places would not be a Deliberation befitting the Wisdom and Gravity of the Venetian Senate It would be better to watch the occasion of some Extremity or Pinch of an Emperour which often happens and buy these places but then be aware that if it be not a Patrimonial Estate the consent of the Dyet is necessary to the purchase to cut off all claims in time to come 'T is as hard that the Emperour should unite with the Republick to acquire the State of any other Prince in Italy because first for Spain they are the same Family with the Emperour Against the Church he will declare as little professing a great Zeal for it and calling himself The Churches Advocate Modena Mantoua and Mirandola are Fiefs of the Empire Savoy and Florence are remote from him and to come at them he must overcome greater Princes that are between him and them so that this Union would prove difficult If the Emperour should fall out with some of these Dukes his Vassals and depose them it might happen that if Spain were busie elsewhere and the Emperour loth to take the trouble of chastising them himself alone he might then unite with the Republick upon condition to have the best part of the Spoil but if the Emperour should as formerly come to a great Rupture with the Church and employ heartily his power in the Quarrel 't is not impossible but he might be willing to engage the Republick by a promise of some part of the conquest I think in any other way 't is not probable to make any advantage of the Imperial Assistance The last Question is Whether he can unite with others against the Republick And of this there is no doubt For if Maximilian tho infinitely oblig'd to the Republick made no difficulty to unite in a League with Lewis the Twelfth of France his Competitor and Enemy whom for Injuries received he had declared a Rebel to the Sacred Empire tho Lewis laugh'd at that Imaginary Jurisdiction I say if he could submit to joyn with so suspected a power much less would the Emperour now scruple the uniting either with Spain or the Pope or any other Princes of Italy not only for to acquire Territory but even for bare Money if it were offer'd him With France I believe the Union would not be so easie as it was then because now the Emperour being partial for Spain if their Interest did not concur they would hinder him from being drawn away by any hopes or promises But this will appear better when we come to treat of Spain For if Spain will have a League against the Republick the Emperour will never stand out Now let us come to France 'T is not above Fifty years ago that the Republick thought themselves oblig'd not only to desire but to procure the Greatness of France because being under the phrensie of a Civil War it threatned little less than the dissolution of that Monarchy The Succession of Henry the Fourth to the Crown who had his Title from Nature and the Possession from his Sword reviv'd it and at last gave it such vigour that from deserving Compassion it came to move Envy and if a fatal blow of a mean hand had not cut off that Prince's Life and Designs there would have been requisite great Dexterity or great Force to defend the Republick from them The Count de Fuentes Governour of Milan us'd to brag that he had such Musick as should make those dance who had no mind to 't Henry the Fourth might have said so with much more reason and he us'd to affirm That at the pass things were the Neutrality of the Republick was a Coyn that would no longer be current If he had given career to his no ill-founded Designs half a World would not have suffic'd him but we must not be frighted if we see the Raging Sea swell in Billows and look as if it would swallow up the Earth since a little Sand stops all its Fury Death has a Scythe that most commonly cuts off all the Noblest Lives If Henry the Third of France had brought the Siege of Paris to an end if Philip the Second had not had the Winds and Seas against him England would have been in Chains and Paris would have been a Village In conclusion the Fatality of Humane Affairs is such that most great undertakings are disappointed by unexpected causes At present the constitution of France is such that there is little danger from them for during the Minority of their King they will have enough to do not to lose ground there being so many Jealousies and Factions a-foot 'T is true that the common people have open'd their Eyes and begin to be weary of spending their blood for the ambition of the great ones and amongst these the chiefest are old and at their ease so that they will think chiefly of keeping themselves in those Posts they enjoy The Duke of Maine who is Head of the Catholick Party is very ancient and very rich wherefore if in the time of the great troubles he either could not or would not aspire to make himself King when even he had all but the Name of it 't is not to be imagined he thinks of it now and if he will be content with the State of a Subject he is as great as he can be The Duke of Mercaeur who in his Wife 's right pretended to Erect Britany into a Kingdom is at last dead in Hungary the Duke of Epernon is more studious of good Husbandry than Soldiery the Duke of Montpensier has always been true to the Royal Family the Capricios of the Marchioness of Aumale will hardly have any Followers and it will be well if she can clear her self of the late King's Death On the other side the Prince of Conde the first Prince of the Blood is young and of a mild Nature he has besides before his Eyes the Example of his Father Grandfather and Great Grandfather who all perish'd unfortunately in civil Broils and has in his own person experimented the Spanish Parsimony in his Retreat from Court to Brussels So that if he desires a greater Fortune he may compass it in France from the hands of the Queen her self who is so ill a Politician as to try to put out Fire with pouring Oyl upon it The Hugonots are weary the Duke of Bovillon their Head well pleased with his present Fortune and if he have a mind to be a Hugonot out of Perswasion and not Faction there is no body will hinder him but most of these great men have Religion only for a pretext as 't is reported likewise of the Duke de Lesdiguieres which if it be true they will never be quiet till the King be of Age and by consequence there will be little protection to be hop'd for from that Kingdom Our Speculation therefore may more certainly conclude that the Greatness of France is at a stand and cannot in the space of some years make any progress
Noblemen as from having too many rich ones besides the Envy and Jealousie that must be in the hearts of those who shall find themselves naked and their Equals cloathed with their Garments and that only for not having been able to pay an Imposition laid upon them by other Peoples Contrivance There are some who not making a right Judgment of things do inveigh extreamly against a Custom of this Republick which is the having so many Offices and Places of so small Revenue that those who enjoy them are almost necessitated to be corrupt and so after they have been Judges and Governours forc'd to come under the lash of the Law or to justifie their Integrity if they can This seems a notorious Abuse and carries with it some appearance But however I should never advise to make these Imployments better because there results from this another greater advantage to the State which is to keep the small Nobility under for they may be compar'd to the Adder which cannot exert its Poyson when 't is numm'd with Cold And if these Nobles who are by inclination discontented should once arrive but to a Mediocrity in Fortune they would presently contest with the great ones and by strength of their Numbers play some ill Trick to the Government whereas now they are kept to their Duty not only by Poverty which clips the Wings of Ambition but also by being subject to the Censure of the great ones for having misbehav'd themselves in their Governments Indead I could think it prudent to proceed against them something coldly unless they are guilty of very great Enormities such as scandalize the generality of your Subjects for then 't is necessary to shew a publick resentment But otherwise I would have them handled gently it being a kind of punishment to lye open to a Prosecution And indeed I would never have any Nobleman though never so guilty be condemned to a Publick Infamous Death because the Damage that results from thence upon the whole Order of the Nobility when they are seen to pass through the Hands of an Hangman is greater than the Good of a Publick Example can avail Neither on the other side would I have these Noblemen thus guilty to walk the Streets and be seen in publick because then your Subjects would conceive a sinister Opinion of your Justice but they should be kept in Prison or if it be necessary be privately dispatch'd If these Criminals fly from Justice then you may use the utmost severity in your banishing of them because then it appears that if nothing more be done nothing more was feasible and let the same Rigour be observ'd in keeping them out for since they are as it were gangreen'd Members cut off from the Body it will not be expedient to unite them again to it with deformity of the whole Here I foresee I shall be censur'd by some as a bad Pilot who endeavouring to shun Scylla runs upon Carybdis that is while I aim at keeping the small Nobility under I forget the danger may arise from the Great and the Rich of that Order I see the Objection but do not value it and my Reason is the long Observation I have made of the Nature of this City by the strength of which I dare boldly affirm that the Republick of Venice will never come to its end by that which has ruin'd all other Republicks to wit when the power has been reduc'd first into a few hands and then their Authority devolv'd upon one who has erected a Monarchy The strange Emulation that reigns here among the great ones even among those of the same Family nay that is between Brothers themselves does secure the Government from this danger and if by a Supposition almost impossible all the Brothers of one Family had the power given them of making a Dictator I am confident they would never agree to chuse one among themselves but would rather chuse to be a part of the Government divided among a Thousand Gentlemen than to be Princes of the Blood and Subjects The Great Governments called Governments of Expence and so contriv'd on purpose by our prudent Ancestors to give an occasion to those who are too rich to lessen their Riches ought to be dispos'd of according to the Intention of their first Institution That is to say not to those who have no means to sustain such a Burden and must be forc'd by consequence to compass them per fas nefas and if they are Honest must do it foolishly because they are not wicked enough to do it knavishly and so either acquire the Hatred of those they govern or be laugh'd at and contemned by them This is a Point of great Importance and he who goes through such an Imployment meanly and without Expence demerits extreamly of his Countrey because he renders the Person that represents the State contemptible and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their first Original Rise from the Contempt of the Prince The Contests that happen between Nobleman and Nobleman of equal Fortunes and are follow'd by Attempts upon one another may be conniv'd at when they are reconcil'd but if the thing be between a Nobleman of the Better sort and one of the Lesser let it be chastis'd with some appearance of Severity at least for fear the Humours of the small Nobility should be stirr'd But if one of these shall attack a Nobleman of the First Rate let him be punish'd with a heavy hand lest the Party injur'd being potent in Friends go about to do himself Justice to the great detriment of the Publick Authority But if a Nobleman do commit an Enormity towards a Subject first let there be all the endeavour possible used to justifie him and if that cannot be let the punishment be with more Noise than Harm But if a Subject insults a Nobleman let the Revenge be sharp and publick that the Subjects may not accustom themselves to lay hands upon the Nobility but rather think them Venerable and Sacred In Civil Judicatures it would be requisite to act without Passion to take away that ill Opinion that Men have of the Partiality of Justice in favour of the Great This Belief must be destroyed for a Subject that once thinks himself prejudg'd by the Quality of his Adversary will never be capable of seeing whether his Cause has been decided according to the merit of it or no Therefore there can never be too much diligence used in the Administration of Civil Judicatures which are one of the greatest Foundations of Government for when a Subject can say to himself That he shall have Justice if his Case deserves it he submits to a great many other Grievances without repining And on the contrary though after an unjust Sentence he should be indulg'd in some Criminal Matter he will never have a Love for the Government because the Injury receiv'd will stick in his Memory and the Indulgence will vanish out of it The Quarrels between the Plebeians may
Four State-Ministers though bound by excessive Rewards to Secresy And what a wonderful thing was the deposition of the Doge Foscari conceal'd by his own Brother Certainly one cannot without Tears observe that in our Times so great a Quality which seem'd to be proper to the Venetian Commonwealth is something altered by the inconsideration of the young Nobility who not out of Disloyalty but too much Freedom do let things slip from them which ought to be conceal'd I think every Venetian Nobleman ought to teach his Children the use of Secresie with their Catechism but the better way were to forbid all talking of Public Concerns out of the place where they are properly to be deliberated on and much less among those who are partakers of the Secret Let the Honours and Dignities of the Commonwealth be dispensed regularly and by degrees avoiding all sudden Flights because they are dangerous To see a Cloud enlighten'd of a sudden is most commonly a sign of a Thunderbolt to come out of it and he that from a private man leaps in an instant to the Port of a Prince has something of the Player Honours given by degrees keep the young Nobility from attaining them before they are ripe for them and we may observe that as in Physick a man moderately Learned but well Experienc'd is safer for the health of the Body Natural So in the Government of the Commonwealth a man often employed though perhaps of less acuteness succeeds best All Matters of Benefices are very properly under the Cognizance of the Great Council but it would be as proper to take away all Appeals to the Quaranties and place them in the Senate because it often happens that these Causes are to be decided according to reason of State and those Quarantia Judges put little value upon those Politick Reasons And besides it seems a great incongruity that a Sentence where the Person of the Doge and the whole Signoria both intervene should afterwards be lyable to the Censure of Forty Persons of lesser value I believe if it were observed to chastise rigorously but secretly all those Lawyers and their Clients who carry these Appeals to the Quarantias the use of them would be less frequent and in time they would be forborn as if they were forbidden If it should fall out that any of your Subjects should procure a Decree in the Rota or Court of Rome you must rigorously command from him a Renunciation ab Impetratis else all beneficiary Causes will be devolv'd to Rome where they are look'd upon as Sacred and so a fourth part of all Civil Causes would be lost for your own Courts Auditors of the Rota are to be with the Commonwealth like Bishops in partibus Infidelium a thing of Title but without Subjects Let the Bishops of the Venetian State be always praecogniz'd in the Consistory by a Venetian Cardinal without the Circumstance of creating him Special Procurator but as Protector which he really ought to be as other Cardinals brag they are so for other States For the Court of Rome to avoid these procurations to Venetian Cardinals would perhaps desist making any of that Nation that so they might oblige the State to have recourse to Strangers which in time would also prejudice the pretence of being treated as Crown'd Heads If the preconisation be made otherwise let the State seize the Temporalities of the Bishoprick and stop all Pensions laid upon it 'T is true that if the Cardinal Nipote should make the Preconisation and enjoy at the same time the priviledge of a Venetian Nobleman it could not well be rejected If it should ever happen that there should be a Pope I won't say a Venetian for that would be of more danger than advantage to the Government but a Foreigner well inclin'd to the Venetian Republick then would be the time to obtain once for all the Grant of the Tenths upon the Clergy as once it was got under Clement the Sixth whose Bull is unfortunately lost for 't is troublesome to get it renew'd every Five Year or Seven Year and it would be a Point gain'd which still would more and more equal the Republick with Crown'd Heads as also if in the Titles given by the Pope to the Doge there could be gain'd the Superlative as Carissimo or Dilectissimo as is usual to Crown'd Heads it would be a new lustre to the Republick which for want of these things and also because that never any Venetian Nuncio was promoted to be Cardinal is look'd upon at Rome as a kind of Third Power between Crown'd Heads and the Ducal State If I say all this could be gain'd by the State from a Pope there might be some return made by making a Law That Church-men in Criminals should not be judged by any Tribunal but the Council of Ten or Delegates from that Council And now I am speaking of that Council I cannot but inculcate That all means possible should be used to hinder an Avogadore from daring to carry the Decrees of the Council of Ten to be re-view'd or censur'd by any other Council but rather if there ought to be any Change made in them let it be by the same Power that made them otherwise the Consequence will be a constant annihilation of their Decrees and a manifest depression of the great Nobility with an Exaltation of the lesser Touching the Authority of this Council I have this more to say That I could wish that the Delegations of its Power were less frequent with great regard to the Dignity of the Persons as well as to the Splendor of the Government which is always more reverenced when it is least communicated like the Sun-beams which in that glorious Body are of Gold but communicated to the Moon are but of Silver Indeed our Ancestors would have deserved well of us if they had lengthened the time of this Magistracy but because that which was not done in those Old Times can hardly be hop'd in these Modern ones the only Remedy would be to obtain a Continuation of the same persons for another year under pretext of avoiding so many various Elections in so short a time as must be made by a Scrutiny in the Pregadi 'T is true that would exempt the persons continued from the Governments of Expence but as long as that Exemption did not extend beyond a year there would be little Inconvenience in it And if it be objected That this would too much strengthen the Authority of the great ones I answer That it lasting but a few months could not be of ill Consequence and on the other side those hands are as it were tied up which ought to be at liberty to do Justice while every week they may be canvass'd and teas'd by a Party of mean Persons both for the Conditions of their Mind and Fortune I have often admired how the Council of Ten having already all the Criminal Power and a good part of the Judiciary in Civil Causes as well as
make their Families their thoughts being far from enlarging a Dominion which they expect to leave every day and in the mean time all the ready Money which else they might lay up would go upon projects of a very uncertain Event And 't is a wonderful thing that Julius the Second being of a very mean Birth should have had so great a Sence of the Publick Interest of the Church as to forego all his private concerns and take the Empty Praises of his Courtiers in payment for the loss of such real advantages as he might have made to his Family The last Query depends in a great measure upon the others I do not think it would be easie to concert the Union of the Pope with other Princes in order to attack the Republick because it will never be advantageous to the Church to increase the power of that other Prince neither will it look like the Justice they profess to take to themselves alone the Spoils except it be upon a Country on which they have a pretence 'T is true that in those noysie Excommunications where they deprive Princes of their Dominions and give them to others that can take them there might be some danger but they are seldom practiz'd but in an Attempt made by a Prince upon the Church which is never to be feared from the Piety and Moderation of the Republick There is no doubt but the Church would enter into a League to hinder any progress of the Republick particularly against any Dependant of theirs and also in case the Republick attack'd some small Prince the Popes to affect the protection of the weak would declare but if the Republick had to do with a strong Prince the Church would look on for fear of greatning too much that Prince the rather because the Republick can lay claim to none of those Old ticklish Titles which some other Princes might set a-foot against the Church And so much for the Pope Now let us come to the Emperour The Republick must never forget that Maxim which is common to all Princes bordering upon the Empire which is That it is not convenient for them to see the Emperour made more powerful lest he renew those antiquated Titles he has to most Dominions near him and particularly in Italy The power of the Roman Commonwealth which extended almost over all the known World being at last usurp'd by Julius Caesar and from him deriv'd to a long Series of succeeding Emperours might give the German Emperour a pretext to reckon with all the Princes of Europe if he were strong enough and perhaps many who wear Crowns would be reduc'd to Beggary therefore 't is best to keep him in his cold Country of Germany where mens Spirits are benumm'd and less undertaking The Republick has Reason to distrust him upon many Heads as Emperour he has pretences upon the Dutchy of Frioul and the Marca Trevisana besides the Cities of Trevisa Padoua Vicenza and Verona As Arch-Duke he pretends to Istria As King of Hungary to Zara and the neighbouring Country So that his Titles and Neighbourhood are considerably dangerous all these Countries are besides of greater Antiquity than the City of Venice it self So that their being subject to a Metropolis of a younger standing gives some suspicion of the Lawfulness of their Subjection All these pretences were renewed in the League of Cambray Therefore I think without hesitation I may pronounce That it is the Interest of the Republick that the Emperour should be kept low both for General and Particular Reasons From these Reflections we may also conclude that the Emperour to these Titles does not want Inclination to acquire a part of the Territories of the Republick particularly it being yet a complaint of that Prince of the little Respect show'd him by the Republick when taking advantage of his Distractions they Erected the Fortress of Palma Nuova just under his Nose There remains therefore to see what Facility he might find in such an Attempt In the present State of his Affairs while the Faction of the Protestants is so strong in Germany I cannot think that he can quarrel with the Republick which is as powerful in Money as he is in Men For in length of time 't is certain that he who has Money may have Men and they who have many Men must consume much Money 'T is true he being so near a Borderer upon the Republick it may give him the more confidence because a lesser Number will be necessary to make the Invasion but if the Enterprize be not in the Name of the whole Empire in which case the whole German Nation would be a party I believe with the help of his own Patrimonial Dominions he will not do any great matter the rather because many great Heretical Princes and Cities of Germany have the same Interest to keep him low So that as he might perhaps be pretty smart upon an Invasion or Incursion at length of time he would prove as weak to hold out a War And indeed this was the true cause of Erecting the Fortress of Palma Nuova to obviate a sudden Incursion of his Forces and provide a Retreat for the Country-people so to gain time which is always as advantageous to the Republick as dangerous to such an Enemy who if he have not some body to furnish him with Money will get but little ground tho his Army be numerous as it was in the time of Maximilian Now whether the Republick has any Title Inclination or Facility to acquire any part of the Emperour's Territories I answer That without doubt the Republick has pretences upon Goritia and Gradisca which formerly belong'd to the Family of the Frangipani and for a little while was under the Government of the Republick There are likewise some Castles in Istria and upon the Coast which the Republick claims and for an Inclination to acquire these we need not doubt but the Republick has it it being either the Vertue or Vice of Princes never to be without it But still the great consideration lies in the Facility of doing it for it there be that 't is above half the Title and if that is wanting 't is Imprudence to own any part of a pretence that must remain without Execution I believe by Sea it would prove easie to take Trieste and some other places but it would be as hard to maintain them and to go further into the Land would need great preparatives on the side of the Republick whereas on the Emperour's side the Defence would be easie he having a command of Men So that except in an open War there is no thinking of any strong Attempt that way and then it were not amiss to put a good strength to it that at the end of the War which always must one time or another be succeeded by Peace some of the Country might remain by Treaty in the Venetians Hands for the charges of the War for to begin a War only for the acquisition of these