argument of true absolute Soveraignty But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty There is Onus aswell as honos that is a great burden charg and care aswell as honour and renowne thâ—…t is inseperably incident to this great function and therefore he that gaines the one be it by discent conquest or otherwise must discharge the other The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor The author tels us that This inference is most weake and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded pray heare his reason The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it followes â—…e which 〈◊〉 their power I may adde his owne perticular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The Authors argument to destroy the Observators inference is but this that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away therefore it must needs follow that the King is greater then the people I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it for if it can be proved on that hangs the strength of his argument that the people have not divested themselves of all power oâ—…t of his premisses the consequence is just that the universe is greater then the King Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Soveâ—…ty as I have shewed before it must follow that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be in effâ—…ct 〈◊〉 which hath been denied even by the King himself who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust and if so as no doubt pâ—…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent for no inferiour power can doe it so that by this time I hope the Author is satisfied that the Obseâ—…ors inference is just and his reason weake and defective But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses for saith he If the people be the true â—…ent cause of poweâ—… it is a rule in naâ—…ure quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Sâ—…ange sayes the Author that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast off Monarchy It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason should make theâ—…selves so palpably ignorant can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatioâ—… from an extreame extirpation or eradication if my reason faile me not it is he that indeavoureth what ever he pretend the casting off of Monarchy for as Monarchy is never so secure as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments it submits to their determinations so it is never so much in danger as when it exalts it selfe above and against them and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of why it is this he hath given you a rule that is regularly not generally true that will maintaine the case in question not all others for instance he tels the Observator That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule and why for that saith he he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich aâ—…d 〈◊〉 richer for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale I this is thaâ—… â—…hat hath made this great combustion maâ—…r of â—…ight and estate could you perswade us out of our reason you would quickly seize upon these but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that which God dispenced unto our Ancestors and they through his mercy â—…queathed unto us If I should tell you that God made man therefore God is greater than man or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets is greater than those rivolets and so conclude that therefore quicquid efficit tale est magis talâ—… you would presently say that this were no infallible way of reasoning why for you to conclude that it doth not hold in some cases therefore not in the case in question is not this the same fallacy but as befor s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds for he saith it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is â—…erent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation dâ—…st themselves of power or wealth That power was origiâ—…lly inherent in the people that I thinke will not be questioned That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power is cleared thus as I have shewn before that power that is fiduciary and upon condition must needs bee subject to a power more supream to see the due discharge of this trust and condition or othâ—…rwise it would in effect prove absolute but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition therefore it must be subâ—…ect to a power more suâ—…e wâ—…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament Besides what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think that a people in whom all power did origâ—…y reside should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one which being abused must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction I but saith the Author If the King be universis minor then the people have pâ—…ced a King not over but 〈◊〉 them and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 when they might command they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject The King is universis minor lesse than the Publike but he is singulis major over and above all individuals and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe for that undutifull and â—…urable passage of commanding of his Majestie and of making him our subject I wish withall my soule that the Author of this booke and his associates were not more guilty of this then his Parliament could ever Parliament or â—…ple with more
owe it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and viâ—… of the Parliament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 have 〈◊〉 by this time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ruine and destruction Besides there is no 〈◊〉 the cause or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 shall we conclude the clouds which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vapours 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 down 〈◊〉 us or that our 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 an idle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 happily our care or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impediment hath 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 the ground and cause of our jealousie The Observator having shewed how that Kings are 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith what 〈◊〉 is it then in 〈◊〉 when they will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conscience and reason in things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people No Man justifies pretended conscience no man can condemne reall T is true but conscience 〈◊〉 not to oppose or contradict that which is good and behoovefor the people I but there is no ground of objecting of pretences saith the Author and why so because the people are deceived and if they looke upon his actions they will 〈◊〉 unto them as 〈◊〉 as the day I am so 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 piety and goodnesse that I 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 so T is his evill 〈◊〉 that causes this misunderstanding and breach 〈◊〉 his sacred person and his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that their 〈◊〉 will prejudice his right and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with honour and a good 〈◊〉 grant 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to would injure 〈◊〉 I but againe 〈◊〉 saith hee hee that hath 〈◊〉 so much in this 〈◊〉 and that in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as put all 〈◊〉 Royall 〈◊〉 acts 〈◊〉 grace together they 〈◊〉 much short of his And no wonder the 〈◊〉 was sick of many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the long 〈◊〉 of Parliaments and all these which by their happy continuance might have beene prevented must now apply 〈◊〉 to the Soveraigne 〈◊〉 of his Royall Grace and favour for their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Would not have 〈◊〉 any thing which was 〈◊〉 not anything since 〈◊〉 wants 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them but 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 him into farre worse 〈◊〉 than that of poverty T is not his Majesties necessity that can 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a complyance with his Parliament what is his necessity to them if theirs finde a supply 〈◊〉 Rex 〈◊〉 regnum they care not But t is strange would setling of the 〈◊〉 by the advise of his Parliament put the King in a worse 〈◊〉 than poverty why yes he that gives away part of his 〈◊〉 is poorer 〈◊〉 if he had divested himsefe of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 plus 〈◊〉 a pretty fallacy The vertue of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beene denyed to the Commons and a 〈◊〉 hath 〈◊〉 made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties 〈◊〉 and so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 that immovable 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 and power whereby the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 right of all the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of England hath 〈◊〉 attempted to be 〈◊〉 and disturbed There may be a 〈◊〉 in the imputation of Severance and 〈◊〉 of representation to the Commons For put the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 men of a county present a 〈◊〉 to the House against â—…ed lawes and the 〈◊〉 discipline of the 〈◊〉 this is received and thankes returned if 〈◊〉 another petition modestly and 〈◊〉 expressing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that most excellent petition of Kent be presented 〈◊〉 by men more 〈◊〉 then the 〈◊〉 c and this in 〈◊〉 of the present government c. t is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 it this by no 〈◊〉 is to bee called a 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 of representation T is neither number nor 〈◊〉 of persons though I confesse these may 〈◊〉 somewhat the better glosse upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 a petition either good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of it And they that shall dare to make one 〈◊〉 against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and â—…terminations of the House t is no 〈◊〉 if they be put to make a second for their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in so doing t is they not the House that deny the 〈◊〉 of representation Most of our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Parliaments have proceeded 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 the people upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 accusations have beene so 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 themselves from their representatives and 〈◊〉 there can be nothing under Heaven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…cing God which can be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉 Here we may see the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And 〈◊〉 you may d'scover the over powring of 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for saith he certainely we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oath of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…ther did ever as I have made 〈◊〉 good before the body 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it 〈◊〉 evidently follow saith 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If one 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…wise it will prove 〈◊〉 This he grants as 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 power of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King and 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 can make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Law without the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King This one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 constantly 〈◊〉 to would 〈◊〉 prevented 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 might restore the Kingdome to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author never read any Law that knowes not what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must receive an equitable favourable 〈◊〉 according as 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the case administers occasion for summum jus est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law may 〈◊〉 be unlawfull And therefore the 〈◊〉 doth make a good qualification of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…ing onely in 〈◊〉 cases but if the safety of the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto them then an extraordinary course may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is it which hath so mâ—…serably rent this Kâ—…ngdome and raised these sad divisions Most malicious and scandalous 't is not this but the want of its due observance and neglâ—…ct of our duty thâ—…t hath raised thes â—…ad distracâ—…ions Fiâ—…st the People are made beleive they are in danger Strange that a Parliament should infringe their trust and so easily deceive a whole Kingdome Then a prevention of thâ—…se danges is promised Good reason â—…oo a whole Kingdome ought not to be sold to misery and destruction upon an easie rate The 〈◊〉 is this in case of apparent and immiâ—…ent danger the peoples sasety is not 〈◊〉 be neglâ—…cted they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy therefore most â—…it they should be put into a posture of defence Well what could reason or malice it selfe object against this I but then none so fit judges of this apparent and imminent danger as the two Houses Is any one so fit Or can any discover more than the râ—…presentative body of the whole Kingdome Wherefore they to order this Militia Had onâ—… Author intended to have dealt fairely and candidly he would have showne the man humble Petitions and requests of the Parliament to
thou 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 with that just man for I have 〈◊〉 many things this day in a â—…reame because of him what was revelation to her was but a single tradition to hâ—…m she was obliged to believe God speaking to her â—…e was not â—…ound to believe a woman speaking to him c. I shall not descant as our Aâ—…thor dâ—…th upon this reveâ—…ation nor trouble my selfe to shew of what validity and esteeme it ought to have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 though 〈◊〉 it ought not to have beene vilipended and râ—…jected and the rather for thaâ—… he himâ—…lfe could discover no fault in him as he professes Ioh. 18 and againe Mâ—… 27. 18. he sayes he knew that for 〈◊〉 they had delivered him wherefore it must needs aggravate his fin who contrary to the 〈◊〉 of his wife agreeing with his own knowledge should thus passe sentence of death upon an innocent Neither were these grounds 〈◊〉 in this 〈◊〉 to challenge his assent and make him yeeld to their vote which the Aâ—…thor by way of alluâ—…on to the Observator hâ—…re 〈◊〉 down â—…at his single judgement was not to be preferred before all advise Thâ—…t the many eyes of all the people sâ—…e more than his Besides there was a 〈◊〉 groâ—…nded upon nature that a 〈◊〉 can haâ—…e no private ends to mislead it No 〈◊〉 here was a sole 〈◊〉 and knew Christ to be innocent and therefore contrary to his owne knowledge and evidence of fact 〈◊〉 â—…ot to haâ—…e bâ—…ene â—…wayed by the multiâ—…de but where there is a joynt judiâ—…all power this doth no way conclude against a wise concession to the majoritie in cases dubious and 〈◊〉 If one Iudâ—…e upon the Bench 〈◊〉 fâ—…om thrâ—…e or one 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 from eleven they may submit to the major number though perhaps lesse 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…putation of guilt The Oaâ—…h of the 〈◊〉 is that tâ—…y will doe râ—…ght betâ—…ixt party and parâ—…y accorâ—…g to â—…vidence given in not their â—…ellowes votes How his Caâ—…uists will satisfie a mans conscience when he violates this Oath I know not The Author mistakes t is no vâ—…ation of oath in matters dubious for the 〈◊〉 to yeeld to 〈◊〉 whose verdict must needs be of greater strength 〈◊〉 validiâ—…y for â—…hough possâ—…ly that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the eleven yet t is eleven to one ods sufficient that he doth not And if he doth as hee ought agree with them in their verdict this is no complyance in vote but a proceeding accordâ—…g to the information of testimony And therefore in this case he need not appeale to a casuâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 for if he doe right betwixt paâ—…ty and party the oath is sufficiently 〈◊〉 T is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many 〈◊〉 there may 〈◊〉 a legall submission but then the Law doth not require 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 act contrary to conscience but provides for the preservation of the innocency of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by making the act of the major part have the force of the whole A 〈◊〉 ought not so to sacrifice to his owne net or to be devoted to his owne opinion as not to 〈◊〉 to the greater number of his 〈◊〉 Nay we know 〈◊〉 usuall for one single Iudge being 〈◊〉 to the other 〈◊〉 to release his opinion and doe we think in this he doth an act conâ—… to conscience seeing all men are subject 〈◊〉 errour the more secure and safe way is in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for one to 〈◊〉 to the judgement of many and not for many to 〈◊〉 to the Vote of one 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 much more in State wher the very satisfying a 〈◊〉 somtimes in things not other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may prove not only 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of peace and 〈◊〉 of strife True if in law 〈◊〉 otherwise A 〈◊〉 must not displease God to please the 〈◊〉 If the Author intend in matters cleare and obvious to every eye there he is in the right a Governour ought not to displease God to please the people But if in matters 〈◊〉 and inâ—… here he failes it may be both convenient and lawfull in such case to subscribe to the 〈◊〉 Many times the 〈◊〉 of an unreasonable request doth not satisfie but increase their 〈◊〉 T is expedient sometimes for Governors to grant that which otherwise would not be necessary There is a freedome of policy they may make use of sutable to the times and occasions and not prejudice the law of God or their owne 〈◊〉 That which at another time may bee unreasonable may now be couvenient Better to run the hazzard of an illimited desire than to destroy all for want of their present satisfaction That the 〈◊〉 and Magazine of Hull c. should be entrusted into such hands as were in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good 〈◊〉 me conscience and understanding could plead nothing against it The King had more 〈◊〉 of some 〈◊〉 more confidence in the fidelity of others The same may be verified of the Parliament though upon better ground and 〈◊〉 our former sufferings could not but ingage our 〈◊〉 the future And how could we trust those with this great ship of the Common wealth in an imminent storm who had 〈◊〉 run it upon the rockes and quicksands in a calme If 〈◊〉 could 〈◊〉 beene 〈◊〉 as it could not for the contrary was true that this would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and have 〈◊〉 the occasion of greater danger What hath beene the cause of these unhappy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the taking of the Kings towne from him by 〈◊〉 and the illegall 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 upon 〈◊〉 of apparent danger What impudence of Malice are these times reduced to that any private pen dare charge the Parliament with such 〈◊〉 Is 〈◊〉 the Towne of Hull possessed in his 〈◊〉 behalfe for the securing of him and his 〈◊〉 and is not the 〈◊〉 thereof 〈◊〉 upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Parliament have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it If his Majesty should 〈◊〉 a forâ—… force or 〈◊〉 to invade the 〈◊〉 and should surrender up a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 not lawfull for his Subjects to seize his 〈◊〉 for his and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all law and had 〈◊〉 most absolute 〈◊〉 that ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to yet let me tell him that 〈◊〉 doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 to stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the 〈◊〉 have upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be legall And I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can imagine his 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 rate that of the 〈◊〉 Nay 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet 〈◊〉 for the Parâ—… to 〈◊〉 all this upon 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 and to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where no 〈◊〉 was c. 〈◊〉 if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it might in so many 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Doth the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all other 〈◊〉 to be blind 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because his confidence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 danger which 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 hath not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we
future thus abuse his judgement and discretion Lâ—…t me give him this caution when his heart shall suggest any ill of so great and reverend a counsell whose actions ought to awe him to a good conceipt of them to consider well the grounds and reasons of his mistrust and when he hath done this ponder on the great disproportion and inequality that there is betwixt so great a power and himself and this will either ingage him to a better beleife or force him to silence And let thâ—… people take this Caveat that the subtile prâ—…ssing and urging of the ill examples of other men ought not though it be most maliciously indeavoured to perswade us to a beleife of the like corruptions in the Parliament The things taken from the King at Hull were armes which are of more danger than other kind of Chattells By the same law all that part of the Kingdome which is not confided in may be disarmed Good reason too if in a publique 〈◊〉 they shall appeare in opposition to them who indeavour nothing but the publique fafety and preservation Nay why may not their money be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it If that probability can be evidenced by a sufficient proofe I see no reason any man should be permitted to buy a sword to helpe to cut his owne throat nay more to hasten the ruine of the Common-Wealth The Subjâ—…ct is in a miserable condition that is liable to be undone as often as they please to be fearefull Wee should be in a farre worse condition if we should not feare when we have just cause and prevent the losing of the whole by a wise parting with some small and inconsiderate portion Let Brainford evidence this truth I but he saith it is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize whatever else belongs unto his Majesty It doth much extenuate the fact to seize those things which would be more immediate Agents or instruments in his Majesties and the publique ruine I but then againe hee sayes that the law of the land hath onely intrusted the Prince with armes so that the Subject ought not to he arrayed trayned and mustered but by his Commission He sayes very much and of great consequence had it beene at another time But as circumstances may vary a case so I hope the Author will learne to distinguish betwixt a case in neceâ—…ity and one out of necessity Betweene the Kings adhering to the advise of his great Counsell the Parliament and his deserting of them and betweene the due execution of his trust and the breach of it These layed together will much vary the case and justifie the Parliament in their arraying trayning and mustering without his Majesties Commission But some determination must be supreame and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the directions of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meere direction No necessity of either for in cases of this nature which is confessed to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary law Our Author doubâ—…lesse hath a strong Minerva that could make so subtile a decision of a matter of so great controveâ—…sie But I beleive this concept was as soone penned as it was thought on For what is this but in plaine termes to tell the Parliament hat they might aswell have saved their labour And that if a King seduced by evill counsell shall indeavour the destruction of the publique yet it lyes not in the power of the Parliament any way to oppose or prevent it A sad conclusion if it would hold But then his Majesty maintaining of his negative power puts this case whether if the Papists in Ireland in truth were or by act or accident had made themselves the Major part of both Houses of Parliament there and had pretended the trust which the Parliament here doth from the Kingdome of Ireland thereupon had voted their Religion and liberty to â—…e in danger of extirpation from a Malignant party of Protestants and Puritanes and therefore that they should put themselves into a possure of defence that the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of that Kingdome were to be put into the hands of such persons as they could confide in c. Wheâ—…her he were bound to consent to all such alterations as these men should propose to him and resolve to be for the publique good I shall not need to prove the unlikely hood of their accomplishing their desired ends nor go about maintaine with the Observator that there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland as betwixt England and Wales Neither do I thinke if it were so that the two Parliaments would joynâ—… for transacting and concluding upon matters for both states But to the question I shall give this short answere that I do not conceive the King in such case bound to consent to their proposalls For I never did nor shall allow where their conclusions and requâ—…sts are evidently against lâ—…w reason or Religion if that may bâ—… presumed of a Parliament that in such case the Kiâ—…g is bound to yeâ—…ld to their Votes No farre be it from any one thus to judge for that were to make him a â—…yrant though against his will and to be ingaged in his peoples ruine against his conscience But now what use or advantage can be made of this against the casâ—… in question â—…he Parliaments proposalls being not apparently either against law reason or Religion doâ—…h nonplus my understanding to imagine A faction is said to have prevailed upon a Major part by cunning â—…orce absence or accident The Observator argues thus aginst it If by cunning we must suppose the Kings party in Parliament hath lost all their law policy and 〈◊〉 The reason why they are overborne may be this not because they have lesse law but more hoâ—…sty which will not permit them to maintaine a good cause by ill meanes No the reason is evidently this that they have liâ—…le law and 〈◊〉 Honesty which wiâ—…hholds them from promoting the publique safâ—…ty I but how falls it out that after so many reiterated scandalls of pretences and deceivings of the people the Author should now confesse that the cause is good only he adds that there is an ill prosecuting of it which he ought to prove if he expects we should beleive him Certainely he did not read what he had writâ—…en or not understand it or there is some hope now at the last after the venting of his spleâ—…ne that he will prove a convert But I dispaire of convincing him by better reason for he is here in his very next words fallen into a contradiction where he saâ—…es that wee all know in how great stead these Piae