that is of what is Good or Evil to each sort of Common-wealth in special The Government of a Common-wealth is either Democracy or Aristocracy or Oligarchy or Monarchy Democracy is that wherein all men with equal right are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot Aristocracy is that wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those that had the best education according to what the Laws prescribe for best Oligarchy is that where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth Monarchy is that wherein one man hath the Government of all which Government if he limit it by Law is called Kingdom if by his own will Tyranny The end of Democracy or the Peoples Government is Liberty The end of Oligarchy is the Riches of those that Govern The end of Aristocracy is good Laws and good ordering of the City The end of Monarchy or Kings is the safety of the People and conservation of his own Authority Good therefore in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends And because belief is not gotten only by proofs but also from manners the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade or diswade in matter of State Their manners may be known by their designs and their designs by their ends and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in But of this more accurately in the Politicks CHAP. IX Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable IN a Demonstrative Oration the subject whereof is Praise or Dispraise the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable and Dishonourable In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief which is from the manners of the Speaker For Praise whether it come in as the principal business or upon the by depends still upon the same Principles Which are these Honourable is that which we love for it self and is withal laudable And that Good which pleaseth us only because 't is Good And Vertue Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good and the faculty of doing many and great things well The kinds of it are these 1. Justice which is a Vertue whereby every man obtains what by Law is his 2. Fortitude which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself Honourably and according to the Laws in time of danger 3. Temperance which is a Vertue whereby a man Governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law 4. Liberality which is a Vertue by which we benefit others in matter of money 5. Magnanimity which is a Vertue by which a man is apt to do great benefits 6. Magnificence which is a Vertue by which a man is apt to be at great cost 7. Prudence which is an Intellectual Vertue by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity And Honourable are the Causes and effects of things Honourable And the Works of Vertue And the signs of Vertue And those actions the reward whereof is Honor. And the reward whereof is rather Honor than Money And that which we do not for our own sakes And what we do for our Countries good neglecting our own And those things are Honourable which good of themselves are not so to the Owner And those things which happen to the dead rather than to the living And what we do for other men especially for Benefactors And bestowing of Benefits And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of And those things which men strive for earnestly but without fear of Adversary And of the more Honourable and better men the Vertues are more Honourable And more Honourable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit than those which tend to ones own And Honourable are those things which are Just. And Revenge is Honourable And Victory And Honour And Monuments And those things which happen not ot the living And things that excell And what none can do but we And Possessions we reap no profit by And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places And the signs of praise And to have nothing of the servile mercenary or Mechanick And that which seems Honourable Namely such as follow Vices confining upon Vertue And the extreams of Vertues And what the Auditors think Honourable And that which is in estimation And that which is done according to custom Besides in a Demonstrative Oration the Orator must shew that he whom he praiseth did what he praiseth unconstrainedly and willingly And he does so who does the same often Praise is speech declaring the magnitude of a Vertue Action or Work But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker is a circular proof To Magnifie and to Praise differ in themselves as Felicity and Vertue For Praise declares a mans Vertue and Magnifying declares his Felicity Praise is a kind of inverted Precept For to say Do it because 't is good is a Precept But to say He is good because he did it is Praise An Orator in Praising must also use the forms of Amplification such as these He was the first that did it The only man that did it The special man that did it He did it with disadvantage of time He did it with little help He was the cause that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions Further he that will praise a Man must compare him with others and his actions with the actions of others especially with such as are renowned And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration than to any other For here the Actions are confess'd and the Orators part is only this to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster CHAP. X. Of Accusation and Defence with the Definition of Injury IN a Judicial Oration which consists in Accusation and Defence the thing to be proved is that Injury has been done and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn are these three 1. The causes that move to Injury 2. The Persons apt to do Injury 3. The Persons obnoxious or apt to suffer Injury An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledg and without compulsion The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable As the Covetous man does against the Law out of an intemperate desire of Money All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition or not Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance by Compulsion or by Natural necessity Those that proceed from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Custom or upon Premeditation or in Anger or out of Intemperance By Chance are said to be done those things whereof neither the Cause nor the Scope is evident and which are done neither orderly nor always nor most commonly after the same manner By Nature are said to be done those things the Causes whereof are in
open before them be Burglary Robbery Theft or other Felony for this is to give a leading Judgment to the Jury who ought not to consider any private Lawyers Institutes but the Statutes themselves pleaded before them for directions La. Burning as he defines it p. 66. is a Felony at the Common-Law committed by any that maliciously and voluntarily in the night or day burneth the House of another And hereupon infers if a Man sets Fire to the House and it takes not that then it is not within the Statute Ph. If a Man should secretly and maliciously lay a quantity of Gun-Powder under another Mans House sufficient to Blow it up and set a Train of Powder in it and set Fire to the Train and some Accident hinder the Effect is not this Burning or what is it What Crime It is neither Treason nor Murder nor Burglary nor Robbery nor Theft nor no dammage being made any Trespass nor contrary to any Statute And yet seeing the Common-Law is the Law of Reason it is a sin and such a sin as a Man may be Accused of and Convicted and consequently a Crime committed of Malice prepensed shall he not then be Punished for the Attempt I grant you that a Judge has no Warrant from any Statute-Law Common-Law or Commission to appoint the Punishment but surely the King has power to Punish him on this side of Life or Member as he please and with the Assent of Parliament if not without to make the Crime for the future Capital La. I know not Besides these Crimes there is Conjuration Witch-craft Sorcery and Inchantment which are Capital by the Statute 1 of King James cap. 12. Ph. But I desire not to discourse of that Subject for though without doubt there is some great Wickedness signified by those Crimes yet I have ever found my self too dull to conceive the nature of them or how the Devil hath power to do many things which Witches have been Accused of Let us now come to Crimes not Capital La. Shall we pass over the Crime of Heresie which Sir Edw. Coke ranketh before Murder but the consideration of it will be somewhat long Ph. Let us defer it till the Afternoon Of Heresie La. COncerning Heresie Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 39. says that 5 things fall into consideration 1. Who be the Judges of Heresie 2. What shall be Judged Heresie 3. What is the Judgment upon a Man Convicted of Heresie 4. What the Law alloweth him to save his Life 5. What he shall forfeit by Judgment against him Ph. The principal thing to be considered which is the Heresie it self he leaveth out viz. What it is in what Fact or Words it consisteth what Law it violateth Statute-Law or the Law of Reason The Cause why he omitteth it may perhaps be this that it was not only out of his Profession but also out of his other Learning Murder Robbery Theft c. Every Man knoweth to be evil and are Crimes defined by the Statute-Law so that any Man may avoid them if he will But who can be sure to avoid Heresie if he but dare to give an Account of his Faith unless he know beforehand what it is La. In the Preamble of the Statute of the 2d Hen. 4. cap. 15. Heresie is laid down as a Preaching or Writing of such Doctrine as is contrary to the determination of Holy Church Ph. Then it is Heresie at this day to Preach or Write against Worshipping of Saints or the Infallibility of the Church of Rome or any other determination of the same Church For Holy-Church at that time was understood to be the Church of Rome and now with us the Holy-Church I understand to be the Church of England and the Opinions in that Statute are now and were then the true Christian Faith Also the same Statute of Hen. 4. Declareth by the same Preamble that the Church of England had never been troubled with Heresie La. But that Statute is Repeal'd Ph. Then also is that Declaration or Definition of Heresie repeal'd La. What say you is Heresie Ph. I say Heresie is a singularity of Doctrine or Opinion contrary to the Doctrine of another Man or Men and the word properly signifies the Doctrine of a Sect which Doctrine is taken upon Trust of some Man of Reputation for Wisdom that was the first Author of the same If you will understand the truth hereof you are to Read the Histories and other Writings of the Antient Greeks whose word it is which Writings are extant in these days and easie to be had Wherein you will find that in and a little before the time of Alexander the Great there lived in Greece many Excellent Wits that employed their time in search of the Truth in all manner of Sciences worthy of their Labour and which to their great Honour and Applause published their Writings some concerning Justice Laws and Government some concerning Good and Evil Manners some concerning the Causes of things Natural and of Events discernable by sense and some of all these Subjects And of the Authors of these the Principal were Pythagoras Plato Zeno Epicurus and Aristotle Men of deep and laborious Meditation and such as did not get their Bread by their Philosophy but were able to live of their own and were in Honour with Princes and other great Personages But these Men though above the rest in Wisdom yet their Doctrine in many points did disagree whereby it came to pass that such Men as studied their Writings inclined some to Pythagoras some to Plato some to Aristotle some to Zeno and some to Epicurus But Philosophy it self was then so much in Fashion as that every Rich Man endeavour'd to have his Children educated in the Doctrine of some or other of these Philosophers which were for their Wisdom so much renown'd Now those that followed Pythagoras were called Pythagoreans those that followed Plato Academicks those that followed Zeno Stoicks those that followed Epicurus Epicureans and those that followed Aristotle Peripateticks which are the names of Heresie in Greek which signifies no more but taking of an Opinion and the said Pythagoreans Academicks Stoicks Peripateticks c. were termed by the names of so many several Heresies All Men you know are subject to Error and the ways of Error very different and therefore 't is no wonder if these Wise and diligent searchers of the Truth did notwithstanding their Excellent parts differ in many points amongst themselves But this Laudable Custom of Great Wealthy Persons to have their Children at any price to learn Philosophy suggested to many idle and needy Fellows an easie and compendious way of Maintenance which was to Teach the Philosophy some of Plato some of Aristotle c. Whose Books to that end they Read over but without Capacity or much Endeavour to examine the Reasons of their Doctrines taking only the Conclusions as they lay and setting up with this they soon professed themselves Philosophers and got to be the School-Masters to the
Justice La. The Judgment for Felony is Ph. Heresie is before Felony in the Catalogue of the Pleas of the Crown La. He has omitted the Judgment against a Heretick because I think no Jury confin'd Heresie nor no Judge Temporal did ever pronounce Judgment upon it For the Statute of 2 H. 5. c. 7. was that the Bishop having convicted any Man of Heresie should deliver him to the Sheriff and that the Sheriff should believe the Bishop The Sheriff therefore was bound by the Statute of 2 H. 4. after he was delivered to him to burn him but that Statute being repeal'd the Sheriff could not burn him without a Writ de Heretico comburendo and therefore the Sheriff burnt Legat 9. king James by that Writ which was granted by the Judges of the Common-Law at that time and in that Writ the Judgment is expressed Ph. This is strange reasoning when Sir Edw. Coke knew and confessed that the Statutes upon which the Writ de Heretico comburendo was grounded were all repeal'd how could he think the Writ it self could be in force Or that the Statute which repealeth the Statutes for burning Hereticks was not made with an intent to forbid such burning It is manifest he understood not his Books of Common-Law For in the time of Hen. 4. and Hen. 5. the word of the Bishop was the Sheriff's warrant and there was need of no such Writ nor could he till the 25 Hen. 8. when those Statutes were repeal'd and a Writ made for that purpose and put into the Register which Writ Fitzherbert cites in the end of his natura brevium Again in the later end of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth was published a correct Register of Original and Judicial Writs and the Writ de Haeretico comburendo left out because that Statute of 25 H. 8. and all Statutes against Hereticks were repeal'd and burning forbidden And whereas he citeth for the granting of this Writ 9. Jac. the Lord Chief Justice the Lord Chief Baron and two Justices of the Common-pleas it is as to all but the Lord Chief against the Law for neither the Judges of Common-Pleas nor of the Exchequer can hold Pleas of the Crown without special Commission and if they cannot hold Plea they cannot condemn La. The Punishment for Felony is that the Felon be hang'd by the Neck till he be dead And to prove that it ought to be so he cites a Sentence from whence I know not Quod non licet Felonem pro Felonia decollare Ph. It is not indeed lawful for the Sheriff of his own Head to do it or to do otherwise than is commanded in the Judgment nor for the Judge to give any other Judgment than according to statute-Statute-Law or the usage consented to by the King but this hinders not the King from altering his Law concerning Judgments if he see good cause La. The King may do so if he please And Sir Edw. Coke tells you how he altered particular Judgments in case of Felony and sheweth that Judgment being given upon a Lord in Parliament that he should be hang'd he was nevertheless beheaded and that another Lord had the like Judgment for another Felony and was not hang'd but beheaded and withal he shews you the inconveniency of such proceeding because saith he if hanging might be altered to beheading by the same reason it might be altered to burning stoning to Death c. Ph. Perhaps there might be inconveniency in it but 't is more than I see or he shews nor did there happen any inconveniency from the execution he citeth Besides he granteth that death being ultimum supplicium is a satisfaction to the Law But what is all this to the purpose when it belongeth not to consider such inconveniencies of Government but to the King and Parliament Or who from the authority of a deputed Judge can derive a power to censure the actions of a King that hath deputed him La. For the death of a Man by misfortune there is he saith no express Judgment nor for killing a Man in ones own defence but he saith that the Law hath in both Cases given judgment that he that so killeth a Man shall forfeit all his Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties Ph. If we consider what Sir Edw. Coke saith 1 Inst. Sect. 745. at the word Felony these Judgments are very favourable For there he saith that killing of a Man by Chance-medley or se defendendo is Felony His words are wherefore by the Law at this day under the word Felony in Commissions c. is included Petit Treason Murder Homicide burning of Houses Burglary Robbery Rape c. Chance-medley and se defendendo But if we consider only the intent of him that killeth a Man by misfortune or in his own defence the same judgments will be thought both cruel and sinful Judgments And how they can be Felony at this day cannot be understood unless there be a Statute to make them so For the Statute of 25 H. 3. cap. 25. The words whereof Murder from henceforth shall not be judged before our Justices where it is found Misfortune only but it shall take place in such as are slain by Felony and not otherwise make it manifest if they be Felonies they must also be Murders unless they have been made Felonies by some latter Statute La. There is no such latter Statute nor is it to say in Commission nor can a Commission or any thing but another Statute make a thing Felony that was not so before Ph. See what it is for a Man to distinguish Felony into several sorts before he understands the general name of Felony what it meaneth but that a Man for killing another Man by misfortune only without any evil purpose should forfeit all his Goods and Chartels Debts and Duties is a very hard Judgment unless perhaps they were to be given to the Kindred of the Man slain by way of amends for dammage But the Law is not that Is it the Common-Law which is the Law of Reason that justifies this Judgment or the Statute-Law It cannot be the Law of Reason if the Case be meer misfortune If a Man be upon his Apple-tree to gather his Apples and by ill fortune fall down and lighting on the Head of another Man kill him and by good fortune saves himself shall he for this mischance be punished with the forfeiture of his Goods to the King Does the Law of Reason warrant this He should you 'l say have look'd to his Feet that 's true but so should he that was under have look'd up to the Tree Therefore in this Case the Law of Reason as I think dictates that they ought each of them to bear his own misfortune La. In this Case I agree with you Ph. But this Case is the true Case of meer misfortune and a sufficient reprehension of the Opinion of Sir Edw. Coke La. But what if this had hapned to be done by one that had been stealing Apples upon the Tree
THE ART OF Rhetoric WITH A DISCOURSE OF The Laws of England By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury Dent Vmbrae tenuem Divi sine pondere terram Spirantesque crocos in urnâ perpetuum ver LONDON Printed for William Crooke at the Green Dragon without Temple-Bar 1681. TO THE READER ALtho these pieces may appear fully to express their own real intrinsic value as bearing the Image and Inscription of that great Man Mr. Hobbes yet since common usage has rendred a Preface to a Book as necessary as a Porch to a Church and that in all things some Ceremonies cannot be avoided Mode and Custom in this point is dutifully to be obeyed That they are genuine credible testimony might be produced did not the peculiar fineness of thought and expression and a constant undaunted resolution of maintaining his own Opinions sufficiently ascertain their Author Besides which they are now Publish'd from his own true Copies an advantage which some of his works have wanted The first of them being an abridgement containing the most useful part of Aristotle's Rhetoric was written some thirty years since Mr. Hobbes in his Book of Humane Nature had already describ'd Man with an exactness almost equal to the original draught of Nature and in his Elements of Law laid down the constitution of Government and shewn by what Arm'd Reason it is maintain'd And having demonstrated in the State of Nature the Primitive Art of Fighting to be the only medium whereby Men procur'd their ends did in this design to shew what Power in Societies has succeeded to reign in its stead I mean the Art of speaking which by use of Common places of Probability and knowledge in the manners and passions of Mankind throu the working of Belief is able to bring about whatsoever Interest How necessary this Art is to that of Politic is clearly evident from that mighty force whereby the Eloquence of the Ancient Orators captivated the minds of the People Mr. Hobbes chose to recommend by his Translation the Rhetoric of Aristotle as being the most accomplish'd work on that Subject which the World has yet seen having been admir'd in all Ages and in particular highly approv'd by the Father of the Roman Eloquence a very competent Judge To this he thought fit to add some small matter relating to that part which concern's Tropes and Figures as also a short discovery of some little tricks of false and deceitful Reasoning The other piece is a Discourse concerning the Laws of England and has been finish'd many years Herein he has endeavour'd to accommodate the general notions of his Politic to the particular constitution of the English Monarchy A design of no small difficulty wherein to have succeeded deserves much Honour to have perchance miscarryed deserves easie Pardon It has had the good fortune to be much esteem'd by the greatest Men of the Profession of the Law and therefore may be presumed to contain somewhat excellent However 't is not to be expected that al Men should submit to his Opinions yet 't is hoped none will be offended at the present Publishing these Papers since they will not find here any new fantastic Notions but only such things as have been already asserted with strength of Argument by himself and other Persons of eminent Learning To the Public at least this Benefit may accrue that some able Pen may undertake the controversie being moved with the desire of that reputation which will necessarily attend Victory over so considerable an Adversary THE WHOLE ART OF RHETORICK BOOK I. CHAP. I. That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the passions of the Judge but chiefly in Proofs And that this Art is Profitable WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse Some by chance but some by method This method may be discovered and to discover Method is all one with teaching an Art If this Art consisted in Criminations only and the skill to stir up the Judges to Anger Envy Fear Pity or other affections a Rhetorician in well ordered Common-wealths and States where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing could have nothing at all to say For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question And that which the pleader is to shew and the Judge to give sentence on is this only 'T is so or not so The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker who judging of universals and future things could not be corrupted Besides 't is an absurd thing for a man to make crooked the Ruler he means to use It consisteth therefore chiefly in Proofs which are Inferences and all Inferences being Syllogismes a Logician if he would observe the difference between a plain Syllogisme and an Enthymeme which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme would make the best Rhetorician For all Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick whether they infer truth or probability and because without this Art it would often come to pass that evil men by the advantage of natural abilities would carry an evil cause against a good it brings with it at least this profit that making the pleaders even in skill it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause Besides ordinarily those that are Judges are neither patient nor capable of long Scientifical proofs drawn from the principles through many Syllogisms and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall and shorter way Lastly it were ridiculous to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the vertue of well expressing the mind CHAP. II. The Definition of Rhetorick RHetorick is that Faculty by which we understand what will serve our turn concerning any Subject to win belief in the hearer Of those things that beget belief some require not the help of Art as Witnesses Evidences and the like which we invent not but make use of and some require Art and are invented by us The belief that proceeds from our Invention comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker partly from the passions of the hearer but especially from the proofs of what we alledge Proofs are in Rhetorick either Examples or Enthymemes as in Logick Inductions or Syllogisms For an Example is a short Induction and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme out of which are left as superfluous that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer to avoid prolixity and not to consume the time of publick business needlesly CHAP. III. Of the several kinds of Orations and of the Principles of Rhetorick IN all Orations the Hearer does either hear only or judge also If he hear only that 's one kind of Oration and is called Demonstrative If he judg he must judg either of that which is to come or of that which is past If of that which is to come ther 's another kind of Oration and is called Deliberative If of that which is past then 't is a third kind
contraries of these CHAP. VI. Of the Colours or common opinions concerning Good and Evil. IN Deliberatives the Principles or Elements from whence we draw our Proofs are common Opinions concerning Good and Evil. And these Principles are either Absolute or Comparative And those that are Absolute are either Disputable or Indisputable The Indisputable Principles are such as these Good is that which we love for it self And that for which we love somewhat else And that which all things desire And that to every man which his reason dictates And that which when we have we are well or satisfied And that which satisfies And the Cause or Effect of any of these And that which preserves any of these And that which keeps off or destroys the contrary of any of these Also to take the Good and reject the Evil is Good And to take the greater Good rather than the less and the lesser Evil rather than the greater Further all Vertues are Good And Pleasure And all things Beautiful And Justice Valour Temperance Magnanimity Magnificence and other like habits And Health Beauty Strength c. And Riches And Friends And Honour and Glory And Ability to say or do also Towardliness Will and the like And Whatsoever Art or Science And Life And whatsoever is Just. The Disputable Principles are such as follow That is Good whose contrary is Evil And whose contrary is Good for our Enemies And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of And of which there cannot be too much And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed And that which many desire And that which is praised And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise And what good we prefer And what we do advise And that which is possible is Good to undertake And that which is Easie. And that which depends on our own Will And that which is proper for us to do And what no man else can do And whatsoever is Extraordinary And what is suitable And that which wants a little of being at an end And what we hope to master And what we are fit for And what evil men do not And what we love to do CHAP. VII Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil comparatively THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives 1. More is so much and somewhat besides 2. Less is that which and somewhat else is so much 3. Greater and more in number are said only Comparatively to Less and Fewer in number 4. Great and Little Many and Few are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind So that Great and Many is that which exceeds Little and Few is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are these Greater Good is Many than fewer or one of those many And Greater is the kind in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind And greater is that Good than another good whose kind is greater than another's kind And Greater is that from which another Good follows then the Good which follows And of two which exceed a third Greater is that which exceeds it most And that which causes the greater Good And that which proceeds from a greater Good And Greater is that which is chosen for it self than that which is chosen from somwhat else And the end greater than that which is not the end And that which less needs other things than that which more And that which is independent than that which is dependent of another And the Beginning than not the Beginning Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good or Evil than that which is not the Beginning and the End than that which is not the End One may argue from this Colour both ways as Leodamas against Chabrias would have the Actor more to blame than the Advisor and against Callistratus the Advisor more than the Actor And the Cause than not the Cause And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause And the Beginning or Cause of a greater Good or Evil. And that which is scarce greater than that which is Plentiful because harder to get And that which is Plentiful than that which is scarce because oftner in Use. And that which is easie than that which is Hard. And that whose Contrary is greater And that whose Want is greater And Vertue than not Vertue a greater Good Vice than not Vice a greater Evil. And greater Good or Evil is that the effects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful And the effects of greater Vertues or Vices And the Excess whereof is more tolerable a greater Good And those things which may with more honour be desir'd And the desire of better things And those things whereof the Knowledg is better And the Knowledge of better things And that which wise men prefer And that which is in better men And that which better men chuse And that which is more than that which is less delightful And that which is more than that which is less Honourable And that which we would have for our selves and Friends a greater Good and the contrary a greater Evil. And that which is Lasting than that which is not Lasting And that which is Firm than that which is not Firm. And what many desire than what few And what the Adversary or Judg confesseth to be greater is greater And Common than not Common And not Common than Common And what is more Laudable And that which is more Honour'd a greater Good And that which is more Punish'd a greater Evil. And both Good and Evil divided than undivided appear greater And Compounded than Simple appear greater And that which is done with Opportunity Age Place Time Means disadvantagious greater than otherwise And that which is natural than that which is attained unto And the same part of that which is great than of that which is less And that which is nearest to the end designed And that which is Good or Evil to ones self than that which is simply so And Possible than not possible And that which comes toward the end of our Life And that which we do really than that which we do for shew And that which we would be rather than what we would seem to be And that which is good for more purposes is the greater Good And that which serves us in great necessity And that which is joyned with less trouble And that which is joyned with more delight And of the two that which added to a third makes the whole the greater And that which having we are more sensible of And in every thing that which we most esteem CHAP. VIII Of the several kinds of Governments BEcause Hortation and Dehortation concern the Common-wealth and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evil as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract so we must speak of them also in the Concrete
the Doer and are done orderly and always or for the most part after the same manner By Compulsion are done those things which are against the Appetite and Ordination of the Doer By Custome those Actions are said to be done the Cause whereof is this that the Door has done them often Vpon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit as the End or the way to the End In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful In sum every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit or Pleasure The Colours of Profitable are already set down The Colours of that which is Pleasing follow next CHAP. XI Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure PLeasure is a sudden and sensible motion of the Soul towards that which is Natural Grief is the Contrary Pleasant therefore is that which is the cause of such motion And to return to ones own Nature And Customes And those things that are not violent Vnpleasant are those things which proceed from Necessity as Cares Study Contentions The contrary whereof Ease Remission from Labour and Care also Play Rest Sleep are Pleasant Pleasant also is that to which we have an appetite Also the appetites themselves if they be sensual as Thirst Hunger and Lust. Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasion and Reason And those things we remember whether they pleased or displeased than when they were present And the things we hope for And Anger And to be in Love And Revenge And Victory Therefore Also contentious Games as Tables Chess Dice Tennis c. And Hunting And Suits in Law And Honour and Reputation amongst men in Honour and Reputation And to Love And to be Belov'd and Respected And to be admir'd And to be Flatter'd And a Flatterer for he seems both to love and admire And the same thing often And Change or Variety And what we return to afresh And to Learn And to admire And to do Good And to receive Good And to help up again one that 's fallen And to finish that which is unperfect And Imitation And therefore the Art of Painting And the Art of Carving Images And the Art of Poetry And Pictures and Statues And other Mens Dangers so they be near And to have escaped hardly And things of a kind please one another And every one himself And ones own pleases him And to bear Sway. And to be thought Wise. And to dwell upon that which he is good at And ridiculous actions Sayings and Persons CHAP. XII Presumptions of Injury drawn from the persons that do it or Common Opinions concerning the aptitude of Persons to do Injury OF the Causes which move to Injury namely Profit and Pleasure has been already spoken Chap. 6. 7. 11. It follows next to speak of the Persons that are apt to do Injury The Doers of Injury are Such as think they can do it And such as think to be undiscover'd when they have done it And such as think though they be discover'd they shall not be called in question for it And such as think though they be called in question for it that their Mulct will be less than their Gain which either themselves or their Friends receive by the Injury Able to do Injury are Such as are Eloquent And such as are practis'd in business And such as have skill in Process And such as have many Friends And Rich Men. And such as have Rich Friends or Rich Servants or Rich Partners Vndiscover'd when they have done it are Such are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused as Feeble Men Slaughter Poor and not Beautiful Men Adultery And such as one would think could not chuse but be discover'd And such as do Injuries whereof there hath been no Example And such as have none or many enemies And such as can easily conceal what they do And such as have some body to transfer the fault upon They that do Injury openly are Such whose friends have been Injured And such as have the Judges for friends And such as can escape their Tryal at Law And such as can put off their Tryal And such as can corrupt the Judges And such as can avoid the payment of their Fine And such as can defer the payment And such as cannot pay at all And such as by the Injury get manifestly much and presently when the Fine is uncertain little and to come And such as get by the Injury money by the penalty shame only And such on the Contrary as get honour by the Injury and suffer the mulct of money only or banishment or the like And such as have often escaped or been undiscovered And such as have often attempted in vain And such as consider present pleasure more than pain to come and so intemperate men are apt to do Injury And such as consider pleasure to come more than present pain and so temperate men are apt to do Injury And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune Nature Necessity or Custom and by Error rather than by Injustice And such as have means to get pardon And such as want Necessaries as poor men or Unnecessaries as rich men And such as are of very good or very bad Reputation CHAP. XIII Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that suffer and from the matter of the Injury OF those that do Injury and why they do it it hath been already spoken Now of the persons that suffer and of the Matter wherein they suffer the common Opinions are these Persons obnoxious to Injury are Such as have the things that we want either as necessary or as delightful And such as are far from us And such as are at hand And such as are unwary and Credulous And such as are Lazy And such as are Modest. And such as have swallowed many Injuries And such as we have Injured often before And such as never before And such as are in our danger And such as are ill belov'd generally And such as are envyed And our Friends And our Enemies And such as wanting friends have no great ability either in speech or Action And such as shall be losers by going to Law as Strangers and Workmen And such as have done the Injuries they suffer And such as have committed a crime or would have done or are about to do And such as by doing them an Injury we shall gratifie our friends or superiours And such whose friendship we have newly left and accuse And such as another would do the Injury to if we should not And such as by Injuring we get greater means of doing good The Matters wherein men are obnoxious to Injury are Those things wherein all or most men use to deal unjustly And those things which are easily hid and put off into other hands or altered And those things which a man is ashamed to
Flattery To be unable to indure such labours as men indure that are elder tenderer greater in quality and of less strength than he signs of Effeminacy To be beholden often to another and to upbraid those that are beholding to him signs of Pusillanimity To speak and promise much of ones self more than his due signs of Arrogance To want those things which ones Equals all or most of them have attained to is also a thing to be ashamed of And to suffer things ignominious as to serve about anothers person or to be imployed in his base actions In Actions of Intemperance whether willingly or unwillingly committed there is shame in Actions of Force only when they are done unwillingly The men before whom we are ashamed are such as we respect namely Those that admire us And those whom we desire should admire us And those whom we admire Those that contend with us for Honour Those whose opinion we contemn not And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence Of old and well bred men Of those we are always to live with Of those that are not guilty of the same fault Of those that do not easily pardon And of those that are apt to reveal our faults such as are men injured Backbiters Scoffers Comick Poets And of those before whom we have had always good success And of those who never asked any thing of us before And of such as desire our Friendship And of our familiars that know none of our Crimes And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise men are not ashamed Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence Of those whom we reverence And of those who are concerned in our own or Ancestors or Kinsfolks actions or misfortunes if they be shameful And of their Rivals And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace The Common Opinions concerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these CHAP. IX Of Grace or Favour GRace is that Vertue by which a man is said to do a good turn or do service to a man in need not for his own but for his cause to whom he does it Great Grace is when the need is great or when they are hard or difficult things that are conferr'd or when the time is seasonable or when he that conferr's the favour is the only or first man that did it Need is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired Grace therefore it is not if it be not done to one that needs Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a Grace or Favour must shew that he needeth it to whom it was done Grace it is not Which is done by Chance Nor which is done by Necessity Nor which has been requited Nor that which is done to ones Enemy Nor that which is a trifle Nor that which is nought if the Giver know the fault And in this manner a man may go over the Praedicaments and examine a benefit whether it be a Grace for being This or for being so Much or for being Such or for being Now c. CHAP. X. Of Pity or Compassion PIty is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of hurt o◠trouble to another that doth not deserve it and which he thinks may happen to himself or his And because it appertains to Pity it think that he or his may fall into the misery he pities in others it follows that they be most compassionate Who have passed through Misery And old Men. And weak Men. And timorous Men. And learned Men. And such as have Parents Wife and Children And such as think there be honest Men. And that they are Iess Compassionate Who are in great despair Who are in great prosperity And they that are Angry for they consider not And they that are very confident for they also consider not And they that are in the Act of contumely for neither do these consider And they that are astonished with fear And they that think no Man honest The things to be pitied are Such as grieve and withal hurt Such as destroy And Calamities of fortune if they be great as none or few friends deformity weakness lameness c. And evil that arrives where good is expected And after extream Evil a little Good And through a Mans life to have no good offer it self or being offer'd not to have been able to enjoy it Men to be pitied are Such as are known to us unless they be so near to us as their hurt be our own And such as be of our own years Such as are like us in manners Such as are of the same or like stock And our Equals in dignity Those that have lately suffer'd or are shortly to suffer injury and those that have the marks of injury past And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery CHAP. XI Of Indignation OPposite in a manner to Pity in good Men is Indignation which is grief for the prosperity of a Man unworthy With Indignation there is always joyned a joy for the prosperity of a Man worthy as Pity is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it In wicked Men the opposite of pity is Envy as also the companion thereof delight in the harm of others which the Greeks in one word have called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of these in the next Chapter Men conceive Indignation against others not for their vertues as Justice c. For these make Men worthy and in Indignation we think Men unworthy But for those goods which men indued with vertue and noble Men and handsome Men are worthy of And for newly gotten power and riches rather than for antient and especially if by these he has gotten other goods as by Riches Command The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new than antient Riches is that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs But the antient seem to have but their own For with common people to have been so long is to be so by Right And for the bestowing of goods incongruously as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Vlysses And for the comparison of the Inferiour in the same thing as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant or whether absolutely Superiour as when a good Scholer is compared with a good Man Apt to Indignation are They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods and do possess them And they that are good And they that are ambitious And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth than he that hath it Least apt to Indignation are Such as are of a poor servile and not ambitious Nature Who they are that Rejoyce or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily and in what occasions may be gathered
he shall displease Men If he speak falsely he shall displease God Here is to be noted that sometimes this argument may be retorted as thus If you speak truth you shall please God if you speak untruth you shall please Men therefore by all means be an Orator A Fourteenth from the quality that Men have to praise one thing and approve another as We ought not to War against the Athenians upon no precedent injury for all Men discommend injustice Again We ought to War against the Athenians for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy that is is no Liberty but the preservation of Liberty is a thing that all Men will approve A Fifteenth from Proportion as seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues why should we not Banish this stranger for his vices A Sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents as He that denies the immortality of the Gods is no worse than he that has Written the generation of the Gods For the same Consequence follows of both that sometimes there are none A Seventeenth from that that Men change their mind as If when we were in Banishment we fought to recover our Countrey why should we not fight now to retain it An Eighteenth from a fained end as that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him not as more Valiant than another but as one that would partake less of the Glory A Nineteenth from the Cause as if he would infer he did it from this that he had cause to do it A Twentieth from that which is Incredible but True as that Laws may need a Law to mend them as well as Fish Bred in the salt Water may need salting CHAP. XXV Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Iâ—possibility LEt the first Place be from inspection 〈◊〉 Times Actions or Words either of the Adversary or of the Speaker or Both. Oâ— the Adversary as He says he loves the People and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty Of the Speaker as He says I am contentious and yet I never began Suit Of Both as He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth whereas I have ransomed divers Citizens with mine own Money A Second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amiss and serves for Men of good reputation that are accused as The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen Imbracing her Son was absolved as soon as she made appear that she imbraced him upon his arrival from far by way of Salutation A Third from rendring of the cause as Leodamas to whom it was objected that he had under the Thirty Tyrants defaced the Inscription which the People had set up in a Pillar of his Ignominy answered He had not done it because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants by the Testimony of the Peoples hatred A Fourth from better Counsel as He might have done better for himself therefore he did not this But this Place deceives when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact A Fifth from the Incompatibility of the things to be done as They that did deliberate whether they should both Mourn and Sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea were told that if they thought her a Goddess they ought not to Mourn and if they thought her a Mortal they ought not to Sacrifice A Sixth which is proper to Judicial Orations from an Inference of Errour as If he did it not he was not wise therefore he did it Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility please more than Ostensive for they compare and put contraries together whereby they are the better set off and more conspicuous to the Auditor Of all Enthymemes they be best which we assent to as soon as hear For such consent pleaseth us and makes us favourable to the speaker CHAP. XXVI Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes OF seeming Enthymemes one Place may be from the Form of speaking as when a Man has repeated divers Sentences he brings in his Conclusion as if it follow'd necessarily though it do not A Second from an ambiguous word A Third from that which is true divided to that which is false joyned as that of Orestes It was justice that I should Revenge my Fathers death and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father therefore I justly killed my Mother Or from that which is true joyned to that which is false divided as one cup of Wine and one cup of Wine are hurtful therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful A Fourth from Amplification of the Crime For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies nor does the Accuser seem when he is Passionate to want ground for his Accusation A Fifth from signs as when a Man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life A Sixth from that which comes by chance as if from this that the Tyranny of Hipparthus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius a Man should conclude that in a free Commonwealth loving of Boyes were profitable A Seventh from the Consequence as Banishment is to be desired because a Banish'd Man has choice of places to dwell in An Eighth from making that the cause which is not as In Demosthenes his Government the War began therefore Demosthenes Governed well With the Peloponnesian War began the Plague therefore Pericles that perswaded that War did ill A Ninth from the Omission of some circumstance as Helen did what was Lawful when she ran away with Paris because she had her Fathers consent to choose her own Husband which was true only during the time that she had not chosen A Tenth from that which is probable in some case to that mhich is probable simply as 'T is probable he fore-saw that if he did it he should be suspected therefore 't is probable he did it not From this Place one may infer both ways that he did it not For if he be not likely to do it it may be thought he did it not again if he were likely to do it it may be thought he did it not for this that he knew he should be suspected Upon this Place was grounded the Art which was so much detested in Protagorâ—â— of making the better cause seem the worse and the worse the better CHAP. XXVII Of the wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme or by an Objection The Places of opposite Syllogismes are the same with the Places of Syllogismes or Enthymemes for a Rhetorical Syllogisme is an Enthymeme The Places of Objections are four First from the same as To the Adversary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme may be objected that no want is good and yet Love is want or particularly thus The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good The Second from Contraries as if the Adversary say A good Man does good to his friends an
be had than the time is now while our Fortune is entire And this is a Sentence of equal force to it Wise Men make peace while their Fortune is entire CHAP. XVII Of Interrogations Answers and Jests THe times wherein 't is fit to ask ones Adversary a question are chiefly four 1. The first is when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity he has already uttered one and we would by Interrogation draw him to confess the other 2. The Second when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity one is manifest of it self and the other likely to be fetch'd out by a question then the Interrogation will be seasonable and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferr'd without adding that Proposition which is manifest 3. The third when a Man would make appear that his Adversary does contradict himself 4. The Fourth when a Man would take from his Adversary such shifts as these In some sort 't is so In some sort 't is not so Out of these Cases 't is not fit to Interrogate For he whose question succeeds not is thought vanquished To equivocal questions a Man ought to answer fully and not to be too brief To Interrogations which we fore-see tend to draw from us an Answer contrary to our purpose we must together with our Answer presently give an Answer to the objection which is implyed in the question And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us we must together with our answer presently distinguish Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse and grave discourse is deluded by Jests The several kinds of Jests are set down in the Art of Poetry Whereof one kind is Ironia and tends to please ones self The other is Scurrility and tends to please others The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness the former may become a Man of good breeding CHAP. XVIII Of the Epilogue THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things Either of inclining the Judg to favour his own or disfavour the Adversaries side For then when all is said in the cause is the best season to praise or dispraise the Parties Or of Amplification or Diminution For when it appears what is good or evil then is the time to shew how great or how little that good or evil is Or in moving the Judge to Anger Love or other Passion For when 't is manifest of what kind and how great the good or evil is then it will be opportune to excite the Judge Or of Repetition that the Judge may remember what has been said Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner For the Orator must shew that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration and how Namely by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries repeating them in the same order they were spoken FINIS THE ART OF Rhetorick Plainly set forth with Pertinent EXAMPLES For the more easie understanding and Practice of the same By Tho. Hobbes of Malmsbury LONDON Printed for W. Crook 1681. THE ART OF RHETORICK RHetorick is an Art of speaking finely It hath two parts 1. Garnishing of speech called Elocution 2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance called Pronunciation Garnishing of speech is the first part of Rhetorick whereby the speech it self is beautified and made fine It is either 1. The fine manner of words called a Trope or 2. The fine shape or frame of speech called a Figure The fine manner of words is a garnishing of Speech whereby one word is drawn from his first proper signification to another as in this sentence Sin lyeth at the door where Sin is put for the punishment of sin adjoyned unto it Lyeth at the door signifieth at hand as that which lyeth at the Door is ready to be brought in This changing of words was first found out by necessity for the want of words afterward confirmed by Delight because such words are pleasant and gracious to the ear Therefore this change of signification must be shamefac'd and as it were maidenly that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification to be driven by force unto the same yet sometimes this fine manner of Speech swerveth from this perfection and then it is Either 1. The abuse of this fine Speech called Katachresis or 2. The excess of this fineness call'd Hyperbole Be not too just nor too wicked which speech although it seem very hard yet it doth not without some fineness of Speech utter thus much That one seek not a righteousness beyond the Law of God and that when none can live without all sin yet that they take heed that sin bear not Dominion over them As My Tears are my Meat day and night Those that hate me are mo in number than the Hairs of my Head Both which do utter by an express of Speech a great sorrow and a great number of Enemies The abuse of Speech is when the change of Speech is hard strange and unwonted as in the first example The excess of Speech is when the change of signification is very high and lofty as in the second Example and Ps. 6. 7. But the excellency or fineness of Words or Tropes is most excellent when divers are Shut up in one or Continued in many An Example of the first sort is in the 2 Kings I pray thee let me have a double portion of thy Spirit where by Spirit is meant the gift of the Spirit and by thy Spirit the gift of the Spirit like to thine The continuance of Tropes called an Allegorie is when one kind of Trope is so continued as look with what kind of matter it be begun with the same it be ended So in the 23 Psal. The care of God towards his Church is set forth in the words proper to a Shepherd So in the whole Book of Canticles the sweet conference of Christ and his Church is set down by the words proper to the Husband and the Wife So old Age is set down by this garnishing of Speech Eccles. 12. 5 6. Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words called a Trope Now the divers sorts do follow They are those which note out 1. No Comparison and are with some Comparison or 2. No respect of Division or some respect The first is double 1. The change of name called a Metonymie 2. The mocking speech called an Ironie The change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it It is double 1. When the cause is put for the thing caused and contrariwise 2. When the thing to which any thing is adjoyned is put for the thing adjoyned and contrariwise The change of name of the cause is when Either the name of the Maker or the name of the Matter is put for the thing made Of the Maker when the finder out or the Author of the thing or the instrument whereby the thing is done is