it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
instructes us The least notice of God of great moment That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us So in his Critieas pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he illustrates this Hypothesis thus When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods c. we thinke it sufficient if they give us but any darke representation of them neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a censorious eye on their worke but rest abundantly satisfied in what representation they give us But when they come to draw our own picture or the picture of any that belong to us we more severely animadvert and censure them if they erre in the least point The same is to be observed in the explication of these things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When we discourse of things celestial and divine we thinke our selves abundantly satisfied if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human we are wont to use greater diligence Wherefore if those things which we are now about to discourse of be not so exactly as their dignitie requires represented by us you 'l pardon us An excellent preface to a discourse of things divine touching God which Plato is here entering on Hence 4. Al notices of God by Divine Revelation Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God than his own revelation and illumination shal afford to us So in his Timaeus pag. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It must be remembred both by me that speak and by you who are Judges of my discourses that we have but human Nature and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things touching God c. we may not inquire farther about them That by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation I thinke wil appear evident to any that considers the use of this phrase in Plato Indeed in our contemplations and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to procede further than divine Revelation and Illumination shal conduct us Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God the humble ignorance of which argues more solid knowlege than curiose and vain speculations thereof These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God not only to follow God learning but also to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself so we may not search into what God has kept secret for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude so the later too much pride and curiositie It was a great Saying of Augustin We may safely follow Scripture which as an indulgent mother goes softly that she may not go beyond our infirmitie A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science Al natural reason and investigation about God ought to follow not precede faith Hence 5. The Gradation of our ascent to God Plato informes us That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees by which he descendes to us either in his workes or words Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509 c. he informes us That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majestie of the chiefest Good as it is in its inaccessible splendor yet we may ascend thereto by certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gra es or degrees which Grades of Ascent must be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Descent unto us that so we may by a certain Analogie and similitude ascend up to the knowlege of God so far as it is possible for man Yet he gives us this needful caution That we must speake soberly of these so great Mysteries and take heed that we ascribe not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious birth to the Parent of the Vniverse The grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either natural or supernatural 1. Natural Grades of knowing God The natural Grades or Degrees whereby God descendes down to us and we ascend up to him are al the Effects Products and Workes of God with al their Virtues Efficaces Orders Varieties and al manner of Perfections So Plato Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Causalitie he saith Al natural Causes and Effects are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Workes Artifices and Children of God the great Parent of the Vniverse whereby we may ascend up to the knowlege of God This is more natively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophie Rom. 1.19 20. as Rom. 1.19 20. where he saith the visible workes of God as so many ascents lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God specially his eternal power and Godhead That there is a natural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident albeit the Socinians to serve their Hypothesis denie it This natural knowlege of God is either insite or acquisite So Dion Prusaeensis said that our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persuasion of God was either innate or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite Our insite and innate knowlege of God consistes in those commun notices of God both speculative and practic which are impressed on the Conscience Our acquisite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the workes of God This acquisite knowlege may according to the distribution of that spurious Dionysius who was indeed a great Platonist cap. 2. de Myst Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways by way of Causalitie by way of Eminence by way of Negation 1 By way of Causalitie when by the Effects of God 1. By way of Causalitie which are either little Images or at least Vestigia Footsteps of God we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God the original Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature impresse and ressemblance of its Cause as you frequently see the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child Thus Plato Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface that it was impossible to comprehend yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majestie in himself he tels us That he would inquire after him in his off-spring or effects and then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but take heed lest I should against my wil give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent He speakes in the language of Aratus cited by Paul Act. 17.28 we are al his off-spring Act. 17.28 and applies this notion to al lower goods which he makes to be the off-spring or issue of the chiefest Good and therefore by them we ascend up to the
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
the substrate mater may require And herein we are not without many Precedents both among the more Orthodoxe of the Fathers as also our first Reformers It 's wel known how much Justin Martyr that great Christian Philosopher delighted himself in the Studie of Platonic Philosophie even to some Intemperance in that he affirmes Apol. 1. p. 51. That the Dogmes of Plato were not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliene from those of Christ And who knows not how much Augustin doth Platonise Augustinus noster immensas Deo gratias agit qùod ad ejus manus pervenerint libri Platonicorum Picus Mirandul Apol. p. 82. in some of his most sublime Contemplations Yea the noble Picus Earle of Mirandula assures us that Augustin gave immense thankes to God for the Platonic Books that came to his hands So great use did his humble Spiritual mind make of Platonic Philosophemes in order to the exaltation of free efficacious Grace So likewise among our first Reformers Picus Mirandulanus Savonarola Wesselus Lud. Vives Ramus c. chiefly addicted themselves to Plato in order to the Reformation of Philosophie Thus also Jansenius that great Patron of Efficacious Grace greatly prefers Platonic Philosophie before al other Yea may we not avouch that the choisest Physic or natural Philosophemes entertained by our New-philosophers Gassendus Cartesius c. are but Imitamens of Contemplations laid down by Plato This we have endeavored to make good in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. c. 2. Albeit that Plato's Philosophie has been thus generally entertained by the best of Christian Philosophers yet it cannot be denied but that it has been the Prolific cause of the worst Heresies and Corruptions in the Church For whence sprang Arianisme Pelagianisme Mystic Theologie and may we not say the whole Complexum of Antichristianisme but from Platonic Philosophie professed in the Schole of Alexandria This is evidently demonstrated in the precedent Part of the Vanitie of Philosophie Al this being granted yet it follows not but that Platonic Philosophie may be greatly useful if wel managed and rendred subservient to Theologie as in Augustin Whereas Origen and his Sectators the Monkes of Egypt by their too fond estime of Platonic Philosophie and reduction of the Scriptures yea the whole of Theologie to a subordination thereto gave the first Formation yea perfect Lineaments to the Man of sin and his Antichristian Theologie I shal only adde on this Theme what Plutarch in Cleomene declares of the Stoic Philosophie If it fal on great and acute wits it becomes lubricous inordinate and incertain but if it be mixed with a serious meek and humble mind it greatly conduceth to the true and proper good So greatly useful may Platonic Philosophie be if loged in a serious humble meek believing mind which hath both Wisdome and Grace to render the same subordinate to Theologie But now having prefaced thus much touching the first Reformers of Philosophie The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie and what Method may seem most conducible to the Reformation thereof we may not conclude without some notices of the principal designe of this Discourse and our procedure therein As for its original Designe it is too too apparent that our Theologie of late has received great damage and prejudice by the old Aristotelean Philosophie as Sophisticated by the Jesuites as also by New-philosophie as abused by Atheistic wits would it not then be a design of great moment so to Reforme Philosophie as to render it no longer opposite but subservient to Theologie How far we have attained hereto the Reader must be Judge As for our procedure herein thus much it 's hoped we may without Vanitie declare that we have sincerely endeavoured to render our Philosophemes Conformable to Sacred Philosophie and the Doctrine of the Church of England I must confesse as I grow in years so I daily grow more and more in the Admiration of the Wisdome Zele and Pietie of our first great Reformers Cranmer Jewel c. who delivered down to us the Apostolic Doctrine sealed by some of them with their own bloud O! how curiose and tenacious were they of the Forme of sound Words But Alas what a reproche is it now among wanton wits to be an Orthodoxe Divine What a world of new-coined termes of art are foisted into Christian Theologie virtually if not intentionally to the prejudice thereof Chrysostome understandes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Tim. 6.20 of Novel Termes and Formes which then began to be introduced into the Church Alas what would he say if he lived in our days and heard those vain Clamors and bablings about words which are now affected And was not this the grand crime imputed by the Orthodoxe Fathers to Origen That despising the simplicitie of the Scriptures and Christian Theologie he affected new Termes and Modes of interpreting Scriptures which his too great confidence in his own Parts and presuming himself to be wiser than others precipitated him into to the subverson of Christian Theologie as Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 8. And may we not fear the like Catastrophe as to those exotic Notions of some now-adays May not the Doctrine of the Church of England which now lyes bleeding take up that Lamentation Zech. 13.8 These are the wounds with which I was wounded in the house of my friends Have we not just cause to persuade ourselves that were there but an Uniformitie of assent and consent as to the Doctrine of the Church of England contained in 36 Articles there would not be so great a Difformitie and disagreament about Discipline contained in the other three Albeit I am no friend to those vexatiose contentiose and inutile Disputes of these Times yet I have been forced to declare my dissent from some learned and pious men of this Age and Nation with hopes that it wil not bring me under the Imputation of being Contentiose disaffected or irrespectuose towards persons of so great estime for natural Parts Learning or Pietie For I solemnely declare that it is no smal affliction to me to dissent much more publicly to declare my dissent from any who are of repute for Learning and Pietie neither could any thing induce me to offer such an apparent violence to mine one repose and retirement did I not conceive my self under an essential obligation to give my Testimonie to those great Truths and Doctrines of the Church of England which our Ancestors valued more than their bloud I shal conclude with that of profunde and pious Bradwardine in his Preface to his most excellent Book do Causa Dei where having laid open the Pride Multitude and continued Successions of the Pelagians he breakes out into this pure Flame of Divine Zele Pag. 5. Burning with Zele for the Cause of God I deliberately thrust mine hand into a terrible flame For I am not ignorant how much the Pestiferous Pelagians enraged in their spirits wil with tumultuose
clamors barke at and with cruel Teeth endeavor to rend in pieces this Paper or Book A PROEMIAL SCHEME OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE § 1. WHereas I sometimes intended to have cast the whole of Reformed Philosophie into one Systeme I am herein in part disappointed in that I have communicated the principal part of what I intended in my Philosophia Generalis But what I could not wel digest therein I have now made public in this Part IV. Of Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie So that to speak the truth I have now put my last period to Philosophie without the least Intention of making any farther progresse therein only to give the Reader a Breviarie of the Forme and Method I would assume were I to cast Philosophie into one entire Systeme or Idea as also to give him an Index where to find al the parts of Reformed Philosophie more professedly discussed by me I judge the following Scheme of Philosophie most necessary Philosophie is either General or Particular Particular Philosophie is either Notional or Real Real Philosophie is either Natural Moral or Supernatural This General Distribution of Philosophie taken from its object seems to me of al most genuine and natural and that which reduceth it to one uniforme Syntagme or Systeme as it may appear by the following particulars Philosophie in its General Idea comprehendes the following particulars 1 The General Historie of Philosophie General Philosophie and Philosophers with their several Sects Dogmes Modes of Life Discipline and Characters Of which we have treated copiosely Court of the Gentiles P. 2. and Philos General P. 1 2. l. 1. 2 The Generic Idea of Philosophie Cognition which takes in al the Intellectual Habits As 1 Opinion which is a kind of Medium between Ignorance and Science arising either from Sense or Affection or Considence or Conjectures It s object is things Physic Sensible Singular c. Its Attributes Infirmitie and Incertitude Obscurite Instabilitie and Inquietude Of which see Philos Gen. P 2. l. 2. c. 1. 2 Experience its Diguitie Object Subject Extension Qualities and Effects Of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 1. s 3. 3 Imitation wherein are considerable its Nature Origine Subject Object Effects namely Images and Signes regular Use and Abuse of which Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2 c. 2. 4 Faith it s Generic Nature Object both Material and Formal Act Subject Proprieties Differences and Species of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 3. 5 Sapience its prime Cause Object Act Proprieties Effects Conveniences with and Differences from other Sciences and Corollaries of which Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. 6 Intelligence which is said to be an Habit of or Assent to first Principes not Practic but Speculative which give al evidence to but receive no evidence from conclusions as Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 1. 7 Science which is a certain assent to necessary conclusions by some certain Medium as Philos General P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 2. 8 Art which is an Imitamen of Nature or habitual Idea and Exemplar inherent in the Mind of the Artificer whereby he is directed unto a regular Operation as Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 3. 9 Prudence wherein we have considered its Subject the Practic Judgement or Conscience consisting of two parts Synteresis and Syneidesis its Object both End and Means its End and Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Its Species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Experience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sensate and reflexe Cognition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence its Material parts Ethic Oeconomic Politic its Causes both Dispositive and Proxime its Opposites and Differences specially from Carnal Policie or Craft in 20 Particulars its Effects Characters and Corollaries Al which we have copiofely considered Philos General P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. Also Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. 3 The General part of Philosophie includes also the Examen of its Object Subject Ends Adjuncts Difference from Philosophie and Theologie Excellence Effects Corruption Right use Parts as also the Characters and Offices of Philosophers which we have largely discussed Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 3. § 2. Philosophie considered in its Particular Ideas Notional Philosophie or Logic is either Notional or Real Notional Philosophie termed by the Platonistes Dialectic or Rational because the ancient mode of Reasoning was by Dialogues is now communly stiled Logic which properly treats of Notions either Simple or Complexe Simple Notions are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Imitamens or Ideas of things impressed on the mind without either Affirmation or Negation as the Notion or Idea we have of a Man Horse or the like Complexe Notions are either Propositions which being composed of simple Notions give some judgement of things or Syllogismes and Discourses which are composed of Propositions or Method which is composed of simple Notions Propositions and Discourses These are the four parts of Logic which are taken from its proper End and answer to the four great Operations of the Mind For what is the End of al Logic The End of Logic. but to direct and conduct the Mind into the Cognition of things Hence Logic is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Art of Introduction i. e. whereby Men are conducted into the knowlege of things also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Way and Method for the Acquirement of Sciences and al useful knowlege Yea Aristotle as wel as Plato defines Logic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Method for the right disposing of every Probleme proposed Whence also Aristotle stiles Logic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Organ or Key of al Sciences whereby we are introduced into the Cognition of althings Aristotle made Logic the Organ of Philosophie yet no part thereof but Plato made it both an Organ and Part. So Ammonius as Court Gent. Part. 2. B. 3. c. 8. § 3. Of what great use Logic is not only for the Acquirement of Sciences but also for the Restauration of the mind to its native Claritie and Acumen in order to a right Apprehension Judgement Discourse and Method in the Cognition or Disquisition of things is most evident to any that understandes the Nature and Use thereof Yea according to the Idea I frame of Logic the Clarifying and Rectifying of the Mind is its principal End and that of the Acquisition of Sciences much inferior thereto For of what use are al natural Sciences but to Clarifie and Elevate the Mind for the contemplation of more Sublime and Noble Objects So that to make use of Logic only as an Instrument or Key to Sciences is to deprive ourselves of the principal use thereof which is to Purifie and Refine the Intellect in order to the more distinct real and perfect knowlege of things specially such as are most Sublime and Divine I no way dout but that a judicious person by the
influential on al the former parts of Logic as also on the operations of the mind about which they are conversant For how can the mind define or divide or distinctly explicate simple Ideas and Notions without Method How imperfect and confused wil its Judgements Ratiocinations and Discourses be unlesse Method assist Hence the Ancients Plato and others reduced the whole of Logic to Method which without al peradventure is the most utile part thereof if not Comprehensive of the whole In the general Method is an Art whereby the Mind is rendred capable rightly to dispose a series of many simple Notions or Apprehensions Judgements and Ratiocinations in order to the Investigation Explication and Demonstration of truth as also the deeper impression thereof on the Memorie In this description we have both the Object Ends and Effects of Method The Object of Method is 1 Simple Notions and Apprehensions Wherein we are to consider their Definition and Distribution In the Definition we are to consider 1 The Name And herein the principal care is to clear the Name from al Obscuritie and Equivocation which is best performed by an Examen of and Inquisition into its Etymologie or Origination Homonymie and Synonymie 2 The Definition of the Thing which must be expressed in termes most known and essential for what is a Definition but the Idea or manifestation of a Thing As for Distribution it is of the whole into its parts which gives a distinct Idea or Notion of a thing 2 Another Object of Method is Propositions and Judgements Wherein we are to avoid al Precipitance Anticipation and Prejudice giving to al Propositions that Measure of Assent as their insite Reason or Autoritie requires admitting nothing as certain or evident but what we know or have reason to believe is certainly or evidently true 3 The last object of Method is Ratiocination and Discourse Wherein we are 1 To leave nothing ambiguous or obscure in the Termes 2 To deduce al Ratiocinations from principes most certain and evident in themselves such as no one invested with commun sense may gainsay For first principes give evidence and force to al conclusions but receive none from them 3 Al Cogitations and Ratiocinations employed for the Investigation of Truth or Remotion of any error must be digested and ranged into the most natural order beginning from things more general simple and easily to be known and thence passing on to things more difficult and composite 4 In seeking out Arguments and examining Difficulties there must be a complete enumeration of all singulars and parts with a distribution proportionable thereto that so nothing be omitted that may conduce to the examen of truth More touching Method see Court Gent. Part 2. B. 3. c. 8. § 3. B. 4. c. 1. § Thus much for Logic wherein we have been the more large because we have no where treated distinctly and fully of it § 3. Real Philosophie may be according to its different Objects Real Philosophie distributed into Natural Moral and Metaphysic or Supernatural Natural 1. Natural Philosophie regardes things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences or things considered in their notional extension 1 Things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences belong to Physic or Natural Philosophie strictly so termed Physic which considers Things Natural 1 In their General Principes and Affections 2 In their parts which are two the Macrocosme or greater world and the Microcosme or Man Of which see Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. 2 Natural things considered in their Notional Extension or Quantitie are discoursed of in Mathematics Mathematic which comprehend Arithmetic Geometrie Astronomie Music Optics Geographie Mechanics c. Of which Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 2. 2. Moral Philosophie is according to its object Moral Philosophie distributed into Ethic 1. Ethic. strictly so termed Oeconomic and Politic. 1 Ethic strictly so termed regards the morals of private persons Wherein we may consider 1 It s Generic Idea Moral Prudence whereof we have copiosely discoursed Philos Gen. P. 2. L. 2. c. 6. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 1. 2 It s prime Object which is the last end and chiefest good which we have largely discussed Philosoph Gen. P. 1. L. 1 3. c. 3. s 1. P. 2. L. c. 1. s 3. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 2 3. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 2. 3 The Principes of Human Acts Practic Judgement Volition or Intention Consultation Election of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 24-27 P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. also Philos Gen. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. § 4. 4 Subjective and Formal Beatitude wherein we are also to consider Vse Fruition and Delectation or Joy Of the first see Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 1. § 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 3. § 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 23. But of Vse Fruition and Delectation see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 4-8 5 The Moralitie of human Acts of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 29. P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 c. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. § 1. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 1. 6 Natural Libertie which we have copiosely explicated Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. s 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 28. 7 Moral Good or Virtue its Causes Formal Idea or Nature Parts and Adjuncts Of which Court Gent. Part 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 29-32 P. 4. B. 1. c. 2 3. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. 8 Moral Libertie of which Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 3. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. 9 Sin its Nature and Causes of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 33. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. also Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 4. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 6. 10 The effects and servitude of Sin Oeconomic of which Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. 2 Oeconomic of which Politic. Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 6. 3 Politic of which Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 5. Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 6. 3. Metaphysic or prime Philosophie Metaphysic which principally regards the supreme most excellent Being and prime Cause of althings namely God his Existence Essence and Attributes his Acts of Creation and Providence his Concurse and Gubernation both Natural and Supernatural and Creatural Dependence c. Which we have more copiosely discussed Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. more cursorily Court Gent. P. 2. B. 2. c.
343. l. 29. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 360. l. 36. l. pro Sect. 4. Chap. 7. p. 361. l. 19. l. Ens possibile p. 381. l. 18. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 382. l. 24. l. Sect. 35. p. 385. l. 29. l. § 9. Item l. 34. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 386. l. 16. l. Cabala p. 398. l. 28. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 416. l. 26. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 421. l. 32. dele 1. p. 424. l. 17. pro and l. is p. 426. l. 3. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 440. l. 3. l. 2. Item l. 5. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 465. l. 28. dele liquors p. 469. l. 27. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 492. l. 8. for as l. is p. 493. l. 27. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 494. l. 14. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Item l. 16. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 514. l. 24. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE Wherein Plato's Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie is reduced to a useful Forme and Method BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP. I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation Moral Philosophie 1 Its Genus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which connotes Prudence wherein consider its Objects Offices and Acts which are 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dexteritie 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 The subject of Moral Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and particularly the Conscience Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Conscience 1 In the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is the seat of Principes 2 In Syneidesis which is a reflexive Light and springs from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensation 3 The Rule of Moral Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is either subjective or objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 2.14 15. James 2.8 The last End its Influence in Morals the chiefest Good its Characters 1 The Idea of Good 2 The first Beautie 3 Most proper Vse its Regulation and Intention Fruition its parts 1 Love 2 Vnion 3 Communion 4 Delectation considered 1 In its Causes a sweet Good Possession and Action 2 In its Adjuncts Realitie Connaturalitie Vniformitie Puritie Force and Infinitude 3 In its Effects Enlargement and Satisfaction § 1. HAving discussed Plato's Natural Philosophie we now descend to his Moral which regards the Morals of single Persons Families The Idea of Moral Philosophie and Cities or Republics We find the Idea of Philosophie as it relates to Morals and Active Sciences in the Platonic Definitions pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosophie is a prudent or studiose consideration of the Soul according to right reason Wherein we may consider 1 The Genus 2 The Subject 3 The Measure or Rule of Moral Philosophie 1. The Genus 1. It s Genus Moral Prudence in this Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a prudent Inspection studiose Consideration and sollicitous Care communly stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence or Moral Wisdome which we have thus copiosely described in the Platonic Definitions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence is a facultie of it self effective of human Happinesse Prudence what Wherein we have 1 The Specific reason whereby it is differenced from contemplative Science expressed by that notion Effective 2 It s Vltimate End which is to make men happie Again Prudence is defined in the same Platonic Definitions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Science of good and evil Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Disposition whereby we judge what is to be done and what is not to be done In al which Definitions laid together we have these Considerables 1. The Vltimate End It s Object and supreme Object of moral Prudence or Philosophie namely human Happinesse which is the measure of al moral Acts and the first thing treated of in moral Philosophie according to that of Aquinas The end of moral Virtues is the chief principe of Prudence as Luke 10.41 Of which Chap. 2. 2. We have here the intermediate Objects of moral Prudence which are in general al Agibles or Practicables 1 Singulars 2 Things present 3 Things in our power 4 Things good or evil 3. Here is also considerable the proper Exercices or Offices of Prudence which are according to Plato in his Charm 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Its Offices To do what belongs unto us 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To understand a mans self 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To use al things wel i. e. with respect to our supreme end 4 Rightly to distinguish 'twixt good and evil 5 To conserve the rectitude of the Wil. 6 To moderate the Affections 7 To governe the whole Life Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. s 3. 4. This moral Prudence may be considered in its Integrals The parts of Prudence which are according to the Platonic account four 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence which 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence in the Platonic Definitions pag. 414. is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence is a preparation or provision for somewhat future Which implies 1 An universal comprehension of al circumstances means difficulties encouragements which may make for or against our end 2 Serious consultation about and prudent determination of what is to be done 3 Prudent precaution of what may impede c. this is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Caution according to that of the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man ought never to fear but always to use caution c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dexteritie of Judgment 2 Another part of moral Prudence is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Dexteritie in judging things which in the Platonic Desinitions pag. 413. is thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Facilitie of judgment is a connate abilitie of reasoning or discerning And Plato de Repub. 4. pag. 428. saies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Facilitie of judgement is certainly some kind of Science c. 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie or perspicacitie of finding out things 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie which Plato makes to be an excellent kind of Prudence or a natural Invention which directs the Reason to find out things wrapt up in Nature which he elsewhere cals a Sagacitie of Nature So in his Epino pag. 976. There remains a marvellous facultie whereby we easily and expeditely learne any thing and having learnt it can faithfully commend it to memorie and as occasion serves by an happie celeritie recal it which some cal Wisdome others good Nature but others 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie of Nature This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or natural Sagacitie Plato makes to be the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Nature So Plato
Principes are in Demonstration the same is the last End in Action for al means receive their Necessitie Goodnesse and Specification from the last End Whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportioned thereto and so measured thereby The last End has the same influence on the means as the Aristotelean Forme is said to have on the mater They say the forme gives the main of Essence Distinction Virtue Operation and Perfection to the bodie and doth not the End give the same to the means How little desirable are the means as means without their reference to the End Is not the distinction and perfection of althings morally considered taken from their End This is wel expressed by Plato Phileb pag. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al these things must be referred to the one infinite i.e. the last End So again de Leg. 4. pag. 716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly God is to us the chief measure of althings i.e. God as our last End is the measure both of essence facultie and operation al the multitude of means ought to be reduced to and governed by the Unitie of our last End which is the true meaning of that moral Axiome Al multitude ought to be governed by Vnitie Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Everything is defined or bounded by its End Hence the End is stiled the Terme which confines and fixeth the fluxe of things which without it are ful of confusion and indetermination And therefore by how much the more the Soul departs from God its last End by so much the more instable confused and vagrant it is Hence 7. Prop. God is the last End of althings This Hypothesis resultes out of the former and is in it self most evident for every thing is so far only an end as it is good wherefore the last end must of necessitie be the chiefest good and what is this but God Is not God the prime Cause of al goodnesse in every good And is he not thence the Cause of every End Must he not then of necessitie be the last End of althings For that for which every thing is such must needs be more such Again is not God the supreme and first in order of Causes and therefore the last in order of Ends Thence Plato Gorg pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings seemed to us to be undertaken for good Art thou of the same opinion with us that the end of al actions is good and that althings else are undertaken for its sake but the end it self is not undertaken for any thing else Wherein he proves 1 That every end is good and the last end the chiefest good 2 That althings else are undertaken for the last end but it for nothing else Whereby it 's evident that God is the last end of althings because the chiefest good for which althings else are desired Thence Proclus that great Platonist Theolog. Plat. lib. 2. cap. 4. cals God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The End of Ends who convertes al Ends to himself and subsistes in or about himself Hence 8. Prop. The ultimate formal Reason or proper Motive of loving things is not their own goodnesse but the Divine Bonitie For the end having the reason of good and the last end of the chiefest good hence althings are so far desirable as they refer to the last end and chiefest good which is God The end as compared with its means has the same regard that the formal reason has to its object now is not the object specified by its formal reason and must not the means also be specified determined and ordered by their last end which is God Althings are so far good as they come from and tend to the Divine goodnesse which is the first effective Principe Exemplar and final Cause of al good So Plato Repub. 2. pag. 357. tels us That the chiefest good which makes althings else good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is desired for it self yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Goodnesse it self and Being it self Whence it necessarily follows that nothing can be the ultimate formal reason of love or desire but the Divine Bonitie For the necessitie and goodnesse of al means is taken from their last end which is the first Mover in the order of Ends as the first Cause is in order of Efficients Hence 9. Prop. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie is the last End of althings specially human operations For so far as any thing participates of the Divine Bonitie so far it is made like unto the same if therefore althings tend to God as their last end that so they might participate of his Divine Bonitie it necessarily follows that the last end of althings is Assimilation to God What are al Creatures but Imitamens of the Divine Bonitie And is not every thing so far participant of the Divine Bonitie as it is assimilated thereto Do not althings then in their motions tend to the divine similitude as to their last end It 's true the tendence of inanimate Creatures and Brutes yea of al Minkind in their natural state is only passive and remote they are reduced to their last end the Divine Bonitie but they have no active power of adhering thereto Hence al lower Creatures yea man himself in his apostate state have only some vestigia or dark shadows of the Divine Bonitie the bright image thereof being peculiar to pious Souls and good Angels That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Assimilation to God is the last end of human Nature Plato frequently inculcates Thence saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of good men is to be assimilated to God So in his Theatet pag. 176. he makes Assimilation to God the end of his Philosophie which he elsewhere makes to be Contemplation Love and Imitation of God Hence 10. Prop. Adherence to God as our last End importes not only subjection and dependence but also the best Constitution Complexion and Perfection of a rational Creature For by how much the higher the end is by so much the more noble and perfect is the act as the intention regulates and qualifies the Action so the end regulates and qualifies the intention Now Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie being the ultimate end of the rational Creature it necessarily follows that Adherence to this Divine Bonitie be his supreme perfection The Divine Bonitie saith Proclus Theolog Platon l. 1. c. 21. is conscrvative of althings constitutive and fundative of althings impletive of althings and conversive of althings to it self Such as the last end is such is the wils motion that is the best election which doth most actually intend God as its last end The nearer the Soul approcheth to God the more perfect it is the last end attractes the appetite to it self for to tend to an end is to be drawen by that end and by how much the more strongly the Soul is drawen by God as its last end by so much
the more intimately it adheres to him The motion of the Soul towards its last end is much stronger than that towards the means and therefore the adherence is the greater What more natural than for a rational Creature to adhere to its last end And O what perfection ariseth hence To be drawen by God as our last end is to be drawen by our most noble perfect and best self and therefore this speaks not only Subjection but blessed Constitution and Perfection § 3. Having summed up Plato's Philosophemes of the last End The chiefest Good its Proprieties we now procede to his Contemplations of the chiefest Good which hath intimate connexion therewith His main Discourses of the chiefest Good he layes down in his Philebus his Convivium 1. It is the Idea of Good and de Repub. l. 26. c. 9. we shal reduce the whole to these following proprieties 1. Plato stiles the chiefest Good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea of al good So in his Philebus having proposed this Question Wherein the chiefest Good consistes he resolves it into the Idea of Good Which he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Good meaning the chiefest He termes the chiefest good the Idea of al good 1 because it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-sufficient Good yea Goodnesse it self in the abstract i. e. al Good pure Good Good by himself and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perfectly Good The chiefest Good is Good by his own Goodnesse and not by any participated Goodnesse Whence some of the Platonists stile him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential Goodnesse Where ever is the chiefest Good there is the Essence of Good Goodnesse in the abstract and the chiefest Good are convertible you cannot find the one but you 'l find the other also Whatever good is predicable of any Creature is in the chiefest Good in the abstract and al know that Abstracts speak Formes and Essences So that the chiefest Good must needs be essential Goodnesse in the abstract and thence by consequence al Good in Idea Thus Basil in Psal 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The self-good or Ideal good is really blessed unto which al look and which al desire as the measure of al good 2 Plato stiles the chiefest Good the Idea of Good because he is both the prime Efficient and Exemplar of al Good 1 He is the prime Efficient of al good As al Creatures flow from and reflow to God as the Ocean or plenitude of al Being so also their Goodnesse participates of the like fluxe from and refluxe to the Divine Goodnesse No Creature hath any good in it further than it partakes of the chiefest Good whatever you possesse if you want the chiefest Good you possesse nothing Hence 2 the chiefest Good is the measure of al Good Every thing is so far good to us as it corresponds with and refers to the chiefest Good So Plato Repub. 2. pag. 357. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We love the chiefest Good for its own sake as also althings else that flow from it meaning the chiefest Good is the only measure of our love So Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. makes that the chiefest Good which is chosen for it self and thence the measure of al good 2. The chiefest Good according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The chiefest Good the first Beautie Beautie it self or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Beautie So in his Conviv pag. 210. Whosoever is brought thus far to contemplate things beautiful rightly and in their order arriving to the end of things lovely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he shal immediately contemplate that wonderful native Beautie for the sake of which we have hitherto undertaken al our labors Wherein he teacheth us that we may not fixe our eyes only on these inferior Beauties but by them as by so many ascents mount up to the contemplation of the first supreme Beautie which is our chiefest good That the prime Beautie is the chiefest good wil be most evident if we look into the nature of Beautie as opened by Plato who makes al Beautie to consiste 1 in Symmetrie and Proportion So in his Timaeus pag. 87. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Every Good is beautiful and what is beautiful cannot want measure order or proportion Aquinas makes this difference between Bonitie and Beautie that Bonitie or Goodnesse properly regards the Wil but Beautie the Eye and Understanding thence beautiful colors arise from that varietie and convenance which is in them to please the eye That Symmetrie is essential to Beautie Timaeus tels us p. 103. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Principes of Beautie are Symmetrie or proportion of parts c. Thence Plato Leg. 3. makes Wisdome to be most beautiful because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest of Symphonies or Harmonies So Conviv pag. 205. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wisdome is the greatest of Beauties Now Plato Conviv pag. 211. saith The chiefest Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it self with it self the most uniforme and simple Being and therefore most beautiful Again is Wisdome most beautiful because most concordant with it self And is not God the chiefest Good also the most uniforme Wisdome The proportion required to Beautie is wel expressed by Sales de l'Amour de Dieu l. 1. c. 1. Union saith he establisht in distinction makes order order breeds convenance agreament and proportion and convenance in things entire and accomplisht makes Beautie An Armie is beautiful when it is composed of al its parts so ranked together in their order that their distinction is reduced to that agreament which they ought to have together To make Music beautiful there is required not only that the voices be clear and wel distinguished but also that they be conjoined in such sort one to t'other that they make one just consonance and harmonie by means of the union that is in the distinction and the distinction that is in the union of the voices which may deservedly be called a discordant Accord or rather an accordant Discord Hence 2 Al Beautie ariseth from Perfection and Integritie of parts Those things are most beautiful in their kind which are most perfect And is not the chiefest Good most absolutely and simply perfect 3 The last and main Cause of Beautie is Splendor Light and Claritie Thence Beautie is defined by Plato the Fulgor and Lustre of Good Splendor and Brightnesse is essential to Beautie to the end that it may be visible or intelligible Obscurities Shadows and Darknesses are deformed and render althings deformable because nothing in them is visible or intelligible neither order nor distinction nor union nor convenance So Job 10.22 in the description of the grave he saith It is a land of darknesse as darknesse it self and of the shadow of death without any order and where the light is as darknesse i.e. There is no light therefore no order and beautie Light gives life to brightnesse which is but a dead inutile
Dulcius est amare quà m amari Sen. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it The Stoic thinkes it sweeter to love than to be beloved Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective it has a violence and pain which is most sweet and delicious The Soul by loving its last end possesseth enjoys and lives in it Have not althings a desire of union and communion with what they love And the more vehement our love is if it be of the chiefest good the sweeter our fruition thereof is This love gains strength by opposition it makes the most difficult service sweet The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to it self is to have no limits Where ever the Soul turnes it cannot but feel dolors if it acquiesce not in God but so far as it adheres to God it feels no pain Augustine that great Doctor of Love to God comprised al Christian Morals in Love which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Dutie It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret and penetrates things most profound it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption Whence also Augustine termed al Virtue but the order of Love and its admirable efficace is seen in this that it doth lift the heart above al things create and yet at the same time depresse it at the lowest centre of self-nothingnesse Al the labors of this Love are ful of divine suavities and carrie their rewards in them Afflictions blunt not its edge cast it into an ocean of miserie and it swims above al it estimates its miserie only by the losse and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end Mediocritie which in other things is estimed Vertue is a Vice in Love to God which admits no excesse These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God as our last end This Communion with God the Romans in their manner and according to their obscure sentiments expressed by their Lectisternia or Beds placed in their Temples whereon they conceited they feasted and had communion with their Gods Of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 3. cap. 17. § 6. Lastly Delectation and Joy Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satisfying Pleasures Suavities and Delights No one properly enjoys a thing who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof Frui est cum gaudio frui August The Quietation Delectation and Satisfaction which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato in his Philebus where he treats professedly of this subject So pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that being young having tasted thereof like one overjoyed as if he had found a treasure of wisdome leaping for joy and as it were under a divine Enthusiasme or rapture he moves every discourse chearfully and orderly This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end Thence Phileb pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth between true and false pleasures There are in the minds of wicked men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 painted pleasures but such as are altogether false Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine Wicked mens pleasures are sucked from some dirtie terrene goods and therefore only imaginarie and spurious but the virtuose mans pleasures are formed out of the chiefest good and therefore genuine and satisfying But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation Joy and Pleasure which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good we shal examine and inquire into 1 The Causes 2 The proper Adjuncts 3 The Effects thereof and that according to Plato's Philosophemes 1. 1. The Causes of Delectation Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy 1 A sweet Good 2 Possession of that Good 1 A sweet Good 3 Actions consequent to that possession 1 There must be a sweet Good out of which al true pleasure is formed and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is by so much the more perfect is the delight Satisfying joy is formed out of nothing but the most amiable best good This Plato frequently inculcates Thus Phaedr pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whom when it shal see and instil the desire of him into it self it shal then break al bounds of modestie and having got libertie of breathing it shal cease to be exagitated by pricking dolors This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good so that it can never depart from its embraces neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good Perfect Joy cannot forme it self out of any inferior good it springs only from the best sweetest good which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul What but the first essential universal Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights 2 Another Spring of Delectation is Possession 2 Possession which as it is essential to al Fruition so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is and the possession more intimate by so much the greater is the delight Generatio voluptatis ex copulatione finiti infiniti Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite i. e. to speak nakedly from the Vnion of the Soul with God This Plato according to his allegoric mode expresseth Conviv 206. Al men saith he in their manner conceive and are pregnant and when they have gone their time Nature desires to bring forth Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beautie or sweetest Good it is affected with joy hilaritie and pleasure and brings forth and generates but on the contrary when it adheres to what is base and fordid it is contracted by sorrow and grief and thence being not able to bring forth it is tormented with pains and dolors By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God and to inferior Goods upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ravishing pleasures but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows but vexatious dolors and torments This pleasure that follows on adherence to and possession of God is wel expressed by David Psal 25.13 Psal 25.13 His Soul shal dwel at ease Heb. loge in goodnesse When God dwels in the Soul it then doth loge in goodnesse or dwel at ease where there is want there can be no perfect
which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie 1 Objective as it is fed and maintained by pure objects whereas al the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirtie in that their mater is only sensible terrene good but the joys and pleasures which flow from the sweetest original good partake of the crystalline puritie of their object which is most pure 2 Effective as it doth banish al sorrows and grief So Plato Phileb 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief it is more pleasant true and fair Thus Repub. 9. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasure to be the cessation of grief and grief the cessation of pleasure So also Phileb pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without mixture of sorrow and pure Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good for al other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow they being indeed but bitter-sweets yea more bitter than sweet 5 The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong Thus Plato 5 Strong Pleasures Phileb p. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must look not to the least pleasures but to such as are supreme and most vehement if we wil make a true judgement of pleasure For the stronger any pleasures are the better they are and the more pure they are the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent because impure and mixed but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement because most pure Again the vehemence and intensnesse of any pleasure is proportionable to the energie power and activitie of the subject which is assected with such pleasure and to the Pondus Bent or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in Now how vehement is the Pondus Impetus and Energie of the Wil whereby it shooteth it self into its sweetest Good which when it enjoyeth what an ecstasie rapture and transportt of joy is it affected with Doth not Plato stile this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The best and strongest of al Ecstasies 6 The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excesse 6 Joys without Excesse Thus Plato Phileb pag. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For pleasure is not al good unlesse it partake of an infinite nature His designe is to prove that pleasure is not the chiefest good because it is not in its nature infinite so as to partake of al good yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good so far it is infinite For as the chiefest good admits of no excesse in our fruition because it is in it self infinite and al good so by a paritie of reason the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excesse because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excesse which it endeavors to cure by change of objects Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 2. Corporal delectations when augmented and continued do excede the natural habitude and therefore become nauseous as it is evident in the delices of food whence the appetite desires change and varietie But spiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude but perfect nature whence the more they come to a consummation the more they delight us How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford And what remedie have they but intermission or exchange of objects But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excesse either in the act of fruition or in the pleasures that attend it and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange § 8. 3. The Effects of Delectation Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts we now procede to the Effects thereof thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation 1 Amplitude and Enlargement 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 1. 1. Enlargement The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement Indeed al delight and joy brings Enlargement which ariseth from the Sympathie between the object and the subject or sacultie specially if the object be ample how doth the facultie spread it self to enjoy the same When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated what enlargement follows thereon How diffusive are they Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy which attends the fruition of the best Good There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good 1 There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end the more its desires are enlarged Thus Plato Phileb pag. 45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But what are not those pleasures most excellent whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us Whereby he shews that those are the greatest and best pleasures that most enlarge the heart in desires after them Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement and therefore in sacred Philosophie one word is expressive of both So Psal 4.1 Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distresse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate or to dilate by exhilarating His spirit was straitned narrowed and confined by distresse but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from Gods presence This Dilatation or Enlargement which follows on spiritual Delectation is wel explicated by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue for as man apprehends the conjunction of some convenient good so his Soul is dilated towards it in order to its perfect fruition thereof and satisfaction therein c. 2 Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting Al joy is vigorous and active as it is the effect of precedent so the cause of subsequent operation Delight is the Spring of motion it puts the Soul into a continual agitation for by how much the more we delight in any object by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good and in al acts that tend thereto What divine suavities doth it infuse into al our acts Thus Plato Conviv pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beautie doth no longer regard human affairs but is as it were captivated thereby c. 2. The Delectation which
attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction Satisfaction These spiritual pleasures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul but also bring satisfaction Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires but never sil them with satisfaction they may slater and tickle the senses but never quiet the appetite the best they leave behind them is repentance This is wel explicated by Digby of the Soul pag. 460. The violence of fruition in those foul puddles of flesh and bloud presently glutteth with satietie and is attended with annoy and dislike and the often using and repeting it weareth away that edge of pleasure which only maketh it sweet and valuable even to them that set their hearts upon it and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation by a convenient hunger and abstinence Contrary in the Soul the greater and more violent the pleasure is the more intense and vehement the fruition is and the oftener it is repeted so much the greater appetite and desire we have to returne unto the same Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen but fil the Soul and crown its desires with satisfaction Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end where there is no rest there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction and where there is want there can be no rest every want wrings the Soul and keeps it in a restlesse condition So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good Thence Plato Conviv pag. 211. assures us That the contemplation of the first sincere most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction for they who arrive hereto are content to live alone in conversation with this first Beautie c. Of which see Philos General Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect 1. § 2. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodnesse in Conformitie to the Divine Law The measure of moral Goodnesse perfect The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good but the Moral Law Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule The Parts and Causes of moral Bonitie 1 The Mater Things indifferent in genere specie Nothing indifferent in individuo A virtuose Wil the Principe of Moral Good The best End essential to Moral Good The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives Forme How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al Moral Good There is no real moral or natural Good but what is supernatural Moral Good most difficult The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only The distribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice § 1. HAving dispatcht the generic Idea and last End The Moralitie of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics we now passe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts and their Bonitie And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege Volition Consultation and Election But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. § 24. we shal not here undertake the discussion of them As for the Moralitie of human Acts there are great disputes in the Scholes Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consiste Suarez in 1.2 which vulgarly they stile his Ethics Tract 3. Disp 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads 1 He makes the formal denomination or that forme whereby an Act is denominated moral to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed or a figment of mens minds something in or appendent to the things themselves This we grant 2 He thence deduceth That the Esse morale in the act of the Wil besides its Entitie and substance addes a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting and the Wil freely working This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction It 's true the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Wil as the subject of those Acts for al moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being As al moral capacitie is subjected in natural so al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto Thus Cyril Alexandr Compend Dialog de S. Trinit Tom. 5. part 1. pag. 673. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is holy by participation being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie that of it self existes primarily in proper nature namely as Man and Angel or any other rational Creature So Damascene Dialect cap. 59. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is first by nature which is inferred but infers not i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated but if there be human Nature it doth not necessarily follow that there must be Grace Thus the human Understanding and Wil precede Virtue as the subject thereof Yet hence it follows not as Suarez seems to conclude that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil. 3 Hence Suarez concludes that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsecally inherent in the moral act but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Wil and in the very act of the Wil besides its physic emanation from the Wil it speaks denomination from the reason directing and the Wil acting with a plenarie power Though as it has been granted al Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Wil as their main Principles yet it follows not hence that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of emanation May we not as wel argue that al virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts because they flow thence But there lies a mysterie in this Jesuitic Hypothesis which when laid open wil soon evidence its vanitie and falshood The Jesuites and some other Schole-men in imitation yet on mistaken grounds of the ancient Philosophers place the formal reason of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reason Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie formally considered to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil. But the falsitie hereof wil appear by what follows If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right Reason which he seems to make the measure of al Moralitie
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
1 2. come under contemplation at present this may suffice to demonstrate that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord it might suffice Thus Solomon the wisest of mere men since the Fal Prov. 4.23 Above al keeping keep thine heart Prov. 4.23 for out of it are the issues of life i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God but dead Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them yet if they flow not from this living Fountain they are but as your Automata those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits which seem to move their eyes hands feet c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impresses such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed morally dead albeit they may seem to have shadows of life Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not so no action is morally good wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe Being life and motion go together in Morals as wel as in Naturals such as the Facultie Spring and Principe is such wil the motion and operation be both in Grace and Nature as Medo has wel observed on Prov. 4.23 Thus Augustine on Mat. 7.18 where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil which he makes essential to every good Act for if the Wil be bad the Act cannot be good and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life there can be no love to God as the last End as the end formes the Wil so Faith formes the End Thence that of the supposed Ignatius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Faith is the Principe of life Love the end these two in unitie perfect the man of God And Chrysostome saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing is good without Faith 3. The best End essential to moral Good To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 499. assures us That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good as before Sect. 1. § 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 2.3 Art 8. It must be said that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end and the reason is most evident because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts and the End the main Object and as it were the forme of the Wil but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent whence in Morals it is necessary that what gives an Act its order to an end give it is also forme c. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine Whatever good is done by man but not for that end for which it ought to be done albeit the office it self i. e. the mater of the Act seem good yet the end being not right it is sin This is wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Wil 1 The office or worke it self done 2 The cause for which it is done or the End In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue our main regard must be to the End This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting that which the Wil its habit and act most incline unto This deservedly rules al Offices which flow from its Empire are tinctured with its color and sapor and ought to be referred to it This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers touching the chiefest Good So again he saith That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue which is animated by the End which gives forme and life without which the office is but as mater without forme or a carcasse without Soul Aristotle wel instructes us That the end is the measure of althings which is true as to moral Good Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 166. assertes That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie not only from the intrinsec end of the worke which is coincident with the object but also from the extrinsec which is the end of the Worker Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts as Ends And what is the last end of al good workes but the Glorie of God which though last in Execution yet ought to be first in Intention at least virtually if not formally in al we do Thence saith Angustine That is not true Virtue which tends not to that end wherein the best Good of man consistes And Gregor Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 29. Quaest 1. proves that Every volition which refers not to God for himself or to other things for God is vitiose 4. The last Cause The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater Principes and End but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al moral Good whereby al difference and perfection is to be measured Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato under various emphatic notions as 1 it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Protag pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law Hence 2 In his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie So in his Timaeus pag. 47. he saith That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut pag. 15. 〈◊〉
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
too many of our Divines in imitation of them make a twofold Good and Virtue one natural and moral the other spiritual and supernatural The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes attain unto The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused Albeit this distinction may with due limitations passe for orthodoxe yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes I should be glad if Jansenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it were embraced who in his August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers specially the Peripatetics and Stoics who held that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue which being wel cultivated might arise up to perfect Virtue These natural seeds of Virtue addes he first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Christian Scholes to the great prejudice of our Doctrine For those Heretics held that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine they therefore framed a double man in one man and thence a double Charitie double Virtues double Workes some natural others supernatural of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine As if those very Virtues which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural were not by Augustine stiled Vices And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us That he has oft greatly wondred that many of the Philosophers had more truly accurately and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine than many Schole-men who would fain frame two men in one the one a Philosopher and the other a Christian whence they also coined a twofold Charitie twofold Virtues twofold Workes and a twofold Beatitude the one natural the other supernatural Hence 3. The difficultie of moral Good To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good from good Principes Ends in a good manner as to Circumstances and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie and contemplate him in himself are there not very few So Phileb pag. 16. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To explain Wisdome is not very difficult but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult So again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What way men may attain to be good is most difficult i.e. to understand and practise Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is difficult for a man to be made good and to continue such Whence in his Cratylus pag. 385. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 According to the old Proverbe things good are very difficult Thence also in his Epinomis pag. 973. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here except some few only Lastly Plato in his Repub. 6. saith That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme and therefore it requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues Thus Aristotle also in imitation of his Master once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed That there were varietie of ways wherein men might sin but one only way of doing good he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore it is most easie to offend but most difficult to do good for to erre from the scope is most-facile but to hit it is most difficult So in like manner c. 9. pag. 108. he saith Virtue consistes in mediocritie i.e. in one indivisible point of conformitie Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious for it is an hard worke to attain to the middle of any thing As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle but only the intelligent Mathematician So to be angrie to give money or the like is easie but to be angrie to give money c. to whom and in such a measure and at such a time and for such an end and in such a manner as we ought this is not easie Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The bene or manner of doing good is difficult laudable and beautiful Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good 1 He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam eò longiùs à scopo recedit ideóque sit miserior Calvin 2 That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean but much more difficult to reach it by our actions True indeed it 's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good as to give almes or the like but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel doing of it i.e. from those Principes for those Ends and with those Circumstances that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution this is most rare difficult and only laudable Hence 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed are but lesser Sins This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes so that it sufficeth not that the Mater or Office be good but there is also required a good disposition and habit the best end and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act or denominate it morally good Now let us inquire did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good What can we produce any Pagan or natural man who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love as to act by force received from God out of love to God and his Glorie Truly Augustine and Jansenius out of him are not afraid to declare that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues are indeed but more splendid sins because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie Yea they rise higher and affirme that the Stoics themselves who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators
irradiation Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state so far as any is made virtuose so far he is made free The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate as that indeed they have one and the same beginning progresse and consummation By how much the more ample spiritual pure and perfect the Soul is by so much the more free it is and whence springs the Amplitude Spiritualitie Puritie and Perfection of the Soul but from virtuose habits Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue and moral Good whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That according to Plato Virtue only was good That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident because hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its first Cause and last End which is the top of moral Libertie For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar which is the Divine Bonitie And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas Dispositio perfecti ad optimum The Disposition of a perfect Subject to the most perfect Exemplar and End Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self so Aquinas Grace saith he in it self and according to its essence is more noble than the nature of the Soul because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie and that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie That which belongs to God by nature belongs to us by Grace And Suarez saith That Grace is the Bond whereby man is conjoined to God his last end Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God by so much the more sublime free and perfect its state and condition is In sum Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul whereby it is enabled to understand embrace and adhere to what is good in that manner and measure as it ought Take al the notions of true moral Libertie and they agree to none but the virtuose man 1. Virtue gives Deminion Libertie is defined by the Platonist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Principalitie or Dominion of Life also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a plenary power over althings Which the Stoics interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving autoritie or power And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over it self and other things but from virtuose habits Plato assures us That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stronger than himself i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part Again Repub. 9. he instructes us That he who is best is most happie and august or royal because he is able to governe himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he that is most wicked is most miserable because he is a Tyrant over himself May we account him a man fit to governe himself who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts The Orator defines Libertie a power of living as men list and who hath this power to live as he list but the virtuose man whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts as by so many wild Horses Can it be imagined that the ambitiose man lives as he list whose mind is stil on the rack of ambitiose designes Doth the avaricious man live as he list who the more he has the more he wants It 's most evident that no man lives as he list but the virtuose man who has a wil slexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie Hos 11.12 So Hos 11.12 But Judah yet ruleth with God and is faithful with the Saints 1 Observe That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim who ruled also but not with God as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel c. But Judah ruled with God and was faithful with the Saints 2 Judah rules with God i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things he lives as he lists because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil. 2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life Health Vigor Virtue gives life health vigor and force and Force of the Soul which also ariseth from virtuose Habits Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres and so by a paritie of reason al moral spiritual Libertie supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful active and perfect Whence by how much the more noble excellent and perfect the life of any thing is by so much the more raised noble and excellent is its state and al its operations Life is that which seasoneth every thing and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature so the spiritual divine virtuose life has Principes above human Nature more noble and excellent and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors c. So in the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue truly is a certain health pulchritude and good habitude of Soul but sin is the disease turpitude and infirmitie thereof Health according to Augustine and Jansenius consistes in the vigor force and strength of Nature and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature but from its Spirits And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul Plato once and again assertes So in his Gorgias pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is of good c. Also pag. 470. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be able to do much is to be good And in his Hippias pag. 375. he saith Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul for the more righteous the Soul is the more potent it is Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul which strongly impels it to its last end What more potent than Love whereby the Soul adheres to its last end By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is by so much the stronger it is and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul Again the strength of every
its chiefest good Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bonitie or the chiefest Good convertes althings to it self i. e. althings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection 6 The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil the more free it is and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil than his who actually and resolutely adheres to God Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point as two strait Lines 3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual Dependence on the first Cause total and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings Every Creature having something of Nothing or passive Power either physic or metaphysic and obediential it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie which is the root of Dependence Novitie of Being Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature as Eternitie of Being Immutabilitie and Independence is to the Creator For every Creature being only Being by participation hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it and inseparable from its nature as Suarez Metaph. Disp 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates Yea Disp 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being both in acting and causing formally belongs to its essential reason as such because this dependence is founded not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature extrinsecal to its Essence but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof So that the very Essence of the Creature as such is the root of this dependence and to suppose a Creature and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation implies a contradiction Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only but also moral on its first Cause We find both mentioned by Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of al Beings whose conduct he that follows shal be happy And Epinom pag. 980. he assures us That he who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie shal act wel So in his Timaeus pag. 27. he tels us That al who have any thing of an awakened mind when they attemt any mater either great or smal are always wont to cal on God Which is an high act of Dependence Thence Theages pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▵ AIMONION For there is a certain DEMON which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do c. What this Demon of Socrates was is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers who have written Books concerning it That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. § 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power either Real or Imagiuary Yea Planto in his Timaeus saith That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Demon dwelling in him Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon in imitation of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indwelling Grace Which alludes to that of Paul 2 Cor. 12.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 12.9 that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me It evidently alludes both name and thing to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitation of God with and in men which denotes the highest Dependence And indeed herein consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause Virtuose persons who are most feeble in themselves are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe Where there is a subordination of Causes either moral or natural it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on and receive from the superior Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first Where there is a limited essence is there not also a limited dependent Activitie Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect Must not every mutable variable defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause That which had not Being from it self may it have Operation independently from it self Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self may it expect the privilege of acting from it self independently as to the first Cause Is not the human Wil a mere passive though vital instrument as to the reception of divine influences albeit it be active as to its own operation Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total Yea is not this Dependence immediate And O! how is the Soul enlarged according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult but with it the most difficult are most facile The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken but if God withdraws his hand it soon sals to the ground and is deshed in pieces he need not take it and throw it against the wal it wil break of it self Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Munudaction also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and cooperation of God Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al manner of energie Cyril 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the aide from above Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the auxiliant or assistent Power Greg. Nyssen in Psalm saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue And Chrysostome in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole of good is from the Grace of God Whence God is termed by Cyril in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Creator and Framer of al good and his efficacious Grace is termed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficacious Aide as by Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence Of which more hereafter The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause but continual effusions and insusions into
〈◊〉 that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome Hence it comes to passe that whiles we know nothing we thinke we know althings And are not those greatly to be pitied who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant Is any thing more worthy of compassion than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World And whence comes this proud affected ignorance but from mens not knowing God and themselves Is it not a strange thing that the Soul which knows althings else should be so ignorant of it self and of its Maker Thence Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 144. saith It is no wonder that they who are ignorant of God should account that which is worst best Whence he concludes That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil And as to the ignorance of our selves he openly affirmes Theaecet pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not i. e. ignorant by how much the lesse they thinke they are so And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and our selves is the root of al sin he further demonstrates Alcibiad 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance whereby a man thinkes he knows what indeed he is ignorant of And he subjoins the reason Those are left under error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who knowing nothing thinke they know every thing Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance Whence he concludes pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins and most opprobriose Lastly Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant we grossely erre Such a venimous maligne efficacious influence has proud conceited practic Error on al sin Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance practic Errors foment and maintain lusts The mind like a silk-worme lies intangled in those errors that came out of its own bowels when lust hath put out Reason it soon takes the Chair men of corrupt minds are men of sinful lives Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other whiles lust bribes conscience out of office it cooperates with sin Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors thereby to create its own chains and fetters a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie surely there is no dutie done by that man whose conscience doth not its dutie for there is nothing in man active for God when conscience is not first active It 's evident then that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin And as Plato so Aristotle his Scholar hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance and ignorant Sins A drunken man that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain and by this they are made unjust and wicked And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds 1 There is saith he an ignorance the cause of which is in our selves As when drunken men sin ignorantly which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse 2 There is an Ignorance of Right or Law when men are ignorant of their dutie which they ought to know 3 There is an ignorance from our own neglect which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided 4 There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sinning We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege the one universal the other particular a defect in either of these causeth sin Whence it follows that a man may have an universal knowlege that this or that is sinful in general and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege But now sithat universal knowlege though most certain is not so influential on our actions as particular because actions are about singulars hence it follows that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin than universal knowlege has to prevent it This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent or that which is consequent to the act Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil may be looked on as voluntary For what is involuntary if it arise from some precedent voluntary act it may be judged voluntary according to moral estimation As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard whose ignorance is voluntary because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle That those Acts whose Principe is in us may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us Lastly we may with Aristotle distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin and such as are cum ignorantia i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance but the later not because the ignorance is voluntary Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do as wil to do what they know Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto as oft as sensual passions prejudice or affected ignorance prevail So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin either because men do not practically consider al circumstances or if they do consider them yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion That this or that sinful Act is sweet or profitable A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises and yet dissent from the conclusion yea consent to a bad conclusion Lusts pervert Conscience and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts nor yet its lusts molest it There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart It 's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse to believe as
that arise from evil customes and follow the wil do not constitute a sin of passion Thence Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith That every sin from passion is not involuntary Thus also Suarez 1.2 Tract 5. Disp 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse in sins either of ignorance or of passion takes away something of their aggravation where there is real unaffected ignorance passion or perturbation there is lesse of sin Where there is involuntary Ignorance there is want of that which might help the understanding where antecedent involuntary passions hurrie men into sin there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said That they who sin from perturbation not voluntarily deserve pardon as Laertius 2. Voluntary wilful Sins are such as procede from a strong bent of wil without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof Such sins are of greater aggravation because of lesse provocation and excuse From a perseverance in voluntary sins and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato of which hereafter § 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin § 6. The Nature The moral servitude of Sin Causes and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open we may with more facilitie explicate and demonstrate what that moral Servitude is which attends it That al moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophie as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients some were made servants by being taken in war others were bought with a price others became such by being borne in the house of servants as Ishmael Sacred Philosophie in treating of the servitude of sin alludes to al these three kinds of service 1 Sinners are said 1 Kings 21.20 2 Kings 17.17 To sel themselves to worke evil i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin and that with a ful bent of heart which is opposed to Pauls being sold under sin Rom. 7.14 2 The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin 2 Pet. 2.19 3 Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin Ephes 2.2 5.6 Eph. 2.2 Children of disobedience i.e. addicted devoted given up to it So Ephes 5.6 Col. 3.6 This is an Hebraic Idiotisme for among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Son being put in the state of Regiment and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it Thus a child of disobedience is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it And Plato Rep. 9. pag. 575. tels us That he who is subject to the Tyrannie of his own Lusts is the greatest slave imaginable for he cannot do what he would but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts Therefore in his Cratylus as he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always to flow which importes libertie so he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vice from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slaverie which attends al Sinners by nature we shal consider this servitude of Sin 1 In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin 2 In the proper Adjuncts or Attributes that attend this servitude First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin we shal draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophie in the ensuing Propositions 1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature The Civilian Sin repugnant to human Nature Justin Institut l. 1. tit 3. defines Civil Servitude a constitution of the Law of Nations whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin What more against human Nature than to be subject to the tyrannie of irregular passions Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemie to man but also himself the greatest enemie to himself That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophie Thence he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discord and Confusion because it causeth an intestine war discord and confusion in human Nature Thus also in his Lysis he saith Al good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proper and agreable to human Nature but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evil is aliene and repugnant to it Good albeit it slow not from Nature yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature whereas al Sin tends to its ruine As al moral Libertie consistes in Virtue which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature so al moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature Thus Psal 106.43 And were brought low for their iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies attenuated depressed Psal 106.43 Vitium contra naturam est ut non possit nisi nocere naturae Non itaque esset vitium recedere à Deo nisi naturae cujus id vitium est potiùs competeret esse cum Deo August de Civ Dei l. 11. c. 17. It 's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition Then follows the cause of this their being brought down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for or in their iniquitie Their iniquitie was not only the meritorious cause but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature as Sin So Psal 107.12 Therefore he brought down their heart with labor they fel down and there was none to help 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with toilsome labor The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature 1 Sin brings down human Nature and is most repugnant to it in that it importes an aversion and falling from God who is our most laudable and excellent Being our first Principe and last End This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam Gen. 3.9 Gen. 3.9 Where art thou In this Question we may consider 1 That it regards not Adams place but state Where art thou Not in what place but in what state How is it with thee now Adam How doest thou do Is al wel What is the condition of thy Soul Art thou in that state I placed thee in 2 It 's a question not of ignorance as to God but of conviction as to Adam it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor Where art thou Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride thy unbelief has reduced thee Thou aimedst to be as God free from my yoke
would he expresse against the bold daring Atheists of this Age O! what an ignoble base degenerate uncomfortable thing is Atheisme how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature Ought not the Atheist sooner to dout of his own being than God's For if he be God who made him must needs be Thence Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician composed a Treatise That Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature and is not to be found therein but that they who acknowlege not the true Deitie must necessarily feigne to themselves some false ones as it is mentioned in his Life pag. 71. In sum Atheisme is a proposition so disnatural monstrose and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man that notwithstanding the insolence vanitie and pride of Atheists who endeavor by violence to rase out al notices of a Deitie in their Conscience yet stil they give us some evidences of their fears that there is a Deitie by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities § 2. 1. Vniversal consent for the Existence of God Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheisme having been discussed we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God First That there is a God he demonstrates from the universal consent of al Times and Nations Thus Leg. 10. pag. 887. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But now giving credit to those Traditions which together with their milke they sucked in and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurses who made it their businesse to implant these sentiments on their minds c. Wherein he shews how those that denie the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradition which they sucked in with their mothers milke and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings as hereafter Yea he makes this Hypothesis That there is a God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-evidencing first Principe which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof because Nature it self instructes us therein it being that which the most prostigate men cannot rase out of their Souls Thence Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith That it never came into Controversie among the most of Grecians that there was a God And he gives this reason for it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The knowlege or notion of Gods Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us or engraven on our Natures We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument in Plato's own dialect thus Have not al mankind in al times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deitie Doth not al the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimonie for the existence of a Deitie What made the Egyptians Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multiplied Deities but a notion engraven on their Beings fomented by universal Tradition that there was some supreme Being they owed Hommage unto It 's true their Hommage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object but doth not the act sufficiently argue that they owned a Deitie albeit not the true God Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deitie Was there ever any Nation so barbarous as not to pay Hommage to some supreme Being Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World where professed Atheisme gained place or habitation Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men that God made the World and governes the same Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run not only through al Times Ages and Nations but even through the Principes of human Nature yea in the venes and bloud of men Wel then might Plato say That men sucked it in with their mothers milke So much for inartificial Argument 2. 2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie rationally from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause Thus in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever is produced it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause for it cannot be that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause Then in what follows 〈◊〉 proves the World was made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The World was made because it is seen and touched and has a bodie But it is clear that such things are produced c. Whence he concludes that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe Plato bottomes his demonstration on these two Hypotheses 1 That the World was made 2 That it was made by some precedent Cause 1 That the World was made and not eternal was an Hypothesis generally maintained by al the Philosophers before Aristotle who asserted That the first Mater was eternal and that on a mistaken Principe That nothing could be produced out of nothing But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal because it is sensible and corporeous and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause And his argument may in his own interrogatorie mode be thus improved If the World be eternal must it not also be immutable and invariable Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal For where there are generations and corruptions there must be causes and effects which implie prioritie and posterioritie for the cause naturally precedes the effect but can there be any prioritie and posterioritie in what is eternal If the World was from al eternitie must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been and eternally not have been Must not the present way of Generation and Corruption correspond with the World's Eternitie Doth not our reason yea commun sense assure us that the Worlds present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternitie Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive that one man should beget another successively from al Eternitie Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternitie implie a flat contradiction Moreover doth not generation and corruption suppose an inequal succession of ascent and descent and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being Again if there were an infinite succession of generations and corruptions how is it possible there should be any effect or issue for can there be an end where there is no beginning Against the Eternitie of the World see more largely Derodone L'Atheisme convaincu pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World the Sun Moon c. that it could not be eternal and thence makes good his Hypothesis that it was created by God See also Sr. Charles Wolseley's Vnreasonablenesse of Atheisme Edit 3. pag. 47-64 177. 2 Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause The World made by some prime Cause is That the World was made by some precedent Cause For saith he whatever is produced is produced by some Cause We see nothing but what is produced by somewhat
else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
in Essence and Perfection for that which renders every Creature finite is its essential constitution and composition of Act and passive Power either physic or metaphysic It 's true Angels and human Souls have no physic passive power yet they have metaphysic and obediential as made out of nothing and so reducible thereto if their Creator please But now the first Being God being one simple pure Act without the least shadow of passive power whereby al Creatures are terminated and bounded it thence necessarily follows that he must be infinite in Essence and Perfection God actually and eternally is whatsoever he may be and cannot hereafter be that which now he is not Al Creatures are somewhat in possibilitie which they are not as yet in act whence they have an inclination to or at least a passive power for something which they have not which being attained unto makes them more perfect But now where there is one pure Act al perfection is because there remains no passive power or capacitie of receiving additional perfection Every Act is by so much the more perfect by how much the lesse of passive power is mixed therewith whence the one simple pure Act which has nothing of passive power mixed therewith must necessarily be without termes of Essence and Perfection Again every Essence is so far perfect as it is in Act thence the Divine Essence being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a most transcendent singular and infinite degree actual it must needs be infinitely perfect Thus Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 28. Every thing is so far perfect as it is in Act but imperfect as it is in power with privation of Act. That therefore which is no way in power but pure Act must needs be most perfect such is God 3. We may explicate and demonstrate the Infinitude of Gods Essence and Perfection by his Transcendence in Being Thus Plato Gods Infinitude from his transcendent Essence Repub. 6. pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The chiefest Good God is not Essence but something greater and more august and infinitely transcending both in dignitie and virtue the nature of althings created Wherein he makes God to be the Cause of al Essences yet not properly Essence in that manner as the Creature is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential or transcendent Essence self-Essence self-Eternitie This transcendent Essence and Perfection of God is termed in sacred Philosophie Magnitude as Psal 95.3 Psal 95.3 For the Lord is a great God and a great King above al Gods i. e. a transcendent Being This transcendent magnitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection must be understood principally intensively as God contains in him eminently and transcendently al perfections Thus Psal 145.3 Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised Psal 145.3 and of his magnitude there is no investigation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. the magnitude of his Essence is an infinite Abysse or Ocean which no mortal finite capacitie can dive into So the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there is no terme or bound to it This is wel expressed by Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It the Deitie being above Intelligence and above Reason and above Life and above Essence c. Whence the commun title he gives God according to the Platonic mode is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential as before Chap. 3. § 1. This infinite transcendent Magnitude of the Divine Essence is also wel expressed by Plato Parmenid pag. 137. where treating of the one God without beginning and end he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is infinite therefore also without figure neither doth it partake of a round figure nor yet of a straight i. e. God being infinite in Essence is not limited by termes of magnitude or figure This Argument from the Transcendence of the Divine Essence may be thus improved That which is transcendently Ens or Being See Suarez Metaphys Disput 30. Sect. 2. is such per essentiam essentially thence it cannot be limited That which has Being only by participation from a superior Cause may be limited either by the pleasure of the superior Cause that gives it so much perfection and no more or else from the capacitie of the Recipient which is capable of receiving so much perfection and no more But now the Divine Essence being transcendently and essentially such without participation cannot be limited either way but is invested with an infinitude of essence and perfection altogether indivisible not precise and limited to one kind of perfection as it is with the Creature but containing in a most eminent transcendent manner whatever is of perfection in the Creature Whence it is that the divine Infinitude and Perfection admit a reciprocation For Being subsisting of it self contains in it the whole perfection of essence and the perfections of althings belong to the perfection of essence wherefore God being a pure Act and Being subsisting of himself nothing of perfection can be wanting to him Hence God the first necessary transcendent Being cannot be defined or limited to any certain degree of perfection but must be infinite as is wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disp 29. Sect. 3. Thus also the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God is invested with al Essence who also is incorruptible and ingenerable being the supreme Opificer and Creator of the whole structure of the Vniverse as Laertius in Zeno. The sum of al is this God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-Being and transcendent superessential Essence he must needs be universally and eminently al-Being and so infinite in essence and perfection of which more fully in the following Argument 4. Gods Infinitude from the nature of Perfection The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonstrated from the formal Idea of Perfection and its peculiar appropriation to God Al perfection importes some kind of universitie because that is perfect to which there is nothing wanting whence the more any thing is contracted to some certain mode of perfection the lesse perfect it is and the more the universitie of perfection agrees to any thing the more it partakes of perfection Now God having the whole of essence in himself must necessarily have an universitie of perfection God has al kinds extents and degrees of perfection in him either formally or eminently he hath need of nothing because infinitely perfect in his essence there is nothing without or within him that may limit or bound his perfection The most perfect of Creatures have much of imperfection in them because they are limited in their Beings one excels in one perfection another in another but none in al perfections they are al negatively imperfect if not privatively Again the Creatures perfection is for the most part accidental and separable as it appears in fallen Angels and men But Gods perfection is essential absolute and universal and therefore infinite Thus in sacred Philoso phie Act.
is not manifest in his sight because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie as they fancied Argus ful of eyes or al eye would it not discerne althings round about it without the least turne or mutation of its posture So God being ful of eyes or al eye and present with al Beings is it possible that any thing should be hid from him Hence Plato held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 althings are ful of God and therefore nothing could he hid from him 3 Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas or Decrees Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being by reason of his Divine Ideas which were the original Exemplar of althings This Plato much insistes on both in his Timaeus and Parmenides as hereafter 4 Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings So Act. 15.18 Act. 15.18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world 5 Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings Plato Leg. 10. pag. 901 c. proves That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things whereof he has an accurate knowlege being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most wise Opificer and Framer of althings For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful knowlege of his own worke in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al. But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science The Object of Gods Omniscience we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe or incomplexe Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses Incomplexe 1. Complexe Intelligibles real things 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles or propositions and discourses both divine and human mental oral and scriptural Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God or subsequent 1 Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God are such as belong to the Divine Essence as that there is a God That God is eternal immutable c. These God knows by his Essence alone and not by his Wil because antecedent thereto Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Wil are al such whose truth is caused by and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Essence simply considered nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings so al propositions that belong to them depend on and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying The Reasons of good and evil are eternal if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil it is most false For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby see Bradwardine de Caus l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible or future 1 Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence 2 Things future in his Wil which gives futurition to althings Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent but things contingent as to us are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil and therefore necessarily known by God That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil and so certainly known by him is most evident because they are al present to God For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us but because it is future When it is present it is certainly known what it is wherefore althings being present to God by reason of his Divine Wil which gives suturition to althings therefore they must be al even things most contingent as to us certainly known by him Even among men those that understand the causes of things and their certain coherence with the effects may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse and shal not the omniscient God who gives Being to al Causes and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects Thus Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Who knows things present to come and past There is nothing so vile so inconsiderable but it fals under the omniscient eye of God Prov. 15.3 as Prov. 15.3 The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil the productive Cause thereof and whatever is evil by its opposite good as also by the positive Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated which also fals under the determination of the Divine Wil so far as it is a real positive Being For he that perfectly knows a thing must needs know al the accidents modes and appendents thereof now al Evil being but a privation of what is good it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation Again Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation which being known to God thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man if this be known by God Gods Omniscience as to the human Soul then surely nothing can be hid Now that the human Soul and al its Principes Habits Cogitations Inclinations Ends Designes and Acts are al known to God is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie it is in nothing more positive and expresse To begin with that great series of Demonstrations Psal 139.1 c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me Psal 139.1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast searched me narrowly sifted me to the bran thou so knowest me and al that is in me as he who knoweth a thing exactly after the most diligent and accurate inquisition So much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off The sense is there is no part of my life hid from thee whether I sit or rise thou knowest it al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee as 2 Kings 19.27 al my thoughts are present to thee long before they are existent Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee before they were mine Thence it follows v. 3. Thou compassest my path v. 3. and my lying down and
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
here cannot signifie disposed or prepared as the Remonstrants and their Sectators would perswade us for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differs much from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Author as I can learne used to signifie an interne Qualitie or Disposition but it generally signifies to Ordain primarily in military affaires and thence in any other maters So Act. 22.10 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be here taken nominally but must signifie Ordained is most evident from the sense For it 's said they were ordained to eternal life as the terme not unto faith only as the means wherefore if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signifie disposed the sense must be they were disposed to eternal life as many as were disposed for what is faith but a disposition to eternal life It 's most evident therefore that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must signifie not nominally but participally such as were ordained unto eternal life as the terme and unto faith as the means by the absolute and antecedent wil of God That Gods Wil properly so termed is ever Antecedent and never Consequent may be demonstrated 1 From the Eternitie of Gods wil. According to Plato the Idea or Decree of the Divine Wil is ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eternal and sempiterne Now if the wil of God and its Ideas be al eternal then not any one of them can be consequent to any act of the Creature which is in time 2 From the Simplicitie Independence and Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God supposeth his Divine Wil to hang in suspense and dependent on the mutable ambulatorie wil of man and is it possible that the prime cause should depend on or be influenced by the inferior second cause What must the Supreme Soverain Wil attend yea subserve the nods and becks of human created wil The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the creature as something consequent thereto because then as oft as the act of the creature is changed the wil of God must be changed 3 From the perfection of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God as stated by the Jesuites and their Followers supposeth an Antecedent imperfect wil consisting only in a natural Velleitie or imperfect inclination which is unworthy of the most perfect wil. 4 From the Omnipotence of God If God wils a thing antecedently to the act of the creature which shal never be then the wil of God is not Omnipotent but in the power of the Creature either to fulfil or frustrate the same And Oh! how incongruous are such Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Wil If Gods Wil be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon then it may be wholly frustrated as to al its counsels and decrees touching the rational world 5 This distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God For every one is so far blessed as he has his wil fulfilled To have our wils crossed or frustrated is accounted by al no smal portion of miserie may we then imagine that the Divine Wil properly so termed is ever frustrated 6 This distinction of Gods wil into antecedent and consequent is also injurious to his Bountie and goodnesse Sacred Philosophie compareth God to a liberal Prince who deviseth liberal things Esa 32.8 and thereby establisheth his Throne Esa 32.8 But the liberal deviseth liberal things and by liberal things he shal stand It 's spoken of Christ as Mediator or the great King of Sion as appears vers 1. who deviseth al manner of liberal things and thereby stands or is established on his Throne as the word denotes in the Hebrew Did not Christ keep open house and distribute al his gifts and good things liberally and freely his Throne would not be established he would have no Subjects to fil up his Kingdome But now the distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent cuts asunder al the nerves and ligaments of Christs Liberalitie in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent wil towards al but a Consequent Wil towards none but those who can by their good merits purchase his favor This distinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is excellently wel refuted by Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 1. Distinct 46 47. where he concludes thus Al the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Bountie and Grace and this speakes that God wills them to us by an Antecedent Wil because no cause antecedes in us but al our good things flow from his Bonitie 7. The Divine Wil most perfect Prop. The Divine Wil is most perfect This Adjunct of the Divine Wil is but the result of the former and that which makes way to what follows The perfection of the Divine Wil may be considered intensively extensively or effectively 1. Intensively 1 The perfection of the Divine Wil considered intensively consistes in its not admitting any intension and remission or latitude of degrees but being alwaies intense in the highest degree For the Divine Wil having one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence it is one simple pure Act without the least gradual remission or intension Hence it is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the perfect Idea of good which admits no latitude of degrees no velleitie or incomplete wil. That Gods Wil is always perfect and complete without the least velleitie or conditionate volition may be demonstrated 1 from the Simplicitie and pure Actualitie of God For al composition and latitude of degrees is inconsistent with a pure Act. 2 From the Identitie of the Divine Wil with the Divine Essence which admits not the least latitude of degrees 3 From the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. For al Velleitie being but an imperfect wil denotes a progression to a more perfect and so mutation 4 From the Wisdome of God For al Velleitie implies ignorance and supposeth that God understandes not fully what the issues and events of the human wil may be 5 From the Omnipotence of God Al Velleitie notes impotence to accomplish what we wil. We may not therefore imagine that Gods Wil is capable of any Velleitie or conditionate incomplete volition either formally or eminently but that it is ever most perfect as to degrees because it is the same with the Divine Essence 2 The Divine Wil is most perfect extensively 2. Extensively as to Objects in that it extendes it self to al objects So in sacred Philosophie Act. 17.26 Acts 17.26 And hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation It is said that God hath determined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by his soverain perfect Wil given termes bounds measures and limits to althings the Divine Wil is infinite and unlimited it receives limits and termes from nothing but gives bounds and termes to althings Hence God is
said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
God An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would nor forced to do what he would not a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent unless it has at least equal power How then is it possible that a poor infirme impotent Creature should resist the Divine Wil Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing being not to be hindred or frustrated any manner of way For who knows not that it altogether follows if God can do any thing and wil do it he doth it c. But of this more when we come to the Causalitie of God C 7. § 4. Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil Gods Wil 1. Decernent or preceptive we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Wil as has been demonstrated we may distribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehensions 1. into Decernent or Decretive and Legislative or Preceptive Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is usually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti and his Legislative Preceptive Wil Voluntas Signi This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophie for God is oft said in Scripture to wil things that are never offected as the salvation of Reprobates or the like which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Wil but may very wel of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this distinction we are to consider 1 That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly said to be his Wil but his voluntas signi or preceptive Wil is only equivocally or analogically and figuratively such Gods decretive Wil is the Divine essence decreeing althings and so properly and univocally stiled his Wil but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil 1 Metaphorically as Princes signifie their interne wil by their externe commands which are thence termed their Wil. 2 Metonymically as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleasure Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the wil of God as Sanderson De Obligat Conscient p. 132. Davenant against Hoard p. 392. and Ruiz prove Hence 2 Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are disparate or diverse but not opposite The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other but the wil decreeing and the wil commanding do not oppose each other because they are not ad idem the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law or the measure of his operation and permission but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law or the Rule of our operation and offices The Decree of God determines what he wil do or not do the Precept what we ought to do or not to do Gods Decernent Wil or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of al his actings towards the Creature but his Reveled Wil is the sole Rule Reason and Measure of al the Creatures actings towards him 3 The Decretive Wil of God is ever Absolute efficacious and particular but the preceptive wil of God is sometimes absolute sometimes conditionate sometimes universal sometimes particular sometimes efficacious and sometimes not 4 Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent called in Scripture his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good pleasure which is the measure of his own Affects and Effects But Gods preceptive wil is externe and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects but only of our Dutie 2. Gods secret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29 Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled which is much the same with the precedent mentioned Deut. 29.29 The secret things belong unto the Lord our God but things which are reveled unto us i. e. Gods secret Wil is the measure of his operation but his reveled wil of ours So Prov. 25.2 It 's the Glorie of God to concele a thing Gods wil is stiled secret 1 as the things he wils are unknown to us 2 as the causes and reasons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us 3 as it is as it were the Law Rule or measure of his Divine operations Gods reveled wil is so termed because it is his pleasure reveled either in his Word or Workes every act of Gods Providence shews somewhat of his Wil as wel as his Word 1 Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promissive or preceptive Reveled promisses are the measure of Gods Benefices towards us Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God 2 Gods reveled providential Wil is either directive or afflictive There is a conformitie which the rational Creature owes to each of these reveled wils of God To the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due to the promissive reveled wil there is an obedience of faith due to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission Resignation and Dependence due Lastly this reveled wil of God is never opposite to albeit it be oft diverse from his secret wil and the reason is because they are not about the same object Gods secret wil regards the events of things his reveled wil the duty of man either active or passive 3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Wil into Complacential Gods Wil Complacential Providential and Beneplacite Providential and Beneplacite 1 Gods Complacential Wil is his simple complacence in al the good Actions Habits and Events of men yea it extendes not only to moral but to natural goods as Gen. 1.31 There is a perpetual necessary volition in God which taketh pleasure in al good whether create or increate Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good This they cal Gods Love of simple complacence of which see Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 6. § 2. p. 38. and Disp 19. p. 214. 2 Gods Providential Wil is that whereby he is said to wil and intend an end when he in his providence either graciose or commun affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it As where God sends his Gospel he may be said really to intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent albeit they are not al saved because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same were they but really embraced and improved In this regard Davenant and others affirme that Christs death is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an universal remedie applicable to al and that God by his Voluntas Providentiae as Aquinas stiles it intended it as such This intention or wil of God
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the progenie of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
the same manner as they who follow Arius he divides and supposeth Subjects inducing Hypostases subordinate among themselves and conceits the Holy and Consubstantial Trinitie to be three distinct Gods And albeit Learned Cudworth B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. against Atheisme endeavors to wipe off this aspersion yet he grants the conclusion as hereafter But to speak the truth I find no express mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Trinitie in Plato only he speaks confusedly of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Father Lord and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mind c. But among the later Platonistes of the Schole of Alexandria ' specially those of the golden succession the Sectators of Ammonius Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus Proclus we find frequent mention and notices of a Trinitie which they thus distinguish 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supreme self-being whom also they stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Good 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine mind the Creatrix or Framer of althings who is also termed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the seminal Word or Reason that gives Being to althings 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Soul of the Vniverse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Soul as c. 8. § 2. These more distinct notices of a Trinitie I am very apt to perswade my self they received not so much from Plato but from Ammonius the famose Head of that Succession who was either a Christian or a friend to their Sacred Philosophie out of which he stole most of his choisest Philosophemes and incorporated them into the bodie of his Platonic Philosophie in order to a refinement thereof which albeit his designe might be good yet it proved the peste and subversion of the Christian Theologie at least among those of that Schole For Origen his Scholar following in his steps out of too fond a love for Platonic Philosophie reduced Sacred Philosophie to Platonic Dogmes which proved the original cause of the greatest Errors that befel the Church in succeeding Ages Thus he makes the Three Persons in the Trinitie to be according to the Three Platonic Hypostases One not in Essence but Wil only So Origen contra Celsum l. 8. p. 386. Edit Cantabr 1658. Where having cited that Act. 4.32 There was of al the Believers one Heart and one Soul he brings it to prove what our Lord affirmes Joh. 10.30 I and the Father are one And thence in what follows concludes thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore we religiosely worship the Father of Truth and the Son who is Truth as being truely two in Hypostase but one in concord consent and identitie of Wil So that whosoever sees the Son shall in him see God as in the Image of God c. Hence Origen in imitation of these Platonistes supposed an essential dependence of the Son the second Hypostasis on the Father as also of the Spirit the third on the Son of which essential dependence and subordination see Cudworth against Atheisme L. 1. C. 4. p. 581 c. Yea Origen in his Comments on John wil needs persuade us That the Word in Divine things is taken only metaphorically How far Origen's Platonic Philosophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other Heresies touching the second and third Person in the Trinitie see Court Gent. p. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 8 9. Samosatenus also had his pestiferous infusions from Plotinus's Philosophemes about the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Arius his from the same Schole as we have more fully proved in our Discourse of the Vanitie of Philosophie B. 2. C. 1. § 8. But whereas Amelius of old and some late Socinians would fain persuade us that John borrowed his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Joh. 1.1 from Plato it 's evident that he had it from the Sacred Philosophie among the Hebrews for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find frequent mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word of Jehovah whereby they understood the Messias as Gen. 3.8 Psal 2.12 and 27.1 as elsewhere Yea Celsus would needs persuade us That the Christians came to cal their Jesus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE SON OF GOD from their Pagan Ancestors who called the World made by God the Son of God But this is refuted by Origen Contra Celsum l. 6. p. 308. Edit 1658. Where he proves that this Character of Jesus was to be found in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets who writ long before the Grecian Philosophers That al those confused notices of a Trinitie among the Platonistes were originally traduced from Sacred Philosophie see Clem. Alexandr Strom. 5. p. 436. Eusebius praepar Evangel l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philos General Part. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect 5. § 2. and l. 3. c. 4. sect 1. § 13. also Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. c. 5. § 7. Learned Cudworth in his Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. sect 35. p. 548. saith We may reasonably conclude that which Proclus asserteth of this Trinitie as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles to be true that it was at first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Theologie of Divine Tradition or Revelation or a Divine Cabala viz. amongst the Hebrews first and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other Nations However addes he we freely acknowledge that as this Divine Cababa was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans so was it by diverse of them much depraved and adulterated For 1 the Pagans universally called this their Trinitie a Trinitie of Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the First the Second and the Third God 2 Whence p. 557. he procedes to demonstrate that the direct designe of this Platonic Trinitie was nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheisme Cosmolatrie and Creature-worship Where by the way he wel observes That these Pagans who so much cried up this Platonic Trinitie were the only public and professed Champions against Christianitie and the Christian Trinitie 3 He addes p. 559. That the Three Hypostases or persons asserted by the Christians are truely and really one God and not one only in Wil as Origen and the Platonistes avouch 4 He informes us p. 564. That Proclus and other of the Platonistes intermingle many particular Gods with those three Vniversal Principes or Hypostases of their Trinitie as Noes Minds or Intellects superior to the first Soul and Henades and Agathotetes Vnities and Goodnesses superior to the first Intellect too thereby making those particular Beings which must needs be Creatures superior to those Hypostases that are Universal and Infinite So great confusions yea contradictions attendes the Platonic Trinitie which yet is too much admired CHAP. VII Of Gods prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general God the first Cause demonstrated The Object of Divine Concurse Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
and Absolute may be proved by these invincible Reasons 1 From the Independence of the Divine Wil the first cause of althings The first cause according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause and dependence Thus Plato Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God under the notion of the chiefest good and the first cause of althings he gives him this character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is not mere essence but somewhat more august than essence transcending al finite essence both in Dignitie and Virtue So elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme effective cause of althings and therefore Independent as to al subservient instrumental causes Yea he wil have God the first Cause to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being it self and Eternitie it self and thence no way dependent on second causes And the Platonistes generally make God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential and so most independent And alas how absurd and monstrose is it that the concurse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause Is not the Divine Wil the first effective Principe of althings the same with the Divine Essence May we not then as wel make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil. 2 From the pure actualitie and simplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it dependes there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or metaphysic But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the least passive power therefore no dependence 3 From the Primatie and Superioritie of the first Cause Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God solely being without Principe or independent he is the Framer of althings c. God being the first Cause of althings must necessarily be independent in his Causalitie and Essence For where there is dependence there is inferioritie and subordination And may we presume that the concurse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause Doth it amount to lesse than a contradiction to say the first Cause dependes on or is subordinate to the second cause What! can it be first and yet subordinate What is this but to be first and yet not first but second For dependence and subordination is an effential mode of the second cause as independence of the first 4 As the concurse of the first Cause is independent so also absolute yea therefore absolute because independent for that which dependes on nothing without it self must needs be absolute That the Concurse of God is absolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the subject or object it workes upon specially as to gratiose effects is most evident from sacred Philosophie Eph. 2.8 9 10. So Ephes 2.8 9 10. He saith v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith and that not of your selves it is the gift of God It 's true it workes through faith but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul the whole is the Gift of God and why v. 9. Not of workes lest any one should boast As if he had said Alas if this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us then there were indeed room for boasting which Christ wil not allow of Are the derivations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can performe doth not the stream owe al that it has to the free independent and absolute communication of the spring Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanship created in or by Christ Jesus unto good workes i. e. look as God created and formed the first rude confused Chaos not for any foreseen goodnesse in it but out of a pure nothing so Christ frames the New Creature not for any foreseen conditions it can performe but unto al conditions or good workes as Esa 19.25 We have an excellent discourse against conditional Grace in Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace which enables us to act if we wil there is nothing gained but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Wil such as Adam had and Angels now have and thus Christ hath died in vain for the proper Grace of Christ which he by his Passion hath brought to heal our infirmities Gratia medicinalis non est talis quae dominatrici samulando voluntati vel influit vel non influit prout imperanti sese determinare vel haerere placet sed prorsus talis quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia repugnantémque domat voluntatem tollit omnem ejus resistentiam rapit eam secum ex invita volentem ineffabili suavitate facit Jansen August Tom. 3. is such as doth not only worke the effect if we wil expecting when our Wils wil move but it enables us to wil for herein lies the precise difference between a sound and sick Wil. That the influxe and concurse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurditie yea impossibilitie of a conditionate concurse in God How absurd is it to conceit that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil Yea how impossible is such a conditionate influxe For if there be any condition required to Gods Concurse then he concurs to the working of that condition or not if not then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurse If God doth concur to that condition then absolutely or on some other condition if absolutely then his former concurse is not conditionate for he that requires any condition of his act and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely besides if God concur absolutely to the later condition why not also to the former act If God concur to the second condition conditionately then also to the third c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progresse into infinite which Nature but much more the God of Nature abhors Hence 3. Gods Concurse is previous and antecedent Gods concurse previous and antecedent For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Causalitie as the causalitie of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causalitie of the second cause for therefore the second cause cooperates because the First cause operates The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects Thus Isidorus Pelusiota lib. 2. Epist 72. Edit Commelin 1605. pag. 121. An evil tree saith he cannot bring forth good fruit Mat. 7.18
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
the concurse of God be only General and Indifferent it then hangs in suspense and has not efficace enough to reach its effect unlesse it be so or so disposed Whence also it follows that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concurse of God so that it shal not reach its effect Hence lastly it follows that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent which we shal anon prove 3 That the concurse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent 2. Dist 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 23. with several others But here it is objected 1. by Burgersdicius and others Objections against Gods particular concurse 1 If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action then he may be said to walke discourse eat c. To this Objection we respond 1 by denying that God concurs to the specification of the action albeit he concurs by a particular concurse for an action is specified from its particular cause not from the first universal cause So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations whereof one is true the other false Or we may cal it a begging of the Question in that they suppose That if God concur by a particular concurse he concurs also to the specification of the action which is an inconsequent consequence 2 Those Animal acts of walking eating c. ascribed to the second cause cannot be ascribed to God the first cause albeit they more principally belong to him because they procede not from pure efficience but from information to use the Aristotelean phrase or a bodie so organised Those actions signifie a relation to the particular subject whence they slow and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God as Bradward l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. S. 3. acutely replie shewing that ambulation eating c. do not denote pure efficience but a subject informed by such motions which are therefore proper to the said subject 2 But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions unto which say they God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse unlesse we make him the author of sin This objection makes a great noise but has little of weight in it For 1 The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause who is the Author of it not unto the first cause who only produceth the physical entitative Act. 2 That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause is so ordered by God as that it shal conduce to the greatest good as before and hereafter in the providence of God 6. Gods Concurse Efficacious Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie specially as to gratiose Influences which are most potent Sin is a mighty strong poison ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong but Christ the Captain of our Salvation hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie captive His Grace is most potent irresistible and victorions Thus Jansenius Augustin Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes he addes This therefore is the true reason why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect but al workes both to wil and to do because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred so on the other hand from the defect of the worke it may be inferred that Grace was not given By which manner of reasoning it appears that Grace as the cause and the operation of the Wil as the effect are as the Philosophers speak convertible and mutually inseparable each from other For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations Agis si ageris bene agis si à â—bono ageris so efficacious is medicinal Grace Yea Jansenins a voucheth that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to expresse that the determination or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God but Augustin assumes the same to demonstrate that the Grace of Christ is not such that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil but that the effect is most potently produced by it not if the Wil willeth but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak 3.4 Habak 3.4 And his brightnesse was as the light he had bornes coming out of his hand and there was the hiding of his power And his brightnesse was as the light The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose even like the brightnesse of the Sun in its meridian glorie Thence it follows he had hornes coming out of his hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to send forth beams as hornes to irradiate and shine forth Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29 hornes whereas it signifies there beams as here Whence it follows out of his hands Hands here denote Christ's power as Act. 11.21 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power the hand being the instrument of the bodie whereby it puts forth its power Thence he addes There was the hiding of his power i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays or concurse which is exceding influential and potent like hornes We find something analogous hereto in Plato Repub 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good he compares him to the Sun and his concurse to the rays thereof in this manner Thou wilt say I presume that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen but also that they are generated do grow are nourished although it be not the generation of those things Thus therefore determine that the chiefest good namely God doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also force and efficace for their existence c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun which gives life sense motion nutrition angmentation and vigor to al manner of Insects Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius the supreme God of Medicine because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat
be a great deep And Psal 97.1 The Lord reigneth let the Earth rejoice Psal 97.1 2. because al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous Yet it follows v. 2. Clouds and darknesse are about him i. e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous yet much darkenesse and mysterious Providences attend it there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures albeit Righteousnesse and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne as it follows Gods Providences are always mater of our Admiration but not of our Comprehension or Imitation To measure Providence by our shallow Reason what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial It 's wel observed in the Life of Padre Paul p. 114. In the successe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired where human prudence vanisheth out of sight it being most certain that in actions there is an eternal force and a long chain of Causes so far without us that neither our knowlege or any consideration of ours can ever come near The workes of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art whereof we see the frame and operations but that which is the interne moving principe and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not So in the workes of Providence we see the Executions and Effects but O! how mysterious are the interne Reasons Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and single Essence And is there not in every worke of Providence something Divine which doth puzle the most sharpe-sighted Reason and hath more in it than the most acute Philosopher can discover And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence but because they cast their eye on some few particulars but consider not the whole frame and complexe It 's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence and is not this the genuine reason why we misjudge and mistake the parts That is not disorder in the whole which seems so in some one particular as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are wel expressed by Damascence Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must saith he admire al the workes of Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 albeit they may appear to many injust because Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible and our cogitations and actions and things future are known to it only Thence he addes towards the close of the Chapter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we must know that there are many modes of the Divine Providence which can neither be explicated by speech nor comprehended by mind § 6. The distributions of Providence From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we passe on to its various Distributions which are for the most part Modal only not Specific As 1 Providence in regard of its Object is distributed into General and Special General Providence is that which respectes althings in general Special Providence that which respectes some under a special relation to God as his people 2 Providence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Mediate and Immediate Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof of which before Immediate Providence is when God produceth Effects without the use of Means 3 Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary Ordinary Providence is when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order which was constituted at first by himself Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production Conservation or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order constituted by himself Of Miracles The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are by a Metonymie of the Effect termed Miracles A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation because the constituted order of Nature being broken the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically in a way of principal efficience produce a Miracle It 's true the Ministers of God have when called to it by him been Instruments of doing Miracles yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental they wrought al in the Name of God in a way of faith and dependence on him and for the manifestation of his Glory Wherefore our Lord Christ by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie without any moral dependence on another gave an evident Conviction and Demonstration of his being God For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience No this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deitie because every Miracle is educed out of nothing either as to the thing it self or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought In Nature and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power and yet the effect is produced that we cal a Miracle which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways 1 When there is no substrate mater at al to worke on 2 If there be a substrate mater yet when the mater is so inhabile and unapt as that it has no natural passive power or capacitie for such an effect Or 3 when there is a natural passive power and capacitie in the substrate mater yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater In al these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence And indeed the very names both Latin Greek and Hebrew import a power extraordinary and Divine To let passe the origination of the Latin which is obvious Miracles are called by the Greeks 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they are Signes of the Divine Efficience and Presence given for the succur of our Faith 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Powers as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence which is most illustrious therein 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prodigies or tremendous Signes such as not only ravish men into admiration but leave also a terror and astonishing stupor on the mind So Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders by reason of the Miracle that is wrought Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which terrefies and astonisheth Al which note that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal Providential Conservation proper to God its formal essential and specific distribution is into Conservative and
Rector of althings Thus we may applie Eccles 8.4 Where the word of a King is there is power or Domination and who can say to him what doest thou i. e. by how much the more Soverain any person is by so much the greater is his Domination God being King of Kings and Lord of Lords must necessarily be most Absolute in Power and Domination This is oft inculcated by Plato and carries with it its own Evidence For 1 althings receiving their Being Perfection Virtue and Operation from God it cannot be but that he should have an Absolute Dominion and Soverain Empire over them 2 Althings tend to God as their last end therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end it 's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end Thus Aquinas 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good it 's necessary that the Gubernation of the world be best But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one c. 3 God is infinitely wise to order althings and potent to bring them to their ends therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato Leg. 10. p. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who is most wise both can and wil take care of his own Creatures c. 4 The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of althings For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made Whatever flows from God as the first Cause must returne to him as the last end 5 This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation to see that althings reach the end for which they were made For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made unlesse they be directed and governed by the same power which made them It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the worke he made to the end for which it was made And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of althings Hence 2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things The last end of Divine Gubernation What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to some last end And what is the last end of althings but the Glorie of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag 903. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us persuade this young man that he who by his providence takes the care of the whole that he may conserve and adorne it with necessary virtue doth wisely dispose and order althings to this end the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into al parts of the Vniverse according to their nature Whereby he explicates to us how God doth order and dispose althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie This he more fully lays open in what follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But thou knowest not that al generation of singulars is for this that the life of the whole may be blessed his Essence is not for thy sake but thou wert made for his sake For every Physician and every skilful Artificer makes al for the sake of the whole aspiring after the commun utilitie Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part but the part for the sake of the whole But thou art ful of indignation because thou canst not see how that which is best may accord with the commun good and thy proper interest Here are several things remarquable for explication and demonstration that the Glorie of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation 1 He saith Al singulars are for this that the life of the whole may be blessed Why may we not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the whole understand God That Plato sometimes understandes God by this notion specially in his Timaeus pag. 90. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contemplations of the whole c. I could easily persuade my self 2 But grant that we must understand this of the Vniverse strictly taken yet it must at last be resolved into God for is not the Universe and althings else for Gods sake not God for the sake of the Universe 3 Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer who workes al for the sake of the whole and is not the Divine Bonitie and Glorie that great Vniversitie or whole into which al lower ends must be melted 4 Plato blames his young Atheist and in him the most of men for preferring their private good before the good of the whole which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God That althings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation for the Glorie of God is manifest 1 From the prime motion and causalitie of God For God being the prime Motor of althings and moved by nothing it thence necessarily follows that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himself as the last end The order of ends necessarily answers the order of Agents the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of althings 2 From Gods Dominion over althings Every Agent has power to use his own workes for the end he made them and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands Has he not then power to use them for his own Glorie 3 From the perfection which althings acquire by subserving the Glorie of God By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie by so much the more perfect it is and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine Bonitie by how much the more subservient it is to the Glorie of God It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius The supreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itself which al desire as their last end and by which they al subsist as their most perfect end Hence 3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and reduceth althings to their last end is most fixed The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed Esa 40.26 immobile and perfect This according to sacred Philosophie is wel expressed Esa 40.26 Lift up your eyes on high and behold who hath created these things that bringeth out their host by number he calleth them al by name by the greatnesse of his might for that he is strong in power not one faileth Observe here 1 he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God 2 He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation 3 He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things specially the Celestial bodies by bringing out their host by number O! what an accurate order do al the Celestial bodies observe in their motions Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
makes an incomparable parallel between natural Vision and Divine Illumination In natural Vision saith he there must be a visive Facultie an Object visible and Light to discerne the Object This Light is derived from the Sun which is the principal and next cause of Vision For addes he as oft as the eyes are converted to such things as are illustrated by the Sun vision in the eyes is very apparent Then he draws up his parallel pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus also thinke of the mind For when that in which Truth itself and Being itself shines forth inheres in it it doth consider and understand the same and then it seems to have an illuminated Mind and Divine Intellect Wherein observe 1 That God who is Being itself as also Truth itself or the first Truth 2 That before there can be any true light in the mind this first Truth must shine forth and irradiate the same 3 That when God illuminates the mind there is not only a transient but a fixed light firmely impressed on it This Divine Light doth become one with the mind and so formes conformes reformes yea transformes it into the things known 4 That the Intellect thus illuminated becomes truely Divine Thence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That therefore that gives truth to those things that are known as also a facultie to know them cal thou the IDEA OF GOOD namely the cause of Science and Truth which is understood by the Intellect Note here that 1 he cals God considered as the Fountain of al Illumination the Idea of Good i. e. the supreme Idea of al Perfection and Truth in whose light alone we can see light 2 He saith that this Idea of good gives truth to those things that are known i. e. al objective wisdome impressed on things as also al objective Revelation whereby things mysterious are reveled 3 Also a facultie to know things intelligible i. e. subjective Illumination and Light both habitual and actual 4 Hence this Idea of good is the cause of al Science and Truth which is understood The sectators of Plato thus explicate his mind about Divine Illumination 1 They make God to be the true essentia Wisdome Thus Plotinus En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The true Wisdome is Essence and again the true Essence is Wisdome i. e. God who is Essence itself is Wisdome itself 2 This essential Wisdome or Light doth illuminate al but is illuminated by none as the Sun gives light to althings but receives not light from any thing 3 The create finite Intellect being irradiated by this essential light of life is invested with true formes and Ideas of things and is thereby conducted into the knowlege of things mysterious and Divine This Divine Illumination is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie and generally acknowleged by the Greek Theologues Chrysostome stiles it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The illuminant Intellect the superne Grace the gift of the Grace of God not of human Nature Greg. Neocaesar Orat. Panegyr 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest gift of God and the illustrious afflate from Heaven And the reasons which enforce the necessitie of such a Divine Illumination for the apprehending of supernatural Truths are taken from the sublimitie of the Object and the imperfection of the human Intellect we find both conjoined 1 Cor. 2.14 The animal man is not capable of the things of the Spirit 1 Cor. 2.14 c. By the animal man we are to understand every man void of supernatural light by which alone things spiritual are discerned for al knowlege supposeth some proportion between the Object and the apprehensive Facultie now what proportion is there between the natural Intellect and supernatural Truths Can an animal facultie take in spiritual objects Is it possible then that the natural mind may by its own force without Divine Illumination reach supernatural Mysteries Thence saith Augustin de Trinit l. 14. c. 7. Tho human intellect cannot apprehend sublimer intelligibles unlesse it be fortified and perfected by a stronger light And Greg. Nyssenus 2. in Eunom assures us That it appertains to the Father Son and holy Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to illuminate minds with the light of Divine knowlege Whence this Divine illumination is stiled by the Greek Theologues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illumination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 irradiation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illustrant Grace 2. Having explicated Divine Illumination The Infusion of Virtues we now procede to treat of the infusion of al other supernatural Habits or Virtues whereby the Rational Creature is governed and conducted to his last end That al true moral and supernatural good is no way attainable but by Divine infusion is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie Thus also in the Theologie of the Grecians it was frequently inculcated 1 That no one could 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 avoid the snares of sin but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he who was assisted and fortified by God as Basil Eth. c. 3. So Greg. Nyssen Orat. 3. in Orat. Domin Tom. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that wil avoid domineering sin must cal God for his succur alwaies having him in his eye who exerciseth him by tentations 2 That al true moral or supernatural good comes from God by Divine infusion This gratiose infusion of Virtue by God was by various and emphatic notions illustrated by the Greek Fathers who terme medicinal efficacious Grace the Spring of this supernatural Infusion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the salutarie Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manuducent and assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine infusion or inspiration For say they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we can do any thing morally good is from the impulse of God Yea they make not only the first infusion but also the prosecution and conservation of al moral good to be from God Whence Divine Grace is termed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persequent or actuating and conservant Grace Hence 3 the Act whereby the Soul is turned from Vice to Virtue is termed by the Greek Theologues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Restauration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Revocation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discession 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 putting off the old man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Progresse from a bad state to a good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transmutation of Soul Of which see more in what precedes of efficacious Concurse c. 7. It was a great Question among the ancient Philosophers Whether Virtue came by institution or by Divine afflation and infusion The Cynics and Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Virtue was teachable as Laertius But Socrates and Plato his sectator held the contrary So Plato Protag pag. 361. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is not a thing that may be taught or gained by institution This he more copiosely demonstrates in his Meno pag. 89. where he proves 1 That men are not good or virtuose
contemplation of their Parent So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But those things that are spoken of God affirmatively are predicated of him as the cause of althings And he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he shal be more properly named from things more excellent and more akin to himself now things immaterial are more excellent Wherein he instructes us 1 That our affirmative notices of God are chiefly drawen from his effects 2 That among his effects those give us the most lively Ideas of God which are most excellent and akin to him namely things immaterial as the human Soul c. God so manifestes himself in the whole opifice of the Universe that we can no sooner open our eyes but may behold the gloriose Ideas of his Divine Wisdome Power and Goodnesse which ever way we turne our eye there shines forth some ray of the Divinitie What is the whole Universe but a visible Map or Picture of the invisible Deitie Is not the Creators Name written in golden Characters on every page of the Book of Nature It 's true some want eyes to see and read their Creators Name in the Book of Nature but it follows not hence that there is no natural knowlege of God as the Socinians would needs persuade us For that a thing be called natural it is not necessary that it be actually in al men but it sufficeth if it may be derived from a natural principe because some men are blind we may not thence conclude that sight is not natural to a man 2 Another natural grade or way of knowing God is by way of Eminence 2. By way of Eminence These Notices of God by way of Eminence are best when composed both of Affirmatives and Negatives as also of termes most simple Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The sweetest notion of God is that complexion of both Affirmatives and Negatives as superessential Essence superdivine Divinitie supercausal Cause and the like When we see any perfection in the Creature we attribute the same to God in a more eminent degree and manner And here we are to remember that the more general notions of created perfections albeit they are more imperfect as belonging to the Creature yet they are more properly attributed to God than more special notions because the former are more abstract and simple the later more concrete and composite For by how much the higher we ascend to the generic notions of things by so much the more simple our notions are Hence it is that Knowlege is more properly ascribed to God than Sense or Reason because it is more generic and simple so Life than Vegetation Spirit than Soul hence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being as Jehovah which denotes the same are the most proper Names we can give God because the most generic and simple notions And the reason of the whole is this Seing the Divine Essence is more aptly and familiarly expressed by Abnegation or Remotion than by Affirmation hence it follows that by how much the more concrete and special our notions are by so much the lesse they agree to God and on the contrary by how much the more simple and general they are by so much the more they agree to God because they are by so much the more remote from the imperfections of the Creature as Twisse Scient med pag. 309. Hence 3 The best natural way or degree of knowing God is by Negation or Remotion for the Divine Essence 3. By way of Remotion by reason of its Immensitie and Infinitude exceding al the Ideas or notions our Intellect can forme of it cannot better be apprehended than by removing al imperfections from it So Aquinas Sum. 1. Quaest 10. Art 1. Things simple are best defined by Negation not as if negation were essential to them but because our Intellect which first apprehendes things composite cannot arrive to the cognition of things simple but by the remotion of al composition The same he more fully explicates contra Gent. l. 1. c. 14. In the consideration of the Divine Essence the way of Remotion is chiefly to be used for the Divine Essence by reason of its Immensitie excedes al forme that our Intellect can attain unto wherefore we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is but we have some notices thereof by knowing what it is not For we by so much the more draw near to the knowlege of God by how much the more we can by our Intellect remove imperfections from God for we by so much the more perfectly know every thing by how much the more fully we contemplate its differences from other things for every thing has in it self its proper essence whereby it is distinguished from al other things But because in the consideration of the Divine Essence we cannot conceive what it is or its Genus nor its distinction from other things by affirmative differences it is therefore necessary that we conceive of it by negative differences Indeed the most simple spirital divine and excellent things are best set forth by negatives Hence God himself is best expressed and apprehended by way of negation We know rather what he is not than what he is 2. The supernatural grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either Graciose or Glorious The supernatural Grades whereby we ascend up to God 1 The grades of Grace whereby we ascend up to God are either objective or subjective 1 The supernatural objective grades of Grace are either simple or complexe 1. Christ. 1 The simple objective grade of Grace whereby we ascend up to God and the contemplation of him is Christ the Mediator who is the essential Glasse wherein al the Glorie of the Deitie is most resplendent as 2 Cor. 3.18 He is the image of God 2 Cor. 4.4 2 Cor. 4.4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an image is an expresse ressemblance or imitamen of an exemplar according to its forme or kind and so it differs from Vesâ—igium or a Footstep which gives only some darke notices of a thing by its causalitie There are some vestigia or footsteps of God impressed on the sensible world yea an accidental Image of God on the renewed Soul but Christ is an essential Image of God in whom al the invisibile perfections of God become visible to an eye of faith Thence he is said to be Col. 1.15 Col. 1.15 the image of the invisible God i. e. God who is invisible in himself becomes visible in his Son Whence also he is stiled Heb. 1.3 Heb. 1.3 the effulgence of his glorie and character of his person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the splendor or effulgence of the Sun communicated in and by its rayes specially as they fal on a cloud and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parelius or a reflexe image of the Sun which seems to be