willingly enter upon so flat a contradictiō to such a discourse of Kinge Iames in the dayes of Kinge Charles and that so soone after his death If you write only concerning men of ripe yeares you must have a care to limit your propositions accordingly and not to give them longer wings then is fitt In the next place you touch upon a distinction much talked of and as much advanced by some as cryed downe by others Yet both Scotus and Durandus give a tolerable and Aquinas with the Dominicans after him an orthodoxe interpretation therof though neyther suitable to the minde of Damascen commonly reputed the Father of it Yet looke what in this kind is wanting in them is supplyed by Arminiensis who gives both an orthodoxe construction thereof and that also in conformity to the opinion of Damascene of whose text he gives a very sound and orthodoxe interpretation and the more orthodoxe the more opposite to theire constructions who with greate cry of words draw it to the countenancing of theire Arminian Tenets without cause Love you say is the fruite of Gods antecedent will wrath and severity are the proper effects of his consequent will Fruite and effect you make all one as with good reason you may Now what I pray you is this effect which you call love You seeme to intimate that they are the effects of creation as when you say Every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted of Gods love Yet faculties of soules and bodyes are found in beasts but Gods antecedent will in Damascene is referred wholly unto men Neyther doth Damascene at all referre it to the worke of creation but makes it to be that wherby God will have all to be saved Liberty of will is proper to man in distinction from beasts but who seeth not that this indifferently makes him obnoxius unto damnation as well as capable of salvation Then when you say wrath and severity is the effect of Gods consequent will what doe you meane by wrath Is it eyther a resolution to take vengeance or the execution of vengeance it selfe I think you take it for the execution of vengeance it selfe Now there is an execution of reward also properly opposite unto this which whether it be the same love you speake of it became you to expresse so much or whether you conceave it to be different yet it were fit you should take notice of it and acknowledge that this is a fruite of Gods consequent will as well as wrath that as effectually presupposing obedience as this disobedience and that love in rewarding is every way as infallibly consequent to the obeying of Gods will revealed as wrath is of our neglecting and despising it A full explication of this distinction you promise in good time how well you performe it we may in good time consider with Gods helpe Next you enter upon another forme of the same distinction as you pretend and you suffer it to fly with one winge For you talke of Gods absolute will which you seeme to confound with Gods antecedent will but as touching the member congruously opposite you leave us to seeke for that But as it is we are to consider it Gods absolute will was you say to have men capable of Heaven and Hell of joyes and miseryes immortall This cannot be understoode of Gods consequent will for this absolute will is indifferent to end in the bestowing of reward or punishment and is immediately terminated only in making man capable of eyther but his consequent will is not so indifferent For the only effect thereof you mention to be wrath and severity and this presupposeth rather then causeth capablenesse Neyther can this absolute will be the antecedent will of God according to Damascens meaning For the antecedent will in Damascene is only referred to the will of God wherby he wills mans salvation but this absolute will is you say to have men capable of Heaven and Hell To helpe this you tell us That this absolute will whose possible objects are two is in the first place set on mans eternall joy But you doe not proceede to shew on what it is set in the next place as if by such like incongrueties you desired rather to confounde your reader then to satisfie him Yet by the tenour of your discourse you leave it to us to guesse that in the second place to witt upon the dispising of Gods love it is set upon a mans damnation So that by this your doctrine both Gods antecedent will and consequent will is all one and that is Gods absolute will But no such thinge is founde in Damascene from whome such as you are doe usually take this distinction of will antecedent in God and will consequent And indeed you doe well to make one as absolute as another for like as wrath the fruite of this will of God in the second place as you imply hath not its course but upō presuppositiō of disobedience so in like manner the proper opposite to wrath on the other side the fruite of this will of God in the first place hath not its course but upon presupposition of obedience And that you may know what this fruite I speake of is I say as wrath is taken for the execution of vengeance so the proper opposite herunto must be love as it is taken for the execution of reward And let any man judge whether this doth not every way presuppose obedience as well as the other presupposeth disobedience And thus shall God as truly be sayed absolutely to wish a mans damnation as his salvation and no more conditionally will the one then the other And like as if God be absolutely sayd to will a mans salvation it shall not herhence follow he shall so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibilitie which unto man he had appointed so though God be sayd absolutely to will a mans damnation yet it will not follow that God doth so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibility which unto man he had appointed Only it is absurd to call this possibility a contrary possibility It is I confesse a possibility to the contrary but not a contrary possibility Like as liberty unto good and liberty unto evill are liberties unto things contrary in the way of manners but yet they are no contrary liberties so the possibilities of obtaining salvation or damnation which are consequent upon the use of this liberty though they are possibilities to contrary things yet are they not contrary possibilities And as Gods anger signifying the execution of vengeance doth never rise up but upon the dispising of his love alluringe unto good so Gods love signifying the execution of reward doth never rise up but upon the embracing of his love alluring unto good But if you take Gods wrath for his will to punish I say that looke by what reason Gods wrath as it signifies his will to punish doth not arise in God
teach when we make the work of faith a worke of power 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power and is not the worke of grace such a worke Eph. 2. 2 But you doe ill under colour of magnifying the love of God to dishonour both his love and his power his love in confining it onely to promises and threatnings as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance his power in denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe and that ardently And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme as wel'l as we doe In the next place you tell us We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him but constraines no mans will to love him But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint why did you not expresse your minde on this point you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse the author and finisher of our faith of our repentance of our obedience Did you acknowledge this there should bee no difference betweene us For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us by way of constraint And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes that which was pleasing in his sight you shall never finde in any of our Divines that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God I know no power in God but infinite and seeing what worke soever he workes is by the exercise of his power it cannot be denied but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite Againe is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts It is not as I presume you will confesse why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts and making us to love him be accounted a worke of power infinite And Austin divers times professeth that God doth convert our hearts omnipotenti facilitate by an almighty facility and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform us as it were of beasts to make us become men Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite as when Bernard confesseth of God saying Bernâ—n circumcis Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum As for Gods power to the immediate parent of our love to God it is no article of our Creed but a tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts whereby wee are brought to love him Neither doe we say that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us according to that of Iohn 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him because he loved us first and to that of S. Paul The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature and not to a seed of grace though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly as it were fit you should And no marvell For they which doe evill hate the light As for constraint we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained As for the will that non potest cogi cannot be constrained And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity whereof others doe not should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite as if they maintained that the will of man may be constrained yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him would this breed in God a loathing of him Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you Yet I have read My soule loathed them and their soule abhorred mee but I never heard the contrary My soule loathed them and their soule loved mee for while we abhorre God as enemies unto him yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love will he continue to love us and not turne his love into loathing as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes as being satisfied and disdaining to be scorned by them whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts yet could not winne their loues But God never makes us unwillingly to love him it is a thing impossible but as Austine saith Ex nolentibus volentes facit T is true God loves a cheerefull giver but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne Like as it is said of him that Corâ—nat non merit a nostra sed donasua he crownes not our works but his owne And where there is a willing minde there it is accepted not according to that which a man hath not but to that which he hath but whose worke is this willing minde Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us but makes us willing and ready and cheerefull in the performing of it not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth but in suffering what hee inflicteth or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse though with much a doe yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse will hee love his childe or his obedience or dutifulnesse the worse for this yet God more effectually and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts even omnipotente facilitate as Austine speaketh and shall hee love our obedience our thankfulnesse our repentance the lesse for this 5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme to wit In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard All
hands and keepe us from falling into the hands of men yet if God calleth us thereunto to commit our selves unto God when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him certainly They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good even at such times when Lyons want and suffer hunger Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence but the revealed will of God For whatsoever Gods nature is hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us but hee hath revealed that he will never faile them that put their trust in him And this is that loving kindenesse of God as much as to say his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us which excites the sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature why God should give them a being neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature as you superficially use to discourse but meerely the love of himselfe For he made all things for himselfe And the creature before God made him was just nothing neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus It is a strange conceit to say that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being who is the Creator For what likenesse is there betweene an apple and a nut between an horne and a bagpipe an harp and an harrow Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator and the creature Certainly all do not love God whom he loves for he loved us when we were his enemies Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him as all shall either sooner or later it will not follow that all should bee saved For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase and such as Esau are hated rather And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncoth assertion That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine as denying Gods omnipotency then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it The apprehension of Gods love to us is the cause morall of our love to him though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love how dare you professe God loves the reprobate and that ardently and with excessive and infinite love Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption and not rather unlovelinesse throughout Neither will it serve your turne to say that he loves them as his creatures For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads yea and the Devills and damned Spirits 3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill as brethren in evill do love one another and our Saviour hath taught us as much Matt. 5. 49. If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have doe not the Publicanes even the same I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable The doing of things otherwise unlawfull in some cases may be dispensed with but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with it may be remitted but that is not to dispense with it I take your meaning and leave your words you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation I no way like such extravagant assertions though frequent in your writings as if you would innovate all both naturall reason and divinity I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost and finall impenitency which God will not pardon in his elect Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe as you doe of your selfe Be God never so louely yet if a man know him not how can hee love him And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God Suppose we doe know him to be most wise most powerfull yet if he be our enemie how should this move us to love him or put our trust in him If we know him to love us and to be our friend yet are not the best backward enough from loving him when we are easily drawne to sinne against him And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable what an uncomfortable doctrine is this and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements Ioh. 14. 5. Againe what is the love of God Is it not to love him above all things even above our selves as Gerson expresseth it Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui Is this naturall long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake is this sinne unpardonable You are a valliant Champion I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ. But alas what should become of poore Peter that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a follower of Christ denied that he knew him and that with oath and imprecation Yet Christ looked back upon him â—s before he had praied for him that his faith might not faile and Peter looked back upon himselfe and went forth and wept bitterly and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order that Peter by name should be acquainted with the first with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead that as he died for his sinnes so hee rose again for his justification The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate who take notice of it chiefly as touching blessings spirituall As for temporall blessings Gods love therein to man how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and bloud comming to passe onely by course of nature But that his intention in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked is to binde himselfe to instate them in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life which hee never meanes to performe is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes To the children of God there is
that they shall worke agreably he setteth them going in working agreably to their natures the one contingently the other necessarily So that whatsoever the will of God is shall fall out contingently the same falleth-out in such sort as it might have fallen out otherwise if good so as it might have fallen out woorse bene marred if ill yet so as it might have fallen out better bene amended And the eleventhe Article of Irelande having professed that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to passe addethe herunto by way of explication that so this was ordeyned as therby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures neyther the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent are opinions of your owne makinge not of others maynteyninge And to sett an ende to his owne fancyes every man may take liberty when he pleasethe without any great paynes takinge about argument to overthrowe them SECT I. IN the first Section and before the first Chapter accordinge to exact method as you professe in reference unto your former Discourse you propose two thinges to be enquired 1. How this truthe of Gods being most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some may by force of speculative argument be made manifest unto others Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled The latter of which two I shoulde never have expected in a Philosophicall or Theologicall discourse Yet I will prescribe to none but give every vessell leave to vent his owne humour to be delivered of such notions wherwith his braynes have bene conceaved If we have any use to make of them we may if none we are litle the woorse for that Every beinge hathe three passions denominating it For there is a truthe of it there is a goodnes of it there is an unity of it Therfore allso all these are to be founde in the beinge of God But it seemeth not to be your meaninge to speake of this truthe which is a passion of beinge a simple terme but rather of the truthe of this proposition There is a good to witt howe it may be made manifest by speculative argument you desire to inquire grantinge it to be most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some wherby unles you understande our Christian Faithe I discerne not your meanninge Vpon the first point you will not have us to looke for much as yet and the reason you give is enoughe to put us out of expectation of any thinge at all For allbeit a desperate enimy despayring of his life Is therby the more animated to sight yet an Adversary in discourse by evidence of argument brought to despayre of maynteyning his Tenet is not therby the more provoked to dispute And therfore I see no iust restraynt to hinder you from bestowinge your best ability upon this argument even in this place And your selfe confesse that notwithstandinge all this you may proceede upon such advantages as groundes of nature give you And your mayne purpose extendes no further CHAP. I. YOVR first Argument is not like to strike your enimye with any great feare or despayre Arguments weake or weakely prosecuted weakneth the cause maynteyned strengthenethe the cause oppugned And first it is not handsomly caryed thus If every particular generation hath causes then all generations have some cause implyinge that every generation hath many causes all have but one But cary it howe you will it is not capable of any sound inference It is true Every generation hath his cause therfore all generations have causes But what causes only the same causes which every one hathe a part aggregated together For as you make an aggregation of particular generations so the cause of this aggregation inferred can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises much lesse the being of the Godhead herby evidenced Then your second inference is as wilde when you adde Otherwise all shoulde not be of one kinde or nature For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation to be of the same kinde or nature with every particular For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu potentia But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens consisting of many particulars each wherof is unum per se heaped together not by any naturall union vnited into one As we doe not say the bushel of corne is of the same kinde with every particular grayne as allso it cannot be sayde to be of a diverse kinde in any congruitie allthough there were diverse kindes of graynes therin But rather an heape of graynes whether of the same kinde or of diverse kindes Agayne you propose your argument not only of the generation of Man who is of one kinde but of all generable bodies who are well knowne to be of diverse kindes therfore why should you accoumpt it any absurdity for all these to be not of one kinde or nature Furthermore when you make shewe of such an Inference as this All must have some cause otherwise they be not of one kinde or nature you doe herby imply that All that have some cause are in a fayre way to be of the same kinde or nature which upon consideration you will finde to be utterly untrue For all creatures have some cause yet are they not any thing the more of one kinde or nature Allthoughe they have not only some cause but the same cause allso namely God Like as though thinges have different causes yet it followeth not that they are of different kindes As all mise are of the same kinde though some are bred equivocally some univocally so of lise and diverse others For although Averroes were of opinion that mise bred equivocally mise bred univocally by generation were of different kindes therupon maynteyned that such as were bred equivocall did never propagate their like by generation yet I doe not thinke you are of that opinion it being contrary to manifest experience And to us it is manifest who believe the creation that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation yet did propagate their like were of the same kinde with creatures propagated from them But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians denyed all creation I am sory you are so unhappy in defendâ—nge truthe especially such a truthe as the being of God but thâ— best is that truthe needethe no mans defense I hope you will proove nothing more happy in defending errours Yet I deny not but that the greatest Divines doe conclude that there is a first cause that is God because the progresse from effects to causes from causes infâ—rior to causes superior cannot be infinite According wherunto your argument shouldâ— have proceeded thus In
no light unto it but barely suppose the truthe of it Secondly because you limit it in comparison of the like causes before the flood As if there were no Anakims knowne since the flood Of late yeares in the place where I dwell hathe bene taken up the bone of a mans legge broken in the digging of a well the bare bone was measured to be two and twentie inches about in the calfe and the spurre about the heele was founde allso that of a very vast proportion It seemes the whole body lyethe there If King Iames were alive and heard of it it is like enoughe that out of his curious and Scholasticall Spirite wherby he was caryed to the investigation of strange things he woulde give order that the body might be digged up the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times As touching the stature of men in these dayes what dothe Capteyne Smith write by his owne experience of the Sasque Sahanocts borderers upon Virginia on the Northe He professethe they seemed like Gyants to the Englishe One of their weroâ—nees that came aboord the Englishe the calfe of his legge was 3. quartars of a yard about and the rest of his limbes answearable to that proportion Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood and Homer writinge of the stone that Aeneas tooke up to throwe at his enimies calleth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he was litle acquainted with Noahs flood that sayde Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos Thirdly in these dayes some are very lowe some very tall of stature in comparison yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each So in all likelihood both before the flood and after such difference was founde The Spyes sent by Iosuah to take a viewe of the land of Canaan having seene the Sonnes of Anak seemed in their owne sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them Yet the vigour of foode and nourishment was the same to both Farre better reasons might be alleaged if I mistake not of this difference and withall I see no reason to the contrary but that men might be of a great stature in these dayes as in former times and that by course of nature if it pleased God to have it so But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse it is unseasonable and I desire rather to deale with you in matter of Divinitie and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets The question followinge why vegetables of greatest vigour doe not ingrosse the properties of others lesse vigorous is a senseles question For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kinde or of a diverse kinde it is ridiculous As for example Woulde any sober man enquire after the cause why that vegetable which is of the greatest heate hathe not the propertie of such a vegetable that is of lesse heate Or why that which is vigourous in heate hathe not the propertie of that which is vigorous in colde or in any other disparate qualitie Nay why shoulde any man expect a reason why different kindes of thinges have different qualities Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider that they are different kindes of things and therfore no merveyle if they have different properties The cause herof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound For that which propagates and that which is propagated is of the same kinde and consequently of the same propertie And the question proceedes equally as well of the one as of the other If you shoulde aske how it comes to passe that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angell it were very absurde to say the reason is because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angell and therfore he coulde not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angell least so he shoulde propagate a more intelligent creature then himselfe I say this manner of answeare woulde give little satisfaction For the question was made of man not of this man in particular but of mankind which comprehendes the Father as wel as the Sonne And agayne the Sonne may be more intelligent then the Father though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angells are The followinge question is as litle worthe the proposinge as the former For what hostilitie is to be feared betweene the ayre and the water But you make choyse to instance in the hostilitie betweene the earthe and the water as a matter of dangerous consequence You demaunde the reason why the restles or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth I had thought the earthe had bene fitter to swallowe up water then water to swallowe up earthe For suppose the Sea shoulde overflowe the Land shoulde it therby be sayde to swallowe it up Then belike the bottome of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea And by the same reason the Element of the Ayre swalloweth up both Sea and Land because it covereth them and the Element of fire in the same sense swalloweth up the Element of the ayre And the heavens swallowe up all the Elements for as much as they doe encompasse them Every Naturalist conceaves that it is not out of any hostilitie that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth but out of inclination naturall to be above the earthe beinge not so heavy a body as the massie substance of the earth is And we knowe it is withdrawne into certeyne valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles as the Poet acknowledgethe who was but a mere naturalist that in commodaâ— habitationem animatium that the earthe might become a convenient habitation for such creatures in whose nostrills is the breathe of life of whome the cheife is man made after the likenes and image of his maker and made Lord over his visible creatures The last question is worst of all and all nothinge to the purpose but mere extravagants What sober man would demaund a cause why the heavens doe not dispossesse the elements of their place might you not as wel demaunde why the fire dothe not dispossesse the ayre and then why it dothe not dispossesse the water lastly why it dothe not dispossesse the earthe of her seate which is as much as to say why is not the heaven where the eartheis and the earthe where the havens are wheras every man knowes that the more spacious place is fitter for the more spacious bodies and the higher places more agreable to lighter bodies like as the lowest place is most fitt for the body of the earthe To say that the nature of the heavens hathe not so much as libertie of egresse into neighbour elements is as if you shoulde say that light thinges have not so much as libertie of mooving downewards nor have heavy thinges libertie of moovinge upwardes Yet there are cases extraordinary when a
a beginninge so we believe it shall have an ende And consequently the producing of more individuall substances shall have an ende And wheras all Species and individualls formerly produced being put together doe make up a number only finite howe can this inferre that God is infinite especially if so be more Species might be produced then have bene produced For eyther it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things or no. If it dothe then the producing of those that are produced is no evidence of Gods greatest power If is dothe not then the number of thinges produced were they double to that they are or shall be cannot evidence that Gods power is infinite Agayne seinge God is yet in producing more and more we can have no evidence herby of Gods greatest power till he come to the ende of his workes therfore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power or that his power is infinite thoughe perhaps the world may have to witt when God is come to the ende of his workinge Yet when that time is come wherein God shall cease from producinge newe all his workes put together being but finite howe can that consideration evince a power infinite Wherfore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea c. maynteyned that the World allready made was infinite because it was fitt as he thought that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent and therfore saythe he the world must be infinite To proceede a litle further when the time shall come that God shall surcease to produce any newe thinge eyther in kinde or individuall the particulars produced put together from the beginninge of the world to that day shall be but finite and howe can this inferre a power infinite Nowe all this discourse of yours proceedes upon supposition that all thinges are produced by God and not only by course of nature but by such a cause as was first created and since maynteyned and governed and ordered by God which truthe was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were And you well knowe that the creation of materia prima was denyed by them all And therfore I should conceave that the infinitenes of God is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things then by the number of thinges produced as namely by his creating of the World that of nothing For if God hathe power to give beinge unto that which hathe no beinge but only is capable of beinge as put the case to a man or Angell and that by his word will he is as well able to give being to any thinge conceavable that is capable of beinge by his word and will and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotens He that can give beinge to any thinge that is possible to be he is Allmighty Agayne if God were finite in perfection of entity then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God then that allso should have an existence For if the essence or existence of a nature lesse perfect shoulde be all one how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect And consequently there shoulde be many Gods one different in perfection above another CHAP. IV. There is no pluralitie of perfections in the Infinite essence albeit the perfection of all thinges be in him Of the Absolute Identitie of the Divine essence and attributes AS for the argument which you propose We must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies or deny them sense because sense is never founde without a body I see no great cause to mislike it especially if it be rightly proposed as it may be thus because sense to witt in proper speeche cannot be founde without a body For is not sense an organicall facultie that is such a facultie as cannot exercise its function without materiall instruments How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument let the Reader judge God the supreame Artificer can make Virtus formatrix you say doe more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason and hence you conclude that therfore God hath both sense and reason Wheras you may as well proove that God hathe bodily substance in him both because he setts virtus formatrix on woorke in producing bodies and can doe more then we can withall our bodies and soules Therfore if you please you may in confidence of such illations proceede to say that God consists of a body and soule too The Psalmists Philosophy is a poore ground for you to builde on For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist that God hathe eyes and eares and handes allso as when he say the The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous his eares are open unto their prayers The right hand of the Lord is exalted the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God why doe you not attribute unto him feeling and smelling and tastinge allso Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses why may not God understand the same without sense as well as Angells That God only is and all thinges numerable are but mere shadowes of his beinge are your owne principles and phrases to drawe conclusions from such groundes is to builde Castles in the Ayre You thinke to helpe it by sayinge that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patternes or perfections you might have taken in three senses more as well and have sayde that smelling â—astinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patternes and perfections and justify Epicurus too in maynteyninge that the Gods have bodies For thoughe our Saviour sayde a Spirite hath not fleshe and bone yet you knowe howe to justifie that bodies and soules and fleshe and bone and braynes and senses yea and the basest thinge that is are in God to witt according to their ideall patternes and perfections For we make no question but that all these thinges are knowne to God and he is able to produce them no more doe you require in the next Section unto this that all thinges are in God yea materia prâ—a and all And this conceyte of yours you prosecute with a great deale more Rhetoricke then Philosophy or Logicke Certeinly not to be and not to have operation are farre more different betweene themselves then nihil agere and otium esse For these are formally the same the other are not For like 〈◊〉 to be and to worke are in themselves manifestly distinct so must be their negations allso so are not nihil agere otium esse 2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge more like a Rhetorician then a Philosopher makes you overlashe and cast your selfe upon resemblances without all proportion As when you say all thinges are in Gods power as strengthe to moove our limmes is in our sinewes or motive faculty Now in this I say is no proportion For seinge all thinges are
imaginary distance you speâ—ke of I have read the question proposed by Vasquius and thâ— opinion of some mentioned who maynteyned that God was in Uacâ— but very fewe yet he reckonnethe Cajetan for one but wheâ—ce dothe he fetche this â—pinion of Cajetan noâ— out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas hiâ— Summes where is the proper place for a Schooleman to manifest his opinion herabouts but out of his Commentaries upon Ioâ—n 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelitie of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan The other which he mentionethe is Major upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction And sincâ— we are fallen upon it I am willingly to conferre discourse with you herabouts And first I say that Scripture and reason seeme to favour it For King Solomon professeth that the Heavens of Heavens doe not conteyne the Lord likewise Iob saythe of him that He is higher then the Heaven and deeper then Hell certeinly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens and consequently in Vacuo herupon it seemes to some that in good reason God should first have a being there before he produce the any body there And this is one reason of many which Brad wardine usethe to proove that God is in Vacuo for thaâ— is his opinion though Vasquius was not acquainted with him Now by your leave I will consider your reasons to the contrary First you demaund whether this locall distance be created or noâ— whether it be something or nothing I answeare that â—rteinly it is not created as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body shoulde be where before was no body As for example where now the World is before the World was 〈◊〉 no body yet was it then possible there should be a body So without the Heavens is no body yet is it possible that a body shoulde be without the heavens You proceede sayinge If it be nothing then they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing and we grant they had For they helde it only an imaginarie space or distance Further you inferre If really nothing then it coulde not be truly termed an imaginary space before the World was created A manifest inconsequence For as men may imagine thinges that are not so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are not reall And there is no such difference as you avouche betweene these two To imagine an infinite space and to say that There is an imaginary infinite space For whersoever there is the imagination of an infinite space there must needes be an infinite space imagined And therfore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens this is as much as to say there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens But I observe your subtiltie following Before the heavens you say there coulde be no imagination of any such space therfore there was no such space imagined I answeare thoughe before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it yet neverthelesse was it imaginable and now you confesse it is so imagined And not only doe we imagine a Uacuum to have bene before the World was but even since the World is to witt without the Heavens And taking it aright is not only nowe so imagined by us but a truthe that a Uacuum is without the heavens and was before the world was where now the world is For the errour of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaninge of Vacuum For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent wheras indeede it is rather the negation of a body existent joyned with the possibilitie of a body to exist So without the heavens is no space or body yet possible is it that a bodly space shoulde be Neyther is it required herunto that it should be created by God for only reall things are created by God but the negation of bodies existent requires no creation but rather the suspension of creation You thinke the reality of this imagination to be God whome the Hebrewes call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place I rather thinke the realitie of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies Touching which possibilitie if it be demaunded in what subject it is I remember what answeare Ioannes Grammaticus made to the like question reported by Averroes on the 12. booke of Aristotles Metaphysicks namely that it was in God to witt fundamentally not formally For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this In God allone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing whence it followeth that before the world was there was a possibilitie that the world should be and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibilitie A possibilitie physicall or naturall requires a subject to support it but a possibilitie logicall not so as being only negatio repugnantie a want of repugnancy And if God was able to make a world out of nothing then surely it was no contradiction that the world should be and consequently the world was possible before it was And yet to drawe a litle nearer unto you in this I professe I finde it more hard to maynteyne that God i any where as in a place then to maynteyne that God is in Uacuo For marke howe Durand distinguishethe Place saythe he is considered two wayes eyther as a naturall thing or as conteyning the thing placed therein As it is a naturall thinge God is in every place but as it conteynethe the thing that is sayde to be therin so God is in no place secundum se in respect of himselfe For nothing without him is able to conteyne him but in respect of his effects he is in all places because he is conteyned of nothing but rather conteyneth all things and preservethe them But in respect of his effects he is every where For he fillethe every place with his effects in this sense it is proper to God to be every where Herupon some may conceave that God may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place because he conteynethe all thinges rather then is conteyned Yet we knowe that the continency of place is corporall and ordinarily the place is more base then the things conteyned therein But Gods continency is merely vertuall and spirituall and in dignitie infinitely beyoud the most noble creatures And we have no great cause to doate upon the Rabbines whose Philosophy was never a whit better then their divinitie Yet one thing more The question was whether God might be sayde to be in Uacuo and your discourse is only to deny that there is any such infinite space as is imagined eyther now to be without the heavens or hertofore to have bene before the world was but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary much lesse doe you take
his divine nature thoughe not for the reason you give to witt because he truly is For that were to inferre that nothing besides God hâ—he any true beinge which were to deny the being of all creatures The divine nature conteynes a totalitie of increated entitie if a totalitie may be imagined of that which hathe no parts As for created entitie that is not to be found in God at all but only from God All creatures may have neede of some thing els then continuance as namely theyr natures being capable of greater perfection then yet they have atteyned unto As for continuance they have only thus farre neede therof because otherwise they shall cease to be and so likewise God himself if he should not continue he should cease to be Only here is the difference The creature may be sayde properly to neede continuance because he depends upon the free will and pleasure of another for the obteyning of it to witt upon the will of God But God depends upon no other for the obteyninge of his continuance no nor upon his owne will neyther And therfore he cannot be sayde to neede continuance but rather that he must needes be because he is not ens contingens but ens necessarium of no contingent but of necessary beinge By your leave Eternity conteynes more then to signify the having of whatsoever is expedient to be had For undoubtedly it signifies allso the continuance of all that without beginninge and without ende But you after your manner seeme under these â—rmes whatsoever is expedient to be had to include and comprehend duration future as if duration future were allready present unto God which is a groundles conceyte arising merely from a superficiall interpretation of the nature of eternitie which is commonly called an instant of duration 〈◊〉 It is true the duration of God is not to come For it is present and incapable of succession as being subject to no manner of mutation But there is a duration of time and of things measured by time to come which future duration is no way present to God in respect of his coexistence with it It is most true and proper enough to say with Scripture phrase that God is he which was is is to come which phrase of specche implyes neyther change nor succession in God but only in things without God Agayne wisedome power and goodnes are expedient to concurre in the supreame essence But this eternitie comprehends not but only the continuance of all these without beginninge without ende That a thing looseth so much of perfection as it wants of duration is a wilde assertion unles under perfection you comprehend duration and then your proposition is identicall and no more then to say that a thing looseth so much of duration as it wants of duration Otherwise I say it is manifestly untrue not only because Aristotle was bold to say that Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius good is not therfore better because the more lasting or everlasting but allso because by the same reason of yours it would followe that a Crowe an Hart and a Raven were much more perfect then a Man if it be true as some write that a Crowe lives three times as long as a Man an Hart three times as long as a Crowe and a Raven three times as long as an Hart. Sure we are the least starre hathe continued from the beginninge of the World 〈◊〉 I muse not a litle to see Platonicall and Plotinicall Philosophy so much advanced by an Oxonian as if Aristotles learning left Logicians perplext in a point of sophistry and only Plotinicall Philosophy would expedite them And lookinge backe to what you have discoursed of out of Plotinus if so be I might light on that parcell of subtiltie suitable to this ende you speake of I professe that as I finde no thing in that which you have alleaged out of Plotinus that is not vulgar nothing woorthy of that commendation which you besto we upon him therby reflectinge no small commendation upon your owne peculiar studies in Plotinus so withall I cannot imagine what piece of witt that is the ignorance wherof dothe perplexe eyther any other better Logician or my selfe eyther in the resolution of that question which you propose Neyther doe you accommodate any sentence of Plotinus herunto that might serve as a key to open that locke which as you say is so hard to be opened but leave your Reader at randon to pore after it But whether it be Plotinus his resolution or your owne let us consider it And first the question proposed is Whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption be a man or corps or bothe To be both you say implyes contradiction and yet you say there is as much reason that in this instant he should be both as eyther Thus have we the question and that argued in part Now followeth your resolution as it were our of Plotinus though you alleage no crumme of any sentence of his for it Now I observe that your solution thoughe you woulde have it seeme to be but one yet indeede it is diverse the one nothing to the purpose the other something to the purpose but utterly overthrowing your former assertion as wheÌ„ you sayde There is as much reason he should be both as eyther The third overthrowinge the very foundation of the question it selfe in effect professing that it proceedes from a false ground or supposition A manifest evidence that you are still to seeke howe to satisfie your selfe herin or others in this unproffitable speculation And if this be to be endoctrinated by Plotinus make you as much as you will with your knowledge of Plotinus his Philosophy I shall have no great cause to complayne of my ignorance therin Your first resolution is that he was a man and shall be a corps This I say is nothing to the question For the question proposed is not what he was or what he shall be but what he is in the instant of his dissolution In the next place you seeme to speake more to the purpose when you say that in the instant of his dissolution he ceaseth to be a man and beginnes to be a corpse But even this allso is not fully to the purpose For the question is not what he beginnes to be or what he ceaseth to be in that instant but what he is Yet because substantiall formes have no degrees as accidentall formes have and therfore cease to be or beginne to be all at once therfore I take your answere at the best to be this that in the instant of his dissolution he is a corps and not a man which is directly contrary unto that which formerly you affirmed sayinge There was as much reason why he should in this instant be both as eyther Your third resolution different from both the former is this that the space of dissolution is not in an instant as the question supposed but a space of
flowres of Rhetoricke growing therein and especially preâ—ty similitudes but by applying them they are utterly cast away for commonly they serve either for the illustration of untruths or very vulgar truths And great pitty but they should finde a place among the toyes in London 12. In the last place for a congruous explication of Austines and Gregories meaning in passages before mentioned you commend unto us certaine observations as necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered This necessity I presume was no impeachment to the liberty of your will in broaching them for my part I see no necessity at all of them nor of this whole discourse of yours In like sort as little necessary it was that my braines should be surbeaten so often in hunting after the involved sense of many sentences thorow the thickets of wilde phrases and figures and affected obscure expressions As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge uncapable of addition therein we argue with you Your next position is worthy of consideration As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so knowne by him to be immutable or absolutely necessarie either in themselves or in respect of his eternall knowledge To this I answer first to the first member of your sentence that great Divines from Austines daies to these daies have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things And the reason they give is thâ—s because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis the knowledge of a crafts-master Now the case is cleare that craftsmasters by their knowledge doe worke and cause things Yet I am content to helpe you with a distinction if you will be pleased to accept of it That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer is the scientia simplicis intelligentiae whereby hee knowes all things possible and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of scientia visionis wherby God ever knew what should come to passe and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things But as for the later member of this your sentence it might have beenâ— so carried as to give your selfe satisfaction if I be not deceived and us also as thus So the certainty of Gods knowledge doth not make things certaine or if you would adde the word necessarie we could have boâ— with it though it marreth the proportâ—on which precisely is this As knowledge doth not make things to be so certaine knowledge doth not make things certainly to be But you leaving out the word certainly take away all evidence of proportion Belike you would acknowledge that certaine knowledge doth make things certainly to be But I doe not like the proposition and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion if it hath any force any way hath force against it Now if I doe not acknowledge that certaine knowledge makes things certainly to bee much lesse would I acknowledge that it makes things necessarily to be There is so manifest reason against it considering that all those things that fall our contingently are as certainly knowne to God as those things that come to passe certainly Yet you as â—imorous men never thinke themselves sure enough are not content with this but clogge your inference with other needlesse circumstances as in saying absolutely necessary and that not in respect of themselves but of Gods knowledge also whereas without these the comparison was incongruous enough And these circumstances I say are needlesse because I would grant what you desire without these But by your addition of these I perceive your meaning for hereby you imply that it is necessary that things knowne by God shall come to passe for though knowledge doth not make them to be much lesse to be necessary yet upon supposition of Gods knowledge it followeth necessarily by way of argument that such things as God foreknows shall come to passe This is of an undoubted truth which kind of necessitie is not any necessitie of being in the things themselves but only of externall denomination upon supposition of Gods foreknowledge And you doe in vaine seeme to strive against this For can you deny this argument God foreknowes that Antichrist shall be destroyed therefore it is necessary that Antichrist shall be destroyed according to the time foreseene by God neither will it herhence followe that therefore it is absolutely necessary that Antichrist should be destroyed as you very weakly suppose For necessitie upon suppositioÌ„ onely commonly called necessitie of consequence was never yet taken for absolute necessitie by any that I knowe I medle not with the terme immutable because it is nothinge congruous in the application For applyed to Gods knowledge it signifieth that knowledge which havinge being cannot be altered but applyed in this sense to the event that commeth to passe is untrue For no event especially contingent after it comes to passe is immutable If applyed to the manner of comming to passe yet it is not congruous For God knowing that it shall come to passe in a mutable manner that is in a contingent manner for if that be not your meaning I know not what is the immutability of Gods knowledge doth rather confirme the contingency of the event then diminish it Yet you suppose some would inferre the contrary but I assure you I am none of them and that for the reason before mentioned Yet still it holds good that if God foreseeth such a thing shall come to passe It followeth of necessity that the same thing shall come to passe albeit not necessarily but contingently when you say Gods knowledge of things mutable that is of the futurition of contingents give me leave to construe you so that I may fayrely understand you is absolutely necessary all Schoolemen I thinke that ever write are directly against you And for good reason for like as it was not at all necessary that such a course of contingent things should be in the world as now is so neither was it necessary much lesse absolutely necessary that God should know this course for if he had ordeyned another course of things as it was very possible then he had also knowne another course But your meaning though incommodiously expressed I conceyve to be this Vpon supposition that thing should come to passe it was necessary that God should know those things For it is impossible that he should be ignorant of any thing that is to come And this is a truth But you have marred it by adding the word absolutely For to be necessary in the sense before mentioned is to be necessary upon supposition only and not absolutely Thus you see I would fayne have healed the incongruity of your position but it will not be healed Agayne you tell us that It is most true which S. Gregory sayth that things future doe not come upon God as they doe upon us that things present doe not
though the Pope wants wisedome and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himselfe as namely of making grants and againe revoking them yet God doth not CHAP. XI Of transcendentall goodnesse and of the infinitie of it in the divine nature I Professe I have no desire to oppose ought in this or in the Chapter following yet having begunne this worke of examination it is fit to consider these also if it be but to take notice of what you deliver and rightly to understand the meaning thereof They which fetch light beyond the Sunne must bee content with Starre-light and they which cannot satisfie themselves with day light but seeke for starre-light they are well enough served if they goe to bed darkling Wee commonly say Life is sweet and it is a truth not because it is a principall stemme of being in my judgment for reason is a more principall stemme of being then it and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable as to creatures reasonable And you confesse that the appetite of preservation of it selfe is naturall unto all yet it cannot be denyed but that life is subject to soure things as well as sweet whereupon some have said Non est vivere sed valere vita And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Better eye out then alwais akeing and better once dead then alwaies dying Nay the hope of a better state without all others consideration may make this life of ours distastefull unto us I desire to be dissolved sayth S. Paule and to be with Christ I am not of your opinion in your construction of the Maxime Omne ens qua ens est bonum as if the meaning were that it is good it selfe for that which is good and that whereunto a thing is good should be rather different then the same for the termes of relation must be distinct Your instances are very incongruous you should say that poyson is good to it selfe not to the aspe for the aspe is a different thing from his owne poyson and so is the Adders stinge from the Adder And as sure I am that even of poyson good use may be made for the service of man And the Scorpion cures the wound that is made by his owne sting And even of the Adders sting God the Creator of it hath a good use evē in stinging and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he sayth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If naturall qualities of contrary nature doe fight for the maintenance of their owne being it seemes being to them is as sweete as life is to us though life be a principall stemme of being How transcendentall goodnes should be equally communicated by God to all and not equally participated by all I understand not the contrary seemes true to my opinion for as much as like as there can be no communication where there is no participation so there can be no equall communication where there is no equall participation And though a lesse vessell may be as full as a greater yet there is no equall communication of water unto them both and the comparison is no way congruous for as much as it is an easy thing to distinguish betweene the water and the vessell filled with it but not so easy to distinguish betweene the thing and the being of it Rather thus God doth sitt every thing with qualities or parts according to the being thereof or as it shall require like as every vessell small and great are filled with water The being of a fly of a man of every thing is good in it selfe and as it may be and is referred to the glory of God for God made all things for himselfe But in the things that God hath created there are degrees of perfection some creatures have onely being some being and life also some adde sense unto them both some have reason over and above them all The degree of entitative goodnesse cannot arise from the specificall nature of it for so it should arise from it selfe for the degree of entitative goodnesse in any thing and the specificall nature thereof is all one Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodnesse is as bad or worse as when you derive it from the degree of their specificall nature As if the specificall nature of a thing had degrees which is untrue as I remember Aristotle compares specificall natures or formes of substances to numbers that admit no intention or remission three flyes are as truly three as three Elephants The difference of individualls under the same species is merely accidentall not essentiall Thus that one is not so happy as another is an accidentall difference not entitative or essentiall It is true sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once yet I have heard of a Ruffian Englishman that in one night at Venico bestowed five hundred pounds upon his five senses It is not the fruition of goodnesse incident to one sense that defeates another for the time of that it most desires but rather want fruition thereof by your instances For if the belly be satisfied it is free to delight in musick also if pinshed with hunger not so yet too much feeding I confesse may bring a man asleepe and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise either of body or minde On the other side deepe contemplation as you say pines the body and is occasion of farre worse accidents also sometimes as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematicall operations made him neglect the Souldiour that came upon him and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies to the great greife of Marcellus the Generall who had given chardge to the contrary The gainving of Archimedes safe into his hāds though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him had been more worth to an ingenuous Conquerour then the taking of Syracusa I have great cause to be sensible of that of Solomons of making many books there is no end for I think if I should live Methusalehs yeares yet I should not make an end Much study is a wearinesse unto the fleshe but by the goodnesse of God I find this wearinesse with a litle refreshing quickly to vanish and I returne unto it with as great vivacity of minde and Spirit as ever I did before I desire to doe the taske which God hath appointed for me And if death prevent me yet it is good to dy doeing something I should put it out of doubt that the more knowledge we get the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied yet it is true I confesse the more we encrease in knowledge the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgement enabled to proceed in knowledge And this capacity of ours will never be throughly satisfied till the enjoying of God himselfe yet I see
neighbours or brethren either in time of plenty or time of scarcitie You doe him the greater wrong to charge him with sucking in cruelty as wine and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you doe him in deeds as for cutting morsels out of other mens throats this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate mans diet is fitter for a superstitious Papist that in case the Priest should vomit the hoast thinkes the people bound to lickâ— it up The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first betweene which what suitable matter hath occurred let the Reader judge Though indigence be the mother of cruelty yet herehence it followeth not that it is not the mother of pitty for Rara est concordia fratrum Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother yet there is a great difference in indigence as the cause of these Indigence heretofore suffered is made the cause of pitty but indigence in present alone is the cause of cruelty and that onely in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty 5 Philosopher-like or rather meere naturalist-like you make errour of judgement the root of all evill as the cause of covetousnesse you make to be the opinion of want either that is for the present or may be for the time to come How farre are you different from Aquinas who maintaines that our wills are more corrupt quoad appetitum boni then our mindes quoad intellectum veri yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor Saint Paul I thinke was a man regenerate when he made that profession I see a law in my members rebelling against the law of my minde and leading me captive to the law of sinne It is true there are bosome sinnes as wee call them like familiar spirits to particular men and so they may be dispensed withall in these they will shew themselves very morrall in other points and thinke it reason God should be mercifull unto them in breaking one commandment so they keepe the other nine Herod heard Iohn Baptist gladly untill hee toucht upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife Iudas was content to follow Christ so he might bâ—are the bagge and so long as hee could make best wages by his service but thirty pieces of silver mooved him to give his master the bagge and to betray him A man for judgement able to arbitrate and voide of exorbitant affections which might expose him to partialitie or prejudice no doubt is the fittest arbitratour But if you aske me whereto this running discourse tends I cannot answer you yet it may bee you may answer your selfe hereafter Internall moderation mixt with outward competency is the onely supporter of true constancy I had thought integritie had made a man fit for arbitrament not constancy for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just I presume it proceeds from constant integrity That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiencie of estate not onely competent but more then competent And to my thinking even in the course of naturall morality a vertuous condition should not depend upon outward things the exercise of vertue doth I confesse but not vertue it selfe Bias his saying was Omnia meo mecum porto but wee are taught of a better Master that Godlinesse is great gaine with contentment and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his minde which is delivered without distinction of poore or rich like as that which followeth The belly of the wicked shall want And that a dinner of greene herbs and love with it is better then a stalled oxe with hatred and strife The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him who answereth to the joy of his heart and the most glorious King that ever was professeth that A good conscience is a continuall feast and David the father a great conquerour found no blessednesse in any temporall state but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects saying Blessed is the man whose iniquitie is forgiven and whose sinne is covered Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sinne and in whose spirit there is no guile The truth is if our pretences depend upon outward things they shall bee as fraile as those are mutable and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God As there is no being but from God so no permanence of being but from God till the time of temptation a man is not known let the raine fall and the flouds rise and the winde beat upon the house then it will appeare whether it were built upon the rock or upon the sand Wee know the Angells fell wee know Adam fell and how vaine a thing is it to discourse of any naturall permanency in vertuous courses amongst naturall men that knew not God By the way your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous of satisfying desires wee usually heare but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse You proceed to discourse unto us of another roote of unconstancy which you call contingency which is a terme of art with you and your peculiar dialect this roote you will have to be the infinite capacitie of reasonable creatures conceites or desires within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere And this applyed to the fall of Angels in whom wee finde a double change or alteration the one morall to wit a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created into the state of sinne the second naturall to wit a change from a blessed state into a wretched and damned condition the first change was their owne worke as wherein they sinned the second the worke of God whereby they were punished Their inconstancie in not standing upright but falling into sinne is onely pertinent to the present purpose and to enquire after the root of this is to enquire after the cause of their fall Now the cause hereof as it is plaine so if we please we may as plainly expresse it for as for their possibility to fall that rose from the condition of their natures being made by God free agents and so accordingly a law being given them by God they might freely obey it freely disobey it what need wee straine our wits for obscure expression of so plaine a truth as by referring it to the infinite capacitie of their conceits or desires within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular What need we affect such perturbation of speech in confounding conceits with desires and placing finite motions within the compasse of desires infinitely capacious which motions undoubtedly were their desires for they sinned questionlesse in desiring somewhat and comparing desires to spheres and againe desires to starres fixed in spheres that so
warnes Timothy to cary himself gently towards them that are without waiting the time when God will give them repentance that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill by whom they were led captive to doe his will By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illation when you say Wheresoever God hath laid the one to wit naturall being it is to all that rightly consider his wisedome truth and goodnesse and assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other Why the truth of God is directly against it professing that he hath mercy on whom he will and heardeneth whom he will and that the same word of God is a savour of life unto life to them that are saved hee doth not say to them that are carefull to prepare themselves and a savour of death unto death unto them that perish and a good savour unto God in both he doth not say to them that do not prepare themselves And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation for they believed as there the Apostle professeth as much as to say the word preached was a savour of life unto life unto them and wot you the reason hereof Why surely because they were ordained to salvation like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that God added to the Church day by day such as should be saved You might with as much modesty professe that in as much as God hath made every man It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to give every man repentance before he drops out of the world Gods gifts are without repentance it is true of the gifts of sanctification but it is as true that God repented that he made man That the current of Gods joyfull benificence can admit no intermission is most untrue for he dispenseth it freely so he continueth it as freely For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his owne will that is nullo necessitatis obsequio as Ambrose expoundeth it Nay it doth admit intermission in this world In the world to come indeed it shall admit no intermission in this it doth both in respect of blessings temporall and in respect of motions spirituall For as touching blessings temporall God sheweth the back sometimes and not the face Ier. 18. 17. And as touching spirituall motions and consolations what moved the Lord to cry out upon the crosse My God my God why hast thou forsaken me but the intermission of these It is true sorrow to us hath no other originall then our own sinne yet no sinne in Christ could be found to bee the originall of his sorrow And though the woman by reason of sinne hath ever since conceived in sorrow yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow notwithstanding that they are incapable of sinne And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures is meerly according to the good pleasure of his will And though all sorrow proceeds from sinne in the way of a meritorious cause yet all sorrow proceeds from God in the way of an efficient cause Hee is the great Iudge that inflicteth sorrow on some as well as hee causeth joy to others 9. The comparison is most absurd For illumination proceeds from the Sunne as from a naturall cause working by necessity of nature but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought or send forth any influence is more Atheisticall then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith they were sowne in their first creation for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall as well as the Angels of light And all the influence that God sends forth you say is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse whence it followeth that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in the verie Devils And seeing Gods concurrence to the actions of men and Angels is a part of that influence that proceeds from God and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits without hope of recovery in concurring to this assurance God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in them Besides this with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinfull actions this your selfe have often acknowledged and this concourse of his is a part of his influence and no influence you say can proceed from him but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith their natures were sowne in their creation Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinfull actions doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in reprobate men and Angels also Now proceed we along with you God you say doth inspire all that are conformable to his will with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them This is a bone very well worth the picking I am perswaded many a sweet morsell will be found about it You doe not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will but as many as are conformable to his will hee inspires with other good desires whence I pray then comes conformity to his will if not from the inspiration of God doe you make conformity to Gods will to bee the inspiration of the flesh For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world or of the devill Yet S. Paul saith that it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed not by any necessary emanation as light issueth from the Sunne but according to his owne good pleasure Againe this very desire of doing others good is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will why not also with another And so why may we not runne over all parts of conformity to the will of God and finde as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God as the cause of them The mystery of your meaning in this the next sentence serves as a key to open when you say that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodnesse or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestiall influence become creators of their owne woe and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish So then Gods influence is to all like as the light of the Sunne onely the difference ariseth herehence that some resist it others yeeld unto it As good Arminianisme and Pelagianisme as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himselfe So then it is not God that ex nolentibus volentes facit but mans free will And in spight of St. Paul it shall be volentis currentis and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speake of can be no other then
that he had cursed them already And equally and indifferently as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient and therefore calls heaven and earth to witnesse that hee hath set before them life and death blessing and cursing So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God as the Author of them like as life and blessing and both are in due proportion to the behaviour of man as it is found either in the way of obedience or in the way of disobedience And in this respect perhaps you may say that man is the cause of cursing not God To this I answer 1. By the same reason man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing and not God 2. If in this respect cursing be to be derived from sin it is onely in the way of a meritorious cause so doth not fruit proceed from trees but onely in the way of an efficient cause God and none but God can be the Author as of happinesse so of misery as of eternall life so also of everlasting death And as none is truly blessed but whom God blesseth so none is truly accursed but whom God curseth Yet no man I thinke that hath his wits in his head will say that this cursing proceedeth from Gods love but rather from his hatred Gods love towards the creature is essentiall his love to the creature is not so no more then to be a creator is of Gods essence And love is no more of Gods essence as a Creator then hatred is of Gods essence as a revenger And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alledged belong to God onely as a Iudge to execute the one by way of reward and the other by way of punishment Albeit there is another course of Gods blessing and of his cursing though you love not to distinguish but to consound rather as all that maintaine bad causes love darknesse rather then light I come to the second point wherein you insist In that he is the Author of being he is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are And this is very true for God saw all that he had made and lo it was very good And as it is very true so it is nothing at all to the purpose For when we enquire whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one wee presuppose their beings in their severall times and generations And secondly we speake of a love proper to mankinde which consisteth not in giving them their being for God hath given being unto Angels even unto Devils as well as unto men and as to men so to all inferiour creatures be they never so noysome and offensive unto man And it is a strange course of yours to magnifie the love of God to man in giving him being which is found in the basest creature that breathes or breathes not I have heard a story of a great Prince when one of the prime subjects of the land being taken in a foule act of insurrection and yeelding upon condition to bee brought to speake with that Prince presuming of ancient favour whereof hee had tasted in great measure and which upon his presence might haply revive he found nothing answerable but imperious taâ—ts rather and dismission in this manner Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad Yet you magnifie the love of God to mankinde in as comfortable manner when you say that hoe hath given us being which wee well know God hath given to lyons rigers and beasts of prey yea to snakes and adders to frogges and toads and fiery serpents Herehence you proceed to the third point and do inferre That because he hath made us therefore hee loveth us for He hateth nothing that he hath made as saith the wise man and to give the greater credit to the authority alledged by you you use an introduction of strange state for you say The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived that He hateth nothing that he hath made But to what purpose tends all this pompe Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all and can neither deceive nor be deceived May not fooles speake of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived as well as wise men and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this If the author of that sentence had beene such a one as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived then indeed the sentence had beene of greatest authority and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Iew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull take the author of it for such a one as could neither deceive nor be deceived If you did this were very foule play and no better then a trick of conicatching Yet we except not against the sentence but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours taken from the same ground above two hundred yeares ago You shall finde it in Aquinas his summes where his first objection is this Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit sed Deus omnem hominem diligit secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt nihil odisti eorum quae secisti Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat It seemes that God reprobates no man For no man reprobates him whom hee loveth But God loves every man according to that Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are and hatest nothing that thou hast made Therefore God reprobateth no man And the answer hee makes unto this objection followeth in this manner Adprimum dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diliget etiam omnes creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare To the first is to be answered that God loves all men yea and all creatures for as much as he willeth some good to them all but yet he willeth not every good to all There-fore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good which is life everlasting he is said to hate them or to reprobate them And you might have beene pleased to take notice not onely of that wise man though as wise as Philo who speakes herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived but of that wise God who is wiser then men and Angels and can neither deceive nor be deceived and affirmeth openly that He hath loved Iacob and hated Esau as also of the Apostle Saint Paul who by the infallible direction of Gods Spirit applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne
therefore you were content not to quote the place in Austin but onely to say that it is somewhere and indeed so it is and that somewhere is in his Enchirid. cap. 103. And in the Chapter immediately going before he professrth Deo procul dubio quà m facile est quod vult facere tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsam nostrae fidei confessionis initium quo nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens nisi quia quicquid vult potest nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus That looke how easie it is unto God to doe what he will so easie is it not to suffer that to bee which hee willeth not Vnlesse we beleeve this the very first Article of our Creed will be shaken whereby we professe to beleeve in God the Father Almighty For he is not truly called Omnipotent in any other respect then because he can bring to passe whatsoever he will have to be neither can the effect of will omnipotent be hindred by the wit of any creature So that herein we have both the authority of so great a Father and manifest reason also directly opposite to your discourse To avoid the brunt whereof you juggle and consider his restraint there where he doth not use it And here you tell us magnificently that if any man will lay this restraint upon this place the scanning of the words following the fitting of the matter contained in both with the reason of the exhortation and other reall circumstances will shake off this or other like restriction with greater ease then it can be laid upon it Here we have a great deale of cry if the wooll be answerable wee shall speed a great deale better then he in Aelian that shore his hogs But the mischiefe is S. Austin doth use no restraint in this place but conceives the Apostles commandement to be this ut oraretur pro singulis So that your paines is like to bee well bestowed in shaking of Austines restriction from this place whereupon he laid no restriction at all It seemes you came to this discourse as a man should come to play at putfinger in the darke We grant we are to pray for the salvation of no other then whose salvation we are unfainedly to desire and we are to desire the salvation of every man of what condition soever or fort or nation provided that wee know him For doe you thinke it a sober course for me to desire and pray for the salvation of I know not whom If so I see no reason but I may pray also for I know not what Any malignant and persecuting enemy of mine I am bound to pray for and I shall bee sure to take notice of such a one for I shall bee sure to feele him And as well for meane persons as for Kings that I have any thing to doe withall albeit I may have greater cause to pray for the conversion of Kings then others and that without accepting of persons because by the good affection of Kings to Gods Church the Church of God is like to prosper farre better then by the conversion of meane persons And the Apostle gives this reason of praying for Kings that under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all godlinesse and honestie And therefore I hope you will beare with mee if I pray with greater devotion for Gods grace upon the Kings heart and Gods blessing upon his head then for meaner persons because the gracious disposition of a King is of far greater importance for the advancing of Gods glory in the liberty and prosperity of his Church then the gracious disposition of meaner persons And herein I hope I shall not be censured for an accepter of persons a conceit of yours quite besides the Apostles text you treat of But yet the Apostle doth not command every congregation to pray for all kings wherunto you drive it devising circumstances to fill the scale For what have I to doe to pray for the king of Bungo if any such king or kingdome there be or for the kings in Terra Australis incognita discovered by Ferdinand de Quit yet his relations are of so little efficacy that hitherto hee hath made no mens mouthes water after them It is enough for us to pray for the fulnesse of the Gentiles that it may come i◠so to make way for the calling of the Iewes But by vertue of the Apostles exhortation every Christian congregation is bound to pray for their owne king Like as Darius though an heathen Prince desired the prayers of Gods people that lived under him Ezr. 6. 10. Let them have to offer sweet odours to the God of heaven and pray for the Kings life and for his sonnes When I pray for the comming in of the fulnesse of the Gentiles and the calling of the Iewes I except none as likewise when I pray for the ruine of Antichrist I except none I finde you doe not much satisfie your selfe in the weight of this your discourse you are still casting about for somewhat more to make up the totall of your account Wee must desire you say the spirituall good of all men not as they fall under our indefinite but under our universall consideration So that belike you are still jealous lest we draw all men to an indefinite and not to an universall consideration I desire to deale as plainly as you would wish name any man throughout the world unto me try mee whether I will not pray God blesse him and convert his heart and save his soule And yet to my thinking you should not urge mee to pray for one with whom I have nothing to doe onely I heare a relation of him perhaps dwelling in the I le of Iapan For though I am bound to love my neighbour as my selfe and by neighbour I must comprehend a Iew although my selfe bee a Samaritane yet this is in case we meet together and I see him to have need to make use of my charity Otherwise to my judgement generall prayers should serve the turne as I shewed for the fulnesse of the Gentiles to come in for the calling of the Iewes for the ruine of Babylon Neither doe wee finde any practice of the Saints to the contrary and herein I assure you I except none But because I see you travaile to bee delivered of somewhat and I take pity of you tell me I pray is not your meaning this that we must pray for all and every one that liveth in the world If this be your meaning and it did not satisfie you to say we must pray for all or desire the salvation of all you do as much as confess hereby that to pray for al doth not include the praying for every one consequently the Apostle in exhorting to pray for all doth not exhort to pray for
for him to repent I know no such state nor any rule that God hath given to himselfe to confine his grace Nay to the contrary we reade that neither continuance in sinne nor greatnesse of sinne doth preclude the grace of God but that Gods grace as it can so it doth many times prevaile over both But you love not to speake distinctly but to carie your selfe in the clouds of generalities They that maintaine a weake cause had need play least in sight wee say plainly that God well knowes no man can repent except he gives the grace of repentance the Scriptures in divers places expresly testifying that repentance is the gift of God though you love not to heare of that eare nor are well pleased as it seemes with the musique that riseth upon the touching of that string On the other side God knowes that every man at any time can repent if God will be pleased to give him the grace of repentance yea and that he shall repent also the habituall grace serves for the one and the actuall and effectuall motion of Gods Spirit is requisite to the other I come to the second parallell of Iesuiticall equivocation or rather the deification of it as you are pleased out of glorious spleene to calumniate your opposites The protestation is on Gods part I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth the reservation with purpose to make this part of my will knowne unto him But where I pray doe you finde any such protestation on Gods part Ezekiel hath none such In him it is said I will not the death of him that dieth But no where doth he say I will not the non repentance of him that dieth This is a tricke of your owne device as if you followed the counsell of Lysander and where the Lyons skinne will not reach you are content to patch it up with some piece of a Fox skinne Wee professe in plaine termes that as God hath mercy on whom he will so he hardneth whom he will and as he will give the grace of repentance unto some so he will not give the grace of repentance unto others Notwithstanding that he bid all in the ministery of his word I meane all those that heare it To repent and beleeve the Gospel So he did bid the Iewes and that with great earnestnesse to keepe the covenant Deut. 30. 19. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death blessing and cursing therefore chuse life that both thou and thy seed may live By loving the Lord thy God by obeying his voice and cleaving unto him for hee is thy life and the length of thy daies that thou maiest dwell in the land which the Lord did sweare unto thy fathers ' Yet I hope you will not say this could be done without grace though of the nature of grace what you thinke and of the universall extention thereof I should be very glad to understand and that therein you would speake your minde plainly As for the reservation here it is most ridiculous neither is any equivocation of Iesuites I trow answerable hereunto for by reservations a sense is raised contradictious to the sense of the protestation but by this reservation no contradiction ariseth to the former as it lieth but onely it denyeth a certaine purpose to be joyned with it but be it that Iesuits allow such artifice what Divine of ours doth Did we say that God wills not the non repentance of any we would say hee willeth it not in as much as hee forbiddeth it And Gods prohibitions and commandements are usually though improperly called the will of God And here voluntas signi hath proper place enough Like as God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne yet his determination was that Isaac should not be sacrificed Some may have said that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth in case he repent But was ever any heard to affirme that God wills not the non repentance of him that dieth to wit with purpose to make it knowne unto him What madnesse possessed you to ascribe so incredible a thing to your opposites so contrary to the rule of fiction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Callimachus hath set it downe Your addition here likewise which drawes a long taile after it hath no conformity to the patterne And as for the substance of it as touching Gods resolution never to grant some repentance or the meanes of it if thereby you meane the Gospel we acknowledge it to be truth for the arme of the Lord is not revealed unto all neither doth he give repentance or faith to all but hath mercy on some onely even on whom hee will and hardenneth othersome even whom he will that is denieth them repentance and consequently they cannot repent which interpretation of obduration your selfe make in the seventh section following and consequently they cannot live this I doubt not but you will acknowledge with us And therefore the vanity of your discourse is not at an end you proceed to talke of Gods oath in giving assurance that he will not the death of them that are damned built meerly upon a translation which you follow different from the most authorized translation of our Church and that contrary to evident reason for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon the impenitent so hee must needs will it for hee doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will Ephesians 1. 11. And yet according to your reading of it a good construction may be given without all reservations as plainly enough deduced out of the word of God it selfe And what God hath manifested unto us in his word I hope is not to bee accounted a reservation but a revelation rather I am not of your minde to thinke that the keeping of an oath is a branch of perfection or to keepe a mans word either which yet is a better point of morality then to keepe an oath Such justice is to bee found amongst heathen men yet workes of mercy go beyond workes of justice yet no great perfection neither but to be mercifull to our enemies When they are hungry to feed them when they are thirsty to give them drinke this is the perfection that our Saviour calleth us unto and sets before our eyes the goodnes of our heavenly Father in suffering his raine to fall and his sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good And here withall how well your calumniation hath sped imputing to us the deification of Iesuiticall equivocations let the indifferent Reader judge 6 Here you proceede learnedly to distinguish betweene somethings determined by oath and somethings else and in the accomodation of your distinction you tell us that Voluntas signi and beneplaciti can have no place in things determined by divine oath but well it may in other things What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by
man or what is the effect of this love and I doubt not but when you say God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sinne your meaning is that God wills their damnation and that for this measure of their sin In proportion your answer should be this That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men yet here is very great disproportion for when you say God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin I finde herein a manifest difference between the reprobate the elect as touching the cause of damnation and that on mans part namely the making up the full measure of their sin which is found onely in reprobates not in the elect But when you say on the contrary side God wills the salvation of all men as they are men I finde no difference at all betweene the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation either on mans part or on Gods part for as touching Gods will that passeth you say upon the salvation of all without difference then on mans part likewise there is no difference at all if they are considered onely as men for the reprobates are men as well as the elect To help this you rest not in this consideration of them as men but adde a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the forme thus Or at having made up the full measure of their sinne Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent which is untrue for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second But I conceive the weakenesse of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helpes and thereupon you confound things that differ for in some cases the first consideration usually hath place as when t is said God hateth nothing that hee hath made therefore he hateth not man true say some he hateth not man as man and this distinction seemes plausible to some and therefore you seemed willing to help your selfe with this by the way for it might stirre some propitious effection in a pliable reader But then finding this bed a great deale too short to stretch your selfe thereon you added by way of disjunctive another consideration which is this As not having made up the full measure of sinne And because you rest upon it I thinke good to consider it Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates and in the particular of Pharaoh and argued that then Pharaoh had beene saved had he died before the seventh wonder for till then in your opinion hee had not made up the full measure of his sinne yet we doe not finde that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect Paul never filled up the measure of his sinne for if he had then had hee beene a reprobate but hee was an elect therefore if hee had died immediately after the sâ—oning of Steven hee had beene saved though accessary to his death For he kept the garments of them that slew him as himselfe confesseth In a word all the elect though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance should notwithstanding bee saved also My third exception is against the disproportion that neverthelesse is found in these propositions for when t is said God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sinne the filling up the measure of sinne is noted here as the cause of their damnation but in saying God willeth the salvation of all not having filled up the measure of their sinne the not having filled up the measure of their sinne cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation And therefore to mend this foule disproportion the Genius of your tenet drives you in conscience to proceede and professe plainely that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that doe not believe and repent and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sinn Now herein wee agree with you namely in justifying the truth of both these propositions But like as from the latter it followeth not that God willeth the damnation of all but of some onely namely of those that doe fill up the measure of their sinne and breake not off their sins by faith and repentance so from the former it followeth not that God willeth the salvation of all but onely that hee willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent And if you please further to infer that because perseverance in sinne of infidelitie and impenitencie as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also I thinke I may with as good reason take liberty to inferre from the former that seeing faith and repentance yea and good workes also are the disposing causes of salvation therefore they are to bee accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation that is of our election also And so your opinion shall appeare at full and to life in his proper coulors not an haires breadth different either from the Arminian heresie of late or from the Pelagian heresie of old 8 The deductions you speake of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions As for moderne Catechismes you are not the first that nibble at them it is a point of imperious learning now a daies from on high to despise such performances But to speake as a free man the lesse they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them the lesse shall they differ from the truth As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandements which you glorie of now a second time In this place it is hard if not impossible to discerne by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdome In the close of the second Section of this chapter you told us That it was not every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from Gods love and withall that this was observed by Bishop Hooper But in stead of alledging any passage in him to this purpose you referred us there to the fourth paragraffe of this chapter which is this present section Yet concerning that sentence I see a good construction may bee made of it taking love quoad effectum as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God and not quoad affectum and the chiefest effect of Gods love is salvation Now it is most true that nothing but finall perseverance in sinne doth bereave men of salvation of glory nothing but finall perseverance in sinne stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject Now albeit in that which followeth it
to be angry But if you take it for voluntas vindicandi this must needs be as everlasting as Gods will and if you deduce any cause herof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of Gods will which Aquinas professeth never any man was so madde as to doe And Gods hatred of Esau is in Scripture made suitable to Gods love of Iacob and if this love be the will of election then hatred must be the will of reprobation And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory be deservedly accoumpted Gods love why should not the everlasting purposu of God to deny unto others both grace and glory be as deservedly accoumpted Gods hatred You undertake to shew how Love and anger being passions or linkt with passions are rightly conceaved to be in God but I hope you will not attribute them unto God either a◠passibus or linkt with passions For albeit love and joy mans formally be attributed unto God because they include no imperfection yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleaged out of him CHAP. XXI How Anger Love Compassion Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature II is true some Schoolemen thinke that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative not because this includes rationem dati accepti but rather because it includes aequalitatem dati accepti Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety then justice commutative as may be seene in Vasque 1. in 1. part disput 86. Likewise I know none that thinke mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God as voluntas miserandi that being as easily abstracted from greife as this from compassion As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward To say that affections or morall qualities may be contayned in the divine essence eminently is a very poore justification of them to be the attributes of God For to be eminently in God is no more as your selfe heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect 2. then God to be the Author of them and produce them Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God and say God is such or such a thing is God to wit eminently But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitly different from the will of man No passion as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man may be truely verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certayne reference unto his creatures without all passion So there is a will and understanding in God but nothing like to the will and understanding of man For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God Our anger at the best as being displeased only with such things that displease God though in some litle thing it be like Gods anger yet in many things it is very unlike For it is a passion in us not in God it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God Gods anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so but only in case we are his ministers For vengeance is myne I will repay sayth the Lord. I cannot justifie you in so speaking when you say that mercy is more reall and truly affectionate in God then his anger For taking them sequestred from theire imperfections each is formally attributed unto God though not as passions and not eminently only as you have delivered it As for the execution of each more or lesse that receaveth moderation merely from the pleasure of Gods will For he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardneth and farre more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men then vessells of mercy though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angelis Mercy consists in pardoning sinnes and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God but passion enough even unto death upon the crosse in the nature of man person of the Sonne of God The better use men have of reason the lesse are they subject to perturbation but no whit lesse doe they participate of affection for vertues are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle hath taught us but the right ordering of them Christs soule was heavy unto the death at the approaching of his passion and wept often before this yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason For all this But no passion at all can be in God for passions rise and fall upon new occasion but no such alteration is incident unto God I know not what you meane by devouring affections They may be concealed or restrained not in a vertuous manner but vitious only to keepe the rankor of theire hearts from discovery as Absolon a long time sayd nor good nor bad to Amnon after he had defloured his sister Thamar he was not any whit the more charitable in that but playd the foxe in waiting opportunity to doe mischeife Likewise when Haman saw Mordecai in the Kings gate that he stood not up nor mooved for him then was hee full of indignation at Mordecai Neverthelesse Haman refrayned himselfe though hee had plotted the destruction both of him and all his natiō To say that passions are moderate in matters which men least affect is as much as to say that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect And indeede affections must needes be moderate when they are least in motion But perpetuall minding of a thing should argue strength of passion in my judgement rather then moderation To my thinkinge now you are in a vaine of writing essayes Yet I find no greate substance of truth in them How secret cariages can be violently opposed I conceave not For if opposed then no longer secret And the more cunning men are the more notice I should thinke they take of violent opposition unlesse they doe apparently see such opposites are like to overshoote or come short which is a very race case and comes ofter into a schollars fancy then into reall practise I finde no greate passion in Achitophel but rather as Caesar came soberly to the ruinating of his country So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himselfe To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a greate poynt of pollicy undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity not allwayes to restraine them but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinkes of them As Moses in the cause of God was mooved so farre as to breake the