discovered and put to flight if the multitude affect their Prince But the Common people being once offended hath cause to fear every moving both at home and abroad This may be effected by the Prince if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people and avoid those things that breed hatred contempt viz. if he seem as a Tutor or a Father to love the people and to protect them if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom For that nothing is more popular nor more pleasing to the people than is peace 4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously yet with State and Majesty to his people and receive complaints of his suppliants and such like 5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts and place of Iusticâ— that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which he maketh the seat of his Empire and so make it sure and faithfull unto him which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom as the hearâ— in the middle of the body or the Sun in the middle of Heaven both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions and least the furthest partsâ— at one end move whilest the Prince is in the other Iâ— he go in progress many times to see his Provinces especially those that are remote 6. If he gratifie his Courtiers and Attâ—nâ—ants in that â—ort and by such means as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people as with Monopolies and such like 7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy or seem grievous to his Ministers but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himself as the French Kings who for thâ—t purpose as may seem have erected their Court at Paris which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and â—nvy both with the Nobles and the Pâ—ople 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people though he have no need and pay the same justly without defalcaâ—ion of any part by his Exchequer or other Officer 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed â—atred or contempt of his person which may be done if he shew himself not too light inconstant hard cruel â—sfeminate fearfull and dastardly c. But contrarywise Religious Grave Iust Valiant c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience than love and reverence of the people towards the Prince 10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision which is to be rumoured and made known abroad if it be known that he is reverenced and obeyed by his peoples at home 11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion which if it happen he is to joyn speedily with other Princes which are in like danger to abate that greatness and to strengthen himself and the rest against it An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain 12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward or other means to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince with whom he hath differences if any thing be intended against his State Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes Court under colour of Embassage or some other pâ—etence which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn 13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey and not to encounter them with his Prâ—rogative nor to use it at all where there is a Law for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts especially if it tender to take from them â—â—â—ir commodities and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers 14. To provide especially That that part which favoureth the State as it standeth be more potent than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change 15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates especially of such as assist the Prince in his Counsels and Policies and not to lean over much to his own advise contrarie to the rule of Machiavil who teacheth That a Prince can have no good counsel except it be in himself his reason because if he use the counsel of some one he is in danger to be over-wrought and supplanted by him if he counsel with more Then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions As if a Prince of great or mean wisdom could not take the Iudgement of all his Counsellorurs in any point of Policie or of so many as the himself thinketh good and to take it either by word or in writing and himself then in private peruse them all and so after good and mature deliberation make choice of the best without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one For the Proverb is true that two eyes see more than one and therefore the advises and Consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a Feast or dinner where many contribute towards the shot by which means they have more variety of dishes and so better fare and yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best â—or his health and appetiâ—e 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten as in the example of Solomon which may seem the reason why our Kings of England had their Kings Bench in place of publick Justice after the manner of the ancient Kings that â—ate in the Gate where for better performing of this Princely duty some special causes may be selected which may throughly be debaâ—ed and considered upon by the Prince in private with the help and advise of his learned Councel and so be decided publickly as before is said by the Prince himself At least the Prince is to â—ake accompâ— of every Minister of publick Justice that it may be known that he hath a care of Justice and doing right to his people which makes the Justicâ—rs also to â—e more â—â—reful in performing of their duties 17. To be moderate in his Taxes and impositions and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse â—o do it by Parliaments and with their consents making the cause apparent unto them and shewing his unwillingness in charging them Finally so to use it that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects than an exaction by him 18. To stop small beginnings unto â—his end to compound the dissentions â—hat arise amongst the Nobles with caution that such as are free be not drawn into parts whereby many times the Prince is endangered and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion as in the example of the Barons Wars and the late Wars of France which grew from a quarrel betwixt the
seem a benenefactour and have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey or doing some good for it 6. To forbid feastings and other meetings which increase love and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters under pretence of sparing cost for better uses To that end the Curfieu Bell was first ordained by William theâ— Conquerour to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour 7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great but rather many equally great that they may envy and contend one with another and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort to do it warily and by degrees If quite to wreck him and to have his life yet to give him a lawfull tryal after the manner of his Countrey And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation as to do him contumely or disgrace not to suffer him to escape because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto Honour which great spirits do most desire and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace than to any thankfulness or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismistion True in Atheists but not in true Christian Nobilitie 8. To unarm his people and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe and having them ready when service requireth and then to arm with them such and so many as he shall think meet and to commit them to such as are sure men 9. To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility and betwixt the Nobility and the people and to set one Rich man against another that they combine noâ— together and that himself by hearing the grieff and complaints may know the secrets of both parts and so have matter aâ—ainst them both when it listeth him to call them to an account 10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong specially about womens matâ—ers by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters which hath been he ruin of many Tyrants and conversion of their States As of â—arquinius by Brutus Appius by Virginius Pisistratus by Harmodius Alexander Medices Duke of Florence Aloisus of Placentia Rodericus King of Spain c. 11. To that end to be moderate in his pleasures or to use them closely that he be not seen For that men sober or watchfull or such as seem so are not lightly subject to contempt or conspiracies of their own 12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize or do any special action â—or the Common-wealth in that manner as it may seem they could not be better regarded in case they lived in a Free-state 13. All rewards and things gratefull to come from himself but all punishments exactions and things ungratefull to come from his Officers publick Ministers And when he hath effected what he would by them if he see his people discontented withall to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects 14. To pretend great care of Religion and of serving God which hath been the manner of the wickedest Tyrants for that people do less fear any hurt from those whom they think Virtuous and Religious nor attempt likely to do them hurt for that they think that God protects them 15. To have a strong sure Guard of forreign Souldiers and to bind them by good turns that they having at least profit may depend upon him and the present State As Câ—ligula the German Guard where the Nobility are many and mighty The like is practised by Lawfull Kings as by the French King 16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault or case with them that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT for their own safetie 17. To take part and to joyn himself with the stronger part if the Common people and mean degree be the stronger to joyn with them if the Rich and Noble to joyn with them For so that part with his own strength will be ever able to overmatch the other 18. So to frame his manners whole behaviour as that he may seem if not perfectly good yet tolerably evil or somewhat good somewhat bad These Rules of Hypocritical Tyrants are to bee known that they may be avoyded and met withall and not drawn into imimitation Preservation of an Aristocracie RUles to preserve a Senatory State are partly taken from the common Axioms and partly from those that preserve a Kingdom Preservation of an Oligarchie by Sophisms Rules 1. IN Consultations and Assemblies about publick affairs to order the matter that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies and Councels But to impose a Fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty On the other side to pardon the people if they absent themselves and to bear with them under pretence that they may the better intend their Occupations and not be hindered in their Trades and earnings 2. In Election of Magistrates and Officers To suffer the poorer sort to vow and abjure the bearing of Office under colour of sparing them or to enjoyn some great charge as incident to the Office which the poor cannot bear But to impose some great Fine upon those that be Rich if they refuse to bear Office being Elect unto it 3. In judicial matters In like manner to order that the people may be absent from publick Trials under pretence of following their business But the Richer to be present and to compel them by Fines to frequent the Court 4. In Warlike exercise and Arms That the poor be not forced to have Armour Horse c. under pretence of sparing their cost nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exercises but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor Horse c. by excessive Fines and to exercise themselves in War-like matters c. 5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts Policie and Warlike exercise and to observe good order and discipline For as Popular States are preserved by the frequencie and Liberty of the People so this Government of the Richer is preserved by discipline and good oâ—der of Governours 6. To provide good store of War-like furniture especially of Horse and Horse-men and of Armed men viz. Pike c. which are proper to the gentry as shot and light furniture are for a Popular Companie 7. To put in practise some points of a Popular state viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment To make yearly or half years Magistrates c. For that the People are pleased with such things and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one And if any grow to too much greatness to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this State 8. To commit the Offices and Magistracies to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters which both tendeth to the conservation of this State and pleaseth the people for that they reap some relief and benefit by it
nor exceed in his kind viz. That a Kingdom be not too Monarchical nor a Popular State too Popular For which cause it is good that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts though inferiour for place and Office And sometimes populaâ—ly with the common people which is the cause that some Common-wealths though they be very simply and unskilfully set yet contiâ—â—e â—â—rm because the Magistrates behave themsâ—lves wiâ—ely and with due reâ—pect towards the râ—st that are without honour and therefore â—ome kind of Moderaâ—â— Popularity is to be used in every â—ommon-wealth 8. To take heed of small beginnings and to meet with them even at the first as well touching the breakiâ—g and altering of Lawes as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several State For the disease and alteration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at once but grows by degrees which every common wit cannot discern but men expert in POLICIE 9. To provide that that part be ever the greaâ—er in number and power which favours the Sâ—ate as now â—t staâ—ds This is to be observed as a veâ—y Oracle in all Common-wealâ—hs 10 To observe a mean in all the degrees and to suffer no paâ—t to exceed or decay over much As first for pâ—efeâ—ments to provide that they be rather small and short than great and long and if aâ—y be grown to overmuch greatness to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour Where the Sophisms are to be practised viz. to do it by parts and degrees to do it by occasion or colour of law and not all at once And if that way serve not to advance some other of whose virtuâ— and faithfulness we are fully assurâ—d to as high a degree or to a greater honour and to be the friends and followeâ—s of him that excelleth above that which is meet As touching wealth to provide that those of the middle sort as before was said be more in number and if any grow high and overcharged with wealth to use the Soâ—â—isms of a Poâ—ulaâ— State viz. to send him on Embassages and Forreign Negotiations or imploy him in some Office that hath gâ—â—at charges and little honour c. To which end the Edilâ—ship served in some Common-wealths 11. To suppress the Factions and quarrels of the Nobles and to keep other that are yâ—â— free from joyniâ—g with them in their partakings and Factions 12 To increase or remit the common Taxes and Contributions according to the wealth or want of the People and Common-wealtâ— If the people be increased in Wealth the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased If they be poor and their Wealth diminish specially by dearth want of Traffick c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions or to take little Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow The Sophisms that serve for Imposiâ—itions are these and other of like sort to pretend business of great charge as War building of Ships making of Havens Castles Fortifications c. for the Common defence sometimes by Lotteries and like devises wherein some part may be bestowed the rest reserved for other expences but Princely dealings needs no pretences 13 To Provide that the Discipline Training of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that Common-wealth As that in a Kingdom the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince In the Senatory State that the sons of the Senatours be not idly nor over daintily brought up but well instructed and trained up in Leâ—rning Tongues and Martial Exercise that they may be able to bear that place in the Common-wealth which their Father held and contrariewise in a Popular State 14. To take heed least their Sophisms or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that State be not discovered least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves but wisely used and with great secrecie Particular Rules Rules and Axioms for preserving of a Kingdom Hereditary Conquered Kingdoms Hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering 1. HImself viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Povver and Prerogative For the less and more temperate their Povver and State is the more firm and stable is their Kingdom and Governmâ—nt because they seem to be further off from a Master-like and Tyrannical Empire and less unequal in condition to the next degree to wit the Nobility and so less subject to grudge and envy 2. Nobility viz. By keeping that degree and due proportion that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm or State can bear as the Scottish Kingdom and sometime the English when the Realm was overcharged with the number of Dukes Earls and other Nobles whereby the Authoriâ—y of the Prince was eclipsed and the Realm troubled with their Factions and Ambitions Nor that any one excel in Honoâ—r Power or wealth as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom as the house of Lancaster within this Realm To that end not to load any with too much Honoâ—r or preferment because it is hard even for the best and worthiest men to bear their greatness and high Fortune temperaâ—ely as appeareth by infinite examples in all States The Sophism for preventing or reforming this inconvenience are to be used with great caution and wisdom If any great person be to be abated not to deal with him by calumniation or forgâ—d matter so to cut him off without desert especially if he be gratious among the people after the Machiavilian Policie which besides the injustice is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once which maketh a desperate Discontentment in the party and a commiseration in the peole and so greater love if he be gracious for his virtue and publick service Nor to banish him into forreign Countries where he may have opportunity of practising with Forrâ—ign States whereof great danger may ensue as in the example of Coriolanus Henry the fourth and such like But to use these and the like Sophisms viz. To abate their greatness by degrees as David Ioabs Iustinian Bellisarius c. To advance some other Men to as great or greater Honour to shadow or over-mate the greatness of the other To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers by prefeâ—ments rewaâ—ds and other good and lawfull means especially to be prâ—vided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the Common-wealth whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State 3. People viz. So to order and behave himself that he be loved and reverenced of the People For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies oâ— forreign Invasion if he be firmly loved of his own people The reason for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise nor any refuge being
9. To the same end To contract marriages among themselves the rich with the rich c. 10. In some things which concern not the Points and matters of State as Electing Magistrates making Laws c. to givâ— an equality or sometimes a preferment to the Common People and not to do as in some Oligarchies they were wont viz. To swear against the People to suppress and bridle them but rather contrary To minister an Oath at their admission That they shall do no wrong to any of the People and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons to shew some example of severe punishment For other Axioms that preserve this State they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular and Tyrannical State for the strict kind of Oligarchie is kin to a Tyranny Preservation of a popular State Sophisms Rules or Axioms 1. IN publick Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State creating of Magistrates publick Justice and Exercise of arms to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government to wit an Oligarcâ—ie For in Popular States the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies Magistrates Offices War-like Exercises c. by mulcts and rewards and the richer sort are to be spared and not to be forced by fine or otherwise to frequent these Exercises 2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men and not to swear against them as the manner hath been in some Popular States but rather to preferre them in all other matters that concern not the State and publick Government 3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commonâ— by Lot or Ballating and not to choose any for their wealths sake 4. To take heed that no maÌ„ bear office twice except it be Military where the pay and salary c. is to be reserved in their own hands to be disposed of by a Common-Councel c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred 5. That no Magistracy be perpetual but as short as may be to wit for a a year half year c. 6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth to give an accompt of their behaviour and government and that publickly before the Commons 7. To have publick Salaries and allowance for their Magistrates Judges c. And yearly dividents for the common people and such as have most need among them 8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts so they have some aptness to perform that duty 9. To provide that publick Judgements and Trials be not frequent and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators as the law of requital c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth which causeth the rich to conspire against the State whereby many times the popular State is turned into an Oligarchie or some other Government Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law made against Accusers and Calumniatours Ad Sâ—natus-consultum Turpilianum l. 1. de Calumniatoribus 10. In such free States as are popular and have no revenue to provide that publick Assemblies be not after because they want salary for Pleaders and Oratours And if they be rich yet to be wary that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons For that this distribution of the Common revenue among the multitude is like a purse or barrel without a bottom But to provide that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs 11. If the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of State to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places and to provide above all that none do live idly but be set to their trades To this end to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Coppiholds such decayed Citizens 12. To be well advised what is good for this State and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State that seemeth most popular but that which is â—est for the continuance thereof And to that end not to lay into the Exchequer or Common-Treasurie such goods as are confiscate but to store them up as holy and consecrate things which except it be practised confiscations and fines of the Common people would be frequent and so this State would decay by weakening the people Conversion of States in general COnversion of a State is the declining of the Common-wealth either to some other form of Government or to his full and last period appointed by God Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts General and Particular GEneral viz. 1. Want of Religion viz. of the true knowledge and worship of God prescribed in his word and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people as in the examples of Saul Uzziah the Jewish State the four Monarchiesâ—â—nd all other 2. Want of wisdom and good Councel to keep the State the Prince Nobles and people in good temper and due proportion according to theiâ— several orders and decrees 3. Want of Justice either in administration as ill Lawes or ill Magistrates or in the execution as rewards not given where they should be or there â—estowed where they should not be or punishments not inflicted where they should be 4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self viz. Of provision as Armour Money Captains Souldiers c. Execution when the means or provision is not used or ill used 2. Particular To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealths Particular causes of Conversion of States are of two sorts 1. FOrreign By the over-greatness of invasion of some forreign Kingdom or other State of meaner power having a part within our own which are to â—e prevented by the providence of the chief and rules of policy for the preserving of every State This â—alleth out very seldom for the great diffâ—culâ—y to overthrow a forreign State 2. Domestick Sedition or open violence by the stronger part Alteration without violence Sedition SEdition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of Arms against the superiour power Quasi ditio secedens Causes of Sedition are of two sorts 1. General Liberty Richer WHen they that are of equal quality in a CommoÌ„-wealth or do take themselves so to be are not regarded equally in all or in any of these three Or when they are so unequal in quality or take themselves so to be are regarded but equally or with less respect than those that be of less deâ—ect in these three things or in any of them Honour 1. IN the Chief Covetousness or oppression by the Magistrate or higher Power viz. when the Magistrates especially the Chief encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure either with the publick or private calamity whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in
or kind of Government And where the multitude is discontented there must needs be many enemies to the present State For which cause Tyrants which allow the people no manner of dealing in State matters are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons and all other means whereby they may resist or amend themselves as in Aâ—shland â—urkâ—y c. IV. Tyranny A Tyranny is the swerving or distortâ—g of a Monarcâ—ie or the Governmâ—â—â— of one tending not to the publick good but the private benefit of himself and his followers As in the Russe and Turkish Government where the State and Wealth of other oâ—â—ers are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperour This is the worst of all the Bastaâ—d States because it is the perverting of the best Regiment to wit of a Monarchie which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself V. Oligarchie or the Government of a few AN Oligarchie is the swerving or the corruption of an Aristocracie or the Govâ—â—nment of some few that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort without aâ—y respect of the publick good The chief end of these Goverâ—â—â—â—s is their own greatness and enriching And therefore their manner is to prepare fiâ— meanâ— to uphold their Estaâ—es This Stâ—te is not wholly so bad as is the Tyrannie and yet worse than the Commoâ—-wealth because it respecteth the good of a few VI Common-wealth A Common-wealth is the swerving or depravation of a Fâ—ee or popular State or the Government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort without respect of the other Orders These two States to wit The Oligâ—â—chie and Common-wealth are very adveâ—se the one to the other and have many bâ—ckerings between them For that the richer or nobler sort suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect because they are superiour but in some reâ—pects onely to wit in Riches Birth Parentage c. On the other side the Common-people suppose there ought to be an equality in all other things and some State matters because they are equalâ— with the Rich or Noble touching their Libâ—â—tie whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour as touching Government and fitness thereunto because they are such to wit because they are Rich Noble Free c. But because they are Wise Virtuous Valiant c. and so have fit parts to Govern a State These several States are sometimes mixed and inter wrought one with the other yet ever so as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other as in the humours and complexions of the body So in the Româ—n State the people had their Plehisâ—â—ta and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates Yet the Senate as the State stood for the most part swayed the State and bare the chief rule So in the Venâ—tian State the Duke seemeth to represeâ—â— a Monâ—rch and the Sâ—nate to be his Councâ—l Yet the Duke hath no power in State mattâ—rs but is like a head set on by art that heareth no brain And so that State is Sâ—natorical or Aristocratical Causes of States Common-wealths in general Causes of States or of CommoÌ„-wealths are of 3. sorts viz. 1. Founding or setling a State where to be considered 1. Measure 2. Parts their Qualities 2. Preserving a State 3. Changing and altering a State Founding a State In founding a State are to be considered 2. things 1. Proportion 2. Parts PRoportion is a Just Measure or Mediocritie of the State whereby it is framed and kept in that Order as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind to wit so that a Monarch bâ— not too Monarchical nor strict or absolute as the â—usse Kings nor Aristocratical that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobility as the Scottish Kingdom but ever respective to the other degrees That Aristocratie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government as the Vâ—netian and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves to have a Tribune to make Plebiscita c. So a Free-State or Common-wealth that it be not over popular viz. That it depress not to much the richer wiser nor learneder sort but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and mysteries of that State That they seek no alteration of the present State The reason because the moderate States in their several kinds as all other things that observe the mean are best framed for their continuance because they give less cause of grudge envy and affecting the Wealth Honour and Libertie which they see in others that govern the State And so are less subject to stirs and commotions and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set Parts THe Parts of the State or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick Government Parts or Partakers of Publick Government are 1. Councel or Senate which consulâ—eth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace Magistrates c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care that they may be men expert in matter of Policie because it is their Trade and Vocation as men use to chuse Pilots and Masters of Ships such as know the Art of Navigation and not Husband-men c. And so the contrary 2. Magistrates and Officers which are to be executioners of that which is consulted and found to be expedient for the Common-vvealth wherein are to be observed the kinds of Magistrates that they be such as fit that kind of Government The time of their continuance and the manner of their election or appointing by whom out of whom and in what manner they be chosen 3. Iudges To determine in Civil and Criminal matters where are to be observed out of whom they are to be chosen what kinds are necessary and the manner oâ—Iudgement and Iudicial proceeding In Magistrates are to be observed 1. Kinds of Magistrats as 1. Civil 1. Superiour which are to be such of that kind as agree with the State as Consuls for a year and not perpetual Dictatours in a Senatorie State Praetors Censors that oversee manners orders of the people For a Kingdom Lieutenant of Shires Marshals Masters of Horse Admirals c. Inferiour as conservatous of Peace Constables c. Overseers of youth that take care for their education for civil warlike exercise Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity and price of victual Ediles for Buildings Streets Bounds Questours or Treasurers to keep and dispence the publick Treasury Aâ—â—uaries or Recoâ—ders which keep the publick Records Gaâ—lâ—rs to keep prisons and Prisoners Surveyours of woods and fields c. 2. Ecclesiastical 1. As Bishops or Pastours Elders Wardens 2. Time of Magistrates whereof some are perpetual some for a time viz. for more years a year half a year according to the necessity of the Common-wealth and
Olygarchies or the other degrees conspire together and make quarrel against the Chief as in Kingdoms The examples of Wat Tyler Iack Straw c. 2. In the Chief Injury when great Spirits and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured or take themselves so to be as Coriolanus Cyrus minor Earl of Warwick In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong 3. Preferment or want of preferment wherein some have over-much and so wax proud and aspire higher or have more or less than they deserve as they suppose so in envy and disdaâ— seek Innovation by open faction so Caesar c. 4. Some great necâ—ssity or calamity So Xerxes after the â—oil of his great Army And Senaâ—harib after the loss of 185. in one night 2. Particular 1. ENvie when the chief exceed the mediocriâ—y before mentioned and so provoketh the Nobility and other degrees to conspire against him as Brutus Cassius c. against Caesar 2. Fear viz. Of danger when one or more dispatch the Prince by secret practice or force to prevent his own danger as Artabâ—nus did Xerxes 3. Lust or Lecherie as Tarquinius Superbus by Brutus Pisistratindae by Armodius Appius by Virginius 4. Contempt For vile quality base behaviour as Sardanapalus by Arbaces Dionysius the younger by Dion 5. Contumely When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation as Caligula by Chaereas 6. Hope of Advancement or some great profit as Mituridates Anobarsanes Chief Other dâ—grâ—es Other degrees Alteration without violence CAuses of alteration without violence are 1. Excess of the State when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was or should have been setled and exceedeth in power riches and absoluteness in his kind by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes and impositions c. applying all to his own benefiâ— without respect of other degrees and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government as a Kingdom into a Tyranny an Oligarchâ—â— into an Aristocraciâ— 2. Excess of some one or more in the Common-wealth viz. When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest either in honour wealth or virtuâ— and so by permission and popular favour are advanced to the Sovereignty By which means popular States grow into Oligaâ—chies and Oligarchiâ—s and Aristocracies into Monarchiâ—s For which cause the Athenians and some other free States made their Laws of Ostrocismos to banish any for a time that should excel though it were in virtue to prevent the alteration of their State which because it is an unjust Law 't is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means that none should grow to that heigth and excellency than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy FINIS A METHOD how to make use of the Book before in the reading of the Story DAVID being seventie years of age was of wisdom Memorie c. sufficient to gouern his Kingdom 1. Reg. Cap. 1. Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government DAvid being of great years and so having a cold drie and impotent bodiâ— married with Abishag a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole Realm to revive his bodie and prolong his life 1. Reg. Chap. 1. verse 3. Example of the like practise in Charles the fifth DAvid being old and impotent of boâ—tâ— by the advise of hâ—s Nobles and Pâ—isitians marriâ—d a young maid callâ—d Abishag to warm and presâ—rve his old bodiâ— Observation VVHâ—ther David did well in mâ—â—rying a maid and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marrie a young woman or on the other side for an old worn and decrepite woman to marrie a young and lustie man For the affirmative ARG. The end of marriage is Societie and mutual comfort bâ—â— thâ—râ— may be Sociâ—tie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old and young partie Ergo 't is Lawful Answ. Societie and comfort is a cause effect of marriage but none of the principal ends of marriage which are 1. Prâ—creation of children and so the continuance oâ— mankind 2. The avâ—iding of Fornication As for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man woman and woman where no marriage is and therefore no proper ends of marriâ—ge The Negative ARG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends for which marriage was â—rdained by God is no lawfull marriage But the conjunction betwixt an old imâ—otent and young partie hath no respect tâ— thâ—â—â—ght end for which marriage was ordainâ—d by God Thereâ—ore it is no lawful marriage 2. No contract wherein the partâ—e contâ—acting bindeth himself to an impossible condition or to do that which he cannot do is good or lawfull But the contract oâ— marriage by an impotenâ— person witâ— a young partie bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot dâ— viz. to perfoâ—m the duties of Marriage Therefore it is unlawfull For the same cause the civil Law determineth a nullity in these mâ—râ—iages except the woman know before the infiâ—mitie of the man in which case she caâ— have no wrong being a thing done with her own knowledge and consâ—nt because Volenti non fit injuria In legem Julian de adulteriis leg. Si uxor c. It provideth further â—or the more certaintie of the infirmitiâ— That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage because that men that have been infirm at the first by reason of sickness or some other accident afterwards proved to be sufficient De repudiis leg. in causis Defence for David in marrying Abishag IT was rather a Medicine than a marriage without any evil or disordered affâ—ction 2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles and Phisitiâ—ns 3. It was for the publick good to prolong the life of a worthie Prince 4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmitie and to what end she was married unto him who if she did it for the common good and for duties sake having withall the gift of continencie she is to be commended if for ambition or some vain respect it is â—er own and not Davids fault Political Nobilitie Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom FIrst took the advantage of Davids affection and kindness towards him and made him secure of any ill dealing Secondly of his age and infirmities disabling his Father as unfit for Government Thirdly blazed his title and Right to the Crown Fourthly got him Chariots Horsemen and Footmen and a guard to make shew of State Fifthly being a comly and goodly Person made a popular shew of himself and his qualities Sixtly joyned to himself in Faction Joab the General of the Armie who was in displeasure for murthering of Abner and Amaza and feared that David would supplie Benajah in his