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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A87137	The prerogative of popular government. A politicall discourse in two books. The former containing the first præliminary of Oceana, inlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections. The second concerning ordination, against Dr. H. Hamond, Dr. L. Seaman, and the authors they follow. In which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the Hebrews, or of Israel, senate, people, and magistracy, both as it stood in the institution by Moses, and as it came to be formed after the captivity. As also the different policies introduced into the Church of Christ, during the time of the Apostles. By James Harrington.	Harrington, James, 1611-1677.	1657 (1657)	Wing H820; Thomason E929_7; ESTC R202382	184,546	252

great boldnesse but if I commit errors in writing these may be known without danger whereas if they commit errors in acting such come not otherwise to be known then in the ruine of the Commonwealth For which cause I presume to open the Scene of my Discourse which is to change according unto the variety of these following Questions Whether Prudence be well distinguisht into Antient and Modern Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws and not of Men and Monarchy to be a Government of some Man or few Men and not of Laws Whether the ballance of Dominion in Land be the Natural cause of Empire Whether the ballance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial and whether these two or Nations that are of distinct ballance comming to depend upon one and the same head such a mixture create a new ballance Whether there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally and how by the Orders of a Common-wealth this may best be distinguisht from private Interest Whether the Senatusconsulta or decrees of the Roman Senate had the power of Laws Whether the Ten Commandements proposed by God or Moses were voted by the people of Israel Whether a Commonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind come not up to the perfection of Government and have no flaw in it Whether Monarchy comming up to the perfection of the kind come not short of the perfection of Government and have some flaw in it in which is also treated of the ballance of France of the Original of a landed Clergy of Armes and their kinds Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by her self were ever conquer'd by any Monarch Whether there be not an Agrarian or some Law or Laws of that Nature to supply the defect of it in every commonwealth and whether the Agrarian as it is stated in Oceana be not equal and satisfactory to all Interests or Parties Whether courses or Rotation be necessary unto a well Order'd Commonwealth In which is contained the Parembole or courses of Israel before the captivity together with an Epitome of the whole commonwealth of Athens as also another of the commonwealth of Venice Antient and Modern Prudence CHAP. I. Whether Prudence be well distinguished into Antient and Modern THe Considerer where by Antient Prudence I understand the Policy of a Common-wealth and by Modern Prudence that of King Lords and Commons which introduced by the Goths Vandals upon the ruine of the Roman Empire hath since reigned in these Western Countreys till by the predominating of some one of the three parts it be now almost universally extinguished thinks it enough for the confutation of this distinction to shew out of Thucidides that of Monarchy to be a more Antient policy than that of a Commonwealth Upon which occasion I must begin here to discover that which the farther I go will be the more manifest Namely that there is difference between quoting Authors and saying some part of them without book this may be done by their words but the former no otherwise then by keeping unto their sense Now the sense of Thucidides as he is translated by Mr. Hobbs in the place alleaged is thus The manner saith he of living in the most Antient times of Greece was Thieving the stronger going abroad under the conduct of their most puissant Men both to enrich themselves and fetch home maintenance for the weak for there was neither traffick propriety of Lands nor constant Abode till Minos built a Navy and expelling the Malefactors out of the Islands planted Colonies of his own by which means they who inhabited the Sea coasts becomming more addicted to riches grew more constant to their dwellings of whom some grown now rich compassed their Towns about with walls For out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the Mighty and the Mighty thus overballancing at home with their wealth brought the lesser Cities abroad into subjection Thus Pelops though he were a stranger obtained such power in Peloponesus that the Countrey was called after his Name Thus Atreus obtained the Kingdome of Mycenae and thus Kingdomes with honours limitted came to be hereditary and rising to power proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy After the war with Troy though with much adoe and in a long time Greece had constant rest and land without doubt came to propriety for shifting their seats no longer at length they sent Colonies abroad The Athenians into Ionia with the Islands the Peloponesians into Italy Sicily and other parts The power of Greece thus improved and the desire of money with all their Revenues in what not in money if yet there were no usury therefore except a Man can shew that there was usury in Land being enlarged in most of the Cities there more erected Tyrannies Let us lay this place unto the former when out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the Mighty it caused hereditary Kingdomes with honours limitted as happen'd also with us since the time of the Goths and Vandals But when the people came to Propriety in Land and their Revenues were enlarged such as assumed power over them not according unto the Nature of their Propriety or Ballance were Tyrants well and what remedy why then it was saies the Considerer that the Grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was the cause of their present sufferings slipt into Popular Government not that upon calm and mature debates they found it best but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance which spirit usually accompanies all Reformations from that with which they were grown into dislike Whereby he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true force and Nature of the ballance working even without deliberation and whether Men will or no. For the Government that is Natural and easie being in no other direction than that of the respective ballance is not of choice but of necessity The Policy of King Lords and Commons was not so much from the prudence of our Ancestors as from their Necessity If Three hundred Men held at this day the like overballance unto the whole People it were not in the power of Prudence to institute any other then the same kind of Government through the same Necessity Thus the meaner sort with Thucidides submitting unto the Mighty it came to Kingdomes with hereditary honours but the People comming to be wealthy called their Kings though they knew not why Tyrants nay and using them accordingly found out means with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to tosse a Dog or a Hern to split an Hawk that is rather as at the long run they will ever doe in the like case by instinct than prudence or debate to throw down that which by the meer information of sense they could no longer bear

with himself which abating the figure is the same again and so I have nothing to answer but the figure Now for this the Prince himself is no otherwise tall then by being set upon the shoulders of the Nobility and so if they set another upon the same shoulders as in Henry the 4th or the 7th who had no Titles unto the Crown nor could otherwise have measured with the Prince be he never so low he comes to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the Prince and to be taller too not only by those Old Examples but others that are younger than our selves though such the Nobility having not of late been weighty enough to keep the People under as derive from another Principle that of Popular ballance A Prince therefore preserving his Nobility weighty enough to keep under the people must preserve in them the ballance of that kind of Empire and the ballance containing the riches which are the power and so the Arms of the Nation this being in the Nobility the Nobility when willing must be able to dispose of the King or of the Government Nor under a lesse weight is a Nobility qualified to keep down the people as by an Argument from the contrary Henry the 7th having found the strength of his Nobility that set him in a Throne to which he had no right and fearing that the tide of their favour turning they might do as much for another abated the dependance of their Tenants and cut off their Train of Retainers which deminution of their weight releasing by degrees the People hath caused that Plain or Level into which we live to see the Mountain of that Monarchy now sunck and swallowed wherefore the ballance of the Nobility being such as failing that kind of Monarchy comes to ruine and not failing the Nobility if they joyn may give Law unto the King the inherent disease of Monarchy by a Nobility remains also uncured and uncurable These are points to which I had spoken before but something concerning France and Forraign Guards was mumbled by the Praevaricator in a wrong place while he was speaking of Turkey where there is no such thing This least I be thought to have courted Opposition for nothing shall open a New Scene while I take the occasion in this place to speak first of the Ballance of the French Monarchy and next of the Nature and use of Forraign Guards The whole Territory of France except the Crown Lands which on this account are not considerable consisteth of three shares or parts whereof the Church holdeth one the Nobility another and the Presidents Advocates other Officers of the Parliaments Courts of Justice the Citizens Merchants Tradesmen the Treasurers receivers of the Customes aids taxes impositions Gabells all which together make a vast body hold a Third by how equal portions I am sorry that I do not know nor where to learn but this is the ballance of the French Monarchy unto which the Paisant holding nothing but living though in one of the best Countrys of the world in the meanest and most miserable Condition of a Labourer or Hiend is of no account at all The parties that hold the ballance in a Territory are those of whom the Government doth naturally consist wherefore these are called Estates so the Clergy the Nobility and the Commons are the three Estates of France Though the Third because the Paisant partaking not of the ballance can in relation to Government be of no account is not called the Commons but only the Third Estate whereas the Yeomanry and Gentry in England having weighed as well in the ballance as the Church and the Nobility the three Estates of England while the Monarchy was in vigour were the Clergy the Nobility and the Commons The Consent of Nations evinceth that the Function of the Clergy or Priest except where otherwise determined of by Law appertaineth unto the Magistrate By this right Noah Abraham Job with the rest of the Patriarchs instructed their Families or sacrisiced There seemeth to have been a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan while Melchisedec was both King and Priest Such also was Moses till he consecrated Aaron and confer'd the Priesthood upon the Levites who are expresly said to succeed unto the first born that is unto the Patriarchs who till then exercised that Function Nor was it otherwise with the Gentiles where they who had the Soveraign power or were in eminent Magistracy did also the Priestly Office omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur iidem Auguria tenebant ut enim sapere sic divinare regale ducebant saith Cicero and Virgil Rex Anius Rex idem hominum Phoebique Sacerdos You find the Heroes that is Princes in Poets sacrificing The Ethiopian Egyptian Lacedemonian Kings did the like in Athens constantly and in Rome when they had no Kings occasionally they elected a Rex sacrorum or King-Priest So that a free People had thus far power of electing their Priests is not deny'd by any Man This came it should seem to be otherwise Established by the Law in Egypt where the Priests whose Lands Joseph when he bought those of the People did not buy being great Landlords it may be unto the Third of the whole Territory were one of the three Estates of the Realm And it is clear in Scripture that the People till they Sold their Lands became not Servants unto Pharaoh While Agesilaus was in Egypt they deposed their King which implies the recovery of their ballance but so seeing they set up another as withall shews the ballance of the Nobility to have been predominant These particulars seem to come near unto the account of Diodorus Siculus by whom the ballance of Egypt should have stood thus The whole Revenue was divided into three parts whereof the Priests had the first the King had the second and the Nobility had the Third It seems to me that the Priests had theirs by their Antient right and title untouched by Joseph that the Kings had all the rest by the Purchase of Joseph and that in time as is usual in like cases a Nobility came through the bounty of succeeding Kings to share with them in one half But however it came about Egypt by this means is the first Example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility at least distributed into three Estates by means of a Landed Clergy which by consequence came to be the greatest Counsellors of State and fitting Religion unto their uses to bring the people to be the most superstitious in the whole World Where it not for this Example I should have said that the Indowment of a Clergy or Religious Order with Lands and the erecting of them into an Estate of the Realm or Government were no Antienter then the Goths and Vandals who introducing a like Policy which unto this day taketh place throughout the Christian world have been the cause First why the Clergy have been generally great Counsellors unto

Kings while the People are led into superstition Secondly by planting a Religious Order in the Earth why Religion hath been brought to serve worldly ends And thirdly by rendring the Mitre able to make War why of later Ages we have had such a thing as War for Religion which till the Clergy came to be a Third State or Landlords was never known in the World For that some Cities of Greece taking Arms upon the usurpation or violation of some Temple have called it the Holy war such disputes having been but upon matter of fact and not of faith in which every Man was free came not to this Account Moses was learned in all the learning of the Egyptians but a landed Clergy introduced he not in Israel nor went the Apostles about to lay any such foundation of a Church Abating this one Example of Egypt till the Goths and Vandals who brought in the Third Estate a Government if it were unequal consisted but of two Estates as that of Rome whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth consisted of the Patritians and Plebeians or of the Nobility and the people And an equal Commonwealth consisteth but of One which is the people for Example of this you have Lacedemon and Venice where the people being few and having many Subjects or Servants might also be called Nobility as in regard of their Subjects they are in Venice and in regard of their Helots or Servants they might have been in Lacedemon That I say which introducing two Estates causeth division or makes a Commonwealth unequal is not that she hath a Nobility without which she is deprived of her most especial Ornament and weakned in her conduct but when only the Nobility is capable of Magistracy or of the Senate and where this is so ordered she is unequal as Rome But where the Nobility is no otherwise capable of Magistracy nor of the Senate then by Election of the People the Commonwealth consisteth but of one Order and is Equal as Lacedemon or Venice But for a Polititian commend me to the Considerer He will have Rome to have been an equal Commonwealth and Venice to be an unequal one which must be evinced by Wyre-drawing For having elsewhere as hath been shewn admitted without-opposition that the ballance of Empire is well divided into national and provincial the humour now takes him to spin that wedge into such a thred as by intangling of these two may make them both easie to be broken Hereunto he betaketh himself in this manner As Mr. Harrington hath well observed p. 5. where there are two parties in a Republique with equal power as in that of Rome the people had one half and the Nobility had the other half confusion and misery are there intayled For remedy whereof or to avoid this there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth very unequal In answer to this there will need no more then to repeat the same things honestly Mr. Harrington speaketh of the National ballance of Empire p. 5. unto this sense where the Nobility holdeth half the propriety or about that proportion and the people the other half the shares of the Land may be equal but in regard that the Nobility have much among Few and the People little among Many the Few will not be contented to have authority which is all their proper share in a Commonwealth but will be bringing the People under power which is not their proper share in a Commonwealth wherefore this Commonwealth must needs be unequal and except by altering the ballance as the Athenians did by the Sisacthia or recision of debts or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian it be brought to such equality that the whole power be in the People and there remain no more then Authority unto the Nobility where is no remedy but the one with perpetual fewd will eat out the other as the People did the Nobility in Athens and the Nobility the People in Rome Where the Carkass is there will be the Eagles also where the Riches are there will be the Power So if a few be as rich as all the rest a few will have as much power as all the rest in which case the Commonwealth is unequal and there can be no end of staving and tayling till it be brought unto equality This for the National ballance for the provincial there power doth not follow propriety but to the contrary This the Praevaricator having acknowledged le ts slip to the end that he may take a grip of Venice which because the three or four thousand of which originally consisted and now consisteth that whole government having acquired Provinces and encrease of their City by later comers do not admit these unto participation of power he saith is an unequal Commonwealth He will be a Mill-Horse whether the Cake be dough or not for this is to draw in a circle and Rome which by his former arguments should have been equal by this again must be unequal seeing Rome as little admitted her Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth as doth Venice This clash is but by way of Parenthesis to return therefore unto the businesse in present Agitation The estates be they one or two or three are such as was said by vertue of the ballance upon which the Government must naturally depend Wherefore constitutively the Government of France and all other Monarchies of like ballance was administred by an Assembly of the three Estates and thus continued untill that Nation being vanquished by the English Charls the 7th was put to such shifts as for the recovery of himself in the greatest distresse he could make unto which recovery while the Estates could not be legally called he happening to attain without them so ordered his affairs that his Successors by adding unto his Inventions came to rule without this Assembly a way not suiting with the nature of their ballance which therefore required some Assistance by force and other concurring Policies of like nature whereof the forraign Guards of that Monarchy are one The great baits alluring the Nobility another and the Emergent interest of the Church a Third To begin with the last of those the Church except it be in a War for Religion as when they joyned with the Princes of Lorrain and what party of the French Nobility were made or they could make against the King of Navarre are not of themselves so hot at hand or prompt unto Arms but the King being to use their word no Heretick through their great apprehension of the third Estate as that which is most addicted unto the Protestant Religion may be confident they will never side with the People So by this Emergent interest or accident he hath the Church sure enough For the Nobility which is exceeding gallant this Change hath the greatest baits for whereas the Church being not spared the Third Estate is laden and the Paisant overladen with taxes the Nobility is not only at better ease

are also of two kinds As first the Reasons why a Government of Citizens where the Commonwealth is equal is hardest to be conquer'd are that the Invader of such a Society must not only trust unto his own strength in as much as the Commonwealth being equal he must needs find them united but in regard that such Citizens being all Souldiers or trained up unto their Arms which they use not for the defence of Slavery but of Liberty a Condition not in this world to be better'd they have more especially upon this occasion the highest Soul of Courage and if their Territory be of any Extent the vastest Body of a well disciplin'd Militia that is possible in Nature wherefore an Example of such an One overcome by the Arms of a Monarch is not to be found in the World And if some small City of this Frame have happen'd to be vanquisht by a potent Commonwealth this is her Prerogative her Towers are her Funeral Pile and she expireth in her own Flame leaving nothing unto Conquest but her Ashes as Sag●ntum overwhelmed by Carthage and Numantia by Rome The Reasons why a Government of Citizens where the Commonwealth is unequal is next the former the hardest to be conquer'd are the same with this difference that albeit her Peace be not perfect within her Condition is not to be better'd by any thing that is without Wherefore Rome in all her strife never call'd in an Enemy and if an Enemy upon occasion of her strife and hopes of advantage by it came without calling he presented her with her most Soveraign Cure who had no leisure to destroy her self till having no Enemy to find her work she became her own Nondum tibi defuit hostis In te verte manus Nor is there any Example that a Government of this kind was ever subdued by the Arms of a Monarch though some indeed may be found that have called or suffer'd Forraign Princes or Force to come in as Holland by Marriages of their Princes and Genoa through her Factions as those of the Fiesci and Adorni To conclude this part for the Reasons why a Government of Citizens so acquir'd or possest as through Marriage or faction is the hardest to be held there needs no more then that Men accustomed unto their Arms and their Libertys will never endure the yoak Wherefore the Spaniard though a mighty King no sooner began in Holland a small Commonwealth to innovate or break her Orders then she threw him off with such Courage and Disdain as is Admirable unto the World And somewhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her Doria in the vindication of her liberty from France To come by this farthest way about as I think the nearest way home Arms are of two sorts Proper or Improper that is Native or Forraign Proper and Native Arms are according unto the triple nature of Government of three kinds Servants in Arms as the Helots in Lacedemon the Timariots and Janizaries in Turkey Subjects in Arms as the Horse in France and the Sea-guards or Forces in Venice or Citizens in Arms as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens of the Morae in Lacedemon and the Legions in Rome Improper or Forraign Arms are of two Sorts Auxiliaries or Mercenaries Auxiliaries are such as are supply'd by vertue of some League as were those of the Latines and Italians unto the Romans and those of the Cantons of Suisse except Zurick unto the King of France or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely or let forth for money by one State unto another the later whereof differ not much from Mercenaries Mercenaries are Souldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade then their Arms and let out themselves for money of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian strength such is the land Force of Venice and notwithstanding the Antient League of France with those Nations such at this day are the Suisse and Scottish Guards and sometimes a good part of the Foot in France Machiavil discourseth upon these particulars in his Art of War unto Admiration by whom I shall therefore steer Where the Arms in bulk are proper and consisting of Citizens they have other Trades and therefore are no Souldiers of Fortune and yet because the Commonwealth hath Arms for her Trade in regard she is a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind and beareth not her Sword in vain they are all educated as well in Military as Civil discipline taking their turns in service of either Nature according unto the Occasion and the Orders of the Commonwealth as in Israel Athens Lacedemon and Rome which had if their Territories permitted and sometimes as I may say whether their Territories permitted or no as in Israel the vastest the highest temper'd the best disciplin'd Militia that is to be found in the whole compass of Story Some Armies of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand Men Rome upon the rumour of a Gallick tumult armed in Italy only without Forraign aid seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot things in our days when the Turk can hardly Arm half so many not to be credited Hence that a Commonwealth which had not first broken her self or been broken by some other Common-wealth should not be found to have been conquer'd by the Armes of any Monarch is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent Cause In this place or upon this text Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemies of Popular power but to give Machiavil his due shall if they please hear him make a goodly Sermon in these words If Antient Commonwealths and Governments used diligence in any other Order to make their people Lovers of peace faithfully unto their Countrey and having the fear of God before their eyes they doubled it in this of their Militia for of whom should your Countrey expect greater faith then of such as have offer'd themselves to die for her whom should she endeavour to make greater Lovers of peace then them who only can enslave her by force In whom should there be greater Fear of God then in such as carry their lives in their hands This when Lawgivers and Captains rightly considered was the Cause why Souldiers were esteemed honour'd followed and imitated above all men in the world whereas since such Orders are broken and Custome is altogether deviated from the course of Antient prudence men are come to detest the iniquity of the Campe and fly the conversation of such as are in Arms as the Pestilence Where the Arms in bulk are proper but consist of Subjects they are the best next and but the best next as appears by all Examples Antient or Modern The Arms with which Pyrrhus Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans were of Subjects yet that Prince though he were not vanquished by the Romans confessed their advantage and gave them over The Spaniard being a far more potent King then was Pyrrhus hath

the Magistracy in this Policy was upon rotation but even the People also at least as to the Nomothetae or their Legislative power and the Supreme Judicatory of the Heliaea each of these being a Representative constituted of one Thousand or fifteen hundred Cittizens But for what followes in the second book it is necessary that I observe in this place the proceeding of certain Divines who indeavour to make use of this Common-wealth for ends of their own as particularly Doctor Seaman who in his book called Four propositions argues after this manner Chirotonia as Suidas hath it signifies both Plebiscitum a Law made by the People and Psephisma Now saith he Psephisma is the ordinary word used in the Attick lawes and in Demosthenes for Senatesconsultum a Law made by the Senate whence he drawes this conclusion As when the People make a Law they are said to Chirotonize so may the Rulers in like manner in those Lawes that are made by themselves alone These wayes with divines are too bad The words of Suidas are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Chirotonia is Election or ratification by the Many which expresly excludeth the Few or the Senate from being otherwise contained by the word Chirotonia than a part is by the whole Nor hath the Authour the word Psephisma or Plebiscitum in the place I would faine know what other word there is in Greeke for Plebiscitum but Psephisma and yet the Doctor puts it upon Suidas that he distinguishteh between these two and taking that for granted where he findes Psephisma in Demosthenes and the Attick Laws will have it to signifie no more then a decree of the Senate It is true that some decrees of the Senate were so called but those of the people had no other name and when ever you find Psephisma in Demosthenes or the Attick Laws for a Law there is nothing more certaine then that it is to be understood of the people for to say that a Law in a Popular Commonwealth can be made without the people is a contradiction The second passage is a what think you of these words of Pollux 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Doctor having englished in this manner The Thesmothetae do privately prescribe when Judgment is to be given and promulge publick accusations and suffrages unto the people askes you whose Suffrages were these if not the Ruler's By which strange construction where Pollux having first related in what part the function of the Thesmothetae was common with that of the Nine Archons comes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to shew you what was peculiar to themselves namely to give notice when the Heliaea or other Indicatoryes were to assemble the Dr. renders it they do privately prescribe as if the Session of a Court of Justice and such an one as contained a thousand Judges being the representative of the whole people were to be privately prescribed then to this private prescribing of Justice he addes that they do publickly promulge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 citations upon crimes not within the written Law as if private prescription and publick promulgation could stand together Next whereas promulgation in the very Nature of the word signifies an Act before a Law made he presumes the Law to be first made by the Rulers and then promulgated by the Thesmothetae to the people kim kam to the experience of all Common-wealths the Nature of promulgation and the sense of his Authour whose words as I shew'd before declare it to have been the proper or peculiar office of the Thesmothetae to give the people notice when they were to assemble for Judicature or when for giving their Chirotonia or suffrage by promulgation of the cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon which they were to determine For the fourth passage the Dr. quoting a wrong place for these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Nomothetae being a Representative as I shewd of the whole people chosen by lot and in number one thousand chirotonized or gave the Legislative suffrage thence inferrs that the Rulers chirotonized voted or made Lawes by themselves without the People which is as if one should say that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome or the House of Commons in England gave their Vote to such or such a Law therefore it was made by the Rulers alone and not by the People of Rome or of England For the fourth passage Stevens quotes Demosthenes at large in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This the Doctor interprets of an Officer to which I shall say more when he shews me where the sentence is or what went before for as yet I do not know of an officer in any Common wealth whose Election was indifferently made either by the Senate or by the People nor do I think the Doctor hath lookt farther for this than Stephens who hath not interpreted it The fifth passage is That a Decree of the Senate in Athens had the force of a Law for one year without the People So had the Edicts of the Praetores in Rome But I would fain know whence the Senate in Athens or the Praetors in Rome originally derived this right which was no more then that such Lawes might be probationers and so better understood when they came to the Vote but from the Chirotonia or suffrage of the People The sixth passage stops the mouths of such as having nothing to say unto the matter of my writing pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it the liberty I take in the defence of truth seeing the Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other termes while he bids his Antagonist one that desended the cause now in my hand go and consult his Authours namely Stephens and Budaeus again for saith he you wrong those learned men while you would have us believe that they were as ignorant of the Greek Story as your self or that things are to be found in them which are not To which confidence I have better leave to say that the Doctor should do well to take no worse counsel than he gives But what is become of my Praevaricator I have quite lost him else I should have intreated him to compare his Notes out of my Sermon with these out of the Doctors or retract that same affectation in saying I know not but Mr. Harrington has conceiv'd a great unkindness for the Clergy As if these their Stratagems with which they make perpetual Warre against the unwary people did not concern a man that hath undertaken the cause of popular Government The Policy of the Achaeans consisted of divers Common-wealths under one which was thus administred the Cities sent their Deputies twice every year of course and oftner if they were summoned by their Strategus or their Demiurges to the place appointed The Strategus was the Supreme Magistrate both Military and Civill and the Demiurges being ten were his Council all Annuall Magistrates elected by the People This Council thus constituted was called the Synarchy and performed like duties in

relation unto the Senate consisting of the Deputies sent by their peculiar Soveraignties or Cities as the Prytans unto that in Athens The Policies of the Aetolians and Lycians are so near the same again that in one you have all So both the Senates and the Magistracy of these Common wealths were upon rotation To conclude with Venice The Common wealth of Venice consisteth of four parts The great Council the Senate the Collegio and the Signiory The Great Council is the aggregate body of the whole People or Citizens of Venice which for the paucity of their Number and the Antiquity of their Extraction are called Gentlemen or Noble Venetians every one of which at five and twenty years of Age hath right of Session and Suffrage in this Council which right of Suffrage because throughout this Common-wealth in all Debates and Elections it is given by the ballot is called The right of ballotting whereby this Council being the Soveraign power createth all the rest of the Orders Councils or Magistracies hath constitutely the Ultimate result both in cases of Judicature and constitution of Lawes The Senate called also the Pregati consisteth of Sixty Senators properly so styled whereof the great Council electeth six on a day beginning so long before the Moneth of October that these being all chosen by that time then receive their Magistracy it consisteth also of sixty more called the Juncta which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senate that is by the Senate proposing and the great Council resolving the rest of their Creation is after the same manner with the former In the Sixty of the Senate there cannot be above three of any one kinred or Family nor in the Junta so many unless there be fewer in the former These Magistracies are all Annuall but without intervall so that it is at the pleasure of the great Council whether a Senator having finished his year they will elect him again The Collegio is a Council consisting more especially of three Orders of Magistrates called in their Language Saui as the Saui grandi to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affaires of Sea and Land the Saui di Terra ferma to whose care and Cognizance belong the affaires of the Land and the Saui di Mare to whose Cognizance appertain the affaires of the Sea and of the Islands These are elected by the Senate not all at once but for the Saui Grandi who are six by three at a time with the interposition of three moneths and for the Saui di terra ferma and the Saui di mare who are each five after the same manner save only that the first Election consisteth of three and the second of two Each Order of the Saui elects weekly one Provost each of which Provosts hath right in any affair belonging unto the Cognizance of his Order to propose unto the Collegio Audience of Embassadors and matters of forraign Negotiation belong properly unto this Council The Signiory consisteth of the Duke and of his Counsellors The Duke is a Magistrate created by the great Council for life to whom the Common wealth acknowledgeth the Reverence due unto a Prince and all her Acts run in his Name though without the Counsellors he have no power at all while they can perform any function of the Signiory without him The Counsellors whose Magistracy is Annual are elected by the scrutiny of the Senate naming one out of each Tribe for the City is locally divided into six Tribes and the Great Council approving so the Counsellors are six whose function in part is of the Nature of Masters of Requests having withall power to grant certain priviledges but their greatest preheminence is that all or any one of them may propose unto any Council in the Common wealth The Signiory hath session and suffrage in the Collegio the Collegio hath Session and suffrage in the Senate and the Senate hath Session and suffrage in the Great Council The Signiory or the Provosts of the Saui have power to assemble the Colledge the Colledge hath power to assemble the Senate and the Senate hath power to assemble the Great Council the Signiori but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Saui in their own Offices and functions have power to propose unto the Colledge the Colledge hath power to propose unto the Senate and the Senate hath power to propose unto the Great Council what ever is thus proposed and resolved either by the Senate for sometimes through the security of this Order a Proposition goes no farther or by the Great Council is ratifide or becomes the Law of the Common-wealth Over and above these Orders they have three Judicatories two Civill and one Criminall in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the great Council are Judges for the Terme of eight moneths to these Judicatories belong the Avogadori and the Auditori who are Magistrates having power to hear causes apart and as they judge fitting to introduce them into the Courts If a man tell me that I omit many things he may perceive I write an Epitome in which no more should be comprehended then that which understood may make a man understand the rest But of these principal parts consisteth the whole body of admirable Venice The Consiglio de Dieci or Council of Ten being that which partaketh of Dictatorian power is not a limb of her but as it were a Sword in her hand This Council in which the Signiory hath also Session and suffrage consisteth more peculiarly of ten Annuall Magistrates created by the Great Council who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lott which so elected are called Capi de Dieci their Magistracy being monethly again out of the three Capi one is taken by Lot whose Magistracy is weekly this is he who over against the Tribunall in the Great Council fits like another Duke and is called the Provost of the Dieci It belongs to these three Magistrates to assemble the Councill of dele Ten which they are obliged to do weekly of course and oftner as they see occasion The Councill being assembled any one of the Signiory or two of the Capi may propose to it the power which they now exercise wherin for their assistance they create three Magistrates called the grand Inquisitors consists in the punishment of certaine heynous crimes especially that of Treason in relation whereunto they are as it were Sentinells standing upon the guard of the Common-wealth But constitutively with the Addition of a Junta consisting of other fifteen together with some of the chiefe Magistrates having right in cases of important speed or secrecy unto this Councill they had the full and absolute power of the whole Common-wealth as Dictator That Venice either transcribed the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedemon or happeneth to be framed as if she had so don is most apparent The Result of this Common-wealth is in the Great

Councill and the debate in the Senate so was it in Lacedemon A decree made by the Senate of Athens had the power of a Law for one yeare without the people at the end whereof the people might revoke it A decree of the Senate of Venice stands good without the great Councill unlesse these see reason to revoke it The Prytans were a Councill preparing businesse for the Senate So is the Collegio in Venice the Presidents of the Prytans were the Ten Proedri those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Saui. The Archons or Princes of Athens being Nine had a kind of Soveraigne inspection upon all the Orders of the Common-wealth so hath the Signiory of Venice consisting of Nine besides the Duke The Quarancys in Venice are Judicatoryes of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that Judicatory so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these The Consiglio de dieci in Venice is not of the body but an Appendix of the Common-wealth so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon and as these had power to put a King a Magistrate or any Delinquent of what degree soever unto death so hath the Consiglio de dieci This again is wrought up with the Capi di dieci and the weekly Provost as were the Prytans with the Proedri and the weekly Epistata and the Ballot is lineally descended from the Beane yet is Venice in the whole and in every part a farre more exquisite policy than either Athens or Lacedemon A Politicall is like a naturall body Commonwealths resemble and differ as men resemble and differ among whom you shall not see two faces or two dispositions that are alike Peter and Thomas in all their parts are equally men and yet Peter and Thomas of all men may be the most unlike one may have his greater strength in his armes the other in his leggs one his greater beauty in his soule the other in his body one may be a fool the other wise one valiant the other cowardly These two which at a distance you will nor know one from the other when you looke nearer or come to be better acquainted with you will never mistake Our Considerer who in his Epistle would make you believe that Oceana is but a meer Transcription out of Venice hath Companions like himself and how near they look in matters of this nature is plain while one knoweth not Jethro from Moses and the other takes a state of Civill Warre to be the best modell of a Civill Government Let a man look near and the shall not finde any one Order in Oceana the Ballot only excepted that hath not as much difference from or resemblance unto any one order in Rome or Venice as any one Order in Rome or Venice hath from or to any one Order in Athens or Lacedemon Which different temper of the parts must of necessity in the whole yield a result a soul or Genius altogether new in the World as embracing the Arms of Rome and the Counsels of Venice and yet neither obnoxious unto the Turbulency of the one nor the Narrowness of the other But the sum of what hath been said of Venice as to the business in hand comes to no more then that the Senate and the Magistracy of this Common wealth are upon Rotation No more nay I am well if it come to so much For the Praevaricator catching me up where I say that for all this the greater Magistracies in Venice are continually wheeled through a few hands tells me that I have confessed it to be otherwise I have indeed confessed that albeit the Magistracies are all confes'd for certain termes yet those termes do not necessitate vacations that is the terme of a Magistracy being expired the party that bore it is capable upon a new Election of bearing it again without intervall or vacation which doth not altogether trash the Rotation of the Common wealth though it render the same very imperfect This infirmity of Venice deriveth from a complication of causes none of which is incident unto a Common wealth consisting of the Many wherefore there lies no Obligation upon me to discover the reason in this place But on the contrary seeing let me shew things never so new they are slighted as old I have an Obligation in this place to try whether I may get esteem by concealing some thing What is said every body knew before this is not said who knowes it A Riddle Riddle me Riddle me what is this The Magistracies in Venice except such as are rather of Ornament then of power are all Annuall or at most Biennial No man whose terme is expired can hold his Magistracy longer but by a new Election The Elections are most of them made in the Great Council and all by the Ballot which is the most equall and impartial way of Suffrage And yet the greater Magistracies are perpetually wheeled through a few hands If I be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the Politickes let him understand Venice he that understands Venice right shall go nearest to judge notwithstanding the difference that is in every Policy right of any Government in the world Now the assault of the Considerer deriving but from some Pique or Emulation which of us should be the abler Polititian It the Councill of State had the curiosity to know either that or who understands Venice this riddle would make the discovery For he that cannot easily unfold this Kiddle doth not understand her The sixth kinde of Rotation is when a Common-wealth goes upon it in all her Orders Senate People and Magistracy Such an one taking in the Many and being fixed upon the foot of a steady Agrarian hath attain'd un●o perfect Equality But of this Example there is none or you must accept of Oceana The Rotation of Oceana is of two parts the one of the Electors which is Annuall and the other of the Elected which is Trienniall Speaking of Electors in this sense I mean as the great Councill in Venice are Electors of all other Orders Councills or Magistrates But the Common-wealth of Oceana taking in the whole People cannot as doth the great Councill of Venice wherein they that have right are but a few attain unto this capacity at one step for which cause she taketh three steps One at the Parishes where every fifth Elder is annually elected by the whole people there is no doubt but there was some such Order in Israel whereby the Monethly Rotation of her Congregation or Perogative by election of two thousand in each Tribe was preserved The next step she takes is at the Hundred whereby Election of Officers and Magistrates the Troopes chosen at the Parishes are well near formed Her third step is at the Tribe where the whole body of her deputies are in exact forme discipline and function Headed by proper Officers and Magistrates these altogether consisting of One