that we can hardly finde it but see as it were the shadow of it ergo diuers haue thought the formes of things to be diuine Some haue gone so farre as to thinke them to be influences but subtile it is indeed and harder to finde out then either the efficient or matter ergo wee commonly call that the matter which containes the forme too because it is rather seene as it hath a materiall cause then as it hath a formall Vt in artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning then any man can trace his wisedome as wee may see in the elements ergo no man can make a thing in nature man may further nature but he cannot make any thing againe the parts are so fine in the mixture of things as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit Why because artificiall things are the workes of men one man may trace another though euery man cannot Caesar 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici c. As for example in artificiall things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to finde out the forme but we vse to point at it by the matter and by the position of it There stood great beames all along two foot asunder put into the earth and the distances betweene them were stuffed with great stones when these were so fastned then there was a new order begun where they layd the beams against those stones that were laid before and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams but what hath he told vs now why sayth he I am a Frenchman and I will tell you the forme of a French wall where if you doe but looke at the formes of euery part and of them you shall see a composed forme so that the Logician doth not looke at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is faine to deliver the forme by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus insula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the hauen told vs the forme of it CAPVT 8. De fine Finis est causa cuius gratia res est WE haue gone through the esse of a thing we haue but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes vp the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that finall cause that serueth to make vp the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keepe the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logicke Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it doe not enter into the essence of the effect by it owne essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cuius gratia Therefore the finall cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cuius gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the finall cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace then finis specialior for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent then any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it euermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the finall cause doth giue to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodnesse of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slaue the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or forme would moue ergo the finall cause is said to be the happines of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be seruiceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment so of a good forme yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happinesse and so is not perfect Againe this shewes the difference betweene the formall cause and the end for the forme may be as we see and not the end Againe wee know there are many things that haue not their perfection but growth and yet haue all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently followes after the forme so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the mat er reason the forme yet here is not his end namely fitnesse to serue God And thus we haue heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositus est homini Deus Of naturall things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summum bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach vnto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logicke and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he meanes by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference betweene the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it neuer be dwelt in so for a garment to be worne is one thing and to be fit to weare another So if I goe forth to speake with one and he be gone yet I obtaine my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Iuno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii
scilicet prolisque gratia Sunt mihi bis septem praestanti corpore Nymphae c. Here Iuno perswades Eolus to let his winde out and she would giue him one of her Nymphes which she presseth vpon him by finall causes first that she may spend all her yeares with him and secondly that shee may make him the father of a faire off-spring In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem vrget c. Et certe ait contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus c. As if he should say Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawne at the battle of Pharsalio thou didst strike his side marke the variety of the phrases and so of the ends What meant thy sword what was thy minde here was the propositum What meantst thou to haue done euen to haue killed Caesar So that the finall cause is not accidentall to the thing but euen substantiall and therefore we haue it so often in the definition of Arts vsed for the forme and that for this reason because it is the next argument to it and presupposeth the forme so that this is the vse of the finall cause in the definition of Arts. As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi here bene disserere is the end and it is as if he should say Dialectica hath such a soule as that it is able to performe and execute this or that thing for which it was made So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in generall why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts Answer But as euery thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo if a man will doe any Logicum opus he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thus wee haue heard the doctrine of the causes CAP. 9. De effectis Effectum est quod è causis existit siue igitur gignatur siue c. NOw we come to see a thing made vp it is worth the consideration to see now we begin at the farthest thing and at the first There are foure esses distinct which we must looke at distinctly and orderly if we will see things aright First the efficients then the matters c. now then let vs see effectum Effectum for the name it seemes to be nominated onely from the efficient for it comes of efficior which comes of efficio whence efficiens comes and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum formatum or finitum yet he rather names it of the efficient but we are to vnderstand that it hath reference to all the causes euen materiatum formatum finitum Obiect Why should there not be as many seuerall kinds of effects as there are of causes Answer Because no one cause alone can make an effect for it is existent from them all the causes are distinct in nature and their forces are their owne ergo their doctrine must be distinct but because effectum must he made of the composition of the foure esses ergo it can be but one so that I cannot say effectū efficientis effectū materiae effectum formae or effectū finis ergo we must see effectū alone in one lump as it is in nature Now because it hath al the esses of the causes ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and worketh generally quite through with euery other cause matter forme and end should haue the effect denominated from it so that this child brought forth by the foure causes is denominated from the efficient Est All things are effects but God alone ergo effectum est therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason it is requisite that as we see the causes that make vp the thing so the effect which is a quinta essentia arising from them Quod. He meanes argumentum absolute consentaneum now wee see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect but how is the effect absolutely agreeing to them yes for if the effect be from them it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it selfe to be from them and we see in nature that if an effect be then all the causes are contra again that we may see it plainly if we take away the efficient the effect will be imperfect so put the effect and we put the matter and forme substantially and the esses of the other so take away the effect and you take away them Now if the efficient be rotten yet it is an effect as this Logicke is Ramus his effect though he be dead and rotten for here we respect not time but the esse Againe he puts efficiens generally à qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cuius gratia and here effectum quod the reason why he vsed quod so often is because he would tell vs that Logick is generall to euery thing Existit Esse is of any one cause existere is a compound of them all not that existere hath respect of time and place as some teach true it is time and place attend euery thing when it doth existere but they are not of the esse of the thing but are onely complementall est is à qualibet existere ex omnibus subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis Existere comes of ex and sto now it doth stand vpon its feet and doth estare out from all the causes being a fift thing from them E causis Here è is as much as à ex per and gratia è causis that is ab efficiente ex materi performā gratia finis Causis not causa and therefore it is that all foure causes must absolutely concurre or else the thing cannot existere as the first matter did not ergo if Angels doe existere they must haue all the causes so the soules of men after they bee out of the body they cannot per se existere without they haue all the causes for if any one cause bee wanting they will bee incomplete Siue igitur gignatur siue corrumpatur Ramus doth here commorari vpon this doctrine of effectum because the common Aristotelians referre the doctrine of motus not to Logicke but to naturall Philosophie but Ramus teacheth it here in Logicke in the doctrine of effectum siue igitur gignatur siue corrumpatur c. whether it be made or corrupted siue modo quodam moueatur quidlibet that is whether it be augmented or diminished c. generatio and corruptio are substantiall motus augmentatio and diminutio quantitatis alteratio and loci mutatio qualitatis and all these are effects then againe whereas the Aristotelians teach that distruens causa is not causa Ramus teacheth that it is for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both ergo both of them are motus of his act to the opus ergo causa
virtus intellectualis is but a little part of them therefore this is fallacia accidentis as they call it Againe to call it an habit as Aristotle saith it is and as the Schooles make it that conceit is very simple for habitus or quantitas habitualis belongeth to Logicke and is nothing but a speciall kinde of adiunct therefore Aristotle doth define homo to be genus rationale whereas wee know genus is but an adiunct animal which is the genus of homo so that it is not Art in the thing but the knowledge he hath of it which is adioyned to man Now wee haue heard that Art is the wisedome of God in ente à primo and the frame of the creature is in the antitype of this wisedome and is a subiect of Art I say Ars est quae constat though it be the frame of the thing Now constare is to stand together in parts Q. How come Arts to haue parts being but that one wisedome in God Ans Not in regard of God but in respect of the frame of the thing where wee see it For euen as Gods Mercy and Iustice are one but various in respect of the obiect It is Mercy to him that comes before him in Christ it is Iustice to him that appeares before him without Christ So Art is one in God but is various in respect of the various worke it hath wrought in the creation of things and that it acteth in their gouernment to their end Againe those parts must constare for in the frame of the thing the subiects of the Arts doe constare ergo this wisedome following them must constare in his parts and as one thing hath his frame and another his differing from the other hence the precepts of Arts must be various and must constare one with another hence it followes that in Art wee must haue no rules but those that will constare and are essentiall to it So that if wee bring a rule af Grammar into Logicke or è contrá or if wee leaue out of Logicke some essentiall rule to it it will not constare againe if the rules of Art be disordered they will not stand together therfore when I say constare I say two things first that euery Art must haue all the rules that are essentiall to it and no more secondly that euery precept must be placed in his due order and rancke For as a Painter that makes the picture of a man would make it verie deformed if hee should set the head where the feet should bee or contra so were it as absurd for an Artist to disorder his Art Constat praeceptis Euery thing hath his speciall acts before it can work that maine act for which it was made as reason must haue two parts it must see the simple causes effects subiects adiuncts c. and Axiomes Syllogismes and Method that it may benè disserere therefore there are many pettie acts of reason to be performed which though they all conspire in one maine act yet are they not one another and here we see that as Arts did arise from the frame of the thing so the precepts of Art are from the Acts of things so that thus Arts constant praeceptis or regulis all is one both are good regere is as large as regula and praeceptum as praecipere But my reason why I rather chuse praeceptum is this because regula is tropicall for it is often taken for a Square or Rular whereby we rule any thing and this is a grand Synecdoche And againe because the Lord hath created gouerneth his creatures by the precepts of arts as by so many statutes or Cōmandements of the things act for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as at the Creation when the Lord said Let there be light by this rule as by a Precept did the Lord create light and also gouerns it It is a Law as God gouernes reason speech quantity c. by the rule of Logick Grammar Mathematicks and euen as a King gouerneth his Dominions by his Lawes so the Lord gouerneth his Creatures by the rules of Arts and because the Creation began with Commandements therefore we still hold it and they may bee called Lawes Statutes or Commandements c. euen as the Lord calleth his Lawes for man Commandements Againe I rather call the rules of Arts praecepta then regulae because they being shortly deliuered are as so many short directions for the guiding of the thing to the end thereof Primè verissimèque scientificis Euery Precept of Art must be scientificum that is making knowledge scientia saith our Logick is the iudgement of a necessarie Axiome and therefore must bee so true so iust and so wise as nothing can bee more true more iust more vvise Why so are the Precepts of Art both in God and in the Creature for as for deductions the Lord hath shut them vp in a briefe rule of Art for looke how many vses there may be of a rule of Art in the thing whose rule it is so many deductions will there arise from that rule Now man not being able to take this wisdome from God which is most simple therefore it hath pleased the Lord to place it in the things and as flowers doe send out a sent or odor that doth affect our sense of smelling so euery precept of Art doth spirare a sweet science to our glasse of Vnderstanding which is indeed that irradiation which we heard of in Diuinity in the Creation of things but it is called scientia by a Trope for as the sent of a flower is not properly odor but that that doth affect the sense and as when we see a strange thing we say looke what a sight is yonder whereas sight is properly of the eye so wee call Art a scientia or sweet sauour in respect of our knowledge of it which is a metonimy of the adiunct for the Subiect Quest Now how doe they scientificare how are they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Answ Wee haue heard how they are in the things and from thence they doe come by an irradiation to the Glasse of our vnderstanding and as the Sunne beames comming through a redde or blew glasse c. will bring the colour of the glasse with them to our sense so doth the irradiation of Art from the thing bring the colour of the thing with it to our vnderstanding I meane that this irradiation doth bring the frame of the thing with it according to which we see it Now then first it is called the wisedome of God as it is one in him then is it called ars as it is in the thing and when it is brought by an irradiation to our vnderstanding the first Act of it is to see the simples in the things and this is called our intelligentia for it is that perspicacie whereby wee looke at the inuention that is in the thing so that it is the first Act of our intellectus As it is
consentit cum re therefore this is cleerly in artificio rei and so is dissentaneum too that consentit hence we see consideration to bee generall betweene things and they are made so for else they would neuer make vp one whole as all creatures make vp the world for it is concordia discors and discordia concors that makes all things Now as there is consention in all things so also there is dissention for else all things should be one thus the Lord made all things to shew forth his wisedome and mightie power that all things should consent together and yet be many Consentaneum est absolute aut modo quodam For some things agree absolutely others but after a sort absolutum is absolutely required for the being of the thing the other is but complementall so that here hee tells vs if wee would see any thing first looke what is in artificio rei then looke what is primitus there then what is absolute then what is consentanie then what is simply required to the being of the thing Absolute that is so agreeing to the thing that if the one be not there the other will not be there et contra as if any one cause be wanting there will be no effect if there be a concurring of all the causes then an effect if no cause no effect et contra if an effect then all the causes if no effect no concurrence of causes so that this absolute agreement doth put a necessity of each others being now absolute and modo quodam are definitions of themselues for hee wanted words and therefore deliuered the definitum by the definitio so that to aske a definition of absolute or modo quodam is as if one should aske a definition of animal ratione Absolute vt causa et effectum The causes giue esse to the effect therefore without these esses the thing cannot existere ergo they are absolutely required In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses of all the causes therefore these are absolute consentanea Hence wee learne that all the causes must goe to the making vp of the effect And againe if any effect then there must be all the causes so then wee see how the ones being depends necessarily vpon the other vt causa et effectum therefore the cause must first be looked at as if I would looke at ens or any thing whatsoeuer therefore our author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures Can any man see any thing throughly and not see the causes first he cannot and is there any thing to bee seene in a thing before the causes there is not therefore that is alwayes first in nature and therefore first also in reason Now here are fallacians as to thinke an effect may be from some causes and to thinke the causes may bee remoued from the effect which is a common fallace Aristotles organon Tullies offices c. here is Aristotles and Tullies causality still though they bee dead Now we see how orderly we goe to worke if wee had not done so we could not haue come to causa all the arguing of them before as of artificiale primum absolutum consentaneum simplex are here in causa and effectum So that there are many claspes as it were as the cause is in artificio of the effect it is also there primitus and absolutè and consentanie and simpliciter so that this discent doth very much cleare truth we haue our flesh blood bones from causa then afterward we haue our complements from modo quodam consentanea then we may see we are not this or that See an imperfect garment at the Taylors and you may aske what it is but let the Taylor make it vp compleat with all its cuts and iagges then you may see it your selfe and need not aske what it is for further knowledge of it De efficiente procreante et conseruante CHAP. 3. Causa est cuius vi res est REmember the purpose of Logicke is to direct man to see the wisedome of God which that reason may doe well it acts doubly first by taking at simples then by laying them together that which we take with the first eye is argumentum that is any thing so farre as it hath the affection to argue first as it is in artificio rei which therefore is in an Art now it is firstly there or secondly first it is there absolutely by way of consention respecting the thing wherein it is or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not those that consent are absolutely consenting or modo quodam absolute as the causes and effect that proceeds from the causes here wee must begin because the first thing that commeth to mans reason is the cause so if wee take the world or any part thereof let vs resolue it and in the end wee shall come to the first causes a first efficient c. So God is the first cause of all things and himselfe without all causes ergo the cause is first of all things then the first matter is first in his kinde the first forme in his kinde and the first end in his kinde So Aristotle saith God is primum intelligibile so then if we will see the wisdome of God in the creatures we shal see the cause the beginner then againe Aristotle doth confesse that causa is primum motus Againe what is the initium of euery thing but his being and that is from the causes therefore they are first againe the next cause is the farthest thing we can goe vnto as if we worke any thing now if we take causes and looke into them then we make them effects not causes as if I looke at the causes of a garment I find the taylor to be the cause but if I looke at his causes I make him an effect yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect c. The Greekes call causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peto because it is that which is first granted or required as the Geometricians require a petitum or as our author should say there can bee no demonstration of the first cause Est argumentum absolutè consentaneum c. causa est if a cause be absolutely required for the effect then there is a cause then againe Logicke serues vs to behold the wisedome of God and himselfe also through the creature now all things but God are made and are composed ergo they must haue causes est absolutè consentaneum because they are essentiall to the effect No shipwright no ship no wood no ship no forme no effect no end no effect and all these together an effect et contra Cuius vi res est First here he tells vs of a vis then he sayes it is vis essendi then vis essendi rei so that as there are foure words so foure things causa
the relation betweene them then à comparatis because relats are mutuall causes one of another Now here he shewes that the adiunct is that that is builded vpon the subiect and as the subiect did presuppose a thing already made but must support another thing so adiunctum tells me it is a thing already made but must lye vpon the subiect subiectum signifies a supporter or a suppository as it were adiunctum that is more common then subiectum and subiectum lyes alway vnder but adiunctum it may either lye ouer or vnder or be tacked to either side yet it will fall off vnlesse it be nayled or adioyned to the subiect Now that which tackes it to the subiect is that affection which it hath to subiectum euery thing will not be an adiunct to euery thing nor euery thing a subiect to euery thing Salomon saith if we bray a foole in a morter as wheat is brayed he will not be wise the reason is for that his spirits are so dry dull and earthy Now wisedome hath so fine a hand as that shee cannot take hold of such hard things but they will hurt it so that it cannot be subiectum or adiunctum to any thing and this shewes that Logicke is in the things in nature and not in mans braine onely So this rule wills vs to looke how subiectum is able to support the adiunct and when he sees how God hath done them for him to vse them to his turn Againe this rule is of great vse to see how things are tacked together in nature so as the one being taken away the other will remaine entire then againe though the adiunct in nature cannot be seuered from the subiect yet by my eye of Logicke I can seuer them Quod argumento etsi sub est leuius attamen est copiosius frequentius Our Author doth commorari and tells vs with very good reason that the adiunct is more light to presse the subiect then contra Obiect But this might haue beene before if it be copiosius and frequentius now he teacheth arguments according to their more strong manner of arguing and subiectum is fortius for because the causes of the adiuncts are in the subiect you may not therefore easily remoue the subiect but you will destroy the adiunct nor contra yet some adiuncts may be taken away and yet take away any adiunct and there will be some imperfection in the thing so that adiunctum will be leuius if wee weigh them in a paire of ballance which appeares many waies as if Mr. Fanshaw be at London his seruants are there this is more strong arguing then to say contra Subiectum est fortius because it is by nature before and the adiunct is eatenus adiunctum as it lyes on the subiect Attamen est copiosius frequentius For one adiunct can haue but possibly one subiect but one subiect may haue an hundred adiuncts now such a kind of copiousnesse or frequentity doth not make the adiunct more generall then the subiect in respect the subiect is of more strength for the sustentation of the adiunct then contra and as it is more copious so frequentius that is more often in common vse because it is of all arguments most familiar to men euen men vnlearned for the inmost thing is the efficient then the matter then the forme then the end then the effect then the subiect and lastly the adiunct ergo because it is so plaine as that a plaine man may see ergo it is frequentius Itaque de eiusmodi signis ait Ouidius 2. de remedio He illustrates this by Ouids testimony which said as much Forsitan haec aliquis c. meaning of signes Sunt parua because these are common qualities which may be in diuers things so that one will not argue so strongly multa iuuant that is where there is a concourse of many together there is as it were a description which argues strongly Animi corporisque totius hominis bona mala quae dicuntur adiuncta sunt animi corporis hominis As he hath shewed before anima c. to be subiects so here he shewes virtus vitium c. to be adiuncts now he takes them bona mala because there are tria genera bonorum namely of the soule of the body and of man so contra tria genera malorum Denique quicquam vlli subiecto extrinsecus accidit adiunctum eius est Againe here is another modus of adiunctum quicquid extrinsecus accidit that is comes vnto it not as causes effects or subiects but as it were adioyned to it accidentally ergo he saith extrinsecus for it was not our Authors minde that qualities were from within though of necessity they must be Vt autem locus est in subiectis sic tempus est in adiunctis That locus wee heard of before was subiectum and because it was a generall affection ergo it belongeth to Logicke and it was nothing but the application of a continet to a contained so time is nothing but the application of one thing to another thing as when I say he came on munday or at three of the clocke that is not time but the adiunct of time and here is the application of the course of primum mobile or of the Clocke to his act it is duratio the meting of a thing Time may well be compared to a line and as fluxus punctum is linea so fluxus nunc is tempus he went in the turning of a hand that is whilest one might haue turned his hand so that I measure it by the durance not by his length or Geometry Rei For Logicke is rei and as causa is res so tempus est res or duratio rei that is of the subiect praesens praeterita futura here he doth distribute this time to shew that this distribution of time belongeth to Logicke and not to any other Art Much descanting there is about time among other Logicians which teach that it hath a double respect one to the thing measured and so it is properly time another to the thing measuring and that is not time but as one is measuring it now for the logicall notion of time it is all one whether it be actiue or passiue and it is one and the same thing diuersly respected and because actiue and passiue goe alwayes together ergo the time must needs be generall to both praeterita praesens and futura So for things that are subiect to our Logicke are diuided into past present and to come for onely God is not subiect to time because he is eternall ergo is omne non esse ante post neither can we say he is now if we respect time for what should measure him should primum mobile or day night no so that though he be at all times according to our Logicke yet he is without respect of time at all times for time is not eternall ergo not omne non
imperfect Now bring it to our Logicke after another sort and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art Our Logick bringeth vs first to a first efficient in the resolution of any thing we go so far as in the end we find a first efficient Now this first efficient hath nothing before it ergo that is beyond our reason therfore what that is wee cannot tell and therefore if wee shall make him an effect to looke out his causes we shall not make him first ergo hee is beyond all art then againe there is no art but is an eternall rule in the Idea of God as a precept of that thing whereof it is an art to guide it to its Eupraxie therefore if there should be an art of him there must bee a former ens which must haue the Idea of it to shew how this ens primum was made and whereby it must bee gouerned so that he is not the subiect of our reason so that whereas I said before that ens was the subiect of our reason here I recall it and say that primū ens is beyond our Logick and therfore he being beyond all art wee will goe them ouer more briefly till we come to ens à primo First then he is without efficient for he is without causes ergo hee is vncreated for the first matter though it were without matter and forme yet it had an efficient and an end ergo was created then againe he is seipso ergo he must be vncreated hence also hee cannot be annihilated neither generated nor corrupted againe hence he is independens aliunde and therefore supremum againe hence he is without matter Now if hee bee without matter therefore he is without genus ergo is not a species either subalterna or specialissima Againe if hee bee without forme as without genus then he cannot be defined ergo he must bee without limitation of essence ergo without limitation of quantity ergo without limitation of place and because he is without beginning from any other thing therfore he is without any duration and because hee is without any matter ergo hee is truely spirituall for so wee account things spirituall according to the subtlenes of their matter but he hath no matter at all againe he being without matter and forme ergo can be no membrum because euery member containeth a portion of matter and forme neither can he be an integrum because that consisteth of members which containe part of matter and forme Now in that he is absolutely first therefore he can be but vnum for else there should be more againe if there should bee more then one then the one would say as well as the other I am as forward as thee and so none could be absolutely first Againe he is no genus for that is an vniuersall or Synopsis of many together whereas he is but one so that now he is not properly an ens but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and aboue our Logicke againe in that hee is absolutely first he must needs bee without accidents to vse their terme without adiuncts for they are second things arising from their substances and in absolutè primo ente there must be nothing but that which is absolutè primum so that here we see his most simple being and that he is beyond our Logicke Now if he be without all potentia both essentialis and accidentalis hee is pure act so that this act now of his must needs be his essae because he is pure act for if he bee agere then his esse and agere are the same so that if any one doth any thing as euery ens à primo doth by potentia it is not pure act some say the Angels doe agere per essentiam but it is false vnlesse they meane that they act first by potentia now indeed there is nothing but it doth act per facultatem essentiae First the forme that is the beginner of act and when it acts vpon matter internall that is habituall or a faculty when it acts by the matter vpon some externall obiect that is an act for first there is the essence the matter and the forme thē the faculty the formes act vpon the matter internally lastly the act which is of the forme by the matter externally now these are not in God but are his very essence Now we find then that this primū ens must be actus purus actus because there is no potentia in him at all ergo it must needs bee that he is primus actus ergo optimus actus for primus actus and optimus actus are all one Againe hence it must needes follow that if there bee any act of other things it must needs bee from him and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him so then thus we haue found him absolute in euery thing Ens a primo Now to returne to the first Syllogisme If there be reason there must bee an adaequatum subiectum of it ergo ens à primo for we haue heard that ens primum is beyond our reason so that there must be ens à primo which is adaequatum subiectum rationi and that now is liable to all our Logicke for it hath causes effects subiects adiuncts c. and thus we will goe on and see all the subiects of the arts in the concretion of ens à primo which the Philosophers say cannot bee demonstrated That we might dig deepe and lay our foundation of Arts sure I haue shewed that there is a being and that it is double the one from whom art is the other in whom it shines now we heard that ens est quod est which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolued by Grammar quod est Now for the continuall succession of things which some dreame of this it is if all things bee effects there must bee so many causes ergo in the end wee shall come to a first cause that is not effectum Further wee heard that ens primum was quod est seipso that is without any other so that in propriety hee is neither essentia nor ens but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hence he neither hath causes neither is any argument that doth arise from causes ergo is an indiuiduum but not a species hee is without end ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hence he therefore was neuer made ergo he made all things hee is without definition distribution and properties because he is without causes ergo there can be no art of him but he must bee the Author of art as wee shall heare hereafter He is merus actus because hee is without all potentia both substantialis and accidentalis againe hee is primus actus ergo optimus actus ergo whatsoeuer is well done of any thing is first from him againe he is infinitus actus ergo able to doe any finite thing yea and infinite Ens à primo est
and Poetry yet makes it more fine where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds So that now we see how these generall Arts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that they are not of so great necessitie in respect of the thing as in regard of vs for our good for so as euery thing is made for man so he must see them for his good by that rule that they are created These now though they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because they are circumstantiall yet they are ab ente primo because there are causes effects subiects adiuncts c. and speech in ente à primo Now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is eyther quantitie or qualitie the reason is this euery ens à primo is finite ergo must needs haue limits of quantitie if he haue limits of essence Quantitie is eyther discreet or continued for if euery thing be finite then it must be discreet or distinct from any other Againe as it is discreet so it is continued so farre as the forme extendeth the matter whereby wee may see how farre it reacheth and where it reacheth not Now as there is quantitie so also there must be qualitie in euery thing for there is no ens à primo that is pure act ergo it hath a forme acting vpon a matter thence proceed all quantities Againe it being made for an end must therefore act vnto its end Qualitas est natura bonitas euery thing hath nature because it hath a matter and a forme ergo there is nature in euery thing And therefore Ramus saith Forma est praecipua rerum natura and the Philosophers call forma principium actionis and materia principium passionis Now this ens being of this scantling for quantitie and of this nature for act must be good for Gods glory so that euery thing hath a goodnesse in it Againe were all things made for man and must hee see them with his reason Yes ergo they are good for him ergo hee must haue a will to imbrace them as bona as well as an eye of reason to see them as vera and so man also is made for God as his will acts goodnes Now for the order of these actus is before actum for the one is actio the other is passio and actio is before passio and is more excellent then it Againe actus doth concrescere with it selfe and with the actum that is in the thing ergo actus is more generall ergo is before actum Againe because wee doe not giue names to things but with reason from some argument of Logicke in the thing and againe because there must be an actus from the thing to man before there can be an actus from man to man therefore the Logismes in the thing must be before the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it ergo Logicke is the most generall and first in order of all arts Of those things that are acta quantitie is first because it ariseth nexly from the matter and forme of a thing for first of all the matter and forme limit the thing when they are put together before they act any thing and afterward they act one vpon the other Now qualitie that is the act of the forme vpon the matter ergo it is after quantitie but before goodnesse because that is the end of natures act For seeing quantitie ariseth immediately from the matter and forme of a thing and nature from the act of the forme vpon the matter therefore goodnesse must be the last as being the end of all the former and thus did the Lord make all things first making the causes effects of things then imposing speech on them then number then measuring them by Geometrie how farre their magnitude should reach and where it should not reach before it should act Now this act of Nature was to goe no further vpon externall obiects but onely be acted by the forme vpon the matter whereas the morall act of goodnes was to goe further for that is for God Againe Nature is the next inmost thing to quantitie and Goodnes is last And thus haue we seene all that is in ente à primo which is the ground of all Arts. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est qua omnes artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium Now wee are come to Arts and first wee are to beginne with Encuclopaidia and the definition of it First for the name it is Orbis ille Circulus Artium The reason of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through as wee vse to say when there are many poore folke to bee serued though they stand in a long row Haue you serued them round But there is a further reason of it A circle wee know is a round line whose beginning and end meet together in a common point therefore this learning in a Circle must be shewed to haue a common point and that wee shall easily finde The proper subiect of Art is Ens à primo because we heard that was made for an end Now then from whence Ens à primo had his beginning from thence must Ars haue his beginning But from Ens primum it had his beginning ergo Againe as Ens à primo hath for his beginning Ens primum so it must haue Ens primum for his last end because Ens primum is not made for any end but is the last end of all things it selfe ergo hee must also be the last end of Arte Then here wee finde as Ens primum is the beginning of Art so also hee is the end of Art because he is the beginning and end of those things that are the subiects of arts therefore there is one common point wherein they begin and end ergo hauing the same beginning and end here is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now howsoeuer the phrase may seeme otherwise as wee heard before yet here wee see the wisedome of God in this name though the Graecians did not know the reason of it when they gaue it Now the Scripture seemeth to witnesse this truth For the Lord saith I am the beginning and the end that is of things And againe I am Alpha and Omega these belong to Grammar ergo to Art ergo hee is both the beginning and end of things and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts. That this wisedome is round we may also see in regard of the subiect for the World is round and that is the subiect of Art ergo Art is so for Art is an adiunct to it and euery adiunct takes figure of his subiect Againe if we will take Art for Knowledge Knowledge is in a mans head and that is round so Encuclopaidia is euery way in circulo and thus wee see the reason why this name should bee giuen to a Chaine whose linkes are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia à primo then he hath the Idea of them in him for he made them by counsell and not
a generall Art so thus here we see argumentum est quod which is as large as aliquid quod affectum est we know this is a borrowed word affection is a disposition naturall as the eye is affected to see but that wee may see it the better we will dig deeper there is an efficient working then his working which is effectio which as it is about it so it is affectum ad effectum as if my hand be wounded with a sword there is first an efficient then there is wounding which is effectio then there is a wound which is effectum then my hand is the affectum to bee wounded so that affectus is nothing but a nature in that thing by which nature can performe that action so argumentum is affectum as if he should say that that is made or factus ad or effected to another thing or which hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it to worke with another thing Why affectum It is a propertie of an argument as homo est risibilis when he doth not ridere so that he defines argumentum in inuention from that power or faculty for as a man may haue an affection to that thing hee neuer doth so an argument may haue an affection to argue when it acteth not so that hee teacheth from that disposition of it to act so that he deliuereth it not from his act for that is but the vse of it but from its true nature as the common Logicians call it praedicabile that which may predicate and sayes it is not an argument till it be disposed but this is accidentall to argmentum then in an axiom they call it praedicatum actu which also is accidentall to an axiome for it may be subiectum as well and both are accidentall ad arguendum Why ad arguendum because the end of an argument is to argue to play the argument as the eye to see ad arguendum because euermore when wee fetch an argument to shew any thing that is the arguens and doth agere the aliquid is also an argument but it doth pati so that as quod was generall that is arguens or does argue so it tells mee that any thing may bee argued so homo est aliquid here homo is the aliquid and is argued by his genus which chargeth homo therefore there is nothing in the world but is an argument and may argue or bee argued but remember that both quod the aliquid that is both the arguens and argutum doe arguere but the one firstly the other secondly the one doth agere the other doth pati and so reagere The aliquid tells me it is the first then quod comes and argues it now would you argue then euermore looke first and that carefully whether your quod will argue your aliquid as will you build an house with sand that will not serue the turne for it is not affectum to it neither hath it that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it so that by any meanes let vs keepe close to our rule and we shall not doe wrong The fallacian of the common Logicians of Coxismus or petitio principij or cuculi cantus for they are all one As the Cuckow cries Cuckowe the Cuckow is Cuckow ergo the Cuckow cries Cuckow for here is no third argument and this is commonly the womans reason because it hath so little reason in it as they will say it is so because it is so So that simplex conuersio among Logicians is a breach of this rule as omnis homo est animal ergo aliquod animal est homo other Logicians as Polanus cals argumentum Thema which is too speciall for thema is taken among schooles for a question to be iudged by way of oration againe euery argument is not taken as thema then he says thema est simplex which is argumentum or compositum which is quaestio and thus we see how our Logicke goes most orderly and that it lookes at ens as it is simmonted with another thing Quales sunt singulae rationes solae et per se consideratae We haue heard what argumentum is and the first thing that we are to looke at in simples is this the glue to bee affectioned as if we would looke for a cause see whether it be affected to be so we haue heard the sallacians in part before as first where there is no argument but petitio principij and that either where there is no petitio at all or where the same thing is vttered in a synonymie or to the same purpose Againe it is a breach of this rule when that is brought for an argument which is no argument as baculus stat in angulo or when the third Argument is more obscure and doubtfull then the arguments of the question these and all other petitiones principij are breaches of this rule in generall and not of any speciall ones Againe it is a breach of the definition of an argument when wee mistake the aliquid though the argument be good and so that Heterozetesis is a fallace of argumentum in genere as when I talke of Chalk he talkes of Cheese Now we come to the commoration after argumentum quales sunt singulae rationes solae c. He hath defined argumentū from that affection that is continually in it for the act is accidentall and may be wanting for potentia as we heare in nature ariseth from the act of the forme vpon the matter Now he saith singulae that is argument by argument the cause alone the effect alone and so all the arguments from the beginning to the end He saith rationes rather then argumenta first because there is an equiuocation in that word many haue thought it to belong to a syllogisme onely and so when we say I deny your reason there it is taken for an axiome Now it is taken sometimes for the facultie of reason sometimes for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in things Here hee shewes that it is taken for the same with argumentum Solae that is as they are to be considered in inuention without iudgement and that he explaines further per se that is they are in their definitions not respected with some thing externally these are tales that is such as I haue defined vnto you so that he doth here commorari because of difference with Aristotle or rather with the Aristotelians euen as he stayed before vpon the definition of Dialectica for they thought there was no argument but in iudgement and therefore haue question with Ramus whether an argument be to be taught before wee come to a syllogisme Ramus here propounds it and determines it for his owne part that it may bee without iudgement and looke at others and you shall see them define all arguments from their vse in a syllogisme as we may see in all to picke places of Aristotle so that it is not so strait as they take it and Ramus would teach
he see the inuention it is a fallace and a preposterous course So argumentū is artificiale or inartificiale they breake this rule that will giue testimony of a thing whose artificiall arguments they haue not seene so do the Papists in their implicite faith when they beleeue as the Church beleeues not knowing what the Church beleeueth So schollers that take any thing that their authors deliuer them without any examination at all of the things they reade Kickerman saith an inartificiall argument may be receiued before an artificiall I doe not deny it but yet you must examine it afterward Gods testimonies onely are vndenyable because he cannot lye but no mans Artificiale est primum aut ortum We are farther to looke at this glue whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei it is there firstly or secondly this affection or going to the act is there at the first hand or at the second hand now it is the same still but is looked at as it is originally or as it is arising from the first as to make vp me there goes a soule and a body and of the formes of the foure elements is the forme of my body made and of their matter the matter of my bodie made now the elements are firstly there as making my body and secondly my body is in me as a part in me so a man is first consisting of body and soule and then is animall now this wisedome of God is wonderfull to consider how he makes things first of causes effects c and then ranketh them vnder a generall head And if we goe to the Creation we shall see them euidently first he made a first matter then the first formes and then mists that had their complements and did differ one from another then they might be compared together then they had names and were ranked vnder generall heads as a part to a whole c. and then they might be defined and their limits shewed how farre they reach for here our Author leads vs to see euery thing there and to see how it is there the reason of this distribution we shall see in euery thing whatsoeuer as in an inke-horne there must be the matter of it then it selfe and it must haue his adiuncts c. and then will it hold your inke then when it is this it is not a tree or a stone though it may be compared and be equall or vnequall like or vnlike so that first we see what is in it firstly then we may call it round deepe made of horne then range it vnder a head then lay it out in it limits and then giue testimony of it Primum quod est suae originis This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out for it is a far fetched trope and onely one is suae originis namely God but he meanes this clamminesse or glue that is suae originis is first there the ortum is not as the son hath the nature of his father but is another thing then his father but first argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum then artificiale est affectum ex sese so primum is argumentum artificiale primitus so that we must look at the argument as it doth argue not as it is suae originis but quod originaliter arguit he meanes that is there first as we shall see by the nature of the thing as homo iustus here iustitia is firstly in homine as an adiunct for he must first haue that vertue before he can be denominated iustus then secondly it is in him as he is denominated from it so a chest is made of wood here is the cause and effect and this is firstly then from hence I may say a woodden chest and this is secondly arising from the first Quod est suae originis As if he should haue said that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus now then we may goe wonderfull deep if we will goe by these degrees what may we not see if we would make a breefe Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est artificiale ex se primum primitus The fallacians are many as they that thinke they are coniugates that are in name as he hath vertue ergo he is studiosus so homo dormit quia somnit here is nothing but causes and effects and so synonimies for coniugata are nomina so againe when orta are taken for prima or taught before aut contra so do the common Logicians in the predicables when they teach genus species differentia proprium accidens First see the orta containe the prima whence they arise symbolicè as it were in a cognizance Here we learne this we must first looke at the affection of an argument then we must be ex se then primitus now ortum containes the same nature that primum doth and some say the effect ariseth from the causes and the subiect and adiunct from the effect But doth the effect argue with the affection of causa it doth not or doth the subiect or adiunct argue with the affection of an effect No. Estque simplex aut comparatum We haue heard what the end of Logick is and all shoots at this marke to reason well that is that we may handle our reason well now that we may doe thus we must haue inuention first afterward iudgement Inuention teacheth vs to finde out simples Iudgement teacheth vs how to lay them together we may compare inuention or arguments to the hookes and nayles in a thing iudgement to the fastning of them together Now inuention beholds arguments Argumentum in Logick is a concrete as the Schools call it signifying the thing together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing as a Taylor is a Taylor quatenus he hath that affection in him to make a garment so that inuention intends immediately the affection and mediately the thing for ens quatenus ens is generall to ars quatenus ars but ens quatenus it is affected ad arguendum so it belongs to Logicke alone and thus we goe by degrees for the Lord doth not let vs see any thing immediately now the very name inuention tells vs what we must doe namely seeke out it tells vs the Lord hath hid things secret in nature and we must labour for the simples and so finde them now we seeke argumentum which we heard to be of two sorts artificiale or inartificiale artificiale is that which is in artificio rei whereas the inartificiale doth but cary to vs what other men haue seene by the artificialls and because none can testifie of a thing before he haue seen it himselfe ergo artificiale is before inartificiale and also because he that seeth inartificialiter can but testifie so farre forth as he sees the thing which is not at all ergo they that giue testimony of that thing whose artificiall arguments they haue not seene are
is here a concrete signifying the thing causing as argumentum was before signifying the thing arguing for our Logicke that brings vs to the first cause doth but shew him as he argueth not as he is in his being causa is the thing arguing cuius that is est res causans cuius vi this vis and vertue is of the thing but Logicke looks at it as it is in the thing and then at the thing for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect it could not bee a cause as wood will not make a gowne so that it is here secondly required that the thing causans haue vim causandi and against this word is that common fallacian of non causa pro causa as he that will lay to the charge of a childe that which a man onely can doe so when wee ascribe to nature that it cannot doe as the making of a world which is peculiar to God est Est Esse is a generall terme and may signifie the essence of a thing or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence as first when I say vir est secondly vir est doctus where I doe not respect homo from his causes but as he hath this adiunct doctrina and the reason why est is so generall is because this esse is from the causes which are most generall for nothing can be sayd to bee this or that before it be which is from the causes by this vis wee must vnderstand that power and faculty in the thing that causeth another thing as if he should say the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly for vis is here the sme that affectio is in argumentum Esse indeed is generall to all the causes and existere is from them all which appeares by this we say mundus est à Deo est ex nihilo est formata c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause to make the effect so we shall see in a knife there are all the foure causes to be in it and the three former for the end and therefore if we will not be deceiued here see that whatsoeuer is de esse of a thing that is a cause res not effectum for we haue heard what res est that is the subiect of Art but if we had sayd effectum it had bene à posteriore for we haue not the effect wrought Againe wee are but yet in causa in generall by res he meanes res efficienda not yet effecta Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa when we take that to be the cause which hath the potentia efficiendi but doth not efficere but is causa quatenus it hath an hand in that effect so that if one bring a cause that is not a cause though it haue vim efficiendi yet is it not causa Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientia This is a deduction out of the first rule following this if the thing be causae vi then this is primus locus inuentionis for it is first in the cause before it bee in the effect then againe it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must looke at Locus here Ramus tells vs closely that the Aristotelians to picke places are these arguments the first whereof is causa Fons We know the fountaine is the first place where waters spring so all things spring from the causes yea subiects adiuncts c. Fons scientiae For if we know the causes then we know the effects because they arise from them and subiects c. and againe that is the principall part of knowledge Scirique demum creditur c. For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing and that which may bee remoued from the thing without destroying the thing but knowing the causes of a thing we know it as it is the things being arising from the causes and thus knowing the thing wee know it intus and in cute Here Ramus doth commorari telling vs what Aristotle meant by these words And againe too tells vs that Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiome consisting of causa and effectum and he teacheth it to euery cause in generall efficient matter forme and end Now Aristotle saith that a demonstration concludes the propertie of a subiect by the definition because that layes forth the essence of a thing but it doth not tell vs all the esse ergo not all the scientia for the esses of the efficient and end doe not goe into a definition Vt merito dicatur a Poeta c. Here he prefers the Poets authoritie before Aristotle for Aristotle being more imployed in this doctrine might speake of it as a priuate man but the Poet as a publike man foelix meaning a contemplatiue happinesse not a practicke Causa est efficiens materia aut forma finis Euery cause yeelds an esse but al together make the effect now it is of two sorts efficiens materia aut forma finis for he cannot giue it to vs in two words but makes a distinct axiome and couples the parts with a coniunction copulatiue by reason whereof they haue a communitie but where lyes it this it is I may call the two first potentiall causes the other two acting causes this the Schooles tells vs when they call materia potentia and the forme actus and this is Ramus meaning as wee shall see in many examples as when a Taylor sets buttons on a doublet with thread they are not done till all the causes are there so a house is not an house so soone as it hath an efficient and matter but when it hath also a forme and end Now our author would not vse potentia and actus first because they are barbarous words secondly they are improper because they cannot be called potentia and actus but potentiating and acting then againe the forme and end are potentia as well as efficiens and materia contra therefore he makes two couple of causes for so we see the efficient is the first mouer mouing quite through with the matter singly and the forme and end moue them inseparably together therefore they are thus distinguished efficiens est motus à quo in a line the matter ex qua and forme per quem finis ad quem but because there is a scope at matter therefore there is a distinction For as the efficient and end terminate the thing so the forme and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same So God made a matter and gaue it a forme and so an end ergo reason must see them thus The same order there is also in Gods prouidence so man also doth imitate God when he doth any thing orderly the first care is for a workman then a matter then a forme and then an end though we may haue cloth before
a taylor yet it is not a matter till it beginne with the Taylor to bring an effect to passe So then the efficient is in nature before the matter and the matter before the forme for the forme is an adiunct to the matter and the forme before the end the end being an adiunct to the forme and again a thing must be formed before it can haue an end The first efficient had the first matter and formes effect to him the second formes are adiuncts to the matter Now the first efficient is absolutely first for it hath nothing before it the first matter is not res prima nor causa prima but first for matter ergo it is from the first efficient onely ergo neuer hath any existency in the world but is ens incompletum so the first forme is from the first efficient not of the first matter but onely in it ergo it is ens also incompletum hence our soules are not our formes for then our formes should be res incompletae Now the end is last and the first end is the last end it is first because it is most generall last because it is not made for another end ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made so that the end as it is last as the thing is acted so it is first as it is most generall for all the the former causes worke to effect the end As we say in Schooles finis est primus in intentione posterius in executione so God made all things for his glorie here his glory is first in intention of him that workes by counsell but is acted last of all by all things that he made And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo melius is true of the last end of all things which is God for he is as we may say finis communissimus ergo optimus Efficiens est causa à qua res est We haue heard of causa and of his kinds and that they are disioyned by which meanes there is made two couple of causes the two first working ioyntly euen is the other doe Efficiens materia here is a second distribution and here the efficient is first for it is first cuius vi res est againe by the rule of method it is first in nature because it giueth light to that which followeth and that the efficient moues first we see it in euery thing he layes hold on the matter which in respect of the efficient is moued and by a naturall appetite moues and runnes to make an effect of it selfe and doth effect the effect as well as the efficient and that from the naturall appetite it hath to the effect but the mouer or efficient is before the thing moued and before the effect also Efficiens Efficiens quasi exfaciens mouing quite through for besides his first mouing as being the first cause hee moueth also together with the matter forme and end and his working with the rest is the cause of his name Est Euery cause is required to the effect efficiens est causa ergo againe first there must needs be a mouer to moue the matter before there can be a table wrought this appeares plainly by the creation of the world and because euery thing is an effect therefore the efficient is the first cause for take any thing and you shall see the vis of the efficient to runne quite through the same so looke into the world and euery part therof and you shall see Gods finger in euery thing without which they could not be so that efficiens est causa and because an effect cannot be without its esse ergo it is of the esse of it à qua from whom it is as if hee should say it is terminus à quo c. so as the world began with God so in euery thing in nature the beginning of motion is first from the next cause so that efficiens est causa à qua telling vs that this is the first being the effect hath Res. Here res is generall as before to all the arts and it is the subiect of the generall Arts. Ramus doth not here breake the rule of method not defining what res is Againe if he had said à qua est we should haue had reference to res againe if he had named effectum it had beene à posteriore not hauing learned what effectum est Res est this is generall to euery cause ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in generall but that he may not be so obscure hee borroweth some thing that went before for else the perfect definition had beene efficiens est à qua Now this teacheth vs to looke first at the efficient in euery thing for Logick tells vs not onely of an esse in generall but of foure seuerall esses from which existere doth arise as efficiens est causa à qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cuius gratia why doth he not say causa est cuius vires sit because something may be a cause and yet is not but if it doe causare then it is a cause So if I say I will doe a thing and yet doe it not yet am I an efficient for est doth here commend to vs the adsignification of time but the essence that so soone as it beginneth to moue so soone it is an efficient though the effect be not till the matter forme and end be there Cuius et si vera genera c. Here Ramus doth commorari telling vs that those many species which the Aristoteliās make are not species but modi efficientis because more of them may bee in one and the same efficient as one man may be causa procreans and conseruans sola and cum aliis per se per accidens because they may bee in the same efficient Euen as actio and passio doe not distinguish the thing but are diuers modi of the same thing Here Ramus will finde no species of efficiens neither are there any of the other three for the matter that is lowest ergo it hath nothing vnder it but examples and so is the efficient ergo he needed not say Cuius etsi vera genera c. for how could that appeare to him that is not wee know the effect is single ergo as the single matter forme and end make that so the thing efficient makes it neither hath it any species Vbertas tamen per magna c. There is great and plentifull vse of the efficient and as it is first of all so is it most generall of all for matter cannot be a matter till the efficient moue it and so of all other arguments now these make cause the efficient to be commended or discommended and according to these modi is the effect more or lesse argued as if a childe kill his father it is parricide so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone
he is more to be commended then if he had done it cum aliis aut contra Againe if a thing be done well natura is better then if it had beene done necessitate and more commendable when a thing is done by counsell then fortuna now because these modi doe vrge and presse the effect more or lesse ergo there is reason in them and therefore they belong to Logicke modi that is adiuncts not making these effects species but onely distinguished by accidents that fallacian non causa pro causa is generall to causa and it is also particular to efficiens making that causa efficiens which is not as the Heretickes in Diuinity were deceiued which said that the Angels did make the world Primo quod procreat aut tueatur These are first because they are more generall then the rest and also they are more in vse for we shall haue this first modus in vse twenty times for one to the other modi so we respect God as causa procreans and tueans before we respect him alone then againe this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse and the preseruing cause is the keeper of the thing in his esse Now in reason hee that is the procreating cause should also be the preseruing cause as God is not onely causa procreans of the world but also causa conseruans and so should parents as they procreant children so should they in like sort preserue them The procreant cause is first because things must needs haue a being before they can be preserued now they are distinguished because when a thing is procreated it is not preserued aut contra and the modi are ioyned with the cause not with the effect because they are first in the efficient as essentiall for actio is before passio so that here marke that next after we see the efficient we are to looke at these modi As we are saued by faith alone here is efficiens sola Our Author brings in an example of Ouids the 4 remedii and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples and would haue him bring his examples out of Diuinity But first Logicke being a generall Art it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and generall Writers as out of Poets and Historians which the Gentiles and Turkes may receiue these being more generally knowne to the world then are the Scriptures and againe Diuinity is the most speciall Art of all And so Ramus findeth fault but iustly with Aristotle for fetching his examples out of Geometry which is too obscure for it is a fallace to fetch examples to proue any thing if the examples be not as well or better knowne to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selues As they say in Geometry A is not B c. for so they say in Geometry angulus A and angulus B c. Now Logicke is a generall Art ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry c. which belongs to Rhetoricke a generall art the example is this first proper otia are proper and conseruing causes of loue then tropicall causa est procreans cibus the cherisher Otia si tollas c. Thus he reasons otia are the causes of loue for take them away and loue is gone hence it appeares they were of the essence of loue so that because causa is of the essence of the effect ergo idlenesse and you must put loue aut contra for the essence will be wanting and we haue a rule sublata causa tollitur effectum and it is generall to all causes for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall haue here as posita causa ponitur effectum yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre many other rules they haue all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa now it holds contingently in euery cause for if we put one cause we put all the causes and so it holds in the speciall causes that posita causa ponitur effectum contra as take away otium from Egistus and you take away loue so that sublata causa à tertio tollitur effectum so in iudgement it is also true as giue otium to Egistus and you may giue him loue which argues from the efficient Sic pater mater procreant nutrix tuetur Before he shewed vs an example out of an Author hee wills vs to looke for the vse of them out of Authors The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks the matter of the second to History Logicke is a generall Art ergo his examples are best out of Poetry and Oratory wherein the vse of all arts is Now the aliquid before is loue which we should haue heard of against which Ouid makes a medicine In this example Dido is the aliquid for here the aliquid is the causa Dardanus had two sonnes Assaracus and Anchises and of him came Aeneas now here shee takes away the true causes and sayes Caucasus begot thee so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans and Hyrcaenetigres are preseruing causes but this is false for here is non causa pro causa Obiection But doth he well to bring fallaces Answer Yes out of Poets for here non ens or ens fictum hath the nature of ens in it neither are all fables lyes but by continued allegories they teach vs notable truths now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners because he forsooke her Sic Romulus conditor Romanae vrbis c. He makes examples of his owne and there is genesis teaching vs that though genesis be before analysis yet genesis imitatiua is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis Againe our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes and whereunto any other example may be brought as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident in the second he makes a substantiall effect to be from substantiall causes naturally but fainedly in the last he brings substantiall causes working substantiall effects ordinarily in artificiall things and here we may see who first shot the arrow before wee can see where it lights or through what it flew or whence CAPVT 4. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit aut cum aliis WEE are still in the efficient the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing is the efficient and the modi of it the most generall modi was procreans and conseruans before now we come to the second modi sola aut cum aliis which are more generall then per se and per accidens in vse but not so generall as the first Secundo sola c. this is next ergo next after the first sola that is where this modus efficiendi is considered and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this
doe it with my nature not from it So in a clocke the leade goes downe by a rule in nature because it is heauy and that pulls the rope and the rope pulles the wheeles c. all these moue with their natures though not from them Ventorum naturalis efficientia est In this example Vna Eurusque Notusque ruunt creberque procellis Affricus vastos tollunt ad littora fluctus Here these three Eurus Notus and Affricus are naturall causes of tempests on the Seas they are also causae cum alijs and each of them is as principall as the other Consilii exemplum est illa Ciceronis de se confessio Suscepto bello Caesar gesto etiam magna ex parte c. those things that fall vnder Logicke them doth hee define as causa per se he defines to be quae sua facultate efficit but if he should define what nature and counsell are he should run into naturall and morall Philosophie for counsell belongs to Pollicy yet for the modus of it in working an effect it belongs to Logicke for a man may take counsell of himselfe without counsellers as Kings haue Suscepto bello Caesar c. iudicio meo ac voluntate in these words lies the modus which hee proues à disparatis nulla vi coactus c. Fallaces here are very common as when we take that for causa per se which is causa per accidens contra Now the reason why hee giues these modi to the efficient and not to the effect is because they are modi mouendi and doe not belong to the thing moued Per accidens efficit causa quae externa facultate efficit vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect but non sua facultate but is moued by some other thing and yet notwithstanding it workes after a sort sua facultate but not sua facultate if wee respect the effect as fire drieth a cloth by remouing the moysture and so leaues the cloth dry which drought is in the cloth Vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum Here wee see a necessitie in inuention which is all one with coaction By fortuna we are to vnderstand the speciall prouidence of God or ignorance of the next cause for ignorance of the prouidence of God in all things and of the next cause hath caused that men say what fortune had I when they are crossed in play or such like Now necessity answereth to nature cum efficiens cogitur so that this necessity here is a coaction and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur cogitur when as the worke of it per se is rather of some other thing now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se and in another respect causa per accidens for they are but modi vi externa ad effectum so that it doth it not natura or consilio Obiection Why saith hee effectum rather then res Answer All comes to one for he meanes res neither doth he define effectum here Here he meanes violence not that vis in causa this vis doth not worke the effect but workes vpon the cause and is that facultas whereof he spake before Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio At mihi quidem ait Orator si proprium verum nomen c. Before he said hee was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate and hither belongs fatum Schooles Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter c. Our author before did tell vs of fortuna in the ablatiue case here he puts it in the nominatiue because fortune is a principall cause of that effect that another doth per accidens the arguing we ascribe it to fortune and say fortune did it so that our author would haue vs consider first that it was fortune did it secondly that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it Per accidens That is working externa facultate now whereas hee saith he doth it per accidens he meanes fortune as it is commonly taken when wee make her blind not seeing what she doth for hence it doth arise when we doe not a thing by counsell but hab nab as they say that causeth vs to make fortune blinde Quando aliquid accidit That is happeneth for here it is principall the improuidence as it were he neither sees himselfe a cause neither doth he see who is the cause and therefore he saith accidit not efficit for hee saith I did it not so againe aske him who did it and he will say know not so that accidere is the speciall efficere of this modus Praeter scopum efficientis Fortune may seeme to be opposed to counsell which euermore hath a scope whereat it leuels now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum it is fortuna wee say Now things in nature may haue a scope which is beyond their nature and then it is fortuna so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should haue said praeter scopum fortunae if it bee causa fortuna or praeter scopum naturae if it be causa natura Sic Pheraeo Iasoni profuit hostis c. here his enemie going about to kill him healed him In hoc genere causarum imprudentia connumerari solet Imprudentia is one modus of fortune as here Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est c. I vnawares haue seene that which hath done me harm Then Ouid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her selfe and here Ouid reasons a simile as Acteon was torne in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana vnawares so am I banished for seeing that I would Scilicet insuperis etiam fortuna luenda est c. He meanes Augustus So if a man goe forth and a tile fall from an house and breake his head this is causa fortuna it is natura as it brake his head being harder then his head and fortuna as it hit him and consilio it breakes his head if it be flung for it hath a scope true it is nothing but counsell hath his end in its intendment yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh Hinc sumitur deprecatio c. For our author said before accidit therefore wee are causes ergo it ought to be pardoned deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna so they will say hee is a proper man but hath no lucke Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit c. Here Ramus doth commorari in the name lest he should be mistaken it is an vnchristian word it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsell but as it is vnknowne
couches in the effect and makes a bulke and if the vis of the efficient were essentiall because there could be no essefication of the effect without it much more must the matter bee essentiall for if we take away the matter we take away both the force and the thing it selfe Now we must vnderstand that ens and non ens are the subiect of Logicke and as argumentum was concretum and also causa so when I say materia I meane a thing that was made of a matter Ex qua That is out of which it is raised it is the mother of euery thing as we often speake of the earth because euery thing indeed is made of the foure elements but more especially nourished of the earth Now the matter doth not onely by his vertue cause the effect but is interessed in it and the effect riseth out of it as if it were a childe springing out of the mother onely it goes further in that its essence goes to the making vp of the effect now though the essence be from matter and forme yet the ens it selfe is from all the causes Res est That effect as we shall heare hereafter for in this doctrine of causa effectum is the aliquid which we must call res till we come to it Est Euery cause giues an esse to the effect and this esse is the bulke of it and from whence ariseth the greatnesse or littlenesse of the effect by the forme now it is a great question in Schooles whether the matter doth any thing indeed in respect of the efficient it is patiens but in respect of the effect it doth causare and so doth agere For if it be an effect in respect of euery cause then euery cause is after a sort the efficient of that effect and if you aske me what his action is I answer it doth materiare or substantiare the effect as the efficient did efficere the effect it is also passiue in regard of the forme but both together co-worke to make the effect though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter Now this is the next thing to be inquired after we see who made it then whereof it was made both which we see in euery thing see them as they are done Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia As Kickerman saith it is proxima or remota but he may say so of euery argument as well as of materia he saith man is made of the first matter then of the elements which are more remote but ex semine that is nearer alas we doe not here consider priority or posteriority neither doe these any more presse the effect here is no Logick still but materia est causa ex qua ergo this will not fall in Logick and if you marke it presently when he comes to materia prima and to the elements he is in naturall Philosophy ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logick but of the particular thing that belongs to a particular Art Hoc argumento ficto apud Ouid. 2. Metam Solis domus auro pyropo ebore argento componitur Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis Clara micante auro flammasque imitante pyropo c. Here Ramus brings an example out of Ouid which is a common Schoole booke and here a fained cause argues a fained effect ens and non ens are the subiect of Logicke but non ens gratia entis for so Logicke lookes at them first and giues entity to ens fictum and therefore Grammar and Rhetoricke must follow it for they are attendants on it The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts and they are argued by their matter it had his pillars of gold for their matter and pyropus another matter of the columnes the couering or seeling of Iuory the leaues of the doores made of siluer Obserue how these causae cum aliis in the matter doe not force the effect any thing at all ergo he doth not teach them here for whether they be made of one matter or of more matters all is one ergo there is no Logicke in that ergo it doth not belong to Logicke Caesar 1. belli ciuilis Imperat militibus Caesar vt c. Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships then he distributes the ship into his parts keeles ribs Carinae primùm and statumina ex leui materia the rest was viminibus contextum lined within with leather so that here is distributio integriin membra and euery part is argued by the materiall cause CHAP. 7. Causae primum genus est in efficiente materia secundum sequitur WEE haue heard of the efficient and of the matter and this is the conclusion of it now we come to the second which is in forma fine so that whilest he saith Causae primum genus eiusmodi est c. he tells me it was a distribution before where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis materiae for so genus is totum partibus essentiale and is neuer but in speciebus so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts Secundum sequitur in forma fine he doth not say Secundus est forma fine now as the efficient and matter were combined together as mouing together a while without the forme and end so the forme and end though the forme be before yet the end comes presently after and is as it were the pedissequa to the forme and indeed where we cannot finde the forme of a thing wee put the end as being next to it and best expressing it So bene disserere the end of Logicke is put for the forme of Logicke now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seene in greater matters so is it also in lesse for there is a cooperation of the efficient and end together first then of the forme and end together also though not without the efficient and matter In forma fine for the forme is before the finall cause for before the forme be induced or ingenerated in the matter it cannot be good for his end and the end is causa in respect of the effect not of the efficient So we say a coat hath a forme before it haue an end for it may be a coat and yet not fit to serue me now then as the efficient began the motion and the motion redounded out of the matter so it runs per formam finem Forma est causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latine there is but a transposition of the letters and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio because when it is made it hath the face of a thing so a thing when it hath its forme it hath a face it will seeme something so that the efficients esse is not facies res
esse ante post And Grammar which is the garment of Logick doth speake by the verbe of time past present and to come now we giue it in Grammar to verbes not but that it may bee giuen to euery thing as well as to actions and passions but that we deliuer it actiuely or passiuely Againe primum mobile which God hath made a common globe to all the world and is measured according to praeterita praesens and futurae ergo time is in euery thing and Angels and mens soules are without respect of primum mobile and day and night because they are beyond them but they are not without duration passiue because they were made creatures by God so that though their tempus be called auum yet is it this tempus Obiection May praeteritum being past be said to be no if we respect praesens for they are as wee see here distinct things but if we respect the thing it is yet not in time but in its essence how in it essence not as it doth existere in rerum natura but as it is in a rule that is eternall so that though Socrates now be not yet this axiome Socrates est homo is now and will be to the worlds end so praeteritum praesens and futurum all of them are for wee doe not respect the adsignification of time but looke at the argument as it is a being so that time future is a true thing though the time be not yet come and that duratio past present and to come are because the thing still is so that time is an adiunct But here as locus must bee a thing with that affection of receiuing so time must bee a thing with this affection of measuring Omninoque qualitates subiectis praeter causas adiunctae c. Againe another modus of adiunctum is called qualitates which is adioyned to this or that not being causes here comes in their praedicament of qualitas and qualitas is no genus of any thing ergo that distinction of qualitas to bee naturalis or moralis is not at all but a speciall vse of a thing that is taught in a generall Art for qualitas is but a logicall terme and as adiunctum is genus to them so is qualitas Euery example is infima species in Logicke so that calor is an adiunct to fire and when I haue said so I haue considered the logicall respect and no more Praeter causas Wee haue heard that there can bee nothing but must haue causes and so the existere of a thing is from the esses that the causes giue and then the adiuncts come ouer and aboue the thing Now qualities are of two sorts proper and common these are but speciall modi of these qualities they may be proper because they argue at proper common because they argue at common or at randome as wee say Now whatsoeuer hath affection to argue that belongs to Logicke ergo these because they haue affection to argue rather as modi then as adiuncts as modi efficientis before So therefore they are distinguished thus So risus doth argue homo not so much in regard of his adiunctity as of its property Now qualitates propriae haue these properties with them conueniunt they come together with the subiect and are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the whole and afterward with the parts ergo he saith well conueniunt Omni. This is somewhat hard for omni non dicitur de vno aut de duobus but tria simul omnia that is three will make an omne and our author teacheth in iudgement that a speciall axiome is quando consequens non omni and there it may be of one or two but here it must be taken more generall for one or two c. but because the schooles thought properties conuenire omni specici onely and thought that indiuidua had no properties as they also thought that forma was onely speciebus and indiuidua were distinguished accidentibus But our Logicke teacheth that euery thing hath a forme and therefore hath properties for commonly properties arise from the forme ergo he saith conueniunt omni whether it be omni specici or omni indiuiduo Soli. Soli shuts out all others else it is not a propertie Semper So that if they agree omni and non soli or soli and non omni or omni and soli sed non semper semper sed non omni soli they are no properties ergo a propertie doth argue with this vertue that it argues omni soli and semper and so it is meet because they will come into Art and will make a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for this it is euery Art ought to deliuer the causes qualities and act of a thing for so there is in nature first the thing then the qualities or faculties then the act which points out the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that if one would make an Art of homo that part of naturall Philosophy hee must speake of risus because he doth something in nature by vertue of that quality so heat and cold first agree to elementum calidum and frigidum and afterwards to the species not by the immediate acts of their formes vpon their matter but by the common acts of fire and agree to produce heat and water and earth to produce cold Vt homini risus aequo hinnitus cani latratus c. He meanes the facultie not the act so neighing to a horse euery beast hath his peculiar voyce though wee cannot discerne it so well Common adiuncts are such as agree to that which is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but is first in the parts and then in the generall as learning first agrees to Socrates Plato c. and then to man and this is the difference betweene proper and common adiuncts the proper adiuncts agree first to the generalls and then to the singulars The common agree first to the singulars and then to the generalls Hoc genere argumenti Faunium Chaeriam Cicero pro Roscio Comaedo cauillatur Nonne ipsum caput supercilia illa penitus abrasa c He had not an haire for he shaued them off ergo he reasons from thence that he was a knaue and it may be true because they are hot headed that are bald this is a new modus and he reasons from signes which are common qualities tney doe not agree omni soli and semper and yet a knaue doth omni soli and semper commonly Sic Martialis 2. lib. Zoilum ludit Crine ruber niger ore breuis pede lumine luscus c. The cause of these not making a good man is this the cause of a red head is colour ergo there is much heat and where there is much heat there will be much fancie and where there is much fancie there will be much iuggling Niger ore that comes from melancholy that lyes in the muscles about the mouth breuis pede that may haue some reason with it for such
with argumentum so that he meanes they differ but onely in some logicall respect they are the subtlest of all arguments because of their little dissention Sola ratione ergo they do not of necessity make a denyed axiome Quo de genere sunt illa frequentissima Non hoc sed illud quanquam tamen This is not a rule of Art but a commoration as if hee should say these arguments haue not beene in Schooles before but I haue obserued them by my experience and then againe they are subtill ergo I will helpe you when you find ergo these notes commonly commend vnto you diuersa so forma and facundia are made to disagree in their adiunctiue nature in respect of Vlisses so that they differ not in their nature but onely in logicall respect as if he should say they may both be adiuncts to one subiect but yet differ in Vlisses Priamus was ready to perish and yet with-held not his hands a man perishing should hold his hands but Priamus did not so that causa and effectum which might consent are here diuersa not in respect of Priamus but of thēselues Paula secus in Eunucho He meanes there is a difference of modus Suppose I be worthy of this reproch yet thou shouldst not tell me of it here is subiectum and adiunctum the diuersitie is in respect of the cause they are diuersa in respect of him that offered it Item alia aliusmodi Scelus tu illud vocas Tubero Here is a little difference too this fact was called scelus by Tubero Tullie tells him others gaue it other names alij enim errorem appellant alij timorem c. but no man besides thee call it scelus Here these names are made diuers in respect of him that called it scelus as if he should say call it any of the rest but call it not scelus and thus we haue heard diuersa If I say though he be rich or poore yet he is honest here is a diuersitie for so a discreet axiom may be affirmed they are diuers because riches commonly make vnhonest and also pouertie so wee may make diuersitie betweene the cause and effect or in giuing many causes to one effect aut contra or one subiect to an adiunct aut contra or many subiects to one adiunct aut contra and according to these wayes also there may be seuerall modi thereof CAP. 13. De disperatis Opposita sunt dissentanea quae ratione re dissentiunt IN looking at things wee first see the causes that giue esse then the complements that giue bene esse to the thing then we see what it is not and easily doe by seeing them arguments that giue esse and first we are to see the diuersitie which though they be conformable yet they doe diuert somewhat one from another and they are first because they giue light to all the rest that follow Now we come to see their opposition that is those things which haue their causes effects subiects and adiuncts are not onely dissenting in a logicall respect but are distinct realls Opposita gaine sets it commeth of ob and pono as it were set against ob is as it were a bolt to barre one thing from another so that their nature is to be barred not onely ratione but it is principally in their realtie and herein doe diuersa differ from opposites Diuersa are made to disagree in that wherein they might agree whereas opposites dissent in their nature Sunt dissentanea We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing they doe not sentire idem but quot capita tot sensus sunt among them whereas consentanies are of the same iudgement and these names doe well fit arguments because they are as it were the senses of things Dissentanea that is such as thinke asunder are seuered and distract our thoughts Quae ratione re dissentiunt Ratione that is as diuersa did because they doe not onely disagree quatenus argumenta that is as they haue logicall respect in them but quatenus they are res as blacke is not white they are opposites and there is a barre that blacke cannot be white contra which opposition is in their dissention being cleane of another iudgement so that there is dissention betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them Re. As if we say blacke is not white we say not onely that blacke is not the cause not the effect subiect or adiunct of white but that they are diuers things in nature ergo this must be obserued that the barre is not onely the barre of rationall respect but of reality Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem ad idem c. Surely if they be bard from comming one at another and that in nature then non possunt eidem attribui As first when I say blacknesse is not whitenesse and againe when as I say blacknesse and whitenesse cannot be giuen to the same subiect here the one dissention is in essence the other is in accident ergo this idem must bee vnderstood of the essence it selfe and likewise the subiect Non possunt takes away all possibility of ioyning in one ergo whatsoeuer makes them consent breakes this rule for whereas this rule saith sunt dissentanea they make them consentanea and againe whereas this rule saith non possunt eidem attribui they say they may Attribui The attribute is alwayes the consequent part of the axiome so that if we giue them to subiects they cannot be giuen to one and the same subiect they may bee the consequent but not the antecedent part so that contraries must be attributed for when I say homo est animal aut brutum I giue them both to animal but not eidem Now antecedent contraries will haue contrary consequents est enim par ratio now they doe dissentire ratione re ergo cannot any waies be consentanies ergo cannot bee made by any meanes to agree Secundum idem According to the same diuers thinke this is put in in respect of relates because of the example that followes pater filius eiusdem but it hath a more generall respect of opposites in their whole nature else it should haue beene taught more specially in the doctrine of relates Now two contraries may be giuen eidem but not secundum idem ad idem eodem tempore eidem that is eidem genere not eidem specie as a man may be well and a man may be sicke but not the same man so that secundum idem hath respect to the same indiuiduality as it were or species so homo may be ager and sanus but not secundumidem for that identity cannot be now ratio is giuen homini secundum idem for herein omnis homo est idem ad idem still there is idem for if we consider them not about idem they are not opposites then againe there must be the same respect and also ad idem that is
definition of Dialectica an example of definitio so that as I say if relation were a common affection to all arguments all examples also should be relates which they are not againe if causa and effectum were relates then they must bee together for relates must be simul natura ergo this is fallacia accidentis they thought the words of Art as they call them were relates ergo the doctrine of relates must goe generally with all arguments We know againe that the causes efficient matter forme and end and the effect are distinct things and doe not constare è mutua alterius affectione ergo are not relates againe causa est cuius vi res est and the effect quod è causis existit Now each relate containes the efficient matter forme and end of his fellow ergo if they should be taught generally then in the efficient alone in the matter alone in the forme alone and in the end alone there should bee all the causes Some would haue relates taught as consentanie arguments because they doe agree it is true but they doe disagree also and if they should be taught in consentanies their dissentio also should bee taught there or else they should make a double doctrine of one thing and this kinde of teaching had beene à posteriore againe where should they haue beene taught they are mutuall causes ergo not causa and effectum but both causes and effects againe the doctrine of causa efficiens materia forma and finis are distinct here they are confounded together in one Now the Aristotelians haue a predicament of relates and haue also their series but their gradus of them will not stand for relates haue no species but are lowest saue onely examples and they goe cleane out and say relates are of this nature or that nature as if they shold say relates whose species are in this Art or in that Art As in Oeconomie in a familie they are free or bound free husband and wife bound children and seruants c. but now the husband and wife are not relates because the bound and free are relats all these are speciall examples of relates containing nothing vnder them so that relates cannot possibly bee a predicament according to their owne doctrine no more then causa and effectum and by that course that they take I can proue that Socrates est genus in going backward and saying he is substantia he is genus c. Now because the whole relation stands in their mutuall causation for that cause they are called relates Vt pater qui filium habet c. So we say is he such a mans sonne here is a metonimie of the adiunct for the subiect son put for man when I say Paul is a seruant of Christ here I meane Pauls calling seruant hath a double respect in it one as it is in Oeconomie another as it hath logicall relation which we may see thus for if he be Christs seruant then Christ is his master Relata dicuntur simul esse natura The reason stands in this the whole being of the one relate is contained in the other ergo they are simul for if they be mutuall causes they must bee mutuall effects ergo as one is the cause so the other is the effect contra ergo they must be simul Natura Because their nature springs from them mutually for nature is arising from causes here we may see in the Trinitie that one person is not before another there is no respect of priority or posteriority in the rest of contraries because there is no force of arguing from thence we heard before that all of them were aequè manifesta that is aeque intelligibilia and not as consentanies where the cause cleareth the effect more then contra because the causes are more simple and single so likewise the subiect is not beholding to the adiunct but contra againe the cause and subiect did more argue the effect and adiunct then contra Againe from hence it is that qui alierum perfectè norit norit reliquum for they are mutuall causes and our scientia est è causis Pro Marcello Ex quo profectò intelligis quinta in dato beneficio sit laus cum in accepto tanta sit gloria Dare and accipere are relates as if he should say if it bee glorious to receiue then it is much more glorious to giue now his principall drift of arguing is à minore but yet the arguments are relates so that a thing is not giuen till it be receiued and againe hee that knowes the one knowes the other Tum seruum sis te genitum blandéque fateris Cum dicis dominum Sosibiane patrem Sosibian is a seruant to his father because he is his master Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est Hermacreonti conducere If it be honest to let out then it is honest to hire for they are mutuall causes and in vsurie I thinke both taking on vsurie and letting out to vsurie are vnlawfull by reason of this relation as Ieremy speakes So discere and docere are relates Iam illa inquit matura vxor generi nouerca filii filia pellex Here he playeth with the names and indeed all names of kindreds are relates Ouidius 1. Metamorphosios Non hospes ab hospite tutus Non socer à genero fratrum quoque gratia rara est c. Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium nihil habet c. Indeed here is no contrarietie in these examples neither consention in that respect but they are paria happely he could find no example of them in their disagreeing nature and so would here commend vnto vs their vse to be more often in the consentanie affection then in their dissentany nature as when we say how could that be why he was his sonne CHAP. 15. De aduersis Aduersa sunt contraria affirmantia quae inter se veluti è regione perpetuò aduersantur WEE haue heard what a thing is that is what goes to the being and what to the well being of it and how thereby it dissenteth from other things by a diuersitie or opposition diuers might consent betweene themselues but they are made to diuert one from another Againe for opposition it is re ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature or by a contrary nature Contraries are either of one thing to another thing or of one thing to nothing the former kinde also is of things that might agree or of them that will neuer bee at peace now therefore wee come to aduersa and these haue their name of turning not aside as diuersa or as one to many as disparats neither as relates which haue a double aspect a coniunct aspect being set face to face and an opposite aspect being set backe to backe But aduersa are in an opposite aspect hence a line drawne from the point of the one aspect through the center to the point of the other aspect will
contrary fights with the other in the same subiect vt iustus non iustus for the vse of them we seldome finde them directly opposed but in an axiom we chiefly finde them as when I say it is so it is not so or we shall finde them often by way of mocking as when we cry at a thing and say If it be not it is not here is the antecedent negatiue and the antecedent affirmatiue Sic in defensione Murenae c. Nihil ignoueris saith the Stoicke imo aliquid non omnia Here be contradicent axioms making one axiom to consist of contradicent arguments So that by this example we may see where they are vsed They are called contradientia because the contrariety is in the denyall of the word affirmed quasi contrarietas in dictione but it is in re indeed so that this is contradiction when two talke together and the one denies that which the other said as Diues non Diues bella non bella puella non puella So Cicero counts Atticus an Epicure by profession that mortui non sunt miseri because non sunt now when we find contradiction in a speech we shew it by the rule we finde many arguments among the Papists to be of this kinde and also among our owne men The fallaces are generall to opposites and there are non-contradicents for contradicents when men contend about nothing CAP. 17. De priuantibus Priuantia sunt contraria negantia quorum alterum negat in eo tantum subiecto in quo affirmatum suapte natura inest NOw we come to see a thing in his being and with his complements may not be that absence of a thing where it should be for priuans is nothing else priuans will neither let the habit of the thing that it denyeth be there nor any other thing but it selfe ergo there is the greatest contention that can be and betweene something and nothing in the same place there is the greatest distance and nothing puls out something as it were by the roots and makes that something to be an absolute nothing Priuantia They are so called because of the priuant that pulls the habit out of his house as it were In eo tantum subiecto He doth not meane that priuantia are alwayes adiuncts to some subiect for they may be of the same thing as when I say sight is not blindnesse but this he meanes that the habit is denyed and the denyer takes away the very same thing without leauing any deputy thereof as cecity denies the verie entity of visus where it should be and plucks vp as it were the first causes of it Suapte natura inest He doth not vnderstand by nature as if it were a thing considered in naturall Philosophy but in that thing wherunto it might be consentany ergo by nature is to be considered that that any way or by any rule of Art should agree to the thing so that simplex natura is as much as consentaneum or that which is consentanie as a cause effect c. to the thing Atque hîc affirmatum dicitur habitus negatum autem priuatio He keepes the common termes it is called habitus because it should be habituall to the thing whereunto it is giuen Negatum autem priuatio because it pulls out the habit by the roots Sic motus quies sic ebrius sobrius Our Author brings such examples as are receiued in Schooles otherwise ebrietas is a vice and indeed all vices are priuantia So sinne is a habit as it causeth the subiect to act imperfectly so non es ebrius quia sobrius hee takes away the priuant by putting the habit Sic caecum esse videre Existat igitur ex hac familia aliquis ac potissimum caecus ille Let blinde Appius come because whilest hee cannot see he will take the lesse griefe at her So pauper and diues mors and vita and indeed this shewes what sinne is that brought death a priuant cause a priuant effect Item tacere loqui so mortalitas is the priuation of immortality though it seeme to make it a priuant Sde dissentaneorum categoria sic est c. Our Author told vs before that there was a categorie of consentanies shewing vs where Aristotles ten categories are and here are categoremata of dissentanies also and a categoria of them Now because we cannot see the categoria or arguing without we first see the arguments ergo we are here first taught the categoremata for the categorias sake Vnde quiduis ab altero differre quolibet modo potest Vnde quiduis that is any thing as if he should say there is nothing that is not another thing or nothing but it is some of these wayes CAP. 18. De paribus Argumenta simplicia ita fuerunt in consentaneis dissentaneis comparata sunt quae inter se comparantur c. WEE haue heard of a thing as it is in it selfe compleat as it is first in the causes and afterward with his complements and seeing it thus wee see how it is not another thing Notwithstanding wee come now to see that there may be a comparison betwixt it and another thing happily to match it or to be vnequall like or vnlike now whilst we see things thus we see the inside and outside of them The arguments are called comparates for this affection in them resteth as it were to argue so soone as they are sundred as for example lay one thing to another it may be greater though lesse to another c. so that these doe not looke at things as they are absolute but as they are laid together The reason of these arguments in nature is this there are more things in nature then there are degrees of quantity or resemblance of similitude ergo some of them must be matches some greater some lesse and as the reason of that question one being asked whether there were any two men in the world that had an equall number of haires on their head he sayd yes because there were more men in the world then any man had haires on his head so it is here there are more things in nature then there are degrees of quantity and they are finite ergo some haue the same quantity and some haue not and againe because some things are like others and some vnlike ergo there must be a looking at that Argumenta simplicia c. Here is a transition containing the doctrine of that which went before and this is the conclusion Comparata sunt c. Therefore it is imperfect wanting the proposition the name comes of con and paro to bring together or lay together so that howbeit the denomination of comparates may seeme to rise principally from parity yet we must take them more generally because impartia similia and dissimilia are also compared but are vnmatches for as our English word Matches may bee taken for equall matches or vnequall so may the latine word
whom I defend then I may accuse him whom he defends Quod cùm fateantur satis magnam c. If vice make miserable shall not vertue make happy Contraria enim contrariorum sunt consequentia c. This rule holds not when it is genus but when it followes from it then it will be true as I cannot say the father is good ergo the sonne is euill because goodnesse and euilnesse doe not follow from fatherhood and sonnehood for consequentia is here as arising from contrarie causes or from causes in the thing or as adiuncts Dic quibus in terris eris mihi magnus Apollo c. This is a common argument among the common sort One propounds a riddle and the other not being able to answer propounds another and this also is common when one sayes giue me this and I will giue you that Paria vero ficta sunt illa c. Now we come to ficta paria As Zenophons wife would not rather haue her neighbours husband then her owne so she should not rather desire his garment or gold c. and as Zenophon would not rather haue his neighbours wife then his owne so hee should not rather desire his neighbours horse or ground rather then his owne and here we see the vse of the third propertie CAP. 19. De maioribus Imparia sunt quorum quantitas non est vna Impar est maius aut minus Maius est cuius quantitas excedit WE haue heard how things may be compared with things and this comparison was either in quantity or quality which quantity was a logicall quantity not a geometricall quantity for it was of things where Geometry cannot be considered Again this is generall to euery thing not speciall to Geometry and the reason hereof we heard to be because there are more things in nature then there are degrees in quantity it was parium or imparium Paria were payres matches and equalls and imparia are such as agree not in any one of these three but the aliquid here as it is greater to one so is it lesse to another Imparia therefore are such as are not paires but the one is greater then the other Quorum quantitas non est vna We haue heard concerning quantity that paria were quorum vna est quantitas imparia sunt quorum non est vna quantitas that is as parity was the quantity of paria so imparity is the quantity of imparia Non est vna Because the ones quantity is called maius and the others minus so that as paria had but one quantity so imparia haue two one maius and another minus Impar est maius aut minus Hauing shewed what imparia are here he distributeth them into maius and minus as if he should say imparitie is either in maiority or minority and here is all logicall quantity and they that will make a predicament of quantity should indeed bring in this quantity and not the table of Arithmeticke and Geometry the reason why this quantity is generall is because all things whatsoeuer are finite in essence ergo in quantity Maius goes before minus because it containeth in it the quantity of the minus and exceedeth it so that the maius giues light to the minus not contra Maius is so called because it is euermore considered in comparison of one thing to another and therefore is not called magnum aut paruum maximum aut minimum Maius est cuius quantitas excedit Here maiority is the quantity of maius and this maiority exceedeth because that the maius is actiue in comparison of the minus for the stronger acts vpon the weaker rather then contra Propriae notae sunt c. Our Author doth commorari vpon this doctrine because others haue taught them confusedly therefore to keepe vs in order that we may not be mistaken hee pleaseth to set downe these notes for our further helpe Tollitur è medio c. Verbosa simulatio prudentiae which is the third argument is argued à maiori domina illa sapientiae There is not onely contempt of the babbling Orator which is the aliquid but of the good Orator Hinc sumitur Logica quaedam gradatio c. That is as a modus belonging hither is that logicall gradation c. as the people and the Senate are compared the Senate and the publique garisons and they and the Generalls c. so that here is a climbing vp the maius in one respect being made the minus in another respect It is better to be the sonne of Thirsites and an Achilles then contra the maius is before the reason is this that that is of his progenitors is not his owne but that which hee hath of himselfe Aeneas perswades his fellowes to stay and beare these because they haue borne greater Thou openest thy fountaine to thy enemies giue vs leaue to open our little springs to our friends She gaue thee great thankes yea as big as great mountaines Now the maius is quam abs te esse datum Ficta vero maiora etiam plurimum valent As wee heard before generally that ficta comparata might argue vera so here ficta maiora may argue ficta minora If a Duke should loue her he could not keepe her much lesse canst thou If Iupiter should doe it I could not hope to doe it much lesse if Aeneas should bid me CAP. 20. De minoribus Minus est cuius quantitas exceditur MInus is a logicall quantity that may bee in euery thing as I haue said before of maius and minority is the quantity of minus ergo it is exceeded by the maius because the maius containes the minus and much more double treble c. Minus autem saepè indicatur c. As maiority hath beene abused by Authors so hath minority ergo he would helpe vs by notes lest we should be deceiued Saepe not alwaies as we shall heare afterward Nemo non modo Romae c. Rome is compared with euery corner of Italy and the argument is drawne à minore Catilin had sought out all the rascalls in Rome and all in euery corner of Italy which is the minus Catilin would faine haue beene Consull to trouble the State here Consul is the maius and exul the minus Ouid. 1. Reme amoris Here the body and soule are compared the body is minus the soule maius If thou wilt labour for the good of the body much more for the good of the soule Atque huius eiusdem speciei sunt hae formulae quae fiunt negatione parium Hither we referre those manner of speeches which are made by deniall of equalls Omnes ex omni aetate c. If all the Lawyers of the common wealth were here they are not comparable to Seruitius Sulpitius who is the maius Aliquando nota nulla est He was so farre from finishing his worke which is the maius that he had not laid so much as the foundation
louer cannot be free here the thing libertas is not the cause of liber but cur tu sis liber looking at the effect together with liber Now coniugates arise onely from argreeing arguments ergo there is nothing that goes to the causality effectity subiunctity or adiunctity of a thing as wee may say but we may denominate from it As I may call a chest made of wood a woodden chest for indeed the reason of the name coniugata is from yoaking the thing vnto the man or vnto the act Cicero 3. de natura Deorum cum Dionysio tyranno loquitur Iam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri c. Dionysius comming into Greece robbed their Temples they vsed to haue fine things in their Temples dedicated to their Gods which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thence came 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 accursed because they dedicated them to their Idols now he tooke these things and there was engrauen in them bona Deorum ergo he said he would bee so bold as vti eorum bonitate I will not vse him as a Consull because he vsed me not as a consular that is as one that hath beene a Consull The cause was consularis and senatoria ergo hee needed the helpe of the Consul and the Senate res consularis and senatoria are the adiuncts to consul and to senatus CAP. 24. De Notatione Notatio est nominis interpretatio nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum c. NOw we come to notatio coniugata did nominate the thing from some thing that was in it but did not name it properly but so as it might agree to another thing that had the same consentanie argument in it from which that name was fetched but notatio is the name of a thing that is proper to it he called the first coniugata for as we were taught by them to giue the thing a name which may bee common to some other thing so here notatio teacheth vs to giue the thing a name arising from some property in it so that it be not common to other things neither is the name and the thing the same as wee heard in coniugates Iustitia iustus iustè were the same onely they were deliuered diuersly Est nominis interpretatio That is not the laying out of the name but the reason of the name so that the arguments arguing are nomen and notatio nominis Notatio is after coniugata because it ariseth from dissentanies also and comparats whereas coniugates arise onely from consentanies Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum So saith our Grammar vox est nota qua vnumquodque vocatur Now as there are nomina so ratio reddi potest si vera notatione fiant The denomination comes from something as homo ab humo for as humus signifieth the fieth the earth so homo names not man earthy but it is a new name drawne from humus So terra is called vesta à vi stando And fire is called focus à fouendo Cicero 4. in Verrem O Verrea praeclara Quo enim accessisti quo non attuleris tecum istum diem Etenim quam tu domum quam vrbem adiisti quod fauum denique quod non euersum atque extersum reliquiris c. They made a holy day in Sicily for the honour of my Lord Boare-pig now he was a sweepe-stake ergo his holy day was named of his manners Verres à verendo because he swept all where he came Ouid. 1. Fastorum Prima dies tibi Carna datur dea cardinis haec est c. Carna was so called quasi dea cardinis because she was conuersant about doores and hinges Tuae coniugis bonae faeminae locupletis quidem certè Bambalio quidem pater c. As Bambalio was so called because he vsed to stammer and stutter in his speech Ex dissentaneis autem est notatio Vt Lucus quia vmbra opacus parum luceat ludus qui est longissime à lusu Dis quia minime diues E comparatis autem est notatio Vt Pyropus quod flammam ignis imititur Est vero vt notationi ad suum nomen sic nomini ad notationem sua affectio Ramus doth commorari here and shewes how the name may argue the notation as well as the notation may the name though that be not so common as animi plenus ergo animosus contra And thus we haue heard how nomina belong to Logicke CAP. 25. De distributione Reliquum est ex ertis aliunde argumentis argumentum distributionis definitionis NOw we come to second orta which arise manifoldly from more arguments and this hee desired to deliuer vnto vs when he said distributio and definitio Now distributio must come after coniugata and notatio in respect of his double arising then againe it is requisite that after we haue seene the first arguments in things that wee next name them from some thing in them and then that wee see a thing as it is common with another and againe when we see the distribution of it into his parts we may soone see the limits of it and how farre it reacheth and so giue testimony thereof Now a distribution doth arise from any consentany arguments or common because that a cause may be common to more effects contra and a subiect to more adiuncts contra hence it comes to passe that a thing may be distributed a common cause into speciall effects aut contra a common subiect into speciall adiuncts contra And this we see to be very true in nature by many examples so that distributio is nothing but taking a common cause or subiect and diuiding it into speciall effects or adiuncts aut contra Reliquum est c. This is an imperfect transition and indeed containeth a distribution as if he should say ortum is reliquum or primum A distribution is from common causes and a speciall cause and that is perfect or from some conflux of other arguments which the Schooles call properties and that is descriptio In qua vtraque pars affectio reciprocationis est That is this is a property to them Now he saith affectio because argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum As if hee should say these arguments are affected to argue with a mutuall receiuing of themselues as the whole containes iust as much as the parts contra the definition as the definite contra So that this reciprocation for all the world is like vnto two Iuglers pots where the one will hold iust as much water as the other and neither more nor lesse so then the whole is not the parts nor the definitum the definitio onely there is this mutuall affection of reciprocation betwixt them that is they haue that affection as that the parts simul sumptae will reach no further then the totum aut contra the definition then the definite aut contra as when I say a man is
sicke or well here the parts may agree to other things then to man Answer True but we must vnderstand it as if it were said homo is either homo aeger or homo sanus now this reciprocation in a distribution is of all the parts together with the whole Distributio est cum totum in partes distribuitur Hauing shewed the generall affection he now comes to tell what distribution is it is called distribution in the actiue signification in respect of the parts now distribution is the categoria and the parts and the whole are the categoremata Cum totum in partes distribuitur Here is first a totum which shewes that it is alwaies some common thing and the parts are speciall things contained in the whole so that that which is new here is common as a common cause a common effect subiect or adiunct c. and here this common is called a totum as it containes the parts then againe this distribution is as it were a pulling the parts in peeces and not a ioyning or gathering of them together though inductio be an inuersa distributio but he rather vseth this word distributio because it is more generall and more in vse and the arguing from the whole to the parts is more in vse then contra Totum est quod continet partes It is that which holdeth together the parts continet because all the parts are in the whole as in one as being the common head wherein they are Pars est quae continetur a toto For the container is the totum and the parts the contained so that the doctrine of distributio is but to teach vs how to range and cary euery thing to his home It is a great question among the Physitians whether a wen be a part of a mans body or no. Answer It is morbus ergo no part it is in toto but not contained à toto for the whole containes the members by reason of its forme if we speake of integrum but the forme reacheth not to this Atque vt distinctio totius in partes distributio sic collectio partium c. Many Logicians haue made this to belong to argumentatio but they are deceiued for they belong hither and it is the same to doe and vndoe to diuide the whole into parts and to colligere the parts to make vp the whole Distributio sumitur ex argumentis toti quidem consentaneis inter se autem dissentaneis Here hee sheweth from whence distribution ariseth namely from consentanies in respect of the parts with the whole and also from dissentanies either disparats or contraries in respect of the parts betweene themselues Itaque tanto accuratior erit quanto partium c. This is a deduction from that that went before for if the former be true then this also now the greatest dissention is of contraries and the greatest of all is betweene something and nothing ergo to distribute into tricotomies and quadricotomies c. is to skip ouer some thing that should bee taught And thus much for distribution in generall CAP. 26. De distributione ex causis Distributio prima est ex absolute consentancis causis nempe effectis COncerning this doctrine of distributio we haue heard the generalitie the ground from whence a distribution doth arise is for that the first arguments are common as a common cause may bee distributed by the effects in like sort a common effect may bee distributed into speciall causes and so for the subiect and adiunct so that beside that community there is nothing new in this second inuention In a distribution we obserued a whole and a part the whole containes the parts and the parts are contained of the whole ergo if either the whole containe not all the parts or all the parts be not contained of the whole there will be no distribution Now these arguments did arise from consentanies in respect of the whole but from dissentanies inter se Itaque tanto accuratior erit c. ergo a distribution into a dicotomy which is of contraries is the best yet if it cannot be had wee must be faine to make a tricotomy now we come to the species of distribution Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis causis nempe effectis A distribution is a deriuatiue argument from cause or from modo quodam consentaneorum vt subiectorum adiunctorum Now the vse of distribution is this that wee may range euery thing in his owne order and place for when we haue seene a thing in his esse and bene esse and then that it is not this or that and haue also compared it with other things to see whether it be equall or vnequall like or vnlike and likewise haue giuen it a name in the next place it is requisite that we set it in his ranke for so the Lord hath ranged euery thing in the world as man vnder his genus animal for the Lord hath made all things lyable to our Logicke ergo they must bee ranged vnder some head that wee may see how they agree and how they disagree Distributio prima est c. Distributio is double as I sayd before ex absolute consentaneis modo quodaÌ„ consentaneis so that he cals that distribution which ariseth from a generall cause and a generall effect Distributio prima It is prima in a double respect first because causa and effectum are prima secondly as they are before subiectum and adiunctum Hee takes distributio here in the actiue signification and according thereunto must the species be prosecuted for he doth define them from the parts diuiding For the notation of the word which giues great light it comes of tribuo and dis as if it signified that distribution that iustice giues it is a terme belonging to Law as many of our logicall termes doe and here it signifieth a seuering of the parts and a giuing to euery part his due as when a common cause is distributed and then to euery speciall effect his owne cause is giuen so that here is nothing in this new inuention but this distribution the rest is the first inuention as when I say a man is sicke and a man is well here are two subiects and two adiuncts but when I say of men some are sick some are well here is a distribution Now the reason why he ioyneth both causa and effectum together saying ex absolute consentanâ—is causis nempe effectis is because that in a distribution as there are parts so there is a whole distributio being both actiue and passiue though it bee principally denominated from the parts so that where the cause is the whole there the effects must be parts Distributio ex causis est quando partes sunt causae totius So that here the effect is the whole and the causes are the parts now he prosequutes the doctrine of distribution by the parts because he goes according to the act of things
of the learner Virgilius 1. Georg. Quid faciat laetas segetes quo sidere terram Vertere Maecenas vlnusque adiungere vites c. Here Virgil distributes his whole worke this is a distribution of the integrum into the members not of the subiect into his adiuncts as some will haue it for it is a distribution of his booke First hee will teach how to plow then how to set vines then how to order cattle then how to order Bees Cicero pro Mureno Intelligo iudices tres accusationis partes fuisse earum vnam in reprehensione vitae c. His oration was diuided into three parts first the reprouing of Murenus for his life Secondly his seeking of honour Lastly the accusing of him of ambition so Preachers diuide their speech not their text Quin etiam aliter tractatur hoc argumenti genus vel à partibus ad totum vel a toto ad partes Catullus Quintia formosa est multis mihi candida longa Recta est haec ego sic singula confiteor c. Againe he shewes another modus when we bring in an induction of the parts to make vp the whole or when we argue from the whole to proue all the parts As Quintia was faire to many here is the totum to me she is candida longa recta but there other things wanting in her to make her beautifull namely venustas mica salis wit to make merry iests without offence and good cariage so here we see how he by withdrawing a part denies the whole Lesbia formosa est quae cum pulcherrima tota est Tum omnibus vna omnes surripuit Veneres Here now contrarie to the other example he gathers all the parts of beauty in one and so concludes the whole CAP. 27. De distributione ex effectis vbi de genere specie Distributio ex effectis est quando partes sunt effecta THe originall of a distribution is from firsts arguments comming to haue a generality because they are common to many distributio ex effectis est c. that is when speciall causes may be giuen to one common effect for as integrum though it bee singular yet is it totum because it is made of the portions of the matter and forme of the members so here the effects are made of their genus Now he sayes distributio ex effectis because it ariseth ex effectis for there are the causes distributing and the parts distributed so that here we may see why these arguments are rightly called orta quando partes sunt effecta so as the whole doth symbolicè containe the causes so the parts doe symbolicè containe the effect as if he should say effecta we heard of in the first inuentio but effecta here sunt partes this is the second inuention God as he made all things so hath he ranged and ordered them one vnder another so that in this definition this is all the parts are the effects and the cause is the whole Marriners are generall causes but they haue speciall effects for some climbe the shroud some runne vp and downe some pumpe c. here are the effects of the efficient cause so we may distribute from the matter as of wood is made a woodden chest or table or stoole c. so from the forme as we may from the genus but this alwayes consider in generall that the parts bee part of the whole and that they be homogenie parts for if we shall diuide a whole into parts and particles there will be no distribution as if a mans body bee anatomized because the particles will agree with the parts Distributio generis in species hic excellit He doth here hasten to genus as being the principall thing in this place and it is as if he should say that distribution which we vsually heare of and which we haue so often in schooles of genus and species they are but modi of a distribution ex effectis and it is true and whilst the common Logicians see not this they know not the truth of them nor their originall and this makes them to begin with genus and species in their Logicke so they know them not in their cause but onely in their second nature Hic excellit As if he should say this is the chiefest modus in this distribution Genus Genus signifieth firstly a stocke or kinred now because all the species come from one roote as a family commeth from one stocke ergo it is called genus or as the parents are causes of their children so is genus cause of the species so the Hiraclides are they that come of Hiracles Species This signifieth in the originall the countenance of a thing now we come to see nothing but singulars ergo indiuidua and species infimae are properly species it comes of an old verbe specio or spicio species it is that which is looked on excellit that is of principall vse and this is the reason thereof the Lord hath ranged all things vnder his owne generall but this kinde of ranging is more generall then the rest and the genus giuing essence to the species it draweth the species with it wheresoeuer it goeth hence it is that whersoeuer the genus of any thing is taught there also must the species be taught and this was the father of praedicaments so that there is nothing but is vnder a genus but genus generalissimum Genus est totum partibus essentiale Totum est quod continet partes for the parts wee heard were holden together in the whole for before whilst the members did contribute euery one a portion of matter and forme they made vp the whole now genus is totum but contrary to integrum for there the integrum had his whole matter and forme from the members but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter and in a common forme Totum essentiale By this wee are to vnderstand that which giues essence that is matter and forme so that integrum did containe all that the members had but the genus doth not containe all that the species haue so that though all the essence of the genus be in the species yet the whole essence of the species is not in the genus when I say totum essentiale I say two things first that genus is a totum secondly that there is nothing in the genus but is also in the species Obiection But how can it bee said that genus giues essence to the species whereas they haue more in them then the genus Answer To containe is to hold together now because the species agree in one common matter and a common forme as in vno puncto ergo genus doth containe them so that reciprocation here is to bee vnderstood so farre forth as by their hypostaticall vnion the species are made one in their genus hence it is that whatsoeuer is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the genus must agree with the species therefore
genere forma comprehenduntur Ramus doth commorari vpon this doctrine shewing that a perfect definition doth lay out the substantiall quidditie of a thing now the reason why hee saith genere and not materia simply but materia as it is in genere is this because the genus containeth not onely the matter but also a portion of the forme the generall forme ergo it must be the next genus that we must bring in a perfect definition for if the genus be more remote then the forme of the next genus must be left out but if we take the next genus then we bring in all aboue it Et forma comprehenduntur That is the speciall forme the reason in nature is this we find that the totum is not subsistent but in singularibus now we find moreouer that singulars haue that whereby they are singulars beside for else one singular could not be distinct from another ergo euery singular must haue his peculiar forme and also his matter not as it is a first argument but as it is symbolicè in genere Vt in animali pars formae He meanes of the generall forme for anima vegetatiua and sensitiua are the formes of viuens and so of animal Totam formam hominis As if the forme of man did consist of these as of parts but it is not so the truth is this there is in some things a simple life in some things more liues as anima vegetatiua is firstly in planta now animal hath that and somewhat more namely sensitiua and man hath both them and also reason so that one of the species hath nothing but that which the genus hath namely viuens and planta for planta is viuens quae viuit vitam tantùm vegetatiuam and so is viuens onely tantùm makes the difference from others Now from this discourse he gathers that a definition is vniuersale symbolum not that singulars cannot bee perfectly defined as well as vniuersalls but he meanes it is a symbolum containing vniuersally the causes constituting the essence so that the indiuiduum hath the matter and forme of euery genus aboue him ergo it is vniuersale in this respect hauing his peculiar forme added to them Naturam Here wee may see what nature is in things properly some make the forme onely to be nature some the matter onely and some both forme and matter here we see the essence and nature are all one in the first signification natura signifies res nata secondly it signifies res vnde res nata est that is the causes so that here know that the causes being put all things attending them follow for so natura is taken for the properties of a thing E qui dat formam dat formam consequentiam so that a perfect definition doth deliuer whatsoeuer comes within the name of nature Tales definitiones sunt artium No not tales if we should exactly try them by this rule but they are the best examples Now ars is not the next genus to Grammar neither is bene loqui the forme but the end of Grammar but he tels vs hereby that there is a soule of Grammar which is in euery rule which is as it were the simular parts of the Art tending to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bene loqui CAP. 31. De Descriptione Descriptio est definitio ex aliis etiam argumentis rem definiens THis we heard to be generally called definitio so that it doth quodam modo definire but as definitio in generall before was a trope so descriptio is not a definition but as it doth explicate quid res sit not definiendo from the essence but describendo from the quantity so that the definitio layes out the flesh bones c. and descriptio layes out the complements The definition was internall the description is but externall limiting the thing as it were with chauke The description may be compared to the Carpenters chaulking the definition to the thing chaulked and by how much the thing it selfe layes out the quiddity of it better then the chaulking doth by so much is a perfect definition more excellent then a description so that here remember that howbeit a descriptiō cannot see the arguments laying out the essence of the thing yet the intendment of it is to doe it Est definitio That is rem definiens that is quidditatem rei explicans Ex aliis etiam argumentis That is others beside the causis so that a description must haue a genus with it if it be not a genus generalissimum that hath no genus againe he saith ex alijs not telling vs which because any of the arguments aforegoing may goe into it euen a distribution yea a testimony also as we may see in the description of fama so that it may arise from inartificials yet must it not be taught after them because artificialls must haue nothing to doe with inartificialls Atque haec succincta breuitas non est in hac specie perpetua sed saepe illustriorem magnificentiorem explicationem desiderat Our author doth commorari vpon the vse of a description shewing that it is not alwaies so briefe as before but sometime we shall lay it out in all the simples in the thing Sed saepè illustriorem magnificentiorem c. That is when we deliuer things that are magis illustriora magnificentiora it is requisite wee should lay them out more at large then those that are of lesse moment Sic gloria describitur in Miloniaena Sed tamen ex omnibus praemiis virtutis si esset habenda ratio praemiorum amplissimum esse praemium gloriam c. Glorie is argued from his genus praemium praemium from his subiect virtus then à comparatis amplissimum Lastly ab effectis Sic 4. Aeneid fama describitur Extemplo Libyae magnas vt fama per vrbes Fama malum quo non aliud velocius vllum c. Fama is the aliquid argued by her effect of going then by the subiect of place vrbes and magnas an adiunct to vrbes vrbes Libyae the integrum extemplo an adiunct of time malum a genus and malum is argued by an adiunct swiftnesse à minore Monstrum another genus horrendum an adiunct mirabile dictu a testimonie nec dulci declinat somne a disparate Tales sunt descriptiones plantarum animalium in Pbysicis item fluminum c. That is when we lay out their whole quidditie at large and thus haue we seene all the artificiall arguments that are in any thing and so haue seene the thing both within and without lastly wee shall heare that hauing seene all in a thing that we haue heard of before then may wee safely giue testimonie of it as wee see occasion and not before CAP. 32. De testimonio Diuino Exposito artificiali argumento sequitur inartificiale Argumentum inartificiale est quod non sua natura sed assumpta artificialis alicuius argumenti
vi arguit WEE haue heard of artificial arguments and there can be nothing that shall be in the artificio of any thing but wee haue heard it so that if wee looke at any of the creatures of God to see the root the causes of it and then the whole circumference and limitation thereof wee may by these arguments taught before see it throughly Now whereas one man cannot see all things though at the first all things were made for one man the Lord hath in wisedome ordained that wee should receiue some things by reports from others for as the world was to increase both in men and other creatures it was impossil e that one man should see all things intus in cute so that whereas at the beginning all things being made for one man and he afterwards could not see them yet still it is so farre forth true whilest all men see all things It is called inartificiale for the contrary reason that artificiale was so called namely of being in the thing whereas this is not in the nature of the thing but externè altogether so that we may see his force by this hauing no farther to doe with the thing then onely by witnessing of it Exposito artificiali argumento c. This transition containes the conclusion of all that went before and the proposition of that which followes and here againe wee may see how artificiall arguments goe before inartificialls because inartificiall arguments haue no ground but as they are backt with artificialls And this doctrine we may see to be true by the practise of common people for if a man giue testimony of that hee knowes not others will say he doth he knowes not what for as no man can giue testimony of that he knowes not so no man ought to receiue a testimony but as it is backed with artificialls otherwise he knowes not the thing sufficiently as hee should and if hee first heare a testimony of a thing and afterward come to see the thing hee will then say he knowes it not because one testified so much but because himselfe saw it to be so it is called argumentum inartificiale because it neuer comes into Art to make vp a rule though it may come in as a commoration to proue a rule syllogistically but method is the disposition of axioms not of syllogismes now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to which the thing witnessed doth belong as Aristotles authority against the Creation of the world belongs to Diuinity there to bee confuted in the doctrine of the Creation Argumentum inartificiale sequitur It is an argument for it is effected ad arguendum but after a new manner for it is externè but as it is grounded vpon the artificials so is it affected to argue Argumentum inartificiale est quod non sua natura sed assumpta alicuius artificialis argumenti vi arguit It is of power to argue as we heard before but not vi sua For when a man beareth witnesse of a thing we receiue it presuming that hee is familiarly acquainted with the thing that hee witnesseth so that arguit but not sua natura for alas what harmonie is there betweene the witnesser considered in his owne nature and the thing witnessed considered in its owne nature none at all so that we must looke at either of these for their natures Sed assumpta c. So that by the force of some artificiall argument taken vnto it it doth argue ergo this teacheth vs not easily to receiue euery testimony hand ouer head but first to looke whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed otherwise as it may be an errour in him to giue testimonie of a thing he knowes not so may it bee no lesse errour in vs that receiue such a testimony this wee see reproued in common matters among men and it teacheth vs to receiue the testimonie of a man not so much because ipse dixit but because wee are sure he knowes the thing throughly Vi assumpta Not that it is ortum argumentum for orta did argue with the same force that the first did from whence they did arise but a testimonie doth not argue with the force of an artificiall be it primum or ortum though it be backed with artificiall The cause effect should be in the witnesser but they are not in the witnesse if the testis haue seene any one argument we are so far to receiue his testimony and no farther if hee haue seene more arguments or all of them then are we much more to receiue his witnesse Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur perexiguam vim probationis habet This being the nature of an inartificiall it hath little force to argue of it selfe for all his strength is aliunde Veritas Truth belongs to an axiome here he meanes if wee would see it to be ens or the entitie of it surely this argument can stand vs in no great stead the testimonie onely swimmes in our braine but we doe not see the thing in its subtle parts as if hee should say the artificiall arguments doe argue subtlely the inartificiall more grosly In ciuilibus autem humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus beneuolentia adfuerint He staies vpon the vse of an inartificiall argument In the matters of the common wealth or in matters concerning priuate men this argument hath his speciall credit because in this kinde they are most receiued we know all the matters in our Courts passe by writings or testimonies of men and in these ciuill matters we looke more after the men then after the thing there are artificialls here in these matters but we looke not at them still wee are to vnderstand that the witnesses know the artificialls the reason is because they are things done in time long before which therefore cannot be desided but by writings or mens testimonies Praecipuam fidem habet That is it doth vrge most in respect of the subiect whereto it is vsed E moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus beneuolentia adfuerint This inartificiall argument hath not this praecipuam fidem from it selfe but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent vertuous and beneuolent Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his rule or any deduct from his rule to practise that is if he be not simple and silly to tattle and prattle he knowes not what then praecipuam fidem habet so that prudentia doth require discretion and iudgement to know and deliuer a truth That Commandement Thou shalt not beare false witnesse is here taught Againe if he haue not vertue ioyned with his prudentia that is if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth when he knoweth it we ought not to receiue it so that as he must be able to iudge of the truth so must hee haue conscience to vtter it Lastly
disioyned from the whole but inter se Enunciatum segregatiuum est discretum aut disiunctum This sâ—gregation of things is either a more easie discerning of them whereas they might otherwise agree which may appeare to our eye though it be not so palpable in the things or it is disiunct where the parts are seuered re ratione so that these axioms doe serue for the deliuerance of diuersa and opposita Discretum cuius coniunctio est discretiua Discretum of discerno so that when things are so seuered in nature as we may see them disiunct with our eye though not so plainly in the things themselues they make a discrete axiome Itaque è dissentaneis praecipuè diuersa enunciat This axiom doth enunciare dissimilia too therefore if he had said dissimilia hee had included diuersa as though there be matters which might be iudged by the outward senses yet are they to be referred to the minde too Cuius negatio contradictio est So that the denyall doth take away that discretion which was laid downe before Discretum enunciatum iudicatur esse verum legitimum si partes non solùm verae sed etiam discretae sint falsum vel ridiculum contra Now for the iudgement of this axiome it is verum legitimum so that two things are required in iudging a discrete axiome first that the parts be true else it will be a false axiome secondly that they be lawfull else they will be ridiculous because the parts will not be diuers As to say though he be a man yet he is a liuing creature here both parts are true but here is no discretion and therefore it is ridiculous CAP. 8. De axiomate disiuncto Axioma disiunctum est axioma segregatiuum cuius coniunctio est disiuncta THE discrete and disiunct seuer things but the former doth it onely ratione now the disiunct lookes at an opposition betweene the things disioyned it is called a disiunct axiome as disioyning or pulling the parts out of ioint so then the former may be compared to the laying of two things that are distinct but not pulled out of ioynt Est segregatiuum Therefore seuering the matter for the parts are so diuided that they cannot agree or be vnited because they are opposite sine vllo medio Cuius coniunctio est disiunctiua Disioyning or pulling in pieces the things disposed as there is either day or night these are priuantia ergo contraries ergo opposites De Fato Omnis enunciatio est vera aut falsa This 〈◊〉 a disiunct in like sort where veritas and falsitas are disioyned now for the iudgement of this axiome here one part onely is true and not both which ariseth from the nature of opposites Itaque eidem attribui c. but if wee consider the affection betweene the whole and the parts there both will be true as argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale but because the whole with the forme make vp the species therefore we say in effect argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale and if these composite axiomes be disposed in a simple syllogisme then the verbe will bee the band for wee haue nothing to doe with the dissention of the parts but to see how the parts of the question are disposed with the third argument Hic significatur è disiunctis vnicum verum esse In a distinct axiome one part onely is true because they are dissentanea as homo est bonus aut non bonus these parts are but contingent separated but the disiunction is necessarie Cuius negatio Non omnis enunciatio est vera aut falsa So that the deniall taketh away the contradiction Et contradictione significatur non necessario alterum verum esse So that though the parts may be contingently true yee the axiome may be necessary Veruntamen quamuis absolute vera disiunctio necessaria quoque sit tamen nihil necesse est partes separatim necessarias esse Therefore est is not the band for it doth tye but contingent truth but the coniunction is it because it ties necessary truth Itaque si disiunctio sit contingens non est absolute vera tantum opinabilis est qualis est frequenter in hominum vsu So that this disiunct contingent is not vsuall in common speech vt si quaeratur c. whereas both or neither of them might come Tantum opinabilis Because opinio is the iudgement of a contingent axiome and thus wee haue heard all the kindes of disposition on two sides CAP. 9. De Syllogismo eius partibus Atque eiusmodi iudicium est axiomaticum axiomatiâ— per se manifesti sequitur dianoeticum NOw wee come to a disposition where there are three sides so that they play as it were at three hand ruffe Now marke the reason of this distribution of dispositio into axioma and syllogismus some things there are that are laid together in nature without a meane ergo we may see them at the first hand vno intuitu some things also haue a meane which we must vse before wee can see them ergo according to the things in nature and according to the act of our reason in beholding these things so must our Logicke proceed and as the medium shall either combine or seuer them so we may conclude them affirmatiuely or negatiuely and herein stands the force of those rules though they be not alwayes true quae conueniunt in aliquo tertio conueniunt inter se contra because that medium is the holder of them two together aut contra for there the medium will be a barre to seuer them as otiosus est amator Egistus est otiosus ergo est amator because otium is as glue to pull on amor for it argues loue as causa and it pulls on Egistus as an adiunct So this rule sublata causa tollitur effectum et contra and all these rules of consecution are because the effect brings the cause with it and any other argument as well as causa may be a meane whereby two things may be glued together for this third argument is not so much a medium in regard of the other two disposed with it but in respect of our seeing them and we may see as well by any other arguments as by causa Atque eiusmodi iudicium est axiomaticum c. An axiome is such a thing as appeares to bee true at the first sight or at the second hand now our reason is to be so glued as that it may be able to see any truth ergo if the truth appeare at the first sight an axiome will serue vs else we must haue a candle to make it cleare so that here wee may see the purpose of syllogisticall iudgement is not to make things more true or more false in themselues but to make the truth or falshood more manifest vnto vs so that cleare per se belongs to an axiome but perspicuity in regard of vs belongs to a syllogisme and here we
is this the consequent part of the question is the maius extremum ergo if that should bee in the assumption then how could the assumption bee taken out of the proposition whereas the minus extremum was there for so the assumption would be bigger then the proposition and by this meanes the third argument in the proposition should be greater if it came after then the maius extremum that should there goe before it whereas wee heard before that the consequent part of the question is either more generall or at least equall to the third argument and againe it should goe before in the assumption though it bee greater then the minus extremum so that there are no more places it must either goe before both and so be lesse then both the parts of the question or follow both and so be greater then both or else it must bee a meane betwixt both Prima vbi argumentum semper sequitur c. For here is a more simple disposition then in the second explicate secondly it is denied in altera parte meaning in the one part of the antecedent part either proposition or assumption they must neuer both be denied nor both affirmed The rule of negatus told vs that one of the antecedents and the conclusion must be denied but not all Semper sequitur That is the consequent in the proposition and the antecedent in the assumption so that if the question bee negatiue we may conclude it here or in all the rest but particulars where the third argument agrees with the antecedent may be onely concluded in a contract as Turbatus non bene vtitur ratione Turbatus is a man addicted to his affections and the Stoicks held that sapiens and turbatus were disparates and the reason is because sapientia is not turbatio Sapientia is properly the readinesse or promptnesse in syllogisticall iudgement now where will rules without reason that is not good for the affections that attend vpon will doe trouble the reason as loue heats fancie and hatred cooles both which are enemies to reason Vsus rationis the third argument is a genus of sapientia for it is generall of all Logicke and the intellectuall vertues are the habituall promptnesses of reasons act and this syllogisme may also be concluded in the second kinde of an explicate Qui bene vtitur ratione non est turbatus Sapiens bene vtitur ratione Sapiens igitur non est turbatus Hoc iudicium ita fit à Cic. 3. Tus Quemadmodum ait oculus conturbatus non est probè affectus ad suum munus fungendum c. The proposition is here adorned with a prosyllogisme à simili sapientis animus ita semper affectus est vt ratione optimè vtatur there is the assumption nunquam igitur est perturbatus there is the conclusion and this is called a generall of the first kinde because here are onely negatiue syllogismes and therefore the conclusion is alwayes negatiue ergo that is the first kind of generalls when the conclusion is like to the proposition for here generall is an affection of simplex syllogismus explicatus but when I say generalis est primus aut secundus here is a distribution of the genus into the species now it is generall because the third argument is giuen to the parts of the question generally Res mortalis est composita This is a generall of the second sort because here the assumption is denyed here composita agrees to res mortalis as a cause ergo the proposition is affirmed and because it will not agree with the antecedent anima ergo the assumption is denyed Cicero 1. Tusc In animi autem cognitione inquit Here the assumption is first being backed with a prosyllogisme à testimonio nisi enim in Physicis plumbei sumus and here Tullies eloquence is shewed in the variety of words signifying the same thing and this belongs to naturall Philosophie where we heare that elementum is composed ex elementis Quod cum ita sit c. here is the conclusion Est enim interitus c. that is res mortalis here is the proposition and these are both generall for here compositio is generall to the consequent part and the conclusion is so too Now we come to the species of specialis prima aut secunda Liuidus non est magnanimus This is speciall because the proposition only is generall it is primus because it is negatiue in the proposition like vnto the conclusion the question is whether maximus bee a snake or a slow worme for a snake is very slow and liuidus is properly that which is blacke and blew and metaphorically it signifies poyson it signifies also one that will not doe good himselfe and yet enuieth at others that doe well magnanimus that is couragious these are disparates Maximus Ouids friend is magnanimus so that liuidus non est magnanimus belongs to naturall Philosophy Quid. 3. de pont Eleg. 3. Liuors iners vitium mores non exit in altos c. Here is the proposition vtque latens ima c. there is a prosyllogisme to it à simili Mens tua sublimis here is the assumption and here are prosyllogismes to that Maximi were so called first of Fabius Maximus who was more then Alexander Magnus supra genus eminet ipsum à comparatis ingenium for magnanimity a metonimy of the adiunct for the subiect then à minore Ergo alij noceant miseris here is a dissimilitude At tua supplicibus c. here are prosyllogismes for the conclusion which is wanting Specialis secundus Saltator est luxuriosus Specialis because one onely part is generall secundus because the assumption is denyed as the conclusion is The question is whether Muraena be a dancer Cicero pro Muraena Nemo enim fere salta sobrius nisi forte insanit c. Here the proposition is first with a prosyllogisme neque in solitudine c. here is a distinction into the specialls intempestiui conuiuij c. to mihi c. here is the assumption and there is a distribution of the integrum into the members lastly the conclusion cum ea non reperiantur here is againe a repetition of the assumption with the conclusion Ouid. 1. Trist Eleg. 2. Carmina proueniunt animo deducta sereno Ouid excuses his verses tripliciter my verses cannot bee good why from the cause carmina proueniunt c. nubila sunt subitis here is a prosyllogisme of the proposition ab aduersis secondly carmina secessum c. the proposition the assumption is me mare c. Againe all feare should be remoued from good verses the assumption followeth enwrapt with a contrary ego perditus ensem c. haec quoque quae facio c. here is a deprecatio in stead of the conclusion which is generall to all the three syllogismes Proprius primus Agesilaus non est pictus ab Appelle c. Here the third argument
modus sola for so we are to consider alwayes when any efficient is brought to argue any thing see which modus is brought with it as in the example before the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans and with the modus of conseruans as would you take away loue take away idlenesse for it is the procreant and conseruing cause of loue Now as God is the procreant and conseruing cause of all things so he is causa sola first ergo that is before causa cum aliis afterward he is causa cum aliis working together with the creatures and we finding this in the first efficient we may also finde it in the first in the second and in euery one because all things are simulacra of the first Now these belong to Logicke for there is reason in them and any thing deserueth more or lesse praise or dispraise as he doth good or euill sola aut cum aliis Earumque omnium saepe alia principalis alia adiuuans ministra That is earum omnium quae cum alijs efficiunt saepe alia principalis alia adiuuans ministra for so saepe here is part of the axiom and thus often it falls out that one among the rest in doing of things is principall and as wee say ring-leader to the rest though sometimes likewise all be haile fellowes So that as the Lord did at the first work all things alone and then with others so likewise do the creatures in nature and here againe as the Lord is principall when he worketh with others so also when creatures worke together one for the most part is principall Alia adiuuans ministra That is as it were a minister and an instrument Here we are to vnderstand there is the principall cause which is holpen and doth not helpe causa adiuuans is principally of liuing things ministra is commonly of instruments which haue not life though both of them may bee of either Virgil. 9. of his Aeneidos Nisus auocat ab Euriolo c. Me me adsum qui feci c. Nisus alone did the deed mea fraus omnis there lies the argument therefore he was sola causa ergo in me conuertite ferrum ô Rutuli Euriolus was taken Nisus escaped and he reasons not from the doing of it for so both might haue deserued punishment but from the manner of doing it mea fraus omnis and for Euriolus thus he saith nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit The syllogisme is this He that hath done this murder is to be punished But I alone haue done it Ergo I alone am to be punished The Assumption is thus proued by denying audacia to Euriolus whereby hee might haue done it and potentia whereby he might haue accomplished it Slaughter is to punishment a subiect Solitaria causa cum plerisque principalibus sociis pro Marcello varie adhibetur In the former example wee see sola causa deliuered in a strange phrase this is causa cum alijs and here dux is causa principalis militum virtus locorum oportunitas c. are the helping causes and fortune is another principall cause quae maximam partem sibi vindicat he reasons thus thou art a valiant fellow Caesar but thou hast helping causes of which fortune is the chiefe At verò huius gloriae Caesar c. here Caesar hath no companion so that Caesar in pardoning Marcellus is sola causa Nihil centurio nihil praefectus c. here he remoues the species of efficiens that should bee cum alijs and he remoues also fortune which is a chiefe helpe in warre this example belongs to Polemica Instrumenta etiam in causis adiuuantibus connumerantur That is whether they be cattle that haue life which are instruments for husbandry or whether they bee things without life they are counted among helping causes so a man writing with his pen is principall and his pen instrumentall but here wee are to know that wee must alwaies analyse as our author layes that downe which is to be analysed as when I say he did this alone though he had an instrument here he is causa sola in respect hee had not another man to helpe him he is causa cum alijs as he hath an instrument Quo argumento impius Epicurus c. The Epicure reasons thus if God had no instruments to helpe him in making the world then hee made it not but he had no instruments c. therefore this we know to bee false by a rule of Diuinity for to make the world was an infinite worke ergo nothing being finite could helpe him Now many times there are fallaces from all these as when causa non procreans is put for causa procreans non conseruans pro conseruans non sola pro sola non cum alijs pro cum alijs all which we are to determine by this rule CHAP. 5. Tertio causa efficiens per se efficit aut per accidens THe modi are of most speciall vse and indeed Ramus was long in determining about the doctrine of them but this was his last determination Now the former are more generall then these because these are more speciall in vse and againe the other belong to these these may bee where the other are but the other include these these modi per se and per accidens are more particular then the other for their reach Now natura belongs to naturall Philosophy as it were consilium to morall as it were Tertio causa efficiens c. these wee haue heard before efficit per se sua facultate that is not onely hauing it owne nature in it selfe whereby it worketh but the beginning of its motion from it selfe causa per accidens hath it from another Sua facultate By facultas here we are to vnderstand the same that vis was generally in the definition of causa but hee meanes here that which hath his principium of motus of it selfe if one doe a thing per accidens he doth it vi but not sua so sua facultate that is whose motus whereby it worketh is determinated in it selfe vt quae natura vel consilio faciunt these two names should seeme to belong to naturall and morall Philosophie but wee are to vnderstand by Nature that thing whose nature is to worke such an effect yea any thing be it naturall or artificiall which hath that principium of motus in it selfe to worke any thing Vt quae natura vel consilio faciunt Counsell is that which doth a thing by deliberation willingly and wittingly as God Angels and men onely worke by counsell causa natura is as a knife cutteth sua natura so all things are subiect to nature and when I find that a thing worketh propria vi and that beginning of motus is with the nature of it taught not from it nature that is causa natura as when another man crouds me and so I croud another and fling him downe I