sayth he among the Canonists but (h) Ibi maxime verū est ubi rex justus est nihil vult nisi justum Quanto magis in regno Dei c. this is true where the King is just and willeth nothing but what is just In which words he plainly maketh the iustice of the King antecedent to that will of his which must be a law Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose Gods will therefore is not a rule of Iustice to himself To whom then To us For by it we are 1 to square all our thoughts words and deeds 2 to examine them when they are spoken and done Primum in aliquo genere est regula posteriorum supremum inferiorum 2 I reply that these absolute decrees of mens inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will The Scriptures teach us no such matter And therefore to say they are is but a meere begging of the question It hath alwayes beene ordinary with false Teachers to make Gods word a Father to their false opinions that they may stand the faster and winne the greater credit The Papists ground their transubstantiation and the Lutherans their consubstantiation and ubiquity upon the Scripture Hoc est corpus meum This is my body Math. 26. And the defenders of absolute Reprobation do so too they make their cause to be Gods and entitle his word to it because they see it is the surest way to defend it being herein like to some contentious people who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to lose they entitle the King to it that they may the better uphold it 3 Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will The reason is because it is odious to right reason and begetteth absurdities For Nulla veritas parit absurda no truth begetteth absurdities Divers truths are revealed in Scripture which are above but not contrary to right reason whether they be matters of faith or life faith and reason nature and scripture are both Gods excellent gifts and therefore though there may be a disproportion yet there can be no repugnancy between them The worship which God requireth is cultus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a reasonable service Rom. 12.2 and the word of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 milke reasonable and without guile 1 Pet. 2.2 These things therefore being layd together it will appeare to be but a meere shift and evasion when absolute Reprobation is proved to be unjust and therefore unworthy of God to say Gods will is the rule of Iustice this is part of Gods revealed will and therefore most just whatsoever reason may cavill and say to the contrary 3 Their third answer is that God is not bound to restore men power to beleeve because they once had it and have lost it through their own fault as a master is not bound to renew his servants stocke if he have wasted it by bad husbandry This answer doth not satisfie me For I grant that God is simply and absolutely bound to no man because he is agent liherrimum a most free dispenser of his owne favours where and what and to whom he will and no man is aforehand with God Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur Who hath given unto him and it shall be recompensed again Rom. 11.35 But yet he is conditionally bound for he hath determined and tyed himselfe 3 wayes especially 1 Decernendo by decreeing The Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances or els he should be mutable And therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men he is bound to give them by vertue of his own decree 2 Promittendo by promising We use to say promise is debt it is Iustice to performe what it was free to promise and whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not is guilty of a trespasse witnesse Ananias and Sapphira and unworthy of the kingdome of heaven Psal 15.4 If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men his promise bindeth him to performance Nam semell emissum volat irrevocabile verbum 3 Legem ferendo by giving men a law to keep which without supernaturall grace they can no more keepe then they can eate a rock By such a law the supreme Lawgiver bindeth himself to his people to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law or else he becommeth as the evill servant in the parable stiled him a hard master reaping where he sowed not and the very true and proper cause of the transgression of that law We shall finde God alwayes giving strength when he giveth a command When he commandeth the creatures to increase and multiply he gave them a multiplying vertue when CHRIST bade the lame man arise take up his bed and walk he put into his limbs an ability of walking when Adam had a spirituall law given him to obey which without spirituall strength he could not God gave him strength answerable to the law as Divines agree consenting to that noted speech of St. Austin that Adam had posse non cadere though he never had non posse cadere a power and possibility though no necessity of continuing in obedience That I may bring this home to my purpose I say that God is bound to restore unto men power to beleeve supposing these things that follow 1 That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with men when he needed not 2 That in that Covenant he requireth obedience at mens hands even at theirs that perish 3 That he promiseth eternall life to every man if he obey and keepe the Covenant 4 That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death These particulars supposed the most free God who is absolutely bound to none is engaged to give ability of beleeving unto men nor can he justly without this gift punish the disobedient any more then a Magistrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence can command this man with justice to reade a book and because he readeth not put him to death or then a Master that I may returne the Simile in the answer when he hath taken away from his servant the stocke which he hath misimployed can afterward exact of him a just imployment of the same stocke and punish him because he imployeth it not I conclude therefore that the absolute and inevitable reprobation of such men as are called to beleeve in CHRIST and punished if they beleeve not is utterly repugnant to the Iustice of God and therefore can be no part of his word 4 Opposite to Gods Truth FOurthly it oppugneth the truth and sincerity of God God is a God of truth Deut. 32.4 Truth it self Ioh. 14.6 so called because he is the fountaine of truth and the perfection of truth without the least mixture of falshood The strength of Jsraell cannot lye Rom. 3.4 1 Sam. 15.29 Let God be true and every man a lyar sayth the Apostle
of the action 2 The formall part which is the evill or obliquity of it God is the Author of the action it selfe but not of the obliquity and evill that cleaveth to it as he that causeth a lame horse to goe is the cause of his going but not of his lame going And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Author of sinne Answ 1 1 All sinnes receive not this distinction because of many sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull as of the eating of the forbidden fruit and Sauls sparing of Agag and the fat beastâ— of the Amalekites 2 It is not true that they make the decree of God onely of actions and not of their aberrations for they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull and not as bare actions For actions deserve damnation not as actions but as transgressions of Gods law 3 To the Simile I say that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knocke him on the head and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him is undoubtedly the cause of his halting and so if God determine to cast men into Hell and then to bring them into a state of sinne that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the author as well of their sinnes as of those actions to which they doe inseparably adhere and that out of Gods intention to destroy them The will is determined to an Object two wayes Distinct 3. 1 By Compulsion against the bent and inclination of it 2 By necessity according to the naturall desire and liking of it Gods Predestination say they determineth the will to sinne this last way but not the first it forceth no man to doe that which he would not but carryeth him towards that which he would when men sinne it is true they cannot choose and it is as true they will not choose It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that Gods decree is the cause of mens sinnes but their owne wicked wils Answ 1 1 The Ancients made no distinction between these two words necessity and compulsion but used them in this argument promiscuously and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne lest they should grant him hereby to be the Author of sinne as I have touched before and shall intimate againe afterward Nor did the Schoolemen put any difference betweene them as may appeare by the testimony of Mr. Calvin Calv. Instit i. 2. c. 2 Sect â—â— who speaking of the Schoole-distinction of the willes threefold liberty from Necessity from Sinne from Mâ—ery sayth This distinction I could willingly receive but that it confoundeth necessity with coaction 2 That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne as that which forceth it because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed which otherwise might be avoyded and therefore if the divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne it is as truly the cause of the sinne as if it did enforce it 3 That which necessitateth the will to sinne is more truely the cause of the sinne then the will is because it over-ruleth the will and beareth all the stroke taketh from it its true liberty by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disposer of its own acts and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power which is under the insuperable check and controll of no Lord but it selfe It over-ruleth I say and maketh it become but a servile instrument irresistibly subject to superiour command and determination and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes as proceed from the will so determined then the will is For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one a principall over-ruling cause the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principal then is the effect in all reasoÌ„ to be imputed to the principall which by the force of its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a meere servant in the production of it We shall finde it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent It is not ye that speak sayth CHRIST but the spirit of my father that speaketh in you Math. 10.20 J laboured more abundantly then they all yet not J but the grace of God which was in me 1. Cor. 15.10 And I live yet not J but CHRIST liveth in me sayth S. Paul Gal. 2.20 In these and many other places the effect or worke spoken of is taken from the instrument and given to the principall Agent Which being so though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne and willeth the sinne which it doth yet seeing what the will doth it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe the sinne committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the inferior as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause 4 That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only that is with and not against his will is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner then that which constrayneth him to sinne against his will as he which by powerfull perswasions draweth a man to stab or hang or poyson himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action then he that by force compelleth him because he maketh him to consent to his own death And so if Gods decree do not onely make men sinne but sinne willingly too not onely cause that they shall malè agere doe evill but malè velle will evill it hath the deeper hand in the sinne Sinne may be considered as sinne Distinct 4. or as a meanes of declaring Gods justice in mens punishments God doth not predestinate men to sinne as it is sinne but as a means of their punishment He is not therefore say they the Author of Sinne. Answ 1 1 A good end cannot moralize a bad action it remayneth evill though the end be never so good bonum oritur ex integris end manner yea and matter too must be good or else the action is naught He that shall steale that hee may give an almes or commit adultery that he may beget children for the Church or oppresse the poore to teach them patience or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example or do any forbidden thing though his end be never so good he sinneth notwithstanding And the reason is because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne for as much as it is laesio divinae majestatis a wronging of Gods majesty and so divino bono opposita directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God as much as
in religion cannot long continue for the affections have been the strongest planters and are the surest upholders of it in the world Primus in or be Deos fecit timor 3 Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sinne Offences if fatall cannot be justly punished The reason is because those deeds for which men are punished or rewarded must be their owne under their owne power and soveraignty but such are no fatall actions or events Neither temporally nor eternally can sinne be punished if it be absolutely necessary 1 Not temporally as God himselfe hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Iewes Deut. 22.25 which was that if a maide commit uncleannesse by constraint she should not be punished His reason was because there was no cause of death in her what she yeelded to was through compulsion being overborne by power as a man that is wounded to death by his Neighbour so was a virgin in that case a sufferer rather then a doer This particular law is of universall right no just punishment can be inflicted for sin where there is no power in the party to avoyd it The speech of Lypsius is but a meere crotchet contrary to reason Fatali culpae fatalis paena Fatall faults must have fatall punishments Did Magistrates think mens offences unavoydable they would think it bootless and unreasonable to punish them Nay not onely so but we see by dayly experience that Iudges following the direction of reason have very remissely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of headstrong and exorbitant passions Yea we may reade of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all Valerius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman Praetor Val. Max. l. 8. c 1. sitting in judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slaine her mother because she had murther'd her children neque damnavit neque absolvit neyther cleered her nor condemned her Gell. l. 12. c. 7. And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsull of Asia that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poyson'd her husband and son for murdering a son of hers which she had by a former husband he turned her over to the Areopagus which was the gravest most renowned judgment seat in the world The Iudges there not daring to acquit her being stayned with a double slaughter nor yet to punish her being provoked with just griefe commanded the Accuser and the Offender to come before them 100 yeares after And so (l) Neque absolutum mulieris venesicium est quod per leges non licuit neque noâ—ns damnata punitaque quae digna venia fuit Neyther was the womans fact justified the Lawes not allowing it nor yet the woman punished because she was worthy to be pardoned If wise Magistrates have spared such Offenders as have beene over-swayed with passions which did but incline not determine them to their irregular actions they would never have punished any trespassers if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity Or if offenders did thinke that their offences were theyr Destinies and that when they Murther steale commit adultery make insurrections plot treasons or practice any outragious villanies they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree and can doe no otherwise they would and might complaine of their punishments as unjust as Zeâ—oes servant did When he was beaten by his Master for a fault he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten because he was fato coactus peccare constrayned to make that fault by his undeclinâ— bâ—e fate The Adrumetine Monkes misled by S. Austin Epist 105. ad Sixtum Presbyterum which he calleth a Booke wherein he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace did so teach grace that they denyed Free-will And this S. Austin confuted in his booke De gratia lib. arb And thinking the grace of God as S. Aug. taught to be such as could not stand with freedome of will they thought that no man should be punished for his faults but rather prayed for that God would give them grace to do better Against this S. Austin directed his other Booke De Corr. grat In which discourse though it be grace that is still named yet predestination is included Kâ— in praâ— aâ—l Luth. de serâ—â—lâ— For as Kimedoncius sayth truly in his Preface to Luther de servo arbitr Betweene Grace and Predestination there is onely this difference as S. Aug. teacheth l. de Praedest SanctoruÌ„ cap. 10. that Predestination is a preparation of Grace and Grace a bestowing of Predestination As Zenoes servant and these Monks did so would all men judge did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend And what would be the resultance of such a perswasion but an inundation of the greatest insolencies and a dissolution of all good government 2 Nor if this be true can sinne be punished eternally or that tribunall be just on which the sentence of eternall fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day To this I have the Fathers bearing witnesse generally and plainly Tertullian hath these words (m) Tertul. lib. 2. Contr. Marcion Caeteâ—ùm nec boni nec mali merces â—re peÌ„saâ— ei qâ— aut bâ—nus aut malus neccisitate suit inventus non vâ—luntate The recompence of good or evill can with no justice be given to him who is good or evill not freely but of necessity S. Hierom sayth (n) Liberi arbiâ—i nos condiâ—t Deus accâ—d vâ—tu es nec ad â—a necessitate trahimur alioquin ubi necessitas est nec damnatio nec corona est Where necessity domineers there is no place for retribution Epiphanius sayth (o) Epiph. advers her l 1. haer 5. num 3. Sanè quidem justiâ— a stâ—lis quae necessitateÌ„ priuat paeâ—ae repetantuâ— quam ab eo qui quod agit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 necessitate adactus aggreditur The starres which impose upon men a necessity of sinning may bee punished with better justice then the men themselves (p) Aug. l. 2 contr Faust c. 5. Et nos quidem sub fato stellatum nullius hominis genesin ponimus ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis quo bene vel male vivitur propter justum Dei judicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus We place mens nativities under no fatall constellations sayth S. Aug. that we may free the will by which a man liveth eyther well or ill from all bands of necessity because of the righteous judgement of God Prosper speaking of the judgment of God by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his workes (q) Prosp ad Obj. 10. Vinc. Quod judicium futurum omnino non esser si homines Dei voluntate peccarent This judgment should never be if men did sinne by the will and determination of God Fulgentius also sayth the same
to bee avoydable For no man will flee from an evill that cannot be prevented but will yeeld up himselfe to it as Caesar did his body to the murtherers in the Senate house Now by this decree Heaven and Hell are not objects possible but necessary Heaven shall unavoydably be obtayned by those that are elected and Hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated For men have no power to alter their eternall states all men by this decree are precisely determined ad unum to one state to necessary salvation or necessary damnation without any power or liberty to choose whether And from hence this conclusion is cleâ—e that the absolute decree taketh away the chiefest inducements to holinesse and deterrements from wickednesse and consequently hindereth a godly life exceedingly The Injuriousnesse of this doctrine to a godly life may further appeare by these considerations that follow one depending upon another 1 Absolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable whatsoever the things be about which they are exercised and mens everlasting states if they be absolutely determined are altogether undeclinable Stat fati lex indeclinabius the law of destiny is undeclinable And the reason is because it hath an inevitable cause the Adamantine decrees of Almighty God which are indeclinable two wayes 1 Jrreversible lyable to no repeale as the Statutes are which are made in our Parliaments but farre more unalterable then the Lawes of the Medes and Persians Aâ— have spoken so will J bring it to passe I have purposed and I will doe it Esay 46.11 Men do many times bite in their words againe because they utter things rashly and do repeale theyr statutes and ordinances because they see some inconvenience in them being made which they could not foresee but God never calleth in his decrees because they are all made in great Wisdome 2 Jrresistible It lyes not in the power of any creature to disanull them Who hath resisted his will Rom. 9.19 Our God is in Heaven hee doth whatsoever he will Psal 115.3 Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will is no wayes alterable by the will of man It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the Sunne or to stay his course in the Heaven to stop the revolutions of the yeare and overturne the whole course of nature then to make the least change in any of Gods absolute decrees 2 Mens actions about ends and things determined by an absolute decree are vaine and fruitlesse and the reason is because they cannot make them otherwise then they are determined to be It is absolutely decreed the Divels shall be damned Were it not a fruitlesse thing in them by prayers teares and endeavors to seeke to alter it It is also simply decreed that the Soule of man shall be immortall Is it not a labor in vaine for any man to use meanes that his Soule may be annihilated It is ordained that the Sunne shall rule the day and the Moon the night that the one shall finish his proper course in a yeare the other in a Moneth Would not a mans indeavour to make an alteration in these things bee unprofitable and ridiculous Without doubt it would So likewise in vain do men labour to obtaine everlasting life and avoyd eternall death if there be no power and liberty in their hands to choose life or death but must of necessity take that which is assigned them be it life or death For by their labour they effect just nothing if they bee absolutely appointed to destruction theyr hearing reading praying almes giving and mourning for their sinnes cannot possibly procure theyr Salvation damned they must be And if they be absolutely ordayned to Salvation theyr neglect of holy duties their ignorance their love of pleasures and continuance in a course of ungodlinesse cannot bring them to damnation they must be saved If so many Soules in a Parish be in this manner decreed to Heaven or Hell the Minister preacheth in vaine and the people heare in vaine For there cannot one Soule bee saved by all his or their paines which is ordayned to Hell nor one Soule be cast away by his or their negligence which is appointed to Heaven Jt is hard for thee sayd CHRIST to Saul to kicke against pricks that is Acts 9 5. to indeavour by thy Persecutions slaughters to root out my Church out of the world because the preservation of it is absolutely decreed in Heaven Teaching us by that speech that a mans labour in any thing whatsoever is never profitable except it be exercised about an end attaynable thereby and without which the end may be lost 3 Men are not willing to be employed in fruitlesse actions if they know it I so runne sayth S. Paul not as uncertainly so fight J 1. Cor. 9.26 not as one that beateth the ayre but I keep under my body and bring it into subjection lest that by any meanes when J have preached to others I my selfe should bee a cast-away The meaning is I indeavour to keep Gods Commandements I fight with the temptations of the Divell the allurements of the world and mine own corruptions I keep my body low by watchings and fastings and other severe exercises of holy discipline But cui bono Do I all this at randome uncertaine whether I shall obtaine any good or prevent any mischiefe hereby No but I do this as one that is sure that by so doing I shall attaine everlasting life and without so doing I cannot avoyd eternall death intimating in these words the common disposition of men which is to labour where some proportionable good is to be gotten or evill prevented otherwise to spare their heads and hands too To be imployed in fruitlesse affaires is both a folly and a misery 1 A folly for de necessariis nemo saepiens deliberat No man useth deliberation about things necessary sayth the Philosopher And our Saviour speaking of things above our power Cur estis soliciti saith he to his Disciples Math. 6.27 Luke 12.25 26. Why take yee thought about such things which is as much as if he had sayd It is an argument of folly in you to trouble your self about such things as lye not in your power 2 It is a misery in the opinions of all men as the fable of Sisyphus implyeth who as the Poets feigne is punished in Hell for his Robberies with the rolling of a great stone to the top of a steep hill where it cannot rest but presently tumb downe againe The morall of that Fable is that it is a torment and a tâ—ment fit for Hell for a man to be set about any work that fruitlesse and in vaine Men will rather be exercised in hiâ— and hard imployments that produce proportionable end then pick strawes play with feathers or with Domitian speâ— their times in flapping and killing of flyes or doe any othâ— easie worke which endeth in nothing but ayre and emptinâ— except they be fooles or Selfe-tormentors And therefoâ—