terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okamâ— first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2â— q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living
chapter and first booke of his Rhetoricke A man sayth he is a Logician by nature or art Logick Dialectick Both these names are vsed indifferently to set out the thing defined and we haue the frequent vse of learned men to avow it The Iesuites doe expresly teach it in their Commentary vpon Aristotles Organon Col 26. neere to the end in these words The whole art of discoursing is set out by either the word Logick or the word Dialectick And they doe not barely avouch it but they confirme it with plentie of proofes as the Reader may finde if he please to consult the place-alledged Both the words doe signifie no more but a thing appertaining vnto the vse of reason therefore the Iesuites in the same Preface q. 4. art 4. Col 40. doe conceiue that Logick in an vniversall apprehension is no more but a director of the art of reason And Suarez hath the same thing in his Metaphysicks disp 39. D. Is This word is the band to tye both parts of the definition together By it the later part is affirmed of the former and it signifies an essentiall attribution that is that the latter part of the definition doth giue being vnto the former so as the first doth consist in the second An art The word art doth set out the generall nature of Logick that is it doth signifie that nature which Logick hath in common with divers other things as Grammar and Rhetorick c. It is called an art in the most common vse of men sometime it is called also a science and that we find in the Iesuites Preface q. 4. art 3. Aristotle doth vse both the words indifferently as signifying the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysicks and first Chapter The word art fignifies a multitude of Precepts orderly digested and approved by vse And thus the Iesuites teach in their Preface q. 6. art 2. and Aristotle hath the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysicks and first Chapter Where wee haue these words Art is gotten by experience experience makes art Art is made when as one vniversall thing is framed out of many experimentalls so as to doe by experience differs nothing from art He brings the same thing and the reason of it Poster lib 2. cap. 19. The word An is vsed to shew that Logick is one intire art that cannot be divided nor is subordinate to any other art as Geometry and many other arts be Logick is usually called the art of arts the mistris and director of all other and there is good cause why for Logick disputeth of all things and is common vnto every being as Aristotle hath taught vs in the fourth booke of his Metaphysicks cap. 2. text 4. Experience sheweth that Aristotle sayd true for there is no art but by the helpe of Logick all the precepts thereof are framed together in a due order and the parts of each singular precept are so fitted together that we may finde truth from falshood Of discoursing These words doe assigne the speciall nature of Logick the very first and intrinsecall being thereof and containe the forme and the end I say they containe them both because the forme is the fountaine of the end and the end is the continuation of the forme as wee shall see hereafter The end of Logick is Next Remote The remote end of Logick is the very act it selfe of discoursing but wee speake not of this end of Logick in the present definition The next end of Logick is to prescribe a way and rules of discoursing so as the end of Logick is a framing of the meanes of discoursing so say the Iesuites in their Comment vpon Aristotles Organon and the Preface thereto Col. 27.55 So likewise saith Gillius lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. The art of Logick delivereth wayes and rules of discoursing To discourse As it is here used is to declare one thing that is lesse knowne by another thing that is more knowne This we haue in the Iesuites Preface col 27. and 62. As for example He that knowes not what a man is is made to know it by saying a man is a reasonable Creature the addition of rationalitie vnto man shewes what man is So likewise when wee say God is a spirit infinite in all perfection we informe him that is ignorant and knowes not what God is In this very thing this art of Logick doth differ from all other arts whatsoever for Logick ends in speculation and proceedeth no further than to judge whether one thing be truly affirmed of another all other arts be practicall they concerne mans outward or transient actions as their next end as Grammar and Rhetoricke tendeth vnto mans speech Geometry vnto measuring Arithmetick vnto numbering c. That art saith Okam is practicall which directeth vs vnto the doing of a thing to be wrought In 3. dist q. 11. lit V. Yea in this mans knowledge differs from the knowledge that is in God and the Angels in that they behold the things in themselues as they are in themselues distinct each from other they doe not know one thing lesse knowne by the light and reflection of another thing that is better knowne wherefore their knowledge is called intellection ours is called rationalitie Well This word seemes vnto some to be superfluous and a man would thinke that the Iesuites were of that opinion because they define Logick to be no more but an art of discoursing coll 27. so Gillius lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. yet indeed in other places they haue as much as this word comes to for thus they writein their Preface the last question col 70. He is a good Logician which doth exercise himselfe in each thing well and diligently and Suarez doth joyne with them in his Metaphysicks disp 39. D. Logick saith he is an art directing the operation of the vnderstanding to exercise itselfe artifically and according to reason And all these Authors doe adde that word to very good purpose for thereby Logick is distinguished from Sophistry which is onely a deceiving science A Sophister seemes to know but indeede knowes not in the truth of the thing as we learne from Aristotle in his Metaphysicks lib. 4. cap. 2. text 4. And thus much shall suffice for the opening of the severall parts of the definition of Logick That wee may put a finall end to the matter in hand wee must remember that the word discoursing implyeth arguments wherefore wee must now see what an argument is An argument is that Ramus which hath a force to argue Altissidiorensis saith in his Preface lit F. an argument is a reason that giveth vs knowledge of a thing that is doubtfull Aristotle saith that arguments are such as whereby faith Logically may be made of the thing that is spoken of Poster lib. 1. Cap. 22. Logicè igitur c. That This word importeth the generall nature of an argument that is the thing which is common to arguments of every kinde
whether it be by the substracting of something inioyed or the receiving of something that is added The nature of these effects and subiects is delivered by Aristotle in his tenth place or seat of arguments viz. of suffering I say they are contained there for in the judgement of Thomas 1. p.q. 79. art To suffer is no more but to lose things inioyed whether appertaining to nature or not appertaining thereto or to be brought from power to act and therefore Aristotles tenth seat of suffering importeth the whole nature of every individuall effect and subiect as it is an effect and subiect Now I conceiue that this is wholy agreeable vnto Aristotles meaning because in his doctrine of predicated arguments hee speakes not a word of effects and subiects This Doctrine is peculiar to Aristotle Ramus doth not acknowledge it for he hath not a word of it It may bee he conceived that 1. To set downe all the seats of arguments in one place together would breed a needles repetition 2. These single termes did not appertaine to Logick 3. The first substance or thing subiected in every sentence hath not the nature of an argument It is very likely that he thought thus because this doctrine of Aristotle hath beene anciently receiued therefore hee would not depart from it vnles hee had some reason for it and I conceiue he had no reason but these 3. I answer these three arguments bee insufficient The first because Aristotle doth neuer repeat or handle these ten seates of arguments twise but in stead of them sometime hee brings in the doctrine of a definition Propertie Genus Accident as the things which are contained in those ten seates of arguments and this wee finde in the 8. and 9. chapters of the first booke of his Topicks Some other time he sets out the nature of other arguments but they are such as are either contained in these 4. or arise from them and at most hee doth but explicate at large the same things that he had set downe summarily in the 10. places aforesaid Neither is the second reason good for those 10. things are propounded not as meâ—re and simple beings but in respect of that reflection or relation which ariseth out of them vnto our vnderstanding for he doth intend them as they may bee fit to argue and serue vnto the framing of disputations either in single propositions or in syllogismes as himselfe expresly sheweth in the 8. and 9. chapters alledged and this is also evident by the properties which he assigneth vnto them viz They containe truth or falshood affirmation or negation when one of them is attributed to the other The third also is insufficient for the first substance or subiect part of every sentence hath truly and properly the nature of an argument for it hath a relation or emanation vnto many things that may be added or attributed to it so as we conceiue it to be a receptiue thing 1. of the causes wherof it is compounded and constituted 2. of the properties flowing from it 3. and of outward additions whereby it is beautified and made to differ and dissent from other and whereby it is made equall or vnequall like or vnlike vnto others as we shall playnly see when we come to the particulars and it is plaine that Aristotle vnderstood that argument which he calls the first substance after this sort for in the sayd 5 chapter of his Categories he sayth it is proper vnto the first substance to receiue contraries as sicknes and health blacknes and whitnes and thereby to be changed from well to ill from white to blacke The onely doubt is whether an individuall effect and subiect bee some wayes predicated or not Ramus sayth yea and brings them as predicated arguments Aristotle doth not so and no doubt he hath the truth No indiuiduall effect is predicated I haue three reasons for it first we neuer find any such predication in the formall writings in the schooles 2. No man can say this indiuiduall thing consisting of soule and bodie is this man for the predicate is lesse knowne then the subiect The subiect engendreth distinct and certaine knowledge because it comprehendeth all the causes but no man will say so of the predicate nor so much 3. The authority of the schools is against it I will alleadge Thomas for them all An integrall whole sayth he 1. p. 1. 77. art 1. ad 1m. is not predicated of all the parts together vnles improperly as when we say these walls this foundation and roofe is this house For the subiect the matter is yet more cleere we cannot say this learning is this man Thomas sayth truly 1. p. q. 29. art 3. ad 3 m Accidents doe mans est the subiect but hee neuer sayd nor any man else that the subiect doth manifest the accident and no maruaile why for if the subiect be predicated of the accident then we must conceiue that the accident is without and before the subiect but no man will say so therfore we may conclude the indiuiduall effect and subiect are fitly comprehended vnder the name of a first substance Thus I haue set downe and explicated the generall nature of arguments and the speciall nature of that argument which is alwayes subiected or argued In the next place I come to those arguments which be alway predicated CHAP. IIII. The distribution of predicated Arguments Arguments be Positiue Consenting absolutely Ramus after a sort Dissenting Comparatiue A positiue argument is that which 〈◊〉 attributed simply and absolutely considered in it selfe not compared with others A consenting argument is that which is predicated of the subiect affirmatiuely I Finde this doctrine of positiue arguments deliuered by Aristotle also and I will shew it in his doctrine of consenting arguments in the second chapter of his Categortes hee sayth some arguments be of the subiect and other some in the subiect those I say be in the subiect which are no parts of it nor can be without that thing in which they are The same thing is taught by Thomas yet more plainly 1. p. q. 25. art 6. In. cor Some arguments saith he be of the essence and other some without the essence of the subtect of which they are predicated I say this of Thomas and that of Aristotle are the same with the last two branches of Ramus his division or at least it is comprehended in them for those that be of the essence doe absolutely agree with the subiect of whose essence they be They that be in the subiect but without the essence therof doe agree to the subiect after a sort seeing therefore they agree in those two last branches they must agree also in the former branches of the division seeing every argument that agrees absolutely doth consent positiuely with the subiect of which they be predicated and consequently it is enough to the vnderstanding of the whole if we doe explicate and prosecute those two last branches and because I suppose that the
Creature seeth eateth sleepeth avoydeth knowne danger The plants grow vpright bring forth leaues and fruit in due season So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature when man moues himselfe vnto doing by the direction of true reason and the vnrestrained and free choyse of the will Naturall things doe worke by accident when the instinct of nature is suppressed or diverted The intellectuall creature workes by accident when the iudgement of reason is erronious and the choyse of the will carried by a previall over-ruling power and all these doe fall out in case where nature meets with defection The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance or the will haled by the naughtinesse of corruption and violence of temptation Lastly the secret providence of God which the Heathen called fortune makes the creature work by accident in all Cases when he workes against meanes as he did when he brought the people through the red Sea Exodus the 14. and as he doth in all miracles or when man intendeth one thing but another thing comes to passe of this we haue an example in the 45. of Genesis and 5. vers 37. 27. verse In this place they are sayd to sell Ioseph because they would be rid of him and in that Ioseph sayth God sent him into Aegypt to preserue their liues They were the efficient Cause of their owne preserving when they sold Ioseph but yet by accident through Gods secret providence that wrought contrary to their intent The Iewes likewise were the Cause of Christs glory and mans salvation when they delivered him to death but yet by accident because God himselfe did create light out of darknesse and made their evill intention serue vnto that good There be many examples wherein wee finde that the efficient cause doth worke on this manner but these are enough for this present The efficient doth worke Physically Morrally This distinction is received in all the Logick schooles and is of frequent vse in the question touching sanctification and the actuall motion of grace in mans conversion the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many other places A Physicall operation is a reall influence into the effect we haue an example of this in mans creation He formed him and that of the dust and poured life into him all these be reall influences of this kinde are the builders of the Tower of Babell they made bricke and reard a building with bricke and stone Of this sort be all workemen that labour with their hands and tooles the strength of nature doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke A morall worke is a motion offered to the vnderstanding and serues to allure and draw it on with reasons and perswasion Of this kinde bee be all such things as be obiected to the vnderstanding as namely the testimonie of God and man by commanding forbidding promising threatning perswading therefore so often as wee finde any of these attributed to God or man wee are to know that then they are efficient causes that worke morally Ramus doth call Testimonies Exhortations Commandements c. inartificiall arguments because they argue not of their owne force but by the authoritie of him that doth testifie but this is altogether vnfitly spoken for inartificiall and argument implyes a contradiction if inartificiall then no argument if an argument then artificiall for an argument is a member of Art 2. These things themselues are no arguments vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator but then they argue as properties or adjuncts and otherwayes they are never attributed to any subject In this place affirmation perswasion c. are not brought as morall causes in themselues but the causalitie is referred to him that affirmeth perswadeth c. which makes it very plaine that they belong to this place or seat of arguments God and his servants are the morall causes of mans holines when they command good and forbid ill when they promise good and threaten ill when they perswade vnto obedience and disswade from sinne thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things when by his obedience he deserved that God should bestow them vpon vs he by meriting I say is the morall cause of Gods gifts because by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them and so much shall suffice for this distinction A Physicall efficient is Principall first second Instrumentall This distinction is very ancient in the schooles and of great vse when we desire to know how mans will is wrought vpon and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace Alvarez received it from Thomas and makes vse of it disp 68. no. 5. c. where hee doth thus describe each member of it A principall efficient is that which worketh out of its owne power or forme as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 18. art 3. in cor A first principall efficient is that which worketh onely out of its owne power Thus God only worketh of whom it is sayd hee sitteth in Heaven and doth what he will He is the vniversall cause for in him we liue and mone and haue our being A second principall efficient is that which is so moved by another that it moveth it selfe by a power of its owne Of this sort is mans mind which is moved by God yet neverth lesse it worketh out of an actiue beginning remaining in it selfe Of this sort be all those sayings in the Scripture which attribute mans good workes as his conversion and the like sometimes vnto God alone and other sometimes vnto man alone An instrument properly taken and so we speake of it here is that which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient of this kinde are all instruments without life as namely the tooles of a Carpenter or Smith c Thus hot water heateth another thing that is cold by the heate received from the fire To conclude the point touching the efficient cause wee are to know that the efficient Ramus alwayes worketh after one of these waies whether it works alone or with others whether it begins the worke or preserues it being alreadie made CHAP. VIII The matter Ramus is a Cause of which a thing is Matter This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily substance but it is not so taken in this place for as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor The matter as it is a matter remaineth onely in power or capacitie to receiue many formes and therefore according to it selfe hath no being nor can be obiected to our vnderstanding 1. p. q. 15. art 3. ad 3m. In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed or some intellectuall thing answerable vnto that A cause These words doe attribute an actiue power and actuall efficacy vnto the matter wherby the effect is produced Of which These words shew the nature of that efficacy and
of Logicke Now wee vnderstand the grosse summe wee shall the better know the particulars CHAP. XXX Of the Division of Disposition IN this Chapter wee must divide a sunder what we found together in the former and so proceede till we haue veiwed every severall precept Iudgement is Axiomaticall Ramus Dianoeticall By this sentence the precepts belonging to this part are devided into their severall kindes and it is as much as to say These precepts teach vs to frame arguments in an Axiom in a discourse that thereby wee may iudge of truth and falshood contayned in them both These I say are severall kindes because they be distinct manners of disposing The first branch supposeth that some speech may be called an Axiome and that is true In this place the word Axiome signifieth no more but a declaratiue or pronouncing sentence This kinde of speech deserues that name because it is in the nature therof more excellent then any other speech of Man An Axiome is thus defined An Enunciatiue speech is that Ramus that containeth truth or falshood Wee haue this precept from Aristotle de interpre cap. 4. He assignes it the first place and well worthy for truth and falshood is the first obiect of our iudgement and belongs to all Axiomes whatsoever and nothing but an Axiome containes truth and falshood Speech This word containes the essence or nature belonging to all Axiomes and other speeches which are not Axiomes In this place it signifies the inward sentence of the minde and the written sentence as well as the sentence pronounced in words Enunciatiue This word importeth a species or one kinde of speech restraines that word which is common to many vnto that one kinde which belongs to this place Enunciating or Pronouncing implyeth that speech is the Herald and proclaimer of mans minde and so it is indeede by institution not of it selfe The signification of words followes the intent of the speaker and not otherwise so saith Aristotle in the fourth Chapter alledged Truth and falshood These words containe the proper and formall being of every Axiome in common Ramus makes truth and falshood a propertie belonging to every axâ—ome but Aristotle doth more he placeth the primary nature of an axiome therein and so he may well doe for thereby all axiomes are made to differ from all other kindes of speech If there be any other thing that giues being to an axiome from whence this propertie doth flow either wee are not able to apprehend it or want words to expresse it I say truth or falshood doth make axiomes to differ from all other kindes of speech for single termes as Man Peter to run to sit c. and all commanding and intreating speeches containe neither truth nor falshood as Aristotle hath well obserued De interpre Cap. 2.3.4 Truth in the iudgement of all Philosophers signifies the adequation of the thing and our vnderstanding Wherefore truth is radically in the thing and formally in the vnderstanding and declaratiuely in a proposition Wee must conceiue of falshood according herevnto A proposition is then true Ramus when it pronounceth of a thing as the thing is indeed Aristoile sayth thus too Speeches are then true when they pronounce as a thing is in it selfe De interpre Cap. 9. Quare cum orationes meta lib. 4. cap. 7. text 27. Cum enim convenit c. Thus Tho. 1. p. q. 21. art 2. in cor 1. dist 46. q. 1. art 2. ad 1m. And so all Philosophers speake I will giue you the words of Albertinus a learned Schooleman in stead of them all That proposition sayth he is true which is conformable to the thing pronounced of and false if it be inconformable fol. 265. col 1. A true axiome is Ramus Contingent Necessary Contingent when it is in such sort true that it may also at sometime be false This is called opinion A necessary axiome Ramus is when it is alwayes true and cannot be false An axiome necessarily false is called impossible Aristotle speakes wholly after this sort Euery proposition sayth he doth signifie something to be either necessarily or contingently Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. And further he sayth Poster lib. 1. Cap. 33. That is necessary that cannot be otherwise Some things are true and are but may be otherwise Opinion is concerning that that is true or false but may be otherwise For the full explication of this point we must first vnderstaÌ„d that axiomes are necessary and contingent by reason that the things whereof they pronounce are necessary and contingent Now that is sayd to be necessary that is so and cannot be otherwise This is simply and after a sort Simply when the being of a thing is of and by it selfe and the causes thereof so necessary that the thing that is hath its being wholy without relation to any other thing without it selfe A thing is necessary by supposition and after a sort when it is by force of another the first is called necessary simply and properly because it is wholy impossible it should be otherwise then it is thus farre Aristotle meta lib. 5. cap. 8. In the first sence all Axiomes that pronounce of God are necessary either in their truth or falshood In the second sence some propositions that pronounce of the creature be necessary and some contingent in their truth and falshood I will shew you how or when Created effects vpon supposition are Necessary 1. In their present being 2. When the next cause is determined to one Naturally Efficiently Contingent when the next cause 1. Is indeterminate vnto doing 2. Wants power for doing And a proposition when it pronounceth of created effects is true or falseaccording hereunto as wee shall more plainely see when wee come to shew the severall natures of Axiomes Every thing sayth Aristotle is necessarie when it is and every thing necessarily is not when it is not but this necessitie to not a necessitie simply de interpre cap. 9. Ergo. Quod. I shall shew the truth and vse of these precepts when I come to the speciall kinde of Axiomes in the next Chapter therefore I forbeare it in this place least I should hale in something before the time or repeat what I haue sayd sufficiently already therefore here I will end those things which belong to all Axiomes in common CHAP. XXXI Of a simple Axiome An Axiome is Simple Ramus Compound A simple Axiome is that the band whereof is a Verbe ARistotle speakes wholly after this sort An enuntiatiue speech is either simple or compounded of those that be simple A simple Enunciation is a voyce that signifieth that something is or is not according to the diversitie of times and he calleth these Axiomes one speech because one thing onely is predicated of another de interpre Cap. 5. 10. Now wee haue the definition of a simple axiome wee must vnfold it It containeth three things 1. The termes of it 2. The extention of one
it consisteth of things true first immediate better knowne preceding and cause of the conclusion Those are first and true which haue force to argue not from others but of themselues They ought to be true because that which is not cannot be knowne they must be first because they ought to be indemonstrable and consist of their owne proper principles we must not inquire of the principles of Science wherefore they are so but every one of them even by it selfe ought to be worthy of credit The medium must containe the causes of the conclusion seeing we know nothing vnlesse wee vnderstand the causes The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion both in nature and our knowledge therefore the principium of ad monstration is an immediate proposition viz. that hath none before it Poster lib. 1. cap. 4. 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. wherupō demonstrations are made by definitions Poster lib. 1. cap. 33. and they are the principles thereof Poster lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no wayes be proued Poster lib. 2. cap 4.5 6. 7. lib. 1. cap 9. By this whole discourse we haue rules to know what Syllogisine containes a truth simply necessary and we are sent vnto them onely whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion and such causes also as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe Wherefore for further explication hereof Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be and how they concurre In these words For as much as we doe then know when we vnderstand the causes and these be foure 1. the forme 2. the matter 3. the efficient and 4. the end Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth when one of these causes is taken and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion And by Causes is meant not onely the causes of those things that are but also of those things that haue beene or shall be hereafter Post lib. 2. cap. 11. 12. Now wee doe fully vnderstand where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme Our next labour must be to set out these scientificall Syllogismes by other properties that we may know them the more easily and certainely for that cause Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner A demonstration is Vniversall Particular Affirmatiue Negatiue Poster lib. 1. cap 24. A demonstration vniversall excells a particular and an affirmatiue is better then a negatiue cap. 24.25 This distribution followes the nature of a Syllogisme for every demonstration is a syllogisme though every syllogisme be not a demonstration Poster lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this necessary truth and the degrees of it To conclude this matter of demonstratiue science he sayth The first figure is fittest for a demonstration yea chiefly proper vnto this science and it is to be sought out onely by that Poster lib. 1. cap. 14. Some perhaps will looke that I should giue instances to open the vse of these precepts and it may seeme the more needfull because some are of opinion that no example can be given answerable to this rule I answer this conceit is very vaine for cannot any of the causes or all of them together serue to proue a sentence that is called into question or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions Without doubt they may Also it is most certaine that every proposition comprehends a necessary truth wherein the effect is argued by the causes for the effect is no more but a comprehension of all the causes and when the causes doe argue the effect the effect is resolued into the causes therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect And consequently such propositions are necessary and what they are such the conclusion must be that is lawfully inferred from them If there may be premises and conclusion answerable to this rule then no doubt there be examples of it and we may shew them if need were but I will saue that labour for this time for divers reasons 1. Aristotle hath done that alreadie Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. so as he that will may make vse of them 2. This kinde of knowledge cannot easily be discerned seeing it is very hard for vs to vnderstand those principles of a thing that are true first and of the same kinde as Aristotle doth admonish Poster lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem c. 3. By a mans owne practice and obseruation he shall finde them and their vse in naturall things and in them onely for in matters divine and spirituall such arguments can haue no place In them we vnderstand by faith not by sence and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof not the nature or causes of the things themselues I say a man may finde them by practice because by sence we get memory by the remembring the doing of the same thing often we get experience by our many times remembring our experience is one amongst all these that we doe remember there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied aboue many that which is one and the same amongst the rest becomes a principium of science if it belong vnto a thing that is Thus much we learne from Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 19. Exsensu c. The medium of a demonstration whereby wee know that a thing is consists in some of these that follow 1. Of the causes but not the first or immediate 2. Of things mediate and no cause but such as are reciprocated or mutually referred to each other 3. Of a demonstration that shewes what a thing is 4. Of things that are not reciprocated yet it is better knowne and yet no cause 5. Of a superior science as Geometry is to the Opticks and Arithmoticke to musicke 6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed vnder another as Surgery is vnto Geometry To know that a wound is healed sooner or later belongs to the Surgeon but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter belongs to Geometry 7. In a demonstration that sheweth what a thing is sometimes also the medium is placed without the extreames as when we say why doth not the wall breath Wee answer because it is not a living creature and these Syllogismes are alwayes made in the second figure after this sort whatsoeuer doth breath is a living creature But a wall is not a living creature Therefore a wall doth not breath Poster lib. 1. cap. 13. Thus farre goe Aristotles precepts to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth and the degrees thereof If any expect examples of these last I answer they may be given because we may haue examples of the former as I haue alreadie proved They may be given with more ease then the former because the things contained in them are neerer to our vnderstanding but I will saue that labour least I make my discourse ouer long and the Reader too idle We