaux and the Clergy of France ended much sooner than they would have done But if ever the old Duke show'd his haughtiness it was on this occasion he gave his