all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
casually upon something in the dark or run against it tho' we neither see or know what that thing is or when we see a thing a far off we know that that thing is tho' as yet we know not what it is The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cauâ—es and Effects For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise he Administâ—rs his workmanship the World after the wisest and best manner which is that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack but perfectly Coherent nor can this be done among an infinit variety of Bodies by any other means so as to make up the Course of Nature but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes since if that were not the Course of Nature would be at a stand and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self it follows that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects 4. The Course of Nature must be câ—â—ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 â—roper to one another For were â—ot â—â—ese â—auses and Effects Proper to one anotheâ— any 〈◊〉 might do any thing or suffâ—r from any thing v. g. Fire might both heat and cool and mâ—iâ—ten and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood and so of all the rest In whiâ—h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions or what Efficient Cause or what Matter rather than another he is to make use of to produce any Effect nor consequentlâ— sinâ—e â—uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect For since to Causâ— is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or proâ—uce some Effect Anâ— this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd § 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing For since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self as being nothing but it's Existence and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative that is of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause hence it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient and that it is prâ—st upon it But there being no vacuum immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature and the Course of Nature consisting in Moâ—ion one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes which we call Demonstrating â priori and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori For since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this that the word Cause speaks the thing as it is in Nature and Reason the same thing as 't is in our understanding and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another and consequently do Infer one another naturally it follows that those Causes and for the same reason Effects as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding Whence follows that thoâ—e Causes and Effects can be uâ—'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another And that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise as 't is shown these are § § 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd because Two Bodies that are Immediate do Act and Re-act or are in some respect mutually Causes and Effects to one another For since their Existences which is their Power of Acting are immediately Apply'd and by the Course of Nature consisting in Motion prest upon one another and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant it follows that till one of them be by degrees totally subdu'd the Resisting Body must necessarily for the reason given Re-act upon it whence they will be to some degree or in some respect Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence and as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones Interiour and Exteriour perfecting and streâ—gthening the Will all along to the very end and ripening Souls for Bliss which we call Grace is that which is truly meant by Predestinatioâ— which sounds so terribly and is such â—â—ugbeaâ— to those that mis-understand it Corâ—â— â—I Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something Corol. â—â—I Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of â—â—e First Cause to cause or lay any 〈◊〉 for Sin For Sin formally as such has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it either â—etaphysical Physical or Moral but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature whence it comes that by falling-short here in using the Means that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End which is only attainable by such Means To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words but by Reason and Good Sense Corol. IV. Hence follows also that were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect known to us we could have no Accidental Predications nor consequently any Opinions but the Effect would still be equally Demonstâ—able from the Complexion of those Causes as it is now from some one single Efficient as was hinted formerly Corol. V. Hence to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes there could be no Chance nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion For Chance as the common use of the word tells us signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes and that they cannot but follow from such Causes Corol. VI. Hence tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World or the Course of Nature because we Comprehend not all Causes nor know what Cause or Causes did
Nothing more obstructs the way to Natural Science than the doctrin of Vulgar Philosophers That Qualities are certain Kinds of little Entities which of themselves have a diminutive sort of Being and are able to produce such and such Effects For example Ask them how a Bell works that effect upon my Ear which we call Sound they 'll tell you there is a Quality in the Bell call'd Sonoreity whose nature it is to make a Sound Ask how a Green thing makes such a pleasing Impression on my Eye they 'll answer There is a certain Quality in it call'd Greenness whose nature 't is to work such an Effect and so of the rest Which ridiculous Method explicates nothing but makes the Silliest old wife as good a Philosopher as the most Learned Naturalist if she can but name the Word that Signifies that Quality Next it makes Learners rest easily contented and well appay'd with a meer Word whence they will grow Negligent and Careless to take pains to look into the Natures of the Things or else if they have any wit in them to despair of all knowledge of Nature by seeing their Masters so profoundly Ignorant and so Superficially Learned And lastly it hinders Learners from Seeing or even endeavouring to see the Natural Proportion and Alliance between Proper Causes and their Effects and inclines them to take purely upon trust the whole Administration of Nature and all Consequence of one thing from another which renders all natural Science precarious For 't is not Science unless we use our own Eyes and see the point Demonstrated Jurare in verba is in such cases the Fool 's Oath and is in plain terms to swear the Devoting or giving up our Reason to a Slothful Contentedness never to grow Wiser LESSON VII Of the Common Head of Relation 1. THE Notion of Relation being what one Individual Thing is if compar'd to another there must be some Real Ground of it in the thing Referr'd which is the Reason of our Referring it and by which formally we do thus Refer it For otherwise Relation would be a Chimerical and Fictitious Notion and not a Real or Natural one common to all Mankind and held by them to be such which yet we experience by our daily Converse with them it is 2. This Ground cannot be their having Disparate or Disagreeing Notions in them or their being of Disparate Orders which have nothing to do with one another For we find that we cannot Refer or compare Green and Hard Youthful and Transparent Hot and Triangular nor any other disparate Notions nor yet a Writer and a Plough-share a Father and a Mill-stone a Brother and a Handsaw c. because they are in Disparate Orders and have no Respect to one another grounding our Referring them or Comparing them together as have a Writer and a Writing a Father and a Son a Baker and Bread c. 3. Wherefore the Ground of Relation must either be some Notion agreeing to both the things related that is found to belong to both either Intrinsecally or Extrinsecally or else their having Communication with one another by way of natural Action and Passion This is prov'd by the former Section and is evident because there can be no other Considerations by which they can be order'd to one another or be of the same Order but their having some Intrinsecal Notion common to both or else their Acting and Suffering upon and from one another which is an Extrinsecal Consideration 4. Relations of the first sort which have one and the same Notion in them are of as many kinds as there are Heads of Notions since all these have a kind of Nature or Notion in them and so some kind of Transcendent Unity Thus if they have the same Nature or Essence in them which belongs to the Common Head of Substance the Relation between them is call'd Identity which is their being of one and the same kind of Entity If of one and the same Notion of Quantity 't is call'd Equality which is their being of one and the same Quantity If of Quality 't is call'd Likeness if of Action singly consider'd they are call'd Co-actors as Fellow-Souldiers Fellow-Servants c. If of Passion singly consider'd Fellow-Sufferers Fellow-Martyrs c. If of Place or Vbi Bed-fellows Chamber-fellows Townsmen Country-men c. If of Time Contemporaries Co-eve or born at the same time If of Habit Fellow-Mourners Fellow-Curassiers Fellow-Souldiers of the Blew or Grey Regiment If of Situation Fellow-Assessors or Sitters tho' such as this seldom occur Nay there may be a Relation grounded on having the same notion even of Relation in them as Parents or Fellow-begetters 5. Of the second sort grounded on Action and Passion not singly consider'd but with an Order to one another or as Inferring one another are such as these viz. Father and Son Master and Servant Prince and Subject Tutor and Pupil which are grounded on the Actions and Passions of Begetting and being Begotten Commanding and being Commanded Governing and being Governed Teaching and being Taught c. 6. In both these sorts of Relations the things Referr'd must have their Correlates that is there must be a mutual Relation on both sides In the former of them because there is the selfsame Ground or Reason of Referring in one as in the other viz. that one same Notion Common or Belonging to Both to wit the same Essence same Quantity same Quality same Relation same Place same Time same sort of Action and Passion same Situation and the same Habit. 7. This Agreeing and Corresponding of the two things thus Related in those of the former kind of Relation must be meant to be their Agreeing in the same Abstracted and Common or Specifical Notion and not in the same Individual one For otherwise two Men could not have Identity in their Individual Essence since then they would be the same and not the same that is Vnum and Non-unum And for the same reason Intrinsecal Accidents being Identify'd with the Subjects in which they inhere and having no Entity but theirs they can have no Individuality but by them and so the same Individual Intrinsecal Accident cannot be Common to two Subjects or Substances but must be Individually Two as They are Whence the Relations grounded on them must be upon their being the same in Species or Kind and not Individually Which reason holds equally for those Relations that are grounded on Action Passion and Situation and the rest For two things cannot be in one Individual place that is in a place capable to hold but one Individual thing without Penetration of Bodies Nor is it possible in the course of Natural Causes that two should be born or dye at the same precise Time that is in such a portion of Time as is terminated by the same Instants Nor can Two wear the same Individual Arms c. at once Wherefore it must be meant that the Notion common to both must be an abstracted or specifical Notion and
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
it The Objecter then slides over the Certainty of this proposition I think as compar'd with the proposition I am and other Judgments experimentally known and compares it with other propositions subsequent to I think Wherefore he first supposes it to be most Certain that is more Certain than they are and prefers it before all others without Comparing it with those others which is to suppose it so gratis and which is yet more strange he grounds all Knowledge whatever upon it 13. 'T is yet a worse Error that whereas Ens or Being is the Basis of all other Notions so that if no Thing be They cannot be the Alledger by arguing thus Cogito ergo sum does by a strange Hysteron proteron put an Operation to be Antecedent to Being it self and that to be Thinking is a more Simple Clear and Distinct Notion than to be And then from an Operation found out or suppos'd he concludes the very Notion of Being it self to be in the Thing Nay which is yet more odd he supposes the Notion of Knowledge of Himself imported by the Word Ego and supposes that Ens or Ego to be as is signified by the Copula Sum nay more he supposes that Ens or himself not onely to be â—ut moreover to be such viz. Operating or Thinking which most evidently speak or imply Existence and when he has done all this he Infers thence contrary to our 3d. 4th Sect. the simple being of that which he had not onely put to be and be known but which he had over and above put to be or be known to be such that is to be Operating or Thinking 14. Hence this Method of Generating Science is Unnatural Preposterous and Self-contradictory T is Vnnatural first because the way Nature takes to Beget Knowledge in us is not by divesting our selves of all other Knowledges to find out what 's most Certain but she at first instils Knowledge into us by a Natural way of Imprinting Notions in our Mind and our Conparing them and thence letting us See whether they Agree or Disagree 2 ly because it strains Nature to fancy our selves Ignorant of many Clear Truths which the goodness of the same Nature forces us to assent to as Evident And 3 ly because I am is according to the Order of Nature Antecedent to I am Thinking T is Preposterous because it argues from Compound Judgments which are less known to inâ—er what 's more Simple and so more known And lastly t is Self contradictory because it supposes that to bee or to be known which as yet according to that doctrine is not or is not known but is to be Concluded that is made known as is shewn Section 13th 15. Hypothetical Philosophy which is grounded on Suppositions and beggs that such and such things may be yielded and then it will explicate alâ— Nature is built on meer Fancy and is unworthy the name of Philosophy For since it belongs to a Philosopher to Resolve all Truths into their Principles and all Natural Effects into their Proper Causes and finally if need be into their first Principles or First Causes and a Hypothetical Philosopher can never perform this Duty which is most Essential to a Philosopher in regard the First Grounds he layes are barely begg'd or Supposed that is neither self-Evident nor made Evident by way of Proof Hence Hypothetical Philosophy is utterly unworthy the name of Philosophy since all its Assertions and Conclusions if driven home are resolved finally into Precarious Suppositions Again since all Speculation is Aiery and Fantastical that is not grounded on the Things as they are found in Nature and such Discoursers do not finally build their Discourses on the Natures of the Things as they find them to be but on their being such as they suppose them or would have them to be it follows that the whole Scheme of their Doctrine and all the speculations they advance how Ingenious so ever they may appear are far from Solid and in reality Groundless Aiery and Fantastical 16. Hence follows that who ever supposes any Principle or Proposition that influences his Explication of Nature or of Natural Effects which arâ— apt to be produced by Natural Causes and demonstrated by them whether that Principle be that Matter is divided into such or such parts or that it is moved in such a manner That it continues its motion without a Natural Motive Cause continually acting on it notwithstanding that it still meets with Rubbs from other parts of Matter which it â—reaks asunder That there are such Figures of it's Parts or such Qualities affecting the Subject and giving it a Virtue of Operating thus or thus That â—here are multitudes of little Entities brought in â—o serve a present turn when the Discourser is at 〈◊〉 plunge or Atomes pursuing and over taking â—heir fellows and clinging together conveniently â—or his purpose without giving a reason why and 〈◊〉 they must do so as is the manner of the Epiâ—ureans or what ever other useful Expedient he â—upposes to carry on the Clockwork of his Scheme such a man is no true Philosopher 17. Likewise who ever layes for his Ground â—hat neither is nor can be viz. Vacuum Imaginary Space Subsistent Dimensions Infinit Expansion of Continu'd Quantity Infinit Number of Atomes and suchlike can be no true Philosopher since they as do the former Resolve things finally into their own Unprov'd and Ridiâ—ulous Suppositions and would have us accept their Groundless Fancies for First Principles when as many â—imes the contrary to these is clearly demonstrable 18. Whoever proceeds meerly upon Experiments and Induction and cannot assign Proper Causes for the Effects or Matters of Fact they see â—one how ever their Inquisitiveness into Nature may merit Commendation and oblige Artificers and Practical men by many useful Observations and in some measure help Speculative Men also who do make use of Principles to find out more easily the Proper Causes of many Effects from which Industrious Researches into Nature such men may deserve the name of Virtuosi or Curious and Ingenious persons yet since as will be shewn hereafter they cannot by that Method alone without making use of Principles refund Effects into their Proper Causes nor give the true reason of the Effects they Experience nor Deduce so much as one Scientifical Conclusion they cannot in true speech be call'd Men of Science or Philosophers 19. Those of the Vulgar who have good Mother-witts and addict themselves to think much and attentively of some certain Natural Objects may by Practical Self-evidence well improv'd arrive to such a true Knowledge of the Causes of things as may rank them in the next Class of Knowers to Scientifical Men or true Philosophers For such Men by an Innate or Casual Addiction of their Thoughts to some particular sorts of Natures and by industrious and frequent consideration of them joyn'd with a natural Sagacity to penetrate them and natural Logick to discourse them in their thoughts are furnish'd with
their Identicals And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly as Heat Cold Moist Dry c. Note that in such as these if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two and are not Contradictory to one another then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them or their Sayings concerning them For such Qualities being sensible ones are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them they if enow of them be collected must give us the true Notion of them or which is all one of what they mean by the Word that expresses them which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition For example when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so or they bid their Servants do it On the Contrary they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard or on a Shelf and never put them in a Vessel or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub out of fear they should squander about Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another which are the very Definitions which that great Observer of Nature Aristotle gives us of those two Qualities Note II. Whence we may with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth who unenviously bestows knowledge on all who will dispose themselves to receive it that where-ever Art by reason of our Shortness is at a plunge he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning Sus Minervam 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses For since the Premisses by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it have in them the whole force of the Consequence and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition which can be nothing but the Conclusion it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses Again since before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded it follows evidently that since we know the Conclusion e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it to be in the Premisses it is there virtually 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another For since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first or for one single one it follows that let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things and from their Metaphysical verity and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions and in all its parts by the Definitions it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions 11. From what 's lately said 't is evinced that if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses For though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing yet since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it and the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the Existence of such a Cause which is sutable to its Essence imprinted upon the Patient hence such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another and therefore nothing hinders but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths and this throughout the whole Course of Nature from the very Creation are virtually in one another For since as will be more clearly seen hereafter all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion and so were apt to Inferr one another all along that is new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses and consequently the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation 13. Hence had we liv'd in every Place and in every part of Time where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects through the whole Series or Course of the World from the beginning to the end except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course For in that case all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration as well as any single Subject does now Wherefore if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance it had been done 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once at the first Instant of her Separation For since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes and Proper Effects and those Mutually inferr one another that is the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other as being Virtually in one another and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
contrary to the Nature of Change or Motion therefore i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature 20. The latter part of the former Minor viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature is thus prov'd Ce-Nothing that antecedently to the First Motion was not-Moving or in Rest could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature but la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving or in Rest therefore rent-No Body could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature which was prov'd Demonstration 4. LESSON VII Other Instances of Demonstration Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being or a Deity Demonstration VI. Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures and consequently of Essence and Existence are Distinct. Da-Every Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be truly predicated is Different from the Notion of Existent But ri-The Notion of Ens in its First and Proper Signification taken for an Individual Substance is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated therefore i The Notion of Ens thus understood is dâ—fferent from the Notion of Existent and consequently the Notions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct. 2. The Minor is Evident For we can truly say that Petrus est while he is Living and as truly say of the same Peter that Fuit or non-est when he is Dead 3. The Major is no less Evident For when we say Petrus est or Peter is Existent were the notion of the Predicate Existent the same with Peter the Subject the Proposition would be in sense formally Identical and the same as 't is to say what 's Existent is Existent Wherefore when we say Petrus non est or Peter is not-Existent Peter Signifying the same as Existent it would be the same as if we said what 's Existent is not Existent which is a Contradiction Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Existence or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence This needs no farther Proof For in the two Propositions lately mention'd Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter which could not be unless the Subject Peter did Abstract from both or were Indifferent to both Besides all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Natures of any Created Ens whatever do so perfectly Abstract from Existence that it is neither Exprest Imply'd nor in the least Hinted in them as appears in the words Lapis Quercus Bucephalus Petrus Raphael which give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other it seems to be rather to Not-being than to Being For since Peter even tho' possest of Actual Being is still no less capable of Not-being it seems as if he had a particular Natural Tendency to Not-being because tho' supported Formally as it were by it's Opposit Actual Existence he is notwithstanding no less a Capacity of Not-existing his Original nothingness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature that it sticks to it and inclines him to it even while he is Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens either Essentially or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence This has been demonstrated Prop. 2 d. and 3 d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsicals and what follows out of them or is Connected with them and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them as Ens is to have or not have Existence Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them For whatever has any thing and not from it's self or from it's own Intrinsical Nature must have it from Another or from something that is Extrinsical to it there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable which is neither Intrinsical nor Extrinsical that is which is neither it's self nor Another Proposition VI. 8. No Created Ens can give Existence to another For tho' as was shown formerly the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Existence of that Ens yet it can work no otherwise than as the Thing it self is or according to the Nature of the Thing which has that Existence whose Nature it actually Imprints as it were on the Subject as we find in Fire heating in Water moistning and in the whole Line of Universal Causality Again since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd and as it were Appropriated to work such an Effect whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes to Proper Effects and Ex indifferente nihil sequitur Therefore seeing Prop. 2. The Created Ens to which such an Existence belongs and consequently the Nature or Essence of that Ens Abstracts from all Existence and is perfectly Indifferent even to it 's own and much more to the Existence of any other Ens it follows demonstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another or be the Proper Cause of it Therefore Proposition VII 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities This is already Evident since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature or from any other Creature Proposition VIII 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent that is his Essence must be his Existence For were his Essence Indifferent to Existence or Existence Accidental to him and not Essential he would need Another Cause to give him Existence for the same reason Creatures do and so He would not be Vncreated Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon by Altering the Matter so that out of those Alterations brought to such a point the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind and consequently loses it's Existence At which Instant the Providence of the First Being so Orders his World that those Determinations of Matter which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this He by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being Demonstration VII Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted
Gramarical Quibbles and it would do too much honour to them to spend labour to name them being too open of themselves to need Exposing Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this He that says you are an Animal says true but He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal Therefore He that says you are an Ass says true Where as has been particularly shown above the word Animal is taken in diverse Senses for in this Proposition Peter is an Animal it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind viz. Rational But in the Proposition An Ass is an Animal it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind viz. Irrational whence 't is no Syllogism because it has Four Terms 10. Of these Fallacies which are not grounded on the Ambiguity of the Words but are built on the Thing or the Sense the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Accidente which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes and not per se or out of its own Nature As Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad but ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth therefore ra-All Religion is bad The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both and to say that what breeds Stirs out of its own Nature is Bad but not that which breeds them Accidentally for otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad because the one sometimes helps to commit Murther and the other causes Drunkenness But the more Solid way and which bears up best to Logical Grounds is to deny it to be a Syllogism because though the Form of it be Legitimate yet the Matter or the Middle Term is not so For a Syllogism being a Speech contriv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises so as by Connexion of the Medium with the Extremes we may know it to be Certainly True for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant it follows that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Extremes or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it neither of which it can be if it be but Accidentally belonging to them We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Remote ones or such as beget Opinion For between Religion and Commotions intervene Perversity of will Disregard of Virtue Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground Pride and Faction against Church Governours who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties Interest c. All which or some if not most of them are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention at least nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self the Principles of which do Oblige men to the preservation of Peace and Unity 11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi which in easier Language is the attempting to prove what 's not in question or putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds when they object to others what they neither held nor thought that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right and by Agreeing before-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd as was recommended in the second and third Rule Or if this be not done before the Dispute begins it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum and forcing the Adversary weary with aiming his blows amiss to recur to the true point and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet which was his only Duty and ought to have been done at first 12. The Third is Begging the Question or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd Which is manifestly faulty For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion which they cannot be if the Proof in whole or in part is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusion it self as it must be if it is barely Suppos'd and begg'd gratis Of which Fallacy therefore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philosophy is Guilty as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts as follows here 13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division which happens wâ—en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated or that it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd when perhaps there is Another way how that thing may be done which was never assign'd but either Unthought of or Neglected As if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum or by the Impression of so much Motion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD and his Continuing it ever since when as a third way may be assign'd viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes and all along Continues the Motion of the first-moved Bodies which move the rest This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action and by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate 14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa That is in plain terms the bringing a Medium that does not Conclude or the pretending the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it This Fallacy if it must be call'd so happens chiefly to Experimental Philosophers who going by meer Induction and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature a priori to guide their Thoughts by but Hypothetical ones only do hence refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes whence every man who sets up a new Scheme does still assign new Reasons or Causes according to which he strives to Explicate Nature and into which he endeavours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it But why this should be call'd a Fallacy I cannot comprehend At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy For since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion whoever argues ill argues Fallaciously and assigns a wrong Cause by producing an Incompetent Medium But in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant it is then enough to deny it and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground as was pretended 15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what 's taken in a Divided sense as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense Example of the Former is this He that is actually sitting may Walk Peter is actually sitting therefore Peter actually sitting or while he sits may walk Where the Major is False unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively and mean that he who sits