futurition made from Eternitie but what is eternal To which he answers with a scoffe thus A pretty argumentation indeed why may we not by the same reason prove that the futurition of sin is God The same is urged by Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes 55 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God it is God which makes God manifestly the Author of sin The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us But in answer hereto I must confesse I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned and in other points judicious on such infirme and rotten grounds For when we speak of the futurition of sin which is a complexe aggregate thing we must distinguish its material from its formal part 1 If we speak of the material entitative part of sin which is in itself a natural good so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme that its futurition is the same or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof and why not is not the futurition of al natural Beings good And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good Yea was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God and sonot really distinct from him So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings even the most gratiose acts from the same wil for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil specially in Adams innocent state who had then perfect free-wil But yet 2 if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie so we utterly denie that its futurition is the same with God for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God but permissive God decrees to effect the entitative act but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto which follows on the act as other privations do on the absence of their habit To make this evident by a parallel instance God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere whence darknesse necessarily follows may we thence argue that the futurition of darknesse or darknesse itself is the same with God Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes And yet who dares denie but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God as also its futurition The like may be instanced in al other privations which have no real being and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition but what has a real efficient cause of its existence what is the first efficient of the existence of things Is it not the wil of God and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition give them also in their appointed periods of time their existence So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true That the same cause that gives things their existence gives them also their futurition this I say holds true of the first cause but not of second causes as they would needs persuade us So that to conclude this argument in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason or vitiositie of sin hence it necessarily follows that the predeterminative Concurse of God whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin § 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude of Gods Prescience and we may forme it thus God can certainly foreknow nothing but what he certainly decrees predefines and predetermines to be But God certainly foreknows al sin Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none that I know except Atheists and Socinians Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God but what has some certain Reasons Principes and Causes of such a foreknowledge Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience 1 A certitude of the Object for if the object be uncertain the Science can never be certain can the Structure or Edifice be firme if the foundation be infirme 2 A certain Medium which is the principal fundamen of al Science 3 A certitude of the Subject for be the Object and Medium never so certain yet there can be no certain Science unless the Subject apprehend the same And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude Must there not be a certitude of the Object Medium and Subject 2 Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree 1 How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so 2 What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience but the divine Wil and Decree 3 And thence how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil Hence 3 Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages Scotus Ricardus Hervaeus Bradwardine Johannes Major and others not a few as Le Blanc de Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 33. p. 443. confesseth Yea Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea Le Blanc De Concord Libert Hum. Par. 1. Thes 59. c. p. 455. proves strongly That according to Strangius's opinion there can no contingent i. e. sinful act be foreknown by God as absolutely future but what God first decreed to be absolutely future His words are these But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future and as such to be foreknown by God without any Decree
sin it is suggested by some and believed by others that we make the holy God the Author of sin which is the dregs of blasphemie and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout but that with divine assistance we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacitie of Divine concurse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majestie from that blasphemous Imputation of being the Author of sin And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us 1 To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in or virtually relating to the subject in controversie 2 To shew wherein the opposite parties agree and wherein they differ both among themselves and each from other together with the original and principal motives grounds and causes of such Differences 3 To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful with an answer to those false glosses and comments which our Adversaries the Jesuites Arminians and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them 4 To draw up a brief Historie or Narrative of this controversie and its state in al periods of the Christian Churches to this day 5 To give the Demonstration of our Hypothesis from Reasons grounded on Scripture with the Vindication of those Reasons from the ungrounded invalid answers given to them by our opponents Strangius and others 6 To solve and answer the Objections urged by those that oppose our Hypothesis particularly Strangius Baranius Le Blanc with others 7 And finally to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheses of the Orthodoxe about this subject in opposition to those false Opinions which their Adversaries charge upon them as also to produce the proper opinions of the adverse party and the dangerous consequences that naturally and necessarily flow from them § 2. Our first and indeed principal task in order to a clear and demonstrative procedure in this controversie wil be to explicate the termes and disabuse them from those ambiguities confusions and false impositions in which at present they are involved And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding state of the Churches of Christ by reason of those vexatious controversies which rend and tear out their very bowels and al from the sophistic abuse or Ambiguitie of termes And I no way dout but to make it most manifest when opportunitie is offered that most of the controversies of this Age are somented and maintained from the obscuritie and abuse of termes misapplyed by subtile wits for the establishment of their own Hypotheses This is most evident in our present case which makes it a duty absolutely necessary before we enter on our province to clear up the way by a distinct and particular explication of those termes that relate thereunto The first Terme we are to consider is Sin wherein we are to examine its Origne Causes Constitution both material and formal and Kinds particularly the nature of Acts substantially or intrinsecally sinful al which we shal discusse with that Brevitie and Perspicuitie the mater wil admit 1. As for the Origine of Sin it came first into the world from the Defectibilitie of our first Parents their Free-wil and has been ever since maintained and fomented by the Vitiositie of human nature depraved by Adams sin as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 2. and Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 3. 2. Sin as to its material constitution has for its substrate mater or subject some natural good For al sin being as to its formal nature but a moral privation or relation it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject The wise Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law so constituted al moral Beings both Virtues and Vices as that they cannot subsist but in something natural albeit sin be according to its formal reason a mere privation yet it requires some positive real natural Being for its subject according to the nature of al other privations Thus Augustin That which is evil by reason of vice is good by nature Again he saith That sin is not nature but the vice of nature And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients That al evil is founded in some good i. e. natural sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion Thus Augustin Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things sinful as sinful are not good yet not only that good things but also that sinful be is good i. e. things sinful are good not morally but naturally as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie for albeit they oppose the bonitie of the creature yet materially considered they oppose not the bonitie of the Creator who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God to permit sins to be Yea doth not the ingresse of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good This is wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 11. sect 3. p. 252. Sin as sin has a material cause which is always some good So Augustin saith That there can be no evil but in good because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself and the reason is because sin as to its formal cause is not purely positive or a pure negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is due which subject must be some good c. Yea Strangius himself our principal Adversary in this Controversie grants in this particular as much as we demand pag. 629. That it is absurd to say any sin or defect can exist of itself sithat there can be no separate evil but al evil is seated in good Yea he ingenuously confesseth pag. 245. That hatred of God which is an action intrinsecally evil as it is an Act and Being so it is from God namely as it is hatred For adds he So hatred truly as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action to which the metaphysic bonitie of Ens or Being agrees and it is morally indifferent but as it is determined to God hence is its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquitie This concession of Strangius if wel considered would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis but also put a period to this Controversie as in what follows we shal demonstrate Chap. 6. § 1. 3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason which we shal endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions 1 Al human
of further grace 4 Whereas he saith That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto is not sin but ruine the consequent of their sin the word stumbling and falling signifying their destruction it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie according to our precedent explication of them primarily their sin and then their ruine or destruction as the consequent of their sin This also is evident from that parallel Text Jude 4. For there are certain men crept in unawares who were of old ordained to this condemnation ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse and denying the only Lord God These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination to be given up to this condemnation of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse c. So that it is evident that God foreordained and decreed not only their destruction but to leave them to those sins which should cause the same But to sum up the whole of this Head we grant 1 That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins or damnation It 's true elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation 2 That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated Yet we denie 1 That it is injust for God by an absolute efficacious Decree to reprobate some for the glorifying of his own Justice For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any 2 We denie also that there is any motive cause or condition of Reprobation as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also 3 we denie that the act of Reprobation is merely negative but affirme that it is positive and absolute of which see Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprobat p. 113. Hence 4 It necessarily follows that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation he predestines and preordains in like manner by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil to leave men to their own sinful courses and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins See more Chap. 5. § 3. CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 1 Fathers Augustin Prosper Fulgentius 2 Such as succeeded in the Roman Church Hugo de Sancto Victore Aquinas Scotus Ariminensis Holcot Altissiodorensis Bradwardine his Conversion Parts both natural and acquired zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin How God wils Sin How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators also of the Tridentine Catechisme 3 The Sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius Beza Chamier Lud. Crocius the Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Sam. Ward c. 4 Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin more ancient Durandus his proper Hypothesis and who may be accounted his Sectators Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe Arminius and his Adherents the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes The New Methodistes Camero Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments and who may be estimed such § 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis touching the efficacious predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in al Ages of the Church and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries First among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries as Strangius by name are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works Thus de Grat. Lib. Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture saith he be diligently inspected it wil appear that not only the good wils of men but also the bad are so in Gods power that he can incline them where and when he wil to performe his benefices or to inflict his punishments by his most secret yet most just judgement Again in the same book he saith That God workes in the hearts of men to incline them which way he please either to Good out of his Mercie or to evil according to their deserts by his Judgement sometimes open sometimes secret but always just So De Praedestinat Sanct. c. 16. It is saith he in the power of wicked men to sin but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that is not in their power but of God dividing the darkness and ordering it that so hence what they do against the wil of God might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God Again De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto c. 5. Some things saith he God makes and orders other things he only orders righteous men he makes and orders but sinners as sinners he makes not but only orders i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good and of the action but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin but only of the act ordering it for his glorie Again De Civitate Dei l. 13. c. 22. he saith That Sin as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law that is the Divine Wil or Decree Moreover Augustin frequently asserts that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another So Contra Julian l. 5. c. 3. de Civitate Dei l. 15. c. 6. libro de Natura Gratia from cap. 20. to the end To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Augustin which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin As 1 He asserted that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil and so in it self positive and absolute 2 He held That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation of which see Jansenius August de Gâ—…t Christ l. 10. c. 3 4. 3 He maintained That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary because punishments as Jansen de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly that Augustin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians who
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed must hold That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause whence by consequence such must assert That there are two first Causes one of Good and the other of Evil which was the error of Marcion and Manes who held there were two first Principes the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme good who was the cause of al good the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme evil God who was the cause of al evil And certainly they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes Again Hieronymus Epist ad Ctesiphontem makes this Antithesis of Durandus to be the Doctrine of Pelagius who saith he held That God having once conferred free-wil it is not necessary that he further operate with us and he speaks of natural operations as of the motion of the hand c. which was Durandus's opinion Though I cannot but confesse Jansenius August Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us the Pelagians granted That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurse to al operations in termes but denied it in effect and consequences as our Adversaries now-a-days Compton Carleton in his Philosoph Vnivers Disput 28. Sect. 1. § 3. assures us that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him by Nicolaus Bonetus lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others But yet it cannot be denied but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was Durandus whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme which they cal a rash erroneous dangerous error little better than Arianisme Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. lib. Arb. saith it is repugnant to the Scriptures Testimonies of the Fathers and manifest Reason Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith It is erroneous in Faith de Concursu l. 1. he assertes That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended but also rejected by al approved Theologues as an error in Faith Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse and so much decried by Papists themselves But to give a convictive demonstration that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators Durandus proposeth his opinion in sentent l. 2. Dist 1. Q. 5. in these words Vtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature which he denies and the principal reasons of his negation are these 1 Because then God should be the author of Sin 2 Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie in that it determines the wil and so puts an end to its Indifference of which see Strangius p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus yet I must freely declare my mind I cannot conceive how they can without apparent contradiction defend their own but by espousing that of Durandus which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth And that the most of our Adversaries even among the New Methodists who in profession disown it fal under the imputation of Durandisme we shal anon make evident when we come to treat of their particular sentiments at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme 1 Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only and not immediate unto the Act fal under the imputation of Durandisme This is wel observed by Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause moving it to act without a continued concurse to the action fal into the error of Durandus Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus a professed abettor of Durandisme Thus also Amyraldus and a Divine of name among our selves 2 Al those who hold only a general immediate concurse to the act such as is determinable by the mater it workes on as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme Thus Baronius together with the Remonstrants and Molinists 3 Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience justly fal under the marque of Durandisme Thus Camero and our Adversaries generally who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil 4 Al those who affirme That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse must necessarily symbolise with Durandus This is acknowledged by Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse sithat this involves no contradiction To which he answers wel in the Negative that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence involves a flat contradiction because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with as hereafter in our account of Strangius But we descend to the particular Sects who oppose our Thesis with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of Durandus And we shal begin with the Jesuites who now generally passe under the name of Molinists from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr cum Gratiae donis c. Quaest 14. Disp 26. assertes 1 That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act but only on the act it self and effect Whence 2 That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act but only simultaneous i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act and conserves the same Thence 3 That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative at least as to human acts but only indifferent and determinable like that of the
Wil to the entitative act of sin 1 From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree the objections against this argument solved 2 From the certitude of Divine Prescience with the solution of objections 3 From the Decree of Reprobation Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees 4 From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe and Origine 2 Its Nature Totalitie Vniversalitie Particularitie Immediation Prioritie and Independence 3 Its Efficace as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin strike as much against Predetermination to what is good 5 From the nature of sin its substrate mater and formal reason 6 From Gods permission of sin which is natural negative and positive 7 From Divine providence about sin both conservative restrictive gubernative 8 From the absolute immediate essential dependence of al creatures on God as the first cause § 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence which we shal reduce to the following Heads 1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree which we thus forme That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence The major is granted by our Adversaries particularly by Strangius who oft assertes That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event And what more rational than this assertion Yea what is predetermination of the event but predefinition in the Decree The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation as active Creation gives futurition to things and passive actual existence so predefinition and predetermination and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor which our Adversaries principally strike at and therefore needs our strongest forces This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature without some cause of its futurition How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie contingence and indifference but by some cause Do not possible and future differ and must there not be some cause of this difference 2 Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal This is most evident because whatever is future was so from Eternitie for God foreknew it to be so otherwise how could his knowlege be certain Hence 3 Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God For is there any thing but God eternal 4 Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things for things are not future because God foreknows them but he therefore foreknows them because future Hence it follows that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. § 9. whence also it necessarily follows 5 That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege but the wil of God which gives futurition to althings And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections 1 They replie to our minor That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but from the wil of man that gives existence to it Thus Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove That it is not repugnant that something should be future which God hath not absolutely predefined but left to the wil of man to effect So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes That God hath not decreed al futures namely the Fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost c. So pag. 631. he saith Nothing hinders but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc Concord Libert Hum. p. 1. thes 55 57. where he endeavors to prove That what is the cause why things existe in time the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time ergo c. A poor Response indeed or rather begging of the Question For is it possible that the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie yea in Nature that the cause is ever at least in order of nature before the effect and is the second cause confined by time before the eternal futurition of its effect 2 But Le Blanc answers hereto thes 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason and an extrinsec denomination of the thing which is said to be future not something really distinct from the thing future c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident for hereby it follows that the thing is not future before it is existent can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence How many absurdities would follow hereon But our Adversaries have one grand Objection which they lay much weight on against our minor and that is this If the wil of God gives futurition to sin then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God and so the futurition of sin must be God This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius Le Blanc and a Divine of name among us So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631 632. having pag. 626 c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin he replies thus Herein saith he lies the whole force of the argument that there can be no other cause of a
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
it must be moral and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause and Author of them and is not this an high piece of blasphemie We are so far from asserting that God determines men to the most wicked actions as that we say he determines men to no wicked action no not the least Yea we adde further that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good and in part sinful albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act or the act as sinful So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie 1 Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree 2 The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience Futurition Divine Concurse and Gods permission of sin 3 The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees the Futurition Divine Permission Prescience Providence Predefinition and Predetermination of Sin THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise For here that old Proverbe holds true A good beginning is half the work But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest 1 Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree 2 Wherein our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis differ among themselves 3 Wherein we differ from them The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question § 1. Wherein we and our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis do agree Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are others on the contrary make them lesse our first work therefore wil be to shew wherein we agree which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions 1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us albeit they differ from us as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confesse and say that God doth truly decree althings that happen but not althings in one and the same manner but some things effectively other things permissively which is the commun opinion of Theologues according to that famose Axiome of Augustin There is nothing done which the Omnipotent doth not wil either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it Yet the said Strangius in what precedes gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees It is not needful saith he that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God touching his Concurse to be afforded as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature as he hath given them a power to act c. This general Decree foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis is most unworthy of the Divine Being in that it overthrows the Prescience of God imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man This Proposition although it be denied by the Pelagians Socinians and Arminians yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius Le Blanc and others For these albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election why should they not be also estimed such as to Reprobation Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God See hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin as wel as of al other Events This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius c. as also by most Arminians although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie For al the wit of man yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees I must solemnely professe I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events of which more in what follows Chap. 5. § 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie he predetermines in time This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition we willingly grant that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us to the same he doth determine our wil For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined it is necessary that he effect the same or cause that it be done because the Decree of God seeing it is absolute and efficacious must necessarily have its effect which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefinite act otherwise if the wil should not act that which is predefined the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated which is absurd A good concession which wil be of use to us in what follows Chap. 5. § 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good as also to some other commun acts and effects This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians as also by Baronius yet the New Methodists who have chalked out a middle Way generally entertain it Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shewen that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil namely not in actions intrinsecally evil and to which Vitiositie is necessarily annexed albeit in things lawful not only in works of
the presence of althings in Eternitie Wherein he follows the Dominicans and so must by consequence resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it which overthrows his Hypothesis Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he resolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes Lastly cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confesseth That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision Which is al that we contend for and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin into the act of his wil permitting it Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science Thus Le Blanc De Concord Libert p 444. Thes 39. As for the fourth opinion which secketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate Yet Thes 40. he confesseth That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question nor take away the principal difficultie For that which is here most difficult to be understood is how future contingents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of futures that so under that reason they may be perceived by God Which knot he endeavors to untie by telling us that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition But this is a very jejune and poor evasion as we shal hereafter shew Chap. 5. § 1. 3 Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites middle science whereby God foresees that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes circumstances and providential concurrences the effect wil certainly follow albeit in itself merely contingent Thus Lud. Crocius Dyodec Dissert Dissert 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle science which Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 449. Thes 26 c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others Le Blanc himself pag. 444. Thes 42. confesseth That it wants not great difficultie how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not nor yet change the nature of its object Whence he concludes Thes 43. That seing there is so much darknesse on al sides our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture A poor refuge indeed why then do they so daringly sift and prie into the Divine prescience and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason We easily grant that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof but this we assert that it is impossible the Divine prescience which is in itself most certain should depend on the most incertain ambulatory wil of man and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate 2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the futurition of sin and Gods predefinition thereof Strangius l. 3. c. 11. holds That some free acts are absolutely future and knowen of God as such without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts and yet he denies that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition Whence it wil follow that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future but what he first decreed to be absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 455. 3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves touching Gods concurse its immediation totalitie prioritie efficace and predetermination as to sinful acts 1 How many of them incline to the sentiments of Durandus denying al immediate concurse to sinful acts And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes how many yet denie it in realitie Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith yea repugnant thereto 2 Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Some grant a total concurse to the physic entitative act in the general but not in particular others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular abstracting the reference it has to its object Thus Strangius lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically which is al that we contend for Others on the contrary make Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general asserting with Molina Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin So a Divine of name among us yea he asserts that God never totally permits sin 3 Our Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Prioritie of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Some grant Gods concurse hereto previous though not predeterminative so Strangius but others make it to be only simultaneous asserting that God concurs with the wil of man in the same moment of nature and reason to the same act So Baronius wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians 4 Lastly the principal difference among our Adversaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurse as to the substrate mater of sin Some make the concurse of God to be only general and indifferent and so determinable by the second cause as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 73 74 75. pag. 142 c. where he makes Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse Wherein he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuites more particularly Molina Concord Liber Arbitr cum Grat. donis c. Quaest 14. Disput 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our selves openly asserts that Gods concurse is determinable by the creature But Strangius albeit he too far fals in with the sentiments of Baronius against predetermination yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concurse as too grosse and Pelagian So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore that God concurs only by a general concurse as the Sun concurs in the same manner to
the generation of a man and of an horse and of a mouse but we determine that the influxe of God is special to special effects as they are physically distinguished specie and unto al kind of entitie but not to the reason of moral iniquitie which consistes in privation Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius's Hypothesis touching a general indifferent concurse but yet I must confesse upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficace yet he makes it be but commun and no way determinative and therefore only indifferent The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very positive in this that no man living can rationally exemt themselves from the imputation of the Jesuites indifferent concurse and assert an efficacious special concurse but what is determinative as to the subject it workes on And thence Le Blanc Concil Arbitr part 3. thes 36. p. 434. confesseth That Strangius ' s opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius Lastly Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78 c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good and to many other acts of the wil whensoever God pleaseth or need requireth yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures specially to such as are intrinsecally evil as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis but wil at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius the Remonstrants and Jesuites or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with of which hereafter Chap. 5. § 4. 4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods permission of sin its nature and efficace 1 A Divine of repute among our selves assertet◠that no act of sin no not the active selling of Joseph or crucifying of Christ was willed by God but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect yea he saith That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense but others allow that God wils the acts of sin as penal or conducible to his own glorie though not as sinful acts Thus Strangius l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction at first framed by Bellarmine and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves of active and passive vendition and crucifixion he concludes thus Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself as hereafter Chap. 3. § 2. 2 Some of our Opponents assert Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious yea idle and unactive but others allow it an efficace and energie for the limiting directing and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends albeit not about the act itself which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction for how can Gods permission limit direct and order sinful acts but by influencing the very act itself materially considered See more of this Chap. 5. § 6. 5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about the Nature of sin its formal Reason c. Some and those of no smal repute among our selves hold sin as to its formal reason to be a positive real Being which indeed is most agreable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which they denie to be as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes one of good the other of evil but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin without making God the Author of sin or making mans corrupt wil independent and so the first cause of a real positive act Therefore Strangius lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strongly argues with the Orthodoxe that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation But withal we are here to note that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater of which more hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves as wel as from us namely touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil natural impossibilitie and possibilitie Gods decretive and approbative wil of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions for how is it possible that they should agree among themselves when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part Chap. 5. § 3. We procede now to shew Wherein we differ from those of the new method Strangius Baronius Le Blanc and others about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted there sprang up some Divines who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod but yet contrived a new method specially as to universal Grace Reprobation and Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie as we shal hereafter demonstrate And the principal Agent who undertook the new modelling this last head was Strangius which he has copiosely treated of according to the new method in his Book De Voluntate Actionibus Dei circa peccatum whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurse to the mater of sin We assert 1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate mater or entitative act of al sin This Proposition Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but sin specially the first sin and such acts as are intrinsecally evil which sufficiently proves our Proposition for we say and are ready to demonstrate that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful but naturally good What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby in which regard we peremptorily
of Soul and self-Dominion yet he grants that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom 2 By the Heart we must understand according to the Hebraic mode the whole soul and al its movements imaginations ratiocinations contrivements purposes and undertakements 3 In the hand of the Lord i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations it 's usually put in Scripture for the energetic potent and predeterminative Concurse of God So Hab. 3. 4. He i. e. Christ whose brightnesse was as the light had hornes i. e. beams as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes coming out of his hands i. e. most potent wil the spring of al his efficacious operations whence it follows and there was the hiding of his power i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power So Solomon saying That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse whereby he applies the heart to its acts conduceth and guideth it therein and determineth it as he pleaseth So it follows 4 As the rivers of waters he turneth it whithersoever he wil. How easie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men please And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God to turne the hearts of men and al their natural conceptions products and issues which way he listes Al this may be evinced from Strangius's glosse on this Text lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence whereby God doth bend impel and incline human wils which way he please not by proper compulsion but by sweet inspiration and motion For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil yet he doth at times and when he please efficaciously move and impel the wils of men and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart Prov. 21. 1. that very same may on a greater account be affirmed of the heart of every man So Augustin de Grat. Liber Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected it shews that not only the good wils of men but even the bad are so in the power of God that where he wil and when he wil he causeth them to be inclined either to performe benefits or to inflict punishments by a most secret yet just judgement So again August de Corrept Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men more than they themselves without dout having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart even such as have intrinsecal evil as they cal it appendent to them Yea Strangius lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and predetermine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes but also to natural and civil as oft as it seems good to him to performe certain ends which he has preordained So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him And how so Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to embrace his brother Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities Exod. 11. 2 3. 12. 35 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple Ezra 6. 1 c. 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God dealt with Jeremy's enemies Jer. 15. 11. Al these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius whence we argue That it is impossible but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions for al these actions being exerted by wicked men had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people yea they were ful of hatred against God To these Scriptures we may adde Act. 17. 28. For in him we live and move and have our being Not only Being in general and Life which implies more than simple being but also al our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets for we are also his off-spring As if he had said Do not your own Poets tel you that we are the off-spring of God Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of al our motions Doth not Aristotle Phys 8. also strongly demonstrate That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions even such as are intrinsecally evil be reduced unto God as the prime Motor I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say If the Lord wil we shal live and do this or that There were a number of Free-willers who proudly conceited that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions whom James rebukes and tels them they ought to say If the Lord wil c. So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God as the original Cause and Principe But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith Who ever understood these words if God wil i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that Then he addes his own glosse But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition IF GOD WIL than this if God shal permit or wil permit as it is elsewhere explicated Act. 16. 7. 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but wonder that a person of so great reason and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation should satisfie himself with so slender an evasion which not only Reason and Scripture but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict For 1 it is most evident that James here as Luke Act. 16. 7. and Paul 1 Cor. 16. 7. speakes not of a mere permissive wil but of an efficacious influential concurse arising from the wil of God which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse for al actions both natural civil and supernatural
they may be extended to althings which God hath decreed So that it 's clear by his own confession that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was predestined predefined constituted foreordained and predetermined by God Whence by a paritie of reason we demonstrate our Hypothesis that the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereunto intrinsecal sin is necessarily annexed is predefined and predetermined by God The inference and conclusion to me is so natural and evident that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Opponents frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christs Crucifixion gives to our Hypothesis 1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among our selves replie That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God not the active i. e. Christs Passion and the effects of it was from God but not the actions of those that crucified him 1 How poor and shiftlesse this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of Joseph from Gen. 45. 5 7 8. 2 But more particularly as to this Head I cannot but wonder how any who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds can satisfie themselves with such jejune notions and evasions Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christs crucifixion how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul which wholly dependes on the death of Christ Again what fine-spun nonsense is this God predetermined the Passion of Christs crucifixion but not the Action as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by Judas but not that Judas should kisse and betray Christ again that Christ should be mocked blasphemed scourged c. by the Souldiers and Jews but that these should not mock blaspheme scourge c. Christ Lastly that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ but yet not that any thrust it in What Logic Reason or sense is this Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us That action and passion are not really but only modally distinct As the way from Athens to Thebes and so back again from Thebes to Athens is but one and the same way diversified only from its relation to different termes so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called Action and as it termines on the patient Passion Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the passion and not to the action of crucifixion But enough of this which is so strongly refuted by Strangius lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772. 2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and pietie evades thus Christs crucifixion was a thing which Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done Act. 4. 28. i. e. foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterprise his sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge so only and not with lesse latitude to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie than to let it procede to this execution And to deliver him up not by any formal resignation or surrender as we wel know but permitting him thereunto Though the same phrase of delivering him hath elsewhere another notion of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men by dying which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties c. This replie of this learned pious Divine so far as I can penetrate and understand it which seems involved under much obscuritie may be resolved into the following parts 1 He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition thereof Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites middle Science making Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree and so dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin which he elsewhere seems to intimate whereas the Scripture which he refers to Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Christs crucifixion subsequent to the predifinition of his determinate Counsel or Decree And certainly al the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate how God should have a certain prescience of Christs crucifixion which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil. 2 He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God Whereas the Text saith categorically That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed 3 He gives us a new Glosse or Paraphrase on that phrase delivering him Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation c. But how little this glosse wil accord with the sense of these Texts is evident For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him and that according to the determinate counsel of God 3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of Strangius whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of those Texts which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He answers lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus The occision and crucifixion of Christ also the kind of death were from God and as they were from God they were good and greatly gloriose and properly the means to procure our salvation and God is deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them Who by his determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them whom with wicked hands they killed on the crosse Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God neither was it willed or predefined by God who cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin Therefore speaking absolutely the occision of Christ was not sin otherwise God should be the Author of sin as to kil a man is not sin And truly if God had commanded men to kil Christ and they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God they had not sinned But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil neither can that be any way wel done or commanded by God Observe here 1 he grants that the crucifixion of Christ with al its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God as the God of nature and so naturally good yea that they were morally good and
and what do we say more Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin But then 5 his last clause presenting objects and occasions c. overthrows al his former concessions for the wise God doth not only present objects and occasions and thereby open a way to mens infatuation but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act and efficaciously permits the vitiositie without the least finger in the sin There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin as Esa 63. 17. O Lord why hast thou made us erre from thy ways and hardened our hearts from thy fear Strangius pag. 839. grants that the Verbe in both Members being in Hiphil oft notes a double action as when we say That one makes another to do a thing though he pretends that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action But it is certain that it cannot here denote a mere naked permission but such as procedes from the efficacious wil of God The like Jer. 20. 7. O Lord thou hast deceived me and I was deceived Whereto answers Ezech. 14. 9. And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing I the Lord have deceived that Prophet Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission namely such as resultes from the active efficacious directive and ordinative wil of God as Strangius lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 840 844. grants What this permission of God is and how far it extendes see what follows Chap. 5. § 6. § 6. Let us now passe on to such Scriptures as mention Gods tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation and induration or hardnesse of heart which wil give a more evident demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Not to insiste on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart Exod. 4. 21. which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine in his Letter to a Friend c. pag. 28 30. I shal begin with Psal 81. 12. So I gave them up to their own hearts lusts or to the hardnesse of their own hearts as Kimhi Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart LXX render it Deut. 29. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Jer. 3. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence it follows and they walked in their own counsels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in their own depraved imaginations It 's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardnesse which they affect his way of hardening is mysterious and invisible he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts and then lets them enjoy what they lust after when men adde acquired hardnesse to natural God justly inflicts on them judicial hardnesse And oh how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully yea voluntarily harden themselves And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual is as wax towards sin and Satans tentations And what is the effect of this judicial hardnesse but to seal up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel Thus God albeit he be not the Author of sin yet is the Orderer of it and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is annexed The like Psal 69. 22. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not and make their loins continually to shake Let their eyes i. e. their minds be darkened 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be made so obscure and dark as that they may not see their way let al true wisdome be taken from them and make their loins continually to shake i. e. take from them al force vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought let them stagger and reel like to a drunken man The shaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force which is chiefly seated in the loins Thus he procedes and then vers 17. brings Divine wrath to a black conclusion Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which implies that God addes the punishment of judicial hardnesse to the iniquitie of their voluntary acquired hardnesse We find this piece of judicial hardnesse cited by Paul Rom. 11. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see and bow down their back alway The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is here rendred by Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bow down the sense being the same for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of strength in the loins To these Texts we may adde Esa 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make the heart fat or grosse i. e. stupid and senselesse for the fat of animals has little sense It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrowen and oppressed with fat These words are six times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows and shut their eyes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is rendred by some dim them or make them dim by others daub them as with plaister or other like mater by others close them al which notes the efficacitie of error and blindnesse that follows on judicial hardnesse The like curse we find Esa 29. 10. For the Lord hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep and hath closed your eyes LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by Theodotion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Act. 10. 11. notes a deep sleep or ecstasie and the radix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to overwhelme with deep sleep and it 's rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dan. 10. 9. So that by the spirit of deep sleep must be understood such a stupor of spirit as leaves men without al sense The allusion is to some soporiferous stupifying wine or potion or medicine which being given to a man or sprinkled on him casts him into a deep sleep Hence the Prophet ushers in these words with a direful exclamation vers 9. Stay your selves and wonder they are drunken but not with wine c. i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a soporiferous stupifying potion As for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pricke Act. 2. 27. but from the ancient word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also remains among the Latins as nuo nutus nutare Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to nod or shake the head as they are wont to do who have drunk any stupifying potion So that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is such a spirituose stupifying potion as deprives men of their senses makes them shake the head stagger and reel as drunken men Thence it follows and hath closed your eyes When God judicially pours out a
what follows touching Bradwardine I now come to Thomas Bradwardine our pious learned and profound Bradwardine whom might I be allowed my libertie I should rather reckon among our first Reformers than among the Sons of Antichrist for indeed he was a zelose Patron of and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion specially efficacious free Grace which he with so much courage strength of argument and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days This Thomas Bradwardine borne at Hartfield in Sussex flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie which he greatly polisht by al manner of acquired Sciences specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations which in his first studies he greedily drank in even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures because they favored not of a metaphysic style as he himself informes us in his Book de Causa Dei When saith he in the state of my unregeneracie I came into the Scholes and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace c. it did no way relish with me quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum because it savored not of a metaphysic style It was with me as it was with Augustin of old nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil c. But after his Conversion he was as another Augustin the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace Balaeus de Script Brit. cent 5. cap. 87. tels us That John Baconthorp that famose Divine and English-man returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination to whom at last Bradwardine assents in al those points as the same Baconthorp declares in Sent. lib. 4. Dist 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbishop of Canterbury without any desire of his own thereto He was indeed a good Mathematician a great Philosopher and excellent Divine being communly stiled Doctor profundus the profound Doctor Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the Cause of God against the Pelagians which he defended with great fervor as wel as acumen of spirit which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei specially lib. 1. c. 30 31 32 33 34. He demonstrates 1 That al voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence cap. 30 31. p. 271 c. 2 That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them and not merely permitting Which he demonstrates many ways as 1 Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. 2 Because otherwise the whole Vniverse would not be disposed in the best manner 3 Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names Thus cap. 32. p. 288. 3 That about whatever Gods Permission is his actual Volition is also employed about the same And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good yet it is good that there should be not only good things but also evil For unless it were good that evils be the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be as Cap. 33. Hence 4 He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie How God wils sin and how he wils it not 1 He proves p. 294 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin because he permits it also God doth voluntarily provide for yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil with al their positive circumstances which necessarily import sin Again This Proposition Sin is is true and therefore there must be some cause of its truth which can be no other than the divine wil from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination Again ` Whatever is good must procede from the first good but that Sin existe is good according to Augustin So Hugo saith That God wils that sins existe because this is good Moreover he brings in Hugo speaking thus which deserves a great remarque If it be said God wils sin this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear and therefore some pious mind doth refute this not because that which is spoken is il spoken but because that which is wel spoken is il understood 2 Thence Bradwardine procedes to refute Lombard who asserts That God wils sin as a punishment not under this reason as it is sin i. e. materially or entitatively considered which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes by shewing That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin so that if God wils sin as a punishment he must necessarily wil the existence of sin Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined and wils that they should be so conjoined and knowingly and rationally wils one the same person wils also the other specially if about both he employ an act of his wil But now God knows and wils that those two Sin and Punishment be conjoined together and rationally wils the one namely the punishment of sin therefore also the sin Again he that wils an Antecedent wils also the Consequent at least in an universal albeit not in a particular for he that wils a whole wils al the parts necessary thereto 3 Thence he procedes p. 300. to shew how God wils sin God saith he doth no way wil Sin simply but only in some limited respect For to say that God wils something simply is according to the commun manner of speech to say that he loves it and approves of it as good Yea addes he may it not be said that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination Deformitie or Sin simply considered but only Sin in some respect Because in regard of the prime and supreme Cause al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdome beautie and justice Whence 4 He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful acts and to such as are good p. 302. God saith he is not the Author of sin as of that which is done wel For of this he is the Author so as that he alone doth supernaturally create and give to the wel-doer Faith Hope and Love c. But it is not so as to sin i. e. As to good God produceth not only the natural act but also the moral Bonitie but as to Sin he produceth only the natural entitative Act. 5 He thence p. 302. explicates how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied that God wils Sin When saith he Augustin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin the cause of this negation seems
this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this
point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans it 's certain that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth and particularly Alvarez who is principally struck at by the adverse partie deserves great honor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations Strangius and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis but the Jesuites themselves who are his most puissant Impugnators give him a more candid and favorable treatment For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius whom they judged more severe they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted in order to an accommodement and the reasons they allege are of moment For say they Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis there is a grand apparence that he and those others who writ at the same time and since took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had albeit they made no Decree on this mater of which see Refutat de Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme p. 82. wherein remarque 1 That the Jesuites Alvarez's sworne enemies give him a more favorable character as one who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination Yea 2 That the Popes themselves Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had the same sentiments with Alvarez Is it not strange then that the Jesuites who are professed enemies to Predetermination and the Popes themselves who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination than Protestant Divines whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination For mine own part I cannot but confesse that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination I read Alvarez with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit and found therein so penetrant an acumen so profound soliditie and such masculine Demonstrations as that I never met with his equal excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us have loaded him with His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations de Auxil l. 3. Disput 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate That God doth by a previous motion truely and efficiently or according to the mode of a physical cause premove free-wil to the act of sin as it is an Act or Being His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible namely from the Participation Limitation and Dependence of every Second cause c. Of which hereafter c. 5. Lastly that the Scholemen generally besides such as are Pelagian assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin see Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress 2. I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers For 1 It 's evident that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin Thus in his August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77 c. he proves That there is no manner of speech among the Scholemen so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie and thence the true opinion of Augustin Again cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract but also in the concrete Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen So that it 's evident he was not averse from the thing albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues as also to confine himself to the termes used by Augustin 2 That reverend Divine among us who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination doth yet grant that Jansenius held the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment Wherein he opposeth Jansenius and also Augustin who held that sin as a punishment was willed and caused by God as before 3 Jansenius August de Statu Nat. Laps l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us That men in their lapsed state before Faith be introduced are under the captivitie of lust and can do nothing but sin which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 1 He proves cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive 2 He demonstrates cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation according to its comparative consideration is the absolute wil of God This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. part 3. Sect. 7. § 22. pag. 93. in these words Jansenius's Doctrine is that the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil of men in original sin and the effect of it excecation and obduration This being his proper opinion it necessarily follows that he asserted Gods predeterminative
herein Whence in the following Chapters 9 10 11 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists whereby they endeavor to prove That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists We may adde hereto the sentiments of Ludovicus Crocius Professor at Breme and a Member of the Synod of Dort who in many points specially that of middle Science and universal Grace follows the new method yet in this of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin seems orthodox and concurrent to Calvins Doctrine So in his Duodecas Dissertat Exegetic De voluntate Dei Dissert 8. thes 74. pag. 415. where he tels us That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin namely of the action and the vitiositie which is in the action for that not this he wils and decrees and this not that he permits And his reason is invincible for otherwise there should be an action independent as to God and the efficacious providence of God should be denied which is Epicurean And then thes 99. pag. 426. he tels us That as to the act of the Divine wil about sin the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves in that some Scriptures assure us that God doth not wil sin but hate it with those that commit it as Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say that God wils creates and effects sins as Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions by distinguishing between the act and the vitiositie of the act also between the act as it procedes from God and as from the Creature lastly between the decreeing wil of God and the preceptive wil of God Whence he concludes thes 100. thus ` For God both wils and produceth the act as an act of it self indifferent to moral bonitie and evil c. And he addes thes 101. ` That this act in itself essentially good even as it is contaminated by the creature God wils it as a punishment and useth it as an ordained convenient means for the best ends The like thes 112. p. 430. where he shews how God wils sin not as sin but as a punishment c. of which more fully hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. These sentiments of Lud. Crocius I rather chuse to cite because he in other points follows the new method and is cried up by some of that partie As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hypothesis it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point both whiles they sate and afterwards I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimonie in favor of their Antithesis but this is so false an imputation as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point than their stout defence of absolute Reprobation of which see Davenants Animadversions on Gods love pag. 242. We might adde almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Reformed Divines Churches and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis but in what remains we shal confine our selves to the Doctrine and Testimonie of the Church of England and those renowned Professors of Theologie who have maintained and vindicated our Hypothesis The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed even in her first Reformation the sentiments of Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France Holland Helvetia and Germanie albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction This is evident by that noble designe of Cranmer and our first Reformers to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confession I shal here only cul out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theologie both in Oxford and Cambridge who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis We shal begin with Davenant a great Master of Reason and one that went as far as he could and I think as far as any ought in compliance with those of the New Method yet he stil asserted and with great strength of reason defended absolute Reprobation and Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Thus in his Determinations when Professor of Theologie at Cambridge Quaest 22. In evil acts saith he God hath decreed to permit the event to concur with the Agent as an universal Motor and lastly to order the event itself according to that of Hugo de sacr fid lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that sin be and yet he wils not sin i. e. with a wil of approbation So Quaest 25. pag. 118. he grants That Gods decree to permit sin is efficacious so as to extract good out of it But he speakes more fully for the defense of our Hypothesis in his Animadversions on Gods love to mankind pag. 72. But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cause and the existing or coming of such actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente ordinante are in no error at al. But if any shal go about to set mans wil at libertie and to tie up short the decreeing and determining wil of God as if this had not the determining stroke amongst al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be and which shal infallibly not be he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicisme and Manicheisme but he wil hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheisme For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil than by Gods What could be said more acutely and distinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis He here alsertes 1 That the existence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them 2 That Gods decreeing wil doth determine or predetermine al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be And do or need we assert more than this And frequently in that Book Davenant assertes and demonstrates That the decree of Reprobation is absolute determining sinful acts and events yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin So pag. 253. he saith Gods decrees carrie with them a necessitie of infallibilitie as to the event but not a necessitie of compulsion as to the manner of acting And elsewhere he frequently inculcates That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and the same libertie to the Agent So pag. 333 340 341 351 360. Yea he proves That the Arminians must and do grant immutable absolute decrees which admit the same objections and difficulties as those of the Antiarminians So pag. 354 400 418 419. Lastly he proves
Sun Whence 4 That as to the substrate mater of Sin immediate Concurse doth no way determine the wil or applie it to its act but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner so as the wil stil retains its innate indifference and libertie of acting or not acting Such are the Sentiments of the Molinists or Jesuites wherein they are greatly opposed both by Dominicans and Jansenists Thus Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul c. 14. p. 58. where he proves That this simultaneous Concurse confers no forces or aide to second Agents but only accommodates it self to the forces of the create power c. which sufficiently demonstrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandisme albeit the avouchers of it oppose Durandus with great vehemence But of late there started up Ludovicus à Dola a Capucine Friar yet learned and acute who espoused the Hypothesis of Durandus as the only Medium for the reconciling those two opposite parties the Dominicans and Jesuites His book he termes A Quadripartite Disputation touching the mode how the Concurse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked He bends his Disputation both against the Predeterminants as also against the Assertors of Middle Science His first part is general stating the controversie between the Jesuites who assert a Middle Science and the Dominicans the Assertors of Predetermination and withal explicating the origine of the Controversie from the presupposed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurse His Second Part is against the Jesuites to demonstrate That a next immediate and identific concurse of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans proving That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked by a physic Predetermination and moreover by an identific and simultaneous concurse In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth with al the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation wil admit the Hypothesis of Durandus That the general Concurse of God to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked is not proxime immediate and identific but remote mediate and really distinct from the act of the creature This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurse with human Libertie the vindication of Gods Sacred Majestie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concurse And I cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point that it is impossible for our Adversaries the New Methodists or any others to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistences with it self or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputations they charge upon us unless they betake themselves to this stratageme and subterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola and therefore I do no way wonder that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of Durandus it being the only refuge to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation Among the Reformed Churches the first Impugnators of our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants communly stiled Arminians from Arminius their first Founder Professor of Theologie at Leyden who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down Disputat publica Thes 7. § 8 9 10. p. 193. but more fully Thes 9. de justitia efficacia Providentiae Dei in malo p. 198. where he distinguisheth Gods efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the beginning progresse and consummation of Sin 1 As for Gods efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into 1 Impedition both sufficient and efficacious whereby God puts an impediment to sin and 2 Permission which is contrary to Impedition the suspension of al impediments which might hinder the execution of Sin The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil 2 Gods Efficience about the progresse of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination 1 Direction of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth passing on from one extreme to the other mightily and yet disposing althings sweetly according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome c. 8. v. 1. 2 Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God puts measures to his Permission and termes to sin that it run not into infinite according to the pleasure of the creature 3 Gods Efficience about the consummation and terme of Sin he placeth in Punition and Remission As for Gods Concurse to the Act of Sin as naturally good he doth craftily according to his wonted mode in such cases wave that difficult point Yet in his Articles De Peccati Causa Vniverse p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists to prove That we make God the Author of Sin But to sum up Arminius's Sentiments in this point Albeit he placeth Gods Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments which is no way influential on the Act yet in that he allows also a providential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due measures we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hypothesis that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin of which hereafter Chap. 5. Arminius's Sectators usually stiled Remonstrants from their Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort Grevincovius Vorstius Episcopius Corvinus c. who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of Holland gave themselves the confidence but those poor Churches the peste of divulging their Pelagian Poison which by the interposure of King James who was a professed enemie to that faction occasioned the Synod of Dort An. 1618. where Divines out of England France and Germanie resorted to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes The Remonstrants in opposition to that Synod writ their Acta Scripta Synodalia Dordracena wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for Absolute Reprobation and Gods Providence in sinful Acts falsely charging on our Divines 1 That they held the Reprobate were destined to Incredulitie Impietie and Sins as the Means and Causes of Damnation 2 That they made God the Author of Sin and the like of which see Acta Synodalia Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica p. 40 41. I shal here only adde what is wel remarqued by Le Blanc Conciliat Arbit Humani Thes 32. p. 434. That
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
predetermining the free causes to those acts as Learned Strangius yet denie that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not include an absolute Decree concerning their futurition as Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 11. His reason is because nothing can be certainly known but what is certainly true but nothing is certainly true but what is necessary either absolutely or conditionally Whence he collects that future conditionates cannot be the Object of divine Science which is infallible and most certain unlesse there be included the condition whence that which is said to be future may be certainly inferred But if this reason prevails God can foreknow nothing contingent as absolutely future but what he before decreed as absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not who confesseth that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermined by God Thus Le Blanc of Strangius's self-contradicting Hypothesis And indeed to speak the truth nakedly there seems so much force in Strangius's reason whereby he proves That al Gods Prescience of free future Contingents includes an absolute Decree of their futurition namely from the certainty of divine Prescience that I no way wonder that he urgeth the same albeit to the subversion of his own Phaenomena And I am very bold yea confident in asserting and demonstrating these following Propositions 1 Prop. That God can have no certain Prescience of things future but from his own decree the only certain determinate cause of their futurition And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cause of things contingent denie also Gods Prescience to be certain as Le Blanc De Concord P. 3. Thes 1. p. 438. and I cannot see how any can rationally avoid the Socinian objection who do not resolve the certitude of the divine Prescience into the divine Decree Hence 2 Prop. There is an hypothetic or consequential necessitie that ariseth from Gods certain Prescience This is wel urged though in the defense of an hell-bred Hypothesis by the Socinians and cited by Le Blanc as a knot not easily untied de Concord Par. 3. Thes 22. pag. 441. There is saith he much of difficultie here which in times past has exercised the ingenies of Doctors For seeing it is impossible that the Prescience of God may be deceived it cannot be but that those things must happen which God foresees wil happen and therefore that althings happen necessarily and it is impossible but that the very wil of man must produce those acts which God from eternity foreknew it would produce This Objection I despair ever to see rationally answered by our Adversaries without contradicting their own Hypothesis See more of this Chap. 6. § 5. Hence 3 Prop. The same arguments that are urged by our Opponents against Gods predetermining the Wil to the substrate mater of sin may be as they are by the Socinians urged with as great force against Gods certain Prescience of Sin For our Adversaries Strangius Le Blanc c. granting the certain futurition of sin in the eternal Prescience of God fal under al those Imputations and black Consequences which they charge on us who assert the predefinition futurition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree This Proposition is incomparably wel demonstrated by judicious Davenant in his Animadversions on Gods Love to Mankind p. 418 419 442 462. where he proves That Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the Wil as absolute Predestination and Reprobation Of which more in our next Argument also c. 6. § 5. Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Adversaries take Sanctuarie in to secure themselves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Prescience And here at what a miserable losse and confusion are they among themselves How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the solving this argument Some flie for refuge to the Molinists Middle Science telling us That God foresaw that men being placed under such hypotheses and circumstances would sin against him c. Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 12. Disp 2. n. 55 56. p. 326. where he professedly defendes Fonseca's conditionate Science making God to have a conditionate Science of the first sin if Eve seduced by the Serpent should temt Adam c. Thus also one and another Divine of good note among us But this subterfuge is greatly disliked by the more fober of this new Method particularly by Strangius who l. 3. c. 11. p. 651. proves nervoâ—… That there can be no such thing as a Middle or conditionate Science in God because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible or Knowable and this he proves because an object cannot be certainly knowen unlesse it be certainly true which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not Thus also Le Blanc De Concord Libert Par. 1. p. 452 c. Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evasion have recourse to the Dominicans real presence of things future in Eternitie whereby they make God by his Science of Vision to behold the sins of men Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded saith he to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins must be referred I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision c. But more fully l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of althings in Eternitie because the Eternitie of God is Insuccessive and Indivisible The same he inculcates p. 595 596 597. But this mode also of solving the difficultie is greatly opposed by some of his own party the New Methodists who take some pains to shew the invaliditie thereof So Le Blanc De Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 37. p. 443. First saith he as for that real presence of futures in Eternitie namely as they are supposed to coexiste from eternitie to eternitie it self it appears to be a mere figment for that one thing coexiste to another it is necessary that both existe c. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among our selves who has espoused Strangius's Hypothesis fals soul on the Thomists for asserting Althings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse reali c. Lastly others therefore to evade the fore-mentioned inconveniences take up their refuge under the Infinitie of Gods Prescience Thus Le Blanc De Concord Par. 1. Thes 40. p. 444. As for the fourth opinion which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect and in the determinate truth of those things which are contingently future it establisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable c. Yet he grants Thes 41. That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth yet it doth not satisfie the Question nor remove the main difficultie namely How things passe from a state of
possibilitie to a state of futurition c. Whence he concludes Thes 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions and absurdities to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience Yea some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie as to professe That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture The like others But is it so indeed Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience Why then 1 are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages How comes it to passe that they contend with so much heat and passion for that which they confesse is not expressely delivered in Scripture Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession But 2 We easily grant them that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out as indeed al Divine Perfections are but yet must we thence necessarily conclude that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture 1 Doth not the Scripture evidently declare That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science as much as Heaven is above the Earth yea infinitely more 2 Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections much more Contradictions And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man But see more hereof Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 2. § 3. We passe on to our third Argument which shal be taken from the Divine Wil and Decrees and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation And here we shal lay down this Principe which is granted by Strangius and others of the New Method That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant saith he that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us he must also determine our Wil to the same This he inculcates c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on for we no way dout but to demonstrate That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive proper condition or cause This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists who grant That God decrees al good absolutely but as for Sin say they God decrees that only respectively and conditionally So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548 But we no way dout but before we have finisht this Demonstration to make it evident that Gods Decree of Reprobation whereby he determines to leave men to sin is absolute as wel as the Decree of Election Yea it is to me a thing altogether impossible to defend an absolute Decree of Election and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other It 's true our Divines that follow the Sublapsarian mode as Davenant c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another for nothing can move the divine Wil but what is some way antecedent to it Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. 2 Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative but positive and efficacious It 's granted that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation which they terme Non-election or Preterition yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil but include also a positive efficacious act Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin That Gods negative Reprobation is positive So Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprob p. 113. But we must take heed saith he lest with Scotus we think that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates which he electes not but passeth by is merely negative for in this very act which we expresse by a Negation is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God So in his Determinations Quaest 25. p. 117. he tels us That it 's most certain there can be no Decree permitting sin to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree And p. 118. he instructs us That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious not in a way of efficience but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil 3 Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord not as a Righteous Judge The Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge not as a supreme absolute Lord whence they conclude that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins not considering that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment but of denying Benefits wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended according to that of the Apostle Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay c What is soverain Dominion but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law more than what is in his own nature and wil Hence it follows 4 That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation And Augustin complains That it is a great injurie to God when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil for his Wil
is such a supreme Rule of Justice as that whatever he wils is for that very reason because he wils it to be accounted just So Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil. So Alvarez de Auxil Disput 109. 3 a Conclus The positive act whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome was not conditionate but absolute antecedent in a moment of Reason to the il use of Free-wil And it is proved 1 Because there can be no cause of Reprobation 2 Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie before the Prescience of the good or il use of free-wil elect some to life eternal and by a positive act wil not to admit others And our Divines generally grant That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation than the absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God But none is more categoric and positive in this than judicious Davenant who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists in his incomparable Animadversions on Gods love to mankind Wherein he doth puissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis 1 That Gods secret wil of good pleasure is very different from his reveled preceptive complacential wil as pag. 221 349 376. 2 That Gods reveled complacential approbative wil is the measure of our dutie but not of Gods decrees or operations pag. 222 356 391 399. 3 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is only properly his wil pag. 392. 4 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself pag. 375 376. 5 That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promisses of life and threats of death pag. 241 332 375 387 398. 6 That God may be said according to his wil of complacence and approbation to intend the salvation of sinners yea Reprobates by providing the means of grace conducing thereto pag. 271 376 394. 7 That the externe means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means not the unknowen wil of God pag. 353. 8 That God by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands pag. 329 393 394 401. 9 That al under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibilitie of salvation pag. 256 257. 10 That Gods evangelic providential intention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by mans sin although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated p. 377 381 387 388 395. 11 That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events though not with contrary events pag. 240 333 341 360 402 253. 12 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God with its difference from that of men pag. 232 321 336 339 342. 13 That absolute Decrees oppose not Gods Holinesse pag. 240-272 14 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Mercie of God pag. 277-310 15 That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods soverain Being and Independence pag. 226. 16 That absolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth pag. 349-362 17 That absolute Reprobation takes not away the end and use of Gods gifts pag. 374-404 18 That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute necessitie or compulsion to sin pag. 253. 19 Let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and libertie to the Agents pag. 333 340 341 351 360. 20 That the Arminians grant an absolute immutable fixed Decree of Reprobation which admits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists p. 302 332 333 340 351 354 400 418 419. 21 Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the wil and compulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation pag. 418 419 442 462. 22 Lastly he shews us What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees pag. 454-526 These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and demonstration to our Hypothesis as also distinct solution to the objections of our Opponents of which hereafter Chap. 6. § 4. Our next Argument shal be taken from Divine Concurse its Principe Nature and Efficace the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonstration of our Hypothesis which we shal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars 1. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful may be demonstrated from the Principe of al Divine Concurse What is the active principe of al Divine Concurse but the Divine wil Doth not sacred Pagine expressely speak so much So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it 's said Act. 4. 28. that those who crucified our Lord did acte but what Gods hand or wil and counsel predetermined to be done of which before And Strangius himself grants us lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurse as to its prime act is in God and the same with God Now such is the Omnipotence of the Divine wil that althings must necessarily be done which he wils to be done and in that manner as he wils them as Aquinas wel determines How then is it possible but that if God wil that the substrate mater of sin existe it must necessarily existe and in that manner as he wils it Can any person or thing resiste the Divine efficacious wil And what is al active concurse but the determination of the same efficacious wil See more of Gods wil being the spring and principe of Divine concurse Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 2. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater of sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concurse as to its Totalitie Vniversalitie as to effects Particularitie as to manner of working Immediation Antecedence and soverain absolute Independence 1 The Totalitie of Divine concurse sufficiently demonstrates its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods concurse to al second causes acts and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. Thus much is also granted by Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. where he assertes That the whole action dependes on God as also on the creature otherwise God should not concur immediately Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us as also of the same partie with Strangius denies Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be total yet because he is singular therein and different from his own partie I shal take it for granted that Gods concurse is
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged and that with as great color of Reason by the Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination to gracious acts I must confesse I could never neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin be admitted as valid 2 The like may be said of that other objection or reason why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin namely That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible c. Is not this very objection and the reason urged to enforce it as much urged by Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side What reason do the new Methodists give that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws impossible but that it takes away the Wils Indifference and destroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference and its power to act or not to act 3 Our Adversaries urge That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises Invitations and al evangelic offers of Grace and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners in making offers of Grace and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers Is not this very objection with its reason urged and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own freewil without a predeterminative Concurse are not al gracious Promises Invitations and offers of Grace to Sinners who fal not under this Predetermination vain and uselesse Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally some few excepted denie any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiositie against the offers of Grace as by the predeterminative Concurse of God 4 Our Adversaries object That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin supposeth God to compel and force men to sin and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion c. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predetermination even to what is good and that with as much color of reason For say they If God predetermine the wil to what is good then he compels and forceth the wil to be good so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act which destroyeth al moral good c. Which objection is as valid as that of our Adversaries and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it as we shal demonstrate c. 6. § 5. To conclude this argument I am very confident our Opponents the new Methodists wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good so long as they denie the same to the substrate mater of sin which is naturally good for al or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later may and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former and that with equal force And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principes though lesse friendly to divine Concurse to denie al Predetermination as wel to supernatural as natural good of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. n. 66. c. p. 136. § 5. Our fifth Argument shal be taken from the Nature of Sin its substrate mater and formal reason 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin we have demonstrated Ch. 1. § 2. 1 That al human acts considered in their natural entitie abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil 2 That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law 3 That no human Act considered physically or according to its natural entitative substance is intrinsecally evil but only morally in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object Hence 4 That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principes we hence argue That God must necessarily concur to yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil morally are according to their substrate mater physically good doth it not necessarily follow that God the first cause must concur thereto yea predetermine the same Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first necessarily demonstrate not only its dependence on but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited defined and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being which is such by Essence May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries who grant that vitiositie follows not any Act as a natural Act So Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confesse saith he that Vitiositie doth not follow the act of sin as an act for then every act would be sin also that it doth not follow as the act procedes from God for then every act that procedes from God would have sin Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius that Breme Professor who was a member of the Synod of Dort and there began the New Method Duodecas Dissert de Volunt Dei Dissert 8. Thes 99. p. 426. As to the Act saith he of the Divine Wil about sin the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves whiles that some expressely affirm That God nils and hates sins and those that commit them Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say That God wils creates effectes them Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do wel agree if the distinction be rightly observed 1 Between the Act and the Vitiositie of the Act. 2 Between the Act as it is from God and as it
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
these rational conjectures 1. From the very name Neptune which Bochart derives from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Niphtha which belongs to Niphal or the Passive Conjugation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Patha to enlarge whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Japhet according to the allusion of Noah Gen. 9. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Japht Elohim lejaphet i. e. God shall enlarge Japhet Proportionable whereto Neptune was called by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Grammarians in vain attempt to deduce from the Greek tongue seeing as Herodotus in Euterpe assures us the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was at first used by none but the Libyans or Africans who alwaies honored this God Namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same with the Punick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pesitan which signifies Expanse or broad from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pesat to dilate or expand Whence it appears that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Japhet are Synonymous and both derived from Radix's signifying latitude which well suits with Neptune's Character who is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 latè imperans and latifonans as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that has a large breast c. See more of this Bochart Phaleg lib. 3. cap. 1. 2. From the Genealogie of Neptune whom the Mythologists make to be Saturnes son as Japhet was son to Noah who passed for Saturne 3. Neptune was fabled to be the God of the Sea and Instructor of Navigation So Diodorus lib. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Cretenses say that amongst other Gods borne of Saturne and Rhea Neptune first began to mannage the Affairs of the Sea and to instruct for Navigation he having obtained this prefecture from Saturne whence it came to passe that in after time the common Vogue so far obtained that whatever was done at Sea was said to have been in the power of Neptune and therefore the Mariners sacrificed unto him Thus Diodorus All which seems to have been taken up from the real storie of Japhet his Posteritie their possessing the Ilands in the midland Sea Greece c. So Bochart Phaleg lib. 1. cap. 2. Japhet saies he passed for Neptune the God of the Sea because his portion was in the Ilands and Peninsules In the Ilands are Britannie Ireland Thule Crete Sicilie Sardinia Corsica Baleares c. In the peninsules are Spain Italie Greece Asia minor c. So Lactantius de falsa Relig. l. 1. c. 11. All the maritime places with the Ilands belonged unto Neptune c. This suits with Plato's origination of Neptunes Greek name who in his Cratylus deriveth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from his giving drink i. e. the Sea and Water unto all which argues thus much that they looked on Neptune as the God of the Sea and that in allusion to Japhets possessing the maritime parts of Europe c. 4. Neptune was also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equestris which is thus explicated by Diodorus lib. 5. where having spoken of Neptune as God of the Sea he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They adde also this of Neptune that he was the first that tamed horses and that the Science of Horsemanship was first delivered by him whence he was stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good horseman This also Vossius applies to Japhet Vossius de Idolol lib. 1. cap. 15. pag. 118. his words are these Japhet had for his portion the Mediterranean Ilands and the European continent wherefore his posteritie had need of a twofold Science 1. Of Nautick to direct them in their Navigation 2. Of Horsemanship to conduct themselves in those rude and wild countries thorow which they were to passe into the Northerne and Westerne parts of Europe This I conjecture was the cause why Neptune whom I interpret Japhet was made to be the God of Nautick Science and sea Affairs as also of Horsemanship c. But touching the Parallel 'twixt Japhet and Neptune see more Bochart Phaleg lib. 3. cap. 1. § 6. As for the Theogonie of Janus and his parallel if we consider him historically and according to the Mythologie of the Poets so he refers to the storie of Noah or Javan That which inclines some to make him Parallel with Noah is 1. The cognation of his Name with the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jain wine whereof Noah was the first Inventor according to Vossius Again 2. Janus was pictured with a double forhead because he saw a double world that before and after the Floud as Noah 3. As the beginning and propagation of mankind after the Floud was from Noah so also they ascribe the beginnings of all things unto Janus whence the entrance to an house is called by the Romans Janua and the entrance to the year Januarie Whence some make the name Xisythrus given by the Assyrians to Noah as in the storie of the Floud Book 3. chap. 6. § 4. to signifie an entrance or door from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ziz a post or threshold of a door as Vossius 4. Latium where Janus's seat was whence part of old Rome was called Janicule was called Oenotria Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wine Thus much for Janus's parallel with Noah Others refer the origination both name and person of Janus to Javan the son of Japhet the parent of the Europeans For 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Javan is much the same with Janus 2. Thence that of Horat. l. 1. 3. Japeti Genus So Voss Idol l. 2. c. 16. Janus's name taken historically is the contract of Javan § 7. To Janus we might subjoin Aeolus the God of the winds and King of the Aeoliar Ilands with notices of his Traduction from the Phenicians and Hebrews But we shall touch only on his name which seems to be a good key or Index to decipher his fabulous Office This fable of Aeolus the God of the winds is supposed to have been first brought into Greece by Homer who had it from the Phenicians with whom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aol as the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a storme or tempest which the Chaldee Paraphrase more fully expresseth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alol and the King Aeolus is thought by the Phenicians to be the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aolin of Tempests as Bochart Can lib. 1. cap. 33. fol. 658. § 8. Having discoursed at large touching the chief of the Grecian Gods and their Traduction from the sacred Oracles we shall briefly touch on sundry of their Goddesses and their derivation from the same sacred fountain 1. Noah is called Gen. 29. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a husband of the earth i. e. a husband man Whence the Mythologists made Saturne i. e. Noah the husband of Rhea i. e. the Earth Some derive Rea by an easy anagrammatisme from Era. So Sandford Descens l. 1. § 26. The Greeks refer Era. Heb. 〈◊〉
Privation only An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices the sum whereof is this The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good and so wel-pleasing unto God the Author of Nature yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie so it is infinitely displeasing to God This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solution to al objections against us so that at present we need say no more than this that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions than that of our Adversaries Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto Are not those very Acts which are morally evil as to the Sinner both naturally and morally good as to God Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin yet must we thence necessarily conclude that he predetermines men to sin formally considered Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause and not to the first universal cause It 's true the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law and therefore sins but doth God come short of any Law Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy even because he wils it The sin which he governs is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil not in regard of his wil It is confest that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered but yet is their Concurse the same Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse include any more than a natural act which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good but doth it not as to mans Concurse speake moral vitiositie Again what doth Gods permission of sin implie but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act Is there any thing in the world purely simply and of it self sinful without some substrate mater naturally good What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater without prejudice to his Sanctitie § 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God both Preceptive and Promissive which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin doth according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries render uselesse impossible yea collusive and unsincere For say they Gods Precepts Promises and Comminations whereof mans Nature is capable should be al made Impertinences through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them 1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse yea naturally and simply impossible This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with But having God and Truth though naked and simple on our side we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery or venimous darts And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions we answer 1 That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible or impossible which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion Chap. 1. § 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature as to divine Commands 2 We are to know that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator i. e. to subserve his ends which principally regard the Elect. 3 Yet we grant that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates 1 In that it lays a great restraint on them not only as to wicked actions but also as to lusts in some measure as Exod. 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts backed with many severe Curses leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits and so keeps their lusts from open violences 2 The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates albeit they have no power to observe them in that they are thereby instructed how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse The Precept shews us what we ought to do not what we can do it is always imperative albeit not always operative and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them What excuse is it for the Sinner to say it is impossible for him to obey the Precept whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil not in any force or defect on Gods part Doth he not in that very moment wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin voluntarily espouse and wil that act And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin in the same moment of time though not of nature that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act 4 We affirme that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins with the conditional Decree of Reprobation Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good which are al granted by our Adversaries bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party I shal mention only the Response of Davenant Animadv p. 341. As for Gods Law which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace we say that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius And p. 418. he strongly proves That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of
greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation and therefore God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them as Act. 2. 23. And 2 we denie with him that the wickednesse and malice of those acts was from God 3 He also grants That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin Whereunto we retort That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its object is sin But 4 he concludes But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil c. Whence we argue That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsecally evil and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice yea malice blowen up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them And was not in this good work of crucifixion the good action of God and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the substrate mater or natural entitative act This pincheth Strangius closely and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews For he saith Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action and therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God Here we grant 1 his consequence or conclusion That their malice was not from God 2 We thus far also grant his Antecedent That the good action of God considered both naturally and morally was distinguished from their evil action considered formally and morally for the malice and vitiositie which formalised the action as theirs is no way imputable to Gods act considered either naturally or morally 3 But yet we stil avouch and no way dout but to demonstrate in its place that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered materially naturally and entitatively was one and the same with Gods act So much al these Texts clearly evince so much also reason dictates For if there were two acts the one primarily yea only from the wicked instruments the other from God the prime Efficient then how could they be said to be the instruments of Gods Efficience Must we not then also suppose two Crucifixions one from God and the other from the Jews What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered entitatively materially and naturally was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered entitatively materially and naturally But to conclude we find an excellent solution to al these evasions and subterfuges in Augustin Epist 48. ad Vincentium thus When the Father delivered his Son and Christ his own Bodie and Judas his Lord why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty but because in one and the same thing which they did the cause was not one and the same A solution sufficient to satisfie any sober mind Wherein note 1 That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ was one and the same entitatively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner 2 That the difference sprang from the Causes God delivered his Son to Death thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wisn for their Salvation but Judas and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death with wicked hands out of an avaricious humor malice c. Hence 3 The Action was most just and gloriose on Gods part but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part This answer of Augustin is so great that it might serve to answer al the objections against our Hypothesis were not men bent to cavil against the truth § 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments namely such wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt I shal divide this Head into two members 1 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people 2 Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments 1. We shal begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people So Esa 10. 5 6. O Assyrian the rod of mine anger I will send him against an hypocritical Nation The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people and every stroke of this rod was from God his hand guiding ordering and actuating the rod in al its motions And yet how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing Israel How little did he intend to serve God herein were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action Thence it 's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so neither doth his heart think so c. whence v. 12. God threatens to punish him for his sin So that it 's evident this sending of the Assyrian by God mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concurse and Providence of God ordering what should come to pass So Jer. 16. 16. Behold I wil send for many fishers saith the Lord and they shal fish them and after wil I send for many hunters and they shal hunt them from every mountain c. Note 1 That these words contain not a promisse but threat begun v. 9. This is evident from v. 17. 2 By Fishers and Hunters in the general we must understand enemies to the Jews To fish and to hunt is to take and destroy War has a great ressemblance with fishing and hunting which is a kind of war against bestes as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men whence Nimrod the first Warrier after the Floud is stiled Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter i. e. of men Ay but more particularly 3 Who are these fishers Why as it is supposed the Egyptians who are called Fishers Esa 19. 8. 4 And who are the Hunters The Babylonians as it is generally said But 5 Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters It is God I wil send c. 6 Why doth God send for them To punish his sinful People and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided and to whom they had so much conformed as is intimated v. 17. And what more just than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments as have been the ground of their confidence and the exemplars of their sins 7 How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters Surely not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them but providentially by exciting their minds applying their wils and drawing forth yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews whereunto there was