Opinion of a God there would be no Idolatry nor Superstition But this Argument as it is deficient in other respects so also is it in respect of time for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Christ for the first four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World notwithstanding the force of this Argument For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate so much Power to himself And indeed Mr. Hobs had great reason to thank the Church of Rome for affording him so much Sophistical matter to stuff his Kingdom of Darkness withal Another Artifice by which Mr. Hobs would disparage a truth that he has a mind to oppose is with a Philosophical Gravity to feign an idle and ridiculous original to which judiciously to ascribe it thus he fancies that Aristotle from the consideration of this or such like Propositions Homo est animal from the Copula in this Proposition he took occasion first to assert separate Essences Celestial Intelligences and humane Souls Leviat Latin p. 320. Another instance he gives of the false interpretation of Scripture is the asserting the immortality of the Soul and its being really distinct from the Body but now one would scarce desire a better Argument for the proof thereof than the very Answers he gives to those places of Scripture which are commonly alledg'd for it so weak and frivolous many times are they Eccles. 12. 7. The Spirit returns to God that gave it which words says he may suffer this interpretation but then they must undergo a great deal of pain and have a great deal of Patience if they suffer it One great defect which seems to run through all Mr. Hobs his Interpretations of Scripture is this that he supposes himsels on the defensive part and that all that he had to do was only to invent some frivolous Evasion or put some forc'd Interpretation upon the place and then all was done whereas he ought positively to prove that that of his was the only true and genuine sense and meaning of the place both from the generally approv'd concurrent Testimonies of the best and purest Ages from the just and proper acceptation of the words by the best and most approved Authors from the general scope and design of the Context and from the natural tendency that his Sense and Interpretation has to promote those noble ends of Vertue and Piety in the World which God and Christ design'd to carry on by the Scriptures None of which things Mr. Hobs hath as much as attempted to do The Spirit returns to God that gave it that is says he God only knows whence it comes and whither it goes And I could wish that he had been true to his own Interpretation But then how comes he so positively to assert its Mortality at present and at what Periods it must return again to Life c. Another place he says which seems to make for the immortality of the Soul is Matt. 22. 32. Where our Saviour affirms Abraham Isaac and Iacob to be alive to which he answers That they were indeed alive but not actually but as by the promise of God they were sure of Eternal Life but he also tells us That the wicked are sure of eternal Death and thus why may not the wicked be as properly said to be dead even whiles they are alive by vertue of the threatning as the Righteous can be said to be alive by vertue of the promise even then when they are suppos'd not to be at all The sum of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion herein is this he supposes the Soul not to be any thing really distinct from the Body but that it is compos'd of the purer parts of the Spirits and by consequence it dies with the Body not that it is annihilated for matter in this sense is immortal that is not naturally capable of annihilation but that upon such grand indispositions of Body which is called Death the Soul is render'd uncapable of such agitations and such reactions in which the nature of a living Creature doth consist So that according to this Opinion a Man can no more properly be said either to be alive or dead than Quicksilver may for though it be not so Organized as Mans Body is though it hath neither heart nor brain to transmit Spirits to each other and though it has not the use of Speech yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours The greatest part of the rest of this Chapter is employ'd in confuting or exposing some Opinions of the Church of Rome yet we may observe that notwithstanding his severe handling that Church in some respects yet her Authority is then valued by him when she seems any ways to favour his Opinions thus he cites her Authority to confirm his assertion That Spirits are mere Phantasms because she in her Exorcisms calls 'em so I shall here only further observe how he hath transform'd all the Subjects of Satan into Phantasms in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkness and in the latter end thereof has allegoriz'd all the Officers and Ministers of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins That which gave the first occasion of employing my thoughts this way was those false Opinions concerning God those various modes of Theism which now prevail in the World which seem to be nothing but Epicurism and Hobbianism transform'd into other I know not whether I may say into better shapes Now if what I here write may but give occasion to some abler Pen more fully to examine and confute those fatal Principles and I hope it will rather than a good Cause should suffer by my ill management If these Papers I say have this good effect I shall not then need to make any other Apology but think my Pains very well bestow'd FINIS AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter I Would not there be thought in the least to favour that false and foolish that dangerous and destructive opinion of Theism an Opinion which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward and thus it seems a composition of the worst ingredients incident to humane Nature Pride Ignorance and Ingratitude of Pride as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature of Ignorance as not fully understanding the true state and condition of laps'd Mankind of Ingratitude as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace But Secondly besides these there are others who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man do yet so melt it down as it were below it self till it come to an equal temper with or very little exceed mere natural Religion 3. Others who in words acknowledge a God but denying the common Principles of all Religion the immortality of the Soul and a future State seem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of Epicurus As for the light of Nature which these Men so much Idolize I shall grant to it as much
more immediate applications of himself to the minds of Men as fully assure 'em of the truth of his Revelations as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles and that it really and actually was so may appear from hence that those to whom God convey'd these Revelations have by vertue hereof undertaken the performance of such things which arguments drawn from mere Sense and Reason in all probability could not have perswaded 'em to Cum it aque mens nostra ex hoc solo quod Dei naturam objectivè in se continet de eadem participat potestatem habeat ad formandas notiones c. Merito mentis naturam quatenus talis concipitur primam Divinae Revelationis causam statuere possumus This seems very strange mystical Divinity if by Divine Revelation he mean Revelation truly so call'd then it is altogether unconceiveable how any impressions of Natural and Moral Truths and that is all that he ought to understand by those expressions quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet de eâdem participat How these can any ways be the cause of Divine Revelation if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge besides the impropriety of the Expression I do not see how the Soul can so truly be call'd the first cause even of that neither but rather the first and immediate subject of it Upon the whole matter one might almost be perswaded from hence to think That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively and partaking of the very same that hereby he design'd as it were to melt down God and the Soul of Man into an equal constitution and both into parts of a material Universe Then he tells us that Quicquid dici potest ex Scripturâ solâ peti debet What ever is said of things relating to Divine Revelation ought to be fetch'd from Scripture alone This in general is a very good Rule yet it is to be understood with some certain limitations as he himself acknowledges in the same Paragraph unless we had rather say that the latter part thereof contradicts the former for he tells us That the Iews never took any notice of Second Causes but did generally recur to God as the cause of all great and excellent things they had occasion to speak of And therefore we must only take that for Supernatural Revelation which Scripture expressly says is such or what may be gathered to be so from the circumstances of the Relation First I grant that God may declare that again which a Man either by Natural Principles or some other way knew before Secondly When God makes any Revelation to a Man it is necessary that he should make such a reduplicative Declaration as this That this which I now speak is Pure Simple unmixt Divine Revelation such as exceeds the Power of Natural Causes to make known if so then it may be questioned Whether God ever made any supernatural Revelation to Mankind or no because we no where meet with any such Declaration And as to the circumstances of the Narration we can never according to his Principles from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine because as I intimated before he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the same or however asserts that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend However we may make use of this assertion against himself that if we may argue from the circumstances of the Relation then it is not necessary that whatever is said concerning these things should be fetch'd from Scripture only 'T is easily observable how this Author by unsetling the significations of Words and confounding the Notions of things designs to bring all into confusion he argues much what at a rate with Mr. Hobbs that is weakly and probably with the same design that is Wickedly But Providence hath so ordered affairs that a bad Cause should always be a weak one He founds all Prophecy meerly in the imagination hence he says it is that the Prophets conceiv'd all things parabolically and express'd spiritual things after a Corporeal manner because this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination Hence it was that those that were with Christ saw the Spirit descending like a Dove and the Apostles as it were Tongues of Fire and S. Paul when he was Converted saw a great light because all these things did suit with the nature of Imagination As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any such belief but only the imagination of Men or as if these appearances reach'd no further than the Fancy without any Divine Influence making any further impressions upon the minds of those who were concern'd herein Si igitur sacra volumina percurramus videbimus quod omnia quae Deus Prophet is revelavit iis revelat a fuerunt vel verbis vel figuris vel utroque modo That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture were convey'd to the Prophets by Words or Figures and sensible Representations or both I shall here show First That this assertion is false Secondly If it was true yet it would not prove what he thereby designs 1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were convey'd one of these two ways There are some instances where there is no mention made of either of these two and to say that one of these was made use of tho' not express'd this is gratis dictum and contrary to his own Rule That whatever is said of these things must be drawn from Scripture The instances I mean are those of Ioseph's interpreting the Dreams of the Butler and the Baker and of Pharoah's Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth c. Gen. 40 and 41 chap. Now the Interpretation of Dreams is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themselves and yet here we do not find either any Voice or sensible Representation Nor are his Reasons any whit more cogent than his Instances for tho' he grants it possible for God immediately to communicate himself to Men Attamen ut homo aliquis solâ mente aliqua perciperet quae in primis nostrae cognitionis fundamentis non continentur nec ab iis deduci possant ejus mens praestantior necessariò atque humana longe excellentior esse deberet But I know no reason why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties without the assistance of Fancy or Imagination For this is certain and both Reason and Religion obliges us to believe That God doth convey his gracious Assistances by which he both enlightens the Understanding and reforms the Will without the mediation of the Phancy and it is also very reasonable to believe That God did many times under the Old Testament convey the Intimations of his Will to Men without either Voice or Vision however this is certainly done by the
much strength retorted upon themselves 1. The Foundation of the Argument is this That that is justly suspected as false in Religion the Belief or Practice whereof is joyned with either publick or private Advantage to those concern'd Now nothing is more false than this for this is one main Foundation of our Natural Religion and part even of the Gentile's Creed viz. A Belief that God is and that he is a rewarder of those that diligently seek him That such is the Goodness of God towards us that he has joyned our Duty and our Interest together not only as to the future but also as to the present Life And God in so ordering the Frame of our Religion has but seconded and confirmed the common sense of Mankind and acted according to the Principles of Humane Nature for such is the Constitution thereof that Good and Convenience is the necessary Object of all our Desires Now if any thing of present or future Advantage be made an Argument of the falseness of things in Matters of Religion we may then upon the same grounds question the Truth and Reasonableness of all humane Actions because Men necessarily propound some kind of advantage to themselves in 'em all But this would lay a Foundation of Scepticism in Humane Nature and cause us to reject or doubt of things for those very reasons for which we ought to receive ' em 2. This Objection taken from the Advantages that attend Religion is a very contingent and accidental one such as could be of no force in the first Ages of the Church when Christianity exposed its Professors to nothing but Persecution their Names to Sandal and Reproach their Estates to Ruine and their Bodies to Martyrdom 3. I shall show the unfitness of the Objection as made by them that urge it indeed if those Men were so Heroical in their pursuits of Vertue and Holiness as to embrace 'em meerly upon the account of their Intrinsick Excellence then might there something more be pleaded for 'em But since they are Men of Debauched Lives and if possible to justifie their own Wickedness would insinuate into the Minds of others a secret belief That Religion is nothing but a meer Cheat This is the greatest instance not only of Profaneness but of Folly too because the Argument may be retorted with as much strength upon themselves thus If the Belief of a God and Religion be therefore suspected to be false because it is the Interest of those that believe 'em that there should be both Then why may not the Denial of a God be rejected for the same reasons because it is as much the Interest of wicked Men that there should be no God as it is of good Men that there should be one So that if there be any force in the Argument it proves as much against themselves as it doth against us As for those who tell us That the Notion of God includes in it a Contradiction and that it is and ever was impossible that there should be one these Men indeed take the most effectual way of defending their Cause in case they could prove their Assertion For whoever grants the possibility of the Being of God must either grant that he really is or else will be forced to contradict himself for what is possible may be reduced into Act. But if God be not now and actually was not existent from all Eternity it is impossible for such a Being as is included in his notion ever to begin to be And this seems to be Bradwardine's Argument Cap. 1. p. 3. So that an Atheist must prove not only that there is no God but that it was from Eternity impossible that there should be one neither of which he will ever be able to prove The Being of God is not the less credible because it is not capable of such proofs as some other things are all things will not admit of Mathematical Demonstrations nor indeed is it expected that they should nor are they on this account less true and certain than those that do For sometimes the very possibility of Demonstration argues some degree of uncertainty or obscurity in the thing to be demonstrated thus Indemonstrables are always the most certain therefore the Being of God is not therefore the less certain because it cannot be demonstrated Some indeed are so gross in their Reasonings that they make the Invisibility of Spirits an Argument against their Existence whereas indeed the very Reasons upon which we believe their Existence are inconsistent with their Visibility That some Heathens did worship that one supream and true God is certainly evident both from the Testimony of Profane and Sacred History Act. 17. 23. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship him declare I unto you So that the Athenians either worshipped the true God or St. Paul declar'd to 'em a false one yet 't is generally agreed that such Heathens might be and were guilty of Idolatry Nothing therefore hinders but that the Papists may be guilty of Idolatry though they do not only acknowledge the true God but the Christian Trinity nor do I see how their Idolatry as such that is such as is consistent with the Belief of the true God is capable of any mitigation because no one charges them with any other than what they are truly guilty of Some Protestants indeed say That some of the Heathens are capable of the same defence that the Papists make for themselves that is That they only give an Inferiour Worship to Saints and other Inferiour Daemons but pay the Supream Worship to the Supream God only Now this Plea seems to hold as much for the one as for the other and must either acquit both or neither Nor can the Papists their being more particularly instructed in the Knowledge of the Nature and Will of God be any Mitigation of their Offence but rather an Aggravation of it Falsehood is neither in its own Nature fit nor was it ever intended by God as a proper means whereby to defend truth For this neither stands in need of a Lye nor can it really be defended by it nor is it our Interest or Prudence to attempt the defence of a good Cause by weak Arguments for this will only give occasion to our Adversaries when they see that they can easily answer these to think worse of our cause and that all the rest of our reasonings are of the same nature Yet granting that some Arguments sometimes made use of to prove the Being of God are not absolutely cogent and conclusive yet are they not presently to be rejected as useless and that upon these two accounts First Because they that urge them do not make use of any single Argument as if the Cause did wholly depend upon it Secondly In things of a Moral Concernment there may be such a thing as an Accumulative Demonstration as Bishop Taylor tells us in another Case Pag. 124. Lib. 1. Cases of Consc. Therefore supposing a Man in his attempt to prove
of this Ratiocination or the Ratiocination the Cause of the Idea Some think that these two Reasoning and the Idea ought not to be separated or contradistinguish'd in this dispute For the Idea is not such an Engine as of it self will prove the Being of God without the Use and Exercise of reasoning thereupon So that the Idea doth not exclude but include the use of our Faculties nor is it any receding from the Argument so to do Yet it seems more probable that there is something in Man Co-eval with and connatural to his very Being that dictates such a thing and directs our thoughts and reasonings that way for it is not probable that Men should as it were accidentally and yet so generally agree in one and the same thing without some inward suggestions and intimations at least to employ their Faculties upon such an object viz. a Supreme Being So that though this Idea be not so full and perfect but that it may receive further Additions of strength and clearness from Ratiocination yet this is no more a disparagement to the Works of Nature that they are sometimes further perfected by Study and Industry than it is to a Man that he was not born with all those accomplishments which he hath afterwards acquired Secondly Next to a Sceptick who grants no Principles at all it is the greatest difficulty to convince an Atheist who asserts such absurd and unreasonable ones that he can scarce be urged with any greater so that he will more easily evade the force of any Argument if what we urge upon him as an absurdity if he make it as it were the very Foundation of his Discourse Only 't is observable that such Men are more usually prevail'd upon by the Convictions of Conscience which is done I conceive by awakening those natural impressions of God and their obligations to him in their minds than merely by convincing their Understandings Thirdly In the managing our thoughts upon this subject we ought to consider not only what is in it self possible and perhaps may imply no contradiction but what upon a full consideration of things and all their circumstances may be counted most reasonable what is worthy of our rational Faculties to assert and a prudent Person to believe So that after these inward impressions made upon the minds of Men and those outward manifestations of himself by the Works of Creation and Providence it perhaps would be difficult even for the most Sceptical Person to assign what further Rational Evidence he could desire for the Belief of a Deity Nor does that variety of Opinions concerning the Nature of God in different Nations and among different Persons any whit lessen the credibility of his Being but rather confirms and strengthens it For this shows that it was not the Invention or Contrivance of any single Nation at first nor of more jointly afterwards for if they had thus combin'd together or borrow'd one from another in all probability they would have agreed better in their Notions and Opinions concerning him Nor was Religion any humane Invention to restrain the Exorbitances of Mankind because there was Religion before any such Offences as a Learned Prelate of our own has well observed That Oppression though by Accident grew rather from Religion than Religion from Oppression for before the two Brothers Cain and Abel had offer'd up their Sacrifice there was no such thing as Oppression There are some who tell us that the Being of God cannot be proved by any Internal Arguments from any natural impressions made upon the minds of Men dictating any such thing others that it cannot be proved by any external ones drawn from the nature of the Universe or any thing else without us Now the Atheists make this advantage of these our unseasonable differences herein That they bid us first Answer our own Arguments which we bring against our selves and if the Being of God cannot be proved either way which some among our selves do with too much eagerness severally assert then they think they have gain'd their point For as for Divine Revelation they do not much value that as thinking it not so proper to be urged against them because they believe nothing of the whole matter What Cuperus in his Arcana Atheismi sayes of Divine Revelation that we are first convinc'd by it That there is a God and afterwards thereby enabled to prove it by reason I think may be better apply'd in some proportion to these two ways of probation here made use of thus That from these natural impressions made upon the minds of Men we have the first grounds of our belief of a God and then this is further confirmed by those External Arguments drawn from Nature Quae non prosunt singula juncta juvant I shall here make some short remarks upon Cuperus his Opinion in this particular In the beginning of his Proem he tells us with some kind of Formality and Ostentation That the only prejudice that can be done to a good cause is to endeavour to defend it by weak Arguments That he had frequent opportunities of hearing Atheists being bred up amongst 'em discovering the weakness of those Arguments which the Theists brought against ' em Hereupon he was forced to think upon some more effectual way of proving the Being of a God than hitherto had been made use of which is this to deny all natural knowledge of God and utterly to reject at least at first all those Arguments drawn from the light of nature and to prove his Being by Divine Revelation This indeed is a very firm and sure way of doing it but I am afraid it will not be altogether so cogent as to convince an Atheist for such an one will not believe Moses his History neither the Creation nor any Tradition relating to it Now the whole force of his Argument will depend upon this slender hinge viz. The faithful and uninterrupted conveyance of this Tradition to all succeeding Ages But the present Learned Archbishop of Canterbury in that excellent Sermon of his against Atheism Page 51. tells us That it is much more likely that the Belief of God is a Notion which was bred in the mind of Man and born with him than a Tradition transmitted from hand to hand through all Generations especially if we consider how many rude and barbarous Nations there are which consent in the Opinion of a God and yet have scarce any certain Tradition of any thing that was done amongst 'em but two or three Ages before If the Knowledge of God says Cuperus Proem p. penult was drawn from the Light of Nature then it needed not to be proved That there was a God because thus we suppose it and already believe it But may not his own way of arguing be retorted more justly upon himself When he tells us p. 246. That Postquam per Dei Revelationem edocti sumus esse Deum tum intelligi posse c. When by Divine Revelation we are taught there is
who thus suppose a Corporeal God do also suppose a Corporeal Soul Thus from the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature 3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship that seeing we consist of Soul and Body therefore must we offer both to God as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship First Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism Secondly By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves or at least think that we did so of that God whom we for ought they perceiv'd did so rudely worship But then on the other hand we must have a more especial regard to the Soul for without this all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body whether it enjoy'd any State of Praeexistence or was then first created when first put into the Body or if it did praeexist then in what manner whether in a pure separation from all matter or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle is not my design here to examine only 't is observable that in things of this Nature where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things there Men are usually determin'd to this or that side of the question by very accidental considerations as in this case of Praeexistence by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philosophy or by those previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable Nor Secondly shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political rather than of Natural Philosophy I shall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body being discouraged therefrom by the difficulties of the thing and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it Claubergius hath a discourse particularly de conjunctione Anime Corporis but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it I shall submit it to the judgment of those who will take the pains to peruse it His way is this The Soul says he is united to the Body by those mutual actions that pass betwixt 'em but more especially by those more confused operations of sense and by the less distinct perceptions of mind And in his 37th chap. he tells us that homo alius alio idem seipso diver so tempore magis minúsve homo censeri debet For according to him the denomination of a Man as such consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body which is more especially perform'd by the operations of Sense Now I see not why that especially should denominate us men wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties why such a one should not be counted as much yea more a Man than he that lives more by sense That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense is very true but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in these more confused operations the difficulty would perhaps still return Nor shall I here dispute whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame or of the more principal Parts of the Body doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station and launch into those other unknown Regions or whether besides this there be not also requir'd which seems as probable as immediate an act of God to take it out as there was to put it into the Body only we may observe that God both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us by laying violent hands upon our selves to separate those whom God hath thus strictly joyned together that whatever natural tye it is under as to the Body 't is certain it ought not to quit its Station without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand the one by ascribing too little to the Body and too much to the Soul the other by attributing too much to the Body and too little to the Soul in the Accounts they give of humane Nature The Stoicks would make Man so wholly rational that they will scarce allow him to be sensible and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature and the Epicureans on the contrary make all the most noble Actions of the Soul meerly subservient to the designs of such Pleasure as is really below the true happiness of the Soul By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body all those motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites so far as they are natural The Design therefore of the Stoicks to root these Passions out of Humane Nature is First impossible Secondly it would be prejudicial thereunto were it feisible for these when duly regulated become the subject matter of moral Vertue and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Vertue Among the many charges brought against Stoicism that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious and the most unanswerable it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of ones self as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man far above any thing that is called Mortal and in some respects equal to God himself As for Repentance they look upon that as a mean thing far below the height of their attainments Innocence indeed is better than Repentance but for them to pretend unto it argues a great deal of Pride founded upon a bad understanding of their own State But this description which they give of a Wise Man is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds but
the Being of God should either through the shortness of his Meditations or the sublimeness of the Theory make use of an Argument not perfectly conclusive yet seeing the success of the Cause depends not upon it and seeing the Man perhaps has effected as much as he intended by it that is added his Mite to the former Treasury upon the whole matter it seems hard if such an one must be prosecuted as an Atheist or a Betrayer of the Cause of Religion Cicer. de Univers Si fortè de Deorum Naturâ ortuque Mundi disserentes minùs id quod habemus Animo consequimur c. hand sanè erit mirum contentique esse debebitis si probabilia dicentur aequum est enim meminisse me qui disseram hominem esse vos qui judicetis ut si probabilia dicentur nè quid ultra requiratis Among the many Arguments brought to prove the Being of God these two seem the most considerable First That comprehensive one which is drawn from the Being of the World whereby I understand not only the Divine Power of creating or producing something out of nothing but that admirable Wisdom also that appears in making it such as it is and in the proper subserviencies of things therein to their respective Ends That Argument further which is drawn not only from the Material but the Intellectual Universe not only from the structure of the Body but the Nature of the Soul Secondly That which is drawn from the Consent and universal Acknowledgment of all Nations As for that which seems Aristotle's Opinion That the World was from Eternity and yet that it was in Nature of an Effect in respect of God the Cause it will be impossible to free this Assertion either from a Contradiction or from an unworthy reflection upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature For if God as a Cause was in time antecedent to the World then it is a contradiction to say it was from Eternity If it did flow from God as an Emanative Effect as the Beams from the Sun then this destroys the chiefest Perfection of the Divine Nature viz. its Liberty And this seems one of the best Arguments to prove That the World neither was nor could be from Eternity and it will be very hard if once we give our Adversaries leave to suppose it to be Eternal by any other Argument to force 'em out of their Opinion For I do not see that it would be any absurdity to say That supposing the World to be Eternal there has been as many Years as Days that is an equal Infinite number of both all Infinites being Equal for Infinity can no more be exhausted by Years than Days if it could then it would not be what it is in its own nature inexhaustible But the truth is such is the nature of Infinite with respect to our Finite Capacity that the one is not a Competent Iudge of the other and when we enter into disputes of this nature we are often entangled with unanswerable difficulties on both sides But the Atheist tells us That all this visible Universe the Heavens the Earth and all Mankind at first were the lucky hits of blind Chance which after almost infinite successless Tryals going before did at last happen upon these admirable and excellent Structures particularly those of humane Bodies But here we must know that according to these Principles the same Chance which first made us must still continue us But then how comes it to pass that Chance is so regular and constant in its Productions since That whereas it is above ten thousand to one according to these Principles but that Mankind long ere this must have wholly ceased to have been or else nothing but Monsters have been produced instead hereof we see a very regular and orderly course of Nature generally observed This is as if a Man should be a thousand years in casting all sizes upon six Dice and then for a thousand years after to throw nothing else if we could suppose a Mans Life to last so long Whoever can believe such strange things as these ought never to blame any one for being over credulous As for that other Argument drawn from the consent of Mankind there are some who tell us That those natural Impressions of God upon the minds of Men upon which this universal consent is founded are mere imaginary things and that there is no need of 'em in our disputes against Atheism But these Men might do well to consider whether they do not too much oblige the Atheists and go too far towards the betraying the Cause of God and Religion in the World who willingly quit and give up that Argument which hath hitherto been managed with such good success by the best and wisest of Men in all Ages willingly I say to give it up gratis for I verily believe it can never be forc'd and wrested out of the hand of a Christian Philosopher who rightly understands it And why should we grant any thing to an Atheist which may tend to the advantage of his or the prejudice of our own Cause unless he necessarily force it from us by dint of Argument always provided that we readily acknowledge evident Truth whereever we find it First I conceive there neither is nor can be any Argument in a true and proper sense à priore to prove the Being of God that taken from the Idea is not such But it is an arguing from the effect to the Cause only the effect seems a more immediate one and such as bears a more particular resemblance to the Cause That somewhat was from Eternity is evidently demonstrable for if once there was nothing it was impossible for any thing ever to begin to be Now this something must be either Matter or Spirit a thinking or unthinking Being it cannot be an unthinking Being for then it would be impossible that there should be any such thing as Knowledge or Cogitation in the World which yet we are inwardly conscious to our selves of For as Dr. Lock Chap. 10. Book 4. hath well observ'd It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being as that nothing of it self should produce matter Now it must be either Man that was the first Eternal Being the Creator of all things or some other Being But though the Atheists are not the greatest Wits in the World yet we must not think 'em such very Atheists neither as to make mere Man to set up for a Sovereign Creator Thus we have an Idea or Conception of a Being infinitely more perfect than our selves and therefore we were not the Cause of our own Existence for if we had we should then have given our selves those Perfections which we find wanting in us and conceive in another Therefore we owe our Existence to and dependance upon that Being without us which enjoys all Perfections But now the Question is Whether the Idea be the Cause or occasion
a God then we can find out natural Arguments to prove it But when we are first taught and convinc'd by DivineRevelation That there is a God How do Arguments drawn from natural reason afterwards prove it So that indeed these Arguments will be little more than Illustrations or further Confirmations of a thing already believed because revealed But then he says in the same place Principia ostendi deberent ex quibus is qui nullam unquam Numinis mentionem vel suspicionem hausisset sponte in Numinis Naturae Conditoris agnitionem paulatim deduceretur Some Principles must be shown from whence he that never heard the least mention nor had the least suspicion of a Diety might be drawn to the knowledge of him To this I Answer First That according to the Principles of those Men whom he now opposes he cannot ordinarily suppose a Man without some suspicion at least of a Deity for this say they is born with him and he must not suppose his Adversaries Assertion to be false but prove it so Secondly Why may not that conviction of mind which is the result of our Faculties rightly reasoning hereupon inferring the Existence of a Supream Being together with that inward consciousness of our Obligations to him Why may not these be Principles sufficient to prove so far as is requisite for Nature to do it That there is a God and that to one who had not heard any other way that there was one But he seems to lay a great stress upon that of a Man's having or not having heard the least mention of a God before But if he suppose a Man so to have heard of a God by Divine Revelation as thereupon really to believe his Existence then those natural Arguments brought to prove the same may further confirm him in his belief but tho' he have heard mention made of a God and yet not believe that there is any such thing I do not understand how his bare hearing of him before will any ways make those reasons drawn from Nature the more effectual to convince him If Men of late have too frequently run into Atheism it was not any weakness they found in that Argument drawn from the Light of Nature to prove the Existence of a God so far as can in reason be expected from it that was the cause thereof but he seems to lay the fault there where indeed he ought not and ascribes it to the weak defence that some Men have made of a good Cause only thereby to magnifie and usher in his own new Notion with more pomp p. 247. He there grants that Men generally have some Notion or Idea of God but then Nullus alius modus inveniri potest quo mentes hominum occupavit quà m quòd ab ipso Deo per Revelationem vel Creationem sit insertus If by Creation he means that natural constitution of Soul whereby by the very Laws or Creation natural to such a Being this Notion of God was imprinted on it then his Assertion would be true but then he would herein contradict himself By Creation therefore he must mean only that Tradition of the Being of God derived down to all Mankind from the Creation and then we can easily assign another way how this Idea might possess the Minds of Men viz. that before mention'd natural Inscription In Chap. 9. Lib. 2. there his chief design is to prove that the Being of God is not knowable by the Light of Nature Now I humbly conceive that in that Dialogue which he fram'd betwixt Philalethes and Misalethes he did not equal justice to Truth in stating the Question so as to make Philalethes whose Province it ought to have been rather to defend than prove the Being of God the Opponent whereas he should in strictness rather have been Respondent for this advantage accrued to Misalethes by being on the Defensive part that meer Evasions might serve instead of solid Answers For it seems a more easie thing to defend an Errour than to oppose a Truth Though I speak not this as if Truth was not able not only to defend it self but to convince its Adversaries provided that reason would do it But I do not see why we should give that advantage to the Atheists as to give 'em leave to suppose us at once both out of our Reason and Religion too p. 264. Cùm verò omnes ex natur â petitas rationes quae pro utraque sententiâ proferri possunt invalidas esse c. Seeing he says he has proved all the natural Reasons brought either for or against the Being of God to be invalid and the Atheist he says has nothing else to relie on then the most natural consequence hereof will be That the Atheists must now hang in aequilibrio and profess themselves Scepticks and this is the utmost that he can pretend to have effected upon 'em p. 265. He tells us That that Notion of a God which so generally prevails in the World must be derived from God himself for si conficta esset c. if it were feigned then it would be necessary that in every Nation there should be some who first invented it and perswaded it upon others Quod p. 266. sanè impossibile est nisi homines qui de Deo nihil unquam audiverunt naturali dispositione ad illam opinionem maximè essent proclives where he grants That if there be such a natural Proclivity in the Minds of Men to believe a God then his Argument fails he therefore should have bent his utmost force to disprove this Natural Disposition or Proclivity to believe a God but the Argument he there brings will not do it 'T is only this that Rochfortius and some others relate That there are some Nations in America who cannot be perswaded that there is a God To this I Answer First That it will proportionably prove against himself and destroy the Universality of his own Tradition for it will follow hence either that God had not taken care to make known this Original Tradition to all Nations or that they which were the first Founders of these Nations had neglected to teach it to their Posterity or that in process of time both Parents and Children were grown so rude and barbarous as to forget it and indeed according to this Hypothesis it is a wonder that half of the Gentile World long e're this is not become mere Soldanians without any knowledge of God or any Principles of Morality nor can there be any good account given of those Moral Principles of Honesty according to this Traditionary way which were as generally believed among the Gentiles as the Being of a God and perhaps with a greater Unisormity Secondly We do not say that this Notion of God is so implanted in the Minds of Men or so connatural to our Faculties but that by carelesness and Inadvertency by Vice and Luxury by habitual Wickedness and Debauchery it may be in a great measure obliterated Others tell us That
the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things and from the Nature of Man that is from the consideration of his Soul and Body not supposing or including any such Natural Notices I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World Valeant quantùm valere possunt Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing and absolutely reject all the rest this I think is to give our Adversaries advantage over us Thus that Ingenious Gentleman Mr. Tyrrell in his late Book p. 197. tells us That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly and without difficulty to be read from the great Book of the Creation without any assistance from natural Impressions and he cites Rom. 1. 19 20. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Where he says The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind guided by things without us for the proof of a Deity But it doth not appear from hence that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds as the 20th doth to the outward Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is manifest in them I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes render'd inter but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept why should we look for another For the invisible things of him from the Creation By Creation here is neither meant the things created nor the Act of Creation but only it relates to the time thereof From the Creation that is ever since the Creation by which says Dr. Hammond it appears That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Doings or Actions here of the Works of Creation that is solely but of all things that from time to time to this inclusively have been done in the World by him and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines and Miracles and Actions of Christ the whole business of the Gospel Nay I may add that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mention'd Even his Eternal Power and Godhead 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World The other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature that it is neither a State of Equality nor a State of War I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan concerning Speech and the particular uses of it viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts and the improvement of Knowledge to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our selves and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another but now how can these Uses be applyed to that cross-grain'd state of Nature which he has describ'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence What place is there for Arts and Sciences What room for friendly counsel and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another where what counsel we give to others ought rather in reason to be suspected seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage Why should we desire or hope for the assistance of others seeing there we design nothing but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine Now Speech must be suppos'd in the State of Nature for without it he tells us there could be no entering into Societies no Compacts no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those who aspire to knowledge to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words and framing true Definitions in examining those of former Authors and either to correct 'em when deficient or to make new ones themselves Therefore he says in Geometry which is the most accurate Science Men begin with setling the significations of their words which setling of Significations they call Definitions and place 'em at the beginning of their work Now it had been well if Mr. Hobbs had practis'd his own rule and that in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy that is if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings Nature and had fix'd the Significations of those Expressions Naturally and by Nature Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive and into corrupt and depraved Nature Which he having no where done it has occasion'd a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto which if he had done in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies which were perhaps at first begun and afterwards continued by the want of it 'T is true he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words but yet has been so far from setling and fixing their Significations as he calls it that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty especially in those other places where they are mentioned singly without any intimation at all in what sense they are to be taken In his Preface to his Book de Cive where 't is objected that from his Principles it would follow that Men are wicked by Nature This he says does not follow for though Men by Nature that is from their first Birth as they are meer sensible Creatures c. Here Nature must signifie Man as he comes first into the World with respect meerly to his Animal Qualisications which he has in common with other Creatures In the same Preface forasmuch as God over-rules all Rulers by Nature that is by the dictates of Natural Reason here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher than the lower Faculties of the Soul Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another that is as Man here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent The Law of Nature he thus defines that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members as much as in us lies Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle
right reason there is in all Mr. Hobbs his Discourses that depend hereupon for he himself tells us in his De Cive 2 Ch. That right reason is that which concludes from true Principles Now these true Principles in matters of Morality and Policy must be more than supposedly true indeed a certain kind of truth may be in favour granted to an Hypothesis of natural Philosophy if it exactly answer all the Phaenomena of Nature though it self do not answer the real truth but this Indulgence cannot be granted to things of a moral or political concern Neither Secondly is it a good Hypothesis as wanting those qualifications which are requir'd to any Hypothesis in general which are these three 1. An Hypothesis must be possible this is the least that it can pretend to but it must not be only so according to the utmost extent of possibility but also fairly possible according to the most easy methods of our Conceptions that is probable so contriv'd that we might be thence perswaded that that was the way that God and Nature made use of in that particular that as the Epicureans say of the Universe that though it was the result of blind chance yet all things therein have happen'd as well as if they had been the result of the greatest wisdom and contrivance thus an Hypothesis though perhaps it be not the real truth yet it should give as full and natural Solutions of things as if indeed it were 2. It must be self-consistent and not contain Principles of Self-dissolution within it self for it is impossible that that should be agreeable to the wise and regular methods of Nature and Providence which is not agreeable with it self 3. An Hypothesis ought to employ our Faculties in the search of true and useful Knowledge and also to promote real Piety in the World therefore we ought not to fancy to our selves such an Hypothesis in Philosophy as excludes God out of the World and such an one as asserts a mere material Universe Now here I might easily show that this of Mr. Hobb's is neither 1. Possible much less probable 2. Not consistent with it self 3. So far from promoting sound Knowledge and true Piety that it is really destructive of both Whether such a state of Nature as Mr. Hobbs describes be a proper and effectual means in order to a Mans self-preservation may be justly question'd and indeed he himself seems not to be of that Opinion seeing he makes his natural Statesmen to get out of it as soon as they can in order to the bettering of their condition yet this is certain that he makes private interest the great and ultimate end of all humane actions in general and of his Levia in particular as being that wherein he thinks he has laid the best and surest foundations of all humane happiness I shall therefore here by way of Appendix to this Chapter speak something in general concerning this great Principle of Self-Preservation It is the natural folly of Mankind to run out of one extream of Vice and Errour into another thus perhaps the ignorant Zeal and blind Devotion of some who attributed too little might first give occasion to others to ascribe too much to Sels-preservation however we must not deny it its due regard so far as Reason and Religion admit because others have extended it further than in either it ought I shall therefore freely grant what the greatest Patrons of Self-preservation can with any just ground or reason demand and hereby I shall gain this double advantage 1. It will hence appear that it is not out of any preiudice or heat of opposition that I contradict any thing even in that Opinion I do oppose 2. Hereby I shall come to a truer stateing of the Question and so shall be better able to defend it for this disadvantage there is even to Truth it self in the false stating of a Question that we either undertake to oppose that in an adversary which is really true and so irresragable or else to defend something that is false and so not capable of being defended To deny that which is true is altogether needless for we need not fear any prejudice to a good Cause from truth elsewhere because all truths of this nature are consistent with themselves and no ways contrary to each other whereas the denyal of any thing that is true tho' in an adversary may break that continuity of truth and some way or other weaken our own cause I shall ad two or three general considerations relating hereunto 1. That God has imprinted in Man a principle of self preservation is not only true but very agreeable to the goodness of God and very subservient for the carrying on the designs of Prudence and Piety in the world for it would have reflected dishonourably either upon the goodness or wisdome of God to have made such an excellent creature as Man and taken no care for his preservation so far as it should not be in the power of any one upon every slight occasion to throw away himself and so destroy Gods peculiar Image or to have expos'd him to all the dangers that either his own inadvertency or the malice of others might have brought upon him without some innate inclinations of self preservation and suitable principles of prudence to inable him thereunto Thus Religion it self doth not only permit but command us to act with a due respect to those two grand Principles of a Christian Life Prudence and Innocence to be wise as Serpents and innocent as Doves Further without this we had wanted that most exact and easy rule of Charity to others Whatsoever you would that Men should do unto you even so do you unto them where our love to our selves is made the rule and measure of our Charity to others But Mr. Hobbs makes self preservation without any respect to the lawfulness of the means to be the first and great dictate of Reason and Nature and charges Christianity with folly in that in some cases it so little regards its own safety but exposes its professors to Martyrdome for Religion's sake If says he Chap. 42. we be commanded by our lawful Prince to say that we do not believe in Christ we must obey him for words are but external things and do no more express the assent of the Speaker than any other external action and therefore a Christian in such things hath the same liberty that the Prophet gave to Naaman the Syrian 2 Kings 5. 18. In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant that when my Master goeth into the House of Rimmon to worship there and he leaneth on my hand and I bow my self in the house of Rimmon the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing and he said unto him go in peace Here Mr. Hobbs saith that Naaman believed the true God in his Heart but by worshiping would seem not to believe least he should offend his King But here he supposes but proves not that Naaman here
Cum igitur virtus res divina sit c. upon which the Commentator's words are Omnis rei cujuscunque sit summa excellentia quae à Deo esse putatur divina appellatur quo modo rudiore quâdam Minervâ intelligi potest quod hoc loco dicitur virtutem quae hominis est perfectio rem quandam esse divinam Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God either immediately or mediately but perhaps this was a way of Expression common to Plato with the Iews of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine so that all that was probably meant by this Phrase was only to express the excellency of the thing and the great Opinion he had of it or else that Divine Providence had some more particular concern in the disposing and inclining Men to it either by giving them a more happy Constitution of Body or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind or by affording more advantagious Circumstances of time and place yet so as that the most happy Occurrences do not necessitate Men to be Vertuous without their own Industry and Inclination nor the most Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault However if this be Plato's Opinion That Vertue is so from God that it cannot be gotten by Humane Industry in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence this Opinion is neither reasonable in it self nor is it sufficiently prov'd by that Argument made use of by Socrates for that purpose If says he Vertue was possible to be taught then would Good Men more especially teach their Sons that so they might inherit their Father's Vertues as well as Fortunes but the contrary frequently appears To this I Answer First That nothing can be prov'd from particular Instances seeing as many may be brought to the contrary where Vertue has been as it were propagated with the Family and we may furnish our selves even from our own Observation with Examples of the happy success of a Vertuous Education Secondly Vertuous Parents tho they may desire their Children may be such too yet many times such is their Tenderness and Indulgence to 'em that they do not make use of those Methods which are most proper thereunto which are commonly joyn'd with some degrees of Severity Thirdly Vertue though it may be taught and is capable of being learn'd yet is it a very conditional thing and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumstances together for the producing the effect and that which often defeats all the rest is the liberty of the Will which many Men use in opposition to all those Moral means which are otherwise sufficient in themselves and design'd by others to moderate their Passions and reduce 'em to Vertue Nor 2. Doth Vertue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars for if we consider the Nature of the Heavens and natural Causes and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will it will be impossible to conceive how any Sydereal Influences can any ways certainly or necessarily determine the Minds of Men. And the same Arguments that prove the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology in other respects do much more evince the folly of their pretences who go into Heaven to fetch down Vertue from thence when indeed it is nearer us even in our Mouths imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures I shall here give you Savanorola's Argument in a case much what to this purpose If says he the Christian Faith and Life proceed from the Stars then their Faith is either true or false if it be true then it cannot proceed from thence because it condemns that Opinion and asserts the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology if it be false and proceed from the Stars then it follows that the Stars incline Men to falshood and the falshood of the Effect will be no good reason why we should believe the truth of the Cause Whereby Men by the mere strength of Nature c. And thus Vertue is distinguished from Grace thus the Heathen Moralists have discours'd very well of Vertue in their Writings and given great Instances thereof in their Practices who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation And this Notion of it seems fitly to assign the just Limits betwixt the Gentile and the Christian Religion it deprives not the one of what it may justly challenge as its right it allows to men in the state of Nature some inclinations and abilities too to Vertue but yet that without supernatural assistance he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection it doth not so far depress humane nature Modices to make it perfectly stupid nor on the other hand doth it raise it to a pitch of Pelagianisin it grants Heathens to be Men and reminds Christians of their Original Sin and the present depravation of their Natures And though the Heathen Moralists do sometimes mention such a thing as afflatus divinus yet it cannot be in reason extended so far as to signify that which Christian Writers commonly understand by that expression To perform that which is most agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature Thus though vertue in the proper acceptation of it be distinguish'd from Grace as to the Principle from whence it flows the one proceeding from nature the other from a more divine original yet do they agree in their end and Friendly conspire together to carry on the same designs of Providence in the World viz. the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two sorts 1. Natural and original 2. Such as are the results of the divine benignity afterwards 1. Natural and Original and under this head I shall only consider the excellencies of the Soul in particular 1. As to the excellency of its nature and essence that it is a spiritual being and ray of Divinity now considering this natural preheminence of the Soul above the Body we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul when we make it only a Slave to the Body and only as it were the Bodies Purveyor to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof 2. As to its intellectual Endowments Man only of all this lower Creation is endowed with a power of reasoning now certainly God never gave us such excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects and debase 'em by unworthy Employments Phil. 4. 8. What soever things are true what soever things are just c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think on these things 3. As to its moral Endowments that is all those natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Vertue and Goodness that inward sense of Honesty that tactus quidam divinitat is as Iamblicus calls it now this also obliges us to be true to that inward sense of obligation that lies upon us 2. Such dignities as are the result of divine benignity afterwards and these I shall consider