Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n
Text snippets containing the quad
|
ID |
Title |
Author |
Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) |
STC |
Words |
Pages |
|
A84082
|
Animadversions on a book called, A plea for non-scribers. By Ephraim Elcock.
|
Elcock, Ephraim.
|
1651
(1651)
|
Wing E325; Thomason E636_2; ESTC R206574
|
62,788
|
67
|
Democratical the Government of these Deligates is Oligarchical they being chosen out of the wealthiest of every County and both these put together make up a Pol ty as Aristotle calls it but as Plato whose termes differ from Aristottles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To prove the erection of this unlawful they much labour but that toyl of theirs might very well have been spared The people of this Land have in all ages had a supreme power over their King and Lords which was exercised by their Representatives who by old Lawes were to meet twice a year and by a latter Statute once a year though the Tyranny of wicked Kings had brought that of late into a disuse Which prescription notwithstanding cannot take away the Peoples right It s vulgarly said That no prescription lies against the Kings Exchequer much less can a prescription lie against the People who are greater then the Prince and for whose sake the Prince hath that priviledge Dicores quatuor esse in quibus sita est tota vis Majestas Reipublicae nimirum Jus Magistratuum creandorum Deliberationes omnes de Pace de Bello Legum lationes tandèmque Provocationes Donatus Janottius de Repub Venetâ pag. 59. Speed Book 5. Chap. 5. Suma imperii bellique administrandi communi concilio commissa est â—assivellauâ—e Nostro adventu commoti Britani hunc toti bello imperióque praefecerant Caesar Commenter lâ—b 5. Spe. d. lib. 7. cap. 1. S. 6. saith Junius Brutus The form of Government is that which dat esse operari as Non-scribers say and natural order and reason requires that propriae operationes propriae formae respondeant if therefore it be proved that the Representatives have ever had de jure a power to do the Acts proper to the supreme power it will follow that the supreme power was formally in them and that they were a Common-wealth having supreme Authority in themselves Let me here use the words of a learned Florentine I say saith he that there are four things in which the whole power and Majesty of every politique body is placed the power of creating Magistrates all deliberations concerning Peace and Warre making of Lawes and the last appeales If therefore the Representatives of the people have had the right to create all general Magistrates to consult of Peace and Warre to make and abrogate Lawes and the priviledge of the last appeal to be made to them they have been the supreme power That they have had these Rights I shall prove and begin first with Creation of Magistrates Julius Caesar before whose entrance into this Island the times are obscure through whose mists no Eagles eyes can pierce as the beloved Historian of Non-scribers Speed confesseth found the supreme power of electing Magistrates in a Common-Councel of the people The chief power of Rule and administring the Warre was by a Common Councel committed to Cassivellauâ—e And again the Britâ—ains being troubled at our landing set him that is Cassivellaune over the whole Warre and Empire The Common Councel then that made Cassivellaune King and General was a Tan-Britanicum an Assembly representing all Britain And when the Romans quitted their tooting here the Britains being invaded by the Picts joyntly united their meanes and powers and with one consent elect a King to manage those affairâ—s which was Vortigerne whom afterwards they deposed and elected his Sonne Vortimer But I must for further satisfaction in this point refer them to the Authour of the Rights of the Kingdom who after many Examples of such Creation of Kings concludes thus We see the Law at lest the â—ustom of those times both for electing anointing judging and executing of Kings themselves among our British Ancestors Conceâ—ning our Saxon Ancestors saith the same Authour the Minor is very clear that they did elect or chuse their Kings from among themselves who well agrees therein with the witness of Tacitus Rights of the Kingdom p. 55. Rights of the Kingdom p. 35. Reges ex nâ—bilitate duces ex virtute sumunt Tacitus de moribus Germanorum Soveraign Power of Parliaments part â— p 78. Soveraign Power of Parliaments part 2. p. 41. Soveraign Power of Parliaments part 1. p. 91. who speaking of the ancient Germans of whom the Saxons were a branch saith they chose their Kings for their Nobility their Leaders for their vertue which Testimony informs us that they enobled some for their vertues and out of them chose their Kings Concerning the Normans I have spoken already To conclude with the Testimony of Mr. Prinne who tells us That our Parliament and Kingdom observe the opposition anciently have both claimed and exercised a Supreme Power over the Crown of England it self and that we may be sure what he meanes by Parâ—iament in another place he saith out of Fortescue Chancellor of England in Henry the sixth's time that Kings were created and elected at first by the general Votes of the people from whom alone they receive all their lawful Authority having still no other or greater lawful power then they conferred on them only for the defence of Lawes Persons Liberties Estates and the Republicks welfare which they may regulate augment or diminish for the common good as they see just cause Neither did the setting of Kings over them divest them of the supreme power it self if Mr. Prinne while a defender of Parliaments may be credited I doubt not saith he but our Parliaments Kings and all other Nations would say they never intended to erect such an absolute eternal unlimited Monarchy over them and that they ever intended to reserve the absolute original soveraign jurisdiction in themselves that if their Princes should degenerate into Tyrants they might have a remedy to preserve themselves An impregnable evidence that the whole Kingdom and Parliament representing it observe what is a Parliament the Representative of a Kingdom and then not the Lords that represent no body are the most Soveraign power and above the King because having the supreme jurisdiction in them at first they never totally transferred it to the King but reserved it in themselves I should tire my Reader should I say all that might be said concerning the Commons Creation of other Magistrates Soveraigâ— Power of Parliaments part 2. p. 7. Mr. Prinne brings in Sir Edward Cook affirming that the Lord Chancellor Treasurer privy Sealâ— Lord chief Justice Privy Councellors Heretoches Sheriffs with all Officers of the Kingdom of England and Constables of Castles were usuâ—lly elected by the Parliament to whom of ancient right their election belonged who being commonly stiled the Lord Chancellor Treasurer chief Justice c. of England not of the King were of right elected by the Representative body of the Realm of England to whom they were accountable for their misdemeanors Rights of the Kingdom p. 77. 78. 2. All consultations of Peace and Warre of right appertain to the Commons of England It was the great Councel saith the Authour of the Rights
them say thus but to make the King absolute supreme and giver of life and being to Parliaments as is evident from that of theirs we have no ground to think Represeâ—tatives anâ—ecedent to Kings Appendix page 35. Lex Rex quest 21. page 177 Lex Rex quest 6. 19. Námque munus illud quâ vi quâ gratiâ favore imo quo pretio denique et corruptelâ pro temporum hominumque conditione sub specie feudi aliisque diversis praetextibus in peculium tandem conversum est ex temporario haereditarium factum Guicc Descrip Hannoniae p. 440. Nunc nullus in honorum nominibus est modus neque praeter inanem titulum ullus Nominum usus Buchanan Rerum Scoticarum lib. 6. Verstegan cap. 10. Rights of the Kingdom p. 9â— which is the rotten ground of Ferke the Authour of Oâ—soriaâ—um c. as Mr. Rutherford will tell them Agâ—in they tell us that the Peoples constitution of their Gâ—vernment either collectively or by Proxies by way of election and consent is no valid argument of any superintendent power in the people to make or unmake Kings To this I say that the people do not constitute their Governours by a bare election and consent but they are their efficient cause and give them their civil power and agency Kings and other Magistrates are the effects of the people and therefore inferiour to them This nail is driven home to the head by the fore-named learned Scotchman they know the common principle Quod efficit tale est magis tale and for their comparisons of Servants and Pastors I must refer them to the place quoted in the Margin where they may be satisfied 2. The Lordâ— were not coordinate with the Representatives of the people I shall not stay for I shall soon dismiss them here to relate the first rising of the like dignities in other places That learned Historian Guicciardin tells us that after Lotharius the Emperor had divided the Empire into three parts among his three Sons they out of flâ—ath began to give up divers Lands to their Palatines who before were as Judges sent to govern them and from hence came up so many Earles as now we see what by force what by favour what by price and corruption under divers pretexts the Offiâ—e of Palatines was turned into a propriety and of temporary became hereditary Nâ—t shall I insist upon honest and learned Geâ—rge Buchanan's verdict concerning this kind of men who informs us that Malcolme the 2. was the first who brought theâ— into Scotland rather for vain ambition then any use and afterwards complains There is now no measure in new names of honour and no use of their names besides the empty Title To come to our own Lords The Dukes which were among our Saxon Ancestors I cannot conceive to be any other then the Heretochii that are mentioned in the Confessors Lawes who were the Captains of the Kingdoms Militia chosen by the people in their Folcmotes for Hertzog is the tearm by which the Dutch of whomâ—thâ— Saxons were a branch express a Duke to this day a word derived from Here an Army and togeâ— to lead and fitly expressing the Latine Dux the fountain of our word Duke Earle a name of honour as Grave of Age was wont to denote amongst them the principal Judge of a shire which was also elective The Norman brought in the Title Baron and the Norman Barons were nothing else but the great Free-holders of the Nation All the Peers are said by Lawyers to sit in the house as Barons in which right the Bishops also sat as being Barons by tenure as also other Barons were before any was so by Pattent which manner of Creation viz. by Pattent is not much elder then Edward the 3. and indeed was one of the prime plots of our Kings whereby they strengthned their Tyranny they saw the great Free-holders that were Barons by tenure were vigorous Patrons of the peoples Liberties they therefore gratified many of their own Creatures with Pattents for that Honour that they might gratifie them with their mercinary Votes Now the most if not all of the Lords were no other then the Kings Pattentees whereof some had bought their Title others were called to it to draw them off the service of the Common-wealth as Strafford Digby c. Others raised out of the Kings private affection so that they were no other then bubbles blowen up by the breath of exorbitant prerogative These things premised I shall demonstrate that the Lords were not coordinate with the Commons by 3. mediums I. The power which they had was but Judicial and that over the King onely Soveraign power of Parliaments part 1. p. 5. in the Margin Rex non habet superiorem in terris praeter Deum Legem Curiam Comitum Baronum qui ideo dicuntur Comites quia sunt socii Regis saith Bracton quoted by Mr. Prinâ—e and their Office is that debent ei fraenum ponere Nay the last King in a Declaration of his as I well remember I have read though now I have it not at hand saith that the Lords were as bankes between him and the Commons to restrain the excesses of prerogative Legislative power at the first they had none should we grant that since their good services for the people they had a share of legislative power allowed them yet this would not prove them coordinate with the Commons For the modi of Parliaments saith an able Lawyer will not only tell us that the Commons have better and stronger Votes then the Lords Rights of the Kingdom p. 88.89 90. Idem Ibiâ—â—â— p. 82. but that there may be a Parliament without the Lords which he proves and defends against Objections Which â—uthour tells us that the Lords lost this Judicial power by accepting Pattents from the King and so becoming incorporate with him his personal Commissioners who was not able to constitute Judges when himself was a party Nay should I grant that Power to the House of Lords Non secus ac Patronus cum clientis adversario de quota litis pactus si Clientis causam prodidisset si minimè noceret non potest ita sanè ista Magnatum in damnum necémque populi inita conspiratio quidquaÌ„ ejus juri detrahere Verum illi in poenam legis quae in praevaricatores lata est incident his ac si res omnino integra esset Patronum alium eligere jus suum denuâ— persequi Lex permittit Vindiciae contra Tyrannos Quaest 3. pag. 98. Rights of the Kingdom p. 87.88 Valer. Max. li. 2. cap. 2. Antiquitus Tribuni Plebis ante valvas positis subselliis decreta patrum perpendebant si quae ex iis improbâssent rata esse non sinebant Janus Gulielmus de Magist Pop. Rom. ca. 14. So Lipsius de Magist Pop. Rom. cap. 15. that they were by office the Patrons of the people against the Inundations of Tyrannie