Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	good_a	just_a	law_n	2,761	5	4.7834	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A52110	Lex Pacifica, or, Gods own law of determining controversies explain'd and asserted in a sermon preached at Dorchester at the Assizes holden there for the county of Dorset, August 5, 1664 / by John Martin ...	Martin, John, 1619-1693.	1664 (1664)	Wing M843; ESTC R31215	24,813	40

by no means infringe but rather advance Christian Liberty As to the later part of the Objection that concerns private conscience supposed in some to be oppressed by such Laws to which others may as innocently as willingly submit I answer that it may justly cause all sober men to suspect that there is some error and fascination in that opinion Conscience of late having justified the Jews miraculous Fable of their Manna namely that it had the taste of that which every one best lik'd flesh to one fish to another and fruit to a third Certainly men ought to be very jealous over the importunities of their Consciences against publike Laws when they shall reflect upon the miserable delusions of those Miscreants amongst us who having besmear'd themselves with the blood of their King should dare publikely to justifie in the very face of Death and Judgement so grievous a Crime from the dictates of their private Conscience and their following of God as they term'd it Which last blasphemous expression will not suffer me to leave you unacquainted with that remarkable Caution for all in Authority which fell many years since from the Divine Pen of that incomparable x In praefat Sect. 8. Hooker Impossible saith he it is that ever the wit of man should imagine what will grow out of such errors as go mask'd under the Cloak of divine Authority till time have brought forth the fruits of them for which cause it behoveth Wisdom to fear the sequels thereof even beyond all apparent cause of fear But to speak something that may comport with the remainder of my time concerning this Objection This maxim must first be laid down as an unquestionable Truth viz. y Suar. de Leg. l. 1. Contra omnem rectitudinem est bonum commune ad privatum ordinare seu totum ad partem propter ipsam referre Law-givers judge what is fit for the common good and unreasonable it were to stoop that unto private interests and respects Supposing then that some Laws may appear contrary to some particular mens Consciences What shall be done obey contrary to their judgements or disobey those Laws for conscience sake For answer hereto give me leave to say first That there is no contrariety betwixt a z Soto de Just Jur. l. 1. q. 6. art 4. just Law and a good Conscience That Law is undoubtedly a just Law in which there is a concurrence of the justice of these four causes of Law wherein the whole of it doth consist That is to say the justice of the final efficient formal and material causes of Law 1. It must be for the common good 2. The Law-maker must have a true legislative power 3. The matter of the Law must be good at least indifferent And 4. lastly It must have the right form of Law i. e. it must be a rule of rectitude for humane actions Such a Law doth necessarily oblige them to whom it is given nor can it possibly be contrary to a good Conscience because such a Law is conform to right reason as right reason is conform to the Law of Nature and the Law of Nature to that eternal Law in the minde of the Divine Essence Let me give an instance or two This is the Law of Nature and to this right reason is conform viz. That men live temperately This Principle considered by the Law-makers they judge it fit to make a Law prohibiting the eating some kinds of meats as of flesh in the Spring or Lent that thereby amongst other reasons Christians might shew their temperance which is not onely an abstinence from excess in the Quantity of all but in regard of the Quality of some meats as appears by Daniel's fast in the 10. of that Prophecy vers 3. Such a Law as this cannot be contrary to a good conscience because it is appointed for the practise of a noble Virtue to wit Temperance Again as to the case in hand This is a rule in the Law of Nature That such as are Governors of others use all prudent means to prevent Sedition and Schism in the Church and State Now if Law-givers are morally assured that this cannot be done without defining some things under dispute amongst their Subjects and exacting from all a submission unto that rule which they shall prescribe by Law and shall thereupon injoyn an uniformity of practice unto all the community such a Law cannot be contrary to a good conscience the reason is because the submission thereunto is an actual exercise of the Virtues of humility obedience charity and sobriety So that unless to practise even Cardinal Virtues be contrary to a good conscience There is no contrariety betwixt a just Law and a good conscience 2. I answer secondly That it is the opinion of many learned men both a Halensis Ant. Henr. Carthus Vasq c. Divines and Canonists That he that submits unto a just Law though contrary to his own judgment is not thereby guilty of sin The reason I conceive to be because no man is guilty of sin in doing of that which God expresly commands him to do Now it is Gods express command that Subjects obey their lawful Governors not onely for fear of wrath i. e. punishment but likewise for conscience sake i. e. that by their obedience they might avoid the guilt of sin Rom. 13.5 which obedience of Magistrates it is impertinent for any one to say he performs that refuseth to obey the just Laws of such as God hath plac'd in authority over him Some indeed have thought that there is a middle course to be taken in this case and that willingly to submit to the penalty of the Law is sufficient to discharge charge the conscience from all guilt of disobedience The reason of this assertion is because there is this rule in the Law Et si non potest infligi poena sine causâ potest tamen sine culpâ there may be no fault for which a punishment may be inflicted but there must be some cause This I acknowledge to be the judgement of some excellent Divines but withall it is to be observed that they confess it holds true only in that sort of Laws which the Canonists term Leges purè poenales Laws purely penal but it extends not unto Leges mixtae poenales Laws of a mixt nature But as those Laws which are purely penal are very few as appears by that Character of them which b Quoties per verba legis poenalis non declaratur sufficienter proprium praeceptum obligans ad actum vel omissionem ejus praesumendum est esse legem purè poenalem Suar. de Leg. l. 5. c. 4 n. 9. Suarez gives us so are they not such Laws of which we now treat for these are both moral and penal and in this case to undergo the punishment doth not discharge the Conscience from the guilt of sin the reason is because there is a double obligation in every such Law it binds

either to do or to omit some moral act and it binds likewise to undergo the punishment if that act be not done or omitted according to the appointment of Law For it is a true rule that omnis praeceptio obligat ad culpam every just command of our lawful Superior leaves a guilt upon the conscience of him that refuseth to obey Now this is an hard case you 'll say So hard indeed that I solemnly profess that it cannot sink into my understanding that our merciful God ever intended that men should be reduc'd into such horrible perplexities as this case imports for nulla est necessitas delinquendi quibus una est necessitas non delinquendi saith c De Coron Mil. c. 11. Tertullian and the case may be such that a man may not be able to suspend his action and then sin he must whether he do or not do as he is commanded However I shall not be peremptory and Magisterial in a point of such infinite importance as by the erroneous doctrines and imaginative practises of men the same is now become veris nitimur verisimilibus non contradicimus as the great Historian speaks Reliance I would have only on Truth but things so likely to be true as that first opinion is I shall not contradict If obedience unto Gods command be a good Warrant against all methinks it should be so against our selves and that upon these two or three considerations which I shall humbly offer unto all such Christians who as themselves complain that they have tender consciences so their brethren have not had cause given them to complain that they have had hard hearts 1. First I shall desire every such Christian to consider whether it seems not unreasonable to affirm That there is in the soul of man a power invested with a capacity of binding the Will from obedience of just Laws because the end of all Government is hereby wholly frustrated and taken away which is the preservation of peace virtue and love in the whole community whether of Church or State by an uniform obedience of the same Laws from the obligation whereof conscience is supposed to set all men equally free and thereby to become the great Palladium of Sedition Heresie Treason and what not whereof I wish there were no argument to be summon'd against the Gain-sayers from fresh experience of these evils 2. Secondly there must needs follow from thence an odium not only upon all such Laws as such men shall esteem unjust how just soever they be but also upon the very persons of Princes and of all inferior Magistrates that shall put such Laws in execution And what think you will become of that Prince if means and opportunity should offer themselves who shall be esteemed a Persecutor of his People for conscience sake 3. Lastly I shall leave it to the consideration of the learned whether the opinion of d In Pra●egom ad P. Soto Brentius viz. That the Magistrate hath power to bind the conscience in cases that concern Religion and yet that his subjects must not submit thereto without approbation of their own judgement whether this opinion I say doth not interfere and is of most dangerous consequence to the Peace and prosperity of Church and State which yet is that same opinion which hath taken by what means I know not too strong and deep rooting in the minds of many men otherwise good and virtuous persons For conclusion of this point Seeing therefore that 1. The Apostles themselves have defined matters in debate and controversie in the Church for prevention of Schism And 2. That National and General Councils have done the like as conceiving themselves duly impowered and obliged thereto 3. That it is necessary unto all Governments whatsoever to be furnish'd with all means that may preserve them from certain ruin and destruction 4. That things that concern humane Affairs are not under the Gospel in a condition inferior to that which they had under the Law 5. That the revival of this Law is not contrary to Scripture nor the Scripture an adequate rule for particular actions And lastly That liberty and conscience duly considered receive no prejudice by this Law of defining points under debate and thereby imposing an end unto controversies I conclude That this Judicial Law as to the directive part of it may be revived by Supreme Authority and in the Third and last place I humbly conceive it to be of force in this Government as a fundamental thereof and that for these two or three reasons which I shall mention in a word and so disburden your patience 1. First because the state of this Church and Commonwealth ought no more to want any of those means which are necessary to her preservation than any other Church of Commonwealth in the world and therefore God having declared that a power of defining matters in debate was necessary to the being and flourishing of his own Church and Kingdom amongst the Jews the Government of this Church and State cannot be reasonably thought to be divested of that power 2. Secondly because the Crown of this Realm is an Imperial Crown the same which Vulcatius Gallicanus calls e See Casaubon not in Vul● Gall. n. ●0 p. 199. Imperium justum which implies that as it is independent from any other but God alone So it cannot be conceived to want any thing that belongs to an absolute and independent Government and therefore is inseparable from such a power we speak of there being inherent in this Crown not onely a temporal but an Ecclesiastical Dominion such as our f At. 37. Church affirms to have been in the Kings of Judah and which was likewise in the Roman Emperors as appears by that title of Pontifex Maximus derived unto them together with the Empire and which was retain'd by Constantine and his successors untill g Z●sim l. 4. Gratian's time who first of all devested the Imperial Crown of that title and thereby opened a way for Maximus to bereave him of his life Let Princes think on that bloody but witty conceit of h Baron ad an Christ 383. Symmachus the Heathen Praetor of Rome and then consider what it is to part with Ecclesiastical Dominion Si Gratianus nolit esse Pontifex Maximus brevi erit Maximus Pontifex 3. My third and last reason is founded in equity because the subjects of this Realm have not onely an interest in making those Laws whereby they are govern'd but likewise a right to interpret those Laws when made if becoming doubtful by reason of some ambiguous clauses or expressions therein For although interpretatio Legum ordinariè Reverendos Judices Regnique sapientes spectat c. as saith Judge i I● Praesat ad lib. 4. Cook though the expounding of the Laws doth ordinarily belong to the Reverend Judges and Sages of this Realm yet in case of greatest difficulty and importance to the high Court of Parliament In which Court of