and if that condescent be an act of Grace doth not this condesent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will if he either formally or virtually as the Author supposeth desert his absolute or Arbitrary power which he hath by conquest or other right Which last words of Mr. H. though I confess they are ill exprest yet I see no down right contradiction in the sence Mr. H. meant them if any man please to consult him he there says That a Monarch may either be limited by original constitution or an after condescent therefore these words the sole means of Soveraignty is the consent and fundamental contract is not meant of a limited Monarchy any more than of another but of any Soveraignty whatever So likewife though these words a secundary original constitution may seem to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to destroy each other yet as the Author explains himself you will find they do not in sense for he only supposes that a Prince who hath an absolute Arbitrary power either by succession or election finding it not so safe and easie as he conceives it would be for him if he came to new terms with his people would desert some of that despotick power and govern by let rules or Laws which he obliges himself and his Successors by Oath or some other conditions never to make or alter without the consent of his Subjects I see not why this may not in one sense be called a second original constitution for he was at first an absolute King by which was the original constitution and his coming to new Terms with them may be termed in respect of this a secundary original constitution or agreement of the government though founded upon the former old right which the Monarch had to govern as for a King by Conquest it cannot indeed in respect of him be properly called a secundary constitution since the Conquerour had no right to clame an absolute subjection from the Subjects until they submitted to him so as that they might not drive him out again if they were able until he came to some Terms with them Thus I think no sober man but will maintain that the people of England might lawfully have driven out William I. called the Conquerour supposing he had claimed by no other title but Conquest alone which when he had sworn to observe and maintain all the Laws and liberties of the people of England and had been thereupon Crown'd and received as King and had quitted his pretensions by Conquest or force and had taken the Oaths and homage of the Clergy Nobility and People they could not then without Rebellion endeavour to do And certainly had he not thought his title by Conquest not so good as the other of King Edward's Testament he would never have quitted the former and sworn to observe the Laws of his Predecessor so likewise Henry I. Mat. Paris from whom all the Kings and Queens of England have since claim'd upon his Election and Coronation for other title he had none granted a Charter whereby he renounced divers illegal practices which Flatterers may call Prerogatives which his Father and brother had exercised contrary to King Edward's Laws and their own Coronation Oaths so that here is an Example of one of the Authors absolute Monarchs who by a right of Conquest might pretend to the exercise of an arbitrary power yet renounced it and only retained so much as might serve for the well governing of his Subjects and his own security It is not therefore true which this Author affirms that this accepted of so much power as the people pleased to give him since they neither desired nor did he grant them any more but those just rights they had long before enjoyed under their former Kings before his Father's coming into England However I conceive this wise Prince was of the opinion of Theopompus King of Lacedemon Plut. in Lycurgo who when his wife upbraided him that he would leave the royal dignity to his Sons less than he found it no rather replyed he greater as more durable and therefore Plutarch in the same place ascribes the long continuance of the Lacedemonian Kingdom to the limited power of their Kings in these words ' and indeed when Envy is removed from Kings together with excess of power it followed that they had no cause to fear that which happened to the Kings of the Massenians and Argives from their Subjects But because this Author tells Mr. H. that if we should ask what proofs or examples he hath to justify his Doctrine of a limited Monarchy in the Constitution he would be as mute as a fish we will shew two or three examples of the antiquity of such limited Monarchies though they were not of the same model with those that are at this day found among the Germanes and other northern Nations descended from thence In Macedon the Kings descended of Caranus as Callisthenes says in Arrian did obtain an Empire over the Macedonians not by force but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Law So Curtius Lib. IV. The Macedonians were used to Kingly Government but in a greater appearance of liberty than other Nations For it is certain the lives of their Subjects were not at their disposal as appears from the same Author Lib. VI. The Army by an antient custom of the Macedonians did judg of Capital causes i. e. in time of War but in peace it belonged to the People the power of their Kings signified litle unless his Authority was before of some force And this was by original constitution for we do not find that ever the Kings of Macedon altered any thing in their original constitution yet they had the Soveraignty in most things and their persons were sacred So likewise among the antient Romans where Romulus from a Captain of Volunteers became a King Dyonisius Halicar Lib. II. Tells us that after Romulus had made a speech to his Souldiers and followers to this effect that he left it to them to consider what Government they would chuse for whatsoever they pitcht upon he should submit to it and though he did think himself unworthy the Principality yet he should not refuse to obey their Commands concluding that he thought it an Honour for him to have been declared the Leader of so great a Colony and to have a City called by his name Whereupon the people after some deliberation among themselves chose him their King or limited Monarch since both the Senate and people had from the very beginning their particular shares in the Government the Senates making this great Counsel which yet were for the greater part of them chosen out of the Patricians by the Tribes Dyon Hal. Lib. 11. and Curiae with these he consulted and referred all business of lesser moment which he did not care to dispatch himself for be reserved to himself the last Appeal in causes and to be Pontifex Maximus or Cheif Priest and Preserver
in the Assembly of Estates To which the answer is obvious that though it is true the Monarchs passing of Laws whether in the great Council or in his privy Council be but a matter of form if the Legislative power remain wholly in himself yet since even the forms and Circumstances in doing things are such essential things without which business cannot be done If therefore the people made it part of their original Contract with their Prince at first that he should make no laws but what should be of their proposing and drawing up and that he might refuse if he pleased the whole but should not alter any part of it This though in its self a matter of form yet being at first so agreed is indeed an original and fundamental constitution of the Government Therefore the Author is as much mistaken in his Divinity as his Law when Patriarcha P. 97. Resolves the question in the affirmative Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he command any thing contrary to his Laws That the Subject ought to break the laws if his King command him Where as as the Author hath put it nothing is more contrary to Law and Reason for so it would be no sin for Souldiers or others to give and take away mens Goods by force or turn them out of their houses if they could produce the Kings Commission for it and consequently it was no sin in those Irish Rebells that acted by a counterfeit Commission under Sr. Philim O Neal for though it was forged yet the forgery being known but to very few it was in respect of those who acted by vertue thereof all one as if it had been true and according to this Authors Divinity Part 1. Page 98. They were obliged to rise and cut the throats of all the English Protestants since the King by his Commission commanding a man to serve him in the Wars he may not examine whether the War be just or unjust but must obey since he hath no authority to judge of the causes of War which if spoken of such Wars as a King hath a right to make is true but of all warin general nothing is more false as appears by the instance before given nor are the examples the Author there brings at all satisfactory as that not only in humane Laws but also in Divine a thing may be commanded contrary to law and yet obedience to such commands is necessary the sanctifying the Sabbath is a Divine law yet if a Master command his Servant not to go to Church upon a Sabbath day the best Divines teach us that the Servant must obey this Command though it may be sinful and unlawful in the Master because the Servant hath no authority or liberty to examine or judge whether his Master sin or no in so commanding Where if the Author suppose as I do not that the Sunday which he improperly calls the Sabbath cannot be sanctified without going to Church or that going to Church on that day is an indispensible duty the Master commanding the contrary ought no more to be obeyed than if he should command his Servant to rob or steal for him but if going to Church be a thing indifferent or dispensible at some times then the Author puts a Fallacy upon his Readers arguing from the non-performance of a thing which is doubtful or only necessary secundum quid in which case the Subject or Servant is bound to obey Authority to a thing of another kind which is absolutely unlawful Since it is sinful for any Subjects to obey the King 's private or personal Commands in things unlawful and contrary to known positive laws The laws only seting the bounds of Property in all Commonwealths so that though it be no sin in Turky or Muscovy for an Officer to go and setch any mans head by vertue of the Grand Seigniors Commission without any trial or accusation I suppose any man that valued his life would say it were murder for any person to do the same by the Kings bare Commission in England and yet there is nothing but the Laws and Customs of each Government that creates the difference Not that I do affirm it were a sin in all Cases for a Subject to obey the King though contrary to Law since there are some Laws which the King hath power to dispence with and others which he hath not and others which he may dispence with but yet only for the publick good in cases of extreme necessity But to affirm as the Author does without any qualification or restriction that it is a sin to disobey the Kings personal Commands in all cases however issued out favours of Mr. Hobs Divinity as well as Law nor does the Author himself when he hath thought better on 't Patriark P. 99. assert the Kings Prerogative to be above all laws but for the good of his Subjects that are under the laws and to defend the peoples rights as was acknowledged by his late Majesty in his speceh upon his answer to the Petition of right So it is true the King hath a power to pardon all Felonies and Manslaughters and perhaps Murders too yet supposing this power should be exerted but for one year towards all Malefactors whatsoever any man may easily imagin what such a Prerogative would produce So that the publick good of the Kingdom ought to be the rule of all such Commands and where that fails the right of commanding ceases Ib. 99. As for the instance of the Court of Chancery it is not a breach of the Kings Preogative but part of the Common Law of this Kingdom so no man that understands any thing of Law or Reason will affirm that it is a Court of that exorbitant power that it is limited by no rules or bounds either of Common or Statute Law or of the Laws of aequum and bonum or that every thing that a Chancellour who is keeper of the Kings Conscience decrees must be well and truly decreed since this were to set up an absolute Tyrany But I shall now proceed to examine the rest of the reasons the Author gives either in this Treatise or his Patriarcha against the possibility of a limited Monarchy He finds fault with Mr. H. P. 281. ' For asserting that a Monarch can have any limitation ab Externo and that the sole means of Soveraignty is consent and fundamental contract which consent puts them in their power which can be no more nor other than is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection upon which our Author inquires thus if the sole means of a limited Monarchy be the consent and fundamental contract of a Nation how is it that he saith a Monarch may be limited by after condescent is an after condescent all one with a fundamentnl contract or with an original and radical constitution why yet he tells us it is a secundary original constitution A secundary original that is a second first
pleases because I have obliged my self to it by compact and I am obliged to follow this Mans will because he can enjoyn me thus by his supreme Authority But supreme and absolute are not one and the same thing for that denotes the absense of a Superiour or an Equal in the same order or degree but this a faculty of exerciseing any right by a Man 's own Judgment and Will but what if there be added a Commissary clause that if he shall do otherwise he shall forfeit his Kingdom as the Arogonians of Old after the King had sworn to their Priviledges did promise him Obedience in this manner Vid Hotomani Frarcogallia C. 12. We who are of as great Power as thou do Create thee our King and Lord on this condition that thou observe our Laws and Priviledges if otherwise not Here it is certain that an absolute King cannot be He to whom the Kingdom is thus committed under a Commissary Clause or Condition but that this King may have for all this a regal Power though limited I see no reason to the contrary for although we grant a Temporary Authority cannot be acknowledged for Supreme because it depends upon a potestative condition and which can never be in the Princes power Yet a King of this sort above-mention'd is not therefore subject to the power of the People with whom the cognizance is whether he keep his Oath or not for besides that such a Commissary Clause is wont to comprehend only such plain things which are evident to any Mans sences and so are not liable to dispute So that this power of taking cognizance does not at all suppose any Jurisdiction by which the Actions of the King as a Subject may be judged but is nothing else than a bare Declaration whereby any Man takes notice that his manifest right is violated by another See Grotius Lib. 1. Cap. 3. § 16. And Baecler upon him who are both of the same Opinion Grotius indeed in the same place speaks more obscurely when he says That the Obligation arising from the promises of Kings does either fall upon the exercise of the act or also directly upon the very power of it if he act contrary to promises of the former sort the act may be called unjust and yet be valid if against those of the latter it is also void as if he should have said Sometimes a King promises not to use part of his Supreme Authority but after acertain manner and sometimes he plainly renounces some part thereof concerning which there are two things to be observed first that also some acts may be void which are performed contrary to an Obligation of the former sorts as for example if a King swear not to impose any Taxes without the consent of the Estates I suppose that such Taxes which the King shall Levy by his own will alone to bevoid Secondly That in the latter form the parts of the supreme power are divided But that the Nature of limited Kingdoms may more thoroughly be understood it is to be observed that the affairs which occur in Governning a Common-wealth are of two kinds for of some of them it may be agreed beforehand because whenever they happen they are still but of the same Nature but of others a certain Judgment cannot be made but at the time present whether they are beneficial to the Publick or not for that those circumstances which accompany them cannot be forseen Yet concerning both that People may provide that he to whom they have commited this limited Kingdom should not depart from the Common good in the former whilst it prescribes perpetual Laws or Conditions which the King should be obliged to observe in the latter whilst he is obliged to consult the assembly of his People or Nobility Thus the People being satisfied of the truth of their Religion and what sort of Ecclesiastical Government or Ceremonies do best suit their Genius so it is in Sweden may condition with the King upon his Inauguration that he shall not change any thing in Religious matters by his sole Authority So every Body being sensible how often Justice would be injured if Sentence should always be given by the sole Judgment of the Prince ex aequo hono without any written or known Laws and that Passion VI. Tacit An. L. 13. 4. 2. Interest or unskilfulness would have too great a sway for avoiding this inconvenience the people may oblige their King that either he shall compose a Body of just Laws or observe those that are already extant and also that Judgment be given according to those Laws in certain Courts or Colledges of Justice and that none but the most weighty Causes should come before the King by way of Appeal This is likewise the Law of Sweden So likewise since it is well known how easily Riches obtained by the Labour of others may be squandered away by Luxury or Ambition therefore the Subjects Goods should not lie at their Princes mercy to sustain their Lusts Some Nations have wisely assigned a certain Revenue to their Prince such as they supposed necessary for the constant Charges of the Common-wealth but if greater expences were necessary they would have those referred to the Assembly of Estates And since also some Kings are more desirous than they ought to be of Military Glory and running themselves into unnecessary Wars may put themselves and their Kingdoms in hazard therefore some of them have been so cautious that in the conferring the regal Dignity they have imposed this necessity upon their Kings that if they would make offensive Wars upon their Neighbours they should first advise with their great Council and so likewise it might be ordained concerning other matters which the People judged necessary for the Common-wealth lest that if an absolute power of ordering those things were left to the Prince the common good of the People would perhaps be less considered And since the people would not leave to this limited King an absolute power in those Acts which are thus excepted but that an Assembly either of the whole people or of those that represent them divided into their several Orders it is further to be observed that the power of this Council or Assembly is not alike every where For in some places the King himself though every where absolute may have appointed a Council or Senate without whose approbation he will not have his decrees to be valid Which Senate without doubt will only have the Authority of Councellors and though they may question the Kings Grants or Decrees and reject those which they judg inconvenient for the Common-wealth yet they do not this by any inherent Right but by a power granted them from the King himself Who would this way prevent his decreeing any thing through hast imprudence or the perswasion of Flatterers that might prove hurtful to his State to which may be referred what Plutarch mentions in his Apothegms ' That the Aegyptian Kings
reason why these distinctions of Grotius may not be well enough defended against all the Reasons which the Authour gives us to the contrary For he only tells us He cannot conceive how in any case Children can ever naturally have any power or moral faculty of doing what they please without their Fathers leave and that naturally the Power of Parents never ceaseth by any separation c. but gives us no other reason than that they are always bound to study to please them As if this obligation of Gratitude and Complacency did likewise comprehend a full and perfect propriety of all Fathers in the persons of their Children and an absolute power over them in all cases whatsoever so that Children shall have no Right left to consult their own good or preservation in any case whatsoever Vid. Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 4. farther than the Father pleases As for Bodin and divers others that have writ on this subject they do no more than follow others who have asserted this Absolute Power upon no other grounds than the Jewish or Roman Municipal Laws but have never troubled themselves to look into the true Original of Paternal Authority or Filial Subjection according to the Laws of Nature or Reason And most Treatises of this subject being commonly written by Fathers they have been very full in setting forth their own Power and Authority over their Children but have said little or nothing of the Rights of Children in the state of Nature towards their Parents Loc. sup laudat Therefore Bodin thinks he hath done enough in supposing that if a Father is wise and not mad he will never kill his Son without cause since he will never correct him without he deserve it and that therefore the Civil Law supposes that the Will of the Parents in managing the concerns of their Children is void of all Fraud and that they will rather violate all Divine and Humane Laws than not endeavour to make their Children both rich and honourable And from those instances out of the Roman Law supposes that Parents cannot so much as will any thing to their Childrens prejudice or so much as abuse this Fatherly Power of Life and Death And therefore thinks he hath sufficiently answered the Objection he makes that there have been some Parents who have abused this power so far as to put their Children to Death without cause He says They give us no Examples to the contrary And supposing this to have sometimes fallen out must therefore Legislators alter a wholsome Law because some persons may abuse it But if we consider what Bodin hath here said we shall finde every one of his Suppositions false For 1. he supposes it to be the Right of all Fathers by the Law of Nature to have an absolute power over the lives and persons of their Children 2. That the Jewish and Roman Law are most agreeable to the Laws of Nature in this point 3. That Fathers do seldom or never abuse this power 4. That if they do abuse it yet it is better to leave it in their hands than to abrogate it or retrench it The falseness of all which Assertions I either have already or else shall hereafter make manifest Only I shall remark thus much at present That upon Bodin's principle women that murder their Bastards would have a good time on 't because having no Husbands they have full power over the Life of their Children and there is no reason that it should be retrencht by any positive Laws because some offend against it But however this Argument of Bodin's would do our Author's cause no good for if Parents are to be trusted with this absolute power over their Children because of the natural affection they are always supposed to bear them then Princes ought not to be trusted with it since none but Parents themselves can have this natural affection towards their Children Princes as the Author grants having this power onely as representing these Parents Whereas Parentage is a natural Relation and neither can be created nor assigned farther than the Civil Laws of the Country have appointed and therefore there can be no adopted Son by the Law of Nature since Adoption arises chiefly from the promise and consent of the person adopted and partly from the Authority of the Civil Law or Municipal Law of the Commonwealth So that in relation to Princes upon this Reason of Bodin's cessante causa cessat effectus But indeed Bodin never dreamt of this fine Notion of our Author's that all Monarchs were not onely Heads but Fathers of their people or else certainly we should have had this as the chief Argument to prove his French Monarchy to be Jure Divino But I shall trouble my self no farther with him at present but shall proceed to consider this point of absolute Obedience a little farther I suppose the Author as any sober man else would grant that Children are not obliged so much as to attempt to perform the commands of their Parents in case they evidently appear impossible or extravagant such as a Father may give when he is in a fit of drunkenness madness or sudden rage which is all one with madness and of this who can judge but the Children who are to perform these Commands And in this case no man will deny but it is lawful for the Children to hold nay binde their mad or drunken Parents in case they cannot otherwise hinder them from doing mischief or killing either themselves their Mothers or Brethren So that though they may do this from that natural love charity which all men in the state of nature ought to shew toward each other yet they may likewise justifie the doing of it as Children who ought to have a greater concern for the good and preservation of their Parents than meer strangers and have therefore an higher obligation to prevent their doing any mischief either to themselves or neer Relations this being for the Fathers good and preservation and that for which he hath cause to thank them when he comes to himself And if it be said that the Son may then refuse his Fathers Commands or resist them pretending he is mad drunk or in a rage when he really is not and thereby take occasion to obey his Father no farther than he pleases to this I answer That the Son is either really perswaded that his Father is in some of those evil circumstances before mentioned or else onely pretends that he thinks so when really he does not If in the first case he erre in his judgment and the ignorance did not proceed from his own fault either of passion prejudice or too slight an esteem of his Fathers understanding he is not culpable though he make such a false judgment of his Fathers actions for God considering onely the sincerity of the heart does not require of any man more than he is able to perform But if on the other side the Son play the Hypocrite and refuse
his Parents Commands pretending they are mad or drunk when really they are not he is without doubt doubly guilty both of Hypocrisie and Disobedience But this does not hinder Children in the state of Nature from judging of the reasonableness or lawfulness of their Parents Commands and of the condition they are in when they gave them for otherwise a Child ought to be of his Fathers Religion though it were Idolatry if he commanded it or were obliged to break any of the Laws of Nature if this Obedience were absolute And it is a lesser evil that the Commands of Parents should be disobeyed nay sometimes their persons resisted than that they should make a Right to command or do unreasonable and unlawful things in a fit of madness drunkenness or passion destroy either themselves or others But it may be replied that though Fathers in the state of Nature have no Right to act unjustly or cruelly toward their Children or to command such unlawful or unreasonable things yet however they are onely answerable to God for so doing and there is out of a Commonwealth no superiour power that can question the Fathers actions for since his Children are committed by God to his care he onely is answerable for them and for his actions towards them since no other man hath any interest or concern in them but himself So that if he kill maim abuse or sell his Son there is no man that hath Right to revenge punish or call him to an account for so doing and if no others that are his equals much less his Wife and Children who are so much his Inferiours and who ought in all things to be obedient to his Will Therefore this Power though it be not absolute in respect of God yet is so in respect of his Wife and Children and so in all cases where the Children cannot yield an active Obedience to their Fathers commands they are notwithstanding obliged by the Law of God See Ephes 6.1 Colos 3.20 to a passive one and patiently to submit to whatever evils or punishments he pleases to inflict though it were to the loss of Life itself To which I answer That though it is true a Father in the state of Nature and considered as the head of a separate Family hath no Superiour but God and consequently no other person whatsoever hath any Authority or Right to call him to an account and punish him for this abuse of his paternal Power yet it doth not follow that such absolute submission is therefore due from the Children as does oblige them either to an active or a passive Obedience in all cases to the Fathers Will so that they neither may nor ought to defend themselves in any circumstance whatsoever There is a great deal of difference in the state of Nature between calling a man to an account as a Superiour and defending a mans self as an equal For a man in this state hath a right to this latter against all men that assault him by the principle of Self-preservation But no man hath a right to the former but onely in respect of those over whom he hath an Authority either granted him by God or conferr'd upon him by the consent of other men So that the evils which an Aggressor or Wrong-doer suffers from him he injured though in respect of God the Supreme Lawgiver they may be natural Punishments ordained by him to deter men from violating the Laws of Nature yet they are not so in regard of the Person who inflicts them For God may sometimes appoint those for the Instruments of his Justice who otherwise do injury to the person punished as in the case of Absalom's Rebellion against his Father David So that in this case the evils the wrong-doer suffers are not properly Punishments but necessary Consequences of his Violence and Injustice and in respect of the Inflicter are but necessary means of his preservation So that if a Son have any Right to defend himself in what belongs to him from the unjust violence of his Father he doth not act as his Superiour but in this case as his Equal as he is indeed in all the Rights of Nature considered only as a Man Such as are a Right to live and to preserve himself and to use all lawful means for that end Therefore since as I have already shown that a Father hath no higher Right or Authority from God over the person of his Child but as it tends to his good and preservation or as it conduces to the great end of Nature the common Good and preservation of Mankinde So when the Father transgresses this Authority his Right ceases and when that ceases the Sons Right to preserve himself and in that to pursue that great end begins to take place Therefore out of a Civil state if a Father will endeavour evidently without any just cause to take away his Sons Life I think the Son may in this case if he cannot otherwise escape nor avoid it and that his Father will not be pacified neither with his submission nor entreaty defend himself against his Father not with a design to kill him but purely to preserve his own Life and if in this case the Father happen to be kill'd I think his Blood is upon his own head But if any object to me the Example of Isaac's submission to his Father when he intended to sacrisice him To this I answer that as this act of Abraham's is not to be taken as an Example for other Fathers so neither does the Example of Isaac oblige other Sons For as Abraham had no right to offer up his Son but by God's express Will so it is rational to suppose that Isaac being then as Chronologers make him about nineteen or twenty years of Age and able to carry wood enough upon his back to consume the Sacrifice and of years to ask where the Lamb was for the Offering was also instructed by his Father of the cause of his dealing so with him and then the submission was not paid to his Father's but to God's Will whom he was perswaded would have it so But if any man yet doubts whether resistance in such a case were lawful I leave it to his own Conscience whether if his Father and he were out of any civil estate whose assistance he might implore he would lie still and suffer his Father to cut his throat only because he had a minde to it or pretended revelation for it So likewise if a Father in this state should go about to violate his Sons Wife in his presence or to kill her or his Grandchildren I suppose he may as lawfully use the same means for their preservation if he cannot otherwise obtain it as he might for his own since they are delivered to his charge and that he only is answerable for them For since the Father doth not acquire any property in the Sons person either by begetting or educating him much less ought he to have it over those
the Son hath begotten But though Children may have this Right of defending their own Lives or those of their Wives and Children from their Fathers unjust violence when they can by no means else be preserved Yet I would not be here understood to give Children this right of resisting upon any less occasion as if the Father should only go about to correct his Son though without just cause it were therefore lawful for him to resist or beat his Father For we are obliged by the Law of Christ to bear smaller Injuries from others much more from a Father neither yet would I give them any right to continue this state of War and to revenge upon their Parents the Injuries they have formerly received at their hands For all Revenge taken in this sence as a satisfaction of the minde in returning of an evil or injury already received without any respect to a mans own preservation or the good of the person that did the wrong is unlawful even in the state of Nature Therefore this returning Evil for Evil which some improperly call Revenge is only justifiable for one or both of these ends either to make the party that hath done the Injury sensible of his Errour and seeing the Follies and Inconveniences of it to alter his minde and resolve to do so no more or as it may conduce to a mans own preservation for the future and be a warning to others not to injure him in like manner since they see he will not take injuries tamely But all this is still left to a mans own prudence how far he will pass them by And he is certainly obliged to leave off returning them assoon as he can be safe without it since otherwise quarrels would be perpetual Neither ought one who hath been highly obliged to a man perhaps for his life to return him evil for evil since scarce any Injury being great enough to cancel so great an Obligation Therefore since a Father who hath truely performed his Duty is the greatest Benefactor we can imagine in this life so no man ought to revenge an Injury though never so great upon him since it is not only undutiful but ungrateful and cannot serve either of those two ends for which alone this returning evil for evil is allowable For first it cannot make the Father see his fault since this correction being from a Son whom he looks upon as one highly obliged to him and so much his inferior will rather serve to exasperate than amend him Secondly Neither can this bearing of the Injury encourage others to attempt doing the like since all that know the case will likewise consider the person that did the wrong So that Patience alone is the only lawful means to make the Father see his Errour and be reconciled to his Child who ought to embrace it assoon as the Father offers it But as for the places of Scripture brought for absolute Obedience to Parents viz. the fourth Commandment Honour thy Father and thy Mother Children obey your Parents in the Lord Ephes 6.1,2 and Children obey your Parents in all things Col. 3.20 God did not intend here to give us any new Law or Precept concerning this Duty but to confirm and explain the fifth Commandment as that was but a confirmation of the Law of Nature by which men were obliged to reverence and obey their Parents long before that Law was given Therefore since the Laws of Nature which are but Rules of right Reason for the good of Mankinde are the foundation of this Commandment and of all those commands in the New Testament they are still to be interpreted according to that Rule Neither are other places of Scripture understood in any other sence such as are those of turning the right Cheek of giving away a mans Coat to him that would go to Law and the like all which we are not to Interpret Literally See Grotius and. Dr. Hammond's Annot. upon these places but according to Reason And so are likewise these words of St. Paul to be understood Children obey your Parents in all things that is in all things reasonable and lawful And this sence must be allowed of or else Children were bound to obey all commands of their Parents whether unlawful or lawful being comprehended under this general word All. Nor will the distinction of an active or passive Obedience help in this case for passive Obedience cannot be the end of the Fathers command and consequently his will is not performed in suffering since no Father can be so unreasonably cruel as to command a thing meerly because he would have occasion to punish his Son whom he thinks must not resist him Neither do these places appoint a Son when an infant a man of full age and perhaps an old man of threescore to be all governed the same way or that the same Obedience is required of them all And this brings me to a fuller Answer to the Author's Argument and to shew that though Children are indeed always bound in Gratitude to please their Parents as far as they are able without ruining themselves and to pay a great reverence to them yet that this submission is not an absolute subjection but is to be limited according to the Rules of right Reason or Prudence And to prove this I will produce instances from the case of Adam's Children since the Author allows no Father to have had a larger authority than himself We will therefore consider in the first place Adam's power as a Father in respect of his Sons marriage Suppose then that he had commanded one of his Sons never to marry at all certainly this command would have been yoid since then it had been in Adam's power to have frustrated Gods Command to mankind of increase and multiply and replenish the Earth which was not spoken to Adam and Eve alone since they could not do it in their persons but to all mankind represented in them And likewise Adam had been the occasion of his Sons incontinency if he had lain with any of his Sisters before marriage Secondly Suppose Adam had commanded Abel to marry one of his Sisters that being the onely means then appointed to propagate mankind which he could not love can any man think that he had been obliged to do it Certainly no for it would have been a greater sin to marry a wife he knew before-hand he could not live with than to disobey his Father for else how could this be true Therefore shall a man leave Father and Mother and cleave to his Wife Since then Adam could not force his Sons affections but onely recommend such of his Sisters as he thought would best suit with his humour therefore if the Son could not live without marriage and that Adam could not force a Wife upon him it was most reasonable that he should chuse a Wife for himself And to come to that other great point that the Son can never separate himself from his Fathers Family nor subjection
Sons of Esau and Ishmael are reckon'd as so many independant Princes or Dukes and Lords of distinct Territories without any Superiority in the eldest Son who ought by the Authours Principle to have been absolute Lord over the rest And if these could divide themselves into as many distinct Governments as there were Sons Why might not they do so in infinitum And then there could never be any common Prince or Monarch set over them all but by Force or Conquest or else by Election either of which destroys the notion of the Natural Right of Eldership And as for the places he brings to prove it 1. Gods words to Gain concerning Abel will not do it His desires shall be subject unto thee and thou shalt rule over him For first this might be spoken only personally to Cain and not to give a Right to all Eldest Sons Secondly the words do not signifie an absolute Despotick Power but a ruling or governing by perswasion or fair means as when a man is ruled that is advised by another in his concerns Then as for the blessing upon Jacob by his Father Isaac Be Lord over thy Brethren and let the Sons of thy Mother bow before thee 't was never litterally fulfilled For Jacob was never Lord over Esau who was a Prince of Mount Seir in Jacob's life-time whilst Jacob was at best but Lord of his own family And as for bowing and other Rights of Superiority we read Gen. 33.3 that Jacob at his Interview with his Brother Esau called him Lord and bowed seven times to the ground before he came to him So that this Text is no more than a Prophecy to shew why the Jews or descendents of Jacob should have Right in After-times to rule over the Edomites or Posterity of Esau Lastly this Example makes against the Authour for it seems it is not the Eldest Son but whom the Father pleases to appoint is Heir after his death Since here Esau looses his Birth right by his own act but chiefly by his Fathers Will. Yet if after all some will urge from the Principles I have laid down that it seems more to conduce to the happiness and peace of Families and in that to the great end I have before laid down the common good of Mankinde rather to allow this absolute Power of Life and Death to Parents over their Children and an absolute Subjection to them as long as they live since Parents do usually take that care to breed up their Children and to have that tender Affection towards them that they will seldom take away their Lives or sell them for Slaves or keep them so themselves unless there be very great cause of which the Father only ought to be Judge since it being the nature of most Children to be apt to contradict and disobey their Fathers commands or perhaps resist them pretending they would kill them when they only go about to give them due correction And since most young people hate restraint and love to be gadding abroad they having a Right by these Principles to judge when they are able to shift for themselves would take any slight pretence to run away from their Father assoon as they were grown pretty big and so perhaps leave their Parents in their old Age when they had no body to take care of them whereby nothing but confusion and quarrels would happen in Families great mischief to the Parents and often ruine to the Children who being often opiniatred and self-will'd would think better of their own abilities than they really deserved And therefore divers Nations seeing these great Inconveniencies did by their Laws leave Parents the Power of Life and Death over their Children Such were those the Author instances in the Persians See Patriarcha p. 38. chap. 2. Gauls and many Nations in the West-Indies And the Romans even in their Popular State had this Law in force Which Power of Parents was ratified and amplified by the Laws of the XII Tables enabling of Parents to sell their Children three times And the Law of Moses gives full power to the Father to stone his disobedient Son so it be done in presence of a Magistrate And yet it did not belong to the Magistrate to inquire and examine the justness of the cause but it was so ordained lest the Father should in his Anger suddenly or secretly kill his Son To all which I answer that since this Argument quits the natural Power of a Father by Generation and only sticks to the acquired one of education and appeals to the common good of Mankinde I do acknowledge it is a better than any of the rest Yet I think it is not true that Parents in the state of Nature would more seldome abuse their power than Children would this Natural Liberty I here allow them of defending and providing for themselves in cases of extreme Danger and Necessity For this Temptation to do ill is greater on the Fathers side than that of the Children For they looking on themselves as having an absolute and unquestionable power over them and that they may deal with them as they please are apt to think themselves slighted and disobeyed by their Children perhaps on very light occasions and their Passion often rises to that height as not considering the Follies and Inconsiderateness of Youth that they may if Cholerick or Ill-natur'd strike them with that which may either kill them or else cripple or maim them and perhaps out of an immoderate Anger or being weary of them murder them on purpose And Fathers being more apt as having oftner occasion to be angry with their Children than their Children with them it is evident to me that in the state of Nature where there is no Magistrate to keep the Father in awe Fathers will be as apt to kill or maim their Children as Children their Parents And if the Fathers as I said before are intended for the good and preservation of their Child and that where their Right ceases the Childrens Right to preserve themselves takes place It seems to conduce more to the general good of Mankinde that the Children should make use of this last refuge of defending themselves when they cannot otherwise preserve their Lives and Members than that Fathers should have such an absolute Right to deal with them as they pleased without any power in the Children to resist or defend themselves So likewise Fathers being so much older understand their own advantage better than their Children and being somtimes more ill-natur'd and often by reason of their Age more covetous than they may be tempted to sell their Children for Slaves whereby they may fall into a condition worse than Death itself and may not the Son then endeavour to run away or use all lawful means possible to escape so great a misery Or if the Father will keep his Son as a Slave all the days of his life without any hopes of ever being free For when the Father dies the Son according to this
Conditions this kind of Servant hath the same remedy against his Lord as an hired Servant may have And of this sort were our ancient English Villains who though they could claim no property against their Lords either in Goods or Lands yet if the Lord killed his Villain the Wife had an Appeal of Murder of the death of her Husband Since no man can be supposed so void of common sense unless an absolute Fool and then he is not capable of making any Bargain to yield himself so absolutely up to anothers disposal as to renounce all hopes of safety or satisfaction in this life or of future happiness in that to come So that I conceive that even a Slave much more a Servant hired upon certain Conditions in the state of Nature where he hath no civil power to whom to appeal for Justice hath as much Right as a Son or Child of the Family to defend his life or what belongs to him against the unjust violence or rage of his Master Nor do I think any places of Scripture if well considered command the contrary For as for the places in St. Paul's Epistles Ephes 6.5 Servants be obedient to them that are your Masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling And Coloss 3.22 Servants obey in all things your Masters c. does not extend to all things that are but only to things lawful for them to do that is that were not against the Principles of Christian Religion And in this it is that St. Peter 1 Pet. 2.18,19 commands Servants or Slaves which there were all one to be subject to their Masters not onely to the good and gentle but also to the froward For this is thank-worthy or grateful if a man for conscience towards God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 endure grief or trouble suffering wrongfully Which words seem to import that Servants ought to bear with a great deal of bad usage from their Masters but does not command them in the state of Nature to give up their Lives or Goods to their Masters without any resistance But if any shall urge the Example of Christ alleadged in the third verse who suffered even to death for us I conceive that does not extend to a suffering or submission unto all things but to such things for which Christ himself suffered viz. for Conscience toward God that is for matters of Religion which is likewise most agreeable to the sence of the words that follow For what glory is it if when you are beaten for your faults you take it patiently but if when you do well and take it patiently c. Now who ever can imagine a Servant to be beaten for doing his duty Therefore doing well here signifies the profession of Christianity which they were not to deny though they had unbelieving Masters Therefore since no interpretation of Scripture ought to be against Reason that can never tell a man that he ought to yield up himself so wholly to anothers disposal as to give his Master an absolute right and power over him to kill or maim him without cause or to be so basely and penuriously used as perpetually to suffer hunger cold and nakedness or the like so that his life should rather become a burden and a punishment than a satisfaction For since we have no notions of happiness but in life nor in that farther than it is accompanied with some contentment of mind no rational man can be supposed to consent to renounce all the pleasures and ends thereof and which onely make life desireable much less the Right of living and preserving himself So that even such a Slave may without doubt in the state of Nature run away from his Master and set himself at liberty if he can since his Master hath not performed his part of that tacite condition of his Service which was that this Master should for his Labour provide him all the necessaries of life and suffer him to enjoy the ordinary satisfactions of it Nor is the worst of Slaves that is one taken in War so absolutely at his Masters dispose as that because he hath him in his power he hath therefore a Right to use him as he will For first as long as the Conquerour keeps his Slave as a Prisoner and makes him work in Fetters though he hath given him his life for the present yet there does not thence arise any Obligation in the Slave to Obedience so that the Slave may yet run away if he can nay kill his Conquerour unless he will come to other Terms with him and make him promise him his Service and Obedience upon the granting him his Liberty and enjoyment of the ordinary Comforts of Life And if he cannot enjoy these I believe there is no sober Planter in Barbadoes who are most of them the Assignees of Slaves taken in War but will grant such a Slave may lawfully run away if he can Therefore it is not true what Mr. Hobbes says That no injury can be done to a Slave for his reason is not valid that because a Servant hath absolutely subjected his will to that of his Lords therefore whatever he does he does it by his Master's will in which his own is included so that volenti non fit injuria this proves no more than that the Slave hath no just reason of complaint though his Master give him Victuals that does not suit with his palate orprescribe him Work which may not please his humour So on the other side what rational man will affirm that this Slave hath given up the natural Rights of living and being preserved as a man but that injury may be done to this Slave as any other Servant if the Task imposed upon him be beyond his strength to perform or if he be beaten or like to be put to death without cause or that he hath not Food sufficient to enable him to do his work for he may still require at his Masters hands the usage of a man and of a rational Creature So likewise though this property in the person of a Slave taken in War may be assigned over to another yet the Right of commanding a Slave by his own consent cannot be so farther than it was agreed upon in the Bargain between him and his Lord for if he convenanted to be a Slave onely to his Lord and no man else the Lord cannot in justice assigne nor sell him to another without his consent nor leave him to his Heirs since there might be certain peculiar reasons wherefore a man might subject himself to this man and not to another So likewise in absolute Empires which began purely from Conquest though it is taken for granted that they may be aliened at the Will of the Conquerour yet it is otherwise in Subjects who have submitted themselves upon certain Conditions and who have some Liberties remaining to them and much more in those Kingdoms which are limited by their Institution for there not properly the Persons of the men but the
of the Laws and Customs of their Country as also to be cheif General in War but to the people were reserved these three Priviledges to create Magistrates to ordain Laws and to decree Peace and War the King referring it to them So that the Authority of the Senate did joyn in these things though this custom was changed for now the Senate does not confirm the decrees of the people but the people those of the Senate But he added both dignity and power to the Senate that they should judg those things which the King referred to them by Major part of the votes And this he borrowed from the Lacedemonian Commonwealth for the Lacedemonian Kings were not at their own liberty to do whatever they pleased but the Senate had power in matter appertaining to the Common-wealth But because these examples may seem too stale or remote Let us now consider all the Kingdoms that have been erected upon the ruins of the Roman Empire by those Northern Nations that over-ran it and see if there were so much as one Kingdom among them that was not limited As for the Kingdoms of the Goths and Vandals erected in Italy Africk and Spain the Author confesses they were limited or rather mixt since their Kings were deposed by the people whenever they displeased them So likewise for the Successors of those Gothick Princes in Castile Portugal Arragon and Navarre and the other Kingdoms of Spain He that will read the histories of those Kingdoms will find them to have been all limited or rather mixt and to have had Assemblies of the Estates Mariana Lib. XVIII without whose consent those Kings could antiently neither make Laws nor raise mony upon their Subjects and as for Arragon in particular they had a Popular Magistrate called the cheif Justiciary who did in all cases oppose and cancel the Orders and Judgments of the King himself where they exceeded the just bounds of his power and were contrary to the Laws though indeed now since the times of Ferdinand and Isabella the Kings relying upon their own power by reason of the Gold and Silver they received from the Judges and the great addition of Territories have presumed to infringe many of their Just rights and Priviledges And as for the Kingdoms erected by Francks in Germany and Gaule which we now call German Empire and Kingdom of France As for the former any one that willread the ancient French and German Historians will find that the Kings of Germany could not do any thing of Moment not so much as declare a Successor without the consent of their Great Counsell of Nobility and Clergy and as to the latter as absolute as it seems at present it was a few ages past almost as much limited if not more than its Neighbours For the Kings of France could not anciently make Laws raise any publick War wherein the Nobility and people were bound to assist him or Levy Taxes upon their Subjects without the consent of the Estates but those Assemblies being at first discontinued by reason of the continual wars which Henry V. and Henry the VI. Kings of England made upon them Phil. Com. Livre VI. Cap. 7. to which Mezeray in his History tells us France ows the loss of its Liberties and the change of its laws In whose time they gave their King Charles VII a power to raise mony without them which trick when once found out appeared so sweet to his Successors that they would never fully part with it again and Lewis the XI by weakening his Nobility and People by constant Taxations and maintaining Factions among them bragged that he had metre les Roys du France Com. Liv. V. Chap. XVIII brought the Kings of France hors du Page or out of worship Whereas the Author last mentioned remarks that he might have said with more truth les mettredu sense hors et de la raison and yet we find in the beginning of the Reign of Charles VIII the Assembly of the Estates gave that King the sum of two Millions and an half of Francks and promised him after two years they would supply him again It seems Comines in the same place did not look upon this as a thing quite gone and out of Fashion since he then esteemed this as the only just and Legal way of raising mony in that Kingdom as appears by these words immediately after Is it toward such Objects as these meaning the Nobility and People that the King is to insist upon his Prerogative and take at his pleasure what they are ready to give would it not be more just both towards God and the World to raise mony this way than by Violence and Force nor is there any Prince who can raise mony any other way unless by Violence and Force and contrary to the Laws So likewise in the same Chapter speaking of those who were against the Assembly of the Estates at that time that there were some but those neither considerable for quality or vertue who said that it was a diminution to the Kings Authority to talk of assembling the Estates and no less than Treason against him But it is they themselves who commit that crime against God the King and their Country and those who use these expressions are such as are in Authority without desert unfit for any thing but flattery whispering trifles and stories into the ears of their Masters which makes them apprehensive of these Assemblies lest they should take cognizance of them and their manners But I suppose it was for such honest expressions as these that Katherine de Midices Queen of France said that Comines had made as many Hereticks in Politicks as Calvin had done in Religion that is because he open'd Mens Eyes and made them understand a little of that they call King-craft But however in some Provinces of France as in Languedoc and Provence though the King is never denyed whatever he please to demand yet they still retain so much of the shadow of their antient Liberties as not to be taxed without the consent of the. Assembly of Estates consisting of the Nobility Clergy and Burgesses of great Towns and Cities which however is some ease to them not to have their mony taken by Edict So Hungary which was erected by the Huns a stirp of the European Scythians by which you may judge the antient form of Government was much the same as that of the Germanes All Histories grant that Kingdom to have been limited and to be of the same form with that of the other Northern Nations nay which is more to have had a Palatine who could hinder the King from ordaining any thing contrary to the Laws and as for Poland the Author cannot deny but it is limited in many things but as he only takes notice of those things in which the King hath power so he omits most of those in which he hath none as in raising of mony or making laws without the consent of the Diet. So
history and Laws of his Country but very well knows and that this opinion of Englands being a limited Monarchy is no new one but owned to be so by our Kings themselves We may appeal to the last words of Magna Charta it self Concessimus etiam eisdem pro nobis et haeredibus nostris quod nec nos nec haeredes nostri aliquid perquiremus per quod libertates in hac Charta contentae infringantur vel infirmentur Et si ab aliquo contra hoc aliquid perquisitum fuerit nihil valeat et pro nullo habeatur And this his late Majesty of blessed memory who best knew the extent of his own power says in his Declaration from New-market Martij 9. 1641. That the Law to be the measure of his power and if the Laws are the measure of it then his power is limited for what is a Measure but the bounds or limits of the thing measured So likewise in his Answer to both Houses concerning the Militia speaking of the men named by him If more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them than by Law is in the Crown it self His Majesty holds it reasonable that the same be by Law first vested in him with power to transfer it to those persons In which passage his Majesty plainly grants that the power of the Crown is limited by Law and that the King hath no other Prerogatives then are vested in him thereby Nor was this any new Doctrine or indicted by persons disaffected to Monarchy and which had but newly come off from the Parliament side by the apparent Justice of his late Majesties Cause as Mr. Hobs in his little Dialogue of the civil wars of England doth insinuate but was the opinion of the ancient Lawyers many hundred years ago Bracton who lived in the time of H. 2. writes thus Li. I. Cap. 8. Ipse autem Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et Lege quia Lex facit Regem Attribuit igitur Rex Legi quod Lex attribuit Ei viz. dominationem et potentiam Non est enim Rex ubi dominatur voluntas et non Lex And Li. III Cap. 9. Rex est ubi bene Regit Tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit dominatione quod hoc sanxit lex humana quod leges ligent suum Laterem if this be law we have a Tyrant as well described as by any difinition in Aristotle Also that the King alone cannot make a Law Li. I. Cap. 1. So likewise the Lord Chancellour Fortescue in his excellent treatise de laudibus Legum Angliae dedicated to Prince Edward only Son to Henry the VI. and certainly writing to him whom it most concerned to know those Prerogatives he might one day enjoy he would not make them less than really they were Cap. 9. He instructs the Prince thus non potest Rex Angliae ad libitum suum mutare Leges Regni sui Principatu namque nedum regali sed et politico ipse suo Populo dominatur Populus enim iis Legibus gubernatur quas ipse fert cum Legis vigorem habeat quicquid de consilio et de consensu Magnatum et Reipublicae communi sponsione authoritate Regis sive Principis praecedente juste fuerit difinitum et approbatum And the Parliament Rol. 18. E. 1. num 41. quoted in Lord Cook 's Inst 4. pt acknowledges the same Homines de Cheshire qui onerati sunt de servientibns Pacis sustentandis petunt exonerari de oneribus Statuti Winton ' c. The Kings Answer was Rex non habet consilium mutandi consuetudines nec statuta revocandi So likewise Cap. 18. speaking of the Laws of England non enim emanant illa à Principis solùm voluntate ut Leges in Regnis quae tantum regaliter gubernantur ubi quandoque statuta ita constituentis procurant commoditatem singularem quod in ejus subditorâ—m ipsum redundant dispendium et jaciuram sed concito reformari possunt dum non sine Communitatis et Procerum regni illius assensu primitus emanarunt so Cap. 13. Et ut non potest caput corperis Physici nervos suos commutare neque membris suis proprias vires et propria sanguinis alimenta denegare nec Rex qui caput est corporis Politici mutare potest Leges corporis illius nec ejusdem Populi substantias proprias substrabere reclamantibus iis an invitis And concludes thus habes jam Princeps institutionis politici Regni formam quam Rex ejus in Leges ipsius aut subditos valeat exercere ad rutelam namque legis subditorum ac eorum corporum et bonorum Rex hujusmodi erectus est et ad hanc potestatem a Populo effluxam ipse habet quo ei non liceat potestate alia suo Populo dominari I had not been so large on a Subject which is so known and evident and which no sober man will deny were it not for two reasons the first is to satisfy Divines and men of other professions who have not leasure to read old Law Books and perhaps may lye under some doubts what the true form of Government of this Kingdom hath ever been and in the next place to confute the Author's Cavil and other mens of his way to the contrary Authority being the best Judge in this Case as Diogenes confuted Zenos's Arguments against motion not by disputeing but walking So now whether the Treatise this Author writes against be but a Platonick Monarchy or a better piece of Poetry than Policy I will not dispute but this much I think I may safely affirm that the Government he describes is not a Creature to be found God be thanked on English ground and for those that so much admire it let them go find it by the banks of Nilus or Ganges where the Sun that late Emblem of universal Monarchy is so indulgent to the Creatures he produces that those which he cannot make grow here beyond an Eut or Adder are there made Crocodiles and Serpents that devour a man at a bit So that if you should stile them the representatives of the Monarchs of those Climates Travellers will say you do not wrong them I shall now proceed to answer the most material Objection of this Authors and not imitate him who in this Treatise passes by all the Arguments which Mr. H. brings to prove that this is no absolute despotick but at least a limited Monarchy as silently as Commentators do hard places that puzle them Let us therefore look back to his Patriarcha where he gives us a distinction of the School-men ' whereby they subject Kings to the directive but not to the coactive power of Laws and is a confession that Kings are not bound by the positive Laws of any Nation Since the compulsory power of Laws of that which properly makes Laws to be Laws by binding men by rewards and punishments to obedience whereas the direction of the Law