ends as Hospitality out of vain-glory of acts and undue circumstances as walking in the Fields when we should be at Church as of acts and undue objects whereof this is an instance And so all sinful actions are evil as to their substance which Mr. Howe hath not affirmed That hatred of God is not evil in it self because the act invaried the object but changed that act which was evil is become morally good So our Learned Bishop of Lincoln again Exerc. met p. 41. which he illustrates and proves by the instance of Adultery where the act being the same for the substance is altered in its moral respect by making the woman with whom I committed Adultery my wife Id. ibid. Which instance of our Learned Bishop is plain in the case of David and Bathsheba whose society together was unlawful before but lawful after their marriage They that desire further satisfaction in this point may do well to have recourse to a learned Discourse in our native Language of Mr. H. Hickman of the positivity of sin Obj. 2. One sin is the cause of another as original sin inherent as that stands opposed to original sin imputed is the cause of actual sins therefore sin is not meerly privative Sol. The privation which is in the natural propension of the will to sin in which natural propension original sin consiste is not the real efficient of evil actions but the will in regard of that propension is the real and true cause of evil actions So Baron wet § 5. n. 30. 33. Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a positive part in original sin Sol. Yet they hold sin to be only Privative But then it will be demanded how their assertions will agree together I Answer In inherent sin there is said to be a positive and a negative Quality This latter Divines call a want of original righteousness or not to be able to do good The former they call a pravity of nature or to be able to do evil only which is called Positive Legice because 't is expressed affirmatively whereas the latter is expressed negatively so Maccov op Post p. 83. r. fuse de hac re disserentem Gisb Voet. Disp Theol. p. 1. p. 1084 Arg. 2. If God hath a prede erminative concurrence to the most wicked actions it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worst of actions is to be distinguished from that which he affords to the best wherein such inherently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them than to the malicious Tempter who prompts to them or to the actor that doth them or wherein not a great deal more Let. p. 32 33. which Argument Mr. Howe gives us more concisely afterward That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions as to the best as much or more than the sinner or the Tempter Postsc p. 25. viz. according to our Doctrine Answ 1. If our learned Adversary understands the antecedent as we do whom he opposes of the materiale of wicked actions we grant his consequence for we cannot yet see the inconvenience of owning that there is an universal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents as such abstracted from their morality The actions of the understanding and will Physically considered are neither holy nor sinful those denominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law prescribed as a compliance with or deviation from it and therefore in linea Physica Gods influence and concurrence is the same when they are the substrate matter of moral evil and moral good 2. If he intends the formale or rather the most wicked actions in concreto we disown the antecedent as none of ours and complain of his disingenuity in pinning such an assertion upon our sleeve 3. Yet however for his satisfaction I shall let him know That besides the influence upon good and bad actions in what degree soever which we acknowledg common to both there are divers differences of the influence we own for distinguishing of good actions from bad 1. That as to good actions God does in genere physico re create those internal habits which he did concreate in the state of innocency with the several faculties in which they were respectively seated as knowledg in the understanding a rectitude of the will consisting in a compliance with the last dictates of the practical understanding that they might be actus primi or principles of the actus secundi or operations of the faculties in vertue of those habits which faculties he influences to reduce them to act by that influence which we call Predetermination But as to evil actions God insuses no evil neither indeed can he besides the repugnancy such an action would carry to his holiness because though sin be sometimes conceived by us per modum habitus positivi under the notion of a positive habit yet it is not properly so and so is not capable of production by that immediate efficiency which we call infusion as hath been in part demonstrated before 2. As to good actions God does in the Predetermination to them so excite to the action as that withal he adds new strength to the habits given whence those acts immediately proceed which he does not neither as to evil actions 3. We have a third difference from Mr. H's own concession The ordinary appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his Word viz. The Precepts Promises and Comminations which are th moral instruments of his Government Postsc p. 40. The meaning of which words is that God is not only a Physical but also a moral cause of good actions whereas 't is our sentiment that God is only a Physical cause of the actions to which sin inheres but not a moral cause of the sin adhering to them And if I do not too much trust my own judgment this observation is not contemptible for the evincing of it that the indifferency of the will to chuse or refuse the Object proposed by the understanding is not so natural to the will but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to chuse or refuse one object rather than another As for the comparison which he makes between God the sinner and the Tempter upon our grounds and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions 't is an odious and horrible calumny not backed with any proof as he intends it of such actions in the concrete i. e. as including with the action the sinfulness of it too Reply To it I reply That a short Horse is soon curried This slight objection is easily answered 1. Either Mr. Howe means as much physical influence or moral If the former we say God and the sinner have both a physical influence upon the action that is evil but the Tempter none at all and
the terms when they labour under any ambiguity or however fall not under the apprehension of those who are to be instructed for want of skill in that art or science to which they belong or language from which they are borrowed In neither of these respects will it be needless in the Controversie now to be agitated not as to the first because Mr. Howe gives us his sense in various terms and such as seem repugnant to each other one while that which he denies is a Predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the Creatures Let. p. 32. and Postsc p. 3. and Predeterminative concourse Post p. 19. another while 't is Predetermining Influence Post p. 19. and a Determinative influence Let. p. 36. and Efficacious influence Post p. 52. As for the two former phrases which are of the same import they are in effect contradictio in adjecto in their conjunction I appeal to Strangius Mr. H.'s friend but my Adversary in the main Question under consideration Hujusmodi Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concursu Dei generali quem concursum praevium appellant c. i.e. Some confound this kind of Predetermination with the general concourse of God But they speak very improperly who call Predetermination a previous or Predeterminative concourse or say that God does by concourse determine second causes and he quotes Twisse with approbation saying Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo c. i.e. To concur with an agent some way to the production of an effect is not to determine that agent For the Creature also concurs with God to the production of an effect and yet it does not determine God therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature determine it to act Strang. de Vol. Dei Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. Strangius does not call the terms a contradiction I confess but the reason out of Twisse gave him as just ground as it does me so to call them As for the latter phrase influence which he makes equipollent with the former concourse in these words I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms as some do Post p. 29. I had rather he should hear Strangius again than me blaming his not affecting that curiosity of distinction Caeterum nobis operaepretium videtur distinguere inter ista duo vocabula concursum influxum c. i.e. But it seems worth our labour to distinguish between those two words Concourse and Influence which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded For first Influence is of a larger extent than Concourse For the causality of every Cause especially the Efficient is called Influence And therefore in many instances there may be observed an Influence of God when yet there is no concourse as when he acts not making use of any second cause Again although in the concourse of two Causes each of them are considered as having their Influence yet the word Influence is absolute and noting a respect to another cause but the word Concourse is relative to another cause Strang. de Vol. Deil. 1. c. 11. p. 59. As for the term Efficacious it suits us well enough if Mr. H. intends by it an Infallibility of the event or the certain production of those actions which God hath an Influence upon The ambiguity of Mr. H. phrases removed and the sense of them brought to a certainty I assert the contradictory to his Proposition That God doth not by an Efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions even those that are most wicked Post p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms we would thus lay down That God does determine or predetermine or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions Strangius fairly enough cites our Thesis lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 155. The Question then to be discussed is Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions So Strang. fairly l. 2 c. 4. p. 155. Unless it may seem meet to add that reduplicative particle as such because of Mr. Howe 's addition even those that are most wicked Post p. 52. As to which it is to be noted that we who assert Predetermination of all actions of the Creatures do limit it to the actions considered abstractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them as for instance we hold Gods Predetermination of the natural act whereby David begat a child in Adultery as well as of those whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony and of the use of his tongue in telling a lie to Abimelech the Priest as well as in praising God Whereas Mr. Howe limits Gods Predetermination only to morally or spiritually good actions as such Posts p. 39. n. 6. Which Predeter nation special we grant but withal assert a general which extends to evil actions In which we consider 1. The subject and as to this we say that sin is in that which is good the nature of man and his faculties and actions and these God excites and guides efficaciously And this subject is called the materiale or substrate matter of sin 2. The end and thus though not the nature yet the existence of sin is good or it is good that sin should be because God draws good out of it and hence God predetermines to the natural actions though he knows sin will adhere to them The grand term then to be explained is Predetermination or as some Divines and Metaphysicians sometimes call it Praecurse and Praemotion of which terms the former which signifies a fore appointment is either from eternity or in time The latter two only in time The former viz. Predetermination is either from eternity and so is an immanent act of Gods that is of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures or in time which is the actual production of all those actions which he had decreed to produce And of this latter only is the Question to be discussed understood and this act of Gods is called Predetermination because it limits the creature to this action rather than to that and 't is called a Precourse or Premotion i.e. a running before or fore motion as I may so speak because in order of nature it is before the action of the creature Again Predetermination or Precourse or Premotion is distinguished into Physical or Moral The latter I grant may be ascribed to God with reference to good actions as such but not with respect to evil actions unless the proposing objects and occasions of sin may as some learned men judg be reduced to the actions of a moral cause But whether the moral acts of God in commanding threatning promising c. may be justly denominated Predetermination will remain dubitable till another doubt be resolved viz. Whether the will do always follow the last practical dictate of the understanding Against the affirmative of which Question to note that obiter the most acute and learned Wallis seems to oppose an
till he hath evinced a specialty in our case which will be somewhat an uneasie task though we should grant him his own option that God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto i.e. to the actions and sinfulness of them too for upon that supposition there is less necessity to imagine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to mans corrupt nature because he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propension to of it self and so Gods determination is but as the wind in a mans back which puts him on a little faster in the way he was going before 3. We are at a great loss as to Mr. H's meaning whether it be that it is a detraction from Gods perfection to affirm God was not able to make a Creature that could not act universally without determination or particularly as to forbidden actions the generality of the terms calls for the former sense the conclusion he was to prove for the latter 1. If the former sense be that he will own I seem to my self fairly allowed to infer that then man in his primitive state had not nor have the good Angels at present any Divine determination to good actions because to both unnecessary and unnecessary it must be presumed because it is a detraction from Gods Perfection to conceive he could not make them of such a nature as that they should not need it and because they had no disinclination to be overcome by an efficaciously determinative influence which is the reason Mr. H. gives of the necessity of Predetermination to holy actions in the lapsed state Post p. 35. Which if it be of any force makes it unnecessary to a state of Integrity And if this inference be natural I wonder not that Man fell but that he fell not as soon as he was set upon his legs nor that some of the good Angels turned Rebels so soon to their Soveraign Lord but how the rest persevere in their Loyalty I have hitherto swom with the stream of Protestant Divines not because it was easie but in my apprehension safe who have conceived the good Angels security an effect of a greater degree of determinative influence to borrow Mr. H's Phrase or corroborating grace that is in the terms of the Question now agitated Predetermination than was afforded to the now bad Angels or to speak more strictly of the continuance of that Predetermination to the one which was suspended as to the other which conception of Divines to note that in passage may be easily freed from the imputation of reflecting either upon Gods Holiness Justice or Truth upon the first because God by the suspension of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angels sin than the Sun of the darkness that overspreads the air when it hath withdrawn its rays upon the second for it is a ruled case in the Schools Non datur justitia proprie dicta inter Deum Creaturas i. e. God cannot be properly said to be a debtor to his Creatures no not when he hath passed a promise to them for even then if we will speak strictly he is a debtor to himself namely to his own truth and fidelity not to them and if he should to suppose an impossibility for illustration-sake break his word he would be but Mendax non injurius a Lyar not unjust Not upon his Truth for he was not under the bond of a promise as he is to the part of repaired Mankind whom we denominate Saints to preserve the Angels from Apostacy As for those who take this Doctrine for a blemish upon Gods goodness I turn them over to God himself for a reconciliation of these two seemingly contradictory Propositions contained in his Word and within the verge of our own experience that God is good and yet that he hath permitted a passage for sin which he could have impeded If the latter sense be avowed as a genuine interpretation of Mr. H's mind I know not how it will be able to save its credit if I should charge it with being guilty of this gross absurdity viz. a supposal that God made Man with an ability to do sinful actions in concreto i. e. the natural actions and sin that adheres to them 'T is true God made Man mutable and how could he do otherwise unless he should have made him a God which very terms involve an insufferable contradiction and so in a remote capacity of sinning But Mr. H's words import a next or immediate capacity of acting which the Creature is capable of as soon as it starts out of nothing into something without the intervenient aid of Predetermination I am very averse from thinking this to be Mr. H's meaning and I would offer him a friendly hand if he would accept of it to help him out of the pit he is fallen into by minding him of our distinction between the materiale and formale of sin the natural action that is the subject and the sin that is the inseparable adjunct in our temporary estate which distinction supposed in conjâ—nction with Mr. H's Hypothesis Mr. H's meaning will be freed from the encumbrance now inferred upon it and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man suffices to the natural actions since sin adhered to them as well as before without the help of Predetermination But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the issue for though it may clear him of one yet it will entangle him in many absurdities or at least self-contradictions For then 1. How shall he quit himself from the blame of being a Favourer of Durandus Hypothesis for the sense is the same and the words not much different And yet why should he once attempt it seeing that Hypothesis serves his professed design of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin with much officiousness and that he may accept this suggestion the more kindly a most Learned hand shall tender it to him Some are of opinion that God hath no immediate influence but mediate only in respect of voluntary agents And according to this opinion it is easie to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes in producing their defective effects If the will of the Creature saith Scotus C. 2. Dist 37. Q. 1. were the total and immediate cause of her action and that God had no immediate efficiency but mediate only in respect thereof as some think It were easie according to that opinion to shew how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes for the producing of their effects for whether we speak of that which is material or formal in sin the will only should be the total cause of it and God should no way be a cause of it but mediately in that he caused and produced such a will
concurred This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing and its effect the letter written and also a Predetermination a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing not morally for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himself but Physically by putting his hand on the Scholars to write and to write one letter rather than another An account how the particular action of any rational creatures will comes to be determined upon the exclusion of Predetermination I know none can be given Not by chance upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object because the action is Gods who is not liable to any such impressions as well as the creatures not by the creatures self-determining power for that as such is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined And these two Propositions are so evident that concurrence immediate does not determine the will and that yet it must be determined that Baronius himself who is an Antipredeterminant does acknowledg both Met. 7 8. Disp 3. n. 66. and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire i. e. That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out Baron Met. 7 12. D. 2. n. 59. which necessity that it excludes not the liberty of mans will shall be cleared in due time 2. Again from the necessity conceded by Mr. Howe of immediate concourse and Predetermination to the production of good actions we shall infer the necessity of both to all actions This necessity must take its rise either from something common to all actions or peculiar to good actions The removing the latter will be the fixing the former in its due place In order hereunto we must consider that grace is an habit seated in the natural faculties and fitting them for good actions which as it was concreated with them in innocency so in the lapsed estate it is re-created or created again by infusion which infusion is not Predetermination for this latter still presupposes the former There must be grace in habit before it can be acted Now then the Query is whether the terminus of Predetermination be the habit or the faculties not the habit for that is a Quality that meliorates the faculties and so the actions in genere morali and cannot be put upon action or one rather than another but mediante potentia by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gracious habit resides It must then be the faculties the will for instance for of that is the grand inquiry for otherwise supposing what has been owned that holy habits fit the will for holy volitions and nolitions in what degree the habits are confirmed in that the will may act without Predetermination and produce sincerely good actions as it please as long as these good actions are done by a power derived originally from it which is Mr. Howe 's Hypothesis and judged by him sufficient to salve the rights and priviledge of the first cause with reference to forbidden actions Let. p. 36. and I see not why not as well with reference to commanded actions The result of this ratiocination will be that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another necessary and the possibility of action contained in the powers that makes the reducing of that possibility to action no less necessary to good actions then the consequence seems immovable that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike necessary to all actions even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations Quod erat demonstrandum And to me this Argument seems to carry along with it triumphant evidence to borrow one of Mr. Howe 's lofty Epithetes Let. p. 62. my fancy labours under so despicable poverty as to be unable to supply me with any evasion As for Mr. Howe 's phrase of impelling by which he intends compelling we shall refer the word and thing to the Head where it will most properly fall under examination In the interim let us attend to what he subjoins Answ I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends both humane and divine should not have been determined at the first sight Let. p. 38. Reply These words imply that all moral Government c. is rendred ludicrous and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Predetermination but upon what Mr. Howe magisterially enough takes for granted but does not once make an offer of proving that the will is hindered by Gods own irresistible counter-action p. 37. from yielding obedience to such Government But if I live till that be proved my age will certainly exceed Methuselahs Answ But Mr. Howe adds The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God methinks should stick so close to our minds and create such a sense in our souls as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers And that we should rather chuse to have our sight hearing and motive power and what not besides disputed or even torn from us than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to and punish the same thing Let. p. 19. Reply The sum of the Argument though accompanied with a long train of fine words is that Predetermination to sinful actions crosses the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodness and Holiness To which we return 1. That there is not the least colour for any such consequence from our Doctrine but upon supposition of two things which Mr. Howe would fasten upon us but we disown 1. That God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto i e. to the natural action and the sinfulness of it which we constantly deny for though we own it a hâ—rd province to answer all objections that may be started against this partition made between the one and the other as to Gods influence which we affirm as to the former the action and deny as to the latter the sinfulness of it yet ' we doubt not in its season to evince these two things that God is the Author and consequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures for as to irrational though we include them yet the Question not being of them we shall not intermeddle with them and that God is not the Author of the sinfulness and so not the Predeterminer thereof And then as to the modus or manner of Gods influence so as to separate these that
DE CAVSA DEI OR A VINDICATION Of the Common Doctrine of Protestant DIVINES Concerning Predetermination i. e. The Interest of God as the first Cause in all the Actions as such of all Rational Creatures From the invidious Consequences with which it is burdened by Mr. JOHN HOWE In a late Letter and Postscript of GOD'S PRESCIENCE By T. D. LONDON Printed for R. Roberts and are to be sold by Walter Davis at his House in Amen-Corner 1678. To the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE Author of the late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience SIR WHen I had read the Title-page of your late Letter to the Honourable Mr. Boyle and thereby understood its design and withal observed the smallness of the Bulk I promised my self that it would be Pagella hoc solo nomine redarguenda quod sit tota Gemmea For else I thought it would not be worthy of so great a Moecenas a Master of all sort of Learning and so whose nobility is not only in Parchment as Charron speaks nor of the Author for I was aware of him though he had concealed his name whose parts I well knew and have always had the candor upon all fit occasions to acknowledge were not of the lower size nor yet of so excellent a subject and so needful in these dregs of time which verge so much toward Socinianism And in the perusal of the Letter it self for some time I pleased my self with an apprehension that I had not imposed upon my self nor had my affection to the Author seduced my judgment Fancy and Reason were in so happy a conjunction that I hoped they would never be parted thoroughout the whole Discourse But alas too soon I found my hopes shamefully baffled For beside a corrupt gloss upon Act. 4.28 pag. 28. which I could not digest and divers passages in the process of your after-Discourse not unexceptionable from pag. 32 to 50 to speak my sense freely I found pro thesauro carbones i.e. Coals instead of Treasure shining indeed but black and smutty politeness of stile I mean continued but the series of well-digested thoughts broken and dissevered jejune Answers to Arguments full of sense old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode and many of which militate as much against your assertions as ours and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill use and a far worse than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames and sometimes degenerate eloquence which like painted glass though it was an ornament yet impeded the transmission of the light and which is worst of all the whole design of those Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popish Calumny that by the Protestant Doctrine God is made the Author of sin which I must needs profess was a strange surprisal to me and so much the more because I could not conceive what should induce you aâ— Protestant Divine to make affidavit of a Pontificial accusation nor why in this Discourse For if the end you assigned your self in doing it was the vindication of the blessed God from the imputation of being the cause of moral evil you have certainly lurcht the Reader of his expectation by offering nothing toward it but what he can easily see through viz. that God is not the cause universally of natural good or at least as remote as the Grand-father is of the Grand-child See your own words Let. p. 36. Two causes which might seem probable of your doing it in this Discourse your self has removed out of your Readers way It was not the request of the Honourable Person to whom your Letter is directed but for ought I can collect as the defending God's Predeterminative concourse unto sinful actions was an unenjoined task Let. p. 150. So was the overthrowing it too Nor was it the connexion between Prescience and Predetermination as it lies in the Divine Decree and is the only true ground of the certainty of Divine Prescience for that was not your design to demonstrate Gods Prescience of all whatsoever futurities and consequently of the sins of men but supposing it to shew its reconcileableness with what it seemed not so well to agree as you since tell us Postsc p. 4. which I did easily apprehend before For all the mediums you use for the eviction of this reconcileableness borrow no strength from the denial of Predetermination Sometime after your Letter succeeded a Postscript in the view of which I was more astonished than before obstupui steteruntque comae For whereas I might have hoped that your second thoughts would be better they proved a great deal worse I had such an opinion of your modesty that at least you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermination to sinful actions Thin Sophistry Collusive ambiguity Let. p. 41. Vain attempts 38. Dismal conclusions 36. the effects of a Sophistical wit against sense and more against the sense of our souls and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once p. 39 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth p. 50. And that reflexion you make upon those who have used the distinction of voluntas signi Beneplaciti that they have only rather concealed a good meaning than expresed by it a bad one p. 106. For take all together and I see not that they amount to a less guilt than of â—rampling upon that venerable dust which was sometimes animated by truly Heroick Souls and bore the names of Zuinglius Calvin Bâ—za Perkins Pemble Davenant Twisse Ames c. than which no cause hath had nor needs greater Patrons But instead of recalling you have avowed them by the addition of others of the same sort a contagion a deadly thing Postsc p. 15. An ill coloured opinion Postsc p. 51. Fearful consequences of that rejected opinion vanity of the subterfuges whereby its assertors think to hide the malignity of it p. 50. Nor was this enough but as if you were Animal gloriae as was said of the Philosophers an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applause and thought your self another Goliah you cry out I defie the armies of Israel this day give me a man that we may fight together What other interpretation are these words capable of Now I perceive that some persons who had formerly entertained that strange opinion of Gods Predeterminative concurrence to the wickedest actions and not purged their minds of it have been offended with that Letter for not expressing more respect unto it and yet offered nothing themselves which to me seems exceeding strange for the solving of that great difficulty and incumbrance which it infers upon our Religion Postsc p. 7. Or these If I find my self obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter I reckon the time I have to spend in this world can never be spent to better purpose than in discovering c. the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it
sapientia est ipsi Lex c. i. e. Though God be not under a Law given him by a superiour Legislatour yet his own wisdom is a Law to him and as Zuinglius himself teaches us That what a Law is to us that is Gods own nature to him God is therefore no less bound not to act repugnantly to his own wisdom and nature than men are bound not to act repugnantly to the Law of God Wherefore if God should impel Mr. Howe 's phrase men to these things which are contrary to the Eternal Law and to his own nature and wisdom as to Adultery his will were evil because repugnant to the right rule of divine wisdom and God should deny himself which cannot be as the Apostle says Thus far Bellarmine ubi supra Answ Mr. Howe concludes What relief is there in that dream of the supposed possibility of Gods making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself For what can be supposed more repugnant or what more impertinent If innocent how were it punishable A Law already made in the case how can it be innocent Let. p. 42. Reply Mr. Howe leaves us wholly at a loss who it is that with this dream hath attempted to relieve a pious and sober mind closely urged with the horrour of so black a conception of God that he does first irresistibly determine mens will to and then punish them for the hatred of his blessed self as he tragically but falsely represents our opinion p. 40. I say falsely for God does not punish that natural passion we call hatred which himself as first Cause applies the second to the production of nor does God determine the will to that natural passion its elicite act irresistibly in his sense forcibly But as Austin long ago of Gods influence upon good actions so say we of bad God acts Omnipotenter pro te suaviter pro me Omnipotently according to his own nature but sweetly according to ours as shall be fully cleared in its place If any particular person of our judgment in the main shall propose an argument liable to exception I see not that we are obliged to defend it But as Mr. Howe introduces it it seems to be represented as a common extravagancy of the Predeterminants which I am sure it is not nor does Mr. Howe labour under a surguedry of candour in a bare presentation of this supposition without its application to the Question Both which because Mr. Howe hath neglected I think not my self obliged to give the Reader an account of but shall dismiss it without any adoe Arg. 2. The second pressing and importunate Argument of ours which Mr. H. repeats That God does predetermine sinful actions as actions otherwise it were impossible for God to foreknow the sinful actions of men many whereof he hath foretold if their futurition were a meer contingency and depended on the uncertain will of the subordinate agent not determined by the supream agent God Let. p. 35 36. Ans To which Argument this is the sum of his Answer That this supposed indetermination of the Will in reference to wickâ—d actions is far from being capable of inferring any thing more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them which is a small inconvenience and manifest absurdity not to acâ—nowledg the like in many cases seeing God does many things whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor understand Let. p. 47 48. Rep. 1. To which I reply That the way how God foreknows future contingencies is in his own Decree at least as to such which he hath decreed For I cannot divine what can be opposed to this Proposition That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree though it should be granted that he foreknows them also antecedently to his own Decree in some manner which we can neither explicate nor understand Taking that then for granted till it be denied I think Mr. H. hath much overshot himself in denying universally our knowledg of the way how God foreknows future contingencies For either he must exclude the good actions which he grants God predetermines men to Postsc p. 39. yea and all actions of free agents to which he acknowledges God affords immediate concourse p. 28. from being Contingencies which himself as well as we suppose in the whole controversie now agitated Or deny that they fall under Gods Decree which is too absurd because there 's nothing more evident than that what God does in time he decreed to do from Eternity Or if he grants both then it roundly follows that God foreknew those acts of the Creatures which in time he did either predetermine to or concur with and such are all the actions of men disjunctively Rep. 2. We shall prove that God foreknows all future contingencies in his own Decree and consequently the sinful actions of men 1. By Scripture Isa 46.9 10 I am God and there is none like me declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done saying my counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure Upon which Scripture the Incomparable Calvin so I call him in compliance with the very Learned Andrews sometime Bishop of Winchester's admonition that he was a man never to be named without the addition of some title of Honour thus glosses Neque solum ejus praescientiam hic commendat c. i.e. Neither does God only here commend his own Prescience but he affirms that he had testified by the Prophets what he had decreed For there were no certainty nor firmness in the Predictions or Prophesies unless the same God who foretells this or that thing would come to pass had the event of things in his own hand As to which words we may further observe 1. The form of the expression two Attributes are here applied by God to himself Wisdom and Soveraignty or liberty of Will and a common adjunct of both Immutability or we may call it a common effect the certainty of the event that what God does wisely and freely determine or decree within himself shall certainly come to pass 2. The extent of it that it refers to all those things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow viz. all that should certainly come to pass For as Judicious Calvin observes upon vers 11. Posteaquam Propheta c. After that the Prophet had spoken of the Prescience of God he accommodates the general expression he had used to his present purpose to comfort the Jews in hopes of the return of their Captivity by Cyrus c. 3. The argument which is couched in them to evince the certainty of Gods foreknowledg of what he did predict viz. because the events predicted were the result of his Wisdom and Pleasure or of his own wise Decrees And now to draw down this General to the particular in question Whether God foreknows sinful actions in his own Decree And for the proof of the
to it inseparably Ergo future contingents must needs be future from some cause 6. The Major of the same fourth Syllogism proved If there be any cause why any thing passeth from Eternity out of the condition of a possible thing into the condition of a future that cause must be either something without God or in God and if in God either that cause shall be the essence of God or the knowledg of God or the will and decree of God But the cause of any thing becoming of possible future is neither any thing without God nor the essence or the knowledg of God Ergo it is only the will or decree of God 7. The Minor of the last Syllogism proved by parts For first nothing out of God could be the cause because that passage which they call futurition was made from eternity and therefore the cause thereof must be from eternity But nothing is eternal besides God Nor can the knowledg of God be the cause for that severed from his will doth rather suppose than make things future Moreover if the Essence of God were the cause of this passage of things from possibility to futurity it must either be said to be the cause as acting necessarily or freely Not the former for then all future things would fall out necessarily and none would fall out contingently and freely But God in things to be created or created hath done nor doth any thing by necessity of nature but freely If the Essence of God be said to be the cause of the passage of things from possibility into futurity as acting freely this is to grant that the will of God and the determination thereof is the cause why any contingent from eternity passeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be into the condition of a thing future or to determine the futurition of it It remains therefore that the Decree of God or the Decreeing will of God be alone the cause of futurition if you will admit the phrase and of its effect Thus far Dr. Twisse I desire the Reader to take notice That though I have a great reverence for Dr. Twisse and do judg the process of the above-cited Argument invincible as to the main yet I am not clear in my apprehension that the third Syllogism is in sense different from the second as Strangius objects against it with some probability Nor yet do I wholly dislike Strangius his alteration of the terms of both the Majors of the second and third Syllogism thus That which from eternity was possible so as that it also had the condition of a thing future its futurition is from the Decree of God But every future contingent was from eternity possible so as that it also had the condition of a thing future Ergo the futurition of every future contingent is from the Decree of God And then the fourth Syllogism will be the proof of the Major of the second leaving out the third and the words must be the same and so the argument runs on without any further rub unless perhaps the reason given in the fifth Syllogism Why contingent things are not future in their own nature because then it would follow that they should be always future and never become present For I confess ingenuously that I cannot answer Strangius contrary consequent from that antecedent That if future contingents were necessarily future whether in their own nature or in respect of any other cause as the 〈◊〉 of God they must necessarily be present some time or other For to be future is nothing else than that a thing should sometime be present Strang. p. 630. And these alterations though I will not positively assert to be needful as not having had time to examine Strangius throughly since he came to my hands which was long after Mr. H's Letter and Postscript came out yet I am the more willing to admit that I may in part wipe off the aspersion Mr. H. casts upon many of us who hold Predetermination That whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replys to and fro in this matter that which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy with many hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation Let. p. 42. As to all the rest of the Doctor 's Arguments if I be not a partial judg of my own abilities an infirmity of lapsed humane nature which I cannot challenge an exemption from I seem to my self able to answer Strangius's subtil evasions and should willingly have done it but that I doubt not but I shall meet with them in Mr. H's threatened Rejoinder in which I expect Mr. H. should answer distinctly by denial or distinction to some Proposition in these Syllogisms and then let him rhetoricate as he pleases in the amplification We have now dispatched the two Arguments in the Letter there remain three in the Postscript cited out of Mr. Gale's Animadversions upon the Letter which though modestly proposed by way of Question will constringe our Learned Adversary Arg. 3. Whether there be any action of man on earth so good which hath not some mixture of sin in it And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful for is not the substrate matter of the act both as good and sinful the same Postscr p. 32. Mr. H's Answ 1. It seems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful which is honestly acknowledged since by his principles it cannot be denied though most of his way mince the business and say the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful not as sinful Ibid. pag. 33. So Mr. H. Reply Mr. H. misrepresents Mr. Gale's meaning for it is not that God concurs to the sinfulness of the action but to the action which though physically one individual action yet is morally diversified in respect of its conformity and difformity to the Law of God so that considering the natural action in concreto with the good or evil adhering to it it is no less true that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering to it than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it This premised to the fault he finds with the distinction I answer that I doubt he must recur to it himself when he is pressed to know how Gods concurrence immediate to actions sinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin yea worse than so I cannot imagine but that as to those actions which he calls in themselves sinful he must own what he would fasten upon Mr. Gale that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as sinful for 't is impossible to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsecally evil action as he tells us Let. p. 33. of which hereafter Mr. H's Answ 2. This I am to consider as an argument for Gods Predeterminative
concurrence to wicked actions And thus it must be conceived that if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith love c. therefore to the acts of enmity against himself cursing idolatry c. To which besides an unseemly scoff is it not a mighty consequence Mr. H. answers divers things as reasons for the denial of the consequence 1. That it is infirm because the actions in the antecedent are good quoad substantiam but these in the consequent are in the substance of them evil Post p. 33. Reply 1. Mr. Gale doth not limit wicked actions to those that are in the substance of them evil but ampliates the term to all whatsoever so that supposing the consequence were not good to such actions as Mr. H. instanceth in yet it may be good to those actions that are evil quoad finem circumstantias as to the end and circumstances For instance to be hospitable or charitable out of vain-glory to be reading the Scriptures at home when we should attend upon publick worship c. and Mr. H. seems to yield it 2. I am not yet convinced that there are any actions evil quoad substantiam And it is a wonder to me that our Learned Antagonist should exact of us an implicite faith of that Position It ill becomes his generosity so basely to beg the question Let him prove that and I will be his Proselyte as to antipredetermination of such actions But because he neglecteth the duty he owes to his Hypothesis I will perform mine to my own anon 2. Mr. H. denies the consequence by an argument a pari That we our selves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others yet it doth not follow that because we may assord our leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good that therefore we may afford it to those that are down right evil because to prayer therefore to cursing and swearing and then ruin men for the actions we have induced them unto Iâ—â—d p. 34. Repl. 1. In general 't is unsafe arguing a pari from the creature to God that what the former may not do neither may the latter The creature is bound to hinder all the sin that he can but if God were under such an obligation there would not only have been so much sin as the world affords but indeed none at all And you your self discourse at large of the incongruity of an universal determinative influence to good actions which yet would have made an admirable Metamorphosis of all the Sinners in the world into Saints at least if in those expressions you include infusion of grace which divine Predetermination of good actions presupposes as I have proved before 2. If your arguing be forcible as to this instance I see not but you reflect as highly upon God by the immediate concurrence you grant to all actions of the Creatures Post p. 28. For will it not follow that God affords men a leading concurrence to actions down-right evil and then ruins them for those actions which were as much his as theirs I am too dull to imagine how you can extricate your self but by eating your words and distinguishing of concurrence as you do of Predetermination that God concurs to actions that are imperfectly good but not to those that are down-right evil 3. Mr. H's answer touches not the intendment of Mr. Gale's argument which is to evince upon Mr. H's own assertion that as God predetermines to actions imperfectly good so by the like reason he may predetermine to actions that are perfectly evil And the ground of the consequence is this that if in actions imperfectly good the evil and the good of the actions are so divided between the creature and God that only the former is the Creatures and the latter Gods whilst yet the natural actions themselves are common to both to God as the first to the Creature as the second cause why may not we infer that in actions perfectly evil the action is common to God and the Creature but the evil of it the Creatures peculiar and no more chargeable upon God than in the other instance And this I take for an irrefragable Argument ad hominem which if Mr. H. can satisfie I am silenced 4. It is an unaccountable inadvertency for to salve his honour so I will call it rather than a slip of Judgment to produce cursing and swearing for instances of actions down-right or for the substance of them evil I thought that Davids frequent cursing of wicked men in the Psalms and Pauls swearing Before God I lye not Gal. 1.20 had not passed under so bad a character but did rest assured that as the actions in themselves are capable so in them they were hallowed by their manner and end 5. To what end Mr. Howe closes with this clause And then ruine men for the actions we have induced them to is not hard to conjecture viz. to insinuate that our Doctrine represents God under the same character with the Devil who induces men to sin and then torments them for it But what is said untruly as well as Prophanely of the Devil is verified of our Doctrine That it is not so black as it is painted Mr. Howe indeed tells Mr. Gale you 'l say God may rather and adds as his own sense But sure he can do so much less than you p. 34. This suggestion deserves a severer animadversion than I shall make upon it In general I say 't is an odious slander For we in no sense assert that God induces men to wicked actions not morally for we constantly affirm that his commands threats are all against it not Physically for so he determines men to actions not to the wickedness of them nor does he ruine men for what he contributes by Predetermination or immediate concurrence to the Production of viz. the natural actions he moves to and joins in Answ 3. Mr. Howe denies the consequence from the evidence of two Scriptures compared Luk. 6.9 Hos 13.6 p. 35. but which is strange hath not directed us how he infers from them the denial of Mr. Gale's consequence or how they shew a difference between the warrantableness of Gods concurring to the substrate matter of an action as good which tends to mans salvation and blessedness and to the substrate matter of all their evil actions which tend to their ruine and misery we must therefore guess at it as well as we can Reply The former Scripture hath these words Is it lawful on the sabbath days to do good or to do evil to save life or to destroy The latter these O Israel thou hast destroyed thy self but in me is thine help From the former Scripture I presume thus he argues If it be unlawful to man to destroy life then it is unlawful to God But the antecedent is true therefore the consequent And he proves the consequence by the latter Scripture by this Enthymeme Gods word is to help man Ergo it is unlawful
for him to destroy And this viz. that man destroys himself Ergo 't is unlawful for God to destroy him To which I return 1. That the antecedent or minor of the first Syllogism is not true universally for for it is not unlawful for man to destroy life se defendendo i.e. in self-defence but it must be limited to Homicide or murther which notes not barely the act of destroying life but involves with it a vitiosity or that act done in cases prohibited by the divine Law 2. Suppose it were yet I deny the consequence and you cannot be any whit-ased or relieved by the thin Sophistry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word Lawful which you must have recourse to For suppose you take it in the antecedent strictly and in the consequent analogically in the former for the declared pleasure of a ruler to his Subject in the latter for an habitual fixed principle and rule of acting after one steady tenour which are both your own distinctions and explications of the word Law Let. p. 41. yet the consequence is utterly false because depending upon this false ground that whatever man may not do in regard of Gods Law God himself may not do because of his own nature or habitual fixed Principle and Rule of acting after one steady nature as you something odly describe it In this sense the subtil Twisse rejects Zuinglius maxim Quod nobis est Lex Deo est ingenium is Gods nature to himself Though in another sense he admits it That such obligation as the divine Law lays upon us to do nothing repugnant to it that Gods nature lays upon him to do nothing repugnant to it Now then though it be unlawful to man to kill in such cases as the Law exempts yet it is not contrary to Gods nature to kill and so not unlawful to him 3. To the Enthymeme we deny the connexion that because in or from God is mans help that therefore it is unlawful for him to destroy for how then does God own himself the author of all evils of suffering Amos 3.6 Shall there be evil in a City and the Lord hath not done it And besides we see not such is the dimness of our sight how the consequence would be proved thereby were the connexion granted The proofs subjoined hang together so loosly that I cannot make sense of them and therefore will dismiss them Your general drift I am aware of that you deny Predestination to evil actions though you concede it to good because it seems more congruous to the divine goodness to concur a term that you will still use though improper enough to signifie that divine action we call Predetermination as hath been shewn once and again to actions that have good in them rather than to these that have evil in them because the one tends to the salvation the other to the destruction of man To which I answer This Argument if it hath any weight will bear as hard upon immediate concurrence which you grant to all actions and so to sinful as upon Predetermination and whatever answer will relieve you will with the same hand ease us I will pause a little with the Readers leave and try my skill what answer I can excogitate for Mr. Howe which will not be a common friend to us both as we have been hitherto one to another and I hope shall remain notwithstanding this publick contest I have thought out my thoughts and they afford me but three Answers 1. That immediate concurrence as to sinful actions divides between the action and the sinfulness so that 't is only the action as such which is Gods and mans at once the sinfulness of it is to be attributed to man only And this distinction is an open friend to us and to which therefore upon all fit occasions we pay our respects 2. That if it be granted divine concurrence is as immediate to evil as to good actions so as hath been explained yet that does not necessitate or compel the will to any elicite act i. e. inward acts of willing or nilling neither does Predetermination judg it self guilty as to any such crime for that does but put the creature upon that action which is produced by Gods immediate concurrence with it And but that it waits a fitter time to speak out her mind she could say That she conceives not how she can compel the will to any act without compelling God himself seeing one and the same act thereof is as truly Gods as the creatures 3. If immediate concurrence thinks her self disobliged to satisfie an inquisitive curiosity as to the modus or manner how she joines with the creature in an action to which sin does necessarily adhere seeing the thing it self is plain that so strict is the dependance of the creature upon the Creator that it cannot act without Gods immediate concurrence Predetermination claims the same priviledg upon the like ground that the creature cannot exert its natural powers till they be applied to action nor determine it self to action till it be determined which determination cannot include a compulsion of the will which is the main if not the only controversie for if the will act spontaneously and from precedent deliberation how is it forced if it do not how is it a will i. e. a rational appetite Arg. 4. which is Mr. Gale's second is There is no action so sinful that it hath not some natural good as the substrate of it Postsc p. 36. Answ 1. To which Argument proposed by way of Question Mr. Howe answers True Reply But then if that be true your former position that some actions are evil in the substance of them p. 33. must needs be false Let us but formalize the Opposition thus some actions are so sinful that they have no natural good as the substrate matter of them which is the sense of the words just now quoted no actions are so sinful that they have not some natural good as the substrate matter of them and it will appear that they are propositions contradictory and consequently that they cannot both be true They are two known Rules in Logick contradictio est oppositio inter universalem particularem Enunciationem aut propositionem And Harum alterutra semper vera altera semper falsa Answ 2. Mr. Howe presently flinches and Sophister-like puts more into the conclusion than was in the premises And what must be inferr'd says he viz. from his own concession That therefore God must by a determinative influence produce every such action what-ever reason there be against it Reply Those words included in the semiquadrates are injuriously foisted in For Mr. Gale's Argument entirely is thus If there be no action so sinful that it hath not some natural good as the substrate of it then God is the cause viz. by Predetermination of that natural good that is in every action sed verum prius Ergo Posterius And indeed the Argument it self excludes any
of a sensitive appetite for to this last spontaneity is essential and intellectual too and so it is for it proceeds from and is guided by a precedent though mistaken judgment of the understanding which represents God to him as a Tyrant that abuses his authority by needless restraints upon mans natural inclinations Suppose to unchastity with any woman whose skin and features attract his liking Joseph's Brethrens hatred of him was determined by God to the selling rather than killing of him yet as they acted spontaneously so upon precedent consideration Two Reasons determined their choice of the milder course of the two they had in view He is our Brother and our Flesh and what profit is it if we slay him and conceal his blood Gen. 37.26 3. If there be any reason to infer Coaction from Predetermination it must be the inconsistency of necessity on Gods part and contingency on mans Which if it be universally affirmed 1. Then I know not how Mr. Howe will salve the objection against immediate concurrence which he seems to grant that thereby the liberty of the will seems to be lost both as to the exercise and specification of the act Unless as Burgesdicius does whose solution offers it service he being the first Metaphysick Author that ever I read That the concourse of God takes not away the contingency of voluntary actions because it does not precede the action of the second cause Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9. But then that reason if assented to will give a mortal wound to the Predestination which certainly precedes them of good actions which Mr. H. acknowledges or if he will loose the knot artificially he must say that the concourse of God is so accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting that notwithstanding it natural causes act necessarily and voluntary causes contingently or freely and then the same answer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions 2. The denial of the consistency between liberty and necessity in general will bear as hard upon what we grant and Mr. H. cannot deny actions in themselves good as Amor Dei the love of God as it can do upon what we deny and you assert actions in themselves evil as odium Dei the hatred of God And harder for the Will is but in part free to good actions when as 't is wholly free I mean disposed and inclined to evil actions We are now the better prepared by way thus made to answer Mr. H's proofs of his consequence Which are 1. Not to do an action whereto the agent is determined by an infinite power is impossible Let. p. 33. Ergo not to do wicked actions for that 's the sum of his consequent in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof to which the creature is determined is impossible Rep. 1. In general that supposing his Antecedent true as 't is in the sense before given yet the impossibility he speaks of is not a simple and most strictly natural impossibility which he before asserted but an impossibility respective to the determination of an infinite power as hath been proved R. 2. That if he intends a respective or conditional impossibility I grant his Enthymeme for it hurts our Hypothesis no more than his viz. of determination to good actions For all determination does infer a necessity that the thing determined should be as it is determined to be or an impossibility that the thing determined should not be as it is determined to be Rep. 3. If we must supply from the Hypoth major the term irresistibly to modifie the determination he opposes and we must understand by it compulsion or force we again concede the whole without any disadvantage to us And so we may rid our hands of it as an ignoble begging of the Question for that was incumbent on him to prove not to take for granted that our Predetermination imports a Coaction Mr. H's second Enthymeme is this To separate the malignity of an action intrinsecally evil is impossible p. 33. Ergo not to do such wicked actions to which the creature is determined is impossible Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Arguments sake I cannot imagine how he will defend the immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures and so to sinful actions and so to those if there be any such as are in themselves evil against the charge of involving God in the production of sinful actions as such seeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrinsecally evil action is as much Gods as mans action Baronius and Strangius who are as Heterodox as Mr. H. do both confess that it is very hard to shew how God may be freed from that charge when-as he co-operates with the creature to every sinful action Bar. Met. 98. D. 3. n. 72. Strang. de Vol. Dei p. 344 372. Though Mr. H. would lay the great difficulty and encumbrance infer'd upon our Religion only upon Predeterminative concourse to wicked actions Yet the Learned Amesius a Predeterminant tells us not without reason Deformitas moralis magis annexa videtur actui in exercito quam in applicatione ad agendum Cont. Grev. p. 189. i.e. Moral deformity seems more closely joined to action than to application unto action For an object may be innocently presented to the eye which may put a man upon action viz. unchast desires Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent ex animo because it does implicate that there should be any such action 'T is a received maxim Malum est in bono tanquam in subjecto i.e. Evil is in good as in its subject And Augustine's saying is well known and as well approved Ipsum quantulum-cunque esse bonum est quia summum esse bonum est De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. Being it self how inconsiderable soever is good because the chiefest Being is good R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a separation of an action from the evil of it Of this separation there are many instances supposing Usury lawful which I will not now dispute I may lawfully take up money at use at Ten pounds per Cent. if my necessity require it when the Interest allowed by Law which to break in matters of publick benefit is sinful is but 6 l. A Christian Prince may urge the great Turk to swear to Articles of Peace though the former knows the latter will swear by his Mahomet These are instances of our concurrence to the actions of others in a remoter kind than God does concur to the actions of his creature as Mr. H. speaks in another case Post p. 33. And by the like reason may God Predeterminatively concur as Mr. H. delights to speak though not accurately to an action that is evil and yet not to the evil of it which the Learned Twisse illustrates by divers pretty similitudes An Horseman that puts on a lame horse to go is the cause of his motion not of his halting that proceeds from some hurt in
that as to the evil of it their physical influence is alike i. e. they have none at all for sin not being a physical effect cannot have a physical cause If the latter besides that that influence is not in the Question the Sinner and the Tempter have influence and concurrence to wicked actions and God not at all for neither by Commands Counsels Threats nor Promises does he induce men to sin 2. Were it so yet the immediate concurrence which he acknowledges to all actions and so to sinful actions in conjunction with the notion he entertains with self-applause of the inseparableness of the evil of some actions from the actions themselves makes himself obnoxious to the same charge of making Gods concurrence with sinful actions to be as much or more than the Sinners or the Tempters Arg. 3. Lastly he charges the Predetermination of sinful actions with irreconcilableness with Gods wisdom and sincerity c. Postsc p. 25. by which c. I presume he intends in his Counsels Exhortations and what-ever means he uses to prevent them which are the expressions he uses in the Title-Page of his Letter in reference to Prescience Reply As to both of these perfections of God I am not aware of any thing well said by Mr. Howe for the reconcileableness of Gods Prescience with them which may not by a just proportion be applied to Gods Predetermination For the evincing whereof we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs 1. To speak particularly of Gods wisdom 1. That there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit Let. p. 51. Reply The same may be said of Predetermining and dehorting though not simply as to the terms yet as to the things signified by them for the elicite acts of the will being the Object of Predetermination contested for we may at first sight perceive it cannot be compell'd and so as to the event infers but a necessity of infallibility as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from which also Prescience does 2. Mr. Howe goes on Let it be supposed only that the blessed God hath belonging to his nature universal Prescience we will surely upon that supposition acknowledg it to belong to him as a perfection And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for Government or wer it a good consequence he foreknows all things he is therefore unfit to govern the world Let. p. 54. Reply And why may not we as well argue thus Let it be but supposed only that universal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature we will upon that supposition acknowledg it a perfection And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection that he not only conserves the powers of his creatures but reduces them to act he is disabled for government or were it a good consequence He is the first cause not only of all beings but of all actions as such therefore he is unfit to govern the world And I will add nay surely but the more fit in the present state of mankind not to intermeddle now with Angels because all the actions of men being either in whole or in part sinful he would have nothing to govern if he had not the government of all their actions and govern them he could not nor limit them nor turn them to good if he did not Predetermine them as hath been I trust clearly evinced 3. Would the supposition of such foreknowledg in God make that cease to be mans duty which had otherwise been so Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledg have to alter or affect any way either the nature of the thing foreknown or the Temper of the person that shall do it any more than the present knowledg of the same thing now in doing p. 55. Reply And can Predetermination make that cease to be mans duty which otherwise had been so seeing that it alters not the nature of the thing the will of man nor the Temper of the person Predetermin'd but as it finds the will free so it leaves it and as it finds the person disposed by habitual inclinations so works upon him which is confirmed by that grave observation of his which we embrace as our cordial friend and confederate It were very unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of such a creture as over whom Gods general course of Government is by moral instruments viz. Man in a way agreeable enough to its nature Let. p. 141. Only we extend it further That supposing what hath been before proved that Predetermination includes a Perfection God can in all cases determine the will without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency for that were to alter the nature of the will and the temper of the person whose will it is And I add what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing or person fore-determined more than immediate concurrence to the same action of the same person now in doing 4. But if what was otherwise mans duty be still his duty what can make it unfit that it be made known and declared to him to be so and how is that otherwise to be done than by these disputed means yea for this is the case what can make it less fit than that God should quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures upon no other reason than only that he foresees they have a mind to invade it Let. p. 56. Reply All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Prescience wherein Mr. Howe and we agree what can make it unfit that God should acquaint man with his duty by proper means seeing Predetermination supposes such a foreknowledg as Mr. Howe supposes antecedent to Gods decree of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government if put under such and such circumstances or rather because we understand not any foreknowledg but of Possibilium things possible not Futurorum of things future antecedent to Gods decree seeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right without which he could not will so to do leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action as if it exerted all its elicite acts only by a power derived from God and preserved apt and habile for action 4. But it may now be said All this reasoning says Mr. Howe tends but to establish this assertion that notwithstanding God did foreknow mans sin it is however necessary he forewarn him of it but it answers not the objected difficulty viz. How reasonably any such means are used for an unattainable end as it manifests the end mans obedience cannot be attained when it is foreknown he will not obey Let. p. 57. To this difficulty Mr. Howe answers That there is this noble and important end which Gods Edicts aim at viz. the Dignity and Decorum of his Government it self