to him are opposed as contraries or contradictories When a generall affirmatiue is opposed by a generall negatiue then they are opposed as contraries but when the same predicate is vniversally affirmed in the one and not vniversally in the other of the same subiect then they are opposed as contradictories de interpre Cap. 7. A singular proposition is contradicted by a singular as Socrates is wise Socrates is not wise cap. 10. Perspicuum autem est A generall contradiction may be false in both parts Ramus A speciall Contradiction cannot be true and false together in both parts Aristotle hath the same precept word for word in the places last alledged These examples following will set out the precepts of an Axiome contained in this and the former Chapter 1. All men are learned 2. No man is learned 3. Some man is not learned 4. Some man is learned 5. Socrates is learned 6. Socrates is not learned The first is an vniversall affirmatiue The third is a particular negatiue and the one doth contradict the other The second is an vniversall negatiue The fourth a particular affirmatiue and they are opposed as Contradictories The fift is an affirmatiue proper The sixt is a negatiue proper therefore they also are Contradictories The first and second are opposed as Contraries Ramus calls their opposition a generall Contradiction Now I haue finished all that is contained in the definition of a simple Axiome touching the disposing of Arguments In the next place wee must see how truth is contained in an Axiome CHAP. XXXIIII Of simple Axiomes necessarily true in common IN the 30. Chapter before going all Axiomes are sayd to containe necessary or contingent truth or falshood and thereby is implyed that truth is contained in them variously even according vnto the different kinde of Axiomes In the 31. Chapter we haue divided Axiomes into simple and compound therefore we must now set downe after what manner truth is in simple Axiomes and thereby finish the precepts touching simple Axiomes I thinke it sufficient to shew how and in what case a simple Axiome is necessarily true for thereby we shall know how they containe a contingent truth and when wee see how they containe truth we shall be able to judge how they containe falshood In a necessary Axiome the CoÌ„sequent is attributed to the Antecedent 1. To all of it Ramus and alwayes 2. By it selfe and essentially 3. Not only to all alwates esseÌ„tially But alâ—o first of the whole and enterchangably We finde this precept taken out of Aristotle Poster lib. 1. cap. 4. In which place he sayth thus In a necessary Axiome the predicate is attributed to the subiect 1. To all that is To all of it not to some onely At all times not at some onely 2. By it selfe that is 1. As essential therto 2. the predicate is in the subiect et contra 3. It is not sayd of any other 4. Even for it selfe not by accident 3. Vniversally that is Of all by it selfe as it is in it selfe It doth demonstrate the subiect first In every part Now we haue the nature of a necessary simple Axiome fully layd out wee should vnfold such termes as seeme doubtfull but wee cannot doe that in this place for here we speake of them in an vniversall notion abstracted from all speciall kindes of simple Axiomes Wee shall come to them in the sixe next Chapters and then we shall see the meaning and vse of this generall precept CHAP. XXXV Of simple Axiomes necessarily true in speciall Necessary simple Axiomes are Definitions Distributions I Doe not finde this precept either in Ramus or Aristotle expresly yet I bring it by the authority of them both According to Ramus every precept of Art is a necessary axiome but according to him also a Definition and Distribution are precepts of art therefore he must confesse they bee necessary Axiomes The principles and foundation of a demonstration are necessary axiomes in the iudgement of Aristotle Poster lib. 1. Cap. 2. But a Definition is a principle and foundation of a Demonstration even in the sentence of the same Aristotle Poster lib. 1. cap. 33. lib. 2. cap. 3. Therefore according to him every Definition is a necessary Axiome Wee may argue the like from his authority for a Distribution for he inioynes him that makes a Definition to distribute the thing defined into parts Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1. and in framing his art of Logicke he makes Distributions to be precepts no lesse then Definitions Lastly though I had not their authoritie to avow this precept yet I might bring it because a Definition and a Distribution haue the nature of a necessary Axiome as we shall see when we examine them CHAP. XXXVI Of a Definition IN this Chapter we must see what a Definition is A Definition is a simple Axiome Ramus wherein we declare what a thing is A definition is perfect This containes the constituting causes onely imperfect This sets out the thing by other arguments also The first is a Definition properly the second is called a Description THis precept is avowed by Aristotle He makes a Definition to be double in the thing though not in words He sets out the nature of a definition as Ramus doth A definition sayth he is a sentence that signifies what the thing is Top. lib. 1. Cap. 5. A notification of the essence and doth explicate what a thing is Poster lib. 2. Cap. 3. A Definition thus set out must needs be a perfect one In the first booke of his Topickes and 4. Chapter he hath these words There is something that is proper that signifies what a thing is and some other that doth not so signifie The first is called a definition the other is commonly called a thing proper when it is attributed to the same subiect with the other Now in this latter place he speakes of a Definition that differs from the former I say it differs 1. In the name he sayth this name is but commonly given he sayes not so of the former 2. In this definition the nature of the thing defined is set out and more too it is explicated by properties that doe not declare the essence and therefore in all these places together he makes one kinde of definition that sets out the nature of the thing onely and another that doth so and more too and consequently according to him a definition is perfect and imperfect and that in the sence and meaning of Ramus Thomas teacheth the same thing expresly A definition sayth he is either perfect or imperfect that comprehends the totall being of the thing as it is constituted by all the causes This expresseth some of these and divers conditions also and is called a description 2. dist 27 q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. In this place we speake of a perfect definition and therefore vnto Thomas I will ioyne Aliaco in him I finde chese words A good description may be conuerted with the thing defined
terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okamâ— first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2â— q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living
Creature seeth eateth sleepeth avoydeth knowne danger The plants grow vpright bring forth leaues and fruit in due season So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature when man moues himselfe vnto doing by the direction of true reason and the vnrestrained and free choyse of the will Naturall things doe worke by accident when the instinct of nature is suppressed or diverted The intellectuall creature workes by accident when the iudgement of reason is erronious and the choyse of the will carried by a previall over-ruling power and all these doe fall out in case where nature meets with defection The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance or the will haled by the naughtinesse of corruption and violence of temptation Lastly the secret providence of God which the Heathen called fortune makes the creature work by accident in all Cases when he workes against meanes as he did when he brought the people through the red Sea Exodus the 14. and as he doth in all miracles or when man intendeth one thing but another thing comes to passe of this we haue an example in the 45. of Genesis and 5. vers 37. 27. verse In this place they are sayd to sell Ioseph because they would be rid of him and in that Ioseph sayth God sent him into Aegypt to preserue their liues They were the efficient Cause of their owne preserving when they sold Ioseph but yet by accident through Gods secret providence that wrought contrary to their intent The Iewes likewise were the Cause of Christs glory and mans salvation when they delivered him to death but yet by accident because God himselfe did create light out of darknesse and made their evill intention serue vnto that good There be many examples wherein wee finde that the efficient cause doth worke on this manner but these are enough for this present The efficient doth worke Physically Morrally This distinction is received in all the Logick schooles and is of frequent vse in the question touching sanctification and the actuall motion of grace in mans conversion the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many other places A Physicall operation is a reall influence into the effect we haue an example of this in mans creation He formed him and that of the dust and poured life into him all these be reall influences of this kinde are the builders of the Tower of Babell they made bricke and reard a building with bricke and stone Of this sort be all workemen that labour with their hands and tooles the strength of nature doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke A morall worke is a motion offered to the vnderstanding and serues to allure and draw it on with reasons and perswasion Of this kinde bee be all such things as be obiected to the vnderstanding as namely the testimonie of God and man by commanding forbidding promising threatning perswading therefore so often as wee finde any of these attributed to God or man wee are to know that then they are efficient causes that worke morally Ramus doth call Testimonies Exhortations Commandements c. inartificiall arguments because they argue not of their owne force but by the authoritie of him that doth testifie but this is altogether vnfitly spoken for inartificiall and argument implyes a contradiction if inartificiall then no argument if an argument then artificiall for an argument is a member of Art 2. These things themselues are no arguments vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator but then they argue as properties or adjuncts and otherwayes they are never attributed to any subject In this place affirmation perswasion c. are not brought as morall causes in themselues but the causalitie is referred to him that affirmeth perswadeth c. which makes it very plaine that they belong to this place or seat of arguments God and his servants are the morall causes of mans holines when they command good and forbid ill when they promise good and threaten ill when they perswade vnto obedience and disswade from sinne thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things when by his obedience he deserved that God should bestow them vpon vs he by meriting I say is the morall cause of Gods gifts because by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them and so much shall suffice for this distinction A Physicall efficient is Principall first second Instrumentall This distinction is very ancient in the schooles and of great vse when we desire to know how mans will is wrought vpon and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace Alvarez received it from Thomas and makes vse of it disp 68. no. 5. c. where hee doth thus describe each member of it A principall efficient is that which worketh out of its owne power or forme as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 18. art 3. in cor A first principall efficient is that which worketh onely out of its owne power Thus God only worketh of whom it is sayd hee sitteth in Heaven and doth what he will He is the vniversall cause for in him we liue and mone and haue our being A second principall efficient is that which is so moved by another that it moveth it selfe by a power of its owne Of this sort is mans mind which is moved by God yet neverth lesse it worketh out of an actiue beginning remaining in it selfe Of this sort be all those sayings in the Scripture which attribute mans good workes as his conversion and the like sometimes vnto God alone and other sometimes vnto man alone An instrument properly taken and so we speake of it here is that which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient of this kinde are all instruments without life as namely the tooles of a Carpenter or Smith c Thus hot water heateth another thing that is cold by the heate received from the fire To conclude the point touching the efficient cause wee are to know that the efficient Ramus alwayes worketh after one of these waies whether it works alone or with others whether it begins the worke or preserues it being alreadie made CHAP. VIII The matter Ramus is a Cause of which a thing is Matter This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily substance but it is not so taken in this place for as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor The matter as it is a matter remaineth onely in power or capacitie to receiue many formes and therefore according to it selfe hath no being nor can be obiected to our vnderstanding 1. p. q. 15. art 3. ad 3m. In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed or some intellectuall thing answerable vnto that A cause These words doe attribute an actiue power and actuall efficacy vnto the matter wherby the effect is produced Of which These words shew the nature of that efficacy and
chapter and first booke of his Rhetoricke A man sayth he is a Logician by nature or art Logick Dialectick Both these names are vsed indifferently to set out the thing defined and we haue the frequent vse of learned men to avow it The Iesuites doe expresly teach it in their Commentary vpon Aristotles Organon Col 26. neere to the end in these words The whole art of discoursing is set out by either the word Logick or the word Dialectick And they doe not barely avouch it but they confirme it with plentie of proofes as the Reader may finde if he please to consult the place-alledged Both the words doe signifie no more but a thing appertaining vnto the vse of reason therefore the Iesuites in the same Preface q. 4. art 4. Col 40. doe conceiue that Logick in an vniversall apprehension is no more but a director of the art of reason And Suarez hath the same thing in his Metaphysicks disp 39. D. Is This word is the band to tye both parts of the definition together By it the later part is affirmed of the former and it signifies an essentiall attribution that is that the latter part of the definition doth giue being vnto the former so as the first doth consist in the second An art The word art doth set out the generall nature of Logick that is it doth signifie that nature which Logick hath in common with divers other things as Grammar and Rhetorick c. It is called an art in the most common vse of men sometime it is called also a science and that we find in the Iesuites Preface q. 4. art 3. Aristotle doth vse both the words indifferently as signifying the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysicks and first Chapter The word art fignifies a multitude of Precepts orderly digested and approved by vse And thus the Iesuites teach in their Preface q. 6. art 2. and Aristotle hath the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysicks and first Chapter Where wee haue these words Art is gotten by experience experience makes art Art is made when as one vniversall thing is framed out of many experimentalls so as to doe by experience differs nothing from art He brings the same thing and the reason of it Poster lib 2. cap. 19. The word An is vsed to shew that Logick is one intire art that cannot be divided nor is subordinate to any other art as Geometry and many other arts be Logick is usually called the art of arts the mistris and director of all other and there is good cause why for Logick disputeth of all things and is common vnto every being as Aristotle hath taught vs in the fourth booke of his Metaphysicks cap. 2. text 4. Experience sheweth that Aristotle sayd true for there is no art but by the helpe of Logick all the precepts thereof are framed together in a due order and the parts of each singular precept are so fitted together that we may finde truth from falshood Of discoursing These words doe assigne the speciall nature of Logick the very first and intrinsecall being thereof and containe the forme and the end I say they containe them both because the forme is the fountaine of the end and the end is the continuation of the forme as wee shall see hereafter The end of Logick is Next Remote The remote end of Logick is the very act it selfe of discoursing but wee speake not of this end of Logick in the present definition The next end of Logick is to prescribe a way and rules of discoursing so as the end of Logick is a framing of the meanes of discoursing so say the Iesuites in their Comment vpon Aristotles Organon and the Preface thereto Col. 27.55 So likewise saith Gillius lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. The art of Logick delivereth wayes and rules of discoursing To discourse As it is here used is to declare one thing that is lesse knowne by another thing that is more knowne This we haue in the Iesuites Preface col 27. and 62. As for example He that knowes not what a man is is made to know it by saying a man is a reasonable Creature the addition of rationalitie vnto man shewes what man is So likewise when wee say God is a spirit infinite in all perfection we informe him that is ignorant and knowes not what God is In this very thing this art of Logick doth differ from all other arts whatsoever for Logick ends in speculation and proceedeth no further than to judge whether one thing be truly affirmed of another all other arts be practicall they concerne mans outward or transient actions as their next end as Grammar and Rhetoricke tendeth vnto mans speech Geometry vnto measuring Arithmetick vnto numbering c. That art saith Okam is practicall which directeth vs vnto the doing of a thing to be wrought In 3. dist q. 11. lit V. Yea in this mans knowledge differs from the knowledge that is in God and the Angels in that they behold the things in themselues as they are in themselues distinct each from other they doe not know one thing lesse knowne by the light and reflection of another thing that is better knowne wherefore their knowledge is called intellection ours is called rationalitie Well This word seemes vnto some to be superfluous and a man would thinke that the Iesuites were of that opinion because they define Logick to be no more but an art of discoursing coll 27. so Gillius lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. yet indeed in other places they haue as much as this word comes to for thus they writein their Preface the last question col 70. He is a good Logician which doth exercise himselfe in each thing well and diligently and Suarez doth joyne with them in his Metaphysicks disp 39. D. Logick saith he is an art directing the operation of the vnderstanding to exercise itselfe artifically and according to reason And all these Authors doe adde that word to very good purpose for thereby Logick is distinguished from Sophistry which is onely a deceiving science A Sophister seemes to know but indeede knowes not in the truth of the thing as we learne from Aristotle in his Metaphysicks lib. 4. cap. 2. text 4. And thus much shall suffice for the opening of the severall parts of the definition of Logick That wee may put a finall end to the matter in hand wee must remember that the word discoursing implyeth arguments wherefore wee must now see what an argument is An argument is that Ramus which hath a force to argue Altissidiorensis saith in his Preface lit F. an argument is a reason that giveth vs knowledge of a thing that is doubtfull Aristotle saith that arguments are such as whereby faith Logically may be made of the thing that is spoken of Poster lib. 1. Cap. 22. Logicè igitur c. That This word importeth the generall nature of an argument that is the thing which is common to arguments of every kinde
the maner how the matter doth concurre vnto the effect and importeth the thing that so receiues the forme that it resteth and remaineth in it This we see in an house wherin the timber stone c. are framed and fashioned together and made fit for habitation so doth a peece of timber receiue the picture made vpon it by a carver A thing is By thing is meant the effect produced by Is is meant essentially so as the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree or notion Wee conceiue the timber c. Of a house to be a part of it but we know that there is an other part therof more principall before that namely the forme fashion thereof A thing signifies an individuall effect so as the office of the matter is to bring the effect vnto asingular or individuall being thus all Philosophers doe conceiue of it The matter is the principium of individuation saith Thomas 1. p. q. 86. art 3. in cor And againe the essence is restrained vnto one individuall thing by the matter 1. p. q. 7. art 3. in cor We haue an instance of this in every singular creature Peter is a singular man by his body every plant is singular by the stem that groweth vp for they inioy all other things in common with therest of their kinds The soule of Peter hath the same rationalitie with all other mens soules no singular tree differs from other trees in vegititie Sanctitie makes men christians Peters sanctitie makes Peter a christian because the holy Ghost dwels in his mortall body This argument brings the subiect to which it is attributed vnto our cleere vnderstanding and it is of singular vse to make vs know the nature and distinction of particular beings Yea of absolute necessitie for that I may vse the words and reason of Aristotle Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text 11 It is not possible to know vntill wee come vnto indiuidualls It is impossible to know vntill we ataine vnto those things which doe not admit division for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our vnderstandings We haue a pregnant example of it in the 1. Cor. 15.39 c. Where the Apostle doth describe and destinguish diuers kinds of singular bodies and saith some be celestiall as the Sunne Moone and stars Other some be terrestriall and those be spirituall as mans body that is raysed other some be naturall viz the flesh of men beasts and birds and from hence he deliuers the nature and difference of glory that these particular beings doe inioy Likewise the holy Ghost Reuel 21 18. c. Makes vs know what the new Ierusalem is by the matter thereof The examples of this kinde are very frequent and well knowne to every man therefore I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the materiall cause CHAP. IX Of the formall Cause A forme is a Cause Ramus by which a thing is that which it is Forme As I sayd of the matter so must I say of the forme If it be considered in it selfe abstracted from all matter and individualitie it is a certaine thing common vnto many so Thomas truly sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor 2. Vnder the name forme sometimes is comprehended a figure which consisteth in the termination of a quantitie This also I haue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. ad 2m. But wee take not this word at this time in either of these sences By forme then wee here vnderstand the intrinsicall part of the compounded effect so sayth Suarez meta disp 10. sect 1. no. 7. that is Received of the matter informing the same Thus saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor A forme saith Thomas is Generall A forme saith Thomas is Speciall A speciall forme is that which informs the subiect but it selfe is not informed by any other forme of the same nature as one colour is not informed by another colour 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 1m. Forme in this place is taken in the second sence not in the first Wee haue an example of this in the rationalitie of man and vigiditie of plants both of them are formes and distinct beings not receiving any thing from other formes of their kinde Is a Cause That is it hath actuall exercised force to inferre the effect By which These words doe shew that the force of the forme is not receptiue nor retentiue nor restrictiue as the force of the matter is but it is actiue for as Aristotle saith Meta. lib. 9. cap. 6. text 17. The forme is an act that is an actuall determinate and actiue being the Reader may see this matter fully opened by Gillius col 467. A thing is By these words the essence of every individuall effect is attributed to the formall cause every thing that doth actually exist saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 2. in cor hath some forme and againe every being is caused by the forme thereof 1. p. q. 51. art 4. in cor That which These words doe attribute the whole effect vnto the forme and this is agreed vpon by the learned in all ages Each thing is that which it is by its forme thus Thomas thinketh 1. p. q 5. art 5. ad 3m. in cor The whole compound is the effect of the forme in the iudgement of Okam 1. dist 32. q. 1. 2. lit C. And this sentence agrees well with the nature of the thing for the matter doth finite and contract the amplitude of the forme and thereby it becomes the determinate forme of this or that individuall effect The forme on the other side doth perfit and determine the matter and bring it from power to act by giuing an essence thereunto in so much that by the forme the essence is termined vnto some speciall kinde And thus much wee receiue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. et 3 in cor q. 14. art 2. ad 1m. This argument is of necessary vse to instruct our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect to which it is attributed for how can we know a thing more cleerely and certainely then when wee finde the intrinsicall primary and proper nature and being thereof It is all one saith Aristotle 2. post cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing and to know the cause of its nature Wee haue examples of this kinde of Cause in the word of God and the nature of the Creature when God would shew vs what sinne is he doth set it out by the forme thereof Sinne sayth the Apostle Iohn 1. Epist chap. 3. v. 4. Is a varying from the Law The Apostle Paul when he would set out what the righteousnesse of faith is he doth describe it in his Epistle to the Romans ch 4. v. 6.7.8 by forgiuenesse of sinnes The holy Ghost doth yeeld vs many of these examples but these shall suffice In man we haue a full representation of every part of this Argument Wee
say rationalitie is the formall cause of man Now 1. Rationalitie is the intrinsecall part of man all other of his parts are more overt and better knowne 2. Rationalitie hath a force to bestow a being vpon man for when God had drawne together the dust of the earth man had not as then his being but he receiued that when God breathed the breath of life into it at that time I say and not before man became a liuing soule 3. Rationalitie bestowes vpon man a being that is actuall and determined vnto one and actiue whereby he is fit to doe the actions of life 4. There is nothing essentiall vnto man but his rationalitie bestowes it on him The body indeed doth make him a singular man by retaining and contracting the soule vnto one but in what respect he is a man that he receiues wholy from his soule and from hence the forme is truely sayd to be the beginning of difference that is hetweene one and another and not the difference it selfe Thom. 1. dist 25. q. 1. art 1. ad 2m. I say the difference of things doth flow from the forme for as vnitie in substance doth make two things to be the same as Okam doth truely teach 1. dist 19. q. 1. lit B. opinio 1a. and Aristotle meta lib. 5. cap. 15. text 20. so difference in substance makes two things to differ The forme is not the difference it selfe for a forme is a subsistence in an vnitie but a difference is a dissenting betweene the essence of two and thus much for the explication of the formall Cause CHAP. X. Of the finall Cause The end is a cause for which the thing is Ramus End By end is meant the last notion which wee haue of the effect and importeth that whereunto the thing tendeth So Aristotle telleth vs meta lib. 2. cap. 1. text 9. An end is Externall Internall In The intent of the doer The thing it selfe naturally Imposed An externall end is the actuall vse of the thing to which the effect is fitted Thus the beatificall vision is mans end to which he tends An end in the intent of the doer is no more but either the fitnes it selfe of the effect thought vpon and purposed by the efficient this is the condition of every workman that deviseth and resolueth vpon the fashion and forme of the thing to be wrought Or the commoditie of the workman and others sought thereby Wee haue example of an end thus vnderstood in those words of Iohn 3.16 God so loued the world c. Where the giving of Christ is an effect wrought by God wherein he intended the glory of himselfe and his sonne and the salvation of the predestinate Thus the workman that makes an axe intends that himselfe shall get reputation and maintenance thereby An end of a thing imposed vpon it is when the efficient inioyned that vse of it which the thing it selfe doth not yeeld and this end we finde in lawes and mony the one is appointed to be a rule of obedience the other to set a price of wares I say appointed by him that hath power to doe it the things themselues doe not yeeld it as all men doe know by experience But the word end in this place doth not signifie either of these foure things The end as it is in the intent and will of the doer is a cause indeed metaphorically not properly and must be reduced vnto the efficient not the finall for in that sort it doth but moue and induâ—â—â—ice principall efficient vnto working and consequently it is an efficient that workes morally That and vnto which the effect tendeth naturally is here vnderstood and defined I haue receiued all these things from Thomas 2. dist q. 1. art 1 2. 3. 1. p. q. 26. art 3. ad 2m. Suarez de praedest lib. 2. cap. 3. no 2. vega in Concil Trident lib. 7. cap. 2. A cause Therfore the end hath an actiue and an exercised act in the producing of the effect for that is the propertie of every cause as hath beene shewed For which a thing is These words set out the nature of that force and they signifie a tendency aptitude and fitnes which the effect hath naturally vnto something without it selfe It is of the nature of a finall cause sayth Okam actually to intend and whatsoeuer doth not so is not truly and properly a finall cause in Prologo 1. sent q. 11. lit F.G. In the same sort writes Aristotle meta lib. 2. cap. 1. text 8. An end sayth he is that for which a thing is made that is whose essence is not so for another that it followes that other but the essence of another followes that If any inquire how tendency c. can haue an actuall exercise vnto doing First I answer it can because that tendency flowes from the forme in as much as the forme doth determine the effect vnto an end according to its owne proportion as the forme of steele is such as best fitteth with cutting Thomas 1a. 2 e. q. 95 art 3. in cor Secondly the end importeth some good so saith Thomas 1. p. q 19. art 1 ad 1 and all men grant it therfore it hath an exercised force to constitute but herein it differs from the form that doth constitute good no more this doth both constitute and diffuse good It doth constitute in as much as it is the perfection of the effect I say the perfection of it because when the effect hath attained thi her it wanteth nothing requisite to a thing of that kind It is diffusiuely good in as much as it is fit and apt to bestow good vpon others Wee haue many examples that shew vs the nature of this argument Fitnes to rule the day and night is attributed to the Sunne and Moone Genesis 1.14 As a thing that followed their nature by creation thus also fitnes to accompany and help Adam is affirmed of Evah Genesis 2.18.21 as the end of her creation Man is apt and fit to loue the knowne good and that is his end this fitnes floweth from his reasonable soule or formall being whose propertie it is to judge truly and choose freely Now this fitnes hath a maine stroake in the constituting of man not by the way of motion for that belongs to the efficient nor by the way of reception and retention for that belongs to the matter but by the way of setled position as the forme doth from whence it floweth 2. By this fitnes a man is made a perfit and compleat humane creature for when he attaines vnto that he wants nothing requisite vnto his being Vntill he be so fitted we cannot conceiue him a humane creature for he would differ nothing from bruit beasts The vse of this argument is of exceeding worth to informe our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect for by it we know the formall cause and consequently the nature of the thing To conclude the doctrine of all the causes ioyntly
c. Both these propositions be compound according to Aristotle for each of them is made one by a Conjunction they may be called Copulatiue because that Conjunction is Copulatiue The forenamed axiomes are compounded of simple axiomes The first of two axiomes the other of fiue But according to Ramus both of them be simple because their band is a verbe Neither of them a compound for their Conjunction tyes not the parts of the proposition together for it neither affirmes nor inferres truth or falshood It tyeth one part of the Axiome together and makes it one by the knitting together of divers parts and no more If we take a veiw of them as they lye wee shall see all these things plainely In the first instance Christ is the subiect death and resurrection are made the predicate both of these are ioyned together by the word And and thereby they are made one that is not one thing but one truth together This one predicate is referred vnto that subiect by the verbe that is included in them both in the truth of the thing the first containes two axiomes Christ dyed Christ did rise from death and we finde the same truth in them both being taken apart that we doe when both the predicates are put together into one axiom The same is the case with the second when it stands in due forme thus Whoremongers I dolaters Lyers c. haue no right to heaven In the truth of the thing this is a simple axiome as the former was the predicate damnation is referred to the subiect Whoremongers c. by a verbe the subiect consisteth of divers parts distinct betweene themselues Whoremongers I delaters c. all those parts are made one by the word And. I say one not in themselues but in the truth of this proposition so as if wee referre damnation to them all ioyntly it containes a certaine truth If that predicate be referred vnto Whoremongers alone Lyers alone c. each one of them doe containe a truth no lesse certaine and vndoubted A Contradiction is made to this kinde of axiome by denying the word And for thereby we say all the parts vnited together doe not agree vnto the other part to which they are referred This precept is made evident by either of the examples alledged If I say damnation belongs not to whoremongers Christ suffered not death I put an expresse Contradiction to them both if these be true those be false If they be true these be false but this Contradiction is the same with simple axiomes for one and the same predicate is denyed of one and the same singular subiect therefore we may conclude these sentences are compound Copulatiue propositions in their present forme but simple propositions in the truth of the thing If you take them as men doe speake them then they are cōpound if you take them as men ought to speake then they are simple And this shall suffice for Copulatiue axiomes CHAP. XLIIII Of connexe Axiomes A Connext axiome comes next the nature whereof may be thus set out An axiome Ramus is then Connex when a Connexiue Coniunction is the band thereof This kinde of Compound axiome is easie to be found and fitly thus named It is in frequent vse amongst men and the nature of it consisteth in composition There are presidents of it that seeme much to differ I will propound examples of them both that the matter may be fully opened 1. If in this life we inioy all our happinesse then we onely are miserable 2. If righteousnes be by the law then Christ dyed in vaine These propositions are compound according to Aristole and Ramus too for each of them are made one by a coniunction that so tyes both the parts together that they containe such truth as the parts doe not when they are taken in sunder and each one by it selfe Secondly They are compounded of simple Axiomes In the first we haue these two first All our happines is in this life Secondly We onely are miserable In the second we haue the like First Iustice is by the Law Secondly Christ dyed in vaine Lastly these 2 simple Axiomes are made one proposition by the coniunction If and Then I say they are one not by mixture but by voyce that pronounceth the latter certainely to be where the former is These compound axiomes are called Conditionall in the common phrase of the Schooles because the first part is put Conditionally not absolutely but I thinke the terme of Connex is more fit because the latter part is inferred from the former and therefore it is made to haue a being together with the former and consequently it is annexed and knit vnto the former The parts knit together in this kind of axiomes are named Antecedent and Consequent and they are so in themselues for the first in place is the first in nature and our apprehension else it could haue no force to inferre the second The second followes the first and receiues its being therefrom All arguments may be disposed in this axiome that haue place in a simple axiome because this serueth to conclude all questions that may be concluded by a simple axiome so also they may be disposed in the same manner in this that they may in a simple that is Consenting arguments affirmatiuely and Disenting negatiuely The truth of this axiome dependeth vpon the Connexion of the parts so as if the one doth follow vpon the other then the axiome is true otherwise it is false therefore if the one doth necessarily inferre the other then the truth of it is also necessary If the one doth inferre the other Contingently then it containes but opinion onely or a Contingent truth The inference that this rule containes is most certaine and vndoubted The antecedent part of it is agreed vpon in the Schooles I will avow it by two Authors of Credit and they shall be in stead of all The first of them is Gregorie de Arim lib. 1. dist 42 q. 2. art 1. in aecisio questionis Conditionall speeches may be true and their parts false These are his words and they imply that the truth of Condition all speeches depends vpon their connexion not their parts The second is Alvarez de Auxilijs disp 72. no. 5. ad 3 m There is required vnto the truth of a Conditionall proposition that the Consequent follow vpon the Autecedent Whether the Antecedent be the adaequate Cause of the Consequent or an effect thereof or a Condition presupposing another Cause It is enough if the Consequent followes by vertue of that Condition Thus farre his words and they are so plaine and so full that we can require no more authoritie for this question yet that I may conceale nothing that may giue light vnto this maine and important rule I will proceed a little further We must vnderstand The Illation or Consequence of a Connexe or Condstionall proposition is either formall or materiall The sentences alledged out of Gregory and Alvarez are
it consisteth of things true first immediate better knowne preceding and cause of the conclusion Those are first and true which haue force to argue not from others but of themselues They ought to be true because that which is not cannot be knowne they must be first because they ought to be indemonstrable and consist of their owne proper principles we must not inquire of the principles of Science wherefore they are so but every one of them even by it selfe ought to be worthy of credit The medium must containe the causes of the conclusion seeing we know nothing vnlesse wee vnderstand the causes The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion both in nature and our knowledge therefore the principium of ad monstration is an immediate proposition viz. that hath none before it Poster lib. 1. cap. 4. 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. wherupō demonstrations are made by definitions Poster lib. 1. cap. 33. and they are the principles thereof Poster lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no wayes be proued Poster lib. 2. cap 4.5 6. 7. lib. 1. cap 9. By this whole discourse we haue rules to know what Syllogisine containes a truth simply necessary and we are sent vnto them onely whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion and such causes also as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe Wherefore for further explication hereof Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be and how they concurre In these words For as much as we doe then know when we vnderstand the causes and these be foure 1. the forme 2. the matter 3. the efficient and 4. the end Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth when one of these causes is taken and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion And by Causes is meant not onely the causes of those things that are but also of those things that haue beene or shall be hereafter Post lib. 2. cap. 11. 12. Now wee doe fully vnderstand where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme Our next labour must be to set out these scientificall Syllogismes by other properties that we may know them the more easily and certainely for that cause Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner A demonstration is Vniversall Particular Affirmatiue Negatiue Poster lib. 1. cap 24. A demonstration vniversall excells a particular and an affirmatiue is better then a negatiue cap. 24.25 This distribution followes the nature of a Syllogisme for every demonstration is a syllogisme though every syllogisme be not a demonstration Poster lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this necessary truth and the degrees of it To conclude this matter of demonstratiue science he sayth The first figure is fittest for a demonstration yea chiefly proper vnto this science and it is to be sought out onely by that Poster lib. 1. cap. 14. Some perhaps will looke that I should giue instances to open the vse of these precepts and it may seeme the more needfull because some are of opinion that no example can be given answerable to this rule I answer this conceit is very vaine for cannot any of the causes or all of them together serue to proue a sentence that is called into question or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions Without doubt they may Also it is most certaine that every proposition comprehends a necessary truth wherein the effect is argued by the causes for the effect is no more but a comprehension of all the causes and when the causes doe argue the effect the effect is resolued into the causes therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect And consequently such propositions are necessary and what they are such the conclusion must be that is lawfully inferred from them If there may be premises and conclusion answerable to this rule then no doubt there be examples of it and we may shew them if need were but I will saue that labour for this time for divers reasons 1. Aristotle hath done that alreadie Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. so as he that will may make vse of them 2. This kinde of knowledge cannot easily be discerned seeing it is very hard for vs to vnderstand those principles of a thing that are true first and of the same kinde as Aristotle doth admonish Poster lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem c. 3. By a mans owne practice and obseruation he shall finde them and their vse in naturall things and in them onely for in matters divine and spirituall such arguments can haue no place In them we vnderstand by faith not by sence and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof not the nature or causes of the things themselues I say a man may finde them by practice because by sence we get memory by the remembring the doing of the same thing often we get experience by our many times remembring our experience is one amongst all these that we doe remember there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied aboue many that which is one and the same amongst the rest becomes a principium of science if it belong vnto a thing that is Thus much we learne from Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 19. Exsensu c. The medium of a demonstration whereby wee know that a thing is consists in some of these that follow 1. Of the causes but not the first or immediate 2. Of things mediate and no cause but such as are reciprocated or mutually referred to each other 3. Of a demonstration that shewes what a thing is 4. Of things that are not reciprocated yet it is better knowne and yet no cause 5. Of a superior science as Geometry is to the Opticks and Arithmoticke to musicke 6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed vnder another as Surgery is vnto Geometry To know that a wound is healed sooner or later belongs to the Surgeon but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter belongs to Geometry 7. In a demonstration that sheweth what a thing is sometimes also the medium is placed without the extreames as when we say why doth not the wall breath Wee answer because it is not a living creature and these Syllogismes are alwayes made in the second figure after this sort whatsoeuer doth breath is a living creature But a wall is not a living creature Therefore a wall doth not breath Poster lib. 1. cap. 13. Thus farre goe Aristotles precepts to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth and the degrees thereof If any expect examples of these last I answer they may be given because we may haue examples of the former as I haue alreadie proved They may be given with more ease then the former because the things contained in them are neerer to our vnderstanding but I will saue that labour least I make my discourse ouer long and the Reader too idle We
the assumption and the rest taken away in the Conclusion BY assuming is vnderstood a bare repeating and taking away is a contradicting in the same sort as hath beene before set downe In this second kinde of disjunct Syllogisme there are three properties First The proposition is whoâ—y affirmatiue Secondly One single terme onely of the opposition is repeated in the assumption Thirdly The other part is contradicted in the conclusion therfore this forme doth really differ from the former That concludes affirmatiues and no negatiues this concludes negatiues and no affirmatiues Gal. Cap 3 ver 2.3 doth yeeld vs an argument of this kinde Yee received the spirit either by the Law or the Gospell But yee received it by the Gospell Therefore yee received it not by the Law This disputation doth suppose two things first They had the spirit Secondly one of these two the law or the Gospell gaue it them not both together Those two things being granted the argument cannot be denyed If either of them might be denied the argument may not be granted The assumption doth barely repeate the second terme opposed and the conclusion doth contradict the first I will adde this second instance This action is either supernaturally good or supernaturally evill or naturally good or naturally evill But it is supernaturally good Therefore it is neither supernaturally evill nor naturally good nor naturally evill Here we finde first divers termes opposed in the proposition one against many and many against one Secondly They are all affirmatiue Thirdly The first terme is barely repeated in the assumption Fourthly The other three are contradicted in the conclusion Fiftly A supposition that every action hath one of these properties and no more but one of them The reason why one opposite terme onely is assumed and the rest contradicted is because but one opposite can be in the subject at once and the presence of that doth inforce the absence of the rest We may bring these into simple Syllogismes after this sort That act which is supernaturally good is not supernaturally evill nor naturally good nor naturally evill But this act is supernaturally good Therefore it is neither supernaturally evill nor naturally good nor naturally evill I doubt not but this will suffice to shew the truth and vse of this precept It is needles for me to set forth what truth is contained in these Syllogismes for if we take them as disjunctiue then they containe truth no otherwise then as disiunctiue axioms doe If we take them as simple then they must be referred vnto simple Syllogismes therefore in the precepts of them we shall know what truth is contained in these I might also alledge the reason why Ramus doth prosecute all the precepts of Compound Syllogismes and thereby justifie him And for what cause Aristotle did but name them not prosecute them and so justifie him also but I thinke I haue done that sufficiently in the matter of Compound Axiomes Cap. 42. they and these draw in one and the same line therefore I referre the Reader vnto that place Repetitions are but lost labour Now we are come to an end of all the precepts of Logicke so as there is no more required to make a Logician then what hath beene sayd alreadie But that seemes not enough to Ramus for he brings another member of this art and calls it Methode but I omit the same of purpose for divers reasons 1. No precepts of Logicke can teach it because even according to him Method is no more but the orderly placing of sentences together But the precepts of Logicke cannot teach that it being no more but the generall nature of art as wee haue alreadie found Cap. 1. I say of art simply abstracted from all particulars and not applyed to Rhetorick Logicke or any other as we do when we say Rhetoricke is an art c. 2. If any precepts of Logicke haue power to teach the orderly framing of sentences together then they must be either some that are past or some that are yet to come if we must haue recourse to these then their Authors and places must be named But that is impossible If the precedent precepts do teach it then we haue done enough alreadie and can doe no more except wee will repeat the same things againe 3. If we define and distribute according to the precepts of a definition and distribution Cap. 34. c. We cannot place definitions and distributions nor any other sentences that depend vpoÌ„ them vnduly and out of order for then the most generall will come first and the most speciall will come last and this is all the Method Ramus required 4. He alledges Aristotles authoritie for method but altogether without cause for he alledgeth no place nor words and I am sure he cannot Aristotle calls all the precepts of Logicke a Method whereby wee come to know how to discusse Top. lib. 1. cap. 2. lib 8. cap. 12. prior lib. 1. cap. 31. therfore he did neuer meane to make Method one member of his Art distinct from the rest seeing therefore we haue nothing to say touching Method I must here put an end to the whole Worke. FINIS